Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop

 

My cynical view is that 90 percent of financial strategy is either tax minimization, regulatory arbitrage (coming up with instruments to comply with the letter of regulations while violating their spirit), or accounting charades (complying with the letter of accounting rules while disguising reality)— Arnold Kling 

In this issue

Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop 

Segment 1.0: The PSEi Debt Financed Asset Transfer Charade

1A. Debt, Not Productivity, Drives the Philippine Economy

1B. The Big Three Borrowers: MER, SMC, AEV The Mechanism: Asset Transfers

1C. The Circular Boost: A Fragility Loop 

Segment 2.0: San Miguel Corporation — The Minsky Ponzi Finance Core

2A. Fragility in Plain Sight

2B. SMC’s Camouflage Tactics

2C. The Mirage of Liquidity

2D. Political Angle: Deals, Influence, and the Administration’s Footprint 

Segment 2.1 — Meralco: A Utility Showing Profit, But Hiding Stress

2.1A. Chromite Gas Holdings: Meralco’s New Largest Exposure

2.1B. Q3 and 9M Performance: Meralco’s Money Illusion Revenues

2.1C. GDP Mirage and Debt Surge and Asset Inflation

2.1D. What This Really Means: Meralco as the Balance-Sheet Absorber 

Segment 2.2 – AEV: Revenue Spikes as Balance-Sheet Shock Absorption

2.2A AEV’s Q3–9M: Not Evidence of Business Growth 

Segment 3.0 — The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI Triangle

3.A How One Deal Created Three Balance-Sheet Miracles 

Segment 4.0: Conclusion: How Concentration Becomes Crisis: The Philippine Energy Paradox 

Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop 

SMC, Meralco, and AEV’s energy partnership reveals how asset transfers inflate profits, recycle fragility across balance sheets 

Disclaimer: This article presents an independent analysis and opinion based solely on publicly available financial reports, regulatory filings, and market data. It does not allege any unlawful conduct, nor does it assert knowledge of internal decision-making or intent by any company or individual. All interpretations reflect broader political-economic dynamics and systemic incentives rather than judgments about specific actors. Readers should treat this as an analytical commentary, not as a statement of fact regarding any wrongdoing. 

Segment 1.0: The PSEi Debt Financed Asset Transfer Charade 

1A. Debt, Not Productivity, Drives the Philippine Economy 

Debt, not productivity, is the engine of the Philippine economy. We’ve said this repeatedly, but what’s striking in 2025 is how debt growth has concentrated in just a handful of dominant companies.

Figure 1 

In the first nine months of 2025, the 26 non‑bank members of the elite PSEi 30 added Php 603.149 billion in debt—a growth rate of 11.22%, pushing their total to an all‑time high of Php 5.979 trillion. This was the second fastest pace after 2022. (Figure 1, upper window) 

The banks were not far behind. Bills payable of the four PSEi 30 banks rose Php 191.8 billion to Php 1.125 trillion. 

Meanwhile, BSP data shows bills and bonds payable across the entire banking industry climbed 9.34% YoY in September (Q3) to Php 1.861 trillion, the third highest on record. (Figure 1, lower chart) 

For clarity, let’s stick to the 26 non‑bank PSEi firms. 

Note: these figures exclude the rest of the 284 listed companies as of Q2. Because holding companies consolidate subsidiary debt, there are double counts here. And these are only published debts—some firms appear to have shifted borrowings into other liabilities or kept exposures off balance sheet. 

Even with those caveats, the Php 5.979 trillion in published PSEi non-bank debt is large enough to equal: 

• 16.8% of the Philippine financial system’s September Php 35.582 trillion in resources/assets; and
• 29.74% of the Php 20.15 trillion in nominal GDP over the first nine months. 

The Php 603.15 billion increase alone accounts for 75% of nominal GDP growth (Php 796.224 billion, or 4.96%) in the same period. 

In short, the debt of the non‑bank PSEi 30 is not just a corporate statistic—it is macro‑significant, shaping both banking dynamics and GDP itself.

1B. The Big Three Borrowers: MER, SMC, AEV The Mechanism: Asset Transfers 

Figure 2

In January–September 2025, the top three debt expanders among the non-bank PSEi 30—Meralco [PSE:MER], San Miguel [PSE:SMC], and Aboitiz Equity Ventures [PSE:AEV]—accounted for 52.65% of the Php 603.15 billion increase. (Figure 2, table and chart) 

Meralco (MER) debt more than doubled, rising 139.4% from Php 89.147 billion to Php 213.43 billion Php (+Php 124.283 billion). 

San Miguel (SMC) debt rose 7%, adding Php 103.312B, reaching a record Php 1.581 trillion. Yes, a T-R-I-L-L-I-O-N! 

Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) debt jumped 24.26%, or Php 89.945B, to Php 460.7B. 

This was not coincidence. 

The synchronized surge reflects the Meralco–Aboitiz buy-in to San Miguel’s energy assets. 

As discussed last August 

"Beneath the surface, SMC’s debt dynamics resemble quasi-Ponzi finance—borrowing Php 681 billion to repay Php 727 billion in 1H 2025, while plugging the gap with preferred share issuance and asset monetization. The latter includes the deconsolidation and valuation uplift of its residual stakes in the Ilijan power facility and Excellent Energy Resources Inc. (EERI), as well as the $3.3 billion LNG deal with Meralco and AboitizPower in Batangas. Though framed as strategic partnerships, these transactions involved asset transfers that contributed heavily to the surge in reported profits. 

"The simulacrum of deleveraging—from Php 1.56 trillion in Q4 2024 to Php 1.506 trillion in Q2/1H 2025—appears to be a product of financial engineering, not structural improvement." 

In other words, SMC’s Q2 “deleveraging” was cosmetic. 

Its debt didn’t fall because operations improved; it fell because SMC dumped assets, liabilities, and valuation gains onto Meralco and Aboitiz.

1C. The Circular Boost: A Fragility Loop 

This buyout sequence increasingly resembles an asset transfer charade:

• SMC unloads assets with embedded liabilities.
• Meralco and AEV borrow heavily to “acquire” them.

Both sides book accounting gains via fair-value adjustments, reclassification, and deconsolidation. 

• Optics improve—higher assets, higher income, stronger balance sheets.
• Substance does not—real cash flow remains weak, debt dependence accelerates, and system-wide concentration rises. 

Each company props up another’s balance sheet, recycling fragility and presenting it as growth. 

The Philippine power sector is already intensely politicized, dominated by quasi-monopolies that operate in their respective territories. Markets exist only in form; in substance, the sector functions as a pseudo-market inside an oligopolistic cage. 

Approximate generation market shares illustrate this concentration: SMC Global ~20–25%, Aboitiz Power ~23%, First Gen + EDC ~12–18%, Meralco/MGen ~7–10%, and ACEN ~5–7% (figures vary by region, fuel type, and year). 

Recent deals only deepen this centralization, reinforcing the economic and political power of these dominant players, while regulatory bottlenecks and concentrated capital ensure that true competition remains largely symbolic. 

Segment 2.0: San Miguel Corporation — The Minsky Ponzi Finance Core 

The Chromite Gas Holdings acquisition is central to understanding SMC’s 2025 numbers.

MGen acquired 60% and Aboitiz’s TNGP took 40%, giving Chromite a 67% stake in several former San Miguel Global Power (SMGP) entities. SMGP retained 33%. This was not an expansion — again, it was an asset transfer. 

Q2: The Illusion of Improvement 

This maneuver produced a dramatic one‑off effect in Q2:

• Debt dipped slightly from Php 1.511 trillion (Q1) to Php 1.504 trillion.
• Cash surged +26.5% YoY to Php 321.14 billion.
• Profits exploded +398% YoY, from Php 4.691 billion to Php 23.4 billion. 

Q3: The Underlying Reality Reappears 

But the illusion unraveled in Q3: 

• Revenues contracted –4.5% in a weak economy.
• Profits collapsed –49.5% to Php 11.9 billion.
• Cash rose again +22.4% to Php 344 billion.

Figure 3

Debt soared Php 103.312 billion YoY, Php 76.28 billion QoQ, bringing total debt to a staggering Php 1.58 trillion. (Figure 3, topmost graph, middle table) 

2A. Fragility in Plain Sight 

Even with the current the sharp rebound in SMC’s share price — whether due to benchmark-ism (potential gaming market prices by the establishment to conceal embedded fragilities) or implicit cross-ownership effects from the Chromite transaction — market cap remains below Php 180B. 

• Borrowing growth this quarter alone equaled ≈40-45% of SMC’s entire market cap (as of the third week of November). 
• Debt outstanding exceeds annual sales. 
• Debt equals 4.44% of the entire Philippine financial system’s assets. 

This is not normal corporate leverage. 

This is systemic leverage. 

2B. SMC’s Camouflage Tactics 

SMC has been masking its worsening debt structure through: 

• Preferred share issuances (debt disguised as equity), another Php 48.6 billion raised in October.
• Asset transfers involving Meralco and Aboitiz (the Chromite–Ilijan–EERI triangle)
• Aggressive fair-value reclassification and balance-sheet engineering 

All three are textbook Minsky Ponzi Finance indