Showing posts with label Philippine Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine Economy. Show all posts

Sunday, February 23, 2025

BSP’s Aggressive RRR Cuts: A High-Stakes Gamble?

 

If there is one common theme to the vast range of the world’s financial crises, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of cash can make a government look like it is providing greater growth to its economy than it really is. Private sector borrowing binges can inflate housing and stock prices far beyond their long-run sustainable levels and make banks seem more stable and profitable than they re­ally are. Such large-scale debt buildups pose risks because they make an economy vulnerable to crises of confidence, particularly when debt is short term and needs to be constantly refinanced—Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 

In this issue

BSP’s Aggressive RRR Cuts: A High-Stakes Gamble?

I. Decline in 2024 Bank Non-Performing Loans Amidst Record-High Debt Levels and a Slowing Economy

II. Deepening Financialization: Financial Assets Surge in 2024 as Banks Drive Industry Monopolization

III. Viewing Bank’s Asset Growth Through the Lens of the PSE

IV. March 2025 RRR Cuts and the Liquidity Conundrum: Unraveling the Banking System’s Pressure Points

V. Liquidity Drain: Record Investment Risks and Elevated Marked-to-Market Losses

VI. Despite Falling Rates, Bank’s Held-to-Maturity Assets Remain Near Record High

VII. Moral Hazard and the "COVID Bailout Playbook"

VIII. The Bigger Picture: Are We Headed for a Full-Blown Crisis?

IX. Conclusion: RRR Cuts a High-Risk Strategy? 

BSP’s Aggressive RRR Cuts: A High-Stakes Gamble?

The BSP announced another round of RRR cuts in March amid mounting liquidity constraints. Yet, the reduction from 20% in 2018 to 7% in 2024 has barely improved conditions. Will this time be different?

I. Decline in 2024 Bank Non-Performing Loans Amidst Record-High Debt Levels and a Slowing Economy

Inquirer.net, February 14, 2025: Soured loans held by Philippine banks as a ratio of total credit eased to their lowest level in a year by the end of 2024 as declining interest rates and softer inflation helped borrowers settle their debts on time. However, a shallower easing cycle might keep financial conditions still somewhat tight, which could prevent a big decline in bad debts this year. Preliminary data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed the gross amount of nonperforming loans (NPLs)—or credit that is 90 days late on a payment and at risk of default—had cornered 3.27 percent of the local banking industry’s total lending portfolio as of December, down from November’s 3.54 percent. That figure—also known as the gross NPL ratio—was the lowest since December 2023, when bad loans accounted for 3.24 percent of banks’ total loan book.

An overview of the operating environment 

In any analysis, it is crucial to understand the operating environment that provides context to the relevance of a statistic in discussion.

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) initiated its ‘easing cycle’ in the second half of 2024, which included three rate cuts and a reduction in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Meanwhile, inflation (CPI) rebounded from a low of 1.9% in September to 2.9% in December. Additionally, the BSP tightened its cap on the USDPHP exchange rate. Fiscal spending over the first 11 months of the year reached an all-time high.

Yet, there are notable contradictions.

Despite record-high bank lending—driven largely by real estate and consumer loans—GDP growth slowed to 5.2% in the second half of 2024 primarily due to the weak consumer spending. The employment rate was also near an all-time high.


Figure 1

Meanwhile, real estate prices entered deflationary territory in Q3, with the sector’s real GDP growth falling to its lowest level since the pandemic-induced recession. Its share of total GDP also dropped to an all-time low. 

Notably, the real estate sector remains the largest borrower within the banking system (encompassing universal, commercial, thrift, and rural/cooperative banks). (Figure 1, topmost chart) This data depends on the accuracy of the loans reported by banks. 

However, despite recent rate cuts and significant reductions in RRR, the sector remains under pressure. Additionally, sluggish GDP growth suggests mounting risks associated with record levels of consumer leverage. 

Upon initial analysis, the decline in non-performing loans (NPLs) appears inconsistent with these economic developments. Gross NPLs dropped to one-year lows, while net NPLs reached levels last seen in June 2020. (Figure 1, middle window) 

Ironically, the BSP also announced another round of RRR cuts this March.

II. Deepening Financialization: Financial Assets Surge in 2024 as Banks Drive Industry Monopolization

Let's now turn to the gross assets of the financial system, also known as Total Financial Resources (TFR).

The BSP maintained its policy rate this February.

Ironically, BSP rates appear to have had little influence on the assets of the bank-financial industry. 

In 2024, TFR surged by 7.8% YoY, while bank resources jumped 8.9%, reaching record highs of Php 33.78 trillion and Php 28.255 trillion, respectively. 

Why does this matter? 

Since the BSP started hiking rates in April 2022, TFR and bank financial resources have posted a 9.7% and 10.9% compound annual growth rate (CAGR), respectively. In short, the growth of financial assets has accelerated despite the BSP’s rate hikes. 

Or, the series of rate hikes have barely affected bank and financial market operations. 

By the end of 2024, TFR stood at 128% of headline GDP and 152% of nominal GDP, while bank resources accounted for 107% and 127%, respectively. This reflects the increasing financialization of the Philippine economy—a growing reliance on credit and liquidity—as confirmed by the Money Supply (M series) relative to GDP. (Figure 1, lowest image)

Banking Sector Consolidation


Figure 2

More importantly, the rate hikes catapulted the bank's share of the TFR from 82.3% in 2023 to an all-time high of 83.64% in 2024, powered by universal and commercial banks, whose share jumped from 77.6% to 78.3%! (Figure 2, topmost diagram) 

Effectively, the banking industry—particularly UCBs—has been monopolizing finance, leading to greater market concentration, which translates to a build-up in systemic concentration risk. 

As of December 2024, bank assets were allocated as follows: cash, 10%; total loan portfolio (inclusive of interbank loans and reverse repurchase agreements), 54%; investments, 28.3%; real and other properties acquired, 0.43%; and other assets, 7.14%. 

In 2024, the banking system’s cash reserves deflated 6.01% YoY, while total loans and investments surged by 10.74% and 10.72%, respectively. 

