Sunday, July 13, 2008

Phisix: Learning From the Lessons of Financial History

``Here’s the thing: When you get diversity breakdowns in markets, you get bubbles and crashes. When you get diversity breakdowns in societies, it’s ideologically similar. As Scott Page has shown, diversity (markets, ideas, ecologies) is a key to stability and growth.”-Josh Wolfe, Forbes Nanotech

In loving memory of my uncle Marciano U. Te (January 2, 1926-July 7, 2008)

``“The mistakes of a sanguine manager are far more to be dreaded than the theft of a dishonest manager," wrote Walter Bagehot. The best protection against excessively sanguine beliefs is the study of financial history, with its many examples of how easy it is to be plausible, but wrong, both as financial actors and as policy makers. Perhaps we need a required course in the recurring bubbles, busts, foibles and disasters of financial history for anyone to qualify as a government financial official. I have the same recommendation for management development in every financial firm.” Thus wrote veteran banker Alex Pollock, a resident fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, in advocating that the lessons from Financial History represents as the paramount guide into shaping of regulations-where history manifests of a slew of policy actions in reaction to market developments and their unintended backlashes-or for financial actors when divining portfolio strategies.

The most common problem we observe is that the public loves to adhere to simplified understanding of a complex problem, usually sourced from mainstream news, and apply nostrums as solutions. Whether it is the rice crisis, stratospheric oil or energy prices, or Phisix bear market it is basically all the same, we find a culprit, pin the blame on them without examining in depth why all these came about and worst, proffer solutions that are usually knee jerk responses bereft of historical morals which usually gets us mired into more trouble in the future.

Understanding the Phisix Bear Market

The Phisix, like most of the major equity benchmarks in the world including the US, is in a technical bear market, down by nearly 40% (37% to be exact based on Friday’s close). Since mainstream media is so fixated with oil and food, thus accordingly our market is likewise allegedly bogged by such issues.

We hardly hear any voice including from our so-called high profile experts in dealing with other pertinent issues: the continuing gridlock in the global credit market, the worsening economic slowdown in major developed worlds as a result of the deflating housing bubbles and attendant signs of contracting liquidity or monetary tightening in the global marketplace which has now become discriminate.

Of course, we do not share with depression advocates the view that the world is headed for Armageddon or that global financial “decoupling” is a fiction. As we mentioned, shrinking liquidity has made investment destinations become rather choosy or discriminate and our observation of Africa (see Recoupling and Inflation Doesn’t Explain Everything…) as benefiting from the present environment has been corroborated by the Economist magazine (emphasis ours),

``At the start of this year, some 15 sub-Saharan African countries had stockmarkets, listing some 500 companies with tradable shares and a combined market capitalisation–excluding relatively mighty South Africa's–of $100 billion, according to a report from Goldman Sachs, “Africa Rising”. Since then, these markets have mostly soared ever higher, even as shares everywhere else have plunged to earth. The best performing stockmarket among this impressive bunch is Ghana's, up by one-third so far this year.”

If this isn’t “decoupling” then I don’t know what this is suppose to represent.

Is it not a wonder why Africa seems immune to the same problem we or the world have been suffering from? Is it not the Philippines an “economically” better positioned compared to these states? So what’s the difference?

Honestly speaking, we don’t have an answer to everything although we do have some suspicions (prolonged years of underinvestment, prevailing commodity resource boom, probable portfolio rotations and China’s growing role in financing Africa’s infrastructure investments).

But there is one thing we can be sure of; if the premises cited by our financial experts do not seem to be applicable to African states, whom are supposedly in a far inferior position relative to us (based from the standpoint of economic statistics) or to most of our neighbors, then the likelihood is that the same conventional justifications used at our end stands from tenuous grounds.

Financial History And The Phases of Bear Markets

Figure 1: Phisix: History Shows 4 Bear Market Cycles

This brings us to financial history.

Financial markets are basically characterized by market trends borne out of the transitions of overinvestment-underinvestment cycles or commonly known as the Boom-Bust cycles.

Bear markets functioning as the other major market trend (other one being the Bullmarket) may constitute as either primary/structural/secular or secondary/cyclical/countertrend.

Primary-secular-structural bear market usually signifies the unwinding of previous excesses built up within the marketplace- as seen by massive overvaluation, speculative excesses (proliferation of margin trading) and “this time is different” euphoric attitudes- financed by too much debt or leverage in the banking system and or capital markets to the point of massive asset-liabilities mismatches which likewise reflects on major imbalances within an economy.

It may also represent fatalistic or defeatist government policies; remember the 5 cardinal sins-protectionism (nationalism, capital controls), regulatory overkill (high cost from added bureaucracy), monetary policy mistakes (bubble forming policies as negative real rates), excess taxation or war (political instability).

