Sunday, November 22, 2026

Three Markets, One Signal: The PSEi Unravels, the Peso Weakens, and T-Bills Surge

 

Psychologist James Reason’s ‘Swiss cheese model’ holds that major disasters in complex systems are the result of the accumulation and alignment of multiple failures—the ‘eyes’ or holes in some kinds of cheese. Today, several risks—overvaluation, high debt, cash flow shortfalls, volatility, rising interest rates, interconnections, financial games, poor safeguards—are creating the perfect conditions for a financial crash—Satyajit Das 

In this issue

Three Markets, One Signal: The PSEi Unravels, the Peso Weakens, and T-Bills Surge

I. Whac-a-Mole 1: The Floor Gives Way

II. The Global Mallet: Equity De-Risking and Deleveraging Reaches the Core

III. Whac-a-Mole 2: The Peso Borrows from the Reserves

IV. Whac-a-Mole 3: The Mallet Hits the T-Bills

V. Three Markets, One Signal: The Mallet Moves the Pressure, Not the Problem 


Three Markets, One Signal: The PSEi Unravels, the Peso Weakens, and T-Bills Surge 

Financial stress keeps migrating. The PSEi's support stock cracks, the peso borrows from the reserves, and T-bills price a liquidity squeeze while the AI unwind reaches Asia. 

I. Whac-a-Mole 1: The Floor Gives Way 

This week, the mallet found the floor.


Figure 1 

The PSEi 30 lost 286.51 points (-5.12%) to 5,306.98, its biggest weekly drop since the week of January 31, 2025 and a 2020 low. The 5,600 "Maginot line" is gone. The March 19, 2020 closing low of 4,623.42 now sits 12.9% below. (Figure 1, topmost pane) 

"ICTSI selloff drags PSEi to 6-year low," ran the headline. Wow. This is a rarity. The Overton window has almost always treated the PSEi as synonymous with the Philippine stock market.

For once, it was accurate. Partly though. 

Friday. ICTSI's 7.22% crash delivered 89.52 gross points, or 52.37% of the index's 170.93-point loss (-3.12%). SM (-4.38%, 23.31 points) lifted the pair's contribution to 66%. The remaining 34% was reflected in negative PSEi breadth: just 5 advancers against 23 decliners. The broader PSE market was equally negative, with 41 advancers against 131 decliners. 

Yet ICTSI alone was 49.5% of the Php 9.11B main board volume (MBV)!  (Figure 1, middle graph) Foreigners sold Php 993.6M of its roughly Php 4.51B turnover (22%), so nothing bid underneath it. The top 10 brokers handled 66% of MBV. 

The week. ICTSI was 136.01 gross points, or 47.5% of the 286.51-point plunge. With SM, BDO, BPI and SMPH, the share was 64.54%. Breadth was 283-593. That -310 spread is the widest since September 30, 2022's -326, and it is the eleventh straight negative week (Figure 1, lowest image)


Figure 2 

The average PSEi member fell 4.45%, and only two held up. ICTSI fell 10.58%, while PLUS (-16.92%) and SCC (-19.8%) kept collapsing. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

ICTSI's index weight slid to about 21.7%, yet the top 5 still carry 53.84%. (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

The three big banks (BDO, BPI, MBT) rose from 20.34% to 21.12% simply by falling less. 

Foreigners were net sellers for a second week (-1.128B). ICTSI's own net foreign selling (-1.271B) exceeded the entire market's net outflow. Daily main board volume rose 14.8% to Php 6.771B, with cross trades at 25.84% and ICTSI at 38.73%. 

Why does one stock carry half the tape? Because a managed index changes who participates. 

When the benchmark is defended, with floors under the heavyweights, rescue bids post-recess  (afternoon delight), into the close (pre-closing pumps) and/or 'rotation’ from one name to the next, prices stop telling participants where the risk is. A measure managed as a target stops measuring. Those who need true prices leave, and a thin ring of brokers and cross trades works a few names. The PSE posted its lowest retail and institutional participation in 2025, and a thinner market attracts more managing, which thins it further. 

What I call benchmarkism is the whole exercise: managing market outcomes through an unofficial "national team," and statistical output to project a panorama of “macro stability.” ICTSI was its primary instrument. Its rising price, valuation and volume share from July to September were engineered to put a floor under the PSEi and power a rotation-led bull market, as our three-part series laid out. 

The index was made to look stronger than the market underneath it. Concentration isn't an oversight. It is what benchmarkism leaves behind, and the establishment has been as silent on WHY it happens as on how concentrated trading has become. 

Each rescue must also be bigger than the last to buy the same calm. ICTSI peaked at Php 1,027 on July 20 and was celebrated for its Php 2T market cap in early September. Then its decline accelerated. The stock engineered to be the floor was holding the index up, and when it broke, the index went with it. 

Benchmarkism backfired. Price controls buy time but deepen the maladjustment, and the consequences run opposite to what was intended. In a savings-starved capital market, the floor had to be built from one stock's price, and that is the unforeseen consequence. 

This week’s collapse essentially validates the arguments advanced in our three-part series. 

ICTSI is now technically oversold, making a rebound possible at any time. But an oversold condition is not a reversal signal. A bounce may provide temporary relief without changing the underlying trend, restoring market breadth or repairing the concentration that benchmarkism left behind. A recovery in price should not be mistaken for a recovery in market structure.

II. The Global Mallet: Equity De-Risking and Deleveraging Reaches the Core 

Of 19 national bourses, 16 fell, with an average change of -3.49%. (Figure 2, lowest chart)


Figure 3 

Taiwan's Taiex crashed 17.5%, its worst week since 1991. The Nikkei fell 7.7% and the KOSPI 7.95%, ending the week 48% below its June record. (Figure 3, topmost diagram) 

The Dow, S&P 500 and Nasdaq lost 8.02%, 8.61% and 10.02%. Gold, silver and copper fell 8.92%, 15.44% and 9.78%, and Bitcoin 14.36% (StockCharts). (Figure 3, middle and lower visuals) 

The dollar rose 0.4% while the 10-year TNX slid from 5.154% to 4.912%. 

