Showing posts with label retailing industry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label retailing industry. Show all posts

Sunday, August 24, 2025

Q2–1H Debt-Fueled PSEi 30 Performance Disconnects from GDP—What Could Go Wrong


A lack of transparency results in distrust and a deep sense of insecurity — Dalai Lama 

In this issue

Q2–1H Debt-Fueled PSEi 30 Performance Disconnects from GDP—What Could Go Wrong

I. PSEi 30 Q2 2025: The Illusion of Resilience

IA. Q2 GDP at 5.5%: Headline Growth vs. Corporate Stagnation

IB. Structural Downtrend and Policy Transmission Breakdown

IC. Real Value Output in Decline, Political Optics and GDP Credibility

ID. Meralco’s Electricity Consumption Story: A Broken Proxy

II. Real Estate: The Recovery That Wasn’t

IIA. Overton Window vs. Market Reality

IIB. Property Developer Falling Revenues, Debt Surge and Liquidity Strain

IIC. Downstream Demand Weakness: Home Improvement & Construction Retail

III. Retail and Food Services: Mixed Signals

IIIA. Retail: Consumer Strain Amid Policy Sweet Spot

IIIB. Divergence Between Store Expansion and Organic Demand, Retail Growth vs. GDP Trends

IIIC. Food Services: Jollibee’s Dominance and Sector’s Growth Deceleration

IV. Banking Revenues and Income: A Stalling Engine

IVA. Banking Sector: Credit Surge, Revenue Stall

V. The PSEi 30 Net Income Story

VA. Earnings Breakdown: SMC’s Income Dominance, Accounting Prestidigitation?

VB. SMC’s Financial Engineering? Escalating Systemic Risk

VI. Debt and Liquidity: The Structural Bind

VIA. Mounting Liquidity Stress: Soaring Debt and The Deepening Leverage Trap

VIB. Transparency Concerns, Desperate Calls for Easing, Cash Reserves Under Pressure

VII. Conclusion: The Illusion of Resilience: As the Liquidity Tide Recedes, Who’s Swimming Naked? 

____

Q2–1H Debt-Fueled PSEi 30 Performance Disconnects from GDP—What Could Go Wrong 

Beneath headline growth lies a fragile mix of policy stimulus, rising leverage, and mounting stagnation—masking systemic fragility. 

I. PSEi 30 Q2 2025: The Illusion of Resilience 

Nota Bene:

PSEi 30 data contains redundancies, as consolidated reporting includes both parent firms and their subsidiaries.

Chart Notes:

1A: Based on same year index members; may include revisions to past data

1B: Historical comparison; includes only members present during the end of each respective period; based on unaudited releases

IA. Q2 GDP at 5.5%: Headline Growth vs. Corporate Stagnation

Q2 GDP at 5.5%?   

On paper, that should have translated into strong corporate earnings—especially when juxtaposed with the financial pulse of the PSEi 30. 

Yet that headline growth masks a deeper dissonance: These firms, positioned as frontline beneficiaries of BSP’s easing cycle and historic deficit spending, should have reflected the policy tailwinds.


Figure 1

Instead, the disconnect is glaring: while nominal GDP surged 7.2% in Q2 and 7.4% in H1, aggregate revenues of the PSEi 30 contracted by 0.3% in Q2 and barely budged at 1.7% for the first half. (Figure 1, upper graph) 

IB. Structural Downtrend and Policy Transmission Breakdown 

More troubling, this isn’t a one-off anomaly. 

2025’s performance merely extends a structural downtrend that peaked in 2022—raising uncomfortable questions about transmission mechanisms, institutional fragility, and the real beneficiaries of expansionary policy. 

Consider this: Universal bank credit hit a historic high in June 2025, with 12.63% growth, the fastest pace since 2022. Yet PSEi 30 revenue growth in H1 limped to just +1.7%. The juxtaposition is telling. (Figure 1, lower window) 

Rather than fueling productive consumption or corporate expansion, credit appears channeled into asset churn and balance sheet patchwork—rolling debt, patching liquidity gaps, gaming duration mismatches. It’s a kinetic mirage, where velocity substitutes for vitalityhallmarks of overleveraging and diminishing returns

The very tools meant to stimulate growth now signal policy transmission failure, where liquidity flows but impact stalls. 

IC. Real Value Output in Decline, Political Optics and GDP Credibility 

Worst still, when adjusted using the same deflators applied to GDP, the PSEi 30’s real output doesn’t just stagnate—it slips into quasi-recession. Both Q2 and H1 figures turn negative, ≈ -2% and -.4%, exposing a structural rot beneath the nominal gloss. (Note 1)


Figure 2 

And this isn’t a statistical fluke. 

A full third of the index—10 out of 30 firms—posted revenue contractions, led by holding firms San Miguel, Alliance Global, and Aboitiz Equity. These aren’t fringe players—they’re positional market leaders. (Figure 2, upper table) 

As a side note, AGI’s revenue decline was partly driven by the deconsolidation of Golden Arches Development Corp, following its reclassification as an associate in March 2025 (Note 2) 

The gap is too wide, too persistent a trend, to be dismissed as cyclical noise. 

Was the PSEi 30 shortfall simply papered over by government spending, with a boost from external trade? 

Or was GDP itself inflated for political ends—to justify lower interest rates, defend the proposed Php 6.793 trillion 2026 budget (+7.4% YoY), and tighten the administration’s grip on power? 

Most likely, the truth lies in some combination of both. 

ID. Meralco’s Electricity Consumption Story: A Broken Proxy 

That’s not all. 

