Showing posts with label Japan debt crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan debt crisis. Show all posts

Monday, March 10, 2014

Japan’s Exports Plunge, Trade and Current Account Deficit Balloons

The popularly held mercantilist view is that weak currency equals strong exports.
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Well the above chart is just an awesome unmasking of the mercantilist myth.

Abenomics via the massive debasement of the yen has led, not to an increase in exports, but instead to a sharp decline. January exports retraced by about 15% (m-o-m). Japan’s exports have now reached pre-Abenomics level. Nonetheless Japan’s exports is still up about a measly 9.5% (y-o-y). After all the yen’s debasement, this has been what remains of export growth?

The steep drop in Japan’s exports seem to mirror China’s exports collapse in February. 

I’ve read some excuses by the mainstream bubble worshiping zealots alleging that China’s export drop has been cyclical and due to a supposed “overinvoicing”. But even if there have been some truth to this, none of this explains the degree or scale of the drop. Why 18% and not 5 or below 10%? Why the huge drop? 

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And of course if we look at Japan’s top trading partners, it looks like neighboring China has been instrumental in providing substantial external trade. 

Unfortunately, both countries have been playing with geopolitical fire, being engaged in a territorial squabble over some small islands called Senkaku.

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And the sharp contraction in Japan’s export growth can likewise be seen in Japan’s exports to China.

I am in doubt if such has been about geopolitics. 

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That’s because Japan’s export to Australia has also been shrinking.

And guess the common denominator between Japan and Australia? 

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Well the answer is China. China represents Australia’s largest trading partner, where Japan comes only second and the US third.

What does all the above suggest? They imply two things; one China appears to be meaningfully slowing down and second there has also been a significant downshift in the global economy

Going back to Japan. The substantial export decline has only exploded…

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…Japan’s trade deficits

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as well as her current account deficits

This means that Japan will need foreigners to plug on these or that she will have to draw down from her dwindling domestic savings (18.6% 2012 from 24.6% 2007) or expatriate her externally located capital (NIIP) or…

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…even borrow more to compound on her debt yoke. The above table from global finance reveals that Japan’s private and government debt load as of 2011 is at 512% (!!!) of GDP.

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And don’t forget the above deficits will add to the ballooning government deficits.


The above conditions looks like the present emerging market dilemma (weak currency, weak current and trade accounts). Nonetheless given Japan’s policy direction, they seem to be headed that way via a Black Swan event.

But don’t worry be happy. Japan’s stock markets will likely ignore this because bad news has really been good news. All these for Japan’s Wall Street means more easing from the BoJ in order to expand “Abenomics”. 

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Fodders for the Bond Vigilantes: US Debt Ceiling, Japanese Government’s Interest Payments

The following developments signify as fodder for the bond vigilantes

In the US, increased political pressure to increase the debt ceiling.

From the  New York Times;
Unless Congress raises the debt ceiling, the Treasury Department said on Monday that it expected to lose the ability to pay all of the government’s bills in mid-October.

That means a recalcitrant Congress will face two major budget deadlines only two weeks apart, since the stopgap “continuing resolution” that finances the federal government runs out at the end of September.

Members of Congress are sharply divided over what to include in measures financing the government and raising the debt ceiling…

The debt ceiling stands at about $16.7 trillion. Congress passed a measure increasing it by about $300 billion in January.
The insatiable US government will keep racking up on debts to finance her extravagant spending. Improving budget deficits today are only temporary.

In Japan, the ramifications of higher bond yields, the Japanese government requests an increase in  budget for servicing debt. From Reuters:
Japan's Finance Ministry will request a record 25.3 trillion yen ($257 billion) in debt-servicing costs under its fiscal 2014/15 budget, up 13.7 percent from the amount set aside for this year, a document obtained by Reuters showed on Tuesday.

The decision, aimed at guarding against any future rise in long-term interest rates, underscores the increasing cost Japan must pay to finance its massive public debt.

The country's debt is double the size of its $5 trillion economy and is the biggest among major industrialised nations.
Rising bond yields in the face of slowing global economic growth means higher costs of real funding. This entails higher credit risks which should be manifested in interest rates.

Saturday, August 10, 2013

Japan’s Ponzi Finance: Public Debt Tops Quadrillion Yen Mark!

To paraphrase a quote misattributed to the late US senator Everett Dirksen: A trillion here, a trillion there pretty soon we are talking about quadrillions! 

For Japan’s debt, quadrillion is now a reality

Japan’s central-government debt topped the quadrillion-yen mark for the first time ever in the second quarter, passing the unwelcome milestone just as a national debate heats up on whether the government should follow through with a controversial a plan to raise the sales tax.