The order matters. Financial market stress first appeared at the periphery, where funding is thinnest: Indonesia's crash in October, Korea, then Brazil, whose real has lost about 14–15% since the re-election and whose central bank intervened for the first time since 2024. Now it has reached the core: the Nasdaq, US banks (KBW -9.5%), the Magnificent 7, high-yield credit. Weak balance sheets lose dollar funding and risk capital first. When the core starts selling, no one is left to fund the periphery. 

The Philippines sits on the periphery side of that line, so this week's PSEi selloff is the same signal on a smaller screen. 

Gold falling with equities matters too. Leveraged holders are selling what they can sell, not what they want to sell. That is deleveraging, not rotation. 

Reflexivity turns market stress into a self-reinforcing process. Falling prices do not merely reflect deteriorating confidence; they help produce it. Asset-price declines impair collateral, tighten financing conditions, trigger margin calls and force liquidation. Forced selling then pushes prices lower, further weakening balance sheets and restricting access to funding. What begins as a repricing becomes a deleveraging cycle. The market is no longer simply discounting economic weakness; it is transmitting and amplifying it. 

The AI unwind, in causal order: 

Falling AI equities are the symptom. Nvidia lost 22.9% on the week, semiconductors 17.1% and the Magnificent 7 index 10.3%. 

Collateral falls and funding tightens. Oracle's CDS hit a record 341 bps, CoreWeave's yields jumped 84 bps to 15.11%, and high-yield spreads widened 51 bps, the most since April 2025. Banks are reportedly selling data-center loans at the 80s and 90s. Falling valuations weaken collateral, while widening credit spreads raise refinancing costs. The financing conditions that amplified the boom now accelerate the unwind. 

Stress reaches circular financing. Chipmakers fund neoclouds, which buy chips, which are pledged against loans. The ECB counts over $4 trillion of off-balance-sheet commitments among big tech. The structure depends on continuously rising valuations, continued financing and demand. A weak link therefore threatens the entire chain. What appeared as independent sources of demand was partly circular capital formation. 

The unwind reaches the supply chain and geopolitics. The US is moving to require licenses for AI chip exports to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil. Strategic initiatives such as Pax Silica and national semiconductor policies make commercial adjustment more politically costly. Governments increasingly treat AI and semiconductor capacity as strategic assets rather than ordinary commercial investments. This creates another layer of rigidity: capital, infrastructure and supply chains become harder to redirect even when their economic returns deteriorate. 

But strategic importance cannot repeal profit and loss. 

The policy response risks transferring rather than resolving the adjustment. Guarantees, liquidity injections and monetary accommodation may interrupt forced selling and postpone balance-sheet recognition. They cannot, by themselves, restore the economic viability of misallocated capital. If intervention sustains excess capacity, debt and demand against constrained productive supply, the adjustment can migrate from financial markets into the currency and price level. Losses that cannot be absorbed through asset repricing eventually be transferred to currency holders through monetary accommodation and inflation. 

This time the policy dilemma is sharper. The Fed is debating hikes even as financial markets demand relief. The traditional central-bank put collides with inflation. Easing may stabilize asset prices but weaken the currency and reignite price pressures; tightening may contain inflation but intensify deleveraging. Policymakers face a conflict between financial stability and monetary stability that cannot be resolved simply by supplying more liquidity.


Figure 4

The Philippine link. Semiconductor exports soared 86% in September to a record, lifting their share of exports to a record 57.5%, but imports surged too (see Stagflation 19). (Figure 4, topmost window) 

September imports rose 25.7% to $15.03B against exports up 35.6% to $9.87B, a $5.15B deficit. 9-month deficit was $47.158B—a record. The export boom is smaller than the import bill it creates. A bust cuts the export leg quickly while the oil and debt-service bills stay put. 

A note on the week's outages (Microsoft, the FAA ground stop, four major US banks, United, the NSA network and Apple): coincidence cannot be ruled out, but neither should the events be viewed in isolation. In a war economy, communications, transportation, financial infrastructure and digital networks are strategic assets and potential points of vulnerability, therefore potential targets. Whether these disruptions were ordinary technical failures, stress-induced operational fragility, strategic probing or something more remains unresolved. The important point is that systemic complexity has created vulnerabilities with geopolitical consequences. The distinction between civilian infrastructure and strategic infrastructure is increasingly difficult to maintain. 

The current “periphery to the core” market stress increasingly resembles a crisis dynamic in progression. 

III. Whac-a-Mole 2: The Peso Borrows from the Reserves 

The dollar rose against 7 of 10 Asian currencies, yet the regional average was +0.02%. India's rupee and Japan's yen rallied, offsetting weakness in the Korean won and ASEAN currencies. USDPHP rose 0.14% to 63.81, close to the 64.17 record of October 27. 

That is a quiet print in a week when Brazil's real fell 4.7%, South Africa's rand 3.7% and Mexico's peso 3.3%. A stable price in a stressed week is information only if you ask who paid for it. The reserves did. 

The BSP reported a $1.5B October BOP deficit, $10.6B for January to October, and GIR down to about $98B. The 10-month deficit is 15% above the BSP's $9.2B full-year forecast, and the BSP's year-end reserves forecast of $104B is $6B above where reserves stand with two months left. The forecast has already failed. (Figure 4, middle graph) 

The Treasury also awarded an initial $453.4M from its third Retail Onshore Dollar Bond issuance at a 5.65% coupon, against $839.5M in tenders—4.2 times the initial $200M offer. The offer remains open until November 24. 

The onshore issuance mobilizes dollar savings for sovereign financing rather than directly generating new external borrowing from international capital markets. It converts privately held dollar claims into a sovereign dollar liability, which the government must eventually service in foreign currency. Residents queuing more than four times over for dollar paper at 5.65% is also a statement about how they expect the peso to behave. 

