Showing posts with label Philippine inflation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine inflation. Show all posts

Sunday, September 14, 2025

Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap


But the boom cannot continue indefinitely. There are two alternatives. Either the banks continue the credit expansion without restriction and thus cause constantly mounting price increases and an ever-growing orgy of speculation, which, as in all other cases of unlimited inflation, ends in a “crack-up boom” and in a collapse of the money and credit system. Or the banks stop before this point is reached, voluntarily renounce further credit expansion and thus bring about the crisis. The depression follows in both instances—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap

I. Introduction: The Banking System’s Wile E. Coyote Moment

II. NPL Benchmarks Unveil Minskyan Fragility and the Wile E. Coyote Moment

III. Diminishing Returns: Policy Stimulus-Backstop Backlash

IV. Banks’ Drift Toward Consumers: Credit Cards and Salary Loans Power NPLs Higher

V. Stagflation Signals and the Death Knell of Benchmark-ism: Labor Frailty Meets Inflation’s Third Leg

VI. The Wile E. Coyote Dynamic in Bank Investments via Available For Sale (AFS) Assets

VII. AFS Surge and Recession-Grade Financial Losses

VIII. Benchmark-ism and the Illusion of Confidence

IX. Velocity or Collapse: The Wile E. Coyote Reckoning

X. BSP’s Tacit Pivot: From Sovereign Risk to Banking Backstop

XI. Conclusion: The Velocity Charade Meets Its Limits 

Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap

The Wile E Coyote velocity game—credit expansion, AFS bets, and central bank lifelines—keeps Philippine banks afloat, but the stability it projects is an illusion

I. Introduction: The Banking System’s Wile E. Coyote Moment 

Inquirer.net, September 06, 2025: Bad debts held by the Philippine banking system rose to their highest level in eight months in July, as lenders—facing slimmer margins from declining interest rates—may have leaned more on riskier retail borrowers in search of yield. Latest data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas showed that nonperforming loans (NPL), or debts overdue by at least 90 days and at risk of default, accounted for 3.40 percent of the industry’s total loan portfolio. That marked the highest share since November 2024, when the NPL ratio stood at 3.54 percent. 

Time and again, we’ve detailed the escalating challenges facing the Philippine banking system—chief among them, its role in financing the government deficit amid elevated rates. 

This has led to record levels of held-to-maturity (HTM) securities, mounting investment losses from mark-to-market exposures, and potentially unpublished credit delinquencies buried in loan accounts. 

Together, these forces have contributed to the system’s entropic liquidity conditions: a slow, grinding erosion of institutional health masked by policy choreography. 

But recent developments take the proverbial cake. While NPLs remain elevated, their apparent ‘containment’ has served as public reassurance—an illusion of stability. 

Beneath that veneer, banks have shifted into a "velocity game" to preserve KPI optics: record-high credit expansion running in tandem with record-high NPLs. 

This statistical kabuki masks growing stress but sets the system on a path to its own Wile E. Coyote moment

While this sustains confidence in the short term, the moment loan growth slows, the cliff edge becomes visible—and the entire charade unravels. 

II. NPL Benchmarks Unveil Minskyan Fragility and the Wile E. Coyote Moment


Figure 1

Since the second half of 2022, Philippine banks have seen a structural uptrend in gross nonperforming loans (NPLs), with nominal levels breaching all-time highs by April 2024 and reaching a record Php 535 billion in July 2025. (Figure 1, topmost chart) 

Though the industry’s NPL ratio remains at a deceptively flat at 3.4 percent, this apparent stability is largely the effect of the ‘denominator illusion’: total loan growth (+11 percent) has been fast enough to offset the rise in bad loans.  (Figure 1, middle window) 

This accelerates procyclical risk-taking—banks extend more credit, often to riskier retail borrowers, to maintain headline ratios

Neo-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky famously proposed that financial instability evolves in stages—from hedge finance to speculative finance, and finally to Ponzi finance—where borrowers can no longer generate sufficient cash flows to service debt and must rely on refinancing, rollovers, or asset sales to stay afloat (see references) 

But Minsky’s framework has a counterparty: the lender

In the Philippine case, banks have become enablers of this drift. To keep overleveraged firms and households solvent, they must sustain ever-faster credit expansion—rolling over weak loans, extending new ones, and deferring recognition of losses. 

This is the Minskyan drift on the supply side: not just borrower pathology, but lender complicity

A banking system whose apparent stability depends on pyramiding credit to increasingly marginal borrowers, refinancing delinquent accounts, and chasing yield into riskier consumer segments—exacerbating the very fragility it was meant to manage. 

The result is a velocity-dependent equilibrium—one that demands constant motion to avoid collapse. 

When the sprint falters or bad debts surge, the NPL ratio will spike—mechanically, inevitably—unveiling the proverbial skeletons long buried beneath the benchmark gloss. 