Yet over the years, cash holdings have declined (since 2013), loan growth has been recovering (post-2018 hikes), and investments have surged, partially replacing both. (Figure 2, middle image) 

Notably, despite the BSP’s historic liquidity injections, banks' cash reserves have continued to erode. 

The catch-22 is that if banks were profitable, why would they have shed cash reserves over the years? 

Why the series of RRR cuts? 

III. Viewing Bank’s Asset Growth Through the Lens of the PSE 

During the Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSEi) 30’s run-up to 7,500, Other Financial Corporations (OFCs)—potentially key players in the so-called "national team"—were substantial net buyers of both bank and non-bank equities. 

BSP, January 31, 2025: "The q-o-q rise in the other financial corporations’ domestic claims was attributable to the increase in its claims on the depository corporations, the other sectors, and the central government. In particular, the other financial corporations’ claims on the depository corporations grew as its holdings of bank-issued debt securities and equity shares increased.  Likewise, the sector’s claims on the other sectors grew as its investments in equity shares issued by other nonfinancial corporations and loans extended to households expanded. The growth in the OFCs’ domestic claims was further supported by the rise in the sector’s investments in government-issued debt securities" (bold added)

The OFCs consist of non-money market investment funds, other financial intermediaries (excluding insurance corporations and pension funds), financial auxiliaries, captive financial institutions and money lenders, insurance corporations, and pension funds.

In Q3 2024, claims on depository corporations surged 12% YoY, while claims on the private sector jumped 8%, both reaching record highs in nominal peso terms.

Meanwhile, the PSEi and Financial Index surged 15.1% and 23.4%, respectively. The Financial Index hit an all-time high of 2,423.37 on October 21st, and as of this writing, remains less than 10% below that peak. The Financial Index, which includes seven banks (AUB, BDO, BPI, MBT, CBC, SECB) and the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) as the sole non-bank component, has cushioned the PSEi 30 from a collapse. (Figure 2, lowest chart)


Figure 3

It has also supported the PSEi 30 and the PSE through the private sector claims. (Figure 3, topmost pane)

The irony is that OFCs continued purchasing bank shares even as the banking sector’s profit growth (across universal-commercial, thrift, and rural/cooperative banks) materially slowed (as BSP’s official rates rose)

In 2024, the banking system’s net profit growth fell to 9.8%, the lowest in four years. (Figure 3, middle chart)

Meanwhile, trading income—despite making up just 2.2% share of total operating income—soared 78.3% YoY. 

The crux is that the support provided to the Financial Index by the OFCs may have enabled banks to increase their asset base via their ‘investment’ accounts, while simultaneously propping up the PSEi 30. 

Yet, this also appears to mask the deteriorating internal fundamentals of Philippine banks. (Figure 3, lowest graph) 

There are several possibilities at play: 

1. The BSP’s influence could be a factor;

2. Banks may have acted like a cartel in coordinating their actions

3. The limited depth of Philippine capital markets may have forced the industry’s equity placements into a narrow set of options.

But in my humble view, the most telling indicator? Those coordinated intraday pumps—post-recess "afternoon delight" rallies and pre-closing floats—strongly suggest synchronized or coordinated activities.

The point of this explanation is that Philippine banks and non-bank institutions appear to be relying on asset inflation to boost their balance sheets. 

Aside from shielding banks through liquidity support for the real estate industry, have the BSP's RRR cuts also been designed to boost the PSEi 30?

IV. March 2025 RRR Cuts and the Liquidity Conundrum: Unraveling the Banking System’s Pressure Points 

Philstarnews.com, February 22, 2025: The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) surprised markets yesterday as it announced another major reduction in the amount of deposit banks are required to keep with the central bank. The BSP said it would reduce the reserve requirement ratios (RRR) of local banks, effective March 28, to free up more funds to boost the economy.  “The BSP reiterates its long-run goal of enabling banks to channel their funds more effectively toward productive loans and investments. Reducing RRRs will lessen frictions that hinder financial intermediation,” the central bank said…The regulator slashed the RRR for universal and commercial banks, as well as non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking functions (NBQBs) by 200 basis points, to five percent from the current level of seven percent. 

The BSP last reduced the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on October 25, 2024. With the next cut taking effect on March 28, 2025, this marks the fastest and largest RRR reduction in recent history.

In contrast, the BSP previously cut RRR rates from 18% to 14% over an eight-month period between May and December 2019.

Why the RRR Cuts if NPLs Are Not a Concern?


Figure 4

BSP’s balance sheet data from end-September to November 2024 shows that the RRR reduction led to a Php 124.5 billion decline in Reserve Deposits of Other Depository Corporations (RDoDC)—an estimate of the liquidity injected into the system. The downtrend in bank reserves since 2018 reflects the cumulative effect of these RRR cuts.  (Figure 4, topmost image)

Yet, despite the liquidity injection, the banking system’s cash and due-from-bank deposits continued to decline through December. It has been in a downtrend since 2013. (Figure 4, middle pane)

Cash reserves dropped 6% in 2024, marking the third consecutive annual decline. The BSP’s 2020-21 historic Php 2.3 trillion injection has largely dissipated.

Since peaking at Php 3.572 trillion in December 2021, cash levels have fallen by Php 828 billion to Php 2.743 trillion in December 2024—essentially returning to 2019 levels.  (Figure 4, lowest chart)


Figure 5

The BSP’s other key liquidity indicator, the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio has also weakened, resonating with the cash reserve trend. This decline, which began in 2013, was briefly offset by the BSP’s historic Php 2.3 trillion liquidity injection but has now resumed its downward trajectory. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

Other Factors Beyond Cash and Reserves

The slowdown isn’t limited to cash reserves. 

Deposit growth has also decelerated since 2013, despite reaching record highs in peso terms. Ironically, a robust 12.7% rebound in bank lending growth (excluding interbank loans and repos) in 2024, which should have spurred deposit growth, failed to translate into meaningful gains. Peso deposits grew by just 7% in 2024. (Figure 5, middle pane) 

The question arises: where did all this money go? 

This brings attention back onto the BSP’s stated goal of "enabling banks to channel funds more effectively toward productive loans and investments." This growing divergence between total loan portfolio growth and peso deposit expansion in the face of RRR cuts—20% before March 2018, now down to just 7% last October—raises further questions about its effectiveness in boosting productive lending and investment.

A Deeper Liquidity Strain: Rising Borrowings

Adding to signs of the increasing liquidity stress, bank borrowings hit an all-time high in 2024, both in gross and net terms. (Figure 5, lowest graph)


Figure 6

Total borrowings surged by Php 394.5 billion, pushing outstanding bank debt to a record Php 1.671 trillion.

More importantly, the focus of borrowing was in bill issuance, which accounted for 65% of total bank borrowings in 2024 (!)—a strong indicator of tightening liquidity. (Figure 6, topmost image)

If banks are highly profitable and NPLs are not a major issue, why are they borrowing so aggressively and requiring additional RRR cuts?

The liquidity squeeze cannot be attributed solely to RRR levels alone—otherwise, the 2018–2020 cut from 20% to 12% should have stemmed the tide.

V. Liquidity Drain: Record Investment Risks and Elevated Marked-to-Market Losses

There’s more to consider.

Beyond lending, bank investments—another key bank asset class—also hit a record high in peso terms in 2024.

Yet, despite lower fixed-income rates, banks continued to suffer heavy losses on their investment portfolios: Accumulated investment losses stood at Php 42.4 billion in 2024, after peaking at Php 122.85 billion in 2022. (Figure 6, middle diagram)

Banks have now reported four consecutive years of investment losses.

These losses undoubtedly strain liquidity, but what’s driving them?

The two primary investment categories—Available-for-Sale (AFS) and Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities—accounted for 40% and 52.6% of total bank investments, respectively.

Accumulated losses likely stem from AFS positions, reflecting volatility in equity, fixed-income, foreign exchange, and other trading activities.

VI. Despite Falling Rates, Bank’s Held-to-Maturity Assets Remain Near Record High

Interestingly, despite easing fixed-income rates, HTM assets remained close to their all-time high at Php 3.95 trillion in December 2024, barely below the December 2023 peak of Php 4.02 trillion.

Since January 2023, HTM holdings have hovered tightly between Php 3.9 trillion and Php 4 trillion.

Government Financing and Liquidity Risks

Yet, this plateau may not persist.

Beyond RRR cuts, the banking system’s Net Claims on Central Government (NCoCG) surged 7% to a new high of Php 5.541 trillion in December 2024.

Per BSP: "Net Claims on CG include domestic securities issued by, and loans extended to, the central government, net of liabilities such as deposits."

While this is often justified under Basel III capital adequacy measures, in reality, it functions as a quasi-quantitative easing (QE) mechanism—banks injecting liquidity into the financial system by financing the government.

The likely impact?

The losses in government securities are categorized as HTMs, effectively locking away liquidity.

BSP led Financial Stability Coordination Council (FSCC) noted in their 2017 Financial Stability Report in 2018 that: "Banks face marked-to-market (MtM) losses from rising interest rates. Higher market rates affect trading since existing holders of tradable securities are taking MtM losses as a result. While some banks have resorted to reclassifying their available-for-sale (AFS) securities into held-to-maturity (HTM), some PHP845.8 billion in AFS (as of end-March 2018) are still subject to MtMlosses. Furthermore, the shift to HTM would take away market liquidity since these securities could no longer be traded prior to their maturity" (bold mine) 

Curiously, discussions of HTM risks vanished from BSP-FSCC Financial Stability Reports after the 2017 and 2018 H1–2019 H1 issues.

VII. Moral Hazard and the "COVID Bailout Playbook"

Although NCoCG has been growing since 2015, banks accelerated their accumulation of government securities as part of the BSP’s 2020 pandemic rescue package. 

Are banks aggressively lending to generate liquidity solely to finance the government? Are they also using government debt to expand the collateral universe for increased lending? Government debt is also used as collateral for interbank loans and repo transactions. 

Have accounting regulations—such as HTM—transformed into a silo that shields Mark-to-Market losses? 

The growth of HTM has aligned with NCoCG. (Figure 6, lowest chart)

While this may satisfy Basel capital adequacy requirements, ironically, it also exposes the banking system to investment concentration risk, sovereign risk, and liquidity risk.

This suggests that reported bank "profits"—likely inflated by subsidies and relief measures—are overshadowed by a toxic mix of trading losses, HTM burdens, and potentially undeclared or hidden NPLs

These pressures have likely forced the BSP to aggressively cut RRR rates.

As anticipated, authorities appear poised to replicate the COVID-era bailout playbook, which they view as a success in averting a crisis.

The likely policy trajectory template includes DIRECT BSP infusions via NCoCG, record fiscal deficits, further RRR and policy rate cuts, accelerated bank infusions NCoCG, a higher cap on the USD/PHP exchange rate, and additional subsidies and relief measures for banks.

This is unfolding before us, one step at a time.

VIII. The Bigger Picture: Are We Headed for a Full-Blown Crisis?

Given the moral hazard embedded in this bailout mindset, banks may take on excessive risks, exacerbating "frictions in financial intermediation". Debt will beget more unproductive debt. "Ponzi finance" risks will intensify heightening liquidity constraints that could escalate into a full-blown crisis. 

Further, given the banking system’s fractional reserve operating framework, riskier bank behavior, whetted by reduced cash buffers, heightens the risks of lower consumer confidence in the banking system—which translates to a higher risk of a bank run

The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) reportedly has funds to cover 18.5% of insured deposits, or P3.53 trillion, as of 2023. 

So, with the RRR cuts, is the BSP gambling with this?

IX. Conclusion: RRR Cuts a High-Risk Strategy?

BSP’s statistics cannot be fully relied upon to assess the true health of the banking system.

1. The decline in non-performing loans (NPLs) is inconsistent with slowing economic growth and the deflationary spiral in the real estate sector. Likewise, falling NPLs contradict the ongoing liquidity pressures faced by banks.

2. Evidence of these liquidity strains is clear: bank borrowings have surged to record levels, with bill issuances dominating the market. The BSP’s RRR cuts only reinforce the mounting liquidity constraints. 

3. Beyond lending, banks have turned to investments to strengthen their balance sheets—including supporting the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), even as asset prices have become increasingly misaligned with corporate earnings.

