Showing posts with label regulatory arbitrage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label regulatory arbitrage. Show all posts

Sunday, March 09, 2014

Phisix: The BSP’s Self Imposed Hobson’s Choice

Because of pressures applied by some influential groups on the Philippine government over the risks of property bubbles, officials of the Philippine central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), proposes to establish a “residential property-price index” index to monitor “asset bubble risks” in the property sector at the first half of the year. 

Overheating is a Sign of a Maturing Inflationary Boom

Yet while the government including the President rabidly denies the “overheating” of the economy, a private company Colliers International notes that “February projected property prices in Manila’s financial district Makati, which climbed to a record last year will rise a further 8 percent in 2014.”[1]

The tautology of “economic overheating” is what I had predicted would become the catchphrase for the mainstream[2],
Eventually, the current boom will get out of hand, which will be manifested through rising interest rates, which the mainstream vernacular will call “economic overheating” …
Of course, record property prices on itself are hardly sufficient representative of an escalating bubble, as record property prices are merely symptoms.

The question what has financed property prices to reach such record levels?

The answer as I have been pointing out here has been intensifying asset speculation financed by debt.

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The article further notes that “property loans and investments rose 6.8 percent to a record 900.1 billion pesos ($20 billion) in the second quarter of 2013 from the previous three-month period, the central bank reported in November. Property made up 22 percent of the total loan portfolio at banks.” (bold mine)

Record property prices backed by record debt. Record debt spending as expressed by a 30++% jump in money supply.

The fundamental problem with the mainstream’s heavy dependence to look at ‘select’ statistics in measuring economic activities has been at the risks of isolating economic variables which are really entwined or interrelated

As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises reminds us[3].
Economics does not allow any breaking up into special branches. It invariably deals with the interconnectedness of all phenomena of acting and economizing. All economic facts mutually condition one another. Each of the various economic problems must be dealt with in the frame of a comprehensive system assigning its due place and weight to every aspect of human wants and desires.
And this is why overheating hasn’t just been as “property” problem. Measuring property and property related credit alone will tend to diminish the size and scale of risks. 

Bubbles operate like a vortex, they draw in associated industries which piggybacks on the main beneficiaries of the credit boom.

Think of it, will shopping mall operators continue with their wild expansion plans if they don’t project a sustained demand for their retail outlets? Will hotel developers also be in an expansion spree if they don’t foresee a sustained boom for their services from both resident and non-resident tourists? Will office building developers continue to expand if they don’t expect to see their units bought or leased out at profitable rates?

This is why the Philippine property bubble incorporates the shopping mall, hotel and restaurants and vertical non-residential edifices, as well as, the trade industry. 

The banking and other financial intermediaries and the capital markets (stocks and bonds) which have all served as the property sector’s financial conduits or agents are also considered as bubble beneficiaries or appendages. 

Statistics which signifies history of specific variable/s in numbers will not tell you this, it is economic deductive causal-realist logic that does.

This also means the BSP will gravely underestimate on their assessment of bubble risks by solely looking at “residential property-price index” while ignoring the other dimensions of the property sectors that have also been scampering to chase yields financed by debt.

As one would note, aside from record property prices, and the revival of the credit inspired mania in domestic stocks, the peso has been falling despite the this week’s region driven rebound and yields of Philippine treasuries remain stubbornly above 2013 levels while price inflation, despite so called .1% pullback from 4.2% to 4.1% this February[4] remains at the high end of the government estimates. All these come in the face of money supply growth going berserk.

And all these converge to depict that the statistical economy has been ‘overheating’ regardless of the official denial.

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As a side note; speaking of the domestic currency, the USD-peso has sharply fallen Friday to close the year almost unchanged. The two week rally in Emerging Asian currencies signifies a regional phenomenon brought about by “resistance-to-change” outlook in the attempt again to resuscitate regional bubbles.

For instance Indonesia’s rupiah has massively rallied over the past 2 weeks, even when there has only been marginal improvement in the so-called current account and balance of trade deficits. Indonesia’s external debt swelled by about 5% in 2013. Meanwhile the Philippine peso has seesawed from big rallies to big losses. Friday monster rally seems part of the recent sharp volatility swings. We will see how rallying ASEAN currencies will react to the crash in China’s exports.

Why the BSP seems Trapped

Going back to BSP’s proposed anti-bubble measures, and this seems why the BSP-Philippine government appears to be trapped.

An asset bubble thermometer has already been in existence. There is an extant 20% cap on bank lending to the property sector. But as early as May 2013, the cap or the quota has been breached[5]. Now property sector lending has swelled by over 10% or 22% of the threshold. In short, the BSP, despite the self-imposed legal proscription, has been tolerant of the breach.