The system confronts its Wile E. Coyote moment: suspended mid-air, legs still spinning, gravity imminent. Once credit growth slows, the ground disappears—and the fragility long masked by velocity is fully revealed. 

III. Diminishing Returns: Policy Stimulus-Backstop Backlash 

This Minskyan drift is unfolding despite a full-spectrum easing cycle from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: reserve requirement cuts, interest rate reductions, the USDPHP softpeg regime, doubled deposit insurance, and lingering regulatory relief. 

Layered atop record fiscal stimulus, these measures were designed to cushion the system—but they now reveal diminishing returns

The irony is sharp: instead of stabilizing credit dynamics, these policies have parlayed into rising risksencouraging yield-chasing behavior and masking stress through refinancing

And to maintain the illusion of stability, authorities have upped the ante on benchmark-ism—using statistical bellwethers to project ‘resilience’ while embellishing markets to fit the narrative. 

As nominal NPLs climb and consumer credit deepens, the central bank faces an unenviable dilemma: tighten policy and risk triggering defaults, or deploy unprecedented, pandemic-style liquidity injections to preserve appearances even as the system runs out of runway. At the same time, banks themselves may be compelled to conserve liquidity and pull back on credit expansion, exposing the system’s velocity game for what it is. 

Needless to say, whether in response to BSP policy or escalating balance sheet stress, banks may begin pulling back on credit—unveiling the Wile E. Coyote moment, where velocity stalls and gravity takes hold. 

IV. Banks’ Drift Toward Consumers: Credit Cards and Salary Loans Power NPLs Higher 

This fragility is no longer confined to institutional (supply side) exposures—it’s now bleeding into the household sector. 

The banking system’s transformational pivot toward consumer credit—particularly credit card loans—has deepened latent risks, building a larger stock of eventual loan portfolio losses. 

While aggregate nominal consumer loans (including real estate) hit a record high in Q2 2025, non-performing loans also sprinted higher from their December 2022 bottom. Gross consumer NPLs now sit just 4.7% below their Q2 2021 peak. (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

Though recent increases have been broad-based, the lag in consumer credit delinquencies reflects delayed stress transmission—especially in motor vehicle and real estate segments.


Figure 2

Crucially, the share of consumer loans to banks’ total loan portfolio (net of interbank) reached an all-time high of 22.34% in Q2 2025. Year-on-year growth in consumer NPLs has accelerated from single digits in 2024 to double digits in the last two quarters. (Figure 2 topmost pane)  

As noted earlier, surging NPLs have accompanied blistering growth in credit card loans—both hitting record highs in Q2. (Figure 2, middle image) 

But it’s not just credit cards: salary loan NPLs also spiked to a record, juxtaposed against all-time high disbursements. (Figure 2, lowest graph)


Figure 3

Strikingly, even as bank lending hits new highs, consumer real estate NPLs have climbed over the past two quarters. This uptick comes despite previously stable delinquency rates—a counterintuitive anomaly given the record and near-record vacancy levels observed in Q1 and Q2 2025, potentially a product of sustained refinancing. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)  

These pressures are permeating into the demand side of the economy—further evidence of a consumer squeezed by inflation, debt, and the slow erosion of repayment capacity. 

Taken together, weak household balance sheets, rising camouflaged NPLs, and a slowing economy raise systemic risks that extend well beyond macro fundamentals—threatening institutional health and reaching deep into the financial sector’s core, even as headline growth continues to mask the underlying fragility. 

V. Stagflation Signals and the Death Knell of Benchmark-ism: Labor Frailty Meets Inflation’s Third Leg 

Credit risk pressures should intensify with the July labor market data, which unexpectedly exposes the labor market’s underlying frailty. 

The unemployment rate (5.33%) and unemployed population (2.59 million) surged to pandemic-era highs (August 2022: 5.3%, 2.681 million), while the labor participation rate fell to 60.7%—slightly above July 2023’s 60.1%. (Figure 3 middle and lowest images) 

Stunningly, despite a 1.51% YoY increase in population, the non-labor force swelled to 31.45 million, the highest level since at least 2021

Combined, the unemployed and non-labor force accounted for a staggering 42.5% of the 15-and-above population in July 2025—a July 2023 high. 

Ironically, authorities amusingly blamed the weather. 

For banks, a looming storm is brewing: fragile household balance sheets, concealed loan delinquencies, and a deteriorating labor market set the stage for increased NPL formation in Q3 2025, with potentially systemic consequences


Figure 4

There’s more. 

Authorities also reported that despite rice price controls and the 20-peso rollout, headline CPI jumped to 1.5% in August—exposing the likely anomalous 0.9% dip in July. More concerning is the CORE CPI breakout, rising from 2.3% to 2.7%, the highest since December 2024. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

Historically, a negative spread—where CORE CPI exceeds headline—has signaled cyclical bottoms for headline inflation. 

