Showing posts with label Singapore. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Singapore. Show all posts

Thursday, April 14, 2016

Singapore’s Central Bank Panics Again, Embraces 2008 Policy as Offshore Yuan Falls

Stock markets have been soaring right? So some have been panic buying even as central banks go on panic mode (as shown by the assimilation of negative rates). 

This Bloomberg’s headline illustrates on the prevailing ambiance: “Singapore Adopts 2008 Crisis Policy as Growth Grinds to Halt”
Singapore’s central bank unexpectedly eased its monetary stance, moving to a policy last adopted during the 2008 global financial crisis, as economic growth in the trade-dependent city-state ground to a halt. The Monetary Authority of Singapore moved to a neutral policy of zero percent appreciation in the local dollar, it said in a statement on Thursday. 

The currency slid the most in five months after the announcement, which came as a surprise to 12 of 18 economists surveyed by Bloomberg, who had seen no change in policy. “The Singapore economy is projected to expand at a more modest pace in 2016 than envisaged in the October policy review,” the central bank said. “Core inflation should also pick up more gradually over the course of 2016 than previously anticipated.” 

As Asia’s financial hub, Singapore is feeling the effects of the global downturn and China’s weakening economy. More businesses were shut than opened in December and February, while bank loans have dropped every month since October, the longest period of declines since 2000. 
Singapore's central bank, the MAS, has been panicking over their credit bubble. The MAS mass warned of a credit bubble in November 2014. Credit risk concerns prompted them to ease in January 2015. Singapore's banks had lately been downgraded by Moodys

Yet a significant downturn in housing prices has already spread to the economy. And this has become a serious headwind. (bold added)


Growth was stagnant in the first quarter, with gross domestic product posting zero expansion on an annualized basis compared with the fourth quarter, the trade ministry said in a separate report Thursday. That was in line with the median forecast of 12 economists surveyed by Bloomberg… 

The last time the MAS shifted its currency policy to zero appreciation was in October 2008, when the economy was in a recession. Thursday’s move was the bank’s second unexpected decision in less than 16 months, following an emergency policy change in January last year to combat the threat of deflation. The International Monetary Fund warned on Tuesday that a prolonged period of slow global growth has left the world economy more exposed to negative shocks. The fund is predicting 1.8 percent expansion for Singapore for this year, compared with the government’s projection of 1 percent to 3 percent. 

The services industry, which makes up about two-thirds of the economy, contracted an annualized 3.8 percent in the first quarter from the previous three months, the first decline since the first quarter of 2015. Manufacturing and construction rebounded strongly in the quarter, expanding 18.2 percent and 10.2 percent respectively. 


Singapore's slowing economy reduces her citizens' capacity to service their high debt exposure, which raises the risks of default. So the MAS responded to such dilemma by easing. 

Yet seen from last year's policy accommodation, bank loans continued to shrivel. This reveals of the nation's balance sheet problems and the impotence of monetarism. You can lead the horse to the water, but you can't make it drink.
 

But no problem. "This time is different"! That's because Singapore's slowing economy has translated to a surge in equity prices. 

Singapore's major bellwether, the STI, was still down by 2.58% as of last Friday. Apparently such deficit was erased from yesterday's 2.69% surge

Nonetheless, the MAS' announcement has prompted the Singapore dollar to fall sharply or the USD SGD to rip.

Curiously, the MAS easing has coincided with the surge in the USD-offshore yuan CNH. Has the MAS responded to the PBoC's action?

Will the prediction of Swiss investor Felix Zuluaf be proven accurate--where Singapore will account for as the epicenter of the region's banking crisis?


Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Singapore’s Central Bank Panics! Goes on an Easing Mode

Last November, Singapore’s central bank the Monetary Authority of Singapore, raised alarm bells by citing the financial system's record levels of corporate debt to gdp, aside from household debt to income ratio.

In the second week of this year, mainstream media has raised anew concerns over cracks in the city state’s debt financed housing bubble expressed in terms of declining property prices in the light of still ballooning debt, rising rates, falling currency, signs of capital flight and growing incidences of loan defaults.

Well I guess all these has led to today’s ‘emergency’ action.

From Bloomberg: (bold mine)
Singapore unexpectedly eased monetary policy, sending the currency to the weakest since 2010 against the U.S. dollar as the country joined global central banks in shoring up growth amid dwindling inflation.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore, which uses the exchange rate as its main policy tool, said in an unscheduled statement Wednesday it will seek a slower pace of appreciation against a basket of currencies. It cut the inflation forecast for 2015, predicting prices may fall as much as 0.5 percent.