4. In a bid to further boost systemic liquidity, implied quantitative easing (QE) spiked to an all-time high in December, which will likely translate into a higher volume of Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets.

Through aggressive RRR cuts, is the BSP taking a high-risk approach merely to uphold its statistical narrative?

 

 

 

Monday, February 10, 2025

January 2025 2.9% CPI: Food Security Emergency and the Vicious Cycle of Interventionism

  

The advocates of public control cannot do without inflation. They need it in order to finance their policy of reckless spending and of lavishly subsidizing and bribing the voters—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

January 2025 2.9% CPI: Food Security Emergency and the Vicious Cycle of Interventionism

I. Introduction

II. January 2025 2.9% CPI: Key Highlights

III. The Government’s Convenient Attribution Bias: The Typhoon Fallacy

IV. Baseline Changes: Engineering GDP Growth

V. The Falling Rice Prices: Why the Food Emergency Security?

VI. The Rice Ceiling Trap: A Self-Inflicted Supply Crisis and the Vicious Cycle of Interventionism

VII. Treasury Markets Are Already Telegraphing Inflation Risk

VIII. The Contradiction: Why a Food Security Emergency Amid Falling Prices?

IX. 2024 Fiscal Snapshot: Rising Debt, the Trade-Off for 5.6% GDP

X. Mounting Risks of Philippine Peso Devaluation and Inflation Risks 

January 2025 2.9% CPI: Food Security Emergency and the Vicious Cycle of Interventionism

I. Introduction 

·         January’s CPI provided a temporary breather against the looming risk of an inflation rebound.

·         Despite falling rice prices, authorities pushed forward with a Food Security Emergency—one in a series of interventions aimed at suppressing CPI in the short term.

·         Meanwhile, rising domestic and external debt, coupled with declining foreign reserves (GIR), amplify risks of peso devaluation and feeding the inflation cycle.

II. January 2025 2.9% CPI: Key Highlights 

Businessworld, February 6, 2025: HEADLINE INFLATION remained steady in January as lower utility costs offset a spike in food prices, preliminary data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) showed. It also settled within the 2.5%-3.3% forecast from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The January print was also slightly higher than the 2.8% median estimate in a BusinessWorld poll of 16 analysts... Core inflation, which discounts volatile prices of food and fuel, settled at 2.6% during the month — slower than 2.8% in December and 3.8% a year ago…On the other hand, rice inflation contracted to 2.3% in January from the 0.8% clip in December and 22.6% jump a year prior. (bold added) 

Nota Bene: As of January, the BSP has yet to release data on bank lending, liquidity conditions, and its central bank survey. This leaves us with the January CPI—interpreted through the lens of what the government intends to highlight: supply-driven inflation!


Figure 1 

Momentum: January’s data suggests stalling momentum in the year-over-year (YoY) change for both headline and core CPI. 

However, a trend analysis of the month-over-month (MoM) change reveals that while headline CPI remains above the upper boundary of its trend line, core CPI remains rangebound, albeit slightly lower than recent highs. (Figure 1, topmost image)

Bottoming Phase? These MoM rates suggest a bottoming phase. It remains uncertain whether this will remain rangebound or break to the upside, requiring further confirmation.

Uptrend of the Third Wave of the Inflation Cycle Intact. Nonetheless, the broader uptrend in the 10-year headline and core CPI remains intact. In fact, MoM trends reinforce the case for a bottoming—a potential launching pad.

It's important to remember that this CPI backdrop occurs amidst the BSP's pursuit of easy money policies since the second half of 2024. This is coupled with a series of all-time highs in bank credit expansion and a near-record unemployment rate in December 2024. (Figure 1, middle and lowest charts)


Figure 2

Level vs. Rate of Change. It is a misimpression to state that January's CPI is at the same level as December's. While the rate of change may be the same, the level is definitively not.

The Philippine Statistics Authority's (PSA) nominal prices determine the level, whereas the CPI figures represent the base-effect represented in percentages. (Figure 2, topmost graph)

The nominal rates also reveal the cumulative effects of the CPI. Even if growth rates stall or decrease (slow), the continued increase in general prices persists.

This leads to sustained hardship, especially for those living on the margins.

III. The Government’s Convenient Attribution Bias: The Typhoon Fallacy

Authorities often employ self-serving attribution bias—crediting successes to internal factors while attributing failures to external ones—to explain economic phenomena. For instance, they attribute recent food price increases to 'typhoons/weather disturbances' or diseases like African Swine Fever.

The Philippines experiences an average of 20 typhoons annually. If the establishment's logic were consistently true, food prices should be perpetually elevated.

review of the 10 worst typhoons to hit the country—events that, according to the establishment narrative, should have triggered inflation surges—shows little correlation with CPI spikes. In fact, food CPI exhibited a downtrend in seven of the nine years when these devastating typhoons occurred (the other two took place in 2020). (Figure 2, middle pane)

But, of course, the vulnerable public is expected to accept the official narrative without question—because the echo chamber insists on it!

IV. Baseline Changes: Engineering GDP Growth

Policymakers are always seeking ways to justify their free-lunch economic policies. 

Now, they are signaling a change in the baseline rates of the most sensitive data—particularly the CPI and the GDP—starting in 2026.

Inquirer.net, February 6, 2025: The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) will change again the base year used to calculate inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) so that key data could better capture the latest economic conditions.

This adjustment, while technical in nature, conveniently offers a tool for reshaping inflation narratives, making future price pressures appear more benign.

Well, if history serves as a guide, "could better capture the latest economic conditions" often implies adjusting baseline rates to lower the CPI. Comparing the CPI with an overlap of the 2006 and 2018 baselines reveals a significant difference, with the 2018 baseline showing a markedly lower CPI. (Figure 2, lowest diagram)

The BSP still publishes data series from 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2018.

Fundamentally, a high Nominal GDP (NGDP) when calculated against a reduced CPI (as a deflator or implicit price index) results in a HIGHER headline GDP! Voilà! A statistical boom! 

Will the Philippine government achieve its coveted "middle-income status" economy by inflating its statistics? 