History rhymes. Peak CPI in October 2018 marked the launchpad for the record run in gross NPLs, which climaxed in October 2021 before slowing. (Figure 4, second to the highest image) 

Likewise, February 2023’s peak CPI became the springboard for the recent all-time highs in gross NPLs—records now eclipsed or obscured by the Wile E. Coyote velocity game. 

The pattern is clear: Each cycle shows how households use credit to bridge spending power losses during inflation surges, only to leave borrowers delinquent in its wake

The fatal cocktail of surging unemployment and a potential third leg of the inflation cycle—stagflation—could be the coup de grâce for NPL benchmark-ism. The illusion of resilience may not survive the next impact. 

VI. The Wile E. Coyote Dynamic in Bank Investments via Available For Sale (AFS) Assets 

There’s another aspect we’ve barely touched—yet it has become a critical factor in the banking system’s health challenges, now showing symptoms of the Wile E. Coyote dynamic: investment assets

First, the distribution of bank assets reveals a transformational shift—from safeguarding liquidity to an entrenched addiction to leverage. This seismic rebalancing is evident in the rising share of investments and, more recently, the rebound in loan activity, both at the expense of cash reserves. (Figure 4, second to the lowest graph) 

Since the BSP’s historic rescue during the pandemic recession, the cash share of bank assets has plunged to an all-time low of 6.93% as of July 2025. 

Second, as we’ve repeatedly noted, the pandemic-level fiscal deficit has driven the banking system’s net claim on central government (NCoCG) to a record Php 5.547 trillion (up 7.12% last July). This is mirrored in Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets, which rose 2.15% to a record Php 4.1 trillion. Today’s deficit is not just a macro concern—it’s manifesting as a liquidity squeeze across the banking system. And that’s before accounting for the adverse effects of crowding out. (Figure 4 lowest graph) 

Third, the very investments that carried the banking system through the pandemic—buoyed by the historic BSP cash injections—have now become a source of friction

The need for sustained liquidity from the BSP to keep asset prices afloat has morphed into a Trojan Horse for inflation and a fuel source for increasingly speculative risk-taking engagements. 

To stave off asset deflation, the BSP must inject liquidity—primarily via bank credit expansion—yet this comes at the cost of spiking inflation risk.


Figure 5

This dynamic is most evident in Available-for-Sale (AFS) assets, which now constitute 41% of gross financial assets, fast catching up to HTMs at 52%. (Figure 5, topmost window) 

VII. AFS Surge and Recession-Grade Financial Losses 

The record build-up of AFS assets has heightened exposure to mark-to-market shocks, transmitting valuation swings directly into capital accounts and investor sentiment. 

The impact is already visible: In Q2, Philippine banks suffered an income contraction of (-) 1.96%, driven largely by a surge in losses on financial assets totaling Php 43.782 billion—the largest since December 2020, at the height of the pandemic recession. Let it be clear, these are recession-grade losses. (Figure 5, middle chart) 

With fixed income rates falling and bond prices rallying, the source of these losses becomes clear by elimination: deteriorating equity positions and bad debt. This is reinforced by the all-time high in banks’ allowance for credit losses (ACL)—a supposed buffer against rising delinquencies that signals institutional awareness of latent stress. (Figure 5, lowest diagram) 

Yet, like NPLs, these record ACLs are statistically suppressed by spitfire loan growth.

VIII. Benchmark-ism and the Illusion of Confidence


Figure 6

Nonetheless, this structural shift helps explain the growing correlation between AFS trends and the PSE Financial Index. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

In this light, banks—alongside Other Financial Corporations (OFCs)—may well represent a Philippine version of the stock market “National Team”: pursuing benchmark-ism or, perhaps, reticently tasked with pumping member-bank share prices within the Financial Index to choreograph market confidence. 

Patterns of coordinated price actions—post-lunch ‘afternoon delight’ rallies and pre-closing pumps—can often be traced back to these actors. 

Whether by design or silent coordination, the optics are unmistakable. 

IX. Velocity or Collapse: The Wile E. Coyote Reckoning 

The implication is stark: even as banks expanded their AFS portfolios —ostensibly for liquidity and yield, they deepened their exposure to volatility and credit deterioration. 

Equity-linked losses began bleeding into financial statements, and provisioning behavior revealed a system bracing for impact. 

The liquidity strain was hiding in plain sight—concealed by statistical optics and benchmark histrionics.

Compounding this is the shadow of large corporate exposures—most notably San Miguel Corporation, whose Q2 profits were largely driven by asset transfers, shielding its Minskyan Ponzi-finance model of fragility 

For instance, if banks hold AFS equity stakes or debt instruments linked to SMC, any deterioration in valuation or repayment capacity would surface as mark-to-market losses or provisioning spikes. 

Alas, like Wile E. Coyote, banks now require another velocity game—pumping financial assets higher to sustain investment optics. 

Without it, they risk compounding their liquidity dilemma into a full-blown solvency issue.

X. BSP’s Tacit Pivot: From Sovereign Risk to Banking Backstop 

The drain in the banking system’s cash reserves appears to be accelerating

Following June’s 11.35% jump (+Php 224.78 billion), July posted a 12.8% contraction (–Php 281.87 billion), fully offsetting gains of June, and partly last May (+Php 66.11 billion). Nonetheless, cash and due from banks at Php 1.923 trillion fell to its lowest level since at least 2014. 

And July’s slump signifies a continuum of long-term trend. However, from the slomo erosion, the depletion appears to be intensifying. 

So, despite interim growth bounce of deposits and financial assets, net (excluding equities), the cash-due banks to deposit and liquid-assets-to-deposit ratios resume their respective waterfalls.  In July, cash to deposit ratio slipped to all-time lows, while liquid assets-to-deposit fell to pre-pandemic March 2020 lows! (Figure 6, middle chart) 

Ironically, July’s massive cash drain coincided with the implementation of CMEPA. 

Importantly, banks drew a massive Php 189 billion from the central bank’s coffers as shown by the BSP’s claims on other depository corporations (ODC). (Figure 6, lowest diagram) 

This wasn’t a routine liquidity operation—it was a balance sheet pivot, redirecting support away from direct government exposure and toward the banking sector itself. The implication is clear: the system is leaning harder on central bank liquidity to offset deepening reserve depletion.


Figure 7

By shrinking its net claims on the central government (NCoCG) while expanding its claims on ODCs, the central bank has effectively told the Treasury to park its funds at BSP, while opening its own balance sheet wider to banks. This reduces BSP’s exposure to sovereign credit, but leaves banks more dependent on central bank lifelines to cover liquidity shortfalls. (Figure 7, topmost visual)  

In practice, this means banks are now forced into a double bind. On one hand, they must absorb more government securities and expand credit to keep up the optics of balance-sheet strength. 

On the other, they rely more heavily on BSP’s injections to plug holes in cash reserves. This rebalancing masks systemic strain—liquidity looks managed on paper, but the underlying dependence on continuous velocity (credit growth, AFS positioning, and central bank drawdowns) signals fragility. 

Far more crucial, what emerges is a structural shift: the BSP’s balance sheet is less about backstopping fiscal deficits and more about propping up the banking system. Yet this is not a permanent fix—if banks stumble in their velocity game or government borrowing intensifies, the pressure could quickly return in the form of crowding-out, valuation losses, and even solvency fears. In short, the pivot may buy time, but it also deepens the Wile E. Coyote dilemma: run faster, or fall.

With the BSP pivoting towards a backstop, bank borrowing growth decelerated to 8.9% YoY or fell by 14% MoM in July to Php Php 1.58 trillion—about 17% down from the record Php 1.907 trillion last March 2025. (Figure 7, middle image) 

This deceleration underscores the limits of the velocity game: even with central bank support, banks are struggling to sustain credit expansion without exposing themselves to deeper asset and funding risks. 

XI. Conclusion: The Velocity Charade Meets Its Limits 

The deepening Wile E. Coyote dynamic—where velocity props up optics of loans and investments—is unsustainable. (Figure 7, lowest cartoon) 

Surging NPLs and rising latent loan losses belie the façade of credit expansion. 

Accelerated exposure to AFS assets injects mark-to-market volatility, while HTMs tie banks to the unsparing race of public debt. 

There is no free lunch. Policy-induced fragility is no longer theoretical—it is compounding and irreducible to benchmark-ism or statistical optics. 

The illusion of managed liquidity is cracking. Each policy lifeline buys time—but only deepens the fall if velocity fails. 

Yet banks and the political economy have locked themselves in a fatal trap:

  • Deposit rebuilding is punished by state policy,
  • Recapitalization is constrained by fiscal exhaustion,
  • Capital markets are dominated by overleveraged elites,
  •  Hedge finance is crowded out by Ponzi rollovers,
  • Tax and savings reform is politically dead under “free lunch” populism 

In short: a trap within an inescapable trap. 

___

References: 

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, May 1992 

Prudent Investor Newsletter Substack Archives: 

-Goldilocks Meets the Three Bad Bears: BSP’s Sixth Rate Cut and the Late-Cycle Reckoning August 31, 2025 (substack) 

-Philippine Banks: June’s Financial Losses and Liquidity Strains Expose Late-Cycle Fragility August 7, 2025 (substack) 

-Liquidity Under Pressure: Philippine Banks Struggle in Q1 2025 Amid a Looming Fiscal Storm May 18, 2025 (substack) 

-BSP’s Fourth Rate Cut: Who Benefits, and at What Cost? April 13, 2025 (substack) 

CMEPA 

The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback July 27, 2025 (substack)

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design July 20,2025 (substack) 

  


Sunday, August 10, 2025

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy


National product statistics have been used widely in recent years as a reflection of the total product of society and even to indicate the state of “economic welfare.” These statistics cannot be used to frame or test economic theory, for one thing because they are an inchoate mixture of grossness and netness and because no objectively measurable “price level” exists that can be used as an accurate “deflator” to obtain statistics of some form of aggregate physical output. National product statistics, however, may be useful to the economic historian in describing or analyzing an historical period. Even so, they are highly misleading as currently used—Murray N. Rothbard 

 

In this issue: A brief but blistering breakdown of the 5.5% GDP mirage. 