The move was the first emergency policy change since one following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks for the MAS -- which only has two scheduled policy announcements a year -- reflecting how the plunge in oil has changed the outlook in recent months. Singapore becomes at least the ninth nation to ease policy this month, as officials from Europe to Canada and India contend with escalating disinflation and faltering global growth…

The European Central Bank announced quantitative easing plans this month while Canada, Denmark and India cut interest rates. More may come -- the Bank of Japan chief said the country may need to get creative in any further monetary stimulus and Thai policy makers face growing pressure to lower borrowing costs.
In view of the previous events, in Singapore’s case, the MAS’ emergency action today has hardly been about “shoring up growth amid dwindling inflation” but rather about the mitigation of the growing burden of debt to an increasingly debt constrained society.

But of course, while easing may lower rates, which temporarily may alleviate the debt onus, easing also allows levered companies heavily dependent on debt to rollover debt. In short, monetary easing entails solving debt problem through MORE debt buildup.

Thus the MAS’ actions have been intended to buy time from a painful reckoning from previous speculative excesses financed by debt. But the kick-the-can-down-the-road policies simply means accretion of more imbalances.

image

The USD-Singapore dollar currently trades at 2010 highs. Yet Singapore’s stock market as measured by the STI nears record highs (stockcharts.com).


image

Perhaps debt constrained entities have pumping up stocks (by using leverage too?) in order to generate a bandwagon effect. And because rising stocks may bring about trading profits, cash flows from speculative stock punts may allow debt constrained entities to rollover existing debt.

So Singapore’s bubble dynamics spreads from property to the stock market.

And once again we seem to be seeing a divergence between the real economy (increased signs of economic stress)-monetary policies (panicking central bank) and the stock market: Singapore edition

Finally, the article notes that 9 nations have undertaken easing measures. If everything has been salutary as manifested by record stocks, and as what media has been saying, then why the need to ease?

Or has these been symptoms of the inability to wean away from overdependence on debt?


Monday, January 12, 2015

Cracks in Singapore’s Credit and Housing Bubble?

Interestingly, mainstream media seems worried over signs of Singapore’s deflating housing markets.

Last year I posted here that Singapore’s central bank the Monetary Authority of Singapore warned of a domestic debt bubble.

Apparently the diffusing property slowdown appears to be raising anxiety over potential escalation of credit risks

From Yahoo.com (bold mine)
Local rates have already started ticking up. Sibor, or the Singapore interbank offered rate, used as the basis for setting mortgage and other loans, climbed around 15 basis points in early January, to its highest since April 2010 after years of stability, Maybank (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange: MBBM-MY)-Kim Eng noted in a report this week.

The bank estimates a one percentage-point rise in Sibor increases monthly mortgage payments by 12 percent, under certain conditions. It expects Sibor will rise to 1.0 percent by the end of this year and 2.0 percent by the end of 2016, compared with 0.46 percent at end-2014.

While the rate is still relatively low -- the three-month Singapore-dollar Sibor was at 0.639 percent Thursday -- analysts expect it could continue to push higher. They lay the rise at the feet of U.S. dollar strength against the Singapore dollar (Exchange:SGD=) spurring fund outflows from the city-state, a situation unlikely to reverse anytime soon. Once the U.S. Federal Reserve begins a rate hike cycle, Sibor is likely to push even higher, they said…

Whether most households can handle a big bump in mortgage payments will be a key policy test. Singapore's central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), introduced a total debt servicing ratio (TDSR) in mid-2013 to help contain property prices and limit how much debt households could take on.
Here is the USD-SGD
image

The USD-Singapore trades at 2010 highs

Yet the debt numbers:
Consumers' debt is still growing, rising 5.6 percent on-year in the third quarter, although that's down from an average 9.2 percent over the past five years, the MAS said.

Housing loans accounted for around 74 percent of household liabilities in 2014's third quarter, the data show.
More signs of the emergence of deflation…
Despite a lot of handwringing forecasts for property price declines of as much as 20 percent, official data show private residential prices fell just 4 percent in 2014, although the number of transactions fell around 50 percent in the year-to-November. But analysts generally expect property price declines to continue this year.

Other cracks have begun to show in the property market, such as indications some buyers may have found ways to skirt the TDSR to get approval for larger mortgages. This week, local bank UOB(Singapore Exchange: UOBH-SG) filed a 181 million Singapore dollar (around $136 million) lawsuit against a unit of Indonesian company Lippo Group and some individuals, claiming a conspiracy to obtain inflated mortgages for 38 units at a luxury development on tony Sentosa island. All but one of those 38 loans have defaulted. Lippo has reportedly denied involvement in a conspiracy…

However, lower property prices will limit financially troubled households' ability to sell their homes as a means of exiting debt.