While it may be partly true that banks have been tightening lending standards for the commercial property sector “for the sixth consecutive quarter in the three months through December”, there has been a vast discrepancy between reports framed from the government’s perspective and what the stock market has been cheering about.

I have noted last week that the expected expansion on capital spending for real estate and allied industries will reach a very conservative Php 250 billion[6]. Most of the companies have declared borrowing as the source of finance for such expansion.

In terms of proportionality, 250 billion pesos amidst a record 900.1 billion pesos in property loans and investments in the banking system for 2013 will extrapolate to a 27.8% jump in credit! As a share of overall banking loans based on 2013 data, real estate loans will balloon to 26.5%. That’s if all these will be sourced from the banks.

Yet if the BSP stringently enforces the cap, there are many implications on these.
Property firms may circumvent the cap through camouflaged borrowing which is borrowing, coursed through other industries from which these property firms have exposure to. Say for instance, if a company’s portfolio includes energy or manufacturing or other non-real estate industries, the sister companies may secure borrowing from banks then execute intercompany loans.

This has been the case in the 2011 Bangladesh stock market crash. Lending caps on the banking system were dodged when loans were acquired through industrial companies and then diverted into the stock market. When the government tightened by raising bank reserves requirements, these loans came under pressure that led to the stock market collapse[7].

A second scenario is related to the first. This for current banks to do what has become one of the alternative main avenues for local government financing in China; the use loopholes via the establishment of non-property companies that serve as intermediaries to acquire and re-channel loans to the intended firms hobbled by such regulations. This is known as the Shadow Banks[8].

The Philippines have already existing shadow banks, according to the World Bank[9]. But one of the current main forms of shadow banks has been to finance buyers of property from the informal economy.

Nonetheless a strict enforcement of banking property loan quota by the BSP will impel for innovative ways to get around such regulations

A third way to go around the restrictions will be through deepening access of the domestic bond and international bond markets. Many companies have already expressed the former option.

Yet a ceiling on debt means reduced availability of funds from domestic sources which implies of HIGHER domestic interest rates. Should domestic interest rates rise faster than foreign based rates then these property companies may resort to more offshoring borrowings. Such may also include borrowing from offshore banks.

Again the Chinese experience can be instructive. In the face of relatively faster rising rates, US dollar loans by Chinese property companies have raised $40 billion over the past 2 years[10].

Of course expectations of currency conditions will play a big role in determining sourcing of credit for these companies. Then, the yuan had been a one way trade, so Chinese property companies underestimated on the currency risks by borrowing US dollar loans

The fourth setting will be for the industry to vastly reduce or even desist from expansions. But this will be devastating for the incumbent government who has been starved out of funds to finance their burgeoning boondoggles.

Bubble Revenues in Support of Government Spending Bubble

Easy access to finance would mean to impress upon to the creditors of the salutary state of financial conditions of the debtors. As such, in terms of the Philippine political economy, confidence has to be established by the impression of a booming economy.

And real estate has been a key anchor to the statistical boom. For instance, construction and Real Estate accounted for 18.18% of statistical GDP growth for the Philippines in 2013 based in the industry origins at current prices. If we should include trade and financial intermediation, the share of exposure of the said credit driven frothy industries balloon to 43.66%. In other words, tighten credit (either via interest rates or strict imposition of banking loan ceiling cap) and your “fastest economy in Asia” crumbles. 

Notice: Credit tightening doesn’t mean that the entire 43.66% will collapse. It means that big overleveraged participants in the sector, which when affected, will drag down many entities of the related sectors and even to the non-related sectors. Yet ironically some [debt free] companies from the same sector may benefit from the problems of their colleagues. The latter could be buyers of problematic assets at fire sale (market clearing) prices.

Also remember access to the formal banking and credit system has been very limited (2-3 out of 10 households), which means all these so-called growth has concentrated. Alternatively this means risks have also been concentrated.

On a side but related note, one has to just ask why is it that the Philippines, an agricultural country, have essentially no commodity spot and futures markets and have been left behind by her neighbors[11]. The benefits from commodity markets should have been the purge or reduction of the role of the middleman, diminished transaction costs, to empower and enrich the agricultural and commodity producers, generate pricing efficiency, spread risks and expand access to credit by allowing the informal sector to migrate to the formal sector. And yet the public blathers about the sins of rice smuggling[12], duh! 

This is also related to why the PSE dithers (or refuses) to integrate her bourses with region[13].

And this is also why there has been a growing divergence in sentiment between the informal and the formal sectors[14].

Also such divergence has brought about the mainstream’s perplexity on why the so-called boom has not been translating into more jobs. Paradoxically, highly paid experts have offered little but to associate joblessness with poverty rates[15].

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As I have been pointing out numerous times, real economic growth can’t happen when there is a huge formal-informal system divide. As one can see from the above chart[16], the degree of shadow economies has been tightly associated with degree of wealth conditions. Naturally any informal economy includes informal or shadow banking too.