The mainstream awaits a Q4 spending recovery, but Q3 GDP grew 2.1% and nine-month growth is 2.45%. Importantly, Q4 and household GDP has been materially slowing since 2021, printing 3.8% and 3% in 2025. (Figure 4, lowest image) 

Year-end government spending without real savings behind it is financed by money creation or foreign borrowing. 

Expect the record fiscal gap to widen, alongside another record trade and current account deficit (twin deficits). That widens the saving-investment gap, which only foreign funding or reserve depletion can bridge. The BOP is where the bridge shows up. 

IV. Whac-a-Mole 3: The Mallet Hits the T-Bills 


Figure 5 

The Philippine (BVAL) yield curve is flattening from both sides Bills are being pulled up while the 3- to 10-year belly is pulled down, closing the spread from both sides. The 1-, 3- and 6-month bills rose 44.4, 22.58 and 10.54 bps on the week, reaching multi-year highs.

Mid-curve moves were +7.79 (1y), -4.04 (2y), -10.13 (3y), -14.16 (4y), -15.91 (5y) and -15.9 bps (7y), while the 10-year fell 8.2 bps. Against October 30, bills are up 36 to 73 bps and 7- to 10-year yields down 10 to 50 bps, while the 20- to 25-year sector is up only about 4 bps, essentially unchanged. (Figure 5, topmost pane) 

Against October 30, bills are up 36 to 73 bps and 7- to 10-year yields down 10 to 50, while the 20- to 25-year is up only about 4 bps, essentially unchanged. (Figure 5, middle image) 

The front end is being pulled up, the belly pulled down, and the long end barely moves. The front-end repricing raises the possibility that markets are anticipating further BSP tightening. (Figure 5, lower graph) 

Persistent peso weakness, reserve depletion and inflation risks constrain the BSP's policy marking ability to either ease, or force it to raise rates despite weakening economic growth. The multi-year highs in short-term bills reflect this tightening pressure, although market yields do not establish that a policy hike is inevitable. 

There are three candidates for the belly's rally: 

  • Weak growth. Materially slowing Philippine GDP growth points to weaker economic activity and lower future credit demand, putting downward pressure on intermediate-term yields. 
  • Imported duration demand. US 10-year yields fell about 20 bps and 2-year yields 22 bps this week. Falling US yields provide an external tailwind for Philippine intermediate bonds, even as domestic short-term funding costs rise. 
  • Domestic liquidity. This is likely the more consequential factor. Diminishing bank liquidity buffers and tighter funding conditions coexist with growing demand for government financing. Banks and other institutions face competing demands for liquidity, while short-term government securities must offer increasingly higher yields to attract funding. This helps explain why bills are repricing upward even as intermediate yields decline. 

There is another complication. The local bond market is losing both turnover and foreign participation.


Figure 6

PHP Treasury volume keeps falling and now sits at 2024 lows. (Figure 6, upper graph) The market is clearing with less turnover, making price movements more dependent on the marginal transaction. Lower volume does not establish the absence of demand, but it raises the question of how much depth remains to absorb a larger adjustment. 

The BSP reports four consecutive quarters of foreign outflows from Philippine bonds, bringing cumulative withdrawals to $4.477 billion. Q3 alone accounted for $748 million, while year-to-date outflows reached $2.941 billion. (Figure 6, lower chart) 

This sustained retreat came as the 10-year yield hit a multi-year high. The foreign bid built around the announced JPMorgan index inclusion, starting next year, is retreating even before the index arrives. 

Higher yields are also a fiscal fact. Every bill that rolls over at a multi-year high raises the cost of refinancing a record deficit, and the interest bill competes with everything else the budget has promised. 

The adjustment has moved from the stock market and the peso into the government's own cost of funds. 

V. Three Markets, One Signal: The Mallet Moves the Pressure, Not the Problem 

  • In stocks, the support stock became the fault line. 
  • In the peso, stability is being sustained through reserve depletion against persistent external deficits. 
  • In bills, the price of liquidity is rising while market volume shrinks. 

All three expose the same shortage of real savings, while the AI unwind removes the external subsidy that had been papering over it. 

Engineering support for the heavyweights does not create market breadth; it suppresses it. Smoothing the peso through intervention and dollar borrowing does not create savings. Institutional demand for government securities at higher yields does not eliminate the cost of debt. Each intervention moves the pressure to the next price that cannot be controlled. 

The mole was never the problem. The mallet is. 

Prices are information. Strategic importance cannot repeal the laws of scarcity.


Monday, November 16, 2026

Stagflation Part 20: Philippine Q3 GDP at 2.1% — The Trendline Breaks, the Debt Dependence Deepens

The politicians will continue pointing to GDP, employment, and nominal consumer expenditures as proof that everything is fine. But an economy cannot be judged solely by how much money changes hands. The real measure of prosperity is whether people can maintain their standard of living, accumulate capital, and improve their financial circumstances over time—Martin Armstrong 

In this issue: 

Stagflation Part 20: Philippine Q3 GDP at 2.1% — The Trendline Breaks, the Debt Dependence Deepens

I. The GDP Trendline Breaks!

II. The Break Behind the Headline

III. A Number Made in the Policy Room

IV. Crowding Out in Motion

V. The Household Pays

VI. Engineered Strength, Organic Weakness

VII. Exports Boom, Output Doesn't

VIII. Money Still Chasing Output

IX. Stagflation Is a Process

X. Conclusion: The Headline Tells You How Much. The Trend Tells You Where

Stagflation Part 20: Philippine Q3 GDP at 2.1% — The Trendline Breaks, the Debt Dependence Deepens 

Q3 and 9M growth were the weakest since the 2020 recession. Yet both figures were built on debt and suppression. Both are running out of room.


I. The GDP Trendline Breaks! 

The headline says 2.1%. The nine-month figure says 2.5%. Both are the lowest since the pandemic recession. LOWEST. 