V. The Falling Rice Prices: Why the Food Emergency Security?

Authorities also claim that "rice inflation contracted to 2.3% in January from the 0.8% clip in December." 

If this is the case, why the sudden need for a Food Emergency Security (FES) program, which includes light-handed price controls (a maximum Suggested Retail Price) and the release of the National Food Authority’s "buffer rice" or reserves?


Figure 3

If anything, these interventions have temporarily suppressed CPI in the short term. 

In any case, here is a timeline of political interventions in the food and agricultural industry, which should serve as template. 

February 15, 2019: GMA News: Duterte signs rice tariffication bill into law

March 11, 2020: DTI: Nationwide price freeze on basic necessities in effect amid COVID-19 emergency 

February 2, 2021: Inquirer: DA: Price ceiling on pork, chicken products to start on Feb. 8

April 8, 2021: Portcalls: Duterte signs EO lowering tariff for pork imports 

June 1 2024: DTI: DTI secures voluntary price freeze commitments for more basic necessities 

However, as history shows, the insidious effects of distortive policies surface over time. Intervention begets more intervention, as authorities scramble to manage the unintended consequences of their previous actions. Consequently, food CPI remains under pressure. (Figure 3, topmost graph)

Ironically, the easing of interventions may have contributed to the decline in CPI from the end of 2022 to mid-2024. 

VI. The Rice Ceiling Trap: A Self-Inflicted Supply Crisis and the Vicious Cycle of Interventionism 

Price ceilings create artificial demand spikes. With buffer stocks being released into the market, their rapid depletion seems inevitable. This means authorities will soon have to replenish reserves—betting that global rice prices remain stable. (Figure 3, middle window)

But even if global rice prices decline, large-scale stockpiling would exacerbate the twin deficits (fiscal and trade deficits). The agricultural sector reported near milestone trade deficit in Q3 2024. (Figure 3, lowest image)

This, in turn, would put additional pressure on the USD-PHP exchange rate, where further peso depreciation would translate into higher import costs, which would help feed into the current inflation cycle.

And now, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is considering imposing FES on pork prices as well!

It appears authorities believe they can override market dynamics and economic laws through sheer force of policy. But history has shown time and again that such attempts only lead to greater imbalances—necessitating even more interventions in an endless loop of self-inflicted crises.

Good luck to the believers!

VII. Treasury Markets Are Already Telegraphing Inflation Risk

The Philippine Treasury markets are already reflecting this narrative.


Figure 4

The yield curve continues to fall, leading to a bull steepening—a clear signal that the BSP is likely to cut rates. (Figure 4, topmost graph)

While this may provide short-term relief, it also carries risks: looser monetary policy could reignite inflationary pressures while signaling heightened economic uncertainty

VIII. The Contradiction: Why a Food Security Emergency Amid Falling Prices? 

If rice prices are declining and core CPI is slowing, why are authorities aggressively pushing a Food Emergency Security (FES) program? 

The short answer: they want their free lunches to continue

Whether through subsidies, price controls, or other interventionist policies, they are ensuring a steady flow of populist measures. 

By the way, the National mid-term Election is in May! 

Importantly, this push signifies a calculated move to secure easier access to cheap credit—leveraging monetary easing to sustain economic illusions

IX. 2024 Fiscal Snapshot: Rising Debt, the Trade-Off for 5.6% GDP 

The Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) has yet to release its cash operations report for February 28, limiting our full-year assessment of fiscal health. 

Still, while public debt eased slightly from Php 16.09 trillion in November to Php 16.05 trillion in December, total 2024 public debt closed at an all-time high

While the consensus was previously pleased that a slowing deficit had led to a decrease in net debt increases, 2024 experienced "a 9.8% or Php 1.44 trillion increase from the end-2023 level."  (Figure 4, middle chart)

The Bureau of Treasury (BTr) further reported that the "corresponding debt-to-GDP ratio of 60.7% was slightly above the 60.6% revised Medium-Term Fiscal Framework estimate, on account of the lower-than-expected full-year real GDP growth outcome of 5.6%" (Figure 4, lowest diagram)

Yet, this debt increase came despite a supposedly “restrained” deficit—largely due to (potential) record government spending in 2024

Put simply, the Php 1.44 trillion debt increase was the trade-off for achieving 5.6% GDP growth. 

There is a cost to everything. 

Yet, the full cost of debt servicing has yet to be published. 

Crucially, this 5.6% GDP growth was artificially fueled by: 

-BSP’s easy money policies,

-Record public spending,

-All-time high public debt,

-Historic bank credit expansion, and

-Near full employment.

Any reversal of these factors—or even a partial pullback—could WIDEN the fiscal deficit to new highs and PUSH debt-to-GDP further upward. 

There is more.

X. Mounting Risks of Philippine Peso Devaluation and Inflation Risks

Figure 5

External debt jumped 11.4% in 2024, reaching an all-time high of Php 5.12 trillion

Its share of total debt rose for the third consecutive year, now at 31.9%—partly due to peso depreciation but mostly from fresh borrowings totaling Php 401.7 billion. (Figure 5, topmost chart)

Meanwhile, BSP’s January 2025 Gross International Reserves (GIR) shrank by $3.24 billion—its steepest decline since September 2022. This was largely due to their defense of the Philippine peso, even though USD/PHP barely hit 59. (Figure 5, middle pane)

The BSP appears to have adjusted its intervention ceiling or their "upper band" to around 58.7. 

Falling GIR is a price to pay for the USD/PHP peg. (discussed last January)

And remember, 'ample reserves' have barely slowed the USDPHP's juggernaut. (Figure 5, lowest chart)

The BSP also revealed another reason for the GIR decline was a "drawdown on the national government’s (NG) deposits with the BSP to pay off its foreign currency debt obligations." 

Adding another layer of irony, the Philippine government raised $2.25 billion and €1 billion on January 24th. These fresh funds may temporarily boost February’s GIR, reflecting the National Government’s deposits with the BSP. 

Going forward, the government will require even more foreign exchange to service its external debt over time. This suggests continued reliance on foreign borrowing—expanding the BTr’s outstanding FX debt stock and increasing the risk of further peso depreciation. 