The informal economy which is a product of economic and financial repression[17] extrapolates to high transaction costs, high cost of capital and equally inefficient means to accumulate real savings and capital[18]. This also means limited growth because substantial growth postulates migration to the formal economy which poses as a disincentive for many in the informal economy.

So the mainstream can continue to prattle about growth statistics but by ignoring the informal economy they will tend to miss out on the real conditions of the economy, that’s because the informal sector constitutes a huge share of the population.

This brings us back to issue of easy access to credit. The Philippine government missed her tax collection target by a slight 2.95% in 2013, albeit overall collections grew by 15% year on year. While this is good news so far as for the statistical concentrated economy, the bad news is that aside from stagflation, taxes will even grow at a faster rate this year.

The BIR, which accounts for 70% of the government’s total revenues, expects a 16.16% increase in her 2014 target[19]. That’s because national government budget will expand by 13% to Php 2.265 trillion in 2014[20]. So government spending will grow about twice the statistical economy.

This explains why in spite of the so-called boom, the BIR has been tightening on the noose of practicing doctors[21], where the latter have pushed backed, and even on the ‘lechon’ or roast pork vendors[22]. As one would note, the government has been waging war on the informal economy. So one can’t expect real growth to occur when government tries to restrict commercial activities.

Oh by the way the Philippine national government has so far done well in containing budget deficit. As of November 2013, annualized deficit (Php 111.464 billion) has been sharply lower, down by 54% compared to the yearend of 2012 (Php 242.827 billion). That’s the good news. The bad news is that the good upkeep depends on revenues from an unsustainable bubble blowing economy.

All these means that the incumbent government will have to increasingly rely on a sustained credit financed boom of assets in the formal economy in order to fund her fast expanding spendthrift appetite, as well as, to maintain zero bound rates or negative real rates (bluntly financial repression) to keep her debt burden manageable.

So the supposed boom in statistical formal economy translates to a boom in government spending financed by a boom in taxes derived from bubbles

Aside from the government, the other beneficiaries of BSP subsidies are the asset holders and formal economy debtors, which come at the expense of savers, non-asset holders and peso holders (outside the beneficiaries whose assets offset the loss in purchasing power).

Yet the only way to neutralize the negative effects of excessive money supply growth is through productivity growth.

But blowing bubbles and taxes diverts resources from high value productive uses to non-productive consumption activities. Thus a statistical boom can occur in the face of a loss of productivity. Yet this isn’t real growth, but that’s how bubbles operate

Think of it, if the BSP rigidly imposes banking caps, a tightening would result to a market meltdown and which will most likely get transmitted to the real economy via a significant slowdown or even a contraction, if not a crisis. This will not only undermine the leadership’s political goals but also bring to the surface the economic and political imbalances that have been built to promote access to easy credit via populist politics. And economic strains will likely bring about a more intense popular demand for the scrutiny of political malfeasances.

So the Philippine government together with the BSP has been trapped. They will need to keep the musical chairs going by continuing to inflate on asset bubbles and hope that such bubbles won’t pop under their terms. Thus this explains two factors: one the Pollyannaish declarations by the officialdom, which has been bought hook, line and sinker by media and industry participants benefiting from the phony boom. Second, the public denials and the superficial measures announced by authorities supposedly to contain the risks of financial instability via asset bubbles.

Yet everything will depend on the bond vigilantes. If interest rates as expressed by bond yields continue to climb, then what is politically hoped for may not be attained, they may even backfire.

As John Adams US founding father and 2nd US President in his defense at the Boston Massacre Trial said,
Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.




[2] See What to Expect in 2013 January 7, 2013
[3] Ludwig von Mises, The Why of Human Action, Economic Freedom and Interventionism
[5] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas BSP Releases Results of Expanded Real Estate Exposure Monitoring, May 10, 2013
[12] Wall Street Journal Crackdown on Rice Smuggling Blamed for Price Jump February 26, 2014
[15] Wall Street Journal Few Good Jobs In Fast-Growing Philippines, March 4, 2014
[19] Malaya BIR MISSES 2013 TARGET BY 3% February 20, 14
[20] Rappler.com Aquino signs P2.265-T 2014 budget December 20, 2013
[22] Manila Standard Taxman roasts lechon traders January 9, 2014

Monday, September 02, 2013

Phisix: Has ASEAN Bear Markets Been Signaling a Crisis?