Another worry is the around 3 percent of credit card holders with unsecured debt greater than their annual incomes, although the MAS plans policies this year to prevent these people from getting further credit.
After the credit fueled boom, the legacy will always be the problem of debt, debt and debt…

This reports says Singapore’s banks are vulnerable to a housing deflation. From Nikkei Asia (bold mine) 
The slow-down in Singapore's property market has reduced high-end condominium prices and raised concerns that major local banks could be vulnerable to a surge in non-performing housing loans.

According to Singapore's Urban Redevelopment Authority, the price of private residential properties dropped 4% in 2014. Maybank Kim Eng notes that loan defaults have concentrated mostly among luxury homes which are more popular with foreign investors, particularly those located near Orchard Road, Singapore's retail hub, and Sentosa Island, a vacation destination with sandy beaches and resort hotels.

Among the three largest Singaporean banks, United Overseas Bank (UOB) is the most exposed on Sentosa. The report indicated UOB's non-performing housing loan volume has risen 61.4% since the end of 2013…
Other vulnerable banks…
Despite this case, Maybank Kim Eng concluded that among the three largest Singaporean banks, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC) is most at risk in the event of a meltdown in the housing market, followed by UOB. DBS Group is least at risk.

Although OCBC's exposure to the luxury properties most favoured by foreigners is lower, the bank lent more heavily overall to property buyers than its competitors from mid 2009 to 2012 when prices in Singapore were breaking records and "speculation was high."
Here are several questions: what happens when Singapore’s housing and debt deflation intensifies? Will Singapore’s problems be isolated to the property sector and to the city state? Will there be no contagion via trade and financial linkages with the region or the world?

How about Singapore’s stocks? Will housing-debt deflation be vented on stocks?
image
So far Singapore’s stocks appear to be ignoring such risks.   

Tuesday, February 04, 2014

Asian Risk OFF Day: Japan's Nikkei Dives 4.2%, Singapore’s STI Breaks Support, Yields of Indonesian Bonds Soar

What an astounding risk OFF day. 

The 2+% plunge in US stocks last night hit some Asian markets right smack on the chin.

image

Japan’s Nikkei 225 plummeted a whopping 4.2% today!

image

The Nikkei 225’s ongoing meltdown (top  window) which ironically commenced during the New Year, has been tightly correlated with the sharply rallying Japanese Yen vis-à-vis the US dollar.

image

And it has not just been the Nikkei, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index likewise got drubbed by 2.89%. 

Given that China’s financial markets remain closed due to the week long New Year festivities, has the Hang Seng’s decline been an indicator to the sentiment of the Chinese financial markets once they open? 

image

The Philippine Phisix also tumbled by 2.15% on heavy foreign selling (technistock.net)

image

Singapore’s stock market benchmark’s decline, as measured by the Strait Times Index (STI), hasn’t been as deep as those above… 

image

...but today’s action highlights the confirmation of yesterday’s breakdown from key support levels (see above). 

Although the STI is still about 5.9% away from a technical bear market.

image

And in addition, the weakening STI goes along with a sluggish Singapore Dollar which seems also nearing a breakdown from support levels. 

Singapore’s bond markets seem also in distress. Yields of 10 year Singapore SGD denominated treasuries while down by about 12 bps from the recent highs has still been about 100 bps from the 2013 lows.

Could it be that the strains in Singapore’s financial markets have been  symptoms of her significant exposure on ASEAN economies, with emphasize on Indonesia, as previously discussed?

image

And speaking of Risk off and Indonesia, yields of the latter’s 10 year rupiah bonds soared today; currently priced at 9.13% (as of this writing) which backed off from a high of 9.27%. Nonetheless current yield stands at the 2011 levels.

Although the Indonesia’s equity bellwether the JCI which is still trading as of this writing has been down by less than 1%.

All this brings us back to the issue of foreign currency exchange reserves.

The mainstream assures us with confidence that forex reserves should shield markets or economies from such events.

Yet none of this panacea appears to be working. That’s because there seems hardly any correlation between stock market/economy and forex reserves.

image

Just look, Japan has $1.25 trillion in forex reserves. The Japanese government continued to amass forex reserves through her own bubble bust in 1990, the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007-8 Global Crisis. 

As a side note: Japan’s reserve accumulation may have peaked given the recent record streak of balance of trade deficits as well as record budget deficits.

image

Meanwhile, despite the current financial tremors, Singapore’s government continues to pileup on Forex reserves which is now at almost $350 billion (about 3x the Philippines). 