Yet both figures are ratios: this year's output measured against last year's. A ratio cannot tell you where the actual output level stands. 

Plot the levels and the story changes.


Figure 1 

The story is not simply slowing GDP. Real GDP has broken the rising secondary trendline it maintained since the 2020 pandemic floor, while nominal GDP continues to cling to its own support. 

We have repeatedly warned about the vulnerability of this trajectory. 

In Stagflation Part 5, we observed that Q1 2026 marked the second attempted breach of the underlying growth trajectory. 

By Stagflation Part 14, we warned that trend support had become precarious and that a decisive break would put a technical recession into the realm of immediate risk. The growth recorded through 2025–2026 had depended heavily on debt-financed government consumption, price suppression, and administratively engineered sectoral gains masking losses elsewhere. 

It is no longer merely fragile. It is broken. 

Headline watchers see growth. Chart watchers see a support break. 

II. The Break Behind the Headline 

GDP growth is a base effect: a percentage change against the same quarter a year ago. Strong base, weak print. Weak base, strong print. 

But the GDP level tells us what the economy was actually estimated to have produced. That level is now below its post-pandemic trend or the secondary trendline. 

Statistically, the ‘economy’ can still report positive year-on-year growth even as its underlying output trajectory deteriorates. 

GDP is supposed to represent the economy's productive activity. Yet when the headline growth rate remains positive while actual output falls below its established trajectory, GDP growth ceases to convey the economy's underlying direction. The statistic records growth; it conceals deterioration. 

Nominal GDP remains better supported because it incorporates both changes in real output and changes in prices. With prices rising, current-price GDP can hold up even as inflation-adjusted output loses ground. But higher nominal output does not necessarily mean stronger productive capacity, nor does it guarantee improved household purchasing power. 

Q4 is the seasonal high of the year. Expect nominal GDP to pop back above support and real GDP to retest it from below. That bounce is the easy part. The real test is the height of the peak. 

If real GDP establishes a lower Q4 high relative to previous Q4 peaks, Q1 2027 begins from a weaker position. Seasonality can mask deterioration; it cannot reverse it. 

The broken trendline likely marks a ‘tipping point.’ The more important question is what has been holding the economy up while its underlying momentum weakens. 

III. A Number Made in the Policy Room 

GDP does not exist outside politics and policy. The economy's measured performance reflects the accumulated consequences of policies: government spending, monetary policy, credit allocation, regulation, and intervention in market prices over time. 

Officials want a presentable number. A presentable number needs presentable prices. 

So the oil shock policies arrive: EO 110 price suppression, BSP relief measures, FX management, and timid tightening. 

These are layered on top of pandemic-era emergency policies, which themselves were layered on top of a decade of easy money. 

But interventions do not eliminate underlying economic constraints. They redistribute the adjustment, often making its eventual consequences harder to see. Worse, each intervention can create distortions and imbalances that invite another set of interventions to conceal them. 

Consider the price system. 

Real GDP is derived by removing price changes from nominal output through an appropriate price index. The PSA’s deflator is called the implicit index. When that index understates actual price increases, measured real output is overstated. This is where price intervention and statistical measurement intersect. 

  • Price controls can hold posted prices down.
  • Shrinkflation—smaller packages at the same price—reduces the quantity received.
  • Skimpflation—lower quality at the same price—reduces what the same expenditure buys.
  • Sneakflation—additional fees and charges—raises the effective cost outside the prominently advertised price.
  • Informal and black-market transactions can reveal prices that official channels do not capture. 

The household pays more, receives less, or both. Yet the official price measure has not fully captured the deterioration in purchasing conditions. When the relevant deflator misses those price increases, nominal spending is divided by an understated price index, leaving an inflated estimate of real output. 

The nine-month numbers expose the gap. 

Nominal GDP grew 6.8%, while real GDP expanded by 2.5%. The implied GDP deflator therefore increased by approximately 4.2%—the price component separating current-price output from inflation-adjusted output. 9-month CPI averaged 5.4%, while the implicit price index for household final consumption expenditure rose 4.97%. 

These measures are not interchangeable. The GDP deflator covers domestically produced final output, while CPI measures the prices of a consumer basket. Household consumption has its own implicit price measure within the national accounts. The differences matter because each index captures a different composition of prices. 

Nor does the GDP deflator mechanically inherit CPI distortions. But neither index can fully represent changes in purchasing conditions that escape price collection or are difficult to quantify: politically suppressed prices, reduced package sizes, deteriorating quality, diminished availability, additional transaction costs, and substitution toward inferior alternatives 

Household final consumption accounts for roughly 71.7% of GDP (9-Month rGDP). That makes the accuracy of its price measurement especially consequential. As an illustration, a one-percentage-point understatement in the relevant household consumption deflator could translate into roughly 0.7 percentage points of aggregate real GDP growth, given that expenditure weight. The actual national accounts effect depends on the component deflators and calculation methodology. 

The result is a growing disconnect between measured output and what households actually obtain from their spending. 

The fiscal numbers reinforce the same deterioration. As we showed in Part 19, the nine-month twin deficits—fiscal and trade—reached record levels. Public debt was also the second-highest on record for the period. 

Record twin deficits alongside the weakest growth since 2020 point to the same underlying problem: it now takes record borrowing to deliver less growth. 

IV. Crowding Out in Motion 

The government's expanding footprint is becoming increasingly central to the GDP story.


Figure 2 (edited to correct the debt cost of incremental real GDP chart)

Government consumption accounted for 16.9% of final expenditure over nine months, up from 16.7% at the half-year—a record high. Household consumption accounted for 71.74%, up marginally from 71.53% a year earlier, but remains on a long-term downtrend from its 78.64% peak in 2003. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

This is crowding out effect in its broader resource-allocation sense. The mechanism is simple. Purchasing power ultimately rests on production (Say’s Law of Markets): you can buy with what you have produced or with a claim on what someone else will produce later. 

Government spending financed by borrowing claims real resources today and transfers the financing burden into the future. The household share does not shrink simply because consumers become timid. It shrinks as the government's claim on economic resources expands. 

