Showing posts with label Philippine banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine banks. Show all posts

Sunday, August 03, 2025

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock


In the final analysis, it’s just central banks printing money, reducing its value and causing inflation as they support dishonest governments that refuse to be fiscally responsible and continually run massive deficits. Such policies flow from the “elite’s” greed and their insatiable thirst for power, benefiting themselves at the expense of the middle class and working poor… When a society loses its moral foundation, it’s only a matter of time before the economy and currency deteriorate and the wealth gaps between the rich and poor increase dramatically—Jonathan Wellum  

In this issue

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock 

I. A Delayed Reckoning: Anatomy of a Fiscal Shock

1. Easy Money–Financed Free Lunch Politics

2. The Political Cult of Spending-Led Ideology: Trickle-Down by Government Fiat

3. Chronic Policy Diagnostic Blindness

4. Econometric Myopia: Forecasting the Past

5. Behavioral Fragility: The Psychology of Denial

II. Countdown to Fiscal Shock: The Hidden Story of June’s Blowout

III. Q2 Slowdown, Q1 Surge: Anatomy of the Half-Year Blowout—From Past Binge to Present Reckoning

IV. Technocratic Overreach, Authorized Expenditures, Congressional Irrelevance

V. Deficit Forecasting: Averaging Toward a Crisis

VI. Financing Strain and the Debt-Debt Servicing Spiral

VII. Tax Dragnet, CMEPA’s Forced Financial Rotation: The Economic Asphyxiation Tightens

VIII. Bank’s Fiscal Complicity, Liquidity Strains, Treasury Market’s Mutiny

IX. Mounting USDPHP Exchange Rate Tension

X. Conclusion: The Structural Fragility of Deficit Philosophy 

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock 

When deficits become destiny: the fiscal countdown accelerates—a convergence of easy money and political overreach

I. A Delayed Reckoning: Anatomy of a Fiscal Shock 

A fiscal shock rarely emerges from a single misstep. It crystallizes from compound misalignments across policy, ideology, and behavior. It’s the law of unintended consequences—unfolding in real time. Where economic orthodoxy meets political convenience, stability is hollowed out. And just as critically, it’s a delayed consequence of systemic denial. 

Here are the five pillars of this reckoning: 

1. Easy Money–Financed Free Lunch Politics 

A regime of entitlement—fueled by populist spending and post-pandemic ultra-low rates—fostered a seductive illusion: 

Deficits don’t matter. Debt is painless. 

Years of stimulus, subsidies, and politically popular transfers hardened into fiscal habit— habits that now resist restraint, and are rooted in beliefs that are difficult to dismantle. 

2. The Political Cult of Spending-Led Ideology: Trickle-Down by Government Fiat 

At the heart of the Philippine development model lies a flawed political-economic ideology: that elite consumption and state expenditure will "trickle down" to the broader economy. 

Massive infrastructure programs, defense outlays, and subsidy-heavy welfare budgets may deliver short-term optics—but they also crowd out private investment, misallocate capital, and accelerate savings erosion. 

The result: an economy that becomes top-heavy, brittle, and structurally vulnerable. 

This heavy-handed, statist-interventionist, anti-market bias is what Ludwig von Mises called "statolatry"—the worship of the state. 

3. Chronic Policy Diagnostic Blindness 

In the social democratic playbook, populist tools dominate. And with them comes a dangerous neglect of structural realities:

  • Crowding out is ignored
  • Balance sheet mismatches are waved off
  • Price distortions go unexamined
  • Resource misallocations are dismissed
  • Economic trade-offs are neglected 

Intervention becomes the default—not the diagnosis. The result? Mispriced assets, distorted capital structures, and risk narratives untethered from fundamentals. 

The same statolatry—elevating state action above market signals—undergirds this blindness. It promotes interventionist reflexes at the expense of incentive clarity and institutional coherence. 

Fragility escalates—masked by the optics of populist-driven fiscal theatrics. 

4. Econometric Myopia: Forecasting the Past 

The establishment clings to econometric models built on frangible assumptions—historical baselines, linear extrapolation, and trend mimicry. These tools overlook what matters most: 

  • Nonlinear disruption
  • Inflection points
  • Complex feedback loops
  • Tail risks and structural breaks 

With ZERO margin for error, fragility festers beneath the surface. 

That fragility was laid bare by a maelstrom of paradigm shifts: 

  • The pandemic rupture
  • Deglobalization and trade fragmentation
  • Raging asset bubbles
  • Debt overload
  • Mountains of malinvestments
  • Hot wars and geopolitical shockwaves
  • Inflation surges
  • Financial weaponization 

This isn’t noise—it’s a new architecture of global and domestic uncertainties. And econometric orthodoxy isn’t equipped to model it. 