Given the relentless growth in credit exactly to the same sectors during the two months of April-May, statistical GDP growth will likely remain ‘solid’ and will likely fall in the expectations of the mainstream. The results are likely to be announced in August.
This was my prediction on the 2nd quarter Philippine economic statistical growth[1] that had been released last week. Such news was cheered upon and interpreted as signs of relief by a confirmation bias starved public from the ongoing market pressures

The Secret of ‘Resilient’ 2nd quarter Philippine Economic Growth
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The Philippine government’s National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) hails the current growth streak[2] as the “second quarter growth is the fourth consecutive GDP growth of more than 7.0 percent under the Aquino Administration” implying for a politically induced growth nirvana.

But where did the growth come from?

The services sector which grew by 7.4%, remained as the “main driver” of the Philippine economy and had been “supported by the 10.3 percent and 17.4 percent growth of  manufacturing and construction, respectively boosting the Industry sector to grow by 10.3 percent” according to the NSCB.

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From the industry side (left window), the so-called ‘resilient’ growth in the services sector comes from financial intermediation (stock and bond market speculation?) and real estate, renting and business activity (real estate speculation?).

From the expenditure side (right window), the source of “resiliency” growth is from construction (20.4%) and government spending (21.4%).

So we have bubbles and prospective higher taxes or inflation as models for a boom.

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Yet here is the secret recipe or ingredient behind the fourth successive quarter of vigorous statistical growth…a surge in real estate related bank loans (year on year basis) as well as financial intermediation loans as per Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas data[3].

Soaring banking loan growth has translated to a spending and supply side boom, which has been reflected on money supply growth and deposit growth in the banking system.

Notice, y-o-y construction loan growth has hovered in the 50% area for the past 6 months. Real estate loan growth has peaked in January and has been on a decline but remains above the 20% growth level.

Yet household final demand or household final consumption expenditure grew by only 7.8% during the 2nd quarter, whereas construction has grown by 20.4%, so who will buy those excess real estate units?

This only means that a reduction of the growth rate of banking loans on these ‘bubble’ sectors will effectively diminish the rate of statistical growth and expose on the system’s dependence to, and fragility from, a credit fuelled statistical growth.

The recent resilient economic picture has already shown some indications of incipient cracks.

Since the first bear market attack on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) last June, growth in the financial intermediation sector shrivelled to only 1.45% which I pointed out earlier[4]. Fortunately enough, the banking loan growth conditions of April and May has been significant enough to neutralize the substantial rate of slowdown, thus 2nd quarter’s “resilient” growth.

But if June’s financial intermediation sector conditions will become a trend, and if June’s financial intermediation sector conditions will serve as precedent and diffuse into the overall banking loan growth conditions going forward, then this will signify as a foreboding sign for future statistical growth conditions.

Philippine asset markets have already been showing the way.

The illusions of frontloading of statistical economic growth via inflationary credit will be bared soon enough.

Unreliable Statistics and Regulatory Arbitrage

I have lumped or categorized wholesale and retail trade along with hotel and restaurant as these sectors are parcel or inclusive to the real estate bubble via the shopping mall[5] and casino[6] bubbles.

While the consensus worships Philippine statistical data as reliable indicators of economic performance, I don’t. For instance, I see banking caps on the real estate sector as being bypassed by market participants. Loans are likely to have been diverted to other industries but end up on inflating bubble sectors.

The lessons of the Bangladesh stock market crash in 2011 tells us of how numerous companies circumvented banking regulations by rechanneling industrial loans in the hunt for yields into the once booming stock market. But when the Bangladesh government tightened the monetary environment the ramification has been a nasty stock market crash which provoked riots[7].

The emergence of the shadow banking represents an offshoot to repressive regulatory environment. Shadow banking emerged mainly out of arbitrage activities based on loopholes from existing regulations or regulatory arbitrages. 

The global shadow banking industry has been estimated at $67 trillion as of November 2012[8] and has been expanding swiftly.

The Philippines as I pointed out last May has its own shadow banking system which like Thailand accounts for more than one third of total financial assets according to the World Bank[9].

Local regulators like to project that they are in control of “excessive credit extension[10]” but current market actions seem to suggest otherwise.

Political direction and market forces have now been diverging

Despite Possible GSIS Interventions, the Bears Rule

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The Phisix June bear market lows have been reinforced by the latest meltdown. 

The bear market area has been encroached for the second time in less than three months. Such alarming deterioration in risk conditions has validated my repeated warnings where we should expect heightened volatility in both directions but with a downside bias.

As I previously wrote[11]; (bold original)
I believe that such dynamic, viz. sharp volatilities in both direction but with a downside bias, will remain as the dominant theme going forward, unless again, the turmoil in the global bond markets will subside and stabilize.
From the technical viewpoint, the recent short-term head and shoulder breakdown (not drawn in chart) has not only falsified the bullish reverse head and shoulder pattern established last June (not drawn too) which became a popular sight in social media, but has been strengthening the longer version of head and shoulder topping formation (curved green trend lines) as the recent string of harrowing declines have been approaching the huge neckline (downward sloping green line)

With the imminence of the “death cross” or the crossover of the 50 day moving averages (blue line) with 200 day moving averages (red line), the Phisix chart conditions looks awfully biased towards the bears.