Now price the borrowing. 

National government debt increased by ₱2.205 trillion over the twelve months to September, from ₱17.455 trillion to ₱19.660 trillion. 

Nominal GDP over the latest four quarters was ₱1.689 trillion larger than in the preceding four-quarter period, rising from ₱27.682 trillion to ₱29.371 trillion. Debt accumulation was equivalent to 131% of the incremental nominal GDP. (Figure 2, middle image) 

This compares a change in the debt stock with an increase in GDP flows. It does not establish that every additional peso of debt financed or generated output. Nor does the entire increase in the debt stock represent new borrowing. Foreign-currency debt revaluation, among other debt-management and cash operations, also affects the peso-denominated total—from an accounting standpoint. 

But the comparison exposes the scale of liability accumulation relative to incremental nominal expansion. Debt accumulation is no longer merely accompanying economic growth; it has become a central pillar of the spending supporting it. 

Against real output, the comparison is even more striking. 

Nine-month real GDP increased by only ₱0.414 trillion from a year earlier, from ₱16.846 trillion to ₱17.2596 trillion, while national government debt rose ₱1.952 trillion over the same nine-month period. That amounts to approximately ₱4.70 in additional debt for every peso of incremental real output—an unprecedented divergence. (Figure 2, lowest graph) 


Figure 3 

The debt-to-GDP ratio tells the same story. Media reports put it at 66.9%, the highest since 2004, as if debt and GDP were two unrelated developments that happened to meet in a ratio. They did not. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

The ratio rose because borrowing outran output, while the borrowing itself financed expenditure that contributed to the output being reported. Borrowing finances government expenditure, which contributes directly to measured GDP. The resulting expansion in output, in turn, becomes part of the denominator against which accumulated debt is measured. The relationship is not incidental; it is part of the mechanism. 

The nine-month fiscal deficit reached a record ₱1.303 trillion, already 78.6% of the full-year ₱1.66 trillion target. Relative to nine-month nominal GDP, the deficit amounted to 6.07%, up from 5.5% at the half-year and approaching the 2022 peak of 6.55%. 

Interest payments alone consumed ₱772 billion, equivalent to 3.6% of nominal GDP—the highest since 2009. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

Against real GDP, the deficit burden reached 7.6%, the highest since 2021's 8.54%. Meanwhile, interest payments amounted to 4.47% of real GDP, the highest since at least 2008. 

Each additional peso of borrowing is now accompanied by a smaller increment in real output. Under the incumbent's savings-investment-gap policy framework, politically prioritized spending claims financing first. What remains for competing productive uses must fight over the residual pool of savings and credit. The allocation is political; the opportunity cost is economic. 

The government gets its funding. The private economy gets what is left. 

V. The Household Pays 

Bank credit to households is one of the transmission belts and it is slowing. Universal and commercial bank consumer loan growth peaked at 25.36% in Q1 2024 and has declined for five consecutive quarters, reaching 17.84% in Q2 and 16.17% in Q3. (Figure 3, lowest chart) 

Household consumption growth resonated: 3.0% in Q1, 2.9% in Q2, and 2.4% in Q3. Per capita, growth slowed from 2.1% to 2.0% and then 1.5%—the weakest since the pandemic recession. 

Real GDP per capita grew just 1.3% in Q3. 

Both household consumption growth and its per capita counterpart have fallen to their weakest levels since the pandemic recession. 

The consumer economy is rapidly losing momentum even as headline GDP remains positive. 

The easy-money, credit-driven backstop that helped sustain the post-pandemic recovery has faded, even as households went on a borrowing blitz through 2024. Its nasty ramification: the balance sheets that borrowed the money are still carrying the debt. 

The pandemic-era credit boom temporarily sustained consumption through monetary accommodation, regulatory relief, and easier financing conditions. But credit cannot permanently substitute for income, real savings, and productive employment. Borrowing creates future claims against income; it does not create the real resources needed to satisfy those claims. 

Yet the sectors banking on the consumer are still hiring and borrowing as if a recovery were just around the corner.


Figure 4 

Retail growth slowed to 3.8% in Q3, its weakest since the pandemic era. Yet universal and commercial bank lending to wholesale and retail trade rose 7.3% in September. Employment in the sector jumped by 545,700 during the month, but remained 100,760 below its year-earlier level. (Figure 4, topmost diagram) 

Food and accommodation grew just 1% for the second consecutive quarter, with accommodation contracting 0.6%. Yet bank lending to the sector expanded 27.4%, while September employment increased by 834,000 year-on-year, 448,840 month-on-month and 734,250 year-to-date. (Figure 4, middle image) 

Credit and headcount are expanding into a market that is barely growing. 

Loans can finance working capital, operating obligations, and refinancing just as readily as business expansion. Rising lending does not necessarily signal confidence in new productive investment. But the underlying bet remains: that a consumer comeback will rescue businesses whose customers are already facing eroded purchasing power and strained balance sheets. 

We have seen what that bet looks like at the end of the pipeline. 

In the accommodation sector, 29% of the 20,509 hotel rooms previously scheduled for delivery by 2026 were cancelled. 

In housing, real estate growth slowed for four consecutive quarters: 3.2% in Q1, 1.4% in Q2, and just 1.1% in Q3—the weakest since the pandemic recession. Growth of total bank loans to the real estate sector has been decelerating, up by 5.3% in September.  (Figure 4, lowest chart) 


Figure 5

In housing, the pressure is becoming harder to conceal. Colliers reported approximately 9,000 condominium purchase cancellations in Metro Manila during the first nine months of 2026, comprising 5,200 units under construction and 3,800 ready-for-occupancy units. The cancellations expose the financing trap awaiting buyers when developer-assisted payment arrangements give way to bank financing. (Figure 5, topmost media headline image) 

Household balance sheets are straining, while consumer-facing industries mistake nominal activity for a revival. That is the money illusion: confusing the appearance of spending with the purchasing power and balance-sheet capacity required to sustain it. 