Meralco’s electricity sales volume contracted −0.33% YoY in Q2, dragging H1 growth down to a mere +0.51%. This isn’t just a soft patch—it’s historic: 

  • First Q2 contraction since Q1 2021,
  • First negative H1 since 2020, —both periods marked by pandemic-induced recession. 

More tellingly, Meralco’s quarterly GWh chart—once a reliable proxy for real GDP—has broken correlation. The divergence, which began in Q1 2024, has now widened into a chasm. (Figure 2, lower chart) 

To compound this, peso electricity peso sales shrank by 1.74% in Q2, and Meralco’s topline declines—both in pesos and GWh—dovetailed with the 8% sales slump in aircon market leader Concepcion Industries Corporation, as we discussed in an earlier post. (see references) 

When electricity consumption decouples from GDP, it raises uncomfortable questions: 

  • Is real consumption being overstated? 
  • Are headline figures engineered to justify policy optics—lower rates, ballooning budgets, and political consolidation? 

The numbers suggest more than statistical noise. They hint at a manufactured narrative, where growth is declared, but not felt. 

II. Real Estate: The Recovery That Wasn’t 

IIA. Overton Window vs. Market Reality 

There’s more. The public has recently been bombarded with official-consensus messaging about a supposed real estate ‘recovery.’ 

 The BSP even revised its property benchmark to show consistently rising prices—curiously, at a time of record vacancies. (see references) By that logic, the laws of supply and demand no longer apply. 

To reinforce the recovery echo chamber, authorities published modest Q2 and H1 NGDP/RGDP figures of 5.7% and 5.4%, respectively. 

IIB. Property Developer Falling Revenues, Debt Surge and Liquidity Strain 


Figure 3

Yet the hard numbers tell another story: stagnation gripped the top 5 publicly listed property developers—SMPH, ALI, MEG, RLC, and VLL—whose aggregate Q2 revenues grew by a paltry 1.23% YoY. (Figure 3 topmost image)

Adjusted for GDP deflators, that’s a real contraction. In effect, published rent and real estate sales may be teetering on the brink of recession.

The relevance is clear: these five developers accounted for nearly 30% of the sector’s Q2 GDP, meaning their results are a critical proxy for actual conditions—assuming their disclosures are accurate.

Yet, if there’s one metric that’s consistently rising, it’s debt.

Published liabilities surged 5.5% or Php 53.924 billion, reaching a record Php 1.032 trillion in Q2. Meanwhile, cash reserves plunged to their lowest level since 2019. (Figure 3, middle chart)

And yet, net income rose 11.15% to Php 35.4 billion—a figure that invites scrutiny, given flat revenues, rising leverage, and tightening liquidity.

In reality, developers appear forced to draw down cash to sustain operations and patch liquidity gaps, a fragile foundation to prop up the GDP consensus.

IIC. Downstream Demand Weakness: Home Improvement & Construction Retail

Worse, the sector’s downstream segment remains mired in doldrums.

Sales of publicly listed market leaders in home improvement and construction supplies—Wilcon and AllHome—fell -1.95% and -22.1% in Q2, respectively. Both chains have been struggling since Q2 2023, but the latest data are striking: despite no store expansion, AllHome reported a -28% collapse in same-store sales, while Wilcon’s growth lagged despite opening new outlets in 2024–2025, underscoring weak organic demand and the record vacancies. (Figure 3, lowest visual)

Strip away the official spin, and the underlying pattern emerges: insufficient revenues, surging debt, and shrinking liquidity. Overlay this with record-high employment statistics, historic credit expansion and fiscal stimulus—what happens when these falters? 

Consumers are already struggling to sustain retail and property demand. Yet, embracing the ‘build-and-they-will-come’ dogma, developers continue to expand supply, worsening the malinvestment cycle: supply gluts, strained revenues, debt build-up, and thinning cash buffers—a crucible for a future real estate debt crisis. 

III. Retail and Food Services: Mixed Signals 

IIIA. Retail: Consumer Strain Amid Policy Sweet Spot 

It’s not all bad news for consumers. 

Some segments gained traction from the “sweet spot” of easy money and fiscal stimulus—manifested in record bank credit and near all-time high employment rates. 


Figure 4

The most notable beneficiaries were non-construction retail chains, where expanded selling space (malls, outlets, stores) lifted revenues. The combined sales of the six listed majors—SM, Puregold, Robinsons Retail, Philippine Seven, SSI, and Metro Retail—rose 8.6% in Q2, their strongest showing since Q2 2023. (Figure 4, topmost graph) 

Still, signals remain mixed. In Q2, retail NGDP slipped to its lowest level since Q1 2021, while real consumer GDP bounced to 5.5%, its highest since Q1 2023. 

Company results reflected this divergence:

  • SM: +8.9% YoY (best since Q4 2023)
  • PGOLD: +12.3%
  • RRHI: +5.9%
  • SEVN: +8.6%
  • SSI: −1.6%
  • MRSGI: +6.6%

IIIB. Divergence Between Store Expansion and Organic Demand, Retail Growth vs. GDP Trends 

Interestingly, while Philippine Seven [PSE: SEVN] continues to boost headline growth via new store openings, same-store sales have operated in negative territory from Q4 2024 to Q2 2025. This divergence reveals how money at the fringes conceals internal vulnerabilities—weakening demand paired with oversupply. Once the benefit of new outlets erodes, excess capacity will magnify sales pressure, likely translating into eventual losses. (Figure 4, middle pane) 

Even as listed non-construction retail firms outpaced retail NGDP (6.8%) and RGDP (6.15%), their performance only partially resonates with the real GDP dynamic. 

Yet, the embedded trend across retail sales, consumer GDP, and retail NGDP remains conspicuously downward. 