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy

I. Q2 GDP: A Mirage of Momentum

II. The Secondary Trendline: Pandemic’s Lingering Scar; GDP: A Flawed Lens, Still Worshipped

III. Economic Wet Dreams, Statistical Kabuki and Confirmation Bias

IV. The GDP Illusion, Poverty Amid Growth: Cui Bono?

V. Policy Theater, the Real Economy and The Credit–Consumption Black Hole

VI. Jobs Boom, GDP Drag

VII. Policy Vaudeville: July .9% Inflation, MSRP and the Php 20 Rice Rollout

VIII. Core vs Headline CPI: A Divergence Worth Watching

IX. Deflator Manipulation, GDP Inflation

X. Inflation-GDP Forecasting as Folklore

XI. The Official Narrative: A Celebration of Minor Gains

XII. The Real Driver: Government Spending, Not Households

XIII. The Consumer Illusion: Retail as a Misleading Proxy

XIV. Expenditure Breakdown: Only Government Spending Beat the Headline

XV. Inconvenient Truth: The Rise of Big Government—Crowding Out in Action, The Establishment’s Blind Spots and Tunnel Vision

XVI. More Inconvenient Truths: Debt-Fueled GDP—A Statistical Shell Game

XVII. The Debt-Deficit Trap: No Way Out Without Pain—Sugarcoating Future Pain

XVIII. Tail-End Sectors Surge: Agriculture and Real Estate Rebound

XIX. The Policy Sweet Spot—and Its Expiry Date: Diminishing Returns of Stimulus

XX. Conclusion: Narrative Engineering and the Keynesian Free Lunch Trap

XXI. Post Script: The Market’s Quiet Rebuttal: Flattening Curve Exposes GDP Mirage 

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy 

Beneath the headline print lies a fragile economy propped up by CPI suppression, statistical distortion, and unsustainable public outlays.

I. Q2 GDP: A Mirage of Momentum 

The Philippines clocked in a Q2 GDP of 5.5% — higher than Q1 2025’s 5.4% but lower than Q2 2024’s 6.5%. 

For the first half, GDP posted a 5.4% expansion, above the 5.2% of the second half of 2024 but still below the 6.2% seen in the first half of 2024.


Figure 1

While this was largely in line with consensus expectations, what is rarely mentioned is that both nominal and real GDP remain locked to a weaker post-2020 secondary trendline — a legacy of the pandemic recession. (Figure 1, topmost graph) 

II. The Secondary Trendline: Pandemic’s Lingering Scar; GDP: A Flawed Lens, Still Worshipped 

Contra the establishment narrative, this lower secondary trend illustrates a slowing pace of increases—a theme we’ve repeatedly flagged. 

GDP now appears to be testing its own support level, underscoring the fragility of this fledgling trendline and the risk of a downside break. 

Though we’re not fans of GDP as a concept, we analyze it within the dominant lens—because everyone else treats it as gospel. 

But let’s be clear: GDP is a base effect—a percentage change from comparative output or expenditure figures from the same period a year ago. 

III. Economic Wet Dreams, Statistical Kabuki and Confirmation Bias 

When pundits claim GDP will breach 6% or that the Philippines is nearing “upper middle class” status, they’re implying that aside from seasonal Q4 strength, the rest of the year will recapture the original trendline and stay there. What a wet dream! 

These forecasts come from either practitioners afflicted by the Dunning-Kruger syndrome or sheer propagandists. 

The PSA’s national accounts data offer contradictory insights. But this isn’t just about statistics—it’s about confirmation bias. The public is told what it wants to hear. 

IV. The GDP Illusion, Poverty Amid Growth: Cui Bono? 

GDP is a quantitative estimate—built on assumptions, inputs, and econometric calculations. It hopes to objectively capture facts on the ground, but in aggregate, it overlooks individual preferences, distributional effects, financing mechanisms, and policy responses. 

Worse, its components (from rice to cars to Netflix) are averaged in ways that can distort reality. Aside, input or computational errors, or even manipulation, are always possible. 

Yes, GDP may be 5.5%, but SWS’s June self-rated poverty survey still shows 49% of Filipino families identifying as poor, with 10% on the borderline. While this is sharply down from December 2024’s 63%, the numbers remain considerable. (Figure 1, middle image) 

So, who benefits from the recent inflation decline that distilled into a 5.5% GDP? 