With growing dollar scarcity, the BSP’s need to refinance public debt, and the rising FX debt appetite of elite institutions, the government and central bank path-dependence on liquidity injections via easy money and fiscal stimulus have only deepened. 

This, in turn, heightens inflation risks—potentially fueling the third wave of the present inflation cycle. 

Take heed.

Monday, February 03, 2025

Q4 and 2024 GDP: Consumer and Capital Spending Stagnates as Bank-GDP Concentration Risks Deepen

  

The government pretends to be endowed with the mystical power to accord favors out of an inexhaustible horn of plenty. It is both omniscient and omnipotent. It can by a magic wand create happiness and abundance. The truth is the government cannot give if it does not take from somebody—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

Q4 and 2024 GDP: Consumer and Capital Spending Stagnates as Bank-GDP Concentration Risks Deepen

I. The GDP’s Critical Defects

II. The Mainstream Narrative is Failing

III. Philippine GDP Predicament: Full Employment and Record Credit, Yet Slowing Consumption?

IV. Malinvestments: Retail Expands While Consumer Spending Stagnates

V. Proposed Minimum Wage Hikes to Compound Consumer Woes

VI. Q4 GDP versus SWS’ Q4 Milestone Highs in Self-Poverty Ratings and Hunger; Critical Questions

VII. Q4 GDP Boosted by Government Spending, Services Exports and Private Sector Construction

VIII. Q4 GDP’s Industry Side: Boost from Public Administration and Defense and other Related Sectors

IX. Q4 2024 Boosted by Financialization Even as Manufacturing and Real Estate Sector Languish; Deepening Bank-GDP Concentration Risks

X. More Signs of Consumer Weakening: Material Slowing ‘Revenge Travel’ and Outside Dining GDP

XI. Summary and Conclusion

Q4 and 2024 GDP: Consumer and Capital Spending Stagnates as Bank-GDP Concentration Risks Deepen 

Q4 and 2024 GDP were another big miss for the establishment. Government spending played a pivotal role in boosting growth, while consumers were sidelined. There is little awareness that the former indirectly causes the latter 

I. The GDP’s Critical Defects 

Inquirer.net January 31, 2025: The Marcos administration missed its growth target for the second straight year in 2024, falling below consensus after the onslaught of destructive typhoons had muted the typical surge in economic activities during the holiday season. Gross domestic product (GDP), the sum of all products and services created within an economy, expanded at an average rate of 5.6 percent for the entire 2024, the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported on Thursday…At the same time, last year’s performance failed to meet market expectations after settling below the median estimate of 5.8 percent in an Inquirer poll of 12 economists…The statistics agency reported that GDP had expanded by 5.2 percent in the fourth quarter, unchanged from the preceding three months and lower than the year-ago print of 5.5 percent. That was also below the median forecast of 5.8 percent. 

Our preface: the BSP cut official rates in August, October, and December. It also reduced RRR rates in October, while the aggregate fiscal spending in 11-months reached all-time highs (ATHs), signaling massive stimulus or Marcos-nomics. 

Despite this, the Philippine GDP registered 5.2% in Q4 and 5.6% in 2024. 

Although GDP provides insight into how economic output is distributed across sectors—categorized by expenditure and industry—it does not present the equivalent allocation of spending by income class. 

Therefore, it is arguable that the headline figure makes a critically flawed assumption by suggesting that the statistical spending growth applies to the average. 

In other words, it assumes that the average citizen has experienced 5.2% growth in Q4 and 5.6% growth overall. The question, however, is how do you aggregate the spending of a few billionaires with that of those living in poverty? 

And this applies to the inflation deflator used to calculate the headline figure as well: How accurate is it to derive an average inflation rate from a mishmash of diverse spending items like a mobile gaming subscription, rice, and vehicle wheels? 

Apples and oranges, you say? Exactly.

If the nominal GDP and the deflator are flawed, why should we trust that the headline estimates reflect reality?

II. The Mainstream Narrative is Failing 

Every start of the year, mainstream experts proclaim at the top of their lungs that GDP will align with sanguine government targets. Some even tout the likelihood of the economy reaching "middle-income status."

Beyond abstract reasoning, they rarely explain the mechanics of how they arrive at their estimated figures.

Either they ignore the data provided by the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), or their forecasts are based on a 'pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey' approach—bluntly put, faith in magic.

What does the PSA data reveal?


Figure 1

It shows that since the post-pandemic recession, GDP has operated within a secondary trendline. This means that despite occasional growth spikes, GDP growth will be SLOWER than in the pre-pandemic era. (Figure 1, topmost pane)

Using the exponential trend as a gauge, we see that Q4 GDP consistently exceeds the trendline but eventually retraces to the secondary support in the following quarters.

The same dynamic applies to the 2024 GDP. (Figure 1, middle graph)

The point having been made, realize that for GDP to meet the mainstream's numbers, it would require a significant breakthrough not only to reclaim the pre-pandemic trend but also to sustain it.

From a statistical standpoint, none of this is happeningEven the PSA’s chart reinforces the notion of a slowing GDP. (Figure 1, lowest chart)


Figure 2 

As evidence, the government has struggled to wean itself off debt-financed pandemic deficits relative to GDP, which have served as a quasi-stimulus. Data reveals that they have become addicted to it. (Figure 2, topmost image) 

Why, then, do they yearn for pre-pandemic GDP figures? 

Incredible.

Statisticians-cum-economic experts often don't disclose that their perpetually optimistic forecasts might be about placating or bootlicking the government.

Why? For business and personal reasons. They might want to secure government contracts, underwrite debt issuance, intermediate stock trading, or gain accreditation as credit appraisers, among other things. On a personal level, they seek social desirability or good standing with officials for career advancement (revolving door politics), off-table deals, etc. In short: the principal-agent dilemma.

Essentially, overstating GDP or understating CPI numbers, or the mainstream's erroneous forecasts, come with no consequences for them—they have no "skin in the game."

However, for many in the investing public, consensus projections guide corporate strategies or investments in financial markets.

It’s unsurprising, then, that in addition to distortions in capital goods pricing due to stock market mispricing, overly optimistic guidance often leads to “build-and-they-will-come” debt-fueled malinvestments.

