Sunday, September 14, 2008

Fannie And Freddie Bailout Designed To Save The US Dollar Standard System

``Over the past few years, the Agencies were central to the process that brought the emerging world’s savings to the US housing market. And governments were involved every step of the way. When the world’s central banks (and other big bond investors) decided that the implicit US government backing for the Agencies wasn’t enough, the US government had to make the backing explicit.”-Brad Setser, Council of Foreign Relations, So true …

 

It was a highly volatile market out there this week.

 

The initial salvo was wild cheering from global equity markets on the recent action by the US Treasury to take its Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE)-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- into “convervatorship” (quasi-nationalization). However, the festiveness quickly dissipated when the realities of “a weakening global economy”, the ramifications from the credit event of the F&F takeover on the Credit Default Swap Market and concerns over the persistent deterioration of US financial conditions as manifested by the lackluster capital raising quandary by Lehman Bros, which until recently, was the 4th largest investment bank in the US, sunk into the consciousness of global investors which resulted to a retreat from most of the earlier gains.

 

The conservatorship program includes the taking over of management control of Fannie and Freddie (F&F) by its regulator the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), where common and preferred stock would be diluted and not eliminated. The takeover now alters the corporate objective of the GSEs to “improving mortgage financing conditions” from “maximizing common shareholder returns”.

 

The program also includes capital injection into the GSEs by US Treasury and FHFA to maintain the positive net worth of these agencies in order to fulfill its financial obligations, where in exchange the US Treasury receives “senior” preferred equity shares and warrants aimed at securing solvency.

 

Aside, a new credit facility designed to secure liquidity concerns will be introduced to backstop F&F and Federal Home Loan Banks, and which is set to expire on December 2009. Lastly, a temporary program will also be put in place to acquire GSE Mortgages in order to secure market liquidity of mortgage securities also slated to expire on December of 2009.

 

For starters, Agency securities are one of the world’s most widely held securities by both private and the public sectors (Sovereign Wealth Funds and Central banks).

 

Morgan Stanley’s Stephen Jen has a great breakdown on these (highlight mine),

 

`` Total foreign holdings of long-term USD securities increased from US$7.8 trillion in 2006 to US$9.8 trillion in 2007, with US$1.3 trillion of this annual increase from increased foreign holdings of US long-term debt securities, including US Treasuries, agencies, agency ABS and corporate bonds.  Foreigners are dominant in some of these markets.  For example, some 57% of the marketable Treasury securities are held by foreign investors. 

 

``Foreign investors’ appetite for US agencies – both straight agency debt and agency-backed ABS (also called agency pass-throughs) – has risen sharply.  (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with two main activities.  First, they securitise mortgages by converting conforming mortgage loans into tradable mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  Second, they have an ‘investment portfolio’ business, whereby they issue AAA rated agency debt to finance the holding of MBS or other assets.  The latter is a ‘carry trade’, capitalising on the then-implicit government guarantee.  One key part of the policy discussion regarding F&F is whether their second activity is justified.)   Of close to US$7.5 trillion in outstanding US agency debt and agency-backed ABS, some US$1.54 trillion (according to Fed flow of funds data, June 2008) is held outside the US, with China, Japan and AXJ being the largest holders of these securities, with US$985 billion of this latter figure held by foreign central banks. (The share of total US long-term securities held by foreign investors has more than doubled since 1994 (from 7.9% of the US$16 trillion in securities back then to 18.8% of the US$49 trillion outstanding as of 2007).” 

 

We featured a chart on the composition of foreign holdings of the F&F in Inflation: Myths And Beneficiaries. Nonetheless, private ownership of Agency backed papers appears to have stagnated since 2005 while foreign public ownership has steadily increased as shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Northern Trust: Foreign Public-Private Exposure On F&F

 

In perspective, aside from foreign holdings GSE debt securities are likewise owned by US households and institutions or financial entities as commercial banks, savings banks, credit unions, pension funds, life insurance companies mutual funds, brokers, ABS issuers and REITs.

 

However, as % of total outstanding debt, in 2007 ownership of GSE debt in pecking order: foreigners comprise 19.92%, followed by commercial banks 13.87%, households 12.06%, mutual funds 7.67% and ABS 5.13% (Northern Trust).

 

So when US Secretary Paulson was asked of the US government’s takeover of F&F, his reply as quoted by the Washington Post,

 

``"The U.S. government had no choice," he said.

 

``Mr. Paulson, in an interview with CNBC on Monday, said foreign pressure was not the "major driver" of the takeover, but acknowledged that "there's no doubt that there's fragility in the capital markets."

 

``"These companies are so big, and they are owned by investors all around the world. You are obviously going to get concerns," Mr. Paulson said. "It was definitely concerning overseas, but there was concern in this country. I tell you, my phone is ringing the most from investors here." 

 

This means the US financial system have reached a near calamity. 

 

However many had been quick to lash at the “conservatorship” program as virtually a bailout of foreign owners of agency securities.

 

While this perception seems partly correct, I think most of these critics ignore the fact that these actions basically signify a remedial patchwork to the emerging cracks at the Fiat Paper Money “US Dollar” standard system. The massive current account imbalances a common feature in today’s world tends to amplify on the systemic flaws especially amidst today’s heightened volatility.

 

At present, countries with current account surpluses at one side of the ledger need to be offset by countries with current account deficits at the opposite side. As an example, deficits of the US have been more than sufficiently covered for by capital flows from mostly emerging markets paving way for the unorthodox pattern of “Poor countries Financing The Rich”.