5. Behavioral Fragility: The Psychology of Denial 

Heuristics shape policy—and not in ways that reward foresight. Beyond populist signaling and econometric hindsight, cognitive distortions rule: 

  • Recency bias
  • Rear-view heuristics
  • Political denialism masked as institutional confidence 

Years of perceived “resilience” dulled vigilance: 

  • Every deficit was shrugged off
  • Every peso slide deemed temporary
  • Every fiscal blowout “absorbed” by the system 

This cultivated an expectation: past stability ensures future resilience. It doesn’t. That assumption—embedded deep within policy reflexes—has left institutions blind to volatility and ill-equipped for disruptions and rupture. 

II. Countdown to Fiscal Shock: The Hidden Story of June’s Blowout


Figure 1

In May, we warned that if June 2025's deficit merely hits its four-year average of Php 200 billion, the six-month budget gap would surge to Php 723.9 billion—surpassing the pandemic-era record of Php 716.07 billion. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Inquirer.net, July 25, 2025: The Marcos administration exceeded its budget deficit limit in the first half of 2025 after narrowly missing both its spending and revenue targets. This happened amid a gradual fiscal consolidation program. Latest data from the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) showed the government logged a budget gap of P765.5 billion in the first six months, which it needed to plug with borrowings. This was 24.69 percent bigger compared with a year ago. (italics added) 

Then came the payload: Php 241.6 billion in fresh red ink last June!   

The government’s first-half deficit reached Php 765.5 billion—24.69% higher than last year and larger than even our most aggressive baseline x.com forecast (Php 745.18–Php 756.53 billion). (Figure 1, table)


Figure 2 

Bullseye! Our projections weren't just close—they were surgical. And the final blowout went further still. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

Curiously underreported, June’s deficit marked an all-time high, driven by expenditure growth of 8.5% outstripping revenue growth of 3.5%. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

  • BIR Collections: Up 16.24% YoY—a strong bounce from 10.71% in May and 4.71% in June 2024.
  • BoC Collections: Recovered 3.23% YoY, compared to –6.94% in May and 0.67% in June 2024.
  • Non-Tax Revenues: Plunged 43.25% YoY—from 40.93% in May and 81.7% in June 2024. 

Behind the aggregate improvement lies deeper fragility: June’s revenue outperformance was narrow, uneven, and ultimately insufficient to contain the programmed spending expansion—a predictable artifact of the conventional socio-democratic ochlocratic political model. 

Populist instincts override structural diagnostics. And the fiscal narrative remains hostage to crowd-pleasing interventionism rather than incentive discipline or institutional coherence.

III. Q2 Slowdown, Q1 Surge: Anatomy of the Half-Year Blowout—From Past Binge to Present Reckoning 

Despite June's record deficit, Q2 posted just Php 319.5 billion, the second slowest since 2020. That means the bulk of the six-month deficit—Php 446.03 billion—was frontloaded in Q1. 

Even then, authorities revised March spending down by Php 32.784 billion, artificially narrowing the Q1 deficit. Adjustments may mask the underlying magnitude but not the fiscal trajectory. 

This six-month outcome validates what we’ve long emphasized: programmed spending vs. variable revenues is no longer an assumption—it’s a structural vulnerability, a primary source of instability 

Importantly, this wasn’t an emergency stimulus. Unlike 2021, there’s been no recession nor one in the immediate horizon—per consensus. 

Yet the deficit beat that year’s record—despite BSP’s historic easing:

  • Policy rate cuts
  • Reserve requirement reduction
  • USDPHP cap
  • Liquidity injections
  • Deposit insurance expansion 

Behind the optics: a quiet financial bailout, not of households or industries, but of the banking system. 

IV. Technocratic Overreach, Authorized Expenditures, Congressional Irrelevance 

As we earlier noted: the government continues to use linear extrapolation in a complex environment. Even with declared economic slowdown, the BIR posted 14.11% growth, buoyed by May–June outperformance. (Figure 2, lowest image) 

But has "benchmark-ism" inflated performance claims? Have authorities padded the numerator (tax data) to rationalize a fragile denominator (spending data)?


Figure 3

Non-tax revenue was the Achilles’ heel—its 2024 spike became the baseline for 2025’s enacted spending binge. The result: forecast miscalibration leading directly to fiscal shock. Beyond mere overconfidence, it was technocratic hubris that helped trigger today’s blowout. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

Again, an underperforming economy—whether a below-target GDP, sharp slowdown, or even recession—would only reinforce this SPEND-and-RESCUE dynamic, repackaged and sold as stimulus. 

Meanwhile, authorized expenditures: Php 3.026 trillion. Remaining balance: Php 3.3 trillion, implying a floor monthly average of Php 550.05 billion. 