The sizable rebound last Thursday (3.54%) and Friday (2.2%) from the new lows has been similarly uninspiring (right blue ellipse). The sum of the two day gains only equals the fierce 5.7% one day comeback by the bulls last June 26th. Yet then, the two day bullish rebellion last June totalled 9.31%. The four day rebound saw a 12.7% gain from the lows (left blue ellipse). The current pace of rally seems to be weakening.

Market internals have equally been unimpressive. The advance decline spread for last Thursday and Friday, 79 and 47 respectively has been quite distant from the spread of 112 and 102 of the huge two day rally for June 26th and 27th correspondingly.

The message is that despite the optimistic chatters in media, particularly by bureaucrats who have little skin in the game and their institutional defenders, the bulls evidently are having diminished convictions in pushing up the markets or that the bears have increasingly been gaining strength which essentially has been neutralizing the bulls.

Interestingly Friday’s material 2.2% gain came amidst a narrow but positive 47 advance decline spread. Since Friday posted a substantial net foreign selling, this means that there may have been orchestrated efforts from what seems as non-profit motivated locals in driving the Phisix higher by concentrating the buying activities to a few index heavyweight issues.

I would suspect that since the incumbent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) president explicitly placed a floor on the Phisix by announcing last July an increase in the equity holdings of the government pension fund to 20% of total assets “ if the gauge falls below the 5,500 level”[12], then possibly a substance of the local buying during the last three days may have been from Philippine government intervention.

As of July, 16.5% of the Php 725 billion (US $16.2 billion @ USDPHP 44.5) investible assets of the GSIS have been allocated into equities[13]. An increase of 3.5% to 20% would parlay into a Php 25.375 billion (US $16.2 billion @ USDPHP 44.5) wager. While such amount looks big, in perspective this would amount to only 14.9% and 12.7% of the total trading volume in the PSE for the months of July and August respectively.

In short, the intended GSIS investments (euphemism for intervention) will hardly be sufficient enough to prop up the Phisix should foreigners remain on a selling spree.

Worst, this signifies as bad news to either pension fund beneficiaries (who may see their retirement savings dwindle from losses made from reckless punts aimed at promoting the administration’s public approval ratings) or to the taxpayers (who will likely shoulder these losses via bailout of the government pension fund). Milton Friedman was right, the easiest thing to do is to spend other’s people money.

But the Government’s pension fund’s equity market dilemma will overshadow its huge 46.5% exposure in the fixed income or bond markets.

Tightly Controlled Philippine Bond Markets

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So far the stock market and peso rout has not transmuted into a domestic bond market selloff, since there has been little exposure by foreigners on local currency or peso based government bond market.

The investor profile of the domestic bond market reveals of a seeming proportional distribution of the outstanding bonds between the resident private sector institutions and various domestic government agencies[14]. In other words, the Philippine government and their private sector allies have been able to ‘manage’ bond markets.

No wonder the BSP can get away with declaring low price inflation figures (e.g. 2.5% July 2013), the entwined interests by the government and the banking sector enables them to manage the illiquid domestic government bond markets and thereby sustain a low interest rate regime to prop up an artificial credit financed asset based boom.

As further proof of how distorted the system is, ironically, the PCSO doubled lotto ticket prices last May[15] to Php 20 from Php 10 or an equivalent of 3.93% lotto ticket inflation rate (from its inception in 1995[16]) with promises of higher winning prices. You see the chasm? 3.93% PCSO inflation ticket rate versus 2.5% BSP inflation rate.

Nevertheless when the losses in the financial markets (peso and stocks) percolate into the real economy (real estate and related sectors), where private sector financial institutions will be forced to raise cash to meet demands of the real economy, doing so will mean selling these bonds. And this would extrapolate to rising yields.

The bond vigilantes will find many outlets to undermine artificially installed barriers.

Reality Check: Bear Markets Overwhelm ASEAN Bourses

I would like reiterate, contra popular wisdom, current developments has not just been an emerging market phenomena but has been spreading through the ASEAN-Asian region. 

The bond vigilantes have already even begun to make their presence felt in the European crisis nations stricken PIGS as I have been anticipating[17]

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Bear markets has become a regional or ASEAN concern.

THREE ASEAN majors have broken into bear markets, particularly, Indonesia (JCI), Thailand (SET) and the Philippines (PCOMP) as shown in the chart above[18].

And as discussed last week, surprisingly even foreign exchange reserve rich (US $290 billion) first world ASEAN economy Singapore has been caught in the line of fire.

The big rallies in the Phisix and JCI last Thursday and Friday, failed to inspire Thailand and Singapore (STI) to do the same. Friday, the SET closed marginally higher while the STI closed modestly lower.