IIIC. Food Services: Jollibee’s Dominance and Sector’s Growth Deceleration 

The food service industry echoes this entropy. Jollibee’s domestic sales grew 10.13% in Q2, pulling aggregate revenue growth of the four listed food chains—JFC, PIZZA, MAXS, FRUIT—to 9.6%, still below the 10.7% NGDP and 8.34% RGDP for the sector. The growth trajectory, led by JFC, continues to decelerate. (Figure 4, lowest diagram) 

Notably, JFC accounted for 86% of aggregate listed food service sales, yet only 54% of Q2 Food Services GDP—a testament to its PACMAN strategy of horizontal expansion—an approach I first described in 2019—enabled by easy-money leverage in its pursuit of market dominance (see references) 

Unfortunately, visibility on the sector is now diminished. Since AGI reclassified Golden Arches (McDonald’s Philippines) as a non-core segment, its performance is no longer disclosed. For reference, McDonald’s sales plunged 11.5% in Q1 2025. 

Losing this datapoint is regrettable, given McDonald’s is Jollibee’s closest competitor and a critical indicator of industry health. 

IV. Banking Revenues and Income: A Stalling Engine 

IVA. Banking Sector: Credit Surge, Revenue Stall 

Finally, despite all-time high loan volumes, bank revenues slowed sharply in Q2—an unexpected deceleration given the credit surge. The top three PSEi 30 banks—BDO, BPI, and MBT—posted a modest 7.02% revenue increase, dragging 1H growth down to 7.99%. For context, Q1 2025 revenues rose by 9%, while Q2 2024 saw a robust 21.8% jump. Full-year 2024 growth stood at 20.5%, making Q2 2025’s performance less than half of the prior year’s pace. 

We dissected the worsening conditions of the banking sector in depth last week (see reference section) 

V. The PSEi 30 Net Income Story 

VA. Earnings Breakdown: SMC’s Income Dominance, Accounting Prestidigitation? 

For the PSEi 30, if revenue stagnation already stands out, net income tells a similar story.


Figure 5 

Q2 2025 net income rose by 11.5% (Php 28.7 billion), pulling down 1H income growth to 13.8% (Php 68.6 billion). While Q2 gross net income was the highest since 2020, its marginal increase and subdued growth rates marked the second slowest since 2021. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

The devil, of course, lies in the details. 

The biggest contributor to the PSEi 30’s net income growth in Q2 and 1H 2025 was San Miguel Corp. Its net increase of Php 18.7 billion in Q2 and Php 53.19 billion in H1 accounted for a staggering 65.2% and 77.54% of the total PSEi 30 net income growth, respectively—despite comprising just 8.5% and 11.8% of the index’s gross net income. (Figure 5, lower table) 

In effect, SMC was not merely a contributor but the primary engine behind the index’s earnings rebound.

Yet this dominance raises more questions than it answers.

Despite a sharp revenue slowdown and only marginal improvements in profit margins—still below pre-pandemic levels—SMC reported a substantial jump in cash holdings and a deceleration in debt accumulation. But this apparent financial strength stems not from operational resilience, but from non-core gains: fair value revaluations, FX translation effects, and dividends from associates.

The result is a balance sheet that appears healthier than it is, with cash levels inflated by accounting maneuvers rather than organic surplus.

VB. SMC’s Financial Engineering? Escalating Systemic Risk

Beneath the surface, SMC’s debt dynamics resemble quasi-Ponzi finance—borrowing Php 681 billion to repay Php 727 billion in 1H 2025, while plugging the gap with preferred share issuance and asset monetization. The latter includes the deconsolidation and valuation uplift of its residual stakes in the Ilijan power facility and Excellent Energy Resources Inc. (EERI), as well as the $3.3 billion LNG deal with Meralco and AboitizPower in Batangas. Though framed as strategic partnerships, these transactions involved asset transfers that contributed heavily to the surge in reported profits.

The simulacrum of deleveraging—from Php 1.56 trillion in Q4 2024 to Php 1.506 trillion in Q2/1H 2025—appears to be a product of financial engineering, not structural improvement. This disconnect between reported profitability and underlying liquidity mechanics raises concerns about transparency and sustainability.

In a market where banks, corporates, and individuals hold significant exposure to SMC debt (estimated at 4.3% of June 2025’s total financial resources), the company’s accounting-driven cash buildup may signal escalating systemic fragility—a risk that the recent equity selloff seems to be pricing in ahead of the curve.

Stripped of SMC’s potentially inflated income, Q2 and H1 net income for the PSEi 30 would rank as the second-lowest and lowest since 2021, respectively—underscoring the fragility behind the headline performance.

At the same time, and with curious timing, SMC announced its intent to undertake large-scale flood control across Metro Manila and Laguna—"at no cost to the government or the Filipino people". Whether this reflects a genuine civic gesture or a strategic bid to accumulate political capital remains unclear. But the optics are unmistakable: as SMC’s earnings distort the index’s headline strength, it simultaneously positions itself as a public benefactor.

Yet, is this narrative groundwork for a future bailout, or a preemptive reframing of corporate rescue as national service?

VI. Debt and Liquidity: The Structural Bind

VIA. Mounting Liquidity Stress: Soaring Debt and The Deepening Leverage Trap 

Finally, let us move on to the PSEi 30’s liquidity metrics: debt and cash. 

If there’s one structurally entrenched dynamic in the PSEi 30, it’s borrowing.


Figure 6

Published short- and long-term debt of the non-financial PSEi 30 surged to an all-time high of Php 5.95 trillion in 1H 2025—up 7.66% year-on-year. (Figure 6, topmost chart) 

The net increase of Php 423 billion amounted to 74.7% of the gross net income and a staggering 617% of the YoY net income increase. 