Budgets have been breached 6 years in a row—highlighting a redistribution of budgetary power from Congress to the Executive. 

Whether through creative reinterpretation or technical loopholes, these breaches signal a quiet transfer of fiscal power from Congress to the Executive. 

V. Deficit Forecasting: Averaging Toward a Crisis 

Looking at pandemic-era averages:

  • Q3 deficits averaged Php 374 billion
    • Q3 2024 hit Php 356.32 billion (–5.7% below average)
  • Q4 averaged Php 537.9 billion Q4 is typically the largest—as government drops all remaining balance and more
    • Q4 2024 deficit: Php 536.13 billion (–0.4% deviation)
  • 2H Average: Php 911.6 billion
    • 2H 2024: Php 892.45 billion (–2.6% vs trend) 

If 2025 follows this pattern, the full-year deficit could hit Php 1.677 trillion—Php 7 billion above prior records. 

But averages conceal real-world volatility, political discretion, and data manipulation—can skew results. 

Once again, it bears emphasizing: all this unfolded as the BSP eased aggressively—through rate and RRR cuts, doubled deposit insurance, capped USDPHP volatility, and expanded credit (mostly consumer-focused). 

Despite the stimulus, vulnerabilities not only persist—they’re escalating. 

If so, the DBCC's revised deficit-to-GDP target of 5.5% would be breached, necessitating another substantial upward adjustment. (Figure 3, middle table) 

Authorities would be mistaken to treat this as mere statistical noise; its implications extend far beyond the ledger into the real economy

VI. Financing Strain and the Debt-Debt Servicing Spiral 

Treasury financing soared 86.2%, from Php 665 billion to Php 1.238 trillion in H1 2025. (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

Even with record high cumulative cash reserves of Php 1.09 trillion, June alone posted a residual cash deficit of Php 90.09 billion—evidence that surplus buffers are already depleted.


Figure 4
 

As such, in June, public debt spiked Php 1.783 trillion YoY (+11.52%) or Php 348 billion (+2.06%) MoM to reach a historic Php 17.27 trillion! (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

Critically, this growth has outpaced the spending curve, suggesting potential deficit understatement or an acceleration of off-book liabilities. (Figure 4, middle image) 

Despite this, external debt share rebounded in June—a pivot back to foreign financing amid domestic constraints. (Figure 4, lowest graph)


Figure 5

Meanwhile, total debt servicing fell 40.12% YoY due to a 61% plunge in amortizations, even though interest payments hit a record. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

Why?

Likely causes:

  • Scheduling choices
  • Prepayments in 2024
  • Political aversion to public backlash 

But the record and growing deficit ensures that borrowing—and debt servicing—will keep RISING. This won’t be deferred—it will amplify. 

As we warned last May

  • More debt more servicing less for everything else.
  • Crowding out hits both public and private spending.
  • Revenue gains won’t keep up with servicing.
  • Inflation and peso depreciation risks climb.
  • Higher taxes are on the horizon 

VII. Tax Dragnet, CMEPA’s Forced Financial Rotation: The Economic Asphyxiation Tightens 

Debt-to-GDP hit 62%, triggering a quiet revision: MalacaƱang raised the ceiling to 70%. 

To accommodate this, authorities imposed a hefty tax on interest income via the Capital Markets Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA), engineering a forced rotation out of long-dated fixed income into leverage-fueled speculation and spending— (see previous discussions) 

This fiscal extraction dragnet is poised to widen—ensnaring more of the economy and constricting what little fiscal breathing room remains. 

VIII. Bank’s Fiscal Complicity, Liquidity Strains, Treasury Market’s Mutiny 

Banks continue to stockpile government securities through net claims on the central government (NCoCG). (Figure 5, middle image) 

Yet despite BSP’s easing, treasury yields barely moved—fueling further Held-to-Maturity (HTM) hoarding and deepening the industry's liquidity drain. 

At end of July, despite dovish guidance: (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

  • Yields across the curve stayed above ONRRP, muting or blunting transmission
  • Curve flattened unevenly: front and long ends softened, belly firmed—signaling hedging against medium-term risk
  • T-bill rates remained elevated signaling inflation fears and short-term funding stress 

Despite rate cuts, the treasury market refused to follow. Monetary policy faces bond mutineers. 

IX. Mounting USDPHP Exchange Rate Tension


Figure 6 

Following the June fiscal report, the USDPHP surged 1.29% on July 31, wiping out prior losses to post a modest 0.52% year-to-date return. 

With wider deficits on deck, foreign borrowing becomes more attractive—and a weaker dollar, further incentivized by the BSP’s soft peg, adds fuel to that pivot. But beneath the surface, this dynamic strain long-term currency stability. 

While global dollar softness might offset domestic fragilities, the USDPHP’s recent breakout hints at further testing—possibly probing the BSP’s 59-Maginot line, a psychological and tactical policy threshold. (Figure 6 upper chart) 

Should that line give, external financing costs and FX volatility could surge, exposing cracks in the peg architecture. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

X. Conclusion: The Structural Fragility of Deficit Philosophy

The Php 17.27 trillion debt—and growing—isn’t the cost of failure. It’s the price of consensus under a soft-focus ochlocratic social democracy. 

These systems don’t just elect leaders—they ratify an ethos: that deficit-fueled expansion is not only moral but inevitable. Redistribution becomes ritual. The annual SONA pipelines new spending schemes, boosting short-term political capital—but the structural anchors are threadbare. 

Compassion without discipline sedates policy. Voters misread rhetoric as reform, empathy as capability, largesse as virtue, and control as stewardship. Time preferences spiral, gravitating toward the instant dopamine hit of political dispensation. 

Alas—the tragedy is not merely fiscal. It’s intergenerational erosion. Each electoral cycle mortgages future agency, compounding fragility over time. 

What’s swelling isn’t just debt. It’s a philosophical incoherence—subsidizing dysfunction and labeling it 'development.’ 

When such convictions are deeply embedded, a disorderly reckoning is inevitable. 

____

References 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock? Substack July 7, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Is the Philippines on the Brink of a 2025 Fiscal Shock? Substack June 8, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Fiscal Performance in Q1 2025: Record Deficit Amid Centralizing Power, Substack May 4, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design, Substack, July 20, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback, Substack, July 27, 2025

Monday, July 21, 2025

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble


All is not hopeless. Markets are turbulent, deceptive, prone to bubbles, infested by false trends. It may well be that you cannot forecast prices. But evaluating risk is another matter entirely—Benoit Mandlebrot 

In this short issue

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble

I. The Philippine Gaming Bubble Is Bursting in Real Time

II. Implications: Sucked into a Cesspool of Losses

III. The Buyback Mirage

IV. The Deeper Malaise: A Speculative Society

V. Financial and Economic Policies as Catalysts; CMEPA: A Gamified Economy in the Making

VI. Regulators to the Rescue?

VII. The Damocles Sword Overhead: San Miguel’s Plummeting Share Prices

VIII. Conclusion: A System Engineered for Bubble Blowing 

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble 

Fiscal fragility and easy money laid the groundwork for a drift to a casino economy; tax distortion threatens to ignite the speculative tinder 

For continuity, this post follows my earlier piece: "The Ghost of BW Resources: The Bursting of the Philippine Gaming Stock Bubble" 

I. The Philippine Gaming Bubble Is Bursting in Real Time 

Trading activity now reveals raw emotion driving wild pendulum swings. 

As summarized:


Figure 1 

DigiPlus Interactive Corp. [PSE: PLUS] surged 15.7% on Friday, with turnover hitting Php 2.33 billion—an all-time high—accounting for 31.75% of mainboard volume! This marks the second-highest volume share after the July 4th collapse of 23.9%, when PLUS’s share skyrocketed to 33.33%. Friday’s rally mirrored the July 7th oversold recoil of +14.6%, when volume share hit 30.2%, the third highest on record. (Figure 1) 

This incredible volatility, backed by stunning trading volumes, shows that the bubble's deflation is still very much underway. 

II. Implications: Sucked into a Cesspool of Losses 

PLUS’s massive footprint in PSE volume underscores how deeply—both retail and institutional players—are entangled in its downside volatility vortex—sucked into a cesspool of losses, where investors have morphed into gamblers.


Figure 2

Many who suffered losses are pouring in more—anteing up or doubling down on losing positions to lower their average entry, hoping that a recovery might redeem them or restore their capital. This Martingale approach—catching a falling knife with both hands—only heightens the risk of ruin. (Figure 2, upper image)

Moreover, nursing drawdowns, many retail accounts will be sidelined, deactivated, or rendered inactive. 

Worse, we don’t know how much of this frenzy is credit-fueled or margin-driven. 

Yet, the biggest question: how exposed are financial institutions—and how compromised? 

III. The Buyback Mirage 

Bulls have pinned hopes on a Php 6 billion buyback. 

But as shown above, it’s a smidgen of total trade—worth less than this week’s volume. 

Down by 40.2%, PLUS’s weekly turnover hit Php 6.4 billion, or 19.3% of mainboard volume—an all-time high. 

Yet, the buyback is not capital formation—it’s capital consumption. Its intent is to support a price bubble, an unsustainable dynamic. Instead of being channeled into productive activity, capital is consumed in positional losses, resulting in both income shortfalls and balance sheet erosion. 

