Showing posts with label BSP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BSP. Show all posts

Sunday, June 29, 2025

A Rescue, Not a Stimulus: BSP’s June Cut and the Banking System’s Liquidity Crunch

 

The ultimate cause, therefore, of the phenomenon of wave after wave of economic ups and downs is ideological in character. The cycles will not disappear so long as people believe that the rate of interest may be reduced, not through the accumulation of capital, but by banking policy—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

A Rescue, Not a Stimulus: BSP’s June Cut and the Banking System’s Liquidity Crunch

I. Policy Easing in Question: Credit Concentration and Economic Disparity

II. Elite Concentration: The Moody's Warning and Its Missing Pieces

III. Why the Elite Bias? Financial Regulation, Market Concentration and Underlying Incentives

IV. Market Rebellion: When Reality Defies Policy

V. The Banking System Under Stress: Evidence of a Rescue Operation

A. Liquidity Deterioration Despite RRR Cuts

B. Cash Crunch Intensifies

C. Deposit Growth Slowdown

D. Loan Portfolio Dynamics: Warning Signs Emerge

E. Investment Portfolio Under Pressure

F. The Liquidity Drain: Government's Role

G. Monetary Aggregates: Emerging Disconnection

H. Banking Sector Adjustments: Borrowings and Repos

I.  The NPL Question: Are We Seeing the Full Picture?

J. The Crowding Out Effect

VI. Conclusion: The Inevitable Reckoning 

A Rescue, Not a Stimulus: BSP’s June Cut and the Banking System’s Liquidity Crunch 

Despite easing measures, liquidity has tightened, markets have diverged, and systemic risks have deepened across the Philippine banking system. 

I. Policy Easing in Question: Credit Concentration and Economic Disparity 

The BSP implemented the next phase of its ‘easing cycle’—now comprising four policy rate cuts and two reductions in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR)—complemented by the doubling of deposit insurance coverage. 

The question is: to whose benefit? 

Is it the general economy? 

Bank loans to MSMEs, which are supposedly a target of inclusive growth, require a lending mandate and still accounted for only 4.9% of the banking system’s total loan portfolio as of Q4 2024. This is despite the fact that, according to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), MSMEs represented 99.6% of total enterprises and employed 66.97% of the workforce in 2023. 

In contrast, loans to PSEi 30 non-financial corporations reached Php 5.87 trillion in Q1 2025—equivalent to 17% of the country’s total financial resources. 

Public borrowing has also surged to an all-time high of Php 16.752 trillion as of April. 

Taken together, total systemic leverage—defined as the sum of bank loans and government debt—reached a record Php 30.825 trillion, or approximately 116% of nominal 2024 GDP. 

While bank operations have expanded, fueled by consumer debt, only a minority of Filipinos—those classified as “banked” in the BSP’s financial inclusion survey—reap the benefits. The majority remain excluded from the financial system, limiting the broader economic impact of the BSP’s policies. 

The reliance on consumer debt to drive bank growth further concentrates financial resources among a privileged few. 

II. Elite Concentration: The Moody's Warning and Its Missing Pieces 

On June 21, 2025, Inquirer.net cited Moody’s Ratings: 

"In a commentary, Moody’s Ratings said that while conglomerate shareholders have helped boost the balance sheet and loan portfolio of banks by providing capital and corporate lending opportunities, such a tight relationship also increases related-party risks. The global debt watcher also noted how Philippine companies remain highly dependent on banks for funding in the absence of a deep capital market. This, Moody’s said, could become a problem for lenders if corporate borrowers were to struggle to pay their debts during moments of economic downturn." (bold added) 

Moody’s commentary touches on contagion risks in a downturn but fails to elaborate on an equally pressing issue: the structural instability caused by deepening credit dependency and growing concentration risks. These may not only emerge during a downturn—they may be the very triggers of one. 

The creditor-borrower interdependence between banks and elite-owned corporations reflects a tightly coupled system where benefits, risks, and vulnerabilities are shared. It’s a fallacy to assume one side enjoys the gains while the other bears the risks. 

As J. Paul Getty aptly put it: 

"If you owe the bank $100, that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem." 

In practice, this means banks are more likely to continue lending to credit-stressed conglomerates than force defaults, further entrenching financial fragility. 

What’s missing in most mainstream commentary is the causal question: Why have lending ties deepened so disproportionately between banks and elite-owned firms, rather than being broadly distributed across the economy?

The answer lies in institutional incentives rooted in the political regime. 

As discussed in 2019, the BSP’s trickle-down easy money regime played a key role in enabling Jollibee’s “Pacman strategy”—a debt-financed spree of horizontal expansion through competitor acquisitions. 