Including the bills payable of the four PSEi 30 banks—Php 859.7 billion, excluding bonds—total leverage rises to Php 6.8 trillion—with net borrowing gains of Php 760.5 billion, overshadowing declared net income of Php 566.7 billion. 

In short, the PSEi 30 borrowed Php 1.34 to generate every Php 1 in profit—assuming SMC’s profits are genuine. 

And this borrowing binge wasn’t isolated. Among the 26 non-financial firms, 18 increased their debt in 1H 2025. 

On average, debt now accounts for 27% of assets—or total liabilities plus equity. 

SMC, once the poster child of corporate borrowing, ceded the title this period to Meralco, Ayala Corp, and Aboitiz Equity Ventures. (Figure 6, middle table) 

Notably, MER and AEV’s borrowing spree coincides with their asset transfer deals with SMC. Whether this reflects strategic alignment or a quiet effort to absorb or ‘share’ SMC’s financial burden to deflect public scrutiny—such optics suggest a coordinated dance. 

If true, good luck to them—financial kabuki always yields to economic gravity. 

VIB. Transparency Concerns, Desperate Calls for Easing, Cash Reserves Under Pressure 

The thing is, transparency remains a persistent concern, especially in periods of mounting financial stress or pre-crisis fragility

First, there’s no assurance that published debt figures reflect full exposure. Some firms may be masking liabilities through other liabilities (leases, trade payables) or off-balance sheet arrangements. 

Second, asset valuations underpinning declared balance sheets may be unreliable. Accounting ratios offer little comfort when market liquidity evaporates—see the 2023 U.S. bank crisis or China’s ongoing property implosion

Despite historic borrowing and declared profits, PSEi 30 cash reserves barely budged—up just 0.96% YoY, with a net increase of Php 14.07 billion following two years of retrenchment. Cash levels have been on a steady decline since their 2020 peak. We suspect that recent upticks in cash are not in spite of borrowing, but because of it. 

This growing debt-income-revenue mismatch explains the establishment’s increasingly desperate calls for “MOAR easing” and declarations of a real estate “recovery.” 

VII. Conclusion: The Illusion of Resilience: As the Liquidity Tide Recedes, Who’s Swimming Naked? 

The PSEi 30’s revenue stagnation belies the optics of headline GDP growth. Even in the supposed “sweet spot”—BSP easing, FX soft-peg subsidies, and record stimulus—consumer strain cuts across sectors.

Stimulus may persist, but its marginal impact is fading—manifesting the law of diminishing returns. The disconnect between policy effort and real economy traction is widening.

Q2 and H1 income growth seem to increasingly reflect on balance sheet theatrics driven more by financial engineering and accounting acrobatics than by operational reality.

When earnings are staged rather than earned, the gap between corporate performance and macro reality doesn’t just widen—it exposes a deepening structural mismatch

Deepening leverage also anchors the PSEi 30’s fundamentals. On both the demand and supply sides, debt props up activity while cash thins. The same fragility echoes through the banking system and money supply mechanics. 

This is not resilience—it’s choreography. And when liquidity recedes, the performance ends

As Buffett warned: "when the liquidity tide goes out, we’ll see who’s been swimming naked" We might be hosting a nudist festival. 

___ 

Notes: 

Note 1 While GDP measures value-added and corporate revenues reflect gross turnover, applying the same deflators provides a reasonable proxy for real comparison. 

Note 2: Alliance Global 17 Q August 18, 2025: Effective March 17, 2025, GADC was deconsolidated and ceased to be a business segment as it becomes an associate from that date, yet the Group’s ownership interest over GADC has not changed p.2 

References 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum, June 01, 2025 (Substack) 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Concepcion Industries Cools Off—And So Might GDP and the PLUS-Bound PSEi 30 (or Not?) July 28, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility, July 13, 2025(Substack) 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Jollibee’s Fantastic Paradigm Shift: From Consumer Value to Aggressive Debt-Financed Pacman Strategy March 3, 2019 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Banks: June’s Financial Losses and Liquidity Strains Expose Late-Cycle Fragility, August 17, 2025 (Substack)

  


Sunday, June 01, 2025

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

 

Bulls of 1929 like their 1990s counterparts had their eyes glued on improving profits and stock valuations.  Not a thought was given to the fact that the rising tide of money deluging the stock market came from financial leverage and not from savings-Dr. Kurt Richebacher 

In this issue:

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

I. An Extension of 2024's Fiscal-Monetary Interplay

II. Debt-Led Growth: Fragile Foundations

III. Revenue Growth: Record Highs, Diminishing Returns

IV. Consumer Sector Strains: Retail and Real Estate Under Pressure

V. Net Income Surge: A Paradox of Profitability

VI. Sectoral Performance: Diverging Trends

VII. Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights

VIII. A Fragile Foundation: The Risks of Fiscal and Financial Leverage

IX. Transparency and Accuracy Concerns

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

Debt-fueled profits mask deeper signs of strain across retail, real estate, and consumer sectors—even as policy easing and fiscal expansion continue.

I. An Extension of 2024's Fiscal-Monetary Interplay 

The PSEi 30’s Q1 2025 performance is largely a continuation of the trends established throughout 2024 and the past decade. 

Fundamentally, it reflects the model of "trickle-down" economic development, underpinned by Keynesian debt-financed spending. This model is anchored primarily on the BSP’s policy of "financial repression"—or sustained easy money—combined with fiscal stabilizers. It has manifested through the persistent "twin deficits," driven by a record-high "savings-investment gap," and rests on the “build and they will come” dogma. 

Q1 2025 also marks the initial impact of the BSP’s first phase of monetary easing, with Q2 expected to reflect the effects of the second round of policy rate and reserve requirement (RRR) cuts. 