At a glance, the 41%—but even within this group, gains are uneven. Or, even within the 41% who are “non-poor,” gains are concentrated among larger winners while most see only modest improvements (see conclusion) 

V. Policy Theater, the Real Economy and The Credit–Consumption Black Hole 

The real economy doesn’t operate in a vacuum. It is a product of interactions shaped by both incumbent and anticipated socio-political and economic policies. 

The BSP began its easing cycle in 2H 2024, delivering four rate cuts (the fifth in June), two reserve requirement ratio cuts, doubled deposit insurance, a soft peg defense of the peso, and a new property benchmark that eviscerated real estate deflation. 

Theoretically, the economy ought to be functioning within a policy ‘sweet spot’. 

Despite blistering nominal growth and record-high universal-commercial bank credit—driven by consumer lending—real GDP barely budged. (Figure 1, lowest pane) 

Interest rates were hardly a constraint. Bank lending surged even during the 2022–23 rate hikes. Yet the policy transmission mechanism seems blunted: credit expansion hasn’t translated into consumer spending, rising prices or real GDP growth. 

Banking sector balance sheets suggest a black hole between credit and the economy—likely a repercussion of overleveraging or mounting balance sheet imbalances. 

More financial easing won’t fix this bottleneck. It’ll worsen it. 

VI. Jobs Boom, GDP Drag


Figure 2

We’re also treated to the spectacle of near-record employment. In June, the employed population reached its second-highest level since December 2023, driving the employment rate to 96.3% and lifting Q2’s average to 96.11%. 

That should be good news. But is it? If so, why has headline GDP moved in the opposite direction? (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

This labor boom coincided with over 25% credit card growth—normally a recipe for inflation (too much money chasing too few goods). (Figure 2, middle visual)

Instead, CPI fell, averaging just 1.4% in Q2. Near-record employment met falling prices, with barely a whisper from the consensus about softening demand. (Figure 2, lowest diagram)

VII. Policy Vaudeville: July .9% Inflation, MSRP and the Php 20 Rice Rollout

Authorities reported July inflation at 0.9%—approaching 2019 lows. But this is statistical kabuki, driven by price controls and weak demand.


Figure 3

Rice prices, partly due to imports, were already falling before January’s MSRP. The Php 20 rice rollout only deepened the deflation. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)

July saw rice prices drop 15.9%. Despite earlier MSRP, meat prices remained elevated—9.1% in June, 8.8% in July.

Because rice carries an 8.87% weight in the CPI basket, its deflation dragged down Food CPI (34.78% weight), driving July’s headline CPI to 2019 lows.

This divergence reveals the optics. MSRP failed on pork, so it was quietly lifted. But for rice, it was spun as policy success—piggybacking on slowing demand, punctuated by the Php 20 rollout even though it simply reinforced a downtrend already in motion.

VIII. Core vs Headline CPI: A Divergence Worth Watching

The growing gap between core and headline CPI is telling. The negative spread is now the widest since June 2022. Historically, persistent negative spreads have signaled inflection points—2015–16, 2019–2020, 2023. (Figure 3, middle window)

Moreover, MoM changes in the non-food and energy core CPI suggest consolidation and its potential terminal phase. An impending breakout looms—implying rising prices across a broader range of goods. (Figure 3, lowest graph)

IX. Deflator Manipulation, GDP Inflation 

Here’s the kicker: statistical histrionics are inflating GDP by repressing the deflator.

Real GDP is not a raw measure of economic output—it’s a ratio: nominal GDP divided by the GDP deflator. That deflator reflects price levels across the economy. Push the deflator down, and—voilà—real GDP pops up, even if nominal growth hasn’t changed. 

Q2’s 5.5% real GDP print looks better partly because the deflator was suppressed by statistical and policy factors: rice imports, price controls, Php 20 rice rollouts or targeted subsidies, and peso defense all helped drag reported inflation to multi-year lows. Rice alone, with an 8.87% CPI weight, deflated nearly 16% in July, pulling down the broader food CPI and, by extension, the GDP deflator. 

If the deflator had stayed closer to its Q1 level, Q2 real GDP would likely have landed closer to the 4.5–4.8% range—well below the official figure. This isn’t economic magic; it’s arithmetic. The “growth” came not from a sudden burst in output, but from lowering the measuring stick. 

Q2 GDP is another "benchmark-ism" in action. 

X. Inflation-GDP Forecasting as Folklore 

Amused by media’s enthrallment with government inflation forecasts, we noted at X.com: "Inflation forecasting is the game of ‘pin the tail on the donkey’ — a guess on a statistical guess, dressed up as science. The mainstream reinforces an Overton-window narrative that serves more as diversion than insight" 

The real economy—fragile, bifurcated, and policy-distorted—remains unseen.

