Philippine Uni-Comm Bank Lending in 2024: Why Milestone Bank Credit Expansion and Systemic Leveraging Extrapolates to Mounting Systemic Fragility

 

Credit Expansion No Substitute for Capital. These opinions are passionately rejected by the union bosses and their followers among politicians and the self-styled intellectuals. The panacea they recommend to fight unemployment is credit expansion and inflation, euphemistically called an "easy money policy"—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

Philippine Uni-Comm Bank Lending in 2024: Why Milestone Bank Credit Expansion and Systemic Leveraging Extrapolates to Mounting Systemic Fragility

I. Challenging the BSP’s Easing Cycle Narrative

II. How BSP’s Credit Card Subsidies Materially Transformed Banking Business Model

III. Bank Lending to Real Estate Expanded in 2024, Even as Sector’s GDP Slumped to All-Time Lows!

IV. Credit Intensity Hits Second-Highest Levels!

V. Redux: The Debt-to-GDP Myth: A Background

VI. The GDP is Mostly About Debt: 2024 Public Debt-to-GDP Reaches Second Highest Level Since 2005!

VII. The Mirage of Labor Productivity

VIII. Conclusion 

Philippine Uni-Comm Bank Lending in 2024: Why Milestone Bank Credit Expansion and Systemic Leveraging Extrapolates to Mounting Systemic Fragility 

Universal-commercial bank lending performance in 2024 provides some critical insights. Combined with public debt and GDP, these reveal rising financial and economic fragilities. 

I. Challenging the BSP’s Easing Cycle Narrative 

Inquirer.net, February 13, 2025: "Bank lending posted its fastest growth in two years to cross the P13-trillion mark in December, as the start of the interest rate-cutting cycle and the typical surge in economic activities during the holiday season boosted both consumer and business demand for loans. Latest data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed that outstanding loans of big banks, excluding their lending with each other, expanded by 12.2 percent year-on-year to P13.14 trillion in the final month of 2024, beating the 11.1-percent growth in November. That was the briskest pace of credit growth since December 2022." 

While the BSP kept its policy rate unchanged this week, it has engaged in an 'easing cycle' following three rate cuts, a substantial RRR reduction, and possibly record government spending in 2024.

Figure 1

The notion that the BSP's easing cycle has driven bank lending growth is not supported by the data. While December saw the "briskest...since December 2022," the 13.54% growth rate in that earlier period occurred near the peak of a hiking cycle, suggesting that neither rate hikes nor cuts significantly influence growth rates.

Official rates peaked in October 2023, ten months after the December 2022 lending surge.

II. How BSP’s Credit Card Subsidies Materially Transformed Banking Business Model 

Unlike the BSP's 2018 interest rate cycle, where hikes coincided with falling bank lending rates, the current credit market anomalies likely reflect distortions caused by the BSP's pandemic-era policies. These included an interest rate cap on credit cards and various relief measures. (Figure 1, topmost image)

Specifically, the BSP's interest rate cap in September 2020 significantly reshaped or transformed the banking system's business model, demonstrably shifting focus from business to consumer loans. 

The consumer share of universal-commercial (UC) bank loans surged by 27.4% over four years, increasing from 9.5% in 2020 to 12.1% in 2024. (Figure 1, middle window)

The biggest segment growth came from credit cards and salary loans:

-Credit card loans grew at a 22.3% CAGR from 2020 to 2024, increasing their share from 4.6% to 7.1% of total loans. Since 2018, their share has more than doubled from 3.4% to 7.1%. (Figure 1, lowest graph)

-Salary loans grew at an 18.07% CAGR over the same period, expanding their share from 0.9% to 1.2%.

Figure 2

-December's month-on-month (MoM) growth of 3.38% marked the highest since January 2022's 3.98%. Contrary to the assumption of seasonality, the highest monthly growth rates have not been confined to the holiday season. (Figure 2, topmost diagram) 

This astronomical growth in consumer credit, further fueled by December's reacceleration, underscores the substantial leveraging of household balance sheets.  

III. Bank Lending to Real Estate Expanded in 2024, Even as Sector’s GDP Slumped to All-Time Lows! 

In 2024, real estate (Php 222.72 billion) and credit cards (Php 212.1 billion) saw the largest nominal increases in lending. Electricity and Gas, and trade, followed. (Figure 2, middle chart) 

Supply-side real estate loans accounted for 20.5% of total UC bank loans at year-end. This figure excludes consumer mortgage borrowing. 

However, while real estate's GDP share hit an all-time low of 5.4% in 2024, bank exposure to the sector reached its second-highest level. In Q3, BSP data revealed that real estate prices had entered deflationary territory. (Figure 2, lowest pane) 

The continued decline in the sector's GDP raises mounting risks for banks. 

Rising real estate loan growth does not necessarily indicate expansion but rather refinancing efforts or liquidity injections to prevent a surge in delinquencies and non-performing loans.

Figure 3

Moreover, key sectors benefiting from BSP’s rate policies—construction, trade, finance, and real estate—continue to represent a significant share of UC bank portfolios, which share of the GDP has also been rising, posing as systemic risk concerns. (Figure 3, topmost chart) 

IV. Credit Intensity Hits Second-Highest Levels!

A broader perspective reveals more concerning trends.