At the same time, the all-time high Q1 fiscal deficit—relative to previous first quarters—was clearly reflected in the PSEi 30’s performance. 

Nota Bene:

PSEi 30 data contains redundancies, as consolidated reporting includes both parent firms and their subsidiaries.

Chart Notes:

1A: Based on current index members; may include revisions to past data

1B: Historical comparison; includes only members present during each respective period; based on unaudited releases

 II. Debt-Led Growth: Fragile Foundations


Figure 1

In Q1 2025, non-financial debt among PSEi 30 firms surged by 7.6% to a record Php 5.87 trillion, with a net increase of Php 413 billion, marking the third-highest quarterly rise since 2020. (Figure 1, upper window)         

In context, this debt level accounted for about 17.12% of total financial resources (bank and financial assets), up from 16.92% in 2024, reflecting increased leverage in the financial system 

In addition, bills payable for the top three PSEi 30 banks soared by 117.5%, rising from Php 393 billion to Php 854 billion, a net increase of Php 461 billion, excluding bonds payable. 

This dramatic increase in the bank’s short-term borrowing likely stems from a sharp decline in the banking system’s liquidity metrics—specifically, the cash and due-from-banks-to-deposits ratio and the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio. 

III. Revenue Growth: Record Highs, Diminishing Returns 

Gross revenues for the PSEi 30 rose by 3.92% to a record Php 1.78 trillion in Q1 2025. However, the net revenue increase of Php 67 billion was the smallest in the past four years, signaling a clear deceleration in growth momentum. (Figure 1, lower image)


Figure 2

This revenue softness partly reflected disinflationary trends, as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell to 2.3%—marking its third consecutive quarterly decline. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

This occurred despite the economy operating near full employment, with the average unemployment rate at 4%, all-time high Q1 fiscal deficit, and amid record levels of bank credit growth, particularly in consumer lending. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

Nonetheless, the validity of the near-full employment narrative appears questionable. Our estimates suggest that approximately 32% of the workforce remains 'functionally illiterate,' raising concerns about the accuracy of PSA labor market data. 

Yet, the paradox is telling: even with aggressive fiscal stimulus and sustained easy money policies, economic returns appear to be diminishing. 

The PSEi 30’s revenue slowdown closely mirrored real GDP growth of 5.4% in Q1 2025, reinforcing the broader downtrend. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

Nevertheless, the PSEi 30 revenues accounted for 27% of nominal GDP in Q1 2025, underscoring their substantial footprint in the Philippine economy. Broadening the scope of PSE-listed firms in national accounts would likely magnify this contribution—while simultaneously highlighting the risks posed by mounting economic and market concentration and the fragile underpinnings of "trickle-down" economic development. 

IV. Consumer Sector Strains: Retail and Real Estate Under Pressure


Figure 3

Consumer sector stress was evident in the performance of PSE-listed firms. While retail nominal GDP grew by 7.9% and real consumer GDP by 4.9%, Q1 2025 sales revenue growth for the six largest non-construction listed retail chains—SM Retail, Puregold, SSI Group, Robinsons Retail, Philippine Seven, and Metro Retail Group—slowed to 6.8%, down from 8% in Q4 2024. This deceleration occurred despite aggressive supply-side expansion, underscoring deteriorating growth dynamics. (Figure 3, upper pane) 

Since peaking in 2022, both statistical (GDP) and real indicators (sales) have undergone significant depreciation. Downstream real estate consumer publicly listed retail chains, Wilcon Depot (WLCON) and AllHome (HOME), continue to grapple with substantial challenges, as rising vacancies further deepen the ongoing sales recession. (Figure 3, lower image) 

For example, WLCON reported a 2% quarter-on-quarter increase in store count, but only a 1.2% increase in sales YoY—highlighting excess capacity amid softening demand.


Figure 4

The food services sector also showed signs of strain, despite posting 10.3% revenue growth in Q1 2025—outpacing both nominal and real GDP. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

Jollibee’s domestic operations, which accounted for 80% of total group sales, led the sector with a 14% gain. 

In contrast, McDonald’s reported an 11.5% sales contraction despite its 'aggressive store expansion' strategy, which includes plans to open 65 new outlets in 2025. This disparity underscores uneven, yet broadly weakening, performance across major retail chains. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

Even electricity consumption has recently deteriorated. Meralco’s electricity consumption growth slowed to 1.5% (in GWh), diverging from historical GDP correlations. This downturn signals weakening underlying demand, despite near-full employment and record-high bank credit expansion. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

V. Net Income Surge: A Paradox of Profitability

Figure 5

Despite revenue challenges, the PSEi 30’s net income amazingly surged by 16.02% to a record Php 290.6 billion in Q1 2025, with an absolute increase of Php 40.12 billion, the second-highest since 2020. (Figure 5, topmost diagram)

This was driven by a significant increase in net income margin, which reached 16.3%, the highest since 2020, possibly due to asset sales (e.g., SMC’s divestitures). (Figure 5, middle window)

Excluding SMC’s asset sales, PSEi 30’s net income would have stood at Php 269.3 billion—reflecting only a 7.6% increase. This equates to a net profit rise of Php 19.12 billion, rather than the reported Php 40.12 billion

The record Q1 fiscal deficit likely bolstered incomes, both directly through government contracts (e.g., infrastructure projects) and indirectly via increased consumer spending. However, this came at the cost of record public debt and systemic leverage, which reached Php 30.7 trillion. Public debt hit an all-time high of Php 16.683 trillion. (Figure 5, lowest image)

The PSEi 30’s debt-to-net income ratio revealed that Php 1.42 in net debt additions was required for every peso of profit generated. In terms of absolute gains, Php 10.3 in new debt supported each peso of profit increase, highlighting deepening debt dependency.