 

Yes, while various politicians and experts from around the world have boisterously decried about “social inequality”, unknowing to most is that such inflationary “inequality” mechanism appears to be the imbedded on the US dollar standard platform. Think of it, while profits are privatized, losses are socialized! Wall Street’s politically connected gets rescued, while the masses pay for the mess created by the former. The failed F&F model was demonstrative of the Keynesian brand of capitalism and not of the laissez faire genre. (Please don’t associate the fiat paper money standard as epitomizing laissez faire or free markets too. Same with currency markets, interest rate markets or even oil markets! These markets are controlled heavily by governments notably on the supply side. As an aside, the “anarchy” in the Shadow Banking System wasn’t symptomatic of a free market mess, but one of going around banking regulations or taking advantage of “regulatory loopholes” in order to take on added leverage by assuming more risk to magnify returns by the establishment of off-balance sheet Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV). Going around loopholes do not signify free market paradigms).

 

Going back to the unorthodox pattern of “Poor countries Financing The Rich”, during the gold standard, current account imbalances had effectively been curtailed by the shifts in the gold reserves by nation states engaged in trade. This essentially accounted for as an automatic adjustment mechanism, which is absent today under the digitalized and unlimited printing capabilities of central banks to churn out money “from thin air”.

 

And as we noted above, current account imbalances today need to be offset. During the recent past, the nations with current account surpluses signified as subsidies to domestic export-oriented industries but came at the expense of domestic consumers, i.e. ChinaAsia and other emerging markets. On the other hand, current account deficit nations run subsidies on domestic consumers via expanding domestic debt (financed by current account surplus countries) at the expense of domestic production. From which the transmission mechanism had been mainly via currency pegs or dollar links.

 

The foreign buying of agency papers or US debts were meant to sustain mercantilists’ policies by frontloading currency and interest rate risks in order to keep the exchange rate undervalued and thus promote domestic export oriented industries in order to expand employment. Hence, the currency manipulation policies that led to the current account imbalances had primarily been meant as a tool to manage domestic political risks.

 

In other words, the US dollar standard system paved way for political imperatives over economic goals, see figure 3.


Figure 3: Asianbondsonline.com: China-US yield curve

 

What sense would it make for a current account surplus country as China to buy or load up on assets of a depreciating currency, thereby suffer from currency loss? What sense too for current account country as China to buy assets whose yield is less than what is offered domestically, thereby suffer from opportunity cost of low interest rate spreads (assuming holding bonds until maturity)? And this has been going on for years!

 

The same for deficit countries, domestic consumers had been financed to go into a debt driven asset buying binge which resulted to overleveraged driven massive speculation, again for political goal of sustaining finance driven economic booms, where the demand from domestic consumption boom has greased the industries of current account surplus countries as China and emerging countries.

 

The US dollar, functioning as the world’s de facto currency reserve currency, has fundamentally been used by the US government to freely load up on debt, given its special privilege to underwrite from its own currency, by selling almost unlimited financial claims to international investors to finance such speculative unsustainable booms.

 

And as the US real estate and financial boom has basically unraveled, all these seem to be in a transition.

 

Recently there had been some signs of reluctance of nations with current account surpluses to stack up into agency papers. Of course, the recent actions by the US Treasury may seem to have assuaged the concerns of repayment by buying more into US treasuries instead of agency papers.

 

So what can we see from all these?

 

One, current account surpluses nations or foreign central banks seem to have the tolerance bandwidth, given their accrued currency reserves, to suffer from the risks of currency and interest rate losses provided they get repaid for holding these securities until maturity. I guess the actions by the US treasury may have answered such “repayment” concerns.

 

Two, foreigners which have been formerly financing the US real estate securitization boom appears to be bailing out, if not help tacitly ‘nationalize’ the structurally beleaguered industries by buying into agency papers until recently.

 

It also reveals of the extent of overdependence or vulnerability of the US on relying on foreign financing. The risk seems such that if foreign central banks or state owned Sovereign Wealth Funds or affiliated institutions would deem to have accumulated more US dollar reserves than what they might think is required, and change their priorities by reducing finance exposure to the US, which can even lead to more volatility in the US. Political factors can also hold sway to the appetite of foreign financing of US deficits.

 

In addition, understanding its present predicament and limitations, the “capital short” US government seems to be working feverishly to attract or to intermediate for foreign capital participation into buying out its besieged financial institutions. Example, a syndicate led by UK’s 3rd largest bank, Barclay’s along with a “club rescue” team of “Temasek of Singapore and China Development Bank, was reportedly have shown willingness to back a deal that would put Barclays in the top tier of financial institutions.” (timesonline.co.uk)

 

Three, it’s all about the increasing integration of geopolitics or the decreasing hegemony of the US, as seen in the “Poor financing the Rich” aside from “Autocratic and non-democratic states financing democratic countries”!

 

Some Poor but Autocratic/non democratic nations that have been a beneficiary to the ongoing wealth transfer appear to have accumulated enough political clout as to weigh on the internal political policymaking of the US. 

 

Remember this quote from Yu Yongding, a former adviser to China's central bank quoted last in our Will King Dollar Reign Amidst Global Deflation? ``If the U.S. government allows Fannie and Freddie to fail and international investors are not compensated adequately, the consequences will be catastrophic, if it is not the end of the world, it is the end of the current international financial system.” The recent political actions employed by the US government appeared to underscore such circumstances and Mr. Yu’s prayers seems to have been answered.

 

Or how about Russia’s recent military offensive against Georgia (as discussed in Toynbee’s Generational War Cycle: In Mindanao or In Georgia/South Ossetia?) which has practically left the US as a political nonparticipant to a besieged ally?

 

This only goes to show how the US looks to be losing its imperial edge over the global geopolitical economy and how the US dollar standard system appears to be in greater jeopardy. 

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