The central government’s outstanding liabilities totaled ¥1.009 quadrillion ($10.44 trillion) at the end of June, up from Y991.601 trillion three months earlier. A Finance Ministry official said it’s the first time total debt has risen above ¥1 quadrillion since the yen became Japan’s official currency in 1871.

The figure is more than 200% of what Japan’s economy, the world’s third-largest, produces per year. That’s by far the highest debt load among industrialized economies.

Add some ¥200 trillion of outstanding long-term municipal debt and the ratio jumps to 250%.

The quadrillion-yen level may be memorable but it isn’t a game changer. It was expected because Japan’s government continues to borrow heavily, financing nearly half of its spending with borrowed money as it pushes off tough reforms.
Any entity that engages in borrowing money to finance previously borrowed money is known as a Ponzi borrower.

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According to the data from the Japanese government’s Ministry of Finance, 51% of the government’s revenues will come from tax, stamp and other revenues. The other 49% of the financing of the government’s expenditures will come from government bond issuance (red ellipse). 

So previous debts will be financed by issuance of new debt...thus today's accrued quadrillion yen milestone of debts.

Ponzi finance, according to Hyman P. Minsky in The Financial Instability Hypothesis, is when (bold mine)
the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common stock lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future incomes. A unit that Ponzi finances lowers the margin of safety that it offers the holders of its debts

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Of course all the seeming placid conditions will entirely depend on interest rates remaining at current levels and of the sustained confidence by creditors on Japan’s ability and willingness to pay. 

The above pie chart of JGB holdings, also from the MOF, is from the pre-Abenomics period. 

It shows that banks, life and non –life insurance, private and public pension as major creditors of Japan’s government. 

Recent developments reveal that banks, several insurance companies and foreigners have significantly pared their JGB holdings.

Meanwhile the ratio of JGBs held by retail investors has peaked in March of 2009 at 4.6% to about 2.5% in March 2013.

This leaves the Bank of Japan (BoJ) as the buyer and financier of last resort for the Japanese government. As the BoJ grabs a larger share of the JGB pie, the issue of confidence from the marketplace will decline, but...

Again Mr. Minsky on the inflationary dynamic of Ponzi financing:
if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values.
In other words, the BoJ would need to keep piling up on such “inflationary state” in order to maintain the current balance, otherwise, the entire house of card collapses. 

The BoJ is trapped with the consequences of her previous actions: stop monetary inflation and the ponzi scheme unravels-- or-- proceed with more monetary inflation, interest rates soar as the currency dives, the same ponzi dynamic collapses. 

Funny how government outlaws Ponzi schemers like Bernard Madoff, when they operate on virtually the same 'something for nothing' 'screw the public' dynamics as social policies.

Friday, June 14, 2013

JGB Watch: BoJ minutes reveals of concerns over a JGB storm

Back to my JGB-Japan debt crisis watch.

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Yields of JGBs across the maturity curve made substantial pullback today. This appears to have underpinned today’s oversold rally in the Japanese stock market.
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The Nikkei 225 and the Topix posted modest gains todays following yesterday’s harrowing crash

Both benchmarks were actually very much higher (more than 3%) during most of the session but both surrendered the bulk of their gains during the close. 

Again, even in the intraday sessions we see signs of “stable instability”.

The BoJ’s minutes came out today only to reveal of apprehensions within members of the institution of the risks of a panic in JGBs

Many Bank of Japan board members were concerned that highly volatile Japanese government bond prices may accelerate JGB selling, the minutes of the BOJ's May 21-22 policy meeting released Friday showed.

"The recent rise in long-term interest rates in Japan was attributable to such factors as the increase in U.S. and European long-term interest rates, the rise in Japanese stock prices, and the further depreciation of the yen," the minutes said.

"Many members pointed out that, if the bond market remained high volatility, this could increase the amount of interest rate risk incurred by banks and other financial institutions, thereby further boosting sales of JGBs."

The 10-year bond yield briefing rose to 1.000% on May 23, a day after the BOJ's nine-member board decided by a unanimous vote to leave the bank's new policy target unchanged, as widely expected, at its monthly meeting.
Well the anxiety of some of the BoJ officials have merit; Japan’s banks have reportedly been unloading or have been hedging against interest rate risks.

Some of Japan's biggest banks are cutting their exposure to Japanese government bonds, a sign of how the central bank's unprecedented easing efforts are starting to reshape the country's financial markets.