 


Figure 6
 

Paradoxically, despite record borrowing and improved net income, net cash reserves fell to 2022 levels, raising more concerns about systemic liquidity. (Figure 6, upper chart)

VI. Sectoral Performance: Diverging Trends 

By sector:  (Figure 6, lower table) 

Debt: The industrial sector recorded the largest percentage increase at 48.9%, but holding companies led in absolute peso gains Php 165.644 billon, followed by industrials Php 151.4 billion. 

Revenues: Banks achieved the highest percentage revenue growth at 9.8%, but industrials led in nominal terms with Php 17 billion in gains. 

Net Income: Holding and property sectors posted the largest percentage increases at 31% and 7.6%, respectively, with holding firms leading in peso terms Php 33.8 billion. 

Cash: The services sector saw the largest increases in both percentage (30.9%) and peso terms (Php 56 billion). 

VII. Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights


Figure 7

By firm: (Figure 7, upper table) 

Debt: Ayala Corp, San Miguel Corporation (SMC), and Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) recorded the largest peso increases at Php 74 billion, Php 70 billion, and Php 62 billion, respectively. LT Group (LTG) showed a substantial reduction of Php 24 billion. 

Interestingly, SMC reported a reduction in total debt—from Q4 2024’s record Php 1.56 TRILLION to Php 1.511 TRILLION in Q1 2025—despite substantial capital and operating requirements. This decline coincided with a surge in income, primarily driven by Php 21 billion in energy asset sales (San Miguel Global Power Holding LNG Batangas facility). Even excluding one-off gains, core profits rose by 31% to Php 19 billion. The company also strengthened its cash position, with cash reserves increasing by Php 57 billion year-on-year. How did this happen? (Figure 7, lower graph) 

Revenue: GT Capital (GTCAP) and Meralco posted the largest revenue increases at Php 15.6 billion and Php 9 billion, while SMC recorded the largest decrease at Php 31.8 billion. 

Net Income: SMC led with a Php 34 billion increase, driven by asset sales, while JG Summit (JGS) reported the largest decline at Php 7.2 billion. 

Cash: ICTSI and SMC posted the largest cash expansions at Php 79.9 billion and Php 57.6billion, while LTG (due to debt repayment) and AEV had the largest reductions at Php 38.2 and 15.015 billion 

VIII. A Fragile Foundation: The Risks of Fiscal and Financial Leverage 

Consider the potential impact on the PSEi 30, the broader PSE, and GDP when: 

-Bond vigilantes demand fiscal prudence, pushing interest rates higher

-Heavily leveraged consumer adopt austerity measures.

-Malinvestments from "build and they will come" industries, such as over saturation in real estate (26% residential condominium and office condominium vacancy rates and 22% per Colliers Philippines), and trade sectors, could lead to rising unemployment. 

These risks, compounded by diminishing stimulus effectiveness, threaten the sustainability of PSEi 30 performance and GDP growth. 

For instance, SMC’s business model has become increasingly reliant on recycling its borrowings or asset sales, making it wholly dependent on the sustainability of cheap money to refinance its rapidly growing debt. Neo-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky famously characterized this as 'Ponzi finance.' (Minsky,1992) 

In essence, the structural risks are real—and growing more visible in each earnings season. 

IX. Transparency and Accuracy Concerns 

As previously stated: 

"The credibility of this analysis rests on disclosures from the Philippine Stock Exchange and related official sources. However, questions persist regarding the possible underreporting of debt and the inflation of both top-line and bottom-line figures by certain firms." (Prudent Investor, May 2025) 

These concerns underscore persistent governance challenges—particularly if elite-owned firms are engaged in systematically underreporting liabilities and overstating revenues or profits. Such practices not only contribute to the distortion of market signals but also foster moral hazard, eventually eroding investor confidence and undermining regulatory integrity. 

___ 

References 

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis* The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College May 1992 

Prudent Investor, The PSEi 30 in 2024: Debt-Fueled Expansion Amid Fiscal and Monetary Shifts, Substack May 25, 2025

 

 

Sunday, August 18, 2024

Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll! PSE’s Q2 Retail Activities Validates Ongoing Consumer Weakness

 

The lesson of history, then, is that even as institutions and policy makers improve, there will always be a temptation to stretch the limits. Just as an individual can go bankrupt no matter how rich she starts out, a financial system can collapse under the pressure of greed, politics, and profits no matter how well regulated it seems to be― Carmen M. Reinhart

In this issue 

Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll! PSE’s Q2 Retail Activities Validates Ongoing Consumer Weakness 

I. Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll!

II. Slowing Retail GDP Validated by Topline Performance of PSE’s Retail Chains

III. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s) Designed to Rescue the Banking System; Banks Bolstered the PSEi 30’s Stagnant Q2 Net Income

IV. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s): Reduce Debt Servicing Costs to Accommodate MORE Debt!

V. BSP Rate Cut Validates the Price Signals of the Philippine Treasury Market

VI. Summary and Conclusion: Watch for the Third and Fourth Phase of the Marcos-Stimulus (Pandemic Rescue Template 2.0) 

Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll! PSE’s Q2 Retail Activities Validates Ongoing Consumer Weakness

The BSP opened its series of monetary easing with a rate cut last week validating our thesis that the unannounced "Marcos-nomics stimulus" is on a roll!

I. Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll!

Bullseye!

In its second phase of the unannounced Marcos-nomics stimulus, the BSP (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) began its campaign to formally ease financial conditions with its first rate cut.