Overall, structural or secular bear markets reflect internal or endogenous adjustments as a result from these malinvestments or bungled policies.

On the other hand secondary-cyclical-countertrends are simply trends that correct temporarily against a major trend. Remember since no trend goes in a straight line major trends are likewise confronted with major corrections, and this could be triggered by many superficial factors.

The Phisix has not been a stranger to bear markets. In the past twenty two years we have seen four bear markets which equally reflect both cyclical and secular or structural (see figure 1) phases.

The Cyclical Phases (as measured by peak to trough)

Following EDSA I, the Phisix soared by TEN times before:

1. August 1987 to October 1988- the Phisix lost about 45% and consolidated for 13 months before recovering and resuming another attempt to the upside. The trigger for the bear market in 1987 – ex-Col. Honasan’s August 28th Black Friday’s botched coup d'état against erstwhile President Cory Aquino.

2. November 1989 to October 1990- the Phisix lost about 62% in about 11 months before convalescing. The trigger for the bear market of 1989 -November 30th Makati coup again by ex-Col. Honasan.

The aftermath to the last cyclical bear market saw the Phisix soar by over 5 times to its 1997 high of 3,447.

As you can see, political upheavals such as the past aborted coup attempts could serve as triggers to bear markets.

The Structural/Secular Phase (as measured by peak to trough)

Figure 2: IMF: Asia: A Perspective on the Subprime Crisis

Figure 2 from IMF’s Khor Hoe Ee and Kee Rui Xiong reveals of the similarity between today’s subprime debacle in the US and the 1997 Asian experience.

Abundant liquidity, massive capital inflows, overcapacity from overinvestments, loose credit standards, soaring assets fueled by leverage, inordinate foreign currency debts, conflicting interests from participants (agency problem) and moral hazard among others have been enumerated as main contributors to these pair of boom bust cycles.

In the Philippine financial markets, the angst from the fundamental adjustments of the 1997 crisis was mainly expressed via massive price revaluations as the sharp depreciation of the Peso, the collapse in real estate prices and the initial collapse of the Phisix.

Again what must be remembered was that even if the bubble popping contagion was seen from a regional perspective, the imbalances brought about by the above factors was seen in the construct of the domestic economy and in the local financial markets. In short, the bubble was internally generated as much as it reflected the region’s activities.

This leads us back to figure 1, the secular bear market of the Phisix…

3. February 1997 to October 1998-the Phisix lost 66% in about 20 months. But following the election of President Joseph Estrada, the cyclical Presidential honeymoon period led to the Phisix rebound of 120%. This could be interpreted as the cyclical bullmarket within the secular bear market.

4. July 1999 to November 2001- the Phisix lost 62% in about 28 months for the culmination of the secular bear market cycle. Oddly, the Phisix appear to trace the developments in the US markets or when the Nasdaq dot.com bubble imploded in 2000, for a huge chunk of this cycle.

From the above we learned that it is very important to distinguish between the basic compositions of market trends. Why? Because, the torment from a secular bear market relative to the cyclical bear market is far worse in terms of depth (longer duration for adjustments) and scale (larger degree of losses). Thus you can make your portfolio adjustments to reflect on the risks involved once you can categorize which part of the cycle we are into.

In general, the internal market configurations and domestic economic structural dynamics determine the adjustments reflected in the financial markets from which demarcates the cyclicality or secularity of a given trend.

Alternatively, this means that if today’s problems emanates from exogenous factors then unless it becomes severe enough to fundamentally alter the present economic and financial landscape, we should expect the present bear market to represent the cyclical nature of today’s underlying market trends.

No Bubble: A Reprise!

Have we been in a structural bubble? No, as we scrupulously argued in Phisix: No Bubble! Time for Greed Amidst Fear.


Figure 3: IMF: Improving Balance Sheets and No Property Bubble

Even IMF’s Khor Hoe Ee and Kee Rui Xiong argues in their piece that balance sheets of corporate debt levels have been markedly improving in Asia, aside from modest property appreciation seen relative to the advances in Europe and the US see figure 3.

But there are always exist some form of risks most likely coming from a contagion, quoting Mr. Khor and Mr. Kee (highlight mine),

``Even so, Asian policymakers must watch for remaining risks from the subprime crisis that could pose problems for Asia. These include what a Standard & Poor's report called a possible "triple whammy" on banks: more subprime-related losses, an adverse impact on Asian financial markets that affects banks, and an adverse impact on Asian economies that affects banks.

``But to date, such impacts seem muted. Asian banks are engaged in traditional bank lending and are not heavily exposed to the more sophisticated types of financial products that have hurt financial sectors in many industrial countries. However, a decline in the real economy as a result of economic declines in the United States and Europe could cause a significant deterioration in the quality of bank loans.”