The country's second- and third-biggest lenders by assets both say they are cutting "interest-rate risk"--a measure of the impact that moves in rates have on their balance sheets—so that a rise in bond yields won't hurt them by pushing down the value of the trillions of yen in Japanese government bonds they hold.
Some have been taking on derivatives to insure against interest rate risks…
The banks say they aren't necessarily dumping bonds, a move that would reduce exposure but could roil the already volatile JGB market. Instead, at least one of the banks, Mizuho, told The Wall Street Journal it is using interest-rate hedges to cut exposure to interest-rate risk by as much as a third. Mizuho said it is keeping the size of its bond portfolio roughly unchanged at Y30 trillion.
…and the reduction of JGB in their portfolio also translates to diminished profits from bond trades.
Meanwhile, an expected rise in interest rates means bond prices have likely peaked, and the era of easy trading profits is over. Japan's four biggest banking groups shed some ¥10 trillion of JGBs in April, and by the end of that month had a combined total of around ¥96 trillion, BOJ figures show.
Bankers hardly seem optimistic on Abenomics which for them hasn’t been working and seems as unlikely to work…
Still, it is unlikely that loan demand will increase sharply any time soon, Japanese bankers say, since the country's economy has only recently begun to pick up and the government's plan to stimulate growth hasn't gotten off the ground.

When it does, bank executives say they aim to tap into industries the government is targeting, such as agriculture or health-care, as well as overseas infrastructure for financing. Until then, they say, even if they do move some of their trillions of yen out of bonds, much of it will likely go into central-bank deposits rather than into the economy
And Abenomics has been exacting tremendous toll particularly to domestic companies.

From another Bloomberg article
For some domestic manufacturers that face higher costs without the export benefit, the situation is worse than after the global slump that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008, said Tanaka at Uchida, which had 1.6 billion yen in sales last year.
The above is an example of how inflationism impedes on the coordinative functions of the price mechanism the economy.

As I pointed out last Sunday Japan’s merchandise trade constitutes only 28.59% of the GDP where exports account for 15.2%. 

This also means that a vast majority of the Japanese economy will be hampered by the PM Shinzo Abe's inflationism. 

Stable instability will likely remain as the dominant theme for Japan's financial markets which is likely to spillover to the world.

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

JGB Watch: BoJ Unfazed by Rising Yields?

Back to my JGB-Japan debt crisis watch.

Yields of 10 and 30 year Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) have been trading higher today.

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30 year GB yields has been climbing during the past 3 days.

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The same holds true for 10 year JGB yields.

Previously such levels would have sent Japan’s equity markets in a panic. But perhaps market participants may have become jaded to this. 

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The Nikkei closed today marginally lower despite a substantial rise in JGB yields.

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Or perhaps the markets have fallen into mainstream media’s magical spell. This article, for instance, suggests that current yield levels “tell you just why the central bank isn't panicking yet.

But as exhibited by the above chart, yields of the 10 year JGBs appear to be building an upside momentum (blue arrow), since the BoJ’s announcement of the program to double Japan’s monetary base in 2 years.

Importantly, real events point to higher yields/ interest rates.

From Reuters:
Japan's home buyers are rushing for fixed-rate mortgages to lock in on what they consider rock-bottom rates, in a sign of early victory for the central bank as it attempts to reflate the world's third-largest economy with a burst of monetary stimulus.

The bold monetary expansion which aims to achieve 2 percent inflation in less than two years has sparked a rise in bond yields and fanned worries among home owners that interest rates are set to rise sooner or later.

Fierce competition for banks is only likely to intensify at the expense of profit margins, analysts and bankers say, as mortgage lending is one of the few areas of growth amid prolonged weakness in corporate loan demand.

Taking advantage of historically low rates thanks to years of ultra-easy monetary policy, roughly nine out of 10 people in recent years took out floating-rate mortgages.
Notice the oxymoron?

The article says that this represents “a sign of early victory for the central bank as it attempts to reflate”. But this has “fanned worries among home owners that interest rates are set to rise sooner or later”. However, BoJ’s Kuroda confidently thinks that JGBs “will eventually regain stability

Essentially, perceptions and actions of Japanese home buyers in expectations of higher interest rates will challenge BoJ Kuroda’s expectations of JGBs regaining stability.

Unfortunately too, whatever statistical “domestic demand” economic gains that has buoyed Abenomics appear as being offset by sluggish business or capital spending.

From another Reuters article:
Japan's core machinery orders fell in April from the previous month, down for the first time in three months as companies remain hesitant to boost capital spending despite Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's sweeping stimulus policies.

Cabinet Office data showed core machinery orders, a highly volatile series regarded as a leading indicator of capital spending, fell 8.8 percent, compared with a 8.5 percent decline in a Reuters poll of analysts.
Policymakers and the mainstream fail to realize that inflationism skewers the coordinative functions of economic calculations. How would an investor or entrepreneur invest in an environment of unstable prices and where profitability is uncertain?  

Without capex growth, how will demand be funded, except by depleting on current savings and or by borrowing, all of which will prove to be temporary and unsustainable?

And considering the growing risks of a bank deposit haircuts, the likelihood is that Japanese savers will seek safety in overseas assets.

Again Abenomics has been pillared on a self-contradictory expectations of igniting inflation in an environment of “stable” interest rates. These forces are simply incompatible.

Given the upside breakout of US treasury yields and the recent collapse of EM risks assets (stocks, bonds and currencies), “not panicking” may transition into a “horror show”.

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

JGB Watch: 10 Year Yields Nears Critical Levels, ASEAN Stocks Smashed

Back to my JGB-Japan debt crisis watch.

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Yesterday’s fantastic one day 4.94% rebound by the Nikkei erased 3/4 of last week’s 6.51% losses.

Post mortem analysis by the mainstream holds that this has largely been attributed to “strong” 4.1% annual statistical growth—a growth ironically, where capital investments continue to fall.

Some have even attributed (post hoc) the substantial 2.59% bounce in the Phisix stocks to actions in Japan.

The reality is that as pointed out in last Sunday’s outlook, Japan’s stocks has been deeply oversold, and that the Japanese government has urged their public pension fund to support their stock markets. The Japanese government has been targeting assets principally the JGBs and secondarily stocks but hardly the currency, where the latter's actions have been coincidental with such interventions.

In addition, market participants heavily expected today that the BoJ will provide additional measures such as “extending the maximum duration of cheap, fixed-rate funds it offers via market operations to two years from the current one year” (Reuters)

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Unfortunately today the BoJ balked. The result? The Nikkei 225 fell by 1.45%.
From the CNBC:
Japan's benchmark Nikkei shed as much as 1.5 percent on Tuesday after the Bank of Japan (BOJ) disappointed investors by failing to address recent market volatility in its monetary policy statement.
The selling pressure extended to the JGBs.

Notes the Reuters:
Japanese government bond prices extended losses on Tuesday after the Bank of Japan left policy unchanged, refraining from announcing a new long-dated funding operation some investors had hoped.
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As of this writing JGB 10 year yields appear to be knocking on the .9% door (trading in between .87-.89%) which seemed to have served as the previous threshold indicative for the recent past dives seen in the Nikkei.

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And as of this writing too, the Nikkei futures have been drifting vastly lower such that if sustained, this will mean a gap down opening tomorrow. 

Current losses in the Nikkei future points to surrendering most of Monday’s gains.

Of course, current market spasms hasn’t been entirely about JGBs now. US Treasuries pierced their critical boundaries, which adding to Abenomics, has sent many emerging markets such as ASEAN majors to a tailspin. 

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Thailand’s SET dived by 4.97%

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Indonesia’s JCI slumped by 3.5%

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The Philippine Phisix crashed by 4.64% which essentially eviscerated in the entirety yesterday’s 2.59% bounce.

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Emerging market bonds such as South Africa, Turkey and Mexico have also been razed

Two of what I see as the three of the world's most critical bond markets have already convulsed. 

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Should the French 10 year bond yield surpass the critical levels (2.3%) interest rate, this will make a trifecta that would usher in the perfect storm.

One domestic analyst quoted by mainstream media said yesterday’s rally signified as “bargain hunting” amidst receding foreign selling.

“Bargain” means cheap, hence bargain hunting is a loaded word underpinning a bullish bias. Unfortunately, “bargain hunting” even became more of a bargain today. And if the current selloffs intensifies, bargain hunting will transpose into catching of falling knives.

As I pointed out last Sunday, foreign money represents the 800 lb gorilla: 
If foreign money turns sour on emerging markets including the Philippines, it seems wishful thinking to be bullish on the Phisix in the knowledge of the disproportionate or lopsided balance in favor of foreign investors (15-16%) vis-à-vis local participants (about 1%).
The erstwhile “value” investor Warren Buffett once said, never ask a barber if you need haircut. Such lesson should apply to so-called clueless mainstream experts who provides the confirmation bias to gullible participants, and where the latter end up losing money and blaming the industry.