The fact that the "Marcos-nomics stimulus" is on a roll means that widening fiscal deficits, which should also reverberate into "trade deficits" and expand the "twin deficits," should escalate public debt levels and, correspondingly, increase the debt burden. 

With fiscal deficits likely to bulge ahead, prompting more borrowings, the logical sequence would be for the BSP to cut rates to ease the onus of debt servicing.

And that’s only the argument for Philippine government debt. 

The BSP’s case for rate cuts will also involve private sector’s mounting debt burden or systemic debt in general. And that excludes shadow banking or informal finance. 

Therefore, BSP rate cuts represent the next phase of the "Marcos-nomics stimulus." (Prudent Investor, July 2024; bold original) 

GMA News, August, 15, 2024: The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Thursday decided to reduce policy rates by 25 basis points, the first cut in nearly four years and the first adjustment since the off-cycle hike in October 2023. 

Why would the BSP start a series of rate cuts with a Q2 headline GDP of 6.3% (6% for the 1H GDP)? 

Yet, the BSP continues to confuse the public by hedging its position with a "rinse and repeat" stance: We will cut, we will not cut, we will cut, we will not cut... to thy kingdom come. 

Just a day before, a business media outlet even cited the BSP as having ""more room to stay tight" after better-than-expected gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the second quarter." 

Stay tight, then cut rates? Incredible. 

For a supposedly data-driven institution, why fixate on interest rates while ignoring the financial and monetary developments despite their actions?

Figure 1

For instance, the BSP’s report on total financial resources (TFR) rocketed by 10.54% to a record Php 32.332 trillion last June, with the banking system, led by the Universal and Commercial banks, surging by 12.3%. (Figure 1, upper window)

Aggregate TFR and bank FR amounted to 128% and 107% of GDP, respectively. 

That is to say, not only have growth rates been accelerating, but banks have also been deepening their stranglehold over the nation’s financial resources—which alternatively translates to an escalation of concentration risk. (Figure 1, middle graph) 

Needless to ask, why would TFR and bank assets skyrocket if rates have been "tight?" Or, why the crescendo of systemic leverage? 

Amazing. 

II. Slowing Retail GDP Validated by Topline Performance of PSE’s Retail Chains 

Getting back to the essence of the Marcos-nomics, despite the Orwellian language, why the cut rates? 

To gauge the heartbeat of consumers, we use the PSE’s Quarterly Report (17Q) to analyze the quarterly activities of the major non-construction retail chains listed on the stock exchange (SM Retail, Puregold, Robinsons Retail, Philippine Seven, SSI Group, and Metro Retail Group). 

The growth rate of BIG 6 retail chains bounced marginally from the Q1 low of 5.13% to 7.22% in Q2.  However, since peaking in Q3 2022, its growth rate has been slowing—exhibited by the downtrend. (Figure 1, lowest image) 

On the other hand, since hitting a low of 10.6% in Q3 2023, the nominal retail GDP has improved in the last three quarters—with Q2 posting a 12.8% growth.  The revenues of the BIG 6 accounted for an estimated 24.6% share of the Philippine retail market, based on the retail GDP. 

The huge variance in growth rates between the revenues of the BIG 6 tell us that either the NON-listed retail chains OUTPERFORMED, or that the retail GDP has been exaggerated. 

The thing is, the growth rate may differ, but the trends resonated. 

Real consumer GDP also corroborated the slowdown. 

In the first two quarters of 2024, real consumer spending grew by 4.6%. 

The slowdown in consumer spending is just one aspect of the complex chain of people’s actions.

Figure 2

While consumer spending has slowed, loans of the BIG 5 retail chains (excluding SM Retail) hit an all-time high in Q2. (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

As banks continue to shift their portfolios toward consumers—with the gap in favor of consumer lending reaching its highest-level last June—credit card and salary loan non-performing loans (NPLs) have accelerated in Q1 2024. (Figure 2, middle and lowest charts)

Figure 3 

This represents a breathtaking structural transformation anchored on Keynesian ideology that the consumer drives the economy. (Figure 3, topmost graph)

Unfortunately, despite the unprecedented metamorphosis, increased leveraging has only resulted in the material slackening of consumer spending.

Essentially, the consensus comprised of media, experts and officials has overlooked the importance of balance sheet conditions and productivity!

III. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s) Designed to Rescue the Banking System; Banks Bolstered the PSEi 30’s Stagnant Q2 Net Income

But there’s more.

The BSP wasn’t transparent enough to reveal that despite the seismic transformation of its business model and the all-time highs in credit expansion within the Philippine banking system, the industry has experienced an erosion of profit growth since Q2 2022—coinciding with rising rates. (Figure 3, middle diagram)

From a low of 2.95% in Q1, bank profits increased by 4.1% in Q2 2024. The data exhibit the sustained corrosion of bank liquidity despite the three-year streak in profit growth.  Bank’s cash-to-deposit and liquid asset-to-deposits on an 11-year downtrend.  (Figure 3, lowest chart)

In my humble opinion, these bank profits represent accounting profits because they conceal massive losses through Held-to-Maturity (HTM) holdings, opaqueness in capital conditions, and unpublished NPLs due to subsidies and various relief measures.

Figure 4

In any case, the big three PSEi banks saved the PSEi 30's Q2 net income activities from outright stagnation.

Net income by the non-financial members of the PSEi slightly contracted by 0.13%. However, the 13.71% net income growth of the PSEi 30 banks boosted the aggregate net income growth to 2.35%. (Figure 4, upper table)

Meanwhile, despite disinflationary forces, revenue growth increased by 9.14% in Q2, pushing the first semester’s topline up by 8.71% (to be discussed in another post).