III. Why the Elite Bias? Financial Regulation, Market Concentration and Underlying Incentives 

Moreover, regulatory actions appear to favor elite interests. 

On June 17, 2025, ABS-CBN reported: 

"In a statement, the SEC said the licenses [of over 400 lending companies] were revoked for failing to file their audited financial statements, general information sheet, director or trustee compensation report, and director or trustee appraisal or performance report and the standards or criteria for the assessment." 

Could this reflect regulatory overreach aimed at eliminating competition favoring elite-controlled financial institutions? Is the SEC becoming a tacit ‘hatchet man’ serving oligopolistic interests via arbitrary technicalities? 

Philippine banks—particularly Universal Commercial banks—now control a staggering 82.64% of the financial system’s total resources and 77.08% of all financial assets (as of April 2025). 

Aside from BSP liquidity and bureaucratic advantages, political factors such as regulatory captureand the revolving door’ politics further entrench elite power. 

Many senior officials at the BSP and across the government are former bank executives, billionaires and their appointees, or close associates. Thus, instead of striving for the Benthamite utilitarian principle of “greatest good for the greatest number,” agencies may instead pursue policies aligned with powerful vested interests. 

This brings us back to the rate cuts: while framed as pro-growth, they largely serve to ease the cost of servicing a mountain of debt owed by government, conglomerates, and elite-controlled banks. 


Figure 1 

However, its impact on average Filipinos remains negligible, with official statistics increasingly revealing the diminishing returns of these policies. 

The BSP’s rate and RRR cuts, coming amid a surge in UC bank lending, risk undermining GDP momentum (Figure 1) 

IV. Market Rebellion: When Reality Defies Policy 

Even markets appear to be revolting against the BSP's policies!


Figure 2

Despite plunging Consumer Price Index (CPI) figures, Treasury bill rates, which should reflect the BSP's actions, have barely followed the easing cycle. (Figure 2, topmost window) 

Yields of Philippine bonds (10, 20, and 25 years) have been rising since October 2024 reinforcing the 2020 uptrend! (Figure 2, middle image) 

Inflation risks continue to be manifested by the bearish steepening slope of the Philippine Treasury yield curve. (Figure 2, lower graph)


Figure 3

Additionally, the USD/PHP exchange rate sharply rebounded even before the BSP announcement. (Figure 3, topmost diagram) 

Treasury yields and the USD/PHP have fundamentally ignored the government's CPI data and the BSP's easing policies. 

Importantly, elevated T-bill rates likely reflect liquidity pressures, while rising bond yields signal mounting fiscal concerns combined with rising inflation risks. 

Strikingly, because Treasury bond yields remain elevated despite declining CPI, the average monthly bank lending rates remain close to recent highs despite the BSP's easing measures! (Figure 3, middle chart) 

While this developing divergence has been ignored or glossed over by the consensus, it highlights a worrisome imbalance that authorities seem to be masking through various forms of interventions or "benchmark-ism" channeled through market manipulation, price controls, and statistical inflation. 

V. The Banking System Under Stress: Evidence of a Rescue Operation 

We have been constantly monitoring the banking system and can only conclude that the BSP easing cycle appears to be a dramatic effort to rescue the banking system. 

A. Liquidity Deterioration Despite RRR Cuts 

Astonishingly, within a month after the RRR cuts, bank liquidity conditions deteriorated further: 

·         Cash and Due Banks-to-Deposit Ratio dropped from 10.37% in March to 9.68% in April—a milestone low

·         Liquid Assets-to-Deposit Ratio plunged from 49.5% in March to 48.3% in April—its lowest level since March 2020 

Liquid assets consist of the sum of cash and due banks plus Net Financial assets (net of equity investments). Fundamentally, both indicators show the extinguishment of the BSP's historic pandemic recession stimulus. (Figure 3, lowest window) 

B. Cash Crunch Intensifies


Figure 4

Year-over-year change of Cash and Due Banks crashed by 24.75% to Php 1.914 trillion—its lowest level since at least 2014. Despite the Php 429.4 billion of bank funds released to the banking system from the October 2024 and March 2025 RRR cuts, bank liquidity has been draining rapidly. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

C. Deposit Growth Slowdown 

The liquidity crunch in the banking system appears to be spreading. 

The sharp slowdown has been manifested through deposit liabilities, where year-over-year growth decelerated from 5.42% in March to 4.04% in April due to materially slowing peso and foreign exchange deposits, which grew by 5.9% and 3.23% in March to 4.6% and 1.6% in April respectively. (Figure 4, middle image) 

D. Loan Portfolio Dynamics: Warning Signs Emerge 

Led by Universal-Commercial banks, growth of the banking system's total loan portfolio slowed from 12.6% in March to 12.2% in April. UC banks posted a deceleration from 12.36% year-over-year growth in March to 11.85% in April. 