VI. Engineered Strength, Organic Weakness 

The sectoral figures reveal an increasingly uneven production structure. 

Electricity is the engineered leg. Seven consecutive quarters of 22%-plus bank lending to the sector have finally reached its output. Electricity, steam, water, and waste management real GDP grew 4.3% in Q2 and 4.7% in Q3. Electricity, accounting for more than 80% of the sector, accelerated from 4.6% to 5.2%. (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

This strength was built by policy: the political/regulatory nudges via SMC-AEV-Meralco and Prime infrastructure-FGEN deals, the suspension of real property taxes (RPT) and imposition of the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) and Green Energy Auction (GEA) charges—as discussed last year. The GEA-All collection is now temporarily suspended, but the FIT-All remains in place. 

The Averch-Johnson effect is relevant. When regulated returns are tied to the capital base, utilities have incentives to expand investment beyond what market conditions might justify. Capital expansion becomes a source of measured economic activity, while its costs and returns are passed through regulated prices and consumer charges. 

Credit finds the regulated sector, the sector builds, and the building shows up in GDP. That is what we mapped in Part 14. 

The consequences become visible in other policy-affected sectors. 

Transport GDP slowed from 5% to 4.1% and then 4.0%. A fare increase, held back by administrative suppression in March, finally took effect in the last week of September. The adjustment came after months of rising operating costs. 

Financial and insurance GDP grew 3.5%, while banks expanded by only 2.7%, despite accounting for 55.14% of the sector. Here, too, policy shapes measured output. BSP emergency relief measures allow qualifying energy-crisis-affected loans to receive payment deferments and temporary exclusion from past-due and NPL classifications. Separately, M-2026-027 allows banks to exclude eligible unrealized losses on peso-denominated government securities from regulatory capital calculations. These interventions suppress the immediate manifestation of financial stress: loan deterioration is deferred in regulatory classifications, while market losses are cushioned in reported capital adequacy. The resulting financial-sector activity is measured within a policy-managed environment, not one reflecting the full extent of underlying balance-sheet pressures.


Figure 6

Construction contracted 4%, following a 14% contraction in Q2. Government construction plunged 15.1%, after falling 33.4% in Q2. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

The 2025 flood-control corruption scandal continues to cast a long shadow over public works. Project investigations, tighter procurement scrutiny, delayed billings, and cautious fund releases carried into 2026, disrupting infrastructure implementation and disbursements. Government consumption keeps expanding while government construction contracts. Meanwhile, financial and non-financial corporations and household construction GDP grew by .3% and 1.1% respectively.  Stagnation enveloped the whole sector. 

Agriculture contracted 4.8%, its steepest decline since at least 2001. (Figure 7, middle visual) Weather took the blame, as it did elsewhere. But agriculture is heavily protected through import controls, administered prices, and subsidies to farmers and fisherfolk. The latest emergency price interventions add another layer to an already distorted pricing environment. The question remains: what does a price ceiling do to the incentive to fish or plant? 

The composition of output reinforces the weakness. The five largest industries account for 56.8% of real GDP: wholesale and retail trade (21.6%), manufacturing (14.4%), professional and business services (7.4%), agriculture (6.9%), and construction (6.5%). 

Only professional and business services accelerated in Q3, from 3.8% to 4.6%. The remaining major industries lost momentum. 

GDP records production and expenditure. It does not, by itself, reveal the quality of investment, the productivity of the capital employed, or the economy's growing dependence on credit-financed policy interventions. 

VII. Exports Boom, Output Doesn't 

Exports of goods and services grew 8.6% in Q3, down from 12.2% in Q2, amid the record AI-related export boom. Yet manufacturing grew just 0.7%, while imports accelerated to 7.7% from 6.2%. (Figure 6, lowest graph) 

As we demonstrated in Part 19, the AI semiconductor export boom carries substantial import requirements and contributes relatively little domestic value added. The nine-month trade deficit reached a record $47.2 billion. This is trade without manufacturing depth. Q3 confirmed it. 

Net primary income provided a temporary quarterly lift, growing 6.6% in Q3 after just 0.8% in Q2. Peso depreciation can contribute by raising the peso-converted value of income earned abroad, cushioning gross national income. But the nine-month picture tells a different story: NPI growth plunged from 22.8% in 9M 2025 to just 3.7% in 9M 2026. 

NPI cushions national income, but does not add to domestic production. Here's the rub: a country can receive more income from abroad without expanding its own productive capacity at the same rate. Even this external cushion is losing strength.

VIII. Money Still Chasing Output 

The monetary and credit ratios add another dimension.


Figure 7

M2 to GDP slipped from 69.3% to 68.3%, and domestic claims to GDP reached an all-time high of 81.96%, from 81.4% (based on my calculation using the quarterly data) (Figure 7, topmost window) 

The M series sits near 70% of GDP, well above the sub-65% of pre-pandemic years. That is a demand-side signature: more money and more credit per unit of output, so output is not keeping pace with the claims written against it. 

The composition of credit matters as much as its aggregate quantity. As depicted above, credit has been used to primarily finance government borrowing, selected industries, financial assets, consumption, rather than productive investment, which provides a blueprint for future output. 

Money does not fall from the sky. It comes from savings or credit. 

When credit expansion substitutes for genuine savings, the economy can temporarily sustain expenditures beyond what its underlying resource base can support. But the resulting claims do not disappear. They must eventually be serviced through income, taxation, refinancing, asset sales, or monetary adjustment. Someone has to pay that bill. 

The unemployment rate stayed low and the employment rate stayed at 94% in Q3, and GDP fell regardless. Employment rates peaked in 2024 but has slowed—even as consumer per capita growth has peaked in Q1 2022 while continuing to slow.  (Figure 7, middle graph) 

The labor market is cracking. It is bearing the delayed cost of policies via credit. Hours are being filled, not goods produced. 