Yet even if Singapore’s STI has yet to reach bear markets, chart indicators suggests of a bearish momentum due to the “death cross”.

I would like to point out that the ASEAN’s bear markets should not be overlooked or dismissed as some figurative nightmare or a bad dream that will be wished away or vanish when the sun shines or when one awakens.

Denials are really destructive to one’s portfolio.

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The ASEAN bear markets have been portentous of a deeper economic malaise unseen or unrecognized yet by the public.

Seething pressures from a build-up of accrued imbalances (bubbles) may have just begun to surface and may have found its release valve in currencies and stocks, as well as partly bonds.

The mainstream misattributes the cause of today’s upheaval to capital outflows which are in reality symptoms.

Foreigners don’t just dump stocks mainly out of fear or out of mistaken group identities. Their actions reflect on a perceived negative impact from radical changes in the environment and from changes in arbitrage spreads[19].

Since 1996, each time the Indonesian currency, the rupiah (top), and the Thai currency, the baht (lower pane), declined considerably or crashed vis-à-vis the US dollar, they coincided with either a major world recession (dot.com bust), or a crisis (2007-8 US mortgage crisis and 1997 Asian crisis).

This implies that falling ASEAN currencies today are typically symptoms of an unfolding adverse economic and financial event, which in the current case has yet to be revealed.

This means that the risk conditions from the current environment may further deteriorate.

Déjà vu Asian Crisis?

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This reminds me of the Asian 1997 crisis where the Phisix fell by a terrifying 68.6% in 19 months.

February 1997 marked the beginning of the free fall of the Phisix, where the local benchmark dived by 25% into the lows of May 1997. The Phisix rebounded to form a right shoulder, then commenced on the next descent where a head and shoulder pattern came into motion.

A head and shoulder top déjà vu today?

It was 5 months into the bear market when the Asian crisis became official in July of 1997. Says the timeline of the Asian crisis in May[20] (bold mine)
Early May (1997) - Japan hinted that it would raise interest rates to defend the yen. The threat was never carried out, but it did cause global investors to begin selling Asian currencies.
Just replace Japan with the US Federal Reserve. Sounds familiar?

A month after the crisis, the head and shoulder neckline was breached and this was followed by the next wave of the horrendous liquidation based tailspin.

Those two downward pointing red arrows following the market’s peak in February of 1997 exhibits the intense bear market ‘denial’ rallies.

Last week’s rally seem as unlikely a bottom or a reversal rally. They are instead signs of a possible bear market reprieve or a sucker’s rally that has been in reaction to short term government actions.

If there should be any lessons from 1997, then current market meltdown seem suggestive of major bad developments for ASEAN by the yearend.

ASEAN Contagion: The Singapore-Indonesian Link

After fighting market forces in futility by depleting forex reserves, Indonesia’s government succumbed to the tightening imposed by market forces by officially raising rates anew last week[21].

The Indonesian government has been very reluctant to raise interest rates because of the massive recent build-up of both public sector and private sector credit. 

But Indonesian government seem to have been cornered.

By refusing to raise rates the domestic markets have wickedly sold off which effectively translates to a tightening.

Yet by accommodating pressures from the markets through policy interest rate increases, the selling pressure may temporarily have waned but the effect of tightening will likely cause a meaningful economic growth slowdown that would expose on the systemic (excess debt/gearing) fragilities, which is likely to spark the next wave of liquidations.

And if the barrage of liquidations will affect the core of the banking system, then Indonesia may have opened the nexus to next ASEAN banking or even an external debt crisis which may lead to a currency crisis.

The opposite may also hold true, if the rupiah continues to melt, this may trigger loan defaults on unhedged exposures that again may impact the core of the banking system.

Remember Indonesia had been a darling of emerging markets in 2011, whose supposed success story was extolled by credit rating upgrades.

Indonesia’s Thursday and Friday’s rebound has not been cheered by Singapore. Yet there are important links between Singapore and Indonesia.

Singapore has been the largest foreign investor in Indonesia with a cumulative investment of US $1.14 billion in 142 projects according to Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board. Trade between the two countries hit around $68 billion in 2010[22]. Moreover, Singapore has been the biggest market in the region for Indonesia’s non-oil and gas exports.

In addition, many regional investors have used Singapore as a regional hub in setting up holding companies to take advantage of double-taxation arrangements that Singapore has with other countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)[23]. Singapore has also become an important source of finance for Indonesia.

This also that means Singapore is highly sensitive to the developments in ASEAN.

Yet with regards to stock market linkages in terms of returns, while a study shows that bilateral foreign investments does not appear to be a significant factor, stock market returns are mostly determined by cross-country and sectoral factors based on bilateral linkages through trade and finance (Forbes and Chinn 2004[24]).