Monday, June 10, 2013

Phisix Meltdown: A Reality Check on the Bullish Dogma

Life is not about self-satisfaction but the satisfaction of a sense of duty. It is all or nothing.--Nassim Nicolas Taleb

The Reality Check
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Except for the US, this week had been a gory one for global stock markets.

The Philippine benchmark the Phisix nosedived by 4.56%. Such loss was the second biggest in Asia, after Japan’s Nikkei. Except for Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Asian markets hemorrhaged.

In two weeks, the Phisix surrendered 7.96%. From the highest weekly close during May 17th at 7,279.87, year-to-date gains crumbled from 25.2%, nearly a month back, to just 15.3%. 

In almost a snap of finger, confidence evaporated. What seemed as the impregnable and infallible trade has been exposed, in just two weeks, as vulnerable and fragile.

Who would have thought that the conventional wisdom of the “rising star of Asia”, “no property bubble”, or “stunning growth” could produce such a bloody outcome?

What used to be mainstream heresy now represents as a reality check.

Just a few months back, mainstream experts pontificated that the Philippine stock markets have become more resilient from external events. They implied of “decoupling”. These experts cited many reasons such as the alleged low debt levels, huge foreign currency reserves or robust statistical economic growth among many others, mostly cherry picking of data sets.

In what seems as a turnaround, the same experts now attributes today’s market weakness to “global” factors. Such implied admission uncovers the myth of decoupling as consequence to the current meltdown.

Imagine today’s meltdown comes with no debt crisis yet. How much more if a debt crisis becomes a fact?

The susceptibility to exogenous dynamics is just one factor. The more important one is the massive buildup of internal imbalances as a result of quasi permanent boom monetary and fiscal policies. In short, domestic bubbles.

Should the onslaught of the global bond market vigilantes intensify, such imbalances will unravel. This would represent the “periphery-to-the-core” syndrome of the bubble cycle.

Yet most of mainstream experts appear to be in denial. They say that this episode is temporary, represents shopping for bargains and is tradeable.

They could be right. But if they are wrong, yield chasing could metastasize into concerns over return OF capital. Denials will morph into depression.

The context of “tradeablity” depends on two things: market timing, or in specific, the chance of catching a bottom and of the degree of rally.

These are factors nobody can predict with consistent accuracy. Not charts, not statistics. These will largely depend on lady luck.

If bull markets can have extended upside actions, panics extrapolate to a mirror image. This means that if markets continue to fall then what is seen as “bargain hunting” may mutate into “catching of falling knives”. 

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Two examples: Anyone who tried to bargain hunt the mining sector (left window) from the early part of this year would have been thoroughly bludgeoned.

On the other hand, in 2007 the initial selloff on the Phisix produced a tradeable bull trap: Those who bought during the August bottom and sold at the peak of October would have ideally profited from such ideal lady luck guided trade. But for those who bought into the late “false positive” rally, they would have all lost significant amount of money, unless they cut their position.

Let me be clear: For now, I am not saying that the bear market is here. What I am saying is that unless the upheavals in global bond markets stabilize, there is a huge risk of market shock that may push risk assets into bear markets.

Bottom line: Current markets seem as in crossroads; if political actions will be able to soothe the mercurial bond markets, then current conditions represents an interim bottom.

If not, or if the conditions of the bond markets deteriorates further, then the imminence of a bear market on risk assets.

This represents an “if, then” conditionality and not a linear based prediction.

The Return of Bond Vigilantes: “All These Trades Start To Fail Massively”

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The above chart represents the changing dynamics of the risk ON-risk OFF environment.

From 2009 until 2011 (chart is abbreviated from 2010), the risk ON landscape produced a synchronized bull market in every asset class (blue arrows), particularly, the bond market (UST-US 10 year treasury price), the US stock markets (as measured by the SPX or the S&P 500), gold-commodities (Gold) and emerging market equities (MSCI Emerging markets- MSEMF). In other words, the 2009-2011 bull markets exhibited convergence and tight correlations.

But such relationship began to diverge in mid-2011 (green arrows). Emerging markets took the initial hit; then this spread to the gold-commodities market and, now to the bond markets. 

This leaves the US equity markets as the only major asset class remaining on the upside as global stock markets have recently been slammed. [Amidst today’s selloffs are booming frontier markets]

US 10 year Treasury Prices appears to have topped exactly the same period last year and has been in a constant decline. Bond prices exhibit opposite relations to the yield[1]

The US Federal Reserve (FED) announced of the expanded unlimited QE 3.0 in September of 2012[2] the objective of which has been to “put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.”

Ironically, the FED’s QE program appears to be producing the opposite effect: an upward pressure on longer-term interest rates!