However, the banking system's balance sheet revealed a unmistakable divergence: the rapid deceleration  of loan growth. Growth of the Total Loan Portfolio (TLP), inclusive of interbank lending (IBL) and Reverse Repurchase (RRP) agreements, plunged from 14.5% in March to 10.21% in April, reaching Php 14.845 trillion. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

This dramatic drop in TLP growth contributed significantly to the steep decline in deposit growth. 

E. Investment Portfolio Under Pressure


Figure 5

Banks' total investments have likewise materially slowed, easing from 11.95% in March to 8.84% in April. While Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities growth slowed 0.58% month-over-month, they were up 0.98% year-over-year. 

Held-for-Trading (HFT) assets posted the largest growth drop, from 79% in March to 25% in April. 

Meanwhile, accumulated market losses eased from Php 21 billion in March to Php 19.6 billion in May. (Figure 5, topmost graph) 

Rising bond yields should continue to pressure bank trading assets, with emphasis on HTMs, which accounted for 52.7% of Gross Financial Assets in May. 

A widening fiscal deficit will likely prompt banks to increase support for government treasury issuances—creating a feedback loop that should contribute to rising bond yields. 

F. The Liquidity Drain: Government's Role 

Part of the liquidity pressures stem from the BSP's reduction in its net claims on the central government (NCoCG) as it wound down pandemic-era financing. 

Simultaneously, the recent buildup in government deposits at the BSP—reflecting the Treasury's record borrowing—has further absorbed liquidity from the banking system. (Figure 5, middle image) 

G. Monetary Aggregates: Emerging Disconnection 

Despite the BSP's easing measures, emerging pressures on bank lending and investment assets, manifested through a cash drain and slowing deposits, have resulted in a sharp decrease in the net asset growth of the Philippine banking system. Year-over-year growth of net assets slackened from 7.8% in April to 5.5% in May. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 


Figure 6

Interestingly, despite the cash-in-circulation boost related to May's midterm election spending—which hit a growth rate of 15.4% in April (an all-time high in peso terms), just slightly off the 15.5% recorded during the 2022 Presidential elections—M3 growth sharply slowed from 6.2% in March to 5.8% in April and has diverged from cash growth since December 2024. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

The sharp decline in M2 growth—from 6.6% in April to 6.0% in May—reflecting the drastic slowdown in savings and time deposits from 5.5% and 7.6% in April to 4.5% and 5.8% in May respectively, demonstrates the spillover effects of the liquidity crunch experienced by the Philippine banking system. 

H. Banking Sector Adjustments: Borrowings and Repos 

Nonetheless, probably because of the RRR cuts, aggregate year-over-year growth of bank borrowings decreased steeply from 40.3% to 16.93% over the same period. (Figure 6, middle graph) 

Likely drawing from cash reserves and the infusion from RRR cuts, bills payable fell from Php 1.328 trillion to Php 941.6 billion, while bonds rose from Php 578.8 billion to Php 616.744 billion. (Figure 6, lowest diagram) 

Banks' reverse repo transactions with the BSP plunged by 51.22% while increasing 30.8% with other banks. 

As we recently tweeted, banks appear to have resumed their flurry of borrowing activity in the capital markets this June. 

I.  The NPL Question: Are We Seeing the Full Picture? 

While credit delinquencies expressed via Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) have recently been marginally higher in May, the ongoing liquidity crunch cannot be directly attributed to them—unless the BSP and banks have been massively understating these figures, which we suspect they are. 

J. The Crowding Out Effect 

Bank borrowings from capital markets amplify the "crowding-out effect" amid growing competition between government debt and elite conglomerates' credit needs. 

The government’s significant role in the financial system further complicates this dynamic, as it absorbs liquidity through record borrowing. 

Or, it would be incomplete to examine banks' relationships with elite-owned corporations without acknowledging the government's significant role in the financial system. 

VI. Conclusion: The Inevitable Reckoning 

The deepening divergent performance between markets and government policies highlights not only the tension between markets and statistics but, more importantly, the progressing friction between economic and financial policies and the underlying economy. 

Is the consensus bereft of understanding, or are they attempting to bury the logical precept that greater concentration of credit activities leads to higher counterparty and contagion risks? Will this Overton Window prevent the inevitable reckoning? 

The evidence suggests that the BSP's easing cycle, rather than supporting broad-based economic growth, primarily serves to maintain the stability of an increasingly fragile financial system that disproportionately benefits elite interests. 

With authorities reporting May’s fiscal conditions last week (to be discussed in the next issue), we may soon witness how this divergence could trigger significant volatility or even systemic instability 

The question is not whether this system is sustainable—the data clearly indicates it is not—but rather how long political and regulatory interventions can delay the inevitable correction, and at what cost to the broader Philippine economy.

 

Sunday, June 15, 2025

Is the Philippine Peso’s Rise a Secret Bargaining Chip in Trump’s Trade War?

Devaluation is not a tool for exports. It is a tool for cronyism and always ends with the demise of the currency as a valuable reserve—Daniel Lacalle

In this issue 

Is the Philippine Peso’s Rise a Secret Bargaining Chip in Trump’s Trade War?

I. BSP Denies Currency Manipulation Amid Trade Talks

II The Mar-a-Lago Framework: Dollar Devaluation as Trade Strategy

III. Asian Geopolitical Allies Lead Currency Appreciation Against USD

IV. Market Signals Point to Implicit Bilateral Deals

V. Taiwan’s Hedging Frenzy: Collateral Damage of FX Realignment?

VI Gross International Reserves Tell a Different Story

VII. Breaking Historical Patterns: GIR Decline Amid Peso Strength

VIII. Yield Spreads and Market Disruptions Signal Intervention

IX. Conclusion: The Hidden Costs of Currency Leverage; Intertemporal Risks and Economic Feedback Loops 

Is the Philippine Peso’s Rise a Secret Bargaining Chip in Trump’s Trade War? 

How the BSP's currency interventions may be hiding an implicit trade deal with Washington

I. BSP Denies Currency Manipulation Amid Trade Talks 

From a syndicated Reuters news, the Interaksyon reported May 20: "The Philippine central bank said there is no indication that its management of the peso’s exchange rate is part of trade negotiations with the U.S. government, as it signalled a preference for non-interest rate tools to manage capital inflows. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas said while it expected to further ease monetary policy because of a favourable inflation outlook, it favoured a more nuanced approach to managing liquidity and exchange rate volatility. “The BSP does not normally respond to capital flow surges or outflows, or even volatility, using policy interest rate action,” the BSP said in an emailed response to questions from Reuters. Philippine officials met U.S. authorities on May 2 to discuss trade. Although not directly involved in the talks, the BSP said there was no indication foreign exchange considerations were explicitly part of the negotiations. The Philippines has not been spared from President Trump’s tariffs, although it faces a comparatively modest 17% tariff, lower than regional neighbours Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. “The BSP adopts a pragmatic approach in managing capital flow volatility, combining FX interventions when necessary, the strategic use of the country’s foreign exchange reserve buffer, and macroprudential measures,” it said." (bold added)

II The Mar-a-Lago Framework: Dollar Devaluation as Trade Strategy 

Though the Mar-a-Lago Accord, coined by analysts like Zoltan Pozsar and popularized by Stephen Miran, is a speculative framework, it draws inspiration from the 1985 Plaza Accord, where G5 nations coordinated to depreciate the U.S. dollar to boost American exports. Stephen Miran, now Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, published a paper in November 2024 titled ‘A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System.’ 

It argues that the U.S. dollar’s persistent overvaluation harms American manufacturing by making exports less competitive and imports cheaper, contributing to a $1.2 trillion trade deficit in 2024.

To address this, Miran proposed devaluing the dollar by encouraging foreign central banks to sell dollar assets or adjust monetary policies, while using tariffs as a ‘stick’ to pressure trading partners into currency adjustments or trade concessions.

While dedollarization—reducing reliance on the dollar in global trade and reserves—is often cited as the cause of recent dollar weakness, this may apply to countries with geopolitical tensions with the U.S., such as China or Russia or other members of the BRICs.

However, it doesn’t explain the currency strength among staunch U.S. allies like the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, suggesting a different motive: implicit negotiations with the Trump administration.

III. Asian Geopolitical Allies Lead Currency Appreciation Against USD


Figure 1 

Year to June 13, 2025, the USD dropped against 8 of 10 Bloomberg-quoted Asian currencies, led by USDTWD (Taiwan dollar) -9.9%, USDKRW (Korean won) -7.8%, and USDJPY (Japanese yen) -8.35%. (Figure 1, topmost and middle charts) 

These countries, staunch U.S. allies that host American military bases, are the most likely to accommodate Washington’s demands. 

In ASEAN, major currencies appreciated more modestly: USDMYR (Malaysian ringgit) fell 5.05%, USDTHB (Thai baht) 5.49%, and USDPHP (Philippine peso) 2.8%. 

In contrast, USDIDR (Indonesian rupiah) rose 1.06%, indicating rupiah weakening—likely due to Indonesia's neutral stance, persistent fiscal concerns, and weaker ties to the U.S.

IV. Market Signals Point to Implicit Bilateral Deals 

On May 23, MUFG commented: "Markets have seemingly perceived that President Trump is looking for a weaker US dollar versus several Asian currencies as part of bilateral trade negotiations. Bloomberg News recently reported that the Taiwanese authorities had allowed the TWD to appreciate sharply earlier this month. The deputy governor of CBC has said that this strategic move is to allow market expectations for TWD gains to play out. But this is apparently at odds with the Taiwan central bank’s past preference to intervene in the FX market to smooth out volatility. The Korean won has also advanced sharply on the news that the US-South Korea finished the second technical discussions on 22 May." (bold added) (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

This MUFG insight—"A weaker US dollar versus several Asian currencies as part of bilateral trade negotiations"—suggests an implicit bilateral Mar-a-Lago deal.

V. Taiwan’s Hedging Frenzy: Collateral Damage of FX Realignment? 

Notably, Taiwan’s insurers recently suffered massive losses during the USD selloff and may have even contributed to it. Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) summoned insurers for reportedly “rushing to hedge their US bond holdings.” This could reflect unintended effects of TWD appreciation, potentially tied to an implicit Mar-a-Lago deal. 

In a nutshell, it’s likely no coincidence that currency appreciation aligns with the U.S.’s closest allies, suggesting implicit bilateral Mar-a-Lago deals driven by Trump’s tariff leverage, despite official denials. 

VI Gross International Reserves Tell a Different Story 

"Never believe anything in politics until it is officially denied"—Ottoman Bismark 

Taiwan’s central bank’s denial of involvement closely mirrors that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). 

The BSP has washed its hands from using the peso as a tool for negotiation, despite the Philippines status as a client state in ASEAN, bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and hosting U.S. military bases

Given the Mar-a-Lago framework of coupling dollar devaluation with tariffs, trade negotiations with the U.S. would likely involve the BSP, making its denial implausible

While no official agreement exists, the BSP noted it could use a combination of “FX interventions when necessary” and “the strategic use of the country’s foreign exchange reserve buffer” for capital flows management. 

This rhetoric suggests using the Philippine peso as strategic leverage for trade negotiations, aligning with the Mar-a-Lago goal of weakening the dollar to reduce the U.S.$1.2 trillion trade deficit, including the Philippines’ $5 billion surplus from $14.2 billion in exports.

VII. Breaking Historical Patterns: GIR Decline Amid Peso Strength


Figure 2 

Consider the evidence: When the USDPHP fell in 2012 and 2018, the increase BSP’s Gross International Reserves (GIR) accelerated, evidenced by aggregated monthly inflows. 

As a side note, May’s GIR saw a marginal increase, supported ironically by gold, which has served as an anchor. (Figure 2, topmost and middle images) 

Recall that last February, the BSP dismissed gold’s role, citing the "dead asset" logic: Gold prices can be volatile, earn little interest, and incur storage costs, so central banks prefer not to hold excessive amounts." Divine justice? 

Yet ironically, unlike past trends, the current USDPHP decline has led to a reduction in the GIR. (Figure 2, lowest visual) 

The BSP’s template, repeated in January, March, and April, states: "The month-on-month decrease in the GIR level reflected mainly the (1) national government’s (NG) drawdowns on its foreign currency deposits with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to meet its external debt obligations and pay for its various expenditures, and (2) BSP’s net foreign exchange operations." 

The USDPHP remains far from the BSP’s ‘Maginot Line’ of Php 59—the upper band of its informal ‘soft-peg’ range—so why is its GIR eroding? 

While part of the decline may be due to ‘revaluation effects’ from rising long-term U.S. Treasury yields (falling bond prices) and a softer dollar, this insufficiently explains the GIR’s decline amid an appreciating peso, contrary to historical patterns.


Figure 3

BSP data shows its net foreign assets contracted year-on-year in April 2025, the first decline since July 2023. (Figure 3, topmost diagram) 

This partly reflects changes in the FX assets of Other Deposit Corporations (ODCs), but the primary driver has been the BSP’s dollar-denominated assets. (Figure 3, second to the highest pane) 

Either we are seeing 'revaluation effects' from a GIR heavily weighted in USD assets—given that the BSP was the largest central bank gold seller in 2024, reducing its gold holdings to bolster reserves—or the BSP has been offloading some of its FX holdings to weaken the USD, thereby supporting the peso’s rise. It could be both, distinguished by scale.