If such theory holds true, then a faltering STI may be a reflection of an ongoing deterioration of the real economy through trade and finance between Singapore and Indonesia.

Such signs are hardly “bullish”.

The ASEAN contagion appears to have even affected Vietnam’s stock market which fell another 2.9% this week, a continuation of last week’s 4.13% slump.

A crisis may or may not occur but current environment is hardly an environment conducive for taking on risks.

Yet should ASEAN financial markets continue to fall, then we should expect the unexpected

ASEAN financial markets appear to be in a highly sensitive and critical point.

Better safe than sorry.




[3] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Bank Lending Sustains Growth in June July 31, 2013



[6] See The Philippine Casino Bubble April 11, 2013


[8] Wikipedia.org Shadow banking system





[13] Manila Standard Today GSIS’ net income dips 5.7% to P33b July 16, 2013

[14] Asian Development Bank Asia Bond Monitor March 2013








[22] The Jakarta Globe, Yudhoyono Wants More Singapore Investors, July 22, 2011


Wednesday, May 29, 2013

Fitch Defies S&P on China’s Credit Bubble

Defying the consensus, US Credit rating agency Fitch ratings says China’s bubble is unsustainable.

From the Bloomberg: (bold mine)
Chinese banks are adding assets at the rate of an entire U.S. banking system in five years. To Charlene Chu of Fitch Ratings, that signals a crisis is brewing.
Total lending from banks and other financial institutions in China was 198 percent of gross domestic product last year, compared with 125 percent four years earlier, according to calculations by Chu, the company’s Beijing-based head of China financial institutions. Fitch cut the nation’s long-term local-currency debt rating last month, in the first downgrade by one of the top three rating companies in 14 years.

“There is just no way to grow out of a debt problem when credit is already twice as large as GDP and growing nearly twice as fast,” Chu, 41, said in an interview.
Usually I would take the opposite side of the fence vis-à-vis credit rating agencies, but in the case above, the Fitch analyst Ms. Charlene Chu resonates on my analytical methodology: She focuses on the trajectory.

China has implemented a massive RMB 4 trillion or $586 billion stimulus meant to shield against the US epicenter crisis in 2008. This serves as an aggravating or secondary cause. From the same article:
Amid the global credit crunch of 2008, China ramped up lending by state-controlled banks to prevent an economic slowdown. The assets of Chinese banks expanded by 71 trillion yuan ($11.2 trillion) in the four years through 2012, according to government data. They may increase by as much as 20 trillion yuan this year, Chu said April 23. That will exceed the $13.4 trillion of assets held by U.S. commercial banks at the end of last year, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

Chu says companies’ ability to pay back what they owe is wearing away, as China gets less economic growth for every yuan of lending.
In short, the stimulus only created massive malinvestments or transfers of resources to wealth consuming activities. Thus the diminishing returns of credit. The payback from which is likely to come sooner than later.

The Chinese government’s denial:
China’s expansion of credit hasn’t caused a surge in the proportion of bad loans, data from the banking regulator show.

While loans overdue for at least three months have grown for six straight quarters to reach 526.5 billion yuan at the end of March, the ratio of nonperforming loans declined to 0.96 percent as of March 31 from 2.42 percent at the end of 2008, according to the China Banking Regulatory Commission.
As previously noted, Non Performing Loans (NPL) are coincidental or lagging indicators. They usually become apparent when the bubbles are in the process of reversing. 

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Yet for as long as the bubble inflates, or for as long as housing prices moves up, the Ponzi financing scheme may continue to thrive.

When entities (private or public) can hardly finance principal and interests of outstanding loans from cash flows but increasingly depends on rising assets to cover funding requirements, through asset sales or as collateral for more borrowing such is called a Ponzi finance as postulated by economist Hyman Minsky.

China’s housing bubble continues to balloon even as the real economy has materially been slowing down, as shown in the chart from Wall Street Journal. Such is a sign of growing Ponzi finance.

In short, current inflationist policies by the Chinese government motivates the public to speculate on housing and other financial packages rather than invest on productive enterprises.

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Such housing bubble has likewise drawn in hot money as shown by the chart from Zero Hedge

The Chinese government has recently moved to curtail hot money flows using copper imports to facilitate “carry trades” based on “interest rate arbitrages”.

Going back Fitch. Ms. Chu says China’s statistical data has been unreliable. Importantly she says that much of what I call Ponzi finance may have found a channel in the burgeoning “Shadow Banking Sector”
Chu, who has covered Chinese financial institutions at Fitch for seven years, says these figures are distorted. The ratio of nonperforming loans to total lending has declined mainly because credit has surged, she said. Moreover, the regulator’s data doesn’t reflect the real amount of debt because of the ways banks move loans off their books, Chu said.