Yet with all these accumulation, Singapore has not been immune from the Asian Crisis, US dot.com bust or from 2008 Global Crisis in terms of…

image

the stock market via the STI… where the STI fell dramatically into bear markets during the above stated episodes

image

...and or even as exhibited in the statistical economy which reveals of recessions during the above events.

Meanwhile Hong Kong has $311 billion of forex reserves.

image

And by the way, Indonesia’s government had record forex exchange reserves during the 2008 global crisis and continued to accumulate until the peak in 2011

In spite of all the evidences, the Panglossian consensus continue to holler in unison “forex reserves!”, “forex reserves!”, “forex reserves!”

Has this rabid denial been because "a pleasant illusion is better than a harsh reality?" (quote from Christian Nevell Bovee)

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

China’s Property Bubbles Intensifies

So the ‘silent stimulus’ recently implemented by the Chinese government (including the hiding, editing censoring of statistics) aimed at attaining statistical growth goals has only been further inflating property bubbles. 

China’s credit fueled property bubbles may have entered a blowoff phase, notes the Bloomberg:
Home prices in China’s four major cities rose the most since January 2011 last month, raising concerns that a lack of new property curbs is allowing a bubble to form.

New home prices climbed in 69 of the 70 cities the government tracked in September from a year earlier, led by 20 percent increases in the southern business hubs of Shenzhen and Guangzhou, the National Bureau of Statistics said in a statement today. Prices in Beijing rose 16 percent and advanced 17 percent in Shanghai, the biggest gains since the government changed its methodology for the home data in 2011.

Premier Li Keqiang has come up with no additional measures to rein in property prices since his predecessor Wen Jiabao stepped up a three-year campaign in March to cool the housing market, ordering the central bank to raise down-payment requirements for second mortgages in cities with excessive cost gains. Some Chinese cities are facing increasing pressure to meet annual home-price targets they set earlier this year and to cap gains at the growth rate of local disposable incomes.
Bubbles are a function of inflationism, and in China’s case, compounded by financial repression, viz keeping capital markets underdeveloped or limiting options for the citizenry to invest their savings in order for the government to tacitly capture them.

Previous property curbs has failed and will continue to fail because of the political incentives driving China’s politics.

Political careers of local government officials have been mainly dependent on the goals set by the national government. Thus, for local government to meet such statistical ‘growth’ targets, they resort to circumventing these regulatory hurdles by using local government financing units (LGFU) through the private sector, who partly bankroll these property projects via the shadow banking industry.The national government has accused many local governments of statistical manipulation. Yet if the LGUs indulge in them why not the national government?

Add to these the barrage of stimulus employed unannounced by the national government.

More signs of credit expansion fueling China’s bubbles, from the same article…
Domestic loans to developers jumped 50 percent last month from a year earlier, according to Shanghai-based advisory firm CEBM Group, which calculated government data.

A residential land parcel in Beijing sold at a record price 73,000 yuan ($11,980) per square meter (10.76 square feet) on Sept. 4, according to Centaline Property Agency Ltd. Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. (16), Hong Kong’s biggest developer by market value, bought a site in Shanghai for 21.8 billion yuan in an auction the next day, a record price in that city, Centaline said.

“Developers have been able to access cheaper liquidity, which financed their land acquisitions,” ANZ’s Liu said. “Homebuyers dashed into the market fearing that home prices will rise further given the high land prices.”

For the fifth month in a row, the eastern city of Wenzhou was the only one to post a decline, with prices dropping 1.7 percent from last year.

Existing home prices rose 18 percent in Beijing last month from a year earlier, leading the gains, followed by a 14 percent increase in Shenzhen and 12 percent in Shanghai, according to the data.
The Chinese government recently surpassed their statistical objective growth threshold of 7.5% with a 7.8% 'growth' for the third quarter. 

Curiously the pace of growth in the broad sector has been nearly ‘identical’ to their reference points.

This from another Bloomberg article 
Gross domestic product rose 7.8 percent in the July-September period from a year earlier, the National Bureau of Statistics said today in Beijing, matching the median estimate in a Bloomberg News survey. Industrial production advanced in September by 10.2 percent, in line with projections, while retail sales gained 13.3 percent…

Industrial output growth compared with August’s 10.4 percent.Retail sales compared with a median estimate of 13.5 percent expansion and 13.4 percent in August.