Other gaming issues, Bloomberry Resorts Corporation [PSE: BLOOM] and Philweb [PSE: WEB], likewise plummeted 6.32% and 17.4% week on week, respectively, reinforcing their recent price declines. (Figure 2, lower graph) 

IV. The Deeper Malaise: A Speculative Society 

This episode reveals just how desperate the market has become for a return to the bull days of the PSE. Chasing yields at any cost has become the new normal. 

But the gaming bubble is a symptom, not the disease. 

The gambling boom has gripped not only ordinary people reeling from inflation, but has also migrated into the PSE itself. 

The PLUS bubble has become a second front for digital gamblers. Or put differently, casino-style gambling has migrated to the stock market. 

Media and gaming apologists have deflected focus to the politics of a potential gambling ban. 

Yet given the sanctimonious cries of social democratic politicians who campaign to ban everything unpopular—should regulators now ban the stock market, too? 

Remember: drugs were the political obsession of the last administration. Now, gambling is the new public enemy. 

The war on POGOs has now morphed into a broader war on gambling. But do prohibitionists really think they can control human behavior through force alone? Will they succeed in imposing virtue—or will they help blow up the fiscal position (already at risk of hitting another record deficit) and magnify systemic corruption? 

Yet, haven’t you noticed? A political trend with every new administration is the use of its coercive political machinery to wage war against an unpopular minority—portrayed as evil. From drugs, to POGOs, to speculative finance—public enemies are manufactured, and the cycle repeats. 

These symptoms are not new.


Figure 3

The unraveling of the 1999 BW Resources bubble was followed by another boom-bust episode with the 2000 SSO-Philweb merger. These misallocations ultimately dragged the Phisix (now PSEi 30) to its knees by 2002. (Figure 3 upper diagram) 

Are we seeing echoes of that dynamic now? 

V. Financial and Economic Policies as Catalysts; CMEPA: A Gamified Economy in the Making 

Is this what the government had in mind with the Capital Market Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA)—a gamified economy modeled after PLUS? 

Read our earlier post on CMEPA "The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design" 

The claim that CMEPA is a tax reform to “benefit stocks” via reducing the stock transaction tax (STT) is superficial at best—a textbook case of the fallacy of division. 

In truth, CMEPA is a reprogramming of the public’s incentive structure—for households, corporations, and even government—towards short-termism, speculation, and consumption. 

Its standardized 20% tax on net income punishes savers, forcing them to seek speculative outlets—exactly what STT “reforms” aim to do. 

Add to this the BSP’s easy money and the crowding-out effects of deficit spending, and you have a perfect recipe for a bubble economy—the PLUS economy. 

Savings and borrowed money alike are being diverted into asset punts—not just in stocks, but in property as well, enabled by the BSP’s distorted, inflated Property Price Index. 

As part of the grand policy of inducing speculative juices—or animal spirits—in the real estate sector, the Social Security System (SSS) reportedly acquired Php 500 million worth of shares in Century Properties Group [PSE: CPG] via a special block sale. The purchase, equivalent to a 6.39% stake, was executed at a discount to market price. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

Since hitting its trough in Q2 2024, CPG’s share prices have more than doubled! 

This move not only signals institutional participation in the speculative drift but also raises questions about how public funds are being deployed to stimulate asset inflation. 

When pension reserves chase yield in property equities—backed by inflated indices and easy liquidity—it reinforces the very fragility the system claims to hedge against. 

VI. Regulators to the Rescue? 

Interestingly, regulators floated the idea of mandatory listings for online gambling firms—in the name of “transparency.” Was this a disguised attempt to rescue PLUS’s hissing bubble? 

Has the PSE been so starved of IPOs that it enlisted the help of regulators to bankroll listings—using mandates and the CMEPA’s policy nudges?


Figure 4

As of Q1 2025, the PSE has posted only one IPO (Topline Business Development, PSE: TOP) against two delistings (voluntary/involuntary)—Philab (DNA) and Keppel Philippines (KPH-KPHB). (Figure 4, upper visual) 

This proposed mandate reveals how authorities increasingly perceive the value of the stock market: a dopamine-laced feedback loop for short-term thrills or a market that hopes to accomplish "something for nothing" or share price inflation built on momentum and easy money. The very definition of a bubble. 

VII. The Damocles Sword Overhead: San Miguel’s Plummeting Share Prices 

As political and market attention fixates on gaming, another looming threat quietly unravels—the Damocles Sword hanging over the markets and the economy: San Miguel Corporation—a Php 1.5 TRILLION+ debt colossus—continues to see its share prices erode as liabilities climb—another potential catalyst for broader market instability. (Figure 4, lower window) 

VIII. Conclusion: A System Engineered for Bubble Blowing 

DigiPlus may be the flashpoint, but the broader market pathology runs far deeper. This is no rogue episode—it is the byproduct of a system engineered to reward velocity over value, status over functionality, dopamine over discipline. 

The convergence of fiscal fragility, monetary excess, and misaligned incentives has transformed the capital market into a gamified arena—one that pulls in both institutions and households into a void of unproductivity and capital consumption. 

CMEPA doesn’t fix this system— it formalizes its dysfunction. It deepens its institutionalization. 

The danger isn’t just the collapse of PLUS. It’s the normalization of a casino economy.  


Sunday, June 22, 2025

Behind the Retail Surge: Dissecting the PSE’s 2024 Investor Profile Amid Heightened Volatility and Economic Strain

  

The world has never been so awash in speculative finance, ensuring aberrant market behavior. Never has the global leveraged speculating community been as colossal and powerful. Egregious Treasury “basis trade” leveraging drives unprecedented overall hedge fund leverage. Household (loving dip buying) market participation is unparalleled, with the proliferation of online accounts, options trading, and herd-like speculation creating extraordinary market-moving power—Doug Noland 

In this issue

Behind the Retail Surge: Dissecting the PSE’s 2024 Investor Profile Amid Heightened Volatility and Economic Strain

I. Introduction: A Record-Breaking Year for Retail Accounts

II. The Retail Activity Paradox; The Real Drivers Behind the Surge: A PSEi 30 Bull Market?

III. Institutional Dominance, Trading Concentration and Market Manipulation

IV. Concentration Risks: National Team, Other Financial Corporations and Total Financial Resources

V. 2024’s Economic Operating Conditions, Financial Distress and Unintended Consequences

VI. The Savings Illusion and the Generational Shifts: Herding Among Youth, Decline Among Seniors

VII. The Digital Divide in Brokerage: Traditional Brokers Under Pressure

VIII. Conclusion: A Mirage of Growth 

Behind the Retail Surge: Dissecting the PSE’s 2024 Investor Profile Amid Heightened Volatility and Economic Strain 

What’s really driving the surge in Philippine retail investors? A closer look reveals economic desperation, distortion, and deepening divides beneath the surface of stock market optimism 

I. Introduction: A Record-Breaking Year for Retail Accounts 

The PSE reported on June 9, 2025: "The number of stock market accounts in the Philippine Stock Exchange reached 2.86 million in 2024, up by 50.1 percent from 1.91 million in 2023. This was fueled by a 62.0 percent surge in online accounts to 2.47 million from 1.53 million. “This 50 percent jump in number of accounts is the highest we have recorded since we started tracking the investor count and profile in 2008. This substantial growth was made possible by the enabling of digital platforms to connect to PSE”s trading engine, thereby facilitating the trading by investors in the market. PSE is committed to being true to its advocacy of promoting financial inclusion,” said PSE President and CEO Ramon S. Monzon. “More than the numbers, what is important is that retail investors are equipped with investment know-how to avoid investing pitfalls. We address this need for investor education through our various investing literacy initiatives. We also actively work with trading participants and government and private entities to spread the word about personal finance and stock market investing,” Mr. Monzon added." (bold added)


Figure 1

The PSE seems exhilarated by this unprecedented surge. Yet beneath the celebratory tone lies a paradox: they appear unsure why this spike occurred. Their attribution to the "enabling of digital platforms" seems insufficient, especially since such infrastructure has been in place since 2013. (Figure 1, topmost graph) 

This inability to explain the surge becomes more apparent when considering their bewilderment over the depressed number of active accounts. 

As the PSE acknowledged: "While growth in retail accounts has been remarkable, the real challenge is getting retail investors to participate more actively in our market as they only contribute 16 percent to total value turnover. We are optimistic that the upcoming reduction in stock transaction tax (STT) to 0.1 percent from 0.6 percent, along with the various investor education programs and upcoming pipeline of products of the Exchange, will encourage greater investor activity for the remainder of 2025," Mr. Monzon noted. (bold added) 

The low contribution of retail investors to market turnover—underscores the PSE’s challenge: Understanding the essence and the development of the capital markets in line with economic freedom, rather than using it as a covert political redistribution, which drives malinvestments and inequality.

II. The Retail Activity Paradox; The Real Drivers Behind the Surge: A PSEi 30 Bull Market?

Three critical questions emerge from this phenomenon: 

One, is the PSE experiencing a bull market, fueling frenzied retail participation? 

Two, could the torrent of enrollment reflect symptoms of economic desperation—people seeking to plug income gaps amid stagnant living standards?  Or, is this a case of instant gratification through asset speculation? 

Three, has a sudden boom in savings driven retail investors into stocks? 

