Showing posts with label Philippine political economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine political economy. Show all posts

Sunday, March 23, 2025

January 2025 Surplus Masks Rising Fiscal Fragility: Slowing Revenues, Soaring Debt Burden

Monetary pumping and government spending cannot remove the dependence of demand on the production of goods. On the contrary, loose fiscal and monetary policies impoverish real wealth generators and reduce their ability to produce goods and services, thus weakening effective demand for other goods—Dr. Frank Shostak 

In this issue

January 2025 Surplus Masks Rising Fiscal Fragility: Slowing Revenues, Soaring Debt Burden

I. The Mirage of Fiscal Prudence: A Closer Look at January’s Surplus

II. January’s Surplus: A Closer Look, Changes in VAT Reporting Effective 2023

III. Diminishing Returns? Slowing Revenue Growth Amid Record Bank Credit Expansion

IV. The VAT Effect, Public Spending Trends and Breaching the Budget: A Shift in Political Power

V. Fiscal Challenges Deepen as Interest Payments Soar and Crowds Out Public Allocation

VI. January’s Record Cash Spike

VII. Rising Public Debt, Increasing FX Financing and Mounting Pressure on the Philippine Peso

VIII. Banks and the BSP as Fiscal Lifelines

IX. Symptoms of Crowding Out: Weak Demand and Slowing GDP

X. Conclusion: Mounting Fragility Beneath Sanguine Statistical Benchmarks 

January Surplus Masks Rising Fiscal Fragility: Slowing Revenues, Soaring Debt Burden 

VAT reporting changes drove January 2025’s surplus, despite slowing revenue growth, record-high interest payments, and ballooning public debt—exposing growing fiscal vulnerabilities.

I. The Mirage of Fiscal Prudence: A Closer Look at January’s Surplus 

Businessworld, March 21, 2025: "FINANCE Secretary Ralph G. Recto said the budget surplus recorded in January is unlikely to continue in the following months. Asked if the surplus will be sustained in the runup to the elections, Mr. Recto told BusinessWorld: “No. Our deficit target this year is 5.3% of the GDP (gross domestic product).”" 

It’s remarkable how media portrays government fiscal management as though it’s a model of efficiency and foresight. 

This supposedly impartial business outlet echoes the optimism with little scrutiny, displaying a certain undue enthusiasm in their narrative. 

-The “manageable” budget? Public outlays continue to grow, often exceeding the allocations set by Congress. 

-Revenues? These are presented as if they align seamlessly with the government’s projections—reality, it seems, is expected to comply. 

-Changes to VAT reporting? The January surplus was largely a result of this adjustment that took effect in 2023. As a media outlet, they should have recognized this. Instead, the omission conveniently aligns with their theme of unquestioning deference. 

-And the political context of deficit spending? It’s treated as a non-issue, as though public resources are always managed with the utmost prudence and altruism. Yet, this framing sidesteps how deficit spending often fuels projects with short-term appeal but long-term consequences. 

Underlying all this is the assumption that the government is all-knowing, omnipotent, and in perfect command of the economy—a notion more fictional than factual. 

II. January’s Surplus: A Closer Look, Changes in VAT Reporting Effective 2023 

Let us dive into the details. 

Back in September, we noted: "So, there you have it: The rescheduling of VAT declarations from monthly to quarterly has magnified revenues and "narrowed" deficits at the "close" of each taxable quarter."  (Prudent Investor, 2024) 

The changes in VAT reporting took effect on January 1, 2023. 

Though expenditures grew by 19.45%, outpacing revenues’ 10.75% increase, in peso terms, January 2025 revenues exceeded outlays, leading to the month’s surplus.         

Revenues of Php 467.15 billion marked the third-largest monthly total in pesos, following April and October 2024.

Figure 1 

Meanwhile, expenditures were the smallest monthly amount since February 2024. Nevertheless, the long-term spending and revenue trends remain intact so far. (Figure 1, upper window) 

III. Diminishing Returns? Slowing Revenue Growth Amid Record Bank Credit Expansion 

However, despite the revenue outperformance—driven by tax collections—growth rates materially declined in January 2025. Total tax and Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) collection growth slowed from 25.03% and 31.35% in 2024 to 13.6% and 15.13% in 2025, respectively.  (Figure 1, lower graph) 

On the other hand, Bureau of Customs (BoC) collections jumped from 3.98% to 7.98% in 2025. Since BIR accounted for 81.2% of the total, tax revenues largely reflected its growth rate.


Figure 2

And this slowdown in revenue growth is occurring alongside record-breaking bank credit expansion! Universal commercial banks reported a 13.3% surge in bank lending growth—the highest rate since December 2020—reaching Php 12.7 trillion in January, slightly below December 2024's record. (Figure 2, upper image)

In a nutshell, the decelerating revenue growth reflects the diminishing returns of the Marcos-nomics fiscal stimulus.