VIII. Yield Spreads and Market Disruptions Signal Intervention 

The spread between 10-year Philippine and U.S. Treasury yields has drifted to its widest since 2019, when BVAL rates replaced PDST in October 2018 as the benchmark for Philippine bonds. (Figure 3, second to the lowest and lowest graphs) 

Historically, this was linked to deeper USDPHP declines, but since the BSP adopted its ‘soft-peg’ regime in 2022, its interventions have significantly reshaped this correlation—altering market signals and shifting currency allocations within the financial system


Figure 4

Weak organic FX revenues—contracting FDIs (-45.24% YoY Jan-Mar 2025), tourism (-0.82% Jan-Apr, including overseas Filipino visitors), March 2025 remittances at a 9-month low, and volatile portfolio flows ($923 million Jan-Apr)—don’t support the peso’s strength, except for services exports (+7.2% Q1 GDP). (Figure 4) 

Insufficient FX flows explain the surge in external debt, as the Philippines borrows heavily to bridge the gap, with external debt increasing to support trade, fiscal needs, and the defense of the USDPHP soft peg.


Figure 5 

Philippine external debt surged by a staggering 14% in Q1 2025, driven by a 17.4% rise in public FX debt, which now accounts for approximately 59% of the total! 

The BSP calls a sustained spike in FX debt 'manageable'—color us amazed!

IX. Conclusion: The Hidden Costs of Currency Leverage; Intertemporal Risks and Economic Feedback Loops 

These factors strengthen the case that the BSP is using the peso as leverage for trade negotiations—an implicit bilateral Mar-a-Lago deal. 

These interventions have intertemporal effects—or unintended consequences from pursuing short-term goals—that will likely surface over time. 

The USD’s decline will likely accelerate FX-denominated borrowings, becoming more evident once the peso weakens—similar to the 2018 and 2022 episodes—amplifying currency, interest rate, and other risks through mismatches that could exacerbate market disruptions. 

This poses risks of dislocations in sectors reliant on merchandise trade, remittances, or FX or USD fund flows, potentially triggering feedback loops that could negatively impact the broader economy or lead to economic and financial instability. 

And with escalating risks of a fiscal shock—one that could trigger and amplify unforeseen ramifications—that would translate into a perfect storm, wouldn’t it? 


Sunday, June 01, 2025

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

 

Bulls of 1929 like their 1990s counterparts had their eyes glued on improving profits and stock valuations.  Not a thought was given to the fact that the rising tide of money deluging the stock market came from financial leverage and not from savings-Dr. Kurt Richebacher 

In this issue:

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

I. An Extension of 2024's Fiscal-Monetary Interplay

II. Debt-Led Growth: Fragile Foundations

III. Revenue Growth: Record Highs, Diminishing Returns

IV. Consumer Sector Strains: Retail and Real Estate Under Pressure

V. Net Income Surge: A Paradox of Profitability

VI. Sectoral Performance: Diverging Trends

VII. Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights

VIII. A Fragile Foundation: The Risks of Fiscal and Financial Leverage

IX. Transparency and Accuracy Concerns

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

Debt-fueled profits mask deeper signs of strain across retail, real estate, and consumer sectors—even as policy easing and fiscal expansion continue.

I. An Extension of 2024's Fiscal-Monetary Interplay 

The PSEi 30’s Q1 2025 performance is largely a continuation of the trends established throughout 2024 and the past decade. 

Fundamentally, it reflects the model of "trickle-down" economic development, underpinned by Keynesian debt-financed spending. This model is anchored primarily on the BSP’s policy of "financial repression"—or sustained easy money—combined with fiscal stabilizers. It has manifested through the persistent "twin deficits," driven by a record-high "savings-investment gap," and rests on the “build and they will come” dogma. 

Q1 2025 also marks the initial impact of the BSP’s first phase of monetary easing, with Q2 expected to reflect the effects of the second round of policy rate and reserve requirement (RRR) cuts. 

At the same time, the all-time high Q1 fiscal deficit—relative to previous first quarters—was clearly reflected in the PSEi 30’s performance. 

Nota Bene:

PSEi 30 data contains redundancies, as consolidated reporting includes both parent firms and their subsidiaries.