UC total bank loans grew by 10.8% year-on-year, from Php 11.392 trillion in 2023 to Php 12.81 trillion in 2024 (a net increase of Php 1.42 trillion). In comparison, nominal GDP grew by 8.7%, from Php 24.32 trillion to Php 26.44 trillion (a net increase of Php 2.12 trillion).

This gives a 'credit intensity' of Php 0.67—the amount of bank lending needed to generate one peso of GDP—the highest since 2019. This means UC bank lending has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, while GDP hasn't. 

Factoring in public debt (excluding guarantees), 2024 saw a sharp rise in credit dependency. Credit intensity from systemic debt (public debt + bank lending, excluding capital markets and shadow banking) reached its second-highest level ever, trailing only the peak of 2021. 

It now takes Php 1.35 of debt to generate one peso of GDP, highlighting diminishing returns of a debt-driven economy. (Figure 3, middle image) 

The mainstream thinks debt is a free lunch! 

V. Redux: The Debt-to-GDP Myth: A Background

The BSP’s trickle-down policies operate under an architectural framework called "inflation targeting."

Though its stated goal is to 'promote price stability conducive to balanced and sustainable growth of the economy,' it assumes that inflation can be contained or that the inflation genie can be kept under control.

Its easy money regime has been designed as an invisible tax or a form of financial repression—primarily to fund political boondoggles—by unleashing "animal spirits" through the stimulation of "aggregate demand" or GDP. At the same time, GDP growth is expected to increase tax collections. 

The fundamental problem is that the BSP has no control over the distribution of credit expansion within the economy. 

As it happened, while the "liberalized" consumer-related sectors were the primary beneficiaries, distortions accumulated—principally as the elites took advantage of cheap credit to pursue "build-it-and-they-will-come" projects. 

The result was the consolidation of firms within industries and the buildup of concentration risk. Soon, the cheap money landscape fueled the government’s appetite for greater control over the economy through deficit spending. 

Thus, the "debt-to-GDP" metric became the primary justification for expanding government spending and increasing economic centralization.

This race toward centralization through deficit spending intensified alongside the elite’s "build-it-and-they-will-come" projects during the pandemic.

VI. The GDP is Mostly About Debt: 2024 Public Debt-to-GDP Reaches Second Highest Level Since 2005!

Once again, the consensus has a fetish for interpreting debt-to-GDP as if it were an isolated or standalone factor. It isn’t.

In the recent past, they cited falling debt-to-GDP as a positive indicator. However, let’s clarify: since the economy is interconnected—one dynamic entwined with another, operating within a lattice of interrelated nodes—such a simplistic view is misleading.

When the BSP forced down rates to reinforce its "trickle-down" policies, the consequences extended beyond public spending, affecting overall credit conditions. This policy catalyzed a boom-bust cycle. 

As such, when the public debt-to-GDP declined between 2009 and 2019, it was primarily because bank credit-to-GDP filled most of the gap. 

The proof of the pudding is in the eating: systemic leverage-to-GDP remained range-bound throughout that decade. Debt was merely transferred or juggled from the public to the private sector. 

GDP growth, in large part, was debt-driven.

Yet, the pandemic-era bailout fueled a surge in both public debt-to-GDP and bank credit-to-GDP. Public debt-to-GDP (excluding guarantees) reached 60.72%—its second-highest level after 2022—following the BSP’s COVID-era bailout, which also marked the highest rate since 2005. 

It’s worth remembering that Thailand—the epicenter of the 1997-98 Asian Crisis—had the lowest debt-to-GDP at the time. (Figure 3, lowest table) 

More importantly, public debt has anchored government spending, which has played a crucial role in shaping Philippine GDP since 2016.

V. Systemic Leverage Soars to All-Time Highs! 

Figure 4

On a per capita basis, 2024 debt reached historic highs, increasing its share of per capita GDP (both in nominal and real terms). (Figure 4, topmost visual)

Simply put, rising debt levels have been eroding whatever residual productivity gains are left from the GDP. 

Alternatively, this serves as further proof that GDP is increasingly driven by debt at the expense of productivity. 

It also implies that the deepening exposure of output to credit is highlighting its mounting credit risk profile. 

In 2024, UC bank loans-to-GDP hit 48.5%, the second-highest since 2020 (49.7%), indicating crisis lending via easy money policies. 

Systemic leverage reached a record 109.2% of GDP, surpassing 2022 ATH. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

Despite a Q4 2024 liquidity spike (M3), consumers struggled; household GDP slowed, suggesting households are absorbing increasing leverage while enduring the erosion of purchasing power in the face of inflation. (Figure 4, lowest diagram)

Figure 5

Another point: The growth rate of systemic leverage has shown a strong correlation with the CPI since 2013. However, it appears to have deviated, as rising systemic leverage has yet to result in an accompanying increase in the CPI. Will this correlation hold? (Figure 5, topmost image) 

VI BSP’s ‘Trickle-Down Policies’ Steered a Credit Card and Salary Loans Boom (and coming Bust)

There is more to consider. The banking model's transformation toward consumers didn’t happen overnight; it was the result of cumulative easy money policies that intensified during the pandemic. 

Our central premise: while bank expansion fueled inflation, the pandemic-induced recession—marked by income loss—and, most notably, the BSP’s easy money emergency response (including historic interest rate and RRR cuts, various relief measures such as credit card subsidies, the USDPHP cap, and the unprecedented Php 2.3 billion BSP injections) sparked a consumer credit boom, which subsequently triggered the second wave of this inflation cycle. 