Fixed-asset investment excluding rural households, a key force behind growth, grew 20.2 percent in the first nine months of the year, compared with the median estimate of 20.3 percent from analysts and a 20.3 percent pace in the January-August period
Let see: Industrial output 10.2 vis-à-vis 10.4. Retail 13.5 relative to 13.4. Fixed asset 20.2 against 20.2. Given the booming and highly volatile property sector, in my view, I’d smell something fishy with the seemingly placid numbers which assumes that general economy has been growing at steady pace.

image

Yet more credit inspired statistical economic growth from Financial Times
A surge in lending by banks and other financial institutions at the start of this year is one of the main explanations for the upturn in Chinese growth. Total social financing – China’s widest measure of credit – rose 52 per cent year-on-year in the first five months of 2013, an astonishingly fast pace.
So whether in the US, Japan, Europe or China or elsewhere, governments have been pushing debts to their critical limits in order to attain temporal statistical growth. 

Along with the momentum or yield chasing inspired private sector, governments have been funneling resources into speculative-capital consuming activities.

Yet every action has a consequence. Spurious or artificial growth financed by unsustainable will eventually face a day of reckoning. The $64 gazillion question is: when?

And another thing… as China’s bubbles intensify, Hong Kong and Singapore’s luxury rental market has shown signs of a slowdown: are these signs of a reprieve before the next leg up or are these initial signs of a coming reversal?

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Quote of the Day: Singapore’s Healthcare System

No, Singapore does not have a free market for health care. What it does have is an alternative to the European/American welfare state, in which private saving and private insurance do what employers and governments do in other countries. The Singapore philosophy is:

-Each generation should pay its own way.
-Each family should pay its own way.
-Each individual should pay his own way.

Only after passing through these three filters, should anyone turn to the government for help.

If the United States adopted a similar approach to public policy, there would be no deficit problem in this country.

How the system works. In Singapore, people are required to save for health care, retirement income, and other needs. They can use their forced saving to purchase a home, pay education expenses, and purchase life insurance and disability insurance. For individuals up to age 50, the required saving rate is 36% of income (nominally divided: 20% from the employee and 16% from the employer). Of this amount, 7 percentage points is for health care and is deposited in a separate Medisave account. Individuals are also automatically enrolled in catastrophic health insurance with a deductible of about US $1,172, although they can opt out. When a Medisave account balance reaches about US $34,100 (an amount equal to a little less than half of the median family income) any excess funds are rolled over into another account and may be used for non-health care purposes.
(bold original)

This is from healthcare expert John Goodman senior fellow at the Independent Institute Blog

Monday, September 02, 2013

Phisix: Has ASEAN Bear Markets Been Signaling a Crisis?

Given the relentless growth in credit exactly to the same sectors during the two months of April-May, statistical GDP growth will likely remain ‘solid’ and will likely fall in the expectations of the mainstream. The results are likely to be announced in August.
This was my prediction on the 2nd quarter Philippine economic statistical growth[1] that had been released last week. Such news was cheered upon and interpreted as signs of relief by a confirmation bias starved public from the ongoing market pressures

The Secret of ‘Resilient’ 2nd quarter Philippine Economic Growth
clip_image001

The Philippine government’s National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) hails the current growth streak[2] as the “second quarter growth is the fourth consecutive GDP growth of more than 7.0 percent under the Aquino Administration” implying for a politically induced growth nirvana.

But where did the growth come from?

The services sector which grew by 7.4%, remained as the “main driver” of the Philippine economy and had been “supported by the 10.3 percent and 17.4 percent growth of  manufacturing and construction, respectively boosting the Industry sector to grow by 10.3 percent” according to the NSCB.

clip_image002

From the industry side (left window), the so-called ‘resilient’ growth in the services sector comes from financial intermediation (stock and bond market speculation?) and real estate, renting and business activity (real estate speculation?).

From the expenditure side (right window), the source of “resiliency” growth is from construction (20.4%) and government spending (21.4%).

So we have bubbles and prospective higher taxes or inflation as models for a boom.

clip_image003

Yet here is the secret recipe or ingredient behind the fourth successive quarter of vigorous statistical growth…a surge in real estate related bank loans (year on year basis) as well as financial intermediation loans as per Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas data[3].

Soaring banking loan growth has translated to a spending and supply side boom, which has been reflected on money supply growth and deposit growth in the banking system.

Notice, y-o-y construction loan growth has hovered in the 50% area for the past 6 months. Real estate loan growth has peaked in January and has been on a decline but remains above the 20% growth level.

Yet household final demand or household final consumption expenditure grew by only 7.8% during the 2nd quarter, whereas construction has grown by 20.4%, so who will buy those excess real estate units?