Chart Notes:

1A: Based on current index members; may include revisions to past data

1B: Historical comparison; includes only members present during each respective period; based on unaudited releases

 II. Debt-Led Growth: Fragile Foundations


Figure 1

In Q1 2025, non-financial debt among PSEi 30 firms surged by 7.6% to a record Php 5.87 trillion, with a net increase of Php 413 billion, marking the third-highest quarterly rise since 2020. (Figure 1, upper window)         

In context, this debt level accounted for about 17.12% of total financial resources (bank and financial assets), up from 16.92% in 2024, reflecting increased leverage in the financial system 

In addition, bills payable for the top three PSEi 30 banks soared by 117.5%, rising from Php 393 billion to Php 854 billion, a net increase of Php 461 billion, excluding bonds payable. 

This dramatic increase in the bank’s short-term borrowing likely stems from a sharp decline in the banking system’s liquidity metrics—specifically, the cash and due-from-banks-to-deposits ratio and the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio. 

III. Revenue Growth: Record Highs, Diminishing Returns 

Gross revenues for the PSEi 30 rose by 3.92% to a record Php 1.78 trillion in Q1 2025. However, the net revenue increase of Php 67 billion was the smallest in the past four years, signaling a clear deceleration in growth momentum. (Figure 1, lower image)


Figure 2

This revenue softness partly reflected disinflationary trends, as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell to 2.3%—marking its third consecutive quarterly decline. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

This occurred despite the economy operating near full employment, with the average unemployment rate at 4%, all-time high Q1 fiscal deficit, and amid record levels of bank credit growth, particularly in consumer lending. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

Nonetheless, the validity of the near-full employment narrative appears questionable. Our estimates suggest that approximately 32% of the workforce remains 'functionally illiterate,' raising concerns about the accuracy of PSA labor market data. 

Yet, the paradox is telling: even with aggressive fiscal stimulus and sustained easy money policies, economic returns appear to be diminishing. 

The PSEi 30’s revenue slowdown closely mirrored real GDP growth of 5.4% in Q1 2025, reinforcing the broader downtrend. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

Nevertheless, the PSEi 30 revenues accounted for 27% of nominal GDP in Q1 2025, underscoring their substantial footprint in the Philippine economy. Broadening the scope of PSE-listed firms in national accounts would likely magnify this contribution—while simultaneously highlighting the risks posed by mounting economic and market concentration and the fragile underpinnings of "trickle-down" economic development. 

IV. Consumer Sector Strains: Retail and Real Estate Under Pressure


Figure 3

Consumer sector stress was evident in the performance of PSE-listed firms. While retail nominal GDP grew by 7.9% and real consumer GDP by 4.9%, Q1 2025 sales revenue growth for the six largest non-construction listed retail chains—SM Retail, Puregold, SSI Group, Robinsons Retail, Philippine Seven, and Metro Retail Group—slowed to 6.8%, down from 8% in Q4 2024. This deceleration occurred despite aggressive supply-side expansion, underscoring deteriorating growth dynamics. (Figure 3, upper pane) 

Since peaking in 2022, both statistical (GDP) and real indicators (sales) have undergone significant depreciation. Downstream real estate consumer publicly listed retail chains, Wilcon Depot (WLCON) and AllHome (HOME), continue to grapple with substantial challenges, as rising vacancies further deepen the ongoing sales recession. (Figure 3, lower image) 

For example, WLCON reported a 2% quarter-on-quarter increase in store count, but only a 1.2% increase in sales YoY—highlighting excess capacity amid softening demand.


Figure 4

The food services sector also showed signs of strain, despite posting 10.3% revenue growth in Q1 2025—outpacing both nominal and real GDP. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

Jollibee’s domestic operations, which accounted for 80% of total group sales, led the sector with a 14% gain. 

In contrast, McDonald’s reported an 11.5% sales contraction despite its 'aggressive store expansion' strategy, which includes plans to open 65 new outlets in 2025. This disparity underscores uneven, yet broadly weakening, performance across major retail chains. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

Even electricity consumption has recently deteriorated. Meralco’s electricity consumption growth slowed to 1.5% (in GWh), diverging from historical GDP correlations. This downturn signals weakening underlying demand, despite near-full employment and record-high bank credit expansion. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

V. Net Income Surge: A Paradox of Profitability

Figure 5

Despite revenue challenges, the PSEi 30’s net income amazingly surged by 16.02% to a record Php 290.6 billion in Q1 2025, with an absolute increase of Php 40.12 billion, the second-highest since 2020. (Figure 5, topmost diagram)

This was driven by a significant increase in net income margin, which reached 16.3%, the highest since 2020, possibly due to asset sales (e.g., SMC’s divestitures). (Figure 5, middle window)

Excluding SMC’s asset sales, PSEi 30’s net income would have stood at Php 269.3 billion—reflecting only a 7.6% increase. This equates to a net profit rise of Php 19.12 billion, rather than the reported Php 40.12 billion

The record Q1 fiscal deficit likely bolstered incomes, both directly through government contracts (e.g., infrastructure projects) and indirectly via increased consumer spending. However, this came at the cost of record public debt and systemic leverage, which reached Php 30.7 trillion. Public debt hit an all-time high of Php 16.683 trillion. (Figure 5, lowest image)

The PSEi 30’s debt-to-net income ratio revealed that Php 1.42 in net debt additions was required for every peso of profit generated. In terms of absolute gains, Php 10.3 in new debt supported each peso of profit increase, highlighting deepening debt dependency.