Though the BSP’s intent may have been to compensate for consumers' income losses in order to stabilize or protect the banking system, the economic reopening further stirred up consumers’ appetite for credit, fueling demand amid a recovering, fractured, and impaired supply chain. 

Debt-financed government spending also contributed to the surge in aggregate demand. Together, these factors spurred a rise in "too much money chasing too few goods" inflation. 

The inflation genie was unleashed—yet it was conveniently blamed by everyone on the "supply side." The underlying premise of the echo chamber was that the demand-supply curve had been broken!  Yet, they avoided addressing the question: How could a general price increase occur if the money supply remained stable? 

Ironically, the BSP calibrated its response to the inflation cycle by adjusting interest rates in line with its own interest rate cycle! In other words, they blamed supply-side issues while focusing their policies on demand. Remarkable! 

The BSP’s UC bank credit card and salary loan data provide evidence for all of this (Figure 5 middle and lowest graphs): the escalating buildup of household balance sheets in response to the loss of purchasing power, the CPI cycle, and the BSP and National Government’s free money policies.

Figure 6

It’s also no surprise that the oscillation of UC bank loan growth has mirrored fluctuations in the PSEi 30. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

Unfortunately, the law of diminishing returns has plagued the massive growth of consumer credit, leading to its divergence from consumer spending and PSEi 30 flows. 

As an aside, the upward spiral in cash in circulation last December and Q4 —reflecting both liquidity injections for the real estate industry and pre-mid-term election spending—likely points to higher inflation and the further erosion of consumer spending power. (Figure 6, middle chart) 

Is it any wonder that self-reported poverty ratings and hunger have surged to record highs? 

Does the path to 'middle-income status' for an economy translate into a population drowning in debt? 

VII. The Mirage of Labor Productivity

Businessworld, February 10, 2025: The country’s labor productivity — as measured by gross domestic product per person employed — grew by 4.5% year on year to P456,342 in 2024. This was faster than the 2.7% a year earlier and the fastest in seven years or since the 8.7% in 2017. (Figure 6, lowest image)

While this suggests improving efficiency, it fails to account for GDP’s deepening dependence on credit expansion. When growth is primarily debt-financed, productivity gains become illusory. 

Credit isn’t neutral. Its removal would cause the 'debt-driven GDP-labor productivity' 'castle in the sand' to crumble 

VIII. Conclusion  

The 2024 UC bank lending data reveals critical economic trends: 

>A structural shift in the banking business model, driven by the BSP’s inflation-targeting and pandemic rescue policies. 

>Mounting concentration risks due to industry consolidations and growing sector fragility.

>Public debt-to-GDP reaching its second-highest level since 2005, while systemic leverage has hit an all-time high.

Diminishing returns from the increasing dependence on systemic credit—bank expansion and public debt—highlighting the risks of financial and economic vulnerabilities and instability.

The Philippine political economy operates with a very thin or narrow margin for error.

In an upcoming issue, we are likely to address the banking system's 2024 income statement and balance sheets. 

What Surprise is in Store for the 2025 Year of the Wooden Snake?

 

Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur (The world wants to be deceived, so let it be deceived) —Sebastian Brant (also Brandt) 

In this issue

What Surprise is in Store for the 2025 Year of the Wooden Snake?

I. 2025: The Year of the Wooden Snake, Zodiac Cycles and Sociology

II. Trump 2.0 and Current Geopolitical Developments

III. Geopolitical Milestones in the Year of the Snake

IV. The Influence of the Year of the Snake on the Global Economy and Financial Markets

V. The Impact of the Year of the Snake on Philippine Politics and Economy

VI. A Comparative Analysis of the Year of the Snake's Impact on the Philippines

VII. Conclusion

What Surprise is in Store for the 2025 Year of the Wooden Snake?

How will the 2025 Year of the Snake impact geopolitics, the global economy, and financial markets? Will it be a year of upheaval or opportunity for the Philippines?

I. 2025: The Year of the Wooden Snake, Zodiac Cycles and Sociology

2025 is the Year of the Wooden Snake. To gain insight into what this might signify, a quote from the article offers a succinct summary. 

Chinese new year 2025 is an especially fortuitous one as it is ruled over by the wood snake, a sign associated with wisdom, intuition, and renewal. It’s a combination of an animal (the snake) and an element (wood) that occurs once every 60 years. It promises to be a period full of unique energy with some distinct characteristics…The combination of snake and wood creates a special synergy in which the introspective and transformative energy of the snake is paired with wood’s expansive and balanced nature. (Mendoza, 2025)

Optimism consistently pervades the annual forecasts for the Chinese zodiac calendar. The zodiac embodies a 12-year cycle, each year symbolized by an animal and its associated attributes.

While we remain agnostic about this tradition (and its geomantic counterpart, feng shui), significant events occurring within the year might appear as circumstantial coincidences or could indeed signal potential cyclical patterns within the political economy. 

In other words, certain aspects of astrology might intersect with sociological phenomena. 

For instance, our analysis of geopolitical developments through the lens of the Chinese zodiac cycles fortuitously resulted in our accurate prediction of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in February 2022. 

Aside from the eroding concerns over the pandemic, potential geopolitical flashpoints for a hot war may occur.  

For instance, the US-Russian impasse over Ukraine (Russia’s vehement objection over the slippery slope of NATO’s expansion into her borders) (Prudent Investor, January 2022) 

Thus, an examination of global and local developments over 12-year cycles may provide valuable clues for 2025. 

II. Trump 2.0 and Current Geopolitical Developments

Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th President of the United States will be held on January 20th, just 9 days ahead of the Chinese New Year on January 29th. This timing suggests that at the start of his term, he will busily sign numerous Executive Orders (EOs) that could significantly influence the geopolitical landscape this year. 

Even before taking office, geopolitical developments have already moved in anticipation of his potential actions.

Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire, which takes effect on Sunday, January 19th—469 days after the conflict began on October 7, 2023. President-elect Trump reportedly had significant influence over this deal. 

Still, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly stated that the ceasefire with Hamas, as discussed with Trump, is intended to be "temporary." 

The incoming president is also reportedly considering easing sanctions on Russian oil exports in exchange for a peace deal with Ukraine, while simultaneously exerting pressure on Iran and Venezuela. 

While the incoming cabinet has reportedly been filled with pro-Israel lackeys and are hostile towards relations with China and Russia, Trump recently posted a video on his X account suggesting that the Syria and Iraq wars were orchestrated by Israel’s Netanyahu. 

Trump also had a phone call with China’s President Xi on January 17th, where both leaders declared on X.com they would “do everything possible to make the world more peaceful and safe.”

Following the sudden collapse of Assad-led Syria, Russian President Putin and Iranian President Raisi signed a “comprehensive partnership agreement” on January 17th, likely aimed at deterring any potential aggression from the U.S.-Israel alliance

Donald Trump has added complexity to geopolitics by exerting pressure on his allies. 

1. He has cited the need to pursue the acquisition of the Panama Canal.

2. Beyond securing access to critical mineral resources, Trump has proposed the acquisition of Greenland and the annexation of Canada, potentially to extend the U.S. sphere of influence in the Arctic Circle, competing with Russia. This strategy might also serve to divert attention from escalating war tensions with Russia and China.

As historian Eric Margolis suggested, "Trump has started a scramble of imperial rebranding"

3. Additionally, Trump has urged NATO members to increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP.

4. Could the alleged snubbing of the Philippine leadership at Trump’s inauguration signal a potential shift in US-Philippines foreign relations?

Trump's presidency promises to be a period of intense geopolitical activities, where traditional alliances might be tested, and new power dynamics could emerge, all under the ambitious and often unpredictable deal-making leadership of the 47th President of the United States.

III. Geopolitical Milestones in the Year of the Snake

Based on historical analysis and considering the cyclical nature of the Chinese zodiac, here are significant geopolitical milestones that occurred in various Years of the Snake: 

1917: The United States joined the Allies and entered World War I in April 1917. This was a pivotal moment that contributed to the eventual end of the war.

1941: The Bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, prompted the U.S. entry into World War II, significantly altering the course of the conflict.

Operation Barbarossa: Launched on June 22, 1941, this was Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, marking the beginning of a massive Eastern Front campaign in World War II. This operation was one of the largest military operations in history and had profound effects on the war's outcome.

The Battle of Moscow, marking a turning point on the Eastern Front for the Russians against the invading Germans in World War II, also took place in (October 2) 1941-42. This battle was crucial for halting the German advance into the Soviet Union.

1953: The Korean War concluded with an armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, ending three years of conflict and setting the stage for the division of Korea that persists today.

1965: The U.S. significantly escalated its involvement in the Vietnam War in 1965, marking a major expansion of American military presence in Southeast Asia.

1989: The Tiananmen Square Massacre in China, from April 15 to June 4, 1989, involved the violent suppression of pro-democracy protests, impacting China's international image and domestic politics.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, marked the end of the Cold War and was a precursor to the reunification of Germany, signaling the decline of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. 

2001: The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, devastated the U.S., leading to the initiation of the War on Terror. This event reshaped global security dynamics.

The War in Afghanistan began 1-month later that year as the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks, marking the start of a long-term military engagement in the region.

2013: The Syrian Civil War saw increased international involvement in 2013, with discussions around chemical weapon use and subsequent military actions, further complicating the conflict.

The Snake is often linked with transformation, introspection, and unpredictability, suggesting that geopolitical tensions might rise or escalate. The Wood element, associated with growth and expansion, could also signify potential for new power struggles. On the other hand, the introspective nature of the Snake might promote diplomatic efforts and peace negotiations, leading to the conclusion of ongoing conflicts.

In sum, the impact of the Year of the Wood Snake will depend on a complex array of interdependent factors, including global political dynamics, the influence of vested interest groups such as the military-industrial complex, hegemonists, and political elites, as well as leadership decisions and international diplomacy. This year tends to bring significant changes, with the potential for new conflicts to emerge, existing wars to escalate, and the possibility of resolving ongoing disputes, reflecting the intricate interplay of forces during this zodiac cycle.

IV. The Influence of the Year of the Snake on the Global Economy and Financial Markets

The influence of the Year of the Snake on the global economy and financial markets have been significant

1929: The U.S. stock market crash of 1929 precipitated the Great Depression, causing global economic devastation, massive unemployment, and profound financial instability. 

1941: U.S. economic mobilization for World War II marked a shift toward a war economy. This also resulted in increased U.S. wartime financing through the issuance of war bonds, a growing national debt and the Fed’s financial repression policies.

