Here is Templeton's Mark Mobius view on the Yuan, (bold highlights mine)
``We look at all currencies on the basis of purchasing power parity (i.e. comparisons of different inflation rates) and, of course, any controls and influences imposed by the central bank of each country. We then try to asses whether a currency is over or undervalued, how devaluation or revaluation may impact a specific currency, and then gauge the potential impact of such currency characteristics on the business of each company. For example, for an export-oriented company, a devaluation of its operating currency could be positive because it may be able to export more aggressively and more profitably, while the opposite could be true for an import-oriented company.
``Our purchasing power parity studies indicate that China’s currency, the renminbi, is actually close to fair value against the U.S. dollar at this stage. Judging from past experience, we believe that China is unlikely to act quickly on currency adjustments because they are afraid of the consequences of such volatility.
``The Chinese Central Bank Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, hinted in March that the renminbi might be allowed to rise once the global economy recovered. However, the Commerce Ministry and others protective of Chinese exporters expressed opposition to a rise in the renminbi, as exporters saw shipments fall early in 2009 for the first time since China began opening trade in the late 1970s.
``As we see it, Chinese exporters have plenty of orders and Chinese companies are even stockpiling commodities such as crude oil, various metals, and grains, as a hedge against what appears to be rising inflation. Wages are moving up – in the export provinces of coastal China, for example, wages were raised by about 20% recently in an attempt to attract more workers from the interior.
``If the renminbi appreciates, that could mean losses in China’s vast foreign reserves, which would fall in renminbi terms. Meanwhile, the Chinese are addressing the depreciation of the U.S. dollar with a diversification of their foreign reserves into other currencies and a move to higher interest rate securities compared to low-interest U.S. Treasuries.
``The purchasing and storing of commodities is another way for China to conserve its value of foreign exchange reserves in an environment of a depreciating U.S. dollar. While statistics on commodity inventory levels in China may not be reliable or fully disclosed, our current information indicates that China’s commodity inventory levels are high. The Chinese favor commodities knowing that they will eventually be used, and also because they are concerned, given high and increasing demand, that commodity prices could rise further. A possible course of action could be to revalue the renminbi upwards so commodities would be cheaper in renminbi terms and wage demands could more easily be met. But with nationalist emotions rising, that course is probably closed."
Based on Mr. Mobius' account of China's forex management, China seems to be acting on her perceived changes in the exchange value of money of her currency relative to other currencies by diversification through higher yields of ex-US dollar instruments and importantly through massive stockpiling of commodities.
In the words of Ludwig von Mises,
``He who believes that the prices of the goods in which he takes an interest will rise, buys more of them than he would have bought in the absence of this belief: accordingly he restricts his cash holding. He who believes that prices will drop, restricts his purchases and thus enlarges his cash holding. As long as such speculative anticipations are limited to some commodities, they do not bring about a general tendency toward changes in cash holding. But it is different if people believe that they are on the eve of big cash-induced changes in purchasing power. When they expect that the money prices of all goods will rise or fall, they expand or restrict their purchases. These attitudes strengthen and accelerate the expected tendencies considerably. This goes on until the point is reached beyond which no further changes in the purchasing power of money are expected. Only then does this inclination to buy or to sell stop and do people begin again to increase or to decrease their cash holdings."
``We look at all currencies on the basis of purchasing power parity (i.e. comparisons of different inflation rates) and, of course, any controls and influences imposed by the central bank of each country. We then try to asses whether a currency is over or undervalued, how devaluation or revaluation may impact a specific currency, and then gauge the potential impact of such currency characteristics on the business of each company. For example, for an export-oriented company, a devaluation of its operating currency could be positive because it may be able to export more aggressively and more profitably, while the opposite could be true for an import-oriented company.
``Our purchasing power parity studies indicate that China’s currency, the renminbi, is actually close to fair value against the U.S. dollar at this stage. Judging from past experience, we believe that China is unlikely to act quickly on currency adjustments because they are afraid of the consequences of such volatility.
``The Chinese Central Bank Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, hinted in March that the renminbi might be allowed to rise once the global economy recovered. However, the Commerce Ministry and others protective of Chinese exporters expressed opposition to a rise in the renminbi, as exporters saw shipments fall early in 2009 for the first time since China began opening trade in the late 1970s.
``As we see it, Chinese exporters have plenty of orders and Chinese companies are even stockpiling commodities such as crude oil, various metals, and grains, as a hedge against what appears to be rising inflation. Wages are moving up – in the export provinces of coastal China, for example, wages were raised by about 20% recently in an attempt to attract more workers from the interior.
``If the renminbi appreciates, that could mean losses in China’s vast foreign reserves, which would fall in renminbi terms. Meanwhile, the Chinese are addressing the depreciation of the U.S. dollar with a diversification of their foreign reserves into other currencies and a move to higher interest rate securities compared to low-interest U.S. Treasuries.
``The purchasing and storing of commodities is another way for China to conserve its value of foreign exchange reserves in an environment of a depreciating U.S. dollar. While statistics on commodity inventory levels in China may not be reliable or fully disclosed, our current information indicates that China’s commodity inventory levels are high. The Chinese favor commodities knowing that they will eventually be used, and also because they are concerned, given high and increasing demand, that commodity prices could rise further. A possible course of action could be to revalue the renminbi upwards so commodities would be cheaper in renminbi terms and wage demands could more easily be met. But with nationalist emotions rising, that course is probably closed."
Based on Mr. Mobius' account of China's forex management, China seems to be acting on her perceived changes in the exchange value of money of her currency relative to other currencies by diversification through higher yields of ex-US dollar instruments and importantly through massive stockpiling of commodities.
In the words of Ludwig von Mises,
``He who believes that the prices of the goods in which he takes an interest will rise, buys more of them than he would have bought in the absence of this belief: accordingly he restricts his cash holding. He who believes that prices will drop, restricts his purchases and thus enlarges his cash holding. As long as such speculative anticipations are limited to some commodities, they do not bring about a general tendency toward changes in cash holding. But it is different if people believe that they are on the eve of big cash-induced changes in purchasing power. When they expect that the money prices of all goods will rise or fall, they expand or restrict their purchases. These attitudes strengthen and accelerate the expected tendencies considerably. This goes on until the point is reached beyond which no further changes in the purchasing power of money are expected. Only then does this inclination to buy or to sell stop and do people begin again to increase or to decrease their cash holdings."
So it's not just the public acting to safeguard money as a store of value, even China seems aware of the endemic propensity by her trading partners to engage in inflationism thereby seek alternative havens.
In short, these are simply manifestations of the ongoing global monetary disorders, which I expect to worsen overtime.
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