This only means that a reduction of the growth rate of banking loans on these ‘bubble’ sectors will effectively diminish the rate of statistical growth and expose on the system’s dependence to, and fragility from, a credit fuelled statistical growth.

The recent resilient economic picture has already shown some indications of incipient cracks.

Since the first bear market attack on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) last June, growth in the financial intermediation sector shrivelled to only 1.45% which I pointed out earlier[4]. Fortunately enough, the banking loan growth conditions of April and May has been significant enough to neutralize the substantial rate of slowdown, thus 2nd quarter’s “resilient” growth.

But if June’s financial intermediation sector conditions will become a trend, and if June’s financial intermediation sector conditions will serve as precedent and diffuse into the overall banking loan growth conditions going forward, then this will signify as a foreboding sign for future statistical growth conditions.

Philippine asset markets have already been showing the way.

The illusions of frontloading of statistical economic growth via inflationary credit will be bared soon enough.

Unreliable Statistics and Regulatory Arbitrage

I have lumped or categorized wholesale and retail trade along with hotel and restaurant as these sectors are parcel or inclusive to the real estate bubble via the shopping mall[5] and casino[6] bubbles.

While the consensus worships Philippine statistical data as reliable indicators of economic performance, I don’t. For instance, I see banking caps on the real estate sector as being bypassed by market participants. Loans are likely to have been diverted to other industries but end up on inflating bubble sectors.

The lessons of the Bangladesh stock market crash in 2011 tells us of how numerous companies circumvented banking regulations by rechanneling industrial loans in the hunt for yields into the once booming stock market. But when the Bangladesh government tightened the monetary environment the ramification has been a nasty stock market crash which provoked riots[7].

The emergence of the shadow banking represents an offshoot to repressive regulatory environment. Shadow banking emerged mainly out of arbitrage activities based on loopholes from existing regulations or regulatory arbitrages. 

The global shadow banking industry has been estimated at $67 trillion as of November 2012[8] and has been expanding swiftly.

The Philippines as I pointed out last May has its own shadow banking system which like Thailand accounts for more than one third of total financial assets according to the World Bank[9].

Local regulators like to project that they are in control of “excessive credit extension[10]” but current market actions seem to suggest otherwise.

Political direction and market forces have now been diverging

Despite Possible GSIS Interventions, the Bears Rule

clip_image005

The Phisix June bear market lows have been reinforced by the latest meltdown. 

The bear market area has been encroached for the second time in less than three months. Such alarming deterioration in risk conditions has validated my repeated warnings where we should expect heightened volatility in both directions but with a downside bias.

As I previously wrote[11]; (bold original)
I believe that such dynamic, viz. sharp volatilities in both direction but with a downside bias, will remain as the dominant theme going forward, unless again, the turmoil in the global bond markets will subside and stabilize.
From the technical viewpoint, the recent short-term head and shoulder breakdown (not drawn in chart) has not only falsified the bullish reverse head and shoulder pattern established last June (not drawn too) which became a popular sight in social media, but has been strengthening the longer version of head and shoulder topping formation (curved green trend lines) as the recent string of harrowing declines have been approaching the huge neckline (downward sloping green line)

With the imminence of the “death cross” or the crossover of the 50 day moving averages (blue line) with 200 day moving averages (red line), the Phisix chart conditions looks awfully biased towards the bears.

The sizable rebound last Thursday (3.54%) and Friday (2.2%) from the new lows has been similarly uninspiring (right blue ellipse). The sum of the two day gains only equals the fierce 5.7% one day comeback by the bulls last June 26th. Yet then, the two day bullish rebellion last June totalled 9.31%. The four day rebound saw a 12.7% gain from the lows (left blue ellipse). The current pace of rally seems to be weakening.

Market internals have equally been unimpressive. The advance decline spread for last Thursday and Friday, 79 and 47 respectively has been quite distant from the spread of 112 and 102 of the huge two day rally for June 26th and 27th correspondingly.

The message is that despite the optimistic chatters in media, particularly by bureaucrats who have little skin in the game and their institutional defenders, the bulls evidently are having diminished convictions in pushing up the markets or that the bears have increasingly been gaining strength which essentially has been neutralizing the bulls.

Interestingly Friday’s material 2.2% gain came amidst a narrow but positive 47 advance decline spread. Since Friday posted a substantial net foreign selling, this means that there may have been orchestrated efforts from what seems as non-profit motivated locals in driving the Phisix higher by concentrating the buying activities to a few index heavyweight issues.

I would suspect that since the incumbent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) president explicitly placed a floor on the Phisix by announcing last July an increase in the equity holdings of the government pension fund to 20% of total assets “ if the gauge falls below the 5,500 level”[12], then possibly a substance of the local buying during the last three days may have been from Philippine government intervention.

As of July, 16.5% of the Php 725 billion (US $16.2 billion @ USDPHP 44.5) investible assets of the GSIS have been allocated into equities[13]. An increase of 3.5% to 20% would parlay into a Php 25.375 billion (US $16.2 billion @ USDPHP 44.5) wager. While such amount looks big, in perspective this would amount to only 14.9% and 12.7% of the total trading volume in the PSE for the months of July and August respectively.

In short, the intended GSIS investments (euphemism for intervention) will hardly be sufficient enough to prop up the Phisix should foreigners remain on a selling spree.

Worst, this signifies as bad news to either pension fund beneficiaries (who may see their retirement savings dwindle from losses made from reckless punts aimed at promoting the administration’s public approval ratings) or to the taxpayers (who will likely shoulder these losses via bailout of the government pension fund). Milton Friedman was right, the easiest thing to do is to spend other’s people money.

But the Government’s pension fund’s equity market dilemma will overshadow its huge 46.5% exposure in the fixed income or bond markets.

Tightly Controlled Philippine Bond Markets

clip_image007

So far the stock market and peso rout has not transmuted into a domestic bond market selloff, since there has been little exposure by foreigners on local currency or peso based government bond market.

The investor profile of the domestic bond market reveals of a seeming proportional distribution of the outstanding bonds between the resident private sector institutions and various domestic government agencies[14]. In other words, the Philippine government and their private sector allies have been able to ‘manage’ bond markets.

No wonder the BSP can get away with declaring low price inflation figures (e.g. 2.5% July 2013), the entwined interests by the government and the banking sector enables them to manage the illiquid domestic government bond markets and thereby sustain a low interest rate regime to prop up an artificial credit financed asset based boom.

As further proof of how distorted the system is, ironically, the PCSO doubled lotto ticket prices last May[15] to Php 20 from Php 10 or an equivalent of 3.93% lotto ticket inflation rate (from its inception in 1995[16]) with promises of higher winning prices. You see the chasm? 3.93% PCSO inflation ticket rate versus 2.5% BSP inflation rate.

Nevertheless when the losses in the financial markets (peso and stocks) percolate into the real economy (real estate and related sectors), where private sector financial institutions will be forced to raise cash to meet demands of the real economy, doing so will mean selling these bonds. And this would extrapolate to rising yields.

The bond vigilantes will find many outlets to undermine artificially installed barriers.

Reality Check: Bear Markets Overwhelm ASEAN Bourses

I would like reiterate, contra popular wisdom, current developments has not just been an emerging market phenomena but has been spreading through the ASEAN-Asian region. 

The bond vigilantes have already even begun to make their presence felt in the European crisis nations stricken PIGS as I have been anticipating[17]

clip_image008

Bear markets has become a regional or ASEAN concern.

THREE ASEAN majors have broken into bear markets, particularly, Indonesia (JCI), Thailand (SET) and the Philippines (PCOMP) as shown in the chart above[18].

And as discussed last week, surprisingly even foreign exchange reserve rich (US $290 billion) first world ASEAN economy Singapore has been caught in the line of fire.

The big rallies in the Phisix and JCI last Thursday and Friday, failed to inspire Thailand and Singapore (STI) to do the same. Friday, the SET closed marginally higher while the STI closed modestly lower.

Yet even if Singapore’s STI has yet to reach bear markets, chart indicators suggests of a bearish momentum due to the “death cross”.

I would like to point out that the ASEAN’s bear markets should not be overlooked or dismissed as some figurative nightmare or a bad dream that will be wished away or vanish when the sun shines or when one awakens.

Denials are really destructive to one’s portfolio.

clip_image009
The ASEAN bear markets have been portentous of a deeper economic malaise unseen or unrecognized yet by the public.

Seething pressures from a build-up of accrued imbalances (bubbles) may have just begun to surface and may have found its release valve in currencies and stocks, as well as partly bonds.

The mainstream misattributes the cause of today’s upheaval to capital outflows which are in reality symptoms.

Foreigners don’t just dump stocks mainly out of fear or out of mistaken group identities. Their actions reflect on a perceived negative impact from radical changes in the environment and from changes in arbitrage spreads[19].

Since 1996, each time the Indonesian currency, the rupiah (top), and the Thai currency, the baht (lower pane), declined considerably or crashed vis-à-vis the US dollar, they coincided with either a major world recession (dot.com bust), or a crisis (2007-8 US mortgage crisis and 1997 Asian crisis).