World War II also led to the U.S. Lend-Lease Act, which strengthened economic ties between the U.S. and Allied nations. 

1965: Often cited as part of the Golden Age of capitalism, 1965 marked a peak in the post-WWII economic boom in Western nations, particularly the U.S. and Europe.

Figure 1

The Bretton Woods System started showing signs of strain mounting due to inflationary pressures and vastly increased spending related to the Vietnam War. (Figure 1, upper graph)

1977: Following the Nixon Shock in 1971, the post-Bretton Woods era led to U.S. dollar weakness and inflationary pressures.

1989: The fall of the Berlin Wall paved the way for Germany's economic reunification. 

Global market liberalization advanced, emphasizing free trade and deregulation.

Despite the Bank of Japan's monetary tightening, the Nikkei 225 reached an all-time high of 38,957.44 on December 29, 1989, amidst a Tokyo land price crash. 

2001: The bursting of the Dot-Com Bubble led to a recession, with considerable stock market losses, particularly in tech stocks, and an eight-month U.S. economic contraction.

The 9/11 attacks further destabilized global markets.

China's accession to the WTO significantly expanded its global trade presence.

2013: The "Taper Tantrum" occurred when Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke announced a potential reduction in bond purchases, causing U.S. bond yields to rise and leading to instability in emerging markets.

The U.S. Dollar Index (DXY), which tracks the value of the U.S. dollar against a basket of six major trading partners' currencies, began its nearly 12-year uptrend in 2013. (Figure 1, lower image) 

Meanwhile, the Eurozone crisis persisted, with Greece and other nations continuing to face financial instability.

The Year of the Snake has historically been associated with heightened volatility in both geopolitics and domestic politics, and its interconnectedness with economics reveals similar underlying dynamics.

Historically, periods marked by surging asset bubbles, financial system pressures, recessions, and rapid economic expansion have all been part of this recurring cycle.

Looking ahead to 2025, uncertainties abound. However, the growing deep-seated economic imbalances—characterized by unprecedented debt levels, record deficits, and central bank policies favoring easy money—along with rising protectionism, the weaponization of finance, and speculative asset bubbles, all point to an increased risk of significant downside volatility.

V. The Impact of the Year of the Snake on Philippine Politics and Economy

How has the year of the Snake affected the Philippines.

1929: The Great Depression severely impacted the Philippine economy, which was still a U.S. colony, due to its dependence on U.S. markets.

1941: Imperial Japan launched a surprise attack on Clark Field and Iba Field on the opening day of hostilities in the Philippines, a day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This paved the way for the Japanese occupation, causing massive socio-economic devastation.

1953: Former Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay was elected as the seventh President of the Philippines. The post-World War II economic recovery was still underway, with the country grappling with the repercussions of the war, including ongoing rebuilding efforts.

1965: Ferdinand Marcos Sr. was elected the tenth President of the Philippines. His victory marked the beginning of a long tenure in power, eventually leading to the declaration of martial law in 1972.

1977: Since the establishment of Martial Law in 1972, the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. had suppressed political dissent and controlled growing unrest, which resulted in widespread human rights violations.

During this period, the Philippine economy was characterized by massive government spending on infrastructure projects, largely funded through loans. This led to rising external debt, which became a significant issue in the later years of Marcos' rule. In 1977, Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1177, which mandated automatic appropriations for debt servicing. 

The imposition of Martial Law coincided with economic instability, partly exacerbated by the global oil crisis, high inflation, and escalating debt levels.

1989: The late 1980s were marked by political turmoil and growing opposition to the regime of Corazon Aquino, who had assumed power after the 1986 People Power Revolution (People Power I).

In 1989, the Reform Armed Forces of the Philippines (RAFP) launched the most serious coup attempt against the Aquino government, among many previous attempts, highlighting dissatisfaction with her leadership and resistance to her reforms.

Despite Aquino's efforts to stabilize the economy, the country continued to face persistent challenges, including high levels of foreign debt and inflation. However, Aquino’s administration made significant strides in implementing market-oriented reforms and privatizing state-run enterprises, though the country still struggled due to global economic conditions and internal political instability.

2001: In January 2001, President Joseph Estrada was ousted in a second People Power Revolution, also known as People Power II, after being accused of corruption. Estrada’s impeachment and subsequent removal from office, amid widespread public protests, marked a significant political transition. Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was sworn in as the new president, though the transition was accompanied by significant political unrest and instability.

At the time, the Philippines was grappling with substantial economic challenges, including the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and declining investor confidence during Estrada's administration.

Figure 2

2013: The Philippine economy showed robust growth, reaching a significant milestone with an upgrade to an investment-grade credit rating by major rating agencies.  (Figure 2, topmost chart)

The economy grew at an impressive rate of 6.8% for the year.

Simultaneously, Philippine assets reached key milestones, reflecting strong investor confidence in the market during this period.

The Philippine Stock Exchange’s PSEi 30 had a record-breaking year, hitting new highs in May 2013. (Figure 2, middle diagram)

The Philippine peso rallied to a five-year high, or the US dollar-to-Philippine peso exchange rate fell to a five-year low. (Figure 2, middle chart)

In April 2013, Philippine 10-year bond yields hit all-time lows or Philippine bonds rallied to historic highs. (Figure 2, lowest graph)

In my humble opinion, 2013 signified the genuine bull market peak of the PSEi 30, which has been affirmed by both the USD-PHP exchange rate and the bond markets.