IX. Stagflation Is a Process 

In Part 14, we defined stagflation as a process, not a mechanical combination of rising prices, rising unemployment, and falling output. The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks generated inflationary pressures, but the Philippine economy's broader stagflationary dynamics became fully apparent only with the 1983 debt crisis, when the different elements converged. (Figure 7, lowest chart) 

We described stagflation as a process in which inflationary pressures, weakening real activity, capital misallocation, and declining purchasing power reinforce one another—until the accumulated distortions become increasingly difficult to sustain. 

Q3 marks another step in that sequence. 

The Philippine economy is displaying several elements of this process: 

  • Inflation is accelerating: October inflation reached 7.8%, its highest since February 2023, while core inflation rose to 5.4%, its highest since September 2023.
  • Real output is losing momentum: GDP grew just 2.1% in Q3 and 2.5% over nine months, the weakest since the pandemic recession.
  • Household demand is deteriorating: Consumption growth has weakened for six consecutive quarters, extending the downtrend from its 10% peak in Q1 2022.
  • Investment is contracting: Real gross capital formation has declined for five consecutive quarters.
  • Productive sectors are weakening: Agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and real estate reveal persistent structural weakness.
  • Fiscal and external imbalances are expanding: Public debt and the twin deficits have reached record levels, while domestic claims relative to GDP have climbed to an all-time high. 

These are not unrelated developments. They reflect the interaction of policy interventions: fiscal absorption of resources, monetary accommodation, credit misallocation, weakening private investment, and eroding household purchasing power—systemic malinvestments 

The drift toward a war economy adds another dimension. As resources are redirected toward state priorities, strategic industries, marked by greater centralization, expenditures can sustain selected sectors without necessarily strengthening civilian or private sector’s productive capacity or the consumer economy. 

Officials may wait until the technical conditions for stagflation are fully satisfied before acknowledging it. That is precisely the problem with relying on a mechanical definition: by the time every symptom is visible, the underlying process has already advanced. Our Q1 GDP analysis identified the illusion early. Q3 makes the underlying deterioration harder to dismiss.

X. Conclusion: The Headline Tells You How Much. The Trend Tells You Where 

The 2.1% is the news. The broken trendline is the story. 

Real output has fallen below its post-pandemic trajectory. Nominal output remains better supported because rising prices cushion its measured expansion.

Look beneath the headline and the structure becomes clearer. Public debt has grown faster than the expansion of both nominal and real GDP, over comparable nine-month periods and even on an annualized basis. 

Government's share of output has reached a record, while the household consumption share continues its 23-year decline. Credit sustains government expenditure, selected industries, financial activity, and consumption, while productive investment and household purchasing power lose ground. 

This is the policy scaffolding: debt-financed expenditure, monetary and regulatory accommodation, price intervention, and credit directed toward politically supported or protected sectors. These interventions sustain measured activity while redistributing costs, postponing the recognition of underlying weaknesses, and allowing capital misallocation, distorted price signals, depleted financial buffers, and growing imbalances to accumulate. 

Q4 seasonality will likely flatter the numbers. The real test is whether real GDP establishes a new high or merely a lower peak. A lower high would turn the deterioration into a more entrenched 2027 trajectory. 

Policies can buy time. They cannot repeal scarcity, manufacture genuine savings, or decree productive capital into existence. 

The headline still stands. The economy beneath it is increasingly dependent on the very interventions concealing its deterioration. The resulting structural entropy raises the risk of an eventual disorderly market-clearing process. 


References: 

Stagflation Part 19: Twin Deficits, a Third Inflation Wave, and the Bill for Free-Lunch Politics November 8, 2026 

Stagflation Part 14: Q2 GDP at 2.3% and Falling — A GDP Built on Suppression and Debt, August 9, 2026 

The Philippines’ Drift Toward a War Economy, July 26, 2026

Stagflation Part 5: The Q1 2026 GDP Illusion and the Gathering Recession Risk Beneath Price Suppression, May 10, 2026 

USD-PHP at Record Highs: The Three Philippine Fault Lines—Energy Fragility, Fiscal Bailouts, Bank Stress, December 21,2025  

The Oligarchic Bailout Everyone Missed: How the Energy Fragility Now Threatens the Philippine Peso and the Economy, December 7, 2025  

Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop, November 23, 2025

 

 


Sunday, November 08, 2026

PSEi 5,761: The Rotational Pump: When the Index Rises and the Market Doesn’t

 

Central banks can, and do, intervene to prop up stock markets and failing institutions. In 2008, the government rescued or supported AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America, among others, when Congress approved the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). You may recall the banking emergency of March 2023, when regulators bailed out Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank. It was great for the tech nerds; not so great for the average citizen—Doug Casey

PSEi 5,761: The Rotational Pump: When the Index Rises and the Market Doesn’t 

ICTSI sold off, five heavyweights took the baton, and the rest of the market was left on the bench.


The PSEi closed the week ending November 6 up 81.6 points, or 1.44%. Read the headline and you’d think the market improved. Read the internals and you find an index being held up while the market beneath it isn’t.

The Scorecard: an Advancing Index, a Declining Market


Figure 1

ICTSI fell 2.62%, taking 37.89 points off the index. Five of the top ten more than offset it: SM (+4.08%), BDO (+5.93%), BPI (+5.21%), Ayala Corp (+3.74%) and Meralco (+5.44%) contributed 91.61 points. The other constituents split the residual gains. Breadth among the 30 members was 22 advancers to 8 decliners, and the average member return was 1.52%. (Figure 1 upper chart) 

Across the whole exchange, advancers numbered 364 and decliners 373 on the main board. On that count, more stocks fell than rose while the index gained. 

Zoom out and the bounce looks smaller. The 5,761.95 close leaves the PSEi down ~8%+ over three months, 4.81% year to date, and about ~13+% below its 52-week high. 

Participation was thin as well. Average daily main board volume fell 23.75% from Php 7.339B to Php 5.595B as of November 6. (Figure 1, lower graph) 

Prices rose on less money. 