Many also invest their hard-earned savings in financial markets (stocks or fixed income) in the hope of achieving real or inflation-adjusted positive returns, without realizing that their investments are silently transferring wealth to politically connected economic elites, who are absorbing unsustainable amounts of debt.

And remember the inflation spike of 2022? NONE of these experts saw it coming.

In clear words, forecasts based on the principal-agent problem will likely keep the public blind to the escalating risks of a crisis.

Here's an example:

Businessworld, January 24: PROPERTY developers in the Philippine capital need to enhance their market research and consider lowering condominium prices to address the current “mismatch” between available units and buyer demand, according to property analysts. “These overpriced condos aren’t matching with the existing buyers…There are so many buyers, as in we’re talking millions of buyers, but the issue is they cannot afford [a condo in Metro Manila] anymore” (bold added) 

The mainstream’s narrative is failing: Expect more to come. 

III. Philippine GDP Predicament: Full Employment and Record Credit, Yet Slowing Consumption? 

Let's conduct a brief investigation into the PSA's GDP data. 

The government's statistics are riddled with paradoxical figures.

First, the government claims that the employment rate (as of November) has reached nearly its highest level. (Figure 2, middle chart)

Curiously, with low savings, how have entrepreneurs managed to fund investments in real businesses, leading to near-full employment?

FDI numbers hardly support this. Despite a spike in October, the 10-month FDI flow was up by only 6.6%, with 68% of those inflows coming from debt. Debt inflows are no guarantee of “investment.”

The likely source of funds might be from banking loans. Over an 11-month period, consumer credit captured the largest share of the net increase in Universal-Commercial Bank loans at 23%, followed by real estate at 18.74%, electricity at 9.72%, and retail trade at 9.52%.

However, retail and agriculture, which account for the largest shares of the working population at 21.3% and 20% respectively, suggest a different story.

Next, fueled by credit cards and salary loans, consumer credit continues to grow at a breakneck pace, setting nominal records consecutively. (Figure 2, lowest graph)

Ironically, despite full employment and unprecedented consumer credit growth, Q4 2024 saw real consumer spending in GDP terms increase by only 4.7%, similar to Q2 and marking the second lowest since Q2 2011, excluding the period of the pandemic recession.

Stagnating household consumption was a key factor in pulling down the period's GDP.

Moreover, household GDP mirrored the deceleration in Q4 2024, with consumer per capita GDP growth at just 3.8%—the lowest since Q3 2017.

Important questions arise: 

-Where did all that record bank credit expansion go?

-How much of the consumer credit growth has been about refinancing existing debt?

-If productivity has been driving the GDP, why would a nation with full employment experience a sustained slowdown in household consumption?

In this context, government data on employment appears questionable.

IV. Malinvestments: Retail Expands While Consumer Spending Stagnates


Figure 3

What’s more, households are struggling with consumption, mainly due to the inflation tax, which continues to erode their spending power. At the same time, they are using leverage to maintain their lifestyles. As this occurs, retail GDP continues to outgrow consumer spending. (Figure 3, topmost window)

Partly due to the mainstream’s constant cheerleading, retail entrepreneurs are hopeful that the consumption slump will reverse soon, and so have been aggressively expanding capacity. Retail GDP grew by 5.5% in Q4 and has outpaced consumer spending in 3 of the last 4 quarters. (Figure 3, second to the highest image)

Or, to put it simply, because of the mainstream belief in the 'build it and they will come' dogma, supply continues to outpace demand.

V. Proposed Minimum Wage Hikes to Compound Consumer Woes

In the meantime, news reports that "the House Committee on Labor and Employment has approved a bill for a P200 across-the-board legislated wage hike."

Would this not function as a form of redistribution or a protective moat in favor of elite companies, at the expense of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs)? How would this incentivize grassroots entrepreneurship when authorities are effectively raising the cost of doing business or barriers to entry?

How would minimum wage laws not negatively impact consumption and productivity while acting as a drain on savings?

Quoting economist Thomas Sowell, "Minimum wage laws play Russian roulette with people who need jobs and the work experience that will enable them to rise to higher pay levels." (Sowell, 2006)

VI. Q4 GDP versus SWS’ Q4 Milestone Highs in Self-Poverty Ratings and Hunger; Critical Questions

And there’s more. How does the 5.2% GDP square with polls showing record highs in consumer stress: "Self-Rated Poverty at 63%, highest in 21 years" and "December 2024 hunger was… at the highest level since the record high 30.7% during the COVID-19 lockdowns in September 2020"? (Figure 3, second to the lowest and lowest charts)

While the government touts the 5.2% GDP, SWS found that 63% of Filipino families rated themselves as "Poor," while "25.9% of Filipino families experienced involuntary hunger."

Simply put, this reflects popular sentiment about inflation: a vast majority of the population feels harried by the peso’s loss of purchasing power, and a quarter of them have actually experienced hunger.

Incredible.

So, who is overstating their data—SWS or the government?

Here’s the thing: If the GDP growth is based on unsustainable leveraging, what would the ramifications be?

Or if consumer balance sheets have been burdened by excessive gearing (spend-now, pay-later) to cope with inflation, how would this affect the economy?

When consumers reach the proverbial tipping point of leveraging and begin to scale down, wouldn't this slow the GDP? Wouldn't credit delinquencies rise, affecting the banks' already strained liquidity?

Or, wouldn’t this reduce lending, exacerbating liquidity pressures in the banking system and increasing defaults?

Could this not lead to rising unemployment, creating a feedback loop that slows GDP, decelerates bank lending, and drives up credit delinquencies?

By the same token, what happens to the supply side’s debt-financed overcapacity? Wouldn’t this worsen pressures on unemployment, output, consumer spending, and negatively affect the health of the banking industry?

Wouldn't increasing sentiments of hunger and perceptions of poverty not lead to higher risks of social disorder

VII. Q4 GDP Boosted by Government Spending, Services Exports and Private Sector Construction 

If household consumption weighed down the GDP, which sectors propelled it upwards?


Figure 4

From the expenditure side of the data, the answer is the government, construction, and export services. 