Once again, like its global counterparts, the Year of the Snake in the Philippines has historically coincided with moments of political upheaval, such as the rise and fall of leaders, coup attempts, and the People Power Revolution, as well as economic challenges and heightened volatility like inflation, debt, instability, and periods of market euphoria.

VI. A Comparative Analysis of the Year of the Snake's Impact on the Philippines

Finally, let us provide a concise analysis of the comparative performances during the Year of the Snake.

Nota Bene: The underlying dynamics behind each economic statistic differ from period to period.

Figure 3

The headline GDP experienced its best performance post-independence from the U.S. and post-bellum or post-war recovery in the Water Snake year of 1953, which saw an 8.9% GDP growth. (Figure 3, upper window)

With the exception of 2001, the headline GDP has been rising since then, with 2013 representing its highest level.

However, the Water Snake year of 1953 was followed by a sharp decline in the Wooden Snake year of 1965. If history follows its pattern, could we witness a sharp drop in GDP? Or will the uptrend since 1965 continue?

The average headline GDP during the Year of the Snake since 1953 stands at 5.4%.

Could the Year of the Snake also reflect trends in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) cycle?

The CPI surged from its trough in the Wooden Snake year of 1965 to its peak of 10.7% in 1989, before descending to 2.6% in the Water Snake year of 2013.

Does this suggest a cyclical pattern of three Snake years (or every 24 years)? Or could the CPI rise sharply in the upcoming Wooden Snake year? (Figure 3, lower chart)

The average CPI during the Year of the Snake since 1965 is 6%.

Figure 4

The USD-PHP exchange rate seems inclined to appreciate during the Year of the Snake. It gained in three of the last four Snake years, averaging 4.6%, particularly due to the 2001 return, which coincided with the weakest GDP performance among Snake years. (Figure 4, upper pane)

Moving to the PSE. Since its largest return of 31.24% in 1989, the Philippine’s major equity benchmark, the PSEi 30 has struggled. However, despite its mixed performance, the five Year of the Snake episodes since 1965 have yielded an average return of 4.1%, thanks in large part to the notable gains in 1989. (Figure 4, lower graph)

The Snake years reveal that the USD-PHP's largest returns, the weakest GDP, and the most significant decline in the PSEi 30 share a common denominator: the Metal Snake year of 2001.

Key global events—such as the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the dot-com recession in the U.S., the 9/11 attacks, and local political upheaval in the Philippines marked by People Power 2, alongside the country's post-Asian Crisis economic challenges in 2001—contributed to this outcome. 

VII. Conclusion

In examining the economic patterns associated with the Year of the Snake in the Philippines, we observe a tapestry of significant historical events and economic indicators. From the peak GDP growth in 1953 to the financial turbulence of 2001 and to the financial euphoria of 2013, these years have often been marked by notable shifts in political power, economic policy, market cycles and external shocks with each year adding a unique chapter to the country's economic and political story.

As we look towards 2025, while historical trends provide valuable insights, the future remains uncertain. Given the current global and domestic economic imbalances, the Year of the Snake may again usher in another period of heightened risk and potential volatility. As always, the interplay of external events, governmental actions, and market responses will determine whether the Snake’s legacy of upheaval or opportunity will prevail. 

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References

Corina Mendoza Architectural Chinese new year 2025: Here's what to expect in the year of the Wood Snake January 1 2025 

Prudent Investor, What Surprise is in Store for the 2022 Year of the Water Tiger? January 23, 2022 

Other Zodiac series

What Surprise is in Store for the 2023 Year of the Water Rabbit? January 22, 2023

What Surprise is in Store for the 2024 Year of the Wooden Dragon? February 11, 2024

 

How the BSP's Soft Peg will Contribute to the Weakening of the US Dollar-Philippine Peso Exchange Rate

 

Balance of payments crises are created in (soft) pegged arrangement because the monetary authority simultaneously targets both the exchange rate and interest rate and fails on both counts—Steve Hanke 

In this issue

How the BSP's Soft Peg will Contribute to the Weakening of the US Dollar-Philippine Peso Exchange Rate

I. Closing 2024: Major Interventions Boost the Philippine Peso and PSEi 30

II. A Brief History of the USDPHP's Soft Peg

III. USDPHP Peg: Tactical Policy Measures: Magnifying Systemic Risks

IV. The Cost of Cheap Dollars: Financing Challenges and Soaring External Debt

V. USDPHP Peg: The Other Consequences

How the BSP's Soft Peg will Contribute to the Weakening of the US Dollar-Philippine Peso Exchange Rate 

The Philippine peso mounted a strong rally in the last week of 2024, a hallmark of the BSP's defense of the USDPHP soft-peg regime. Why such policies would boost it past 60! 

I Closing 2024: Major Interventions Boost the Philippine Peso and PSEi 30

In the last week of December, I proposed in a tweet that the BSP and their "national team" cohorts might engage in "painting the tape" to boost Philippine asset prices during the final two trading sessions of the year.  