IV. The VAT Effect, Public Spending Trends and Breaching the Budget: A Shift in Political Power

The quarterly shift in VAT reporting resulted in a Php 68.4 billion surplus, the third largest after January 2024 and April 2019. (Figure 2, lower chart)

Although public spending may have appeared subdued in January, the government has an enacted 2025 budget of Php 6.326 trillion, averaging Php 527.2 billion monthly.

Figure 3

Yet, the Executive branch has hardly been frugal—it has consistently outspent legislated allocations since 2016! (Figure 3, upper visual)

If spending, which they have the power to control, cannot be managed, then revenues—being dependent on spontaneous economic and financial interactions—are even less controllable. 

This persistent spending overreach signals an implicit yet pivotal shift in the distribution of political power. As we noted earlier: "More importantly, this repeated breach of the "enacted budget" signals a growing shift of fiscal power from Congress to the executive branch." (Prudent Investor, March 2025) 

This suggests that the monthly average of Php 527 billion represents a floor! We are likely to see months with Php 600-700 billion spending. 

V. Fiscal Challenges Deepen as Interest Payments Soar and Crowds Out Public Allocation 

January 2025 interest payments (IP) soared to a record Php 104.4 billion, pushing their share of total expenditures to 26.2%—a peak last seen in 2009! (Figure 3, lower diagram) 

Authorities attributed this to a "shift in coupon payment timing due to the issuance strategy of multiple re-offerings of treasury bonds," as well as "an earlier servicing of a Global Bond with a February 1 coupon date falling on a weekend." 

Nonetheless, the programmed budget for interest payments in 2025 is Php 848 billion. January’s interest payment equates to 12% of this total 2025 allocation for interest payments, while 26.2% represents its share of January’s total expenditures. 

Interest payments and overall debt servicing data in the coming months will shed light on the true conditions. 

Once again, as we noted earlier: "Government spending will increasingly be diverted toward debt payments or rising debt service costs constrain fiscal flexibility, leaving fewer resources for essential public investments" (Prudent Investor, March 2025) 

VI. January’s Record Cash Spike 

Figure 4

Another striking figure in the government’s cash operations report was the January cash balance surplus, which soared to an all-time high of Php 1.23 trillion, despite reported financing of only Php 211 billion. (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

The Bureau of Treasury (BoTr) reported cash flow deficits of Php 104 billion, Php 261 billion, and Php 370.04 billion in the last three months of 2024, totaling Php 735 billion. The BoTr offered no explanation for this discrepancy. One plausible reason could be the USD 3.3 billion ROP Global bond issuance. 

VII. Rising Public Debt, Increasing FX Financing and Mounting Pressure on the Philippine Peso 

During the same period, public debt rose by Php 261.5 billion month-on-month (MoM) or Php 1.134 trillion year-on-year (YoY) to a record Php 16.313 trillion in January.  (Figure 4, middle graph) 

Authorities are programmed to borrow Php 2.545 trillion in 2025, slightly down from Php 2.57 trillion in 2024. 

Yet, outpacing domestic debt growth of 10.3%, external borrowings rose 13% in January, with their share of the total reaching 32.05%—nearly matching November’s 32.13% and reverting to 2020 levels. (Figure 4, lower image) 

Since 2020, reliance on foreign exchange (FX) borrowings has steadily increased. 

Greater dependence on FX financing raises internal pressure for the Philippine peso to devalue. As we have previously explained, the widening credit-financed savings-investment gap (SIG)—a key element of the structural economic model pursued by authorities—has resulted in persistent 'twin deficits,' which has been magnified by the pandemic era. 

Consequently, it is unsurprising that the upper limit of the USD-PHP ‘soft peg’ continues to be tested by mounting liabilities. The government is increasingly resorting to Hyman Minsky’s "Ponzi Finance"—as organic fund flows decline, reliance on debt refinancing to manage the balance sheet deepens. 

VIII. Banks and the BSP as Fiscal Lifelines


Figure 5

Banks remain a primary source of government financing, with Net Claims on Central Government (NCoCG) up 7.42% YoY to Php 5.409 trillion, though slightly down from December’s all-time high of Php 5.541 trillion. (Figure 5, upper window) 

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is another source. January’s spending decline mirrored the BSP’s NCoCG, which rose 14.54% YoY to Php 390.3 billion but fell 34% MoM from December’s Php 590 billion. The fluctuations in BSP’s NCoCG have closely tracked public spending, with correlations tightening since its historic rescue of the banking system. (Figure 5, lower graph) 

IX. Symptoms of Crowding Out: Weak Demand and Slowing GDP 


Figure 6

Weak demand, potentially exacerbated by lower public spending in January, contributed to the decline in Core CPI, with non-food and energy inflation falling from 2.6% in January to 2.4% in February 2025. (Figure 6, upper diagram) 

It is worth reiterating that record public spending in Q4 2024 accompanied just 5.2% GDP growth—evidence of the crowding-out syndrome in action. (Figure 6, lower chart) 

X. Conclusion: Mounting Fragility Beneath Sanguine Statistical Benchmarks 

The January 2025 surplus is a fleeting anomaly rather than a sign of sustainable fiscal health. The underlying trends—slowing revenue growth, surging debt servicing costs, and increasing reliance on external borrowings—paint a concerning picture of fiscal vulnerabilities, with long-term consequences for economic stability and growth. 