"Is the PSE experiencing a bull market driving frenzied retail participation?" 

With the PSEi 30 returning just 1.22% in 2024, the surge in new participants seems disconnected from its performance. (Figure 1, middle window) 

However, breaking down this performance by quarters reveals important insights. 

While Q1 2024's 7.03% increase may have been a contributing factor, Q3's phenomenal 13.4% returns likely lured the bulk of these newcomers into stocks. (Figure 1, lowest chart) 

Of course, they were also likely swayed by the constant "propagandizing" or the bombardment by media and establishment "talking heads" of a "return of a bull market!" 

Even more, one critical aspect highlighted by the PSE deserves attention: retail investors "contribute 16 percent to total value turnover." This means retail trades represent a significant minority in the PSE’s turnover.


Figure 2

According to PSE infographics, retail active accounts represented 23.1% of total accounts and 24.5% of online accounts, totaling 660,714 retail accounts. The massive influx of new participants helped boost the active account ratio from an all-time low of 17.5% in 2023 to 23.1% in 2024. (Figure 2, topmost and middle images) 

Our underlying assumption is that the data reflects the ratio of active to total accounts, rather than the proportion of active accounts relative to total market turnover. 

As further proof of the PSE's lackadaisical activities, gross volume turnover rose by just 1.37% in 2024—the second lowest peso level since at least 2014. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

III. Institutional Dominance, Trading Concentration and Market Manipulation


Figure 3 

This raises a striking question about the remaining 84% share of total turnover. The answer lies with institutional investors—both local and foreign. Foreign money accounted for 48.8% of gross turnover, with foreigners selling local equities worth Php 25.253 billion in 2024. (Figure 3, topmost chart) 

Foreign investors represented 36% of active online activities, though the distribution between retail and institutional foreign activities remains unspecified. 

The data reveals a staggering concentration of trading activities in 2024:

  • The top 10 brokers accounted for a daily average of 58.9% of mainboard turnover. (Figure 3, middle window)
  • The top 10 and 20 most actively traded issues averaged 64% and 83% respectively, and
  • The Sy Group (among the top 3 of the five biggest market capitalizations) averaged 21.19% of market activity.

The scale of concentrated activities also elucidates evidence of "coordinated price actions," such as the post-lunch recess "afternoon delight" and the 5-minute pre-closing "float pumps-and-dumps"—as demonstrated by some of the major activities in 2025. (Figure 3, lowest charts) 

Basically, the PSEi 30 has been "propped up" or "cushioned" by local institutional investors.


Figure 4

As a result, the share of the top five free-float heavyweights reached its highest level at 52% in December and averaged 50.3% in 2024—meaning their free-float share accounted for more than half of the index. SM, ICT, BDO, BPI, and SMPH delivered returns of 3.01%, 56.04%, 10.34%, 17.54%, and -23.6%, respectively, resulting in an average return of 12.76% in 2024—a clear sign of divergence from the rest of the PSEi 30. (Figure 4, upper pane) 

Furthermore, given that the aggregate advance-decline spread was generally negative, albeit better than in 2023, this shows why novice "traders" morphed into "investors." Or, the negative spread signifies that losses dominated the overall performance of listed firms at the PSE—a continuing trend since 2013. (Figure 4, lower visual) 

With the PSEi returning 1.22% in 2024, the asymmetric performance reinforces the massive divergence between the PSEi 30 and the broader PSE universe. 

Put simply, the synchronized and mostly coordinated pumps and dumps of the top five—or even the top ten—have fundamentally kept the PSEi 30 from a free fall. 

IV. Concentration Risks: National Team, Other Financial Corporations and Total Financial Resources


Figure 5

It is no coincidence that the ebbs and flows of the domestic private sector claims of Other Financial Corporations (OFCs) have dovetailed with the PSEi 30 level. (Figure 5, upper graph) 

In short, OFCs appear to have played a very substantial role in propping up the PSEi 30. 

Could they be part of the local version of the "national team" aimed at supporting price levels of the PSEi 30? 

It is also not a coincidence that banks have been deepening their hold on the nation’s total financial resources (assets), a trend that further reveals the depth of systemic concentration risks. 

Although the growth of Total Financial Resources has been slowing from its July 2024 peak of 11.23% to 5.06% in April 2025, the share of Philippine banks and universal banks in the total has been drifting at all-time highs of 82.64% and 77.08%, respectively. (Figure 5, middle diagram) 

Could all these actions have been designed to keep asset prices or "collateral values" afloat to stave off risks of credit deflation, which would imperil the banking system? 

V. 2024’s Economic Operating Conditions, Financial Distress and Unintended Consequences 

"Could the torrent of enrollment reflect symptoms of economic desperation?" 