Government GDP rose from 5% in Q3 to 9.7% in Q4. While construction GDP dipped from 8.8% to 7.8%, it still exceeded the 5.2% threshold. Private sector construction, driven by households (12.8%) and corporations (5.7%), powered the sector’s GDP, while government construction GDP stagnated at 4.7%. (Figure 4 topmost diagram)

Interestingly, while exports of goods entered a recession, declining by -0.37% in Q3 and -4.6% in Q4, services exports GDP surged from 2.3% to 13.5%, elevating the sector's performance from -1.4% in Q3 to 3.2% in Q4. (Figure 4 middle image) 

Curiously, real estate services firm CBRE reported in 2024 that "32 percent of vacated (office) spaces are from the IT-BPM sector." Why have service export firms like BPOs been downsizing if their businesses were reportedly booming, as suggested by the GDP figures? 

Meanwhile, gross capital formation fell sharply from 13.7% in Q3 to 4.1% in Q4, while durable goods GDP also plunged from 7.9% to just 0.1%. Unfortunately, this indicates a sluggish state of investments, which contrasts with the employment data. 

The expenditure side of the GDP shows that government spending was primarily responsible for the Q4 GDP boost, supported by services exports and private sector construction. However, it also reveals that while consumer spending has stagnated, capital spending has languished. 

VIII. Q4 GDP’s Industry Side: Boost from Public Administration and Defense and other Related Sectors 

On the industry side, sectors like transport (9.5%), financial and insurance (8.5%), professional and business services (8.3%), public administration and defense (7%), education (6.2%), and health (12.1%) all grew above the GDP rate. 

Or, to put it another way, outperforming government and related sectors contributed about 10% of the industry's GDP. 

After the 2020 spike, the share of public administration and defense in GDP remains elevated compared to pre-pandemic levels. This should come as no surprise, as the government is focused on centralization, partly driven by a subtle shift toward a war economy. (Figure 4 lowest graph)

IX. Q4 2024 Boosted by Financialization Even as Manufacturing and Real Estate Sector Languish; Deepening Bank-GDP Concentration Risks


Figure 5

On the other hand, despite showing signs of a slight slowdown in Q4 2024, the financial and insurance sector's contribution to national GDP continues to expand. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

It's not coincidental that the sector's improvements coincided with the BSP's unprecedented sector rescue in 2020. Since then, the sector's growth has not looked back, even as the BSP raised interest rates. That is, the sector’s GDP suggests that there was no tightening at all. 

In Q4, banks accounted for 49% of the sector's GDP, while non-banks and insurance had respective shares of 32% and 13.33%. These sectors posted GDP growth rates of 8%, 8.4%, and 8.2%, respectively. 

Yet the paradox lies in the sector's dependence on the real economy, as it lends and invests to generate profits and contribute value to GDP. 

Real estate, trade (primarily retail), and manufacturing are among their largest borrowers, accounting for 40% of total bank lending as of last November. 

Lending to the financial sector itself accounted for a 7.7% share, which together with the aforementioned sectors, totals 48.5% of all bank loans (from universal commercial, thrift, and rural banks). 

Incidentally, these sectors are also significant contributors to the GDP, making up a 42.7% share of the national GDP. Including the financial sector, the aggregate GDP increases to 52.5%. 

Aside from retail, the manufacturing sector posted a real GDP growth of 3.1%, while real estate GDP materially slowed to 3.0%, pulling its share of the national GDP to an all-time low! (Figure 5, lower diagram) 

We previously discussed the sector's deflationary spiral, and the Q4 decline could signal further price drops in the sector. 

To illustrate the struggles of the manufacturing sector, JG Summit announced the shutdown of its Petrochem business last week, in addition to the goods export recession in Q4. 

To summarize, the Philippine GDP and bank lending exposure reveal an increasingly fragile economy heavily dependent on a few sectors, which have been buoyed by bank credit. This means that the higher the concentration risks, the greater the potential impact of an economic downturn. 

X. More Signs of Consumer Weakening: Material Slowing ‘Revenge Travel’ and Outside Dining GDP 

Another piece of evidence that consumer spending has been slowing can be found in the food and accommodation sectors' GDP. 

The authorities' response to the pandemic with economy-wide shutdowns initially pushed Food GDP into an upward spiral, while the reopening triggered a "revenge travel" GDP surge in the accommodation sector. 

However, the massive distortions caused by these radical political policies have started to unwind.


Figure 6

Accommodation GDP slowed from 12.2% in Q3 to 8.7% in Q4, while food GDP dropped from 10.1% to 4.9%. Since food accounts for a large portion (68%) of the sector, the overall GDP for the sector moderated from 10.7% to 6.1%. (Figure 6, topmost and middle charts) 

The distortions caused by pandemic policies have led many investors to believe that the 'revenge travel' trend, or the recovery streak in tourism, will continue, fueling massive investments in the sector. 

In our humble opinion, they have critically misread the market, as the growth rate of foreign tourist arrivals has substantially slowed in 2024. (Figure 6, lowest image) 

Moreover, the sector's declining GDP further highlights the weakening of domestic tourism

XI. Summary and Conclusion 

1 Q4 and 2024 have reinforced the secondary trendline in GDP, continuing to show a slowdown in GDP growth.

2 Dwindling consumer spending has been a critical factor driving this slowdown.

3 Importantly, capital spending growth has also been lackluster.

4 Conversely, government spending has provided crucial support to GDP, along with contributions from other ancillary sectors.

Yet, these dynamics reveal that the Philippines operates under the flawed assumption of political "free lunches" — where government spending is seen as having only a positive impact, while ignoring the negative effects of the crowding out syndrome

They also highlight the pitfalls of the BSP's 'trickle-down' policies, which have deepened concentration risks due to the bank-dependent financing of a few sectors. 

It’s no surprise, then, that after the initial easing by the BSP in the second half of the year — which contributed to the dismal Q4 GDP, the January 2025 PSEi 30 crash and rising bond yields, the BSP proposes to continue the same strategy, slashing rates by 50 basis points and reducing reserve requirements by 200 basis points

Succinctly, they are "doing the same thing and expecting different results."

____

references 

Thomas Sowell, A Glimmer of Hope August 08, 2006, realclearpolitics.com