Given that politics often relies on path-dependent economic policies, meaningful reforms are unlikely to occur until they are forced upon the government by market pressures. 

The BSP’s easing cycle, characterized by cuts in interest rates and the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR), further underscores this dynamic. These measures effectively accommodate the government’s borrowing-and-spending cycle, exacerbating fiscal imbalances and delaying necessary structural reforms. 

Or, the establishment may continue to tout the supposed capabilities of the government, but ultimately, the law of diminishing returns will expose the inherent fragility of the political economy. This will likely culminate in a blowout of the twin deficits, a surge in public debt, a sharp devaluation of the Philippine peso, and a spike in inflation, reinforcing the third wave of this cycle—heightening risks of a financial crisis. 

____

References 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Philippine Government’s July Deficit "Narrowed" from Changes in VAT Reporting Schedule, Raised USD 2.5 Billion Plus $500 Million Climate Financing, September 1, 2024 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, 2024’s Savings-Investment Gap Reaches Second-Widest Level as Fiscal Deficit Shrinks on Non-Tax Windfalls, March 9, 2025

  


Sunday, March 09, 2025

2024’s Savings-Investment Gap Reaches Second-Widest Level as Fiscal Deficit Shrinks on Non-Tax Windfalls

 

Deficits add up. Debt needs to be refinanced. And the larger the cost of servicing past spending, the less is available for the present. This is inherently and obviously a crackpot way to run a nation. It guarantees chaos, inflation, defaults and poverty—Bill Bonner 

In this issue

2024’s Savings-Investment Gap Reaches Second-Widest Level as Fiscal Deficit Shrinks on Non-Tax Windfalls 

In 2024, the Philippines' Savings-Investment Gap continued to widen to a near record, driven primarily by fiscal deficit spending—its effects and potential consequences discussed in two connected articles.

A. The Widening Savings-Investment Gap: A Growing Threat to Long-Term Stability

I. The Philippines as a Poster Child of Keynesian Economic Development

II. The Persistent Decline in Savings and the Investment Boom

III. Sectoral Investment Allocation and Bank Lending Trends

IV. Bank Lending Patterns and the Role of Real Estate

V. The SI Gap and the ’Twin Deficits’

VI. Conclusion: Deepening SI Gap a Risk to Long-Term Stability

B. 2024 Fiscal Performance: Narrower Deficit Fueled by Non-Tax Windfalls, Masking Structural Risks

I. 2024 Deficit Reduction: A Superficial Improvement? Revenue Growth: The Role of Non-Tax Windfalls

II. Government Spending Trends: A Recurring Pattern; Symptoms of Centralization

III. 2024 Public Debt and Debt Servicing Costs Soared to Record Highs!

IV. Public "Investments:" Unintended Market and Economic Distortions

V. Conclusion: Current Fiscal Trajectory a Growing Risk to Financial and Economic Stability 

A. The Widening Savings-Investment Gap: A Growing Threat to Long-Term Stability

I. The Philippines as a Poster Child of Keynesian Economic Development


 
Figure 1

Businessworld, February 28, 2025: In 2024, the country’s savings rate — defined as gross domestic savings as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) — grew to 9.3%, reaching P2.47 trillion. Meanwhile, the investment rate was 23.7% of GDP, or P6.27 trillion, resulting in a P3.8-trillion gap. The savings-investment gap (S-I) gap — the difference between gross domestic savings and gross capital formation — shows a country’s ability to finance its overall investment needs. An S-I deficit occurs when a country’s investment expenditures exceed its savings, forcing borrowing to fund the gap. (Figure 1, topmost chart)

The Philippines may be considered one of the poster children of Keynesian economic development.

Given that aggregate demand serves as the foundation of the economy, national economic policies have been designed to stimulate and manage a spending-driven growth model, particularly through investment and consumption.

From a Keynesian perspective, the government is expected to compensate for any spending shortfall from the private sector by increasing its own expenditures.

The Savings-Investment Gap (SIG) serves as a key metric for tracking the evolution of aggregate demand management over time.

However, this ratio may be understated due to potential discrepancies in macroeconomic data—GDP figures may be overstated, while inflation (CPI) may be understated. Or, in my humble view, the actual savings rate may be even lower than indicated.

II. The Persistent Decline in Savings and the Investment Boom

The Philippines’ gross domestic savings rate has been in a downtrend since 1985, but it plummeted after 2018coinciding with an acceleration in government spending. This trend worsened in 2020, when the pandemic triggered a surge in public expenditures. (Figure 1, middle image) 

From 1985 onward, the persistent decline in savings suggests a rise in household consumption, a "trickle-down effect," supported by accommodative monetary policy and moderate fiscal expansion.

Meanwhile, the investment rate surged between 2016 and 2019, driven by government-led initiatives, particularly the ‘Build, Build, Build’ program.

However, the 2020 collapse—where both savings and investment rates fell sharply—highlighted the government’s aggressive "automatic stabilization" response to the pandemic recession, which relied on RECORD deficit spending and monetary stimulus.