Some loans, often for real estate, are bundled together and sold to savers as so-called wealth-management products, while other assets are sold to non-bank financial institutions, including trusts, to lower the lenders’ bad debt levels, according to Chu. Wealth management products and trusts are sold to investors eager to get more than the government-mandated benchmark of 3 percent annual interest on bank savings accounts.

“The data may be somewhat accurate for the on-balance-sheet loan portfolios of the banks, but banks have substantial off-balance-sheet positions for which there is no asset-quality information,” she said.
The Moody’s estimates that China’s Shadow Banking System have reached 29 trillion yuan or  $4.7 trillion  compared to 17.3 trillion yuan in 2010

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Shadow banks are manifestations of regulatory arbitrages or the circumvention of regulations. China's shadow banks has been mainly through Wealth Management Products (WMP) which have mainly been about short term financing

Quoting Ms. Chu from another article:
WMPs are vehicles that can borrow/lend, and banks engage in transactions with their own and each other’s WMPs. This makes the pools of assets and liabilities tied to WMPs in effect second balance sheets, but with nothing but on-balance-sheet liquidity, reserves, and capital to meet payouts and absorb losses. These hidden balance sheets are beginning to undermine the integrity of banks’ published balance sheets.

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The leverage being accreted can be seen in the accelerating growth of China’s bank assets as shown from the chart by Northern Trust. Bank Assets in the official sector have now topped 250% of GDP and excludes the shadow banks. Bank assets has spiked since 2008. 

Every bubble culminates with a mania phase, characterized by a blow off in the build up of debt which ultimately implodes
A jump in the ratio of credit to GDP preceded banking crises in Japan, where the measure surged 45 percentage points from 1985 to 1990, and South Korea, where it gained 47 percentage points from 1994 to 1998, Fitch said in July 2011. In China, it has increased 73 percentage points in four years, according to Fitch’s estimates.

“You just don’t see that magnitude of increase” in the ratio of credit to GDP, Chu said. “It’s usually one of the most reliable predictors for a financial crisis.”
New Picture (12)

I have previously shown this chart from Harvard’s Reinhart-Rogoff where debt build up leading to every crisis intensifies until this hits a certain debt intolerance level which may triggered internally or externally.

Fitch versus S&P
The nation is in a better position now to tackle nonperforming loans, said Liao Qiang, a Beijing-based director at S&P. In the past decade, China’s economy has quadrupled, the number of urban residents surpassed those on farms and policy makers allowed freer flows of its currency in and out of the country. Its foreign-exchange reserves surged fivefold from 2004 to $3.3 trillion at the end of 2012.

“Given that China’s credit is mostly funded by its internally generated deposits, I don’t think a real financial crisis, which is normally manifested in a liquidity shortage, will happen anytime soon,” S&P’s Liao said by phone. Local-currency savings stood at 92 trillion yuan at the end of 2012, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
Again we see the conflict between analysis based on statistics and with that of economic logic.

Bubbles are symptoms of savings being squandered for yield chasing speculative wealth consuming activities.

With underdeveloped capital markets and as the Chinese government uses financial repression via negative real rates to confiscate people’s savings, real savings by the average Chinese are being transferred (to the government) and consumed (through speculations—housing and Ponzi Shadow banks). The implication is that real savings are being depleted. 

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China’s stock market continues to languish since the 2007 top. This provides scant returns for the public (tradingeconomics.com)

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And that’s why many Chinese gravitate to gold. The state of the Chinese yuan, like other fiat currencies, reveals of the "inflation tax" and continues to depreciate against gold as shown by the chart from GoldMoney.com

Surging bank loans
Chinese banks extended 2.8 trillion yuan of loans in the first quarter, 12 percent more than a year earlier and the second-largest quarterly total on record, government data show. Economic growth in the period slowed to 7.7 percent from 7.9 percent in the fourth quarter.

Only 29 percent of last year’s aggregate financing translated into economic growth, the lowest rate on record, as borrowers use more resources to finance outstanding debt and less for investment, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. analyst Michael Werner wrote in January.

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The reality is that the Chinese government has already launched a stealth stimulus since last year. 

This can be seen in the continuing credit growth in the Chinese banking sector as seen from ‘the chart from Dr. Ed Yardeni.

Most of the pick up in credit growth I believe has been directed to State Owned Enterprises (SOE). One must realize that Chinese economy remains heavily politicized where many firms are wards of the government. So Chinese policies can be coursed through them without official admission. 

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And as a final note, the covert stimulus being reflected as credit boom is likewise manifested on money supply as shown by the chart from Zero Hedge

Denials will not assume away the effects of unsound policies.

At the end of the day: bubbles (something out of nothing) and Ponzi schemes will reveal of their true nature. 

This means I will not bet on the China led “Asian century” until we see significant liberalization of her economy and monetary system.