Changing Dynamics In Central Bank Management, Quasi Boom Policies

``With the economic improvement and steepening yield curve that our US team expects, commercial banks may find it a good risk/return decision to move these funds into the real economy rather than simply earn an interest rate in the neighborhood of the risk-free IOR. The risk therefore is that these methods of draining reserves simply postpone the macro problem of burgeoning excess reserves.”-Manoj Pradhan ER, RR, IOR and RRR

It’s a simple fact that the world constantly changes.

Even the management of central banks given today’s monetary conditions has been exhibiting such changes. Traditional tools don’t seem to have the same measured ‘efficacy’ due to the drastic stimulus-response feedback loop mechanism applied by authorities in response to the rapidly changing environment. I would posit that the past successes had not been out of bureaucratic skills but out of happenstance; the emergence of globalization had engendered the era of the “great moderation”.

For instance, in an effort to curb the incidences of bank failures during the latest crisis, central banks have rapidly deployed the unorthodox (nuclear option) means of providing emergency loans against ‘dubious’ forms of collateral and importantly the purchasing of specific types of bubble ‘tainted’ assets directly from the market.

The proceeds from the central bank loans or sales have led to the intensive ballooning of excess reserves (ER) of banks, which until today, has been warehoused in the central bank. Considering the extent of balance sheet impairments of the US banking system, the temporary measures have not yet adequately resolved the chronic woes, nor has these excess reserves been converted into end user or consumer loans. Not yet anyway.

Hence, the huge buildup of excess reserves has apparently altered the scalability of the tools required to deal with balance sheet management of the central bank.

Morgan Stanley’s Manoj Pradhan describes the transition, ``The traditional way of draining reserves was to sell T-Bills to commercial banks. This would mean that commercial banks would replace cash on the asset side of their balance sheet with the T-Bill of an equivalent quantity. However, ER held by the Fed now stand at US$1.1 trillion and the size makes it difficult for reserves to be drained in the traditional way.” (emphasis mine)

In other words, the change in the discount rates or possibly even the Fed Fund rate may seem more symbolic than functional. And perhaps this may be one reason why the markets appear to have discounted the recent actions by the Federal Reserve.

The Federal Reserve has thus been tinkering with experimental tools such as reverse repo, term deposit facilities and interest rates on reserves.

So while the Fed desires to see ample liquidity in the system, withdrawing the huge stack of bank reserves underlines the apparently emerging distinct objectives- the task of liquidity and interest rate management.

Reviving The Credit Process By Fueling Bubbles

On our part, we understand the fact the Fed is dabbling with generally untested tools relative to the new circumstances it is faced with brings about greater risks than what the mainstream expects.

For one, it is becoming clearer that credit demand hasn’t been the underlying problem as alleged by many, instead it looks more likely to be a ‘supply’ problem, where tight lending from banks have stifled the credit process.

As proof, many in the US, have turned to local ‘scrip’ currencies in the face of money shortages to conduct business or trade [see Emerging Local Currencies In The US Disproves The 'Liquidity Trap']. There are as many as 100 local currencies operating in the US today.

Next, banks that have benefited from government’s bailout have reportedly been averse at lending to small business.

According to CNN Small Business,

``Small business loans continue to dry up at the nation's biggest banks. Eleven top TARP recipients -- including Wells Fargo, by far the nation's largest lender to small companies -- cut their collective small business loan balance by more than $2.3 billion in December, according to a Treasury report released late Tuesday.

``The drop marked the eighth consecutive month of declines for the 11 banks. In that time, their total loan balance has fallen 7%, to $169.4 billion. Seven of the reporting banks have cut their small business loan balance every single month.

``"Credit is still tight for many small businesses," the Treasury acknowledged in a Feb. 10 report.

Another, government interventions in the housing market through a recent tax credit subsidy program compounded by low interest rates could spark the process of inflating yet another property bubble.

But this time bubble signs appear to have surfaced in homebuilder lots, according to Doug French of the Mises Institute, (bold highlights mine)

``Last November, President Obama signed the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009, which, as many people know, extended unemployment benefits and the first-time-homebuyer tax-credit program. But quietly included in this legislative lasagna was a provision allowing big businesses to offset the losses of 2008 and 2009 against profits made as far back as 2004. This provision will generate corporate tax refunds of $33 billion, the New York Times reports. Previously, only small companies could offset losses against past years' profits.

``Big home builders are the prime beneficiaries. After racking up monster profits during the housing boom, the industry has booked huge losses in the bust, accentuated by write-downs of their land positions totaling $28.5 billion for the 14 largest publically traded homebuilders. Now these large homebuilders are recapturing some of what Uncle Sam took away during the boom years. According to the Times, Pulte Homes has a refund of $450 million coming, Hovnanian Enterprises will get back $250–275 million, while Standard Pacific and Beazer Homes will recoup $80 million and $50 million of their profits respectively.

``And while returning taxes to businesses is a wonderful thing, home builders are reading the distorted economic tea leaves. These seem to say that low interest rates and tax credits will eventually bring buyers back to their subdivisions, while many of the big builders' smaller competitors were washed away for good by the housing tsunami — so ramp up the higher-stage and durable-production process by investing capital in building lots…

While it is true that there are still enormous housing inventories to reckon with as to successfully reignite a bubble, improving trends in the sales of homebuilder lots could signify as important clues to a brewing bubble.

Adds Mr. French, ``The lot-buying homebuilders may be irrational, but they aren't yet exuberant. The National Association of Home Builders' housing-market index rose just 2 points to 17 in February — far below the bullish readings of 50 that haven't been seen since April 2006. But the 528 residential developers surveyed say that the tax credits being offered along with low mortgage rates are spurring some demand.” (bold highlights mine)

This seem to reconcile with our view that if we are correct, the record steepness in the yield curve will likely generate belated credit traction 2-3 after a recession [see What’s The Yield Curve Saying About Asia And The Bubble Cycle?]. We may probably see some signs of revitalization in the credit process of the US by the end of the year.

And what else could stoke the credit process than a new bubble!

Remember considering that homebuilder losses have been allowed to be offset via tax refunds, essentially, the carryover losses has been borne by the US government.

So there lies the issue of the moral hazard problem. What should stop these economic agents from resuming reckless and imprudent risks, when they know that Big Brother would backstop their activities?

Moreover, these homebuilders are only responding to the incentives set by the government: Government gives them money from which they employ based on inherent familiarity, and government provides the conditions-low interest rates and the moral hazard issue/risk free environment- for them to take a stab at new risks. Besides, government subsidies tend to immunize economic agents from the sentience of profits and losses.

So the US government’s approach to gradually disengage itself from the housing market appears to be to stir up a new bubble.

The US government is simply fundamentally following the dogma of sustaining the perpetuity of a quasi boom.

From John Maynard Keynes, ``The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.” A quasi boom kept as permanent policy would lead to a prolonged depression and a reduction of the nation’s living standard.

Also this should put into rigorous tests the effectiveness of the new set of tools, strategies or the new doctrines for the Federal Reserve to deal with its humongous excess reserves.

Where to bet our money? Against the success of the Federal Reserve, of course.