As of Friday’s close, US 10 year bonds are at critical support level or that yields are at crucial resistance level. A breakout of such thresholds will likely intensify the pace of the interest rate increases.

In contradiction to mainstream media’s post hoc narratives that the FED has been spooking the US Treasury markets, chart actions shows of a reverse causation: Rising interest rates have been compelling FED officials to make chatters about “tapering”. Or rising rates have prompted FED officials to realign their views with the market actions in order to maintain their so-called credibility.

The failed QE policies appear as being ventilated on the bond markets.

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The returns based Dow Jones Corporate Bonds Index[3] (DJCBP) has recently collapsed as yields have significantly risen. 

Even as the US stock markets have been performing strongly, REIT stocks (real estate investment trusts) represented by the Dow Jones US Mortgage REITs Index has also been plunging[4].

Meanwhile increasing rates has spilled over to the US housing seen via the Mortgage Backed Securities of government sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae[5] (FNMAM).

Media has been awash with the adverse ramifications of the rioting bond markets. High yields funds has posted the biggest record outflows[6], US credit default swaps rises to a two month high along with deepening losses from junk-bond exchange-traded funds[7] and carry trades endures from deepening losses.

This is noteworthy quote from the Economic Times[8] depicts of the aura of the current milieu
"Carry works as long as things don't change, and what really changed in our mind a few weeks ago was the message from the Fed," Rajiv Setia, the head of US rates research at Barclays in New York, said in a May 30 phone interview. "Once you start worrying about hikes, all these trades start to fail massively."

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An improvement in the growth outlook induces confidence and henceforth should reflect on improvements on credit standing and credit quality.

But as the chart above shows[9], rising yields and increasing prices of credit default swaps[10] (or insurance premium on debt) have been indicative instead of market concerns over credit quality, or simply put, growing default risks.

Crashing global stock and bond markets, aside from sluggish commodity markets amidst rising interest rates demonstrates that bearish forces has been at margins spreading and outflanking the bulls.

Such likewise suggest of monetary tightening which has been seen through increasing signs of liquidations and deleveraging mainly on the credit markets.
If unlimited QE 3.0 has been putting pressure on interest rates, more QE will likely add to such pressure, and less QE also compounds on the interest rate risks woes.

The FED’s QE, like Abenomics, seems in a trap, where they are in a “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” predicament.

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The very important difference between today’s bubble conditions from the US Lehman bubble days is that in the recent past, the bond markets specifically government bonds benefited from the bubble crash. Thus, governments from crisis stricken nations substantially channelled the rescue of financial institutions and of the political economy via the bond markets, thus the ballooning of government bonds[11] (upper window).

Today, the likely epicenter for a black swan event will be on government bonds first, and also on financial companies[12] exposed to government bonds as well as to asset bubbles. 

This also translates to increasing risks of a bond bubble crash or a debt crisis.
This also signifies as a backlash or the unintended consequences from previous government “bailout” policies.

These factors are hardly bullish for stocks.

As a side note, asset bubbles and statistical improvements in the US hardly suggest of a “goldilocks economy”[13], not too hot or not too cold economy which US media tries to sell.

Instead they signify as the “periphery-to-the-core dynamics” of bubble cycles and the Wile E. Coyote syndrome: inflating asset bubbles on increased leverage amidst rising interest rates—such lethal mix are ingredients for a financial “all these trades start to fail massively” accident.

Foreign Money: the PSE’s 800 Pound Gorilla

I read one so-called expert say that last week’s bloodbath had some signs of what is known as a “sudden stop”.

Sudden stops[14] which represent a slowdown or reversal of private capital flows into emerging market economies usually occur to nations suffering from large current account deficits. Sudden stops are in truth symptoms of the unwinding of internal emerging market bubbles.

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But this hasn’t been the reality with regards to the latest ASEAN selloff yet. While trade deficits have indeed been swelling, ASEAN’s current account balance[15] remains a surplus, albeit in a decline.

In today’s tightly connected global financial markets, contagions can occur even without a bubble bust. The Philippines Phisix suffered a collapse in 2007-8 even when the economy continued to post positive growth, and corporate earnings were just off the record highs[16]. In short, a parallel universe or a huge disconnect emerged between actions in the financial markets and real events.

Yet such developments are hardly accepted by the mainstream intelligentsia who continues to peddle unrealistic conventional methodologies to the unwitting and gullible public.

If bubbles in ASEAN’s real economy continue to inflate, which will get reflected on trade and current account balance, then eventually a “sudden stop” may become a reality.