 


Figure 6
 

Paradoxically, despite record borrowing and improved net income, net cash reserves fell to 2022 levels, raising more concerns about systemic liquidity. (Figure 6, upper chart)

VI. Sectoral Performance: Diverging Trends 

By sector:  (Figure 6, lower table) 

Debt: The industrial sector recorded the largest percentage increase at 48.9%, but holding companies led in absolute peso gains Php 165.644 billon, followed by industrials Php 151.4 billion. 

Revenues: Banks achieved the highest percentage revenue growth at 9.8%, but industrials led in nominal terms with Php 17 billion in gains. 

Net Income: Holding and property sectors posted the largest percentage increases at 31% and 7.6%, respectively, with holding firms leading in peso terms Php 33.8 billion. 

Cash: The services sector saw the largest increases in both percentage (30.9%) and peso terms (Php 56 billion). 

VII. Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights


Figure 7

By firm: (Figure 7, upper table) 

Debt: Ayala Corp, San Miguel Corporation (SMC), and Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) recorded the largest peso increases at Php 74 billion, Php 70 billion, and Php 62 billion, respectively. LT Group (LTG) showed a substantial reduction of Php 24 billion. 

Interestingly, SMC reported a reduction in total debt—from Q4 2024’s record Php 1.56 TRILLION to Php 1.511 TRILLION in Q1 2025—despite substantial capital and operating requirements. This decline coincided with a surge in income, primarily driven by Php 21 billion in energy asset sales (San Miguel Global Power Holding LNG Batangas facility). Even excluding one-off gains, core profits rose by 31% to Php 19 billion. The company also strengthened its cash position, with cash reserves increasing by Php 57 billion year-on-year. How did this happen? (Figure 7, lower graph) 

Revenue: GT Capital (GTCAP) and Meralco posted the largest revenue increases at Php 15.6 billion and Php 9 billion, while SMC recorded the largest decrease at Php 31.8 billion. 

Net Income: SMC led with a Php 34 billion increase, driven by asset sales, while JG Summit (JGS) reported the largest decline at Php 7.2 billion. 

Cash: ICTSI and SMC posted the largest cash expansions at Php 79.9 billion and Php 57.6billion, while LTG (due to debt repayment) and AEV had the largest reductions at Php 38.2 and 15.015 billion 

VIII. A Fragile Foundation: The Risks of Fiscal and Financial Leverage 

Consider the potential impact on the PSEi 30, the broader PSE, and GDP when: 

-Bond vigilantes demand fiscal prudence, pushing interest rates higher

-Heavily leveraged consumer adopt austerity measures.

-Malinvestments from "build and they will come" industries, such as over saturation in real estate (26% residential condominium and office condominium vacancy rates and 22% per Colliers Philippines), and trade sectors, could lead to rising unemployment. 

These risks, compounded by diminishing stimulus effectiveness, threaten the sustainability of PSEi 30 performance and GDP growth. 

For instance, SMC’s business model has become increasingly reliant on recycling its borrowings or asset sales, making it wholly dependent on the sustainability of cheap money to refinance its rapidly growing debt. Neo-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky famously characterized this as 'Ponzi finance.' (Minsky,1992) 

In essence, the structural risks are real—and growing more visible in each earnings season. 

IX. Transparency and Accuracy Concerns 

As previously stated: 

"The credibility of this analysis rests on disclosures from the Philippine Stock Exchange and related official sources. However, questions persist regarding the possible underreporting of debt and the inflation of both top-line and bottom-line figures by certain firms." (Prudent Investor, May 2025) 

These concerns underscore persistent governance challenges—particularly if elite-owned firms are engaged in systematically underreporting liabilities and overstating revenues or profits. Such practices not only contribute to the distortion of market signals but also foster moral hazard, eventually eroding investor confidence and undermining regulatory integrity. 

___ 

References 

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis* The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College May 1992 

Prudent Investor, The PSEi 30 in 2024: Debt-Fueled Expansion Amid Fiscal and Monetary Shifts, Substack May 25, 2025