Let us also not forget the operating conditions in 2024. The BSP initiated its easing cycle in the second half of 2024 (rate cuts and RRR cut), while public spending rose to a record high. 

The unintended consequences of the PSEi 30's 'Potemkin village' effect extend beyond price distortionsovervaluing capital goods and fostering spillover effects through excess capacity and malinvestments. More importantly, it redistributes wealth through zero-sum transactions, where institutions sell holdings at elevated prices while naive retail participants are 'left holding the bag.' 

Once again, downside volatility has 'emasculated' these neophytes, transforming their initial short-term trading positions into long-term or 'buy-and-hold investments.' More precisely, their failed attempts to generate short-term income resulted in a 'trading freeze.' 

That is to say, many novice traders were drawn in by the pursuit of short-term yield—whether to compensate for insufficient income, recover lost purchasing power, or escape excessive debt—by engaging in stocks, a true 'Hail Mary Pass!' 

It is no surprise that this period aligned with milestone highs in sentiment-driven surveys on self-rated poverty and hunger incidences. 

In essence, many newcomers likely perceived the PSE not as a structured investment market but as a high-stakes gamble—a 'lottery ticket' or a 'casino' offering a chance to escape financial hardship. 

VI. The Savings Illusion and the Generational Shifts: Herding Among Youth, Decline Among Seniors

"Has a sudden boom in savings driven retail investors into stocks?" 

Using the Philippine banking system's deposit liabilities and cash balances as proxies, the answer is definitively no. In 2024, despite record-high bank credit expansion, bank deposit liabilities reported their lowest growth rate of 7.04% since 2012, while PSE volume increased by only 1.4%. (Figure 5, lowest chart)


Figure 6

Next, bank cash and due balances fell to their lowest level since 2018, wiping out the historic liquidity injections by the BSP during the pandemic recession in 2020. (Figure 6, topmost pane) 

Circling back to retail accounts, distributed by generations, the accounts with the biggest gains emerged from Gen Y and Gen Z, posting 48.8% and 26.5% growth in 2024, respectively. (Figure 6, middle image) 

This category hints that with likely insufficient income, these age groups could have fallen prey to the ‘herding effects’ of the PSEi 30's Q1 and Q3 upside volatility. 

In contrast, seniors' growth fell sharply from 14.8% in 2023 to 7.3% in 2024. Seniors, likely with the most savings, topped in 2023, but they accounted for the least growth (3.7%) in online accounts in 2024. 

VII. The Digital Divide in Brokerage: Traditional Brokers Under Pressure 

The surge in online accounts, representing 86.42% of total accounts, has reduced traditional brick-and-mortar accounts to just 13.58%. However, non-online brokers still represent the vast majority of trading participants. 

According to PSE's 2024 infographics, there were 121 active trading participants, but only 37 offered online accounts—meaning 30% of brokers accounted for the bulk of total turnover. (Figure 6, lowest graph) 

This implies that brick-and-mortar brokers are fighting for a rapidly dwindling share of PSE volume, making many vulnerable to sustained low-volume conditions and an extension of the prevailing bear market. 

VIII. Conclusion: A Mirage of Growth 

The Philippine Stock Exchange's reported surge in new accounts in 2024, while seemingly a triumph of financial inclusion and capital market deepening, masks a more complex and potentially troubling reality. 

Our analysis suggests that this growth isn't primarily a result of a robust bull market or a sudden boom in savings. Instead, it reflects heightened volatility, a concentrated market, and a populace grappling with economic hardship

The significant disconnect between the dramatic increase in accounts and the persistently low level of active participation—coupled with the overwhelming dominance of institutional investors—paints a picture of a market, where retail investors, particularly younger generations, may be making a "Hail Mary Pass" amid limited economic opportunities. 

The “Potemkin village” nature of the PSEi 30’s performance—propped up by institutional activities and circumstantial signs of coordinated activity—raises deeper concerns: price distortions, misallocated capital, and the quiet transfer of wealth from uninformed and gullible retail players to more sophisticated institutions. 

Moving forward, it’s no longer enough for the PSE to simply lower transaction taxes, launch new products, or expand investor education programs. 

What’s truly needed is a political economy that fosters real economic freedom—grounded in long-term thinking or lower time preference—so savers can build genuine wealth by channeling their capital into productive enterprise and transparent capital markets. 

Above all, capital markets must operate with integrity: free from manipulation, insulated from rigged dynamics, and designed to protect—not exploit—retail investors from becoming cannon fodder in a system tilted toward institutional dominance. 

___

References 

Doug Noland, Uncertainty Squared, June 7, 2025, Credit Bubble Bulletin 

Philippine Stock Exchange, Stock market accounts breach 2M mark, June 9, 2025 pse.com.ph