Since the banking system has been the foremost conduit for the financing of most the Asian economies, all eyes should now focus on how banks will adjust to the ensuing downdraft in the economic growth of developed countries or from the junctures of rising “inflation”.

This I think is what the global financial market has thus far priced in, aside from the ongoing delevaraging process that has fomented the forcible selling of most liquid asset classes by institutions caught in the web of illiquidity stasis.

And if Asia is not a bubble then the likelihood is that the bear market arising from the present contagion conditions as mentioned above could be likewise be cyclical and temporary in nature. If our analysis is correct then we should see the rendition of the same patterns even amongst our neighbors.

Vietnam climbed about EIGHT times from late 2003 and has corrected 66% over the past 8 months. Today, the much ballyhooed “next China” seems to be healing (but needs further confirmation) and is up 20% from its most recent lows.

India likewise soared nearly FIVE times over the past four years and is down nearly 40% from the peak and could see still some selling pressures. Whereas China’s Shanghai index skyrocketed 4.5 times since only 2005 (or a bullmarket of about 2 years old!) and has surrendered 57% of those gains (based from its recent peak prices).

Meanwhile, our neighbor Indonesia has climbed about 4.5 times also since 2003 and has contracted by 32% during the first panic in August of 2007, but interestingly remains above this level. The JKSE is also presently above its April lows (-23% from peak) and is today down by about 20%.

On the other hand, our Phisix has trailed all of them up by only 280% from June 2003 to October 2007 and has touched the 40% threshold of losses just the other week.

Another, in a structural bear market practically all issues are supposedly headed for the gutters, but this isn’t the case today. In fact some issues have been trading within their 2007 highs: namely, Pilipino Telephone (PLTL), Petron Corp (PCOR) and Oriental Petroleum (OPM), or at near historical highs Manila Water (MWC), Philodrill (OV) and Semirara Corp (SCC).

Again these are empirical evidences that today’s bear market is cyclical in nature.

The point of this exercise is to show you the following:

1. Relativity of the performance of the previous upside and the present downturn matters. Market trends are generally determined by the longer term trends and are usually impeded by intermittent secondary or cyclical-counter trends.

2. Experts usually use existing headline information to account for present market actions but whose analysis can be shown NOT TO BE CONSISTENT with the broader market picture or if taken from a macro perspective. To quote self development author Robert Ringer, ``A false perception of reality leads to false premises, which in turn leads to false assumptions, which in turn leads to false conclusions, which, ultimately, leads to negative results…Which is why it’s incumbent upon you to become adept at distinguishing between reality and illusion. A false perception of reality — regardless of the cause — automatically leads to failure. An accurate perception of reality doesn’t guarantee success, but it’s an excellent first step in the right direction.”

3. Since people by nature are hurt by the prospects of pain more than the delight from future gains-this accounts for a cognitive bias called LOSS AVERSION- thus, losses tend to be fast and furious, even during cyclical markets due to the impulsive nature of investors.

4. If the recent losses signify cyclicality and not structural impairments then the gist of the losses appear to have been priced in for many of Asian markets (Barring any massive shocks from external channels, e.g. stock market crash in the US or UK). This is not to imply that they can’t go lower. What we mean is that the scale of losses will probably be much lesser from this point on or the degree of losses could be in the process of culminating.

5. The cyclicality, tendency to overshoot, false premises and relative performance combines to reinforce the likelihood of a faster than expected recovery.

6. Finally we are not in the practice of financial voodooism to suggest when exactly the turning point will be. From our perspective, using the lessons of the financial history, we should use the present crisis as an opportunity to grab worthwhile investment themes which are likely to be selective given the present character of heightened risk aversion.

To quote PIMCO’s co CEO Mohamed El-Erian (emphasis mine),

``Today's markets are particularly tricky as they provide the duality of both great opportunity and enormous risk. And in contrast to recent years, investors will not be able to appeal to a few macro themes; be they bullish ("the great moderation" and "goldilocks") or bearish ("debt exhaustion" and the collapse of structured finance). Instead of the phase of highly correlated market moves, up and then down, we will witness the gradual assertion of fundamental differentiation between market segments and for instruments in the capital structures…

``This volatile cocktail also speaks to the other side of the duality: the existence of big opportunities. The toxic mix is causing markets to throw the baby out with the bath water. There is now a littering of high quality assets whose prices are divorced from their underlying quality. Rather than reflect fundamentals that will eventually assert themselves, these valuations have fallen victim to the seemingly endless disruption in the financing of highly leveraged owners that have no choice but to continually dispose of assets in a disorderly fashion.”

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