Market failure is a tricky topic even for professional economists. And when non-economists raise the examples of market failure that we discussed here, matters become even trickier. Not only do all of these terms have technical meanings that often do not match what the non-economist thinks the terms mean, but most non-economists also are unaware of the various criticisms that have been raised in the literature on these topics. Most important, non-economist critics of the market are frequently unaware of the comparative institutional analysis that public choice theory has made a necessary part of thinking about the role of government in the economy. Pointing out imperfections in the market does not ipso facto justify government intervention, and the only certain way that market "failures" are "failures" is by comparison to an unreachable theoretical idea. Market imperfections are not magic wands that make market solutions and government imperfections disappear. Real understanding of comparative political economy begins rather than ends with the recognition that markets are not always perfect.
The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate hut at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups—Henry Hazlitt
Tuesday, April 02, 2013
Quote of the Day: Market Failures Does Not Justify Government Interventions
Thursday, December 20, 2012
Quote of the Day: Innovation Happens When Inventions Meet the Market
we must recognize one important insight about technology, social evolution, and economic growth. It is common for people to attribute the western world’s stunning economic growth over the last 200 years to technology. True, technology does contribute to growth in important ways, although it’s also true that economic growth helps create new technologies by generating capital to fund research. Technology, however, does not create wealth by itself, as decades of technology transfers to the third world demonstrate. For technology to lead to wealth, the right institutions are required. I like to call this the Three I’s approach: Innovation = Invention + (good) Institutions. More specifically, the market must be free enough that technology can be turned from simply an invention into an innovation. Rising wealth requires innovation, and innovation happens when inventions meet the market.
Saturday, November 24, 2012
Video: Should Governments Regulate and Intervene to Correct "Market Failures?"
"What regulation and intervention do is prevent markets from discovering new ways of solving existing problems and new ways of solving new problems. When regulation erects barriers to entry or other kinds of limits on market behavior, it cuts short this discovery process, and that leads to inefficiency and waste of resources."
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
Quote of the Day: Fed is Like the Arsonist Disguised as a Firefighter
Remember: the Fed is like the arsonist disguised as a firefighter who claims only he can put out the fires he started. Yeah, maybe the firefighter can’t rescue people from the building if he doesn’t have an axe to break down the door, but giving him a way to break in makes it far more likely that he’ll set fires in the first place.
Claiming that a gold standard ties the Fed’s hands is exactly the reason to favor it, not oppose it. The Fed was primarily, though not solely, responsible for getting us in this mess in the first place precisely because its hands were free to flood the market with artificially cheap credit.
The discretion of Big Players like the Fed is the problem, and the solution is not somehow hoping that next time they will use that discretion only for good and not evil. Tying Federal Reserve Notes to gold would take away some of that discretion, and eliminating the central bank completely in favor of a competitive monetary system with commodity backing of any sort would take it all away.
When the arsonist can’t set fires, we don’t need to worry about whether or not he has the tools to put them out. That is the fundamental argument for constraining both central banks and competitive ones by making the money they create redeemable in gold.
This is from Professor Steve Horwitz’s refutation of Ezra Klein’s critique of the Gold Standard.
Wednesday, August 08, 2012
Video: The Difference between Free Markets and Pro-Business Policies
In the following video from LearnLiberty.org, Professor Steve Horwitz explains their differences (thanks to Learn Liberty's Tim Hedberg for sending the video)
The following digest from LearnLiberty.org
In this video, Professor Steve Horwitz advocates for free market economic policy. He refutes the often recited claim that "What is good for General Motors is good for America" by explaining that pro-business legislation encourages behavior that is not beneficial to society or the business itself. He suggests that, in a free market, factors such as profit and competition encourage behavior that ultimately benefits society. Professor Horwitz illustrates that pro-business legislation restricts progress and therefore caters to the interests of industry rather than to consumers, whereas "supporters of free markets are ultimately pro-human and pro-people because it is through markets that we get the most innovation and we get the most goods and the cheapest prices."
Tuesday, May 08, 2012
Video: Corporate Taxes Hurt the People
Here is the prologue from LearnLiberty.org
Corporations are not monoliths -- they are made up of individuals, including workers and non-wealthy shareholders. So are corporations distinct from the people that comprise them? When corporations are taxed, who pays the tax? Economics professor Steven Horwitz shows why a tax on corporations is not the equivalent of a tax on the wealthy. Instead, workers and consumers will pay these taxes. A tax on a corporation is also a tax on the workers who work at the corporation, the consumers who buy from the corporation, and the shareholders who own the corporation as part of their retirement fund.
Monday, February 13, 2012
Why the Austrian Business Cycle is Not a Tarot Card
Many, if not most people, tend to look for a one-size-fits-all solution or supposed elixirs to the world’s problem. That’s one of the key reason why many are seduced by analysis or reasoning premised on mathematical or statistical models or on pattern seeking formulas.
Readers of this blog recognize that I use much of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT), but not as a standalone way to evaluate markets and events. It is important to know of the limitations of every theory, and this applies to the ABCT as well.
Professor Steve Horwitz explains, (italics original, bold emphasis mine)
Both critics and adherents of the ABCT misunderstand it if they think it is some sort of comprehensive theory of the boom, breaking point, and length/depth of the bust. It isn't. As Roger Garrison has long insisted, the theory by itself is a theory of the unsustainable boom. It is a theory that explains why driving the market rate of interest below the natural rate through expansionary monetary policy produces a boom that contains endogenous processes that will cause that boom to turn to a bust. Again, it's a theory of the unsustainable boom.
ABCT tells us nothing about exactly when the boom will break and the precise factors that will cause it. The theory claims that eventually costs will rise in such a way that make it clear that the longer-term production processes falsely induced by the boom will not be profitable, leading to their abandonment. But it says nothing about which projects will be undertaken in which markets and which costs (other than perhaps the loan rate) will rise, and it tells us nothing about the timing of those events. We know it has to happen, but the where and when are unique, not typical, features of business cycles.
Once the turning point is reached, ABCT tells us little to nothing about how the bust will play out. Yes, we know that further inflation and interventionist attempts to prevent the necessary reallocation of resources will make matters worse, but the theory by itself doesn't tell us a priori how this will play out in any given historical circumstance. The ABCT is not a theory of the causes of the length and depth of recessions/depressions, but a theory of the unsustainable boom.
In short, the ABCT explains the cause and effects of tampering with interest rates. Yet there are many other influences to people's incentives to act, which is not limited to interest rate signals.
And in looking for specifics or exactitudes, like ‘timing’ and which ‘particular projects or costs’ will be affected, would be similar to looking for answers from the tarot card. Obviously ABCT does not work that way.