Last week’s meltdown has basically been foreign driven. Emerging market bond markets and stock markets registered substantial outflows[17] and so with Asia ex-Japan Equity Funds, which according to Livemint[18], were triggered by a further dip in sentiment towards China.

The Philippine Stock Exchange posted a net weekly selling of Php 8.43 billion (US$ 200.65 million) the largest since October 2012.

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It is important to point out the biggest driver of the latest rally in the Philippine financial markets has been foreign money.

Foreign investors according to the BSP[19] were net buyers of P110.0 billion worth of stocks in 2012, more than double the P50.0 billion net purchases recorded in 2011.
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And foreign money has also underpinned the yield chasing rally of ASEAN’s local currency (LCY) denominated government bonds[20].

I found no updated data for the Philippines but I will apply deductive logic instead. Considering the general trend exhibiting significant increases of foreign money on our neighbors’ bond markets plus the recent credit upgrades, these factors should imply at least a similar pace of foreign money placements on Peso denominated bonds.

Yet if bond vigilantes continue to wreak havoc on the financial markets, then current inflows to bond and stock markets may reverse, as this week has shown.

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We understand that an estimated 83% of the market cap held by the politically privileged economic elites.

If foreign money turns sour on emerging markets including the Philippines, it seems wishful thinking to be bullish on the Phisix in the knowledge of the disproportionate or lopsided balance in favor of foreign investors (15-16%) vis-à-vis local participants (about 1%).

Should a significant number of foreigners head for the exit doors, similar to 2008 as shown in the previous BSP chart, such would be enough to push the Phisix into a deep bear market.

We cannot expect local investors to absorb the massive wave of foreign exodus for mainly the same reasons as the low penetration level of household (estimated at 21 out of 100) access to bank accounts, the informal system can hardly migrate to the formal system due to regulatory obstacles such as “Anti Money Laundering Act”, and of the inadequate understanding of finances.
Besides, even those with access to the banking system appear to be risk averse, they are most likely invested in government papers.

Sovereign papers (bills and bonds) accounts for 87% of the Php 4 trillion (US $99 billion) Philippine Peso bond markets, according to the ADB.

But again if bond vigilantes persist to unsettle financial markets, even these sovereign paper holders in the local banking system will endure losses.

And this also will apply to the government. The Philippine government has $40.3 billion of US treasury holdings as of March 2013 according US treasury[21]. This accounts for 42% of the BSP’s total assets[22] or about half 49.6% of the BSP’s Gross International Reserve, as of November 2012. A bear market in US treasuries would shrink the vaunted GIR, as well as, impose losses on the BSP.

It would take the resources of the entrenched families of economic elite to help cushion any decline.

Again this is an “if then” proposition.

The Myth of the Yen Targeting Redux

The mainstream has been fixated with the yen rather than the JGBs from which the Bank of Japan’s policies has been directed to.

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Some have come to mistakenly believe that the BoJ targets the yen. This is arrant nonsense. Look at the chart of Japan’s Nikkei and the USD-Yen exchange rate[23]. Do you think that the BoJ designed both the boom and the latest collapse of the Nikkei and the USD-yen?

Last Friday, the Nikkei has touched or encroached on the 20% threshold levels which demarcates of a bear market.

While I would say that previous boom of the Nikkei and the weakening of the yen has been a desired outcome by political authorities, they are coincidental. The ongoing reversal hardly represents a policy agenda.

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One of the supposed three arrows of Abenomics is the doubling of monetary base via the BoJ’s asset purchasing program. And since the announcement last April[24], the BoJ directly bought into JGBs (6.58%) and commercial papers (30.86%) and a scanty 1.33% of foreign currency assets as of May 31.

It is important to point out that JGBs account for 77.55% of BoJ’s balance sheets, while commercial paper and foreign currency assets represent 1% and 2.76% share respectively. So a 6.58% increase is substantial for 77% of BoJ’s assets.

Notice that the JGBs have traded rangebound from a high of nearly 1% to a low of .8% (left window).

The BoJ appears to have set an implicit target at .9% and thus the range which comes at the cost of a boom-bust cycle.

Since the announcement of the boldest experiment in modern central banking history, the BoJ’s JGB purchases allowed JGB sellers to use the proceeds to bid up on the asset markets. Along with the explicit inflation target of 2% which provided a boost to inflation expectations, direct interventions increased the monetary base from which the yen responded with a corollary sharp selloff.

The Nikkei and yen became tightly correlated arising from the feedback loop from such dynamics. Unfortunately the Nikkei punters came to realize that this was not sustainable. Ben Bernanke’s tapering talk provided the trigger for the tipping point.