Where the Money Actually Went 

Relative to main board volume:


Figure 2

  • Top 10 brokers: 65.8% last week, against a 2026 daily average above 62.66% in 2026.
  • ICTSI alone: 27.47% daily average of 24.2% since July 1, 2026
  • Top 3 banks: 17.4%, up from 12.2% the week before
  • Top 10 most active issues: 69.2% vs daily average of 65.7% in 2026
  • Top 20 most active issues: 83.65% vs daily average of 81.5% in 2026 (Figure 2, upper image) 

This is structural, not a one-week blip. 

The rally didn’t find buyers across the board. Turnover funneled into a few names. 

Passing the Baton: From ICTSI To SM and the Banks 

ICTSI’s weight in the PSEi has slipped to 24.74% from a record above 28% after the PSE feted its 2 trillion cap. Trading didn’t leave the index. It moved. 

As of November 5, the top 5 (SM, BDO, BPI, SMPH and ICTSI) hold 55.33% of the PSEi’s free float market cap, and that share has risen for a fifth straight week. 

The top 10 hold 73.5%, which makes the other 20 members benchwarmers. 

The Sy Group’s free float share climbed from 22.61% to 23.25%, a seventh straight weekly increase. 


Figure 3

The banks show the same pattern. Their share of the PSEi rose from a recent low of 18.6% to 19.51%. They hold 81.4% of the Finance index (November 6th), which gained 4% WoW, while their share of volume jumped from 12.2% to 17.4%. (Figure 3, upper diagram) 

The pumping focus moved from one big cap to several, and the index kept its shape. 

The PSEi is a free float cap-weighted benchmark, not a measure of the average listed company. That is what makes the trick possible: heavyweights can take turns carrying the index while the rest of the market struggles. 

121 Brokers, 280 Issues, A Handful Of Winners 

The PSE’s Q3 infographic lists 121 trading participants and 280 listed companies. (Figure 3, lower image) 

When the top 10 brokers handle 60-65% of a thin turnover, the other 111 split the leftovers. 

When the top 20 issues take about 80% of volume, the other 260 are left barely any bids. A stock can stay listed while attracting almost no depth. 

Two caveats. One investor can hold accounts at many brokers, so broker rankings understate real concentration. And many top brokers serve institutions more than retail, so some institutional flow may sit just outside the top 10 (e.g done thru trades). 

What matters for the argument is that the top 10 broker names are nearly the same week after week, and so are the names behind the pre-closing pumps/dumps. 

A market where the names and the timing repeat doesn’t behave like a crowd of independent buyers. That is circumstantial. It doesn’t prove coordination, and the same brokers could be executing for the same large clients. But it is a pattern, and patterns deserve explanation. 

Support, Or Price Control? 


Figure 4

In technical analysis, a level where buyers keep stepping in is called “support.” The PSEi has been holding off that 5,600-level since October—bouncing in what others would call trading range. (Figure 4, upper visual) 

But in my framework, it is something else: a price control. 

Any price held away from where voluntary buyers and sellers would put it must be defended by someone. The defender has to keep buying what real buyers won’t, and the inventory piles up on a balance sheet. 

Genuine support is spontaneous: many independent participants each decide the price is attractive. What we see (the same few brokers, pre-closing activities, rotating bids) looks more like management than spontaneity. 

I don’t know who they are, and it isn’t my job to find out. Forensics belong to the regulators: PSE, the SEC and the BSP. But our task is to trace the economic consequences. Call them the Philippine version of a “national team” (commonly alluded to unofficial stock market interventions by Chinese authorities) or the US “Plunge Protection Team,” the informal name for officials or allied institutions quietly propping up markets in a selloff. 

The motives aren’t mysterious. Share prices serve as collateral, so a falling index tightens credit for anyone who pledged shares. 

There are also “confidence” goals: a healthy-looking market flatters the GDP narrative and the administration’s popularity. 

Together, these motives can reinforce market illiquidity, as declining collateral values transmit financial stress from equity markets to the broader financial system. 

No Free Lunch: Who Absorbs the Losses 

There is precedent for political direction of public investment funds. During the pandemic crash, the finance chief ordered the GSIS and SSS to support the market. Pension funds are public institutions, and public institutions answer to political direction. (Figure 4, news clip image) 

I can’t say whether the SSS is part of today’s national team, and the argument doesn’t depend on it. But its books show what an equity bet costs: its 2025 audited statements, as reported by the Commission on Audit, show about ₱39.99B in unrealized equity losses (cost ₱121.47B against market value ₱81.47B). These are paper losses, but they are paper losses on retirement money. 

The constraint is general. Domestic savings are strained, deficits are persistent, and capital does not appear because someone wants an outcome. 

A defended price makes the defenders absorb the difference as mark-to-market losses. Losses lead to more borrowing, tighter liquidity or dilution elsewhere, and eventually a solvency question. There is no free lunch. 

No Free Lunch: Sauve Qui Peut 

The rotational pump can momentarily preserve the benchmark's appearance of stability or what I call benchmarkism, but it cannot eliminate the underlying pressures. It merely transfers exposure to whoever supplies the capital. 

The Philippine economy already faces strained domestic savings, twin (fiscal and trade) deficits, and competing demands for financing. Institutions cannot indefinitely absorb securities that the broader market is unwilling to buy at prevailing prices. As losses accumulate and liquidity tightens, the capacity to sustain support diminishes. 

This is where historian Charles Kindleberger's account of financial crisis, sauve qui peut becomes relevant: the late-cycle transition from collective efforts to preserve market confidence toward an every-man-for-himself scramble for liquidity and balance-sheet survival.

The same institutions that participate in preserving the benchmark eventually have to protect their own balance sheets.

The PSEi rose for the week. But shrinking turnover, negative broader-market breadth, and concentrated trading reveal the fragility beneath the advance. 

The preservation of the benchmark is not the preservation of the market. There is no free lunch.