XI. The Official Narrative: A Celebration of Minor Gains 

The establishment line, echoed by Reuters and Philstar, goes something like this: 

"Slowing inflation also helped support household consumption, which rose 5.5% year-on-year in the second quarter, the fastest pace since the first quarter of 2023" … 

"Faster farm output and strong consumer spending helped the Philippine economy expand by 5.5 percent in the second quarter"


Figure 4

But beneath the headlines lies a more sobering truth: a one-basis-point rise in household spending growth has been heralded as a “critical factor” behind the GDP expansion. 

While the statement is factually correct, it masks the reality: household spending as a share of GDP has been rangebound since 2023, showing no real breakout in momentum

XII. The Real Driver: Government Spending, Not Households 

The true engine of Q2 GDP was government spending, which rose 8.7%, down from 18.7% in Q1 but still dominant. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

Over the past five quarters, government spending has averaged 10.7%, dwarfing household consumption’s 5.1%.  

This imbalance exposes the fragility of the consumer-led growth narrative. When per capita metrics are used, the illusion fades further: Real household per capita GDP was just 4.5% in Q2, barely above Q1’s 4.4%, and well below Q1 2023’s 5.5%.

This per capita trend has been flatlining at secondary trendline support, locked in an L-shaped pattern—inertia, not resurgence—and still drifting beneath its pre-pandemic exponential trend.  The per capita household consumption “L-shape” shows spending per person collapsing during the pandemic and never meaningfully recovering — a flatline that belies the GDP growth narrative. (Figure 4, middle graph)

XIII. The Consumer Illusion: Retail as a Misleading Proxy

Despite the BSP’s promotion of property prices as a proxy for consumer health—and the Overton Window’s deafening hallelujahs—SM Prime’s Q2 results reveal persistent consumer strain: (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

  • Rent revenues rose only 6.3%, the weakest since the pandemic recession in Q1 2021.
  • Property sales stagnated, up just 0.2% despite new malls in 2024 and 2025 

So much for the “strong consumer” thesis. 

XIV. Expenditure Breakdown: Only Government Spending Beat the Headline 

In the PSA’s real GDP expenditure table, only government spending exceeded the headline:

  • Household: 5.5%
  • Gross capital formation: 0.6%
  • Exports: 4.4%
  • Imports: 2.9%
  • Government: 8.7% 

Notably, government spending excludes public construction and private allocations to public projects (e.g., PPPs). Due to the May mid-term elections, real public construction GDP collapsed by 8.2%. 

XV. Inconvenient Truth: The Rise of Big Government—Crowding Out in Action, The Establishment’s Blind Spots and Tunnel Vision

Figure 5

The first half of 2025 exposes a structural shift the mainstream won’t touch:  Government spending’s share of GDP has surged to an all-time high! 

Meanwhile, consumer driven GDP continues its long descent—down since 2001. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

As the public sector’s footprint swells, the private sector’s relative role contracts. This isn’t theoretical crowding out. It’s empirical. It’s unfolding in real time. (Figure 5, middle image) 

Importantly, this is not a conspiracy theory—these are government’s own data. Yet the establishment’s analysts and bank economists appear blind to it. 

Proof? 

Banks are shifting focus toward consumer lending, even as the consumer share of GDP trends lower. 

The “build-and-they-will-come” crowd remains locked in a form of tunnel vision, steadfastly clinging to a decaying trend. 

XVI. More Inconvenient Truths: Debt-Fueled GDP—A Statistical Shell Game 

Government has no wealth of its own. It extracts from the productive sector—through taxes, borrowing (future taxes), and inflation. 

As Big Government expands, so does public debt — now at Php 17.3 trillion as of June! 

The June debt increase annualizes to Php 1.784 trillion — eerily close to the Php 1.954 trillion NGDP gain over the past four quarters (Q3 2024–Q2 2025). (Figure 5, lowest visual)

Figure 6 

That’s a mere Php 170 billion gap. Translation: debt accounts for 91.3% of NGDP’s statistical value-added. 

The 91.3% “debt as share of NGDP increase” means almost all of the year-on-year nominal GDP expansion came from government borrowing, not private sector growth — in other words, strip out the deficit spending, and the economy’s headline size barely moved. 

Yet this spread has collapsed to its lowest level since the pandemic recession. (Figure 6, upper pane) 

This isn’t growth. It’s leverage masquerading as output — GDP propped up almost entirely by deficit spending! 

This also reinforces the government’s drift toward centralization—where state expansion becomes the default engine of the economy. 

XVII. The Debt-Deficit Trap: No Way Out Without Pain—Sugarcoating Future Pain 

It’s unrealistic for the administration to claim it can “slowly bring down” debt while GDP remains tethered to deficit spending. 