The BSP and their Philippine "national team" have 2 days left in 2024 to steepen Treasury markets, limit $USDPHP gains, and boost #PSEi30 returns after Friday's massive 5 minute pre-closing pump (correction: should have been Monday instead of Friday)

Figure 1 

This post turned out to be prescient. The "national team" apparently didn’t allow any major corrections on the PSEi 30 following Monday’s powerful 5-minute pump, subsequently, following it up with another two-day massive pre-closing rescue pump. (Figure 1, topmost charts)

However, the USD Philippine peso exchange rate (USDPHP) market exhibited even more prominent interventions. Despite the USD surging against 19 out of 28 pairs, based on Exante Data, the Philippine peso stood out by defying this trend, delivering the most outstanding return on December 26th. It was a mixed showing for the other ASEAN currencies. (Figure 1, middle table)

On that day too, the USDPHP traded at its lowest level from the opening and throughout the session, with depressed volatility—a clear indication of an intraday price ceiling set by the market maker, or possibly the BSP. (Figure 1, lowest graph)

By the last trading day of the year, the USDPHP weakened further, resulting in an impressive 1.64% decline over three trading sessions!

Figure 2

Notably, the Philippine peso emerged as the best-performing Asian currency during the final trading week of the year. Still, the USDPHP delivered a 4.47% return compared to the PSEi 30’s 1.22%. (Figure 2)

Figure 3

Over the past 12 years, the USDPHP has outperformed the PSEi 30 in 9 of them. Given its current momentum, this trend is likely to persist into 2025. (Figure 3, upper chart)

It is crucial to understand that such price interventions are not innocuous; they have lasting effects on the market and the broader economy.

II. A Brief History of the USDPHP's Soft Peg

The BSP employed a ‘soft peg’ or limited the rise of the USDPHP back in 2004-2005 (56.4 in 2004 and 56 in 2005).  (Figure 3, lower image)

Because of the relatively clean balance sheet following the post-Asian Crisis reforms, the BSP seemed successful—the peso rallied strongly from 2005 to 2007.

Despite the interim spike in the USDPHP during the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it fell back to the 2007 low levels in 2013. This episode marked both the culmination of the strength of the Philippine peso and its reversal: the 12-year uptrend for the USDPHP.

Figure 4

Thanks to the expanded deployment of new tools called Other Reserve Assets (ORA), the BSP managed to generate substantial gains for the Philippine peso from 2018 to 2021. (Figure 4, upper window)

ORA includes financial derivatives (forwards, futures, swaps, and options), repos, and other short-term FX loans and assets.

However, this did not last, as the BSP launched a multi-pronged bailout of the banking system in response to the pandemic recession. The bailout comprised Php 2.3 trillion in injections (Quantitative Easing via Net claims on Central Government), aggressive RRR cuts, historic interest rate reductions, and various capital and regulatory relief measures, including subsidies. (Figure 4, lower diagram)

The USDPHP soared by about 5.4% from its 2004-2005 cap to reach the 59 level, marking the second series of its soft peg.

The USDPHP hit the 59 level four times in October 2022.

This second phase of USDPHP soft peg signified a part of the pandemic bailout measures.

Fast forward today, as the BSP maintained its implicit support via relatively elevated net claims on central government (NCoCG), the USDPHP’s 2023 countertrend rally was short-lived and rebounded through June 2024.

Promises of easy money from both the US Fed and the BSP sent a risk-on signal for global assets, including those in the Philippines sent the USDPHP tumbling to its low in September 2024.

Unfortunately, renewed signs of ‘tightening’ sent it re-testing the 59 levels three times in November-December 2024.

In short, despite recent interventions to maintain the 59 level, the numerous attempts to breach it signal the growing mismatch between the BSP’s soft peg and market forces.

III. USDPHP Peg: Tactical Policy Measures: Magnifying Systemic Risks

Yet, the BSP’s upper band limit signifies a subsidy on the USD or a price distortion that undervalues the USD while simultaneously overvaluing the peso.

This policy impacts the economy in several significant ways.

Widening Trade Deficit: First, the cap widens the trade deficit by making imports appear cheaper and exports more expensive. An artificial ceiling exacerbates imbalances stemming from the historical credit-financed savings-investment gap.

Figure 5

It is no surprise that the trade deficit hit its all-time high in the second half of 2022 as the BSP cap went into effect.

Meanwhile, in October 2024, the trade deficit reached its third highest on record, following the USDPHP run-up through June 2024 with a quasi-upper band limit of 58.8-58.9. The USDPHP hit the 59 level twice in October. (Figure 5, upper chart)

Reduced Tourism Competitiveness: Second, an artificially strong peso (due to the cap) could make the Philippines a more expensive destination for tourists. This could reduce the country’s competitiveness in the tourism sector, ultimately impacting tourism revenue negatively.

Resource Misallocation: Third, prolonged price distortions lead to resource misallocations. In the short term, an overvalued currency might fuel consumption-driven growth due to cheaper imports. However, businesses may over-import because of the cheap USD, while exporters face challenges, with some potentially shutting down, resulting in job losses.

Over time, this could lead to overinvestment in import-related and dependent sectors while underinvestment could spur declining competitiveness in exports and tourism-related industries. These represent only the first-order effects.

The intertemporal ripple effects extend through supply and demand chains, compounding the long-term economic impact.

Inflation Risks: Fourth, the policy could exacerbate domestic inflation. While one goal of the cap is to suppress rising import costs, dwindling reserves make defending the cap increasingly difficult. Once reserves are depleted, the risk of abrupt devaluation grows, potentially defeating the policy’s original purpose.

