Bloomberg Analyst William Pesek Jr.: Is Kafka Running Korea's Currency Policy?

Is Kafka Running Korea's Currency Policy?
by William Pesek Jr.

Feb. 25 (Bloomberg) -- It's THE question in global currency markets: What force of nature prompted South Korea suddenly to scrap plans to sell dollars?

On Tuesday, the dollar was plunging amid a comment by Asia's No. 3 economy that it would diversify foreign-exchange reserves into other currencies. By Wednesday, Korea's central bank said it had no such plan, leaving traders scratching their heads.

Dumping dollars would be a logical move for the world's fourth-largest holder of reserves after Japan, China and Taiwan. Korea, after all, is going against the tide in Asia, letting its currency rise. It no longer needs so many U.S. Treasuries, nor does it want to sustain huge losses as the dollar falls.

Korea's hasty and counterintuitive about-face makes you wonder if U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow himself made a call to Seoul. It's hardly in the U.S.'s interest to see Korea pull the plug on Treasuries. It could prompt other Asian central banks to do the same, driving up U.S. debt yields.

Or maybe it was Japan, the biggest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries, pressuring Korea. Shortly after Korea's denial, Japan's vice finance minister for international affairs, Hiroshi Watanabe, referred to ``wild'' moves in the yen and said Tokyo ``will act when necessary'' if its currency rises too rapidly. Asia hardly wants a resumption of Japan's yen-selling campaign.

Franz in Charge?

Conspiracy theories aside, markets could be excused for wondering if Franz Kafka is roaming the halls of Korea's Ministry of Finance -- and whether the Czech writer is running its currency policies.

Kafka, of course, is famed for tales possessing bizarre, illogical and nightmarishly complex qualities. And there are some rather Kafkaesque aspects to recent events, not only in Seoul but also on currency policies throughout Asia.

Korea's retreat from dumping dollars shows the bind central banks are in these days. This region's mercantilist tendencies have manifested themselves in exchange-rate management efforts the likes of which have rarely been seen before.

``Bretton Woods II'' economists have dubbed the system that unofficially replaced the original post-World War II currency regime, which was based on a gold standard that collapsed in 1973. In gold's place, many nations adopted the U.S. dollar as an anchor, formally or informally pegging their currencies to it. We may be seeing the demise of this new system, with Korea in the vanguard.

`Risk Is Growing'

``The risk of a disorderly unraveling of Bretton Woods II -- a sharp correction of the U.S. dollar and of the U.S. bond market, a surge in U.S. long-term interest rates, and a sharp fall in the price of a wide variety of risky assets such as equities, housing, high-yield bonds and emerging-market sovereign debt -- is growing,'' Nouriel Roubini of New York University's Stern School of Business and Brad Setser of Oxford University said in a research paper this month.

As their findings suggest, the current system is looking more and more like a huge pyramid scheme. As long as Asian central banks stick together and buy dollar-denominated securities, things are fine. Once they start selling, virtually everyone loses -- central banks experience capital losses and economies become less competitive. Central banks have an interest in keeping the game going and hoping others do, too.

Yet this week's events underline ``how vulnerable the dollar is to negative news,'' says Carl Weinberg, chief global economist at High Frequency Economics, referring to the dollar's biggest drop against the euro in six months. The news, Weinberg says, ``unwrapped a lot of tightly-wrapped traders who were spring- loaded to sell greenbacks on adverse news.''

No Altruism

Sure, Korea's Treasuries holdings are much smaller than China's, Japan's or Taiwan's, but its $200 billion of reserves may be at the forefront of trends to trim dollar holdings.

Central banks here don't buy U.S. debt out of altruism; it's to hold down currencies to boost growth. Monetary officials find themselves in the unenviable position of having to buy lots of dollar assets they know are likely to lose value over time.

This may be as good a time as any for the region's monetary authorities to avoid losses ahead of a possible surge in U.S. debt yields. Investors won't ignore the record U.S. current-account and budget deficits forever.

Yet it's a complex issue for Asian economies, which find themselves in a ``damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't'' situation.

Devalue vs Reform

Korea seems to have chosen to let the won rise, and it's a good thing. Asia spends inordinate amounts of time weakening currencies, worried about growth a quarter or two out. That distracts from repairing structural problems. It's always easier to devalue your way to growth than to reform financial systems, improve corporate governance and promote entrepreneurship.

Hopefully the rest of Asia will follow Korea's example. Rising currencies are a sign of confidence in an economy, not a problem. They lower bond yields and boost stock prices. Capital a hard money brings in can be more important than increased trade attracted by a softer one.

The Kafkaesque state of the global financial system may leave Asia little choice in the matter.

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Prudent Investor says

Should Mr. Pesek's wish come true, it would mean a BIG "OUCH" for the US dollar and its economy.