Debt-to-GDP ratios are used to soothe public concern—but the same debt is inflating GDP through government outlays. It’s a circular metric: the numerator props up the denominator

According to the Bureau of Treasury, Debt-to-GDP hit 63.1% in Q2 2025—highest since 2005! 

Ironically, authorities quietly raised the debt-to-GDP threshold from 60% to 70% in Augustan implicit admission that the old ceiling is no longer defensible

This is a borrow-now, pay-later model. Short-term optics are prioritized, while future GDP is sacrificed. 

Even the PSA’s long-term trendline reflects this dragconfirming the trajectory of diminishing returns. 

And we haven’t even touched banking debt expansion, which should have supported both government and elite private sector financing. Instead, it’s compounding systemic fragility. 

We’re no fans of government statistics—but even their own numbers tell the story. Cherry-picking to sugarcoat the truth isn’t analysis. It’s deception. And it won’t hide the pain of massive malinvestments. 

XVIII. Tail-End Sectors Surge: Agriculture and Real Estate Rebound 

From the industry side, Q2 saw surprising strength from GDP’s tailenders: 

Agriculture GDP spiked 7%, the highest since Q2 2011’s 8.3%. Volatile by nature, such spikes often precede plunges. 

Real estate GDP nearly doubled from Q1’s 3.7% to 6.1%, though still below Q2 2024’s 7.7%. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

Yet initial reports of listed property developers tell a different story: 

-Aggregate real estate sales: +4.1% (Megaworld +10.5%, Filinvest -4.96%, SMPH +0.02%) 

-Total revenues: +5.23% (Megaworld +9.6%, Filinvest -1.2%, SMPH +3.83%)

These figures lag behind nominal GDP’s 7.9%, suggesting statistical embellishment aligned with BSP’s agenda. 

Benchmark-ism strikes again!  

XIX. The Policy Sweet Spot—and Its Expiry Date: Diminishing Returns of Stimulus 

Technically, Q2 and 1H mark the ‘sweet spot’ of policy stimulus—BSP’s easy money paired with fiscal expansion. But artificial boosts yield diminishing returns. 

A 5.5% print reveals fragility more than resilience. 

Once again, the entrenched reliance on debt-financed deficit spending inflates GDP at the expense of future stability—while compounding systemic risk.  

XX. Conclusion: Narrative Engineering and the Keynesian Free Lunch Trap 

GDP has been sculpted to serve the establishment’s preferred storyline: 

  • CPI suppression to inflate real GDP
  • Overstated gains in agriculture and real estate
  • Escalating reliance on deficit spending 

Repressing CPI to pad GDP isn’t stewardship—it’s pantomine. A calculated communication strategy designed to preserve public confidence through statistical theater. 

Within this top-down, social-democratic Keynesian spending framework, the objective is unmistakable: Cheap access to household savings to bankroll political vanity projects. These are the hallmarks of free lunch politics. 

The illusion of growth props up the illusion of competence. And both are running on borrowed time. 

Yet, who benefits from this GDP? 

Not the average household. Not the productive base. As The Inquirer.net reports: "The combined wealth of the country’s 50 richest rose by more than 6 percent to $86 billion this year from $80.8 billion in 2024, as the economy got some lift from robust domestic demand and higher infrastructure investments, according to Forbes magazine." 

GDP growth has become a redistribution mechanism—upward. A scoreboard for elite extraction, not shared prosperity. 

Without restraint on free lunch politics, the Philippines is barreling toward a debt crisis. 

XXI. Post Script: The Market’s Quiet Rebuttal: Flattening Curve Exposes GDP Mirage 

Despite headline growth figures and establishment commentary echoing official optimism, institutional traders—both local and foreign—remain unconvinced by the Overton Window of managed optimism rhetoric. 

The market’s posture suggests skepticism toward the government’s narrative of resilience.


Figure 7
 

Following a Q2 steepening (end-June Q2 vs. end-March Q1), the Philippine Treasury curve has flattened in August (mid-Q3), though it remains steep in absolute terms. While the curve remains steep overall, the recent shift reveals important nuances: 

Short end (T-bills): August T-bill yields are marginally lower than June Q2 but still above March Q1 levels. 

Belly (3–5 years): Rates have been largely static or inert, showing no strong conviction on medium-term growth or market indecision 

Long end (10 years): Yields have fallen sharply since March and June, suggesting softer growth expectations or rising demand for duration. 

Ultra-long (20–25 years): Rates remain elevated and sticky, reflecting structural fiscal and inflation concerns. 

After July’s 0.9% CPI print, the peso staged a brief rally, yet the USDPHP remains above its March lows. Meanwhile, 3-month T-bill rates softened slightly post-CPI, hinting at the BSP’s intent to maintain its easing stance. 

Q3’s bearish flattening underscores rising risks of economic slowdown amid stubborn inflation or stagflation. 

The divergence between market pricing and statistical growth exposes the mirage of Q2 GDP—more optical than operational, more narrative than organic.