In brief, it’s not just consumers; the overall slowing of the economy has been evident in the topline and bottom-line performance of the PSEi 30. We will omit the debt conditions of the PSEi 30’s non-financials from this discussion.

As a side note, why then the PSEi 30 pump?

Think of it this way: why the slowdown in the PSE’s performance despite record bank lending and the soaring expansion of systemic leverage (exhibited by members of the PSEi 30)?

Consumer spending per capita GDP peaked in Q1 2021 and has turned south in the face of historic levels of systemic leverage—comprising the formal credit (bank credit plus public debt) system, which accounted for 112% of the annualized 2024 GDP! (Figure 4, lower graph)

Figure 5

As it stands, this monumental build-up in systemic leverage translates to escalating hidden financial skeletons in the form of balance sheet mismatches—which have yet to be revealed. UC bank and public debt accounted for 108% of the annualized 2024 GDP. (Figure 5, topmost chart)

Incredible.

In a nutshell, the Marcos-nomics stimulus via the BSP’s rate cut also represents the RESCUE of the banking system (Pandemic Bailout Template 2.0).

IV. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s): Reduce Debt Servicing Costs to Accommodate MORE Debt! 

With the slowing of the real economy, the government has stepped up the tempo of its spending to boost the statistical economy, GDP.

This represents the opening salvo of Marcos-nomics. Besides, the torrent of spending is all about politics: pre-election funding, the subtle pivot to a war economy, the deepening administrative (infrastructure and bureaucracy) and the welfare state.

Record Q2 spending bolstered the Q2 budget deficit and accounted for a direct 27.4% share of the Q2 GDP, the second largest in GDP’s history (as previously explained). (Figure 5, middle chart)

Since debt has financed the Marcos-nomics stimulus, the rising but flawed debt-to-GDP metrics should increase further. With it, the debt servicing-to-GDP ratio should also rise.

If anything, both debt-to-GDP and debt-servicing-to-GDP ratios have now exceeded pre-Asian crisis levels. (Figure 5, lowest image)

This signifies the primary reason why the BSP cut rates.

Its recourse to deficit spending means more debt, so the BSP must reduce its cost of servicing to allow for or accommodate more debt!

Anyway, according to the government officials, there is "Nothing to worry about PH debt." Debt won’t matter until it does. Alternatively, this could also mean "never believe anything in politics until it has been officially denied." 

Furthermore, as with the pandemic template, liquidity injections should represent the third phase of the Marcos-nomics stimulus. 

Figure 6

The BSP's net claims on the Central Government (NCoCG) remain adrift at near record levels— indicating near-record holdings of government debt by the BSP. What tightening? Where? (Figure 6, topmost chart)

The all-time highs in public spending and bank lending should translate into HIGHER liquidity growth. The growth of BSP’s currency issuance has been accelerating since April 2024, rising by 7.4%—its highest since December 2022!

Should public spending, bank lending, and bank (NCoCG) fail to deliver the various government headline targets, expect the BSP's NCoCG to explode higher.

The fourth and final phase of the Marcos stimulus would involve expanding subsidies and widening the coverage of various relief measures for the banking system. 

Again, this would mirror the Pandemic Bailout Template 2.0. 

All these said, the rebound in liquidity growth should manifest in higher inflation and reinforce the uptrend of the USD-Philippine peso exchange rate. (Figure 6, middle and lowest graphs) 

Moreover, the Fed has long been used by the BSP as a pretext for keeping its stance, unfortunately, waiting for the FED seemed like "Waiting for Godot," so the BSP relented and eased ahead of the Fed.  This should provide further fuel to the bull market of the USDPHP over time. 

V. BSP Rate Cut Validates the Price Signals of the Philippine Treasury Market

Lastly, the BSP rate cuts validated the Philippine treasury markets.  

The curve’s transition from a steepening to a bullish flattening to an inversion in the belly (2-7 years yield) highlights disinflation, rising uncertainties and the growing slack in the real economy (rising risk of recession). 

Figure 7

The belly’s inversion only deepened right after the BSP’s rate cut (as of August 16th) 

And don’t just take it from me, a chart from the BSP’s 2023 Financial Stability Report expresses this. (p.13) 

VI. Summary and Conclusion: Watch for the Third and Fourth Phase of the Marcos-Stimulus (Pandemic Rescue Template 2.0) 

So, there you have it. 

Last week’s BSP rate cut validated our thesis of a "Marcos-nomics stimulus."

It represents the second phase of the tacit bailout of the deficit-spending-driven GDP, the banking system, and the firms of elites. The other objectives are the financing of the growing domain of various political agendas—mostly pre-election spending, the warfare state, infrastructure, and the bureaucratic state. 

One can expect the liquidity injections via the BSP and the banking system to account for the third phase of the stimulus program. 

To complete the fourth and final phase of the Pandemic Bailout Template 2.0, various subsidies and relief measures will be implemented to support the banking system

Despite the interim disinflation phase, the sustained bailout means the re-emergence of the third wave of inflation and the strengthening of the USD-Philippine peso bull market

The real tightening is about to come. 

Good luck to those who believe in the illusion that manipulated stock market pumps will translate into economic prosperity. 

___

References:

Prudent Investor, Bullseye! “Marcos-Nomics” Stimulus on a Roll as Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High! BSP Rate Cuts Next? July 28,2024 

Other post on Marcos-nomics: 

Prudent Investor, Philippines' Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus, June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates—A Statistical Pump August 11, 2024 

Prudent Investor, Marcos-nomics stimulus: Yields of the Philippine Treasury Curve Plunged, The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth July 14, 2024 

Prudent Investor, Could the Philippine Government Implement a 'Marcosnomics' Stimulus Blending BSP Rate Cuts and Accelerated Deficit Spending? June 30, 2024