Reduced Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Fifth, pricier peso assets and heightened inflation risks translate to higher ‘hurdle rates’ for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). This diminishes competitiveness and results in slow or stagnant FDI inflows, hindering long-term economic growth. Since peaking in December 2021, FDI flows have been stagnating and have shown formative signs of a downtrend since falling most last September 2024. (Figure 5, lower graph)

Increased Market Volatility: Sixth, the artificial ceiling could inadvertently magnify market volatility. Although designed to maintain stability, the widening misalignment between the USDPHP and economic fundamentals may prompt speculative pressures. If markets perceive the cap as unsustainable, the result could be a destabilizing devaluation. 

Capital Flight and Financial Instability: Finally, the growing perception of an imminent, sharp devaluation might spur capital flight from prolonged price controls, increasing the risks of financial instability. 

The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Policies: Tactical policy measures, such as an artificial cap, magnify risks over time. These stop-gap measures are not "free lunches." Instead, they increase economic inefficiencies, contribute to stagnation, and amplify systemic risks. 

IV. The Cost of Cheap Dollars: Financing Challenges and Soaring External Debt 

On top of that, there is the critical issue of financing. 

>By keeping the dollar artificially cheap, authorities ENCOURAGE USD debt accumulation. This policy may amplify medium- to long-term vulnerabilities, particularly in the face of rising global interest rates or a stronger dollar. 

>Depleting Reserves and Surging External Debt: The artificial ceiling requires substantial central bank intervention through the use of foreign reserves. However, prolonged interventions deplete these reserves and may compel the government to borrow externally to replenish them, thereby increasing public debt. 

Unsurprisingly, external debt soared in Q3 2024. 

What’s more, since the National Government’s (NG) net foreign currency deposits with the BSP include proceeds from the NG's issuance of ROP Global Bonds, external debt inflates the BSP’s Gross International Reserves (GIR).

Figure 6 

Still, the level and growth of Q3 external debt continue to outpace the GIR. (Figure 6, topmost image) 

As a side note, GIR fell by USD 2.6 billion to USD 108.5 billion last November.

>Increasing Refinancing and Liquidity Strains:

As I recently noted, 

rising external debt compounds the government’s predicament, as the lack of revenues necessitates repeated cycles of increased borrowing to fund gaps in the BSP-Banking system’s maturity transformation, creating a "synthetic US dollar short." (Prudent Investor, November 2024)

Increasing requirements for refinancing have only magnified the US dollar shortage, amplifying a race to borrow that heightens the risk of abrupt exchange rate adjustments or repayment shocks.

Additionally, banks (+34.14% YoY) and non-financial institutions (+5.5%) have also been ramping up their external debt. However, government borrowings (+18.7%) continue to outpace those of the private sector (in mil USD). (Figure 6, middle diagram) 

>Growing Short-Term Debt Concerns: Worse yet, while the BSP describes the present growth pace of external debt as "sustainable," short-term external debt has hit a record, and its share of the total has also expanded in Q3. (Figure 6, lowest window) 

The rapid rise in short-term debt is a symptom of mounting US "dollar shorts" or developing liquidity strains, which are likely to be magnified by the BSP’s caps. 

>Rising Debt Crisis Risk: Although one implicit objective of maintaining a USDPHP cap is to artificially lower the cost of debt servicing, the removal of this cap or an eventual devaluation could cause the cost of servicing foreign-denominated debt to skyrocket in local currency terms, potentially triggering a debt crisis. 

Figure 7

Eleven-month debt servicing costs have already hit a record (compared with same period and against the annual), partly due to the increasing share of foreign-denominated debt. Imagine where these costs would land if the USDPHP exchange rate breaches the 60 level!

V. USDPHP Peg: The Other Consequences

And that’s not all. 

The artificial peg may lead to additional consequences:

>Moral Hazard: Economic actors might engage in risky financial behavior, such as excessive USD borrowing, expecting government intervention to shield them from losses by perpetually maintaining a cheap dollar policy.

>Policy Tradeoffs: The BSP’s prioritization of exchange rate stability could worsen imbalances brought about by past and present monetary policy stances.

>Black Market Emergence: As USD supply becomes restricted due to prolonged interventions, a parallel or black market for the dollar may emerge.

>Social Inequality: The benefits of an artificially cheap dollar often skew toward wealthier individuals, who gain access to inexpensive foreign goods and international investment opportunities. In contrast, low-income households may face rising prices for basic goods—especially domestically produced ones—because local producers struggle with higher input costs or reduced competitiveness. 

>Economic Inequality: Moreover, such policies disproportionately favor certain groups, such as importers or holders of foreign currency-denominated assets (and related industries), and USD borrowers, at the expense of others, including exporters, local producers and savers.

>Trade Relations and Currency Manipulation Risks: A significant trade deficit driven by an undervalued dollar could strain trade relationships, potentially inviting retaliatory measures from trading partners or complicating trade negotiations. 

In extreme cases, accusations of "currency manipulation" could lead to sanctions by organizations such as the WTO. These sanctions might allow affected countries to impose tariffs on imports from the Philippines. 

All these factors point to one conclusion: the USDPHP is likely headed past 60 soon.

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References

Prudent Investor US Dollar-Philippine Peso Retests Its All-Time High of 59, the BSP’s "Maginot Line": It’s Not About the Strong Dollar November 25, 2024