Since, the yen has firmed along with a collapsing Nikkei.

Again boom bust cycles have not been the desired outcome but represents as the unintended consequence from aggressive inflationist policies.

Common sense or basic logic tells us that given the immense interest rate sensitivity from the gargantuan nearly ¥ 1 quadrillion of JGBs the BoJ will prioritize targeting JGBs rather than the yen.

Japan has nearly 250% debt to gdp, and as I pointed out last week[25],
The Japanese government’s tax revenues have been estimated by the Ministry of Finance at ¥ 43.1 trillion for 2013. National debt service accounts for ¥ 22.241 trillion which accounts for 24% of the general account budget or 51.4% of tax and stamp revenues. This may have been computed using perhaps less than 1%, if based on the yields of 10 year bonds. Thus a spike of interest rates to 2% will most likely wipe out the Japanese government’s ability and capacity to pay her obligations.
In targeting the yen, this would risks setting loose the bond vigilantes that would devastate on the JGB markets and bring about immediately a debt crisis.

Yen targeting will be like Godzilla running amuck and razing Tokyo.

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Why would the Japanese government target the yen when merchandise trade as % gdp[26] accounts for only 28.59% (left window) in 2011 while exports constitutes[27] just 15.2% of gdp (right window) over the same period?

Such notion that the government will risk a debt crisis in order to pump up exports reeks of rank foolishness and is devoid of common sense.

Nonetheless crashing Japanese stock market has prompted Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe to use political suasion to convince their largest public pension fund, Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), to invest in risk assets as I recently noted. The GPIF has announced that they will comply by selling a fraction of JGBs and shifting 1% to domestic stocks and 3% a piece to foreign stocks and bonds. This announcement lifted the Nikkei from bear market territory to close with marginal losses.

Such a shift may provide a temporary boost or relief to Japan’s oversold stock markets and some of the world’s stock and bond markets which the GPIF will acquire.

But then consequences over the clashing goals of stoking price inflation and of low interest rates remains as the proverbial sword of Damocles which hangs over the head of Japan’s financial markets, and of the potential contagion risks particularly to Asia.

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While JGBs appears to have stabilized at the costs of a volatility surge in the Nikkei and the yen, Japan’s credit default swap has been revealing of increasing stress via rising credit default swaps[28]. The Japanese government appears to be fighting the mythical hydra, where cutting of one of the monster’s many head would grow two more.

Finally the huge rally in Wall Street will likely provide a relief rally in the Nikkei and from the battered world markets. However, rising US markets and falling bond markets will eventually prove incompatible.

The Nikkei is expected to open strong as Nikkei futures suggest of a ‘gap up’ gain of 2.5%. Yet given the fantastic intraday swings during the past week, the question is will this hold?

Inflationistas are hoping that George Soros’ repositioning on Japan’s stock markets[29] would provide support to their cause.

In my view, if interest rates as expressed via the bond markets continue to rise across the world, any relief rally would be short-lived.

Everything now seems to depend on whether bond vigilantes will remain on a blitzkrieg or will be contained by forthcoming political actions.

Since we are at crossroads, where risks are extraordinarily high, do trade with extreme caution.



[2] CNN Money Federal Reserve launches QE3 September 13, 2012

[3] S&P Dow Jones Indices Dow Jones Equal Weight U.S. Issued Corporate Bond Index The Dow Jones Equal Weight U.S. Issued Corporate Bond Index is an equally weighted basket of 96 recently issued investment-grade corporate bonds with laddered maturities. The index intends to measure the return of readily tradable, high-grade U.S. corporate bonds. It is priced daily.

[4] S&P Dow Jones Indices Dow Jones U.S. Mortgage REITs Index The proprietary classification system described at www.djindexes.com defines the Mortgage REITs Subsector as real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property trusts (LPTs) that are directly involved in lending money to real estate owner

[5] Wikipedia.org Fannie Mae






[11] BBC News Is UK government debt really that high? December 22, 2009

[12] Branimir Gruić Philip Wooldridge Enhancements to the BIS debt securities statistics Bank of International Settlements December 2012

[13] Investopedia.com Goldilocks Economy

[14] Wikipedia.org Sudden Stop





[19] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 2012 Annual Report



[22] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Economic and Financial Statistics

[23] Danske Bank Europe delivers the good news Weekly Focus, June 7, 2013



[26] World Bank Merchandise trade as % of gdp Google public data


[28] Tokyo Stock Exchange Credit Risk (CDS Indices)