This implies that falling ASEAN currencies today are typically symptoms of an unfolding adverse economic and financial event, which in the current case has yet to be revealed.

This means that the risk conditions from the current environment may further deteriorate.

Déjà vu Asian Crisis?

clip_image011

This reminds me of the Asian 1997 crisis where the Phisix fell by a terrifying 68.6% in 19 months.

February 1997 marked the beginning of the free fall of the Phisix, where the local benchmark dived by 25% into the lows of May 1997. The Phisix rebounded to form a right shoulder, then commenced on the next descent where a head and shoulder pattern came into motion.

A head and shoulder top déjà vu today?

It was 5 months into the bear market when the Asian crisis became official in July of 1997. Says the timeline of the Asian crisis in May[20] (bold mine)
Early May (1997) - Japan hinted that it would raise interest rates to defend the yen. The threat was never carried out, but it did cause global investors to begin selling Asian currencies.
Just replace Japan with the US Federal Reserve. Sounds familiar?

A month after the crisis, the head and shoulder neckline was breached and this was followed by the next wave of the horrendous liquidation based tailspin.

Those two downward pointing red arrows following the market’s peak in February of 1997 exhibits the intense bear market ‘denial’ rallies.

Last week’s rally seem as unlikely a bottom or a reversal rally. They are instead signs of a possible bear market reprieve or a sucker’s rally that has been in reaction to short term government actions.

If there should be any lessons from 1997, then current market meltdown seem suggestive of major bad developments for ASEAN by the yearend.

ASEAN Contagion: The Singapore-Indonesian Link

After fighting market forces in futility by depleting forex reserves, Indonesia’s government succumbed to the tightening imposed by market forces by officially raising rates anew last week[21].

The Indonesian government has been very reluctant to raise interest rates because of the massive recent build-up of both public sector and private sector credit. 

But Indonesian government seem to have been cornered.

By refusing to raise rates the domestic markets have wickedly sold off which effectively translates to a tightening.

Yet by accommodating pressures from the markets through policy interest rate increases, the selling pressure may temporarily have waned but the effect of tightening will likely cause a meaningful economic growth slowdown that would expose on the systemic (excess debt/gearing) fragilities, which is likely to spark the next wave of liquidations.

And if the barrage of liquidations will affect the core of the banking system, then Indonesia may have opened the nexus to next ASEAN banking or even an external debt crisis which may lead to a currency crisis.

The opposite may also hold true, if the rupiah continues to melt, this may trigger loan defaults on unhedged exposures that again may impact the core of the banking system.

Remember Indonesia had been a darling of emerging markets in 2011, whose supposed success story was extolled by credit rating upgrades.

Indonesia’s Thursday and Friday’s rebound has not been cheered by Singapore. Yet there are important links between Singapore and Indonesia.

Singapore has been the largest foreign investor in Indonesia with a cumulative investment of US $1.14 billion in 142 projects according to Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board. Trade between the two countries hit around $68 billion in 2010[22]. Moreover, Singapore has been the biggest market in the region for Indonesia’s non-oil and gas exports.

In addition, many regional investors have used Singapore as a regional hub in setting up holding companies to take advantage of double-taxation arrangements that Singapore has with other countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)[23]. Singapore has also become an important source of finance for Indonesia.

This also that means Singapore is highly sensitive to the developments in ASEAN.

Yet with regards to stock market linkages in terms of returns, while a study shows that bilateral foreign investments does not appear to be a significant factor, stock market returns are mostly determined by cross-country and sectoral factors based on bilateral linkages through trade and finance (Forbes and Chinn 2004[24]).

If such theory holds true, then a faltering STI may be a reflection of an ongoing deterioration of the real economy through trade and finance between Singapore and Indonesia.

Such signs are hardly “bullish”.

The ASEAN contagion appears to have even affected Vietnam’s stock market which fell another 2.9% this week, a continuation of last week’s 4.13% slump.

A crisis may or may not occur but current environment is hardly an environment conducive for taking on risks.

Yet should ASEAN financial markets continue to fall, then we should expect the unexpected

ASEAN financial markets appear to be in a highly sensitive and critical point.

Better safe than sorry.




[3] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Bank Lending Sustains Growth in June July 31, 2013



[6] See The Philippine Casino Bubble April 11, 2013


[8] Wikipedia.org Shadow banking system





[13] Manila Standard Today GSIS’ net income dips 5.7% to P33b July 16, 2013

[14] Asian Development Bank Asia Bond Monitor March 2013








[22] The Jakarta Globe, Yudhoyono Wants More Singapore Investors, July 22, 2011