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) introduced unprecedented measures, including ₱2.3 trillion in liquidity injections, historic reductions in reserve requirements and policy rates, a managed USDPHP cap, and various financial relief programs.

III. Sectoral Investment Allocation and Bank Lending Trends 

The distribution of investments can be inferred from sectoral GDP contributions and bank lending trends. 

As of 2024, the five largest contributors to GDP were:

-Trade (18.6%)

-Manufacturing (17.6%)

-Finance (10.6%)

-Agriculture (8%)

-Construction (7.5%) (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

However, both manufacturing and agriculture have been in decline since 2000, suggesting that investments have largely flowed into trade, finance, and construction (including government-related projects).

Real estate, once a growing sector, peaked in 2015 and has since been in decline. Nevertheless, it remained the seventh-largest sector in 2024. It trailed professional and business services—which encompasses head office activities, architectural and engineering services, management consultancy, accounting, advertising, and legal services.

The top five GDP contributors accounted for 62.25% of total output, down from 66.06% in 2020, primarily due to the contraction in manufacturing and agriculture. 

IV. Bank Lending Patterns and the Role of Real Estate


Figure 2

While the real estate sector's share of real GDP declined, its share of bank lending expanded significantly. (Figure 2, topmost window) 

From 2014, real estate-related borrowing rose sharply, peaking in 2021, before moderating below 2022 levels. Nevertheless, real estate remained the largest client of the banking system in 2024, accounting for 19.6% of total loans. (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

That is—assuming banks have reported accurate data to the BSP. The reality is that banks often lack transparency regarding loan distribution and utilization (where the money is actually spent)

Given that many retail investors (mom-and-pop borrowers) are very active in real estate, it is likely that actual exposure is understated, as banks may structure their reporting to circumvent BSP lending caps on the sector—it extended the price cap during the pandemic. 

In the meantime, the share of consumer lending has seen the most significant growth, surging after 2014 and becoming the dominant growth segment of bank credit. 

Meanwhile, the share of loans to the trade industry declined marginally, and manufacturing loans saw a steep drop—reflecting its GDP performance. 

Lending to the financial sector peaked in 2022 but has since declined, whereas credit to the utilities sector increased from 2014 to 2020 and has remained stable since. 

V. The SI Gap and the ’Twin Deficits’ 

The sharp decline in manufacturing underscores the structural imbalances reflected in the SI Gap, which in turn has contributed to the record "twin deficits" (fiscal and external trade). (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

As both consumers and the government spent beyond domestic productive capacity, the economy became increasingly reliant on imports to satisfy aggregate demand. 

Although the deficits have slightly narrowed from their pandemic peaks, they remain at ‘emergency stimulus levels’, posing risks to long-term stability. (see discussion on fiscal health below) 

These deficits have been—and will continue to be—financed through both domestic (household) and foreign (external debt) borrowing.


Figure 3
 

The widening SIG has coincided with a decline in M2 savings growth, while the M2-to-GDP ratio surged, reflecting both credit expansion and monetary stimulus (including BSP’s money printing operations). (Figure 3, upper pane) 

External debt has also reached an all-time high in 2024, adding another layer of vulnerability. 

VI. Conclusion: Deepening SI Gap a Risk to Long-Term Stability 

The Philippines' growing S-I gap and declining savings rate reflect deep-seated structural imbalances that raise concerns about long-term economic stability

A shrinking domestic savings pool limits capital accumulation, increase dependence on external financing, and expose the economy to risks such as debt distress and currency fluctuations. 

B. 2024 Fiscal Performance: Narrower Deficit Fueled by Non-Tax Windfalls, Masking Structural Risks 

I. 2024 Deficit Reduction: A Superficial Improvement? Revenue Growth: The Role of Non-Tax Windfalls 

Inquirer.net, February 28: "The Marcos administration posted a smaller budget shortfall in 2024, but it was not enough to contain the deficit within the government’s limit as unexpected expenses pushed up total state spending. Latest data from the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) showed that the budget gap had dipped by 0.38 percent to around P1.51 trillion last year. As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), the deficit improved to 5.7 percent last year, from 6.22 percent in 2023. But it still indicated that the government had spent beyond its means, requiring more borrowings that pushed the state’s outstanding debt load to P16.05 trillion by the end of 2024." (bold added)

Now, let us examine the performance of the so-called "public investment" in 2024.

Officials hailed the alleged improvement in the fiscal balance. One remarked"This is the lowest since 2020 and shows the good work of the administration's economic team."

Another noted that "the drop in the deficit was ‘better than expected,’" implying that "the government no longer needs to borrow as much if the budget deficit is shrinking."

From my perspective, manipulating popular benchmarks—whether through statistical adjustments or market prices—as a form of political signaling to sway depositors and voters—is what I call "benchmark-ism."

While both spending and revenues hit their respective milestones, the 2024 fiscal deficit only decreased marginally from Php 1.512 trillion to Php 1.51 trillion. (Figure 3, lower image)

The so-called "improvement" mainly resulted from a decline in the deficit-to-GDP ratio, which fell from 6.22% in 2023 to 5.7% in 2024—a reduction driven largely by nominal GDP growth rather than actual fiscal restraint.

Authorities credit this "improvement" primarily to revenue growth.

While it's true that fiscal stimulus led to a broad-based increase in revenues, officials either deliberately downplayed or diverted attention from the underlying reality.


Figure 4

Despite record bank credit expansion in 2024, tax revenue only increased 10.8%, driven by the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s (BIR) modest 13.3% growth and the Bureau of Customs’ (BoC) paltry 3.8% rise. Instead, the real driver of revenue growth was an extraordinary 56.9% surge in NON-tax revenues, which pushed total public revenues up 15.56%. (Figure 4, middle image) 

As a result, the share of non-tax revenues spiked from 10.3% in 2023 to 14% in 2024—its highest level since 2007’s 17.9%! (Figure 4, topmost diagram) 

The details or the nitty gritty tell an even more revealing story. According to the Bureau of Treasury (February 27): "Total revenue from other offices (other non-tax, including privatization proceeds, fees and charges, grants, and fund balance transfers) doubled to PHP 335.0 billion from PHP 167.2 billion a year ago and exceeded the P262.6 billion revised program by 27.56% (PHP 72.4 billion) primarily due to one-off remittances." (bold added)

To emphasize: ONE-OFF remittances!

Revenues from "Other Offices" doubled in 2024, with its share jumping from 4.4% to 7.6%.

If this one-time windfall hadn’t occurred, the fiscal deficit would have exploded to a new record of Php 1.84 trillion! 

Despite the minor deficit reduction, public debt still surged. 

Public debt rose by 9.82% YoY (Php 1.435 trillion) in 2024—higher than 8.92% (Php 1.2 trillion) in 2023. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

Was the increased borrowing in 2024 a response to cosmetically reducing the fiscal deficit? 

And that’s not all.

II. Government Spending Trends: A Recurring Pattern; Symptoms of Centralization


Figure 5

For the sixth consecutive year, the government exceeded the ‘enacted budget’ passed by Congress. The Php 157 billion overrun in 2024 was the largest since the post-pandemic recession in 2021, when the government implemented its most aggressive fiscal-monetary stimulus package. (Figure 5, topmost chart)

More importantly, this repeated breach of the "enacted budget" signals a growing shift of fiscal power from Congress to the executive branch.

Looking ahead, 2025’s enacted budget of Php 6.326 trillion represents a 9.7% increase from 2024’s Php 5.768 trillion.

The seemingly perpetual spending growth has been justified on the assumption of delivering projected GDP growth. 

While some "experts" claim the Philippines is becoming more ’business-friendly,’ the growing expenditure-to-GDP ratio tells a different story:

-The government is increasingly centralizing control over economic resources.

-This trend began in 2014, accelerated in 2016, and peaked in 2021 at 24.1%—the first breach of the enacted budget. After marginally declining to 21.94% in 2023, it rebounded to 22.4% in 2024. (Figure 5, middle image)

However, these figures only account for public spending. When factoring in private sector funds allocated to government projects, the true extent of government influence could easily exceed 30% of economic activity.

Of course, this doesn’t come for free. Government spending is funded through taxation, borrowing, and inflation. 

The more the government "invests," the fewer resources remain for private sector growth—the crowding out effect. 

This spending-driven economic model has distorted production and price structures, evident in: 

-The persistent "twin deficits"

-A second wave of inflation (Figure 5, lowest visual) 

III. 2024 Public Debt and Debt Servicing Costs Soared to Record Highs!


Figure 6

And surging public debt is just one of the consequences of crowding out the private sector. 

Public debt-to-GDP rose from 60.1% in 2023 to 60.7% in 2024—matching 2005 levels. (Figure 6, topmost diagram) 

More strikingly, debt service (interest + amortization) as a share of GDP surged from 6.6% in 2023 to 7.6% in 2024—its highest since 2011.

In fact, both debt-to-GDP and debt service-to-GDP in 2024 exceeded pre-Asian Crisis levels (1996-1997). 

Rising debt service costs imply that: 

1 Government spending will increasingly be diverted toward debt payments or rising debt service costs constrain fiscal flexibility, leaving fewer resources for essential public investments

2 Revenues will suffer diminishing returns as debt servicing costs spiral (Figure 6 middle window)

Growing risks of inflation (financial repression or the inflation tax)—as government responds with printing money

Mounting pressures for taxes to increase 

The principal enabler of this debt buildup has been the BSP’s prolonged easy money regime. (Figure 6, lowest chart)


Figure 7

The banking system has benefited from extraordinary BSP political support, including: Official rate and RRR cuts, liquidity injections, USDPHP cap and various subsidies and relief measures 

The industry has also functioned as a primary financier of government debt via net claims on central government or NCoCG), with banks acquiring government debt—reaching an all-time high in 2024. (Figure 7, topmost window)

IV. Public "Investments:" Unintended Market and Economic Distortions

This policy stance of propping up the banking system comes with unintended consequences. 

Bank liquidity has steadily declined—the cash-to-deposit ratio has weakened since 2013, mirroring the rising deficit-to-GDP ratio. (Figure 7, middle graph) 

Market distortions are also evident in declining stock market transactions and the PSEi 30’s prolonged bear market—despite interventions by the so-called "National Team." (Figure 7, lowest chart)

V. Conclusion: Current Fiscal Trajectory a Growing Risk to Financial and Economic Stability 

So, what’s the bottom line? 

Government "investment" is, in reality, consumption. 

It has fueled economic distortions, malinvestment, and ballooning public debt—ultimately crowding out private sector investment and jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. 

Political "free lunches" remain popular, not only among the public but also within the “intelligentsia” class or the intellectual cheerleaders of the government.

As we warned last December: 

"Any steep economic slowdown or recession would likely compel the government to increase spending, potentially driving the deficit to record levels or beyond. 

Unless deliberate efforts are made to curb spending growth, the government’s ongoing centralization of the economy will continue to escalate the risk of a fiscal blowout. 

Despite the mainstream's Pollyannaish narrative, the current trajectory presents significant challenges to long-term fiscal stability." (Prudent Investor 2024)

 ___

References: 

Prudent Investor, Debt-Financed Stimulus Forever? The Philippine Government’s Relentless Pursuit of "Upper Middle-Income" Status December 1, 2025

 

 

Sunday, February 16, 2025

Philippine Uni-Comm Bank Lending in 2024: Why Milestone Bank Credit Expansion and Systemic Leveraging Extrapolates to Mounting Systemic Fragility

 

Credit Expansion No Substitute for Capital. These opinions are passionately rejected by the union bosses and their followers among politicians and the self-styled intellectuals. The panacea they recommend to fight unemployment is credit expansion and inflation, euphemistically called an "easy money policy"—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

Philippine Uni-Comm Bank Lending in 2024: Why Milestone Bank Credit Expansion and Systemic Leveraging Extrapolates to Mounting Systemic Fragility

I. Challenging the BSP’s Easing Cycle Narrative

II. How BSP’s Credit Card Subsidies Materially Transformed Banking Business Model

III. Bank Lending to Real Estate Expanded in 2024, Even as Sector’s GDP Slumped to All-Time Lows!

IV. Credit Intensity Hits Second-Highest Levels!

V. Redux: The Debt-to-GDP Myth: A Background

VI. The GDP is Mostly About Debt: 2024 Public Debt-to-GDP Reaches Second Highest Level Since 2005!

VII. The Mirage of Labor Productivity

VIII. Conclusion 

Philippine Uni-Comm Bank Lending in 2024: Why Milestone Bank Credit Expansion and Systemic Leveraging Extrapolates to Mounting Systemic Fragility 

Universal-commercial bank lending performance in 2024 provides some critical insights. Combined with public debt and GDP, these reveal rising financial and economic fragilities. 

I. Challenging the BSP’s Easing Cycle Narrative 

Inquirer.net, February 13, 2025: "Bank lending posted its fastest growth in two years to cross the P13-trillion mark in December, as the start of the interest rate-cutting cycle and the typical surge in economic activities during the holiday season boosted both consumer and business demand for loans. Latest data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed that outstanding loans of big banks, excluding their lending with each other, expanded by 12.2 percent year-on-year to P13.14 trillion in the final month of 2024, beating the 11.1-percent growth in November. That was the briskest pace of credit growth since December 2022." 

While the BSP kept its policy rate unchanged this week, it has engaged in an 'easing cycle' following three rate cuts, a substantial RRR reduction, and possibly record government spending in 2024.


Figure 1

The notion that the BSP's easing cycle has driven bank lending growth is not supported by the data. While December saw the "briskest...since December 2022," the 13.54% growth rate in that earlier period occurred near the peak of a hiking cycle, suggesting that neither rate hikes nor cuts significantly influence growth rates.

Official rates peaked in October 2023, ten months after the December 2022 lending surge.

II. How BSP’s Credit Card Subsidies Materially Transformed Banking Business Model 

Unlike the BSP's 2018 interest rate cycle, where hikes coincided with falling bank lending rates, the current credit market anomalies likely reflect distortions caused by the BSP's pandemic-era policies. These included an interest rate cap on credit cards and various relief measures. (Figure 1, topmost image)

Specifically, the BSP's interest rate cap in September 2020 significantly reshaped or transformed the banking system's business model, demonstrably shifting focus from business to consumer loans. 

The consumer share of universal-commercial (UC) bank loans surged by 27.4% over four years, increasing from 9.5% in 2020 to 12.1% in 2024. (Figure 1, middle window)

The biggest segment growth came from credit cards and salary loans:

-Credit card loans grew at a 22.3% CAGR from 2020 to 2024, increasing their share from 4.6% to 7.1% of total loans. Since 2018, their share has more than doubled from 3.4% to 7.1%. (Figure 1, lowest graph)

-Salary loans grew at an 18.07% CAGR over the same period, expanding their share from 0.9% to 1.2%.


Figure 2

-December's month-on-month (MoM) growth of 3.38% marked the highest since January 2022's 3.98%. Contrary to the assumption of seasonality, the highest monthly growth rates have not been confined to the holiday season. (Figure 2, topmost diagram) 

This astronomical growth in consumer credit, further fueled by December's reaccelerationunderscores the substantial leveraging of household balance sheets.  

III. Bank Lending to Real Estate Expanded in 2024, Even as Sector’s GDP Slumped to All-Time Lows! 

In 2024, real estate (Php 222.72 billion) and credit cards (Php 212.1 billion) saw the largest nominal increases in lending. Electricity and Gas, and trade, followed. (Figure 2, middle chart) 

Supply-side real estate loans accounted for 20.5% of total UC bank loans at year-end. This figure excludes consumer mortgage borrowing. 

However, while real estate's GDP share hit an all-time low of 5.4% in 2024, bank exposure to the sector reached its second-highest level. In Q3, BSP data revealed that real estate prices had entered deflationary territory. (Figure 2, lowest pane) 

The continued decline in the sector's GDP raises mounting risks for banks

Rising real estate loan growth does not necessarily indicate expansion but rather refinancing efforts or liquidity injections to prevent a surge in delinquencies and non-performing loans.


Figure 3

Moreover, key sectors benefiting from BSP’s rate policies—construction, trade, finance, and real estate—continue to represent a significant share of UC bank portfolios, which share of the GDP has also been rising, posing as systemic risk concerns. (Figure 3, topmost chart) 

IV. Credit Intensity Hits Second-Highest Levels!

A broader perspective reveals more concerning trends.

UC total bank loans grew by 10.8% year-on-year, from Php 11.392 trillion in 2023 to Php 12.81 trillion in 2024 (a net increase of Php 1.42 trillion). In comparison, nominal GDP grew by 8.7%, from Php 24.32 trillion to Php 26.44 trillion (a net increase of Php 2.12 trillion).

This gives a 'credit intensity' of Php 0.67—the amount of bank lending needed to generate one peso of GDP—the highest since 2019. This means UC bank lending has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, while GDP hasn't. 

Factoring in public debt (excluding guarantees), 2024 saw a sharp rise in credit dependency. Credit intensity from systemic debt (public debt + bank lending, excluding capital markets and shadow banking) reached its second-highest level ever, trailing only the peak of 2021. 

It now takes Php 1.35 of debt to generate one peso of GDP, highlighting diminishing returns of a debt-driven economy. (Figure 3, middle image) 

The mainstream thinks debt is a free lunch! 

V. Redux: The Debt-to-GDP Myth: A Background

The BSP’s trickle-down policies operate under an architectural framework called "inflation targeting."

Though its stated goal is to 'promote price stability conducive to balanced and sustainable growth of the economy,' it assumes that inflation can be contained or that the inflation genie can be kept under control.

Its easy money regime has been designed as an invisible tax or a form of financial repression—primarily to fund political boondoggles—by unleashing "animal spirits" through the stimulation of "aggregate demand" or GDP. At the same time, GDP growth is expected to increase tax collections. 

The fundamental problem is that the BSP has no control over the distribution of credit expansion within the economy. 

As it happened, while the "liberalized" consumer-related sectors were the primary beneficiaries, distortions accumulated—principally as the elites took advantage of cheap credit to pursue "build-it-and-they-will-come" projects

The result was the consolidation of firms within industries and the buildup of concentration risk. Soon, the cheap money landscape fueled the government’s appetite for greater control over the economy through deficit spending

Thus, the "debt-to-GDP" metric became the primary justification for expanding government spending and increasing economic centralization.

This race toward centralization through deficit spending intensified alongside the elite’s "build-it-and-they-will-come" projects during the pandemic.

VI. The GDP is Mostly About Debt: 2024 Public Debt-to-GDP Reaches Second Highest Level Since 2005!

Once again, the consensus has a fetish for interpreting debt-to-GDP as if it were an isolated or standalone factor. It isn’t.

In the recent past, they cited falling debt-to-GDP as a positive indicator. However, let’s clarify: since the economy is interconnected—one dynamic entwined with another, operating within a lattice of interrelated nodes—such a simplistic view is misleading.

When the BSP forced down rates to reinforce its "trickle-down" policies, the consequences extended beyond public spending, affecting overall credit conditions. This policy catalyzed a boom-bust cycle. 

As such, when the public debt-to-GDP declined between 2009 and 2019, it was primarily because bank credit-to-GDP filled most of the gap. 

The proof of the pudding is in the eating: systemic leverage-to-GDP remained range-bound throughout that decadeDebt was merely transferred or juggled from the public to the private sector. 

GDP growth, in large part, was debt-driven.

Yet, the pandemic-era bailout fueled a surge in both public debt-to-GDP and bank credit-to-GDP. Public debt-to-GDP (excluding guarantees) reached 60.72%—its second-highest level after 2022—following the BSP’s COVID-era bailout, which also marked the highest rate since 2005. 

It’s worth remembering that Thailand—the epicenter of the 1997-98 Asian Crisis—had the lowest debt-to-GDP at the time. (Figure 3, lowest table) 

More importantly, public debt has anchored government spending, which has played a crucial role in shaping Philippine GDP since 2016.

V. Systemic Leverage Soars to All-Time Highs! 


Figure 4

On a per capita basis, 2024 debt reached historic highs, increasing its share of per capita GDP (both in nominal and real terms). (Figure 4, topmost visual)

Simply put, rising debt levels have been eroding whatever residual productivity gains are left from the GDP. 

Alternatively, this serves as further proof that GDP is increasingly driven by debt at the expense of productivity. 

It also implies that the deepening exposure of output to credit is highlighting its mounting credit risk profile. 

In 2024, UC bank loans-to-GDP hit 48.5%, the second-highest since 2020 (49.7%), indicating crisis lending via easy money policies. 

Systemic leverage reached a record 109.2% of GDP, surpassing 2022 ATH. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

Despite a Q4 2024 liquidity spike (M3), consumers struggled; household GDP slowed, suggesting households are absorbing increasing leverage while enduring the erosion of purchasing power in the face of inflation. (Figure 4, lowest diagram)


Figure 5

Another point: The growth rate of systemic leverage has shown a strong correlation with the CPI since 2013. However, it appears to have deviated, as rising systemic leverage has yet to result in an accompanying increase in the CPI. Will this correlation hold? (Figure 5, topmost image) 

VI BSP’s ‘Trickle-Down Policies’ Steered a Credit Card and Salary Loans Boom (and coming Bust)

There is more to consider. The banking model's transformation toward consumers didn’t happen overnight; it was the result of cumulative easy money policies that intensified during the pandemic. 

Our central premise: while bank expansion fueled inflation, the pandemic-induced recession—marked by income loss—and, most notably, the BSP’s easy money emergency response (including historic interest rate and RRR cuts, various relief measures such as credit card subsidies, the USDPHP cap, and the unprecedented Php 2.3 billion BSP injections) sparked a consumer credit boom, which subsequently triggered the second wave of this inflation cycle. 

Though the BSP’s intent may have been to compensate for consumers' income losses in order to stabilize or protect the banking system, the economic reopening further stirred up consumers’ appetite for credit, fueling demand amid a recovering, fractured, and impaired supply chain. 

Debt-financed government spending also contributed to the surge in aggregate demand. Together, these factors spurred a rise in "too much money chasing too few goods" inflation. 

The inflation genie was unleashed—yet it was conveniently blamed by everyone on the "supply side." The underlying premise of the echo chamber was that the demand-supply curve had been broken!  Yet, they avoided addressing the question: How could a general price increase occur if the money supply remained stable? 

Ironically, the BSP calibrated its response to the inflation cycle by adjusting interest rates in line with its own interest rate cycle! In other words, they blamed supply-side issues while focusing their policies on demand. Remarkable! 

The BSP’s UC bank credit card and salary loan data provide evidence for all of this (Figure 5 middle and lowest graphs): the escalating buildup of household balance sheets in response to the loss of purchasing power, the CPI cycle, and the BSP and National Government’s free money policies.


Figure 6

It’s also no surprise that the oscillation of UC bank loan growth has mirrored fluctuations in the PSEi 30. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

Unfortunately, the law of diminishing returns has plagued the massive growth of consumer credit, leading to its divergence from consumer spending and PSEi 30 flows

As an aside, the upward spiral in cash in circulation last December and Q4 —reflecting both liquidity injections for the real estate industry and pre-mid-term election spending—likely points to higher inflation and the further erosion of consumer spending power. (Figure 6, middle chart) 

Is it any wonder that self-reported poverty ratings and hunger have surged to record highs? 

Does the path to 'middle-income status' for an economy translate into a population drowning in debt? 

VII. The Mirage of Labor Productivity

Businessworld, February 10, 2025: The country’s labor productivity — as measured by gross domestic product per person employed — grew by 4.5% year on year to P456,342 in 2024. This was faster than the 2.7% a year earlier and the fastest in seven years or since the 8.7% in 2017. (Figure 6, lowest image)

While this suggests improving efficiency, it fails to account for GDP’s deepening dependence on credit expansion. When growth is primarily debt-financed, productivity gains become illusory

Credit isn’t neutral. Its removal would cause the 'debt-driven GDP-labor productivity' 'castle in the sand' to crumble 

VIII. Conclusion  

The 2024 UC bank lending data reveals critical economic trends: 

>A structural shift in the banking business model, driven by the BSP’s inflation-targeting and pandemic rescue policies. 

>Mounting concentration risks due to industry consolidations and growing sector fragility.

>Public debt-to-GDP reaching its second-highest level since 2005, while systemic leverage has hit an all-time high.

Diminishing returns from the increasing dependence on systemic credit—bank expansion and public debt—highlighting the risks of financial and economic vulnerabilities and instability.

The Philippine political economy operates with a very thin or narrow margin for error.

In an upcoming issue, we are likely to address the banking system's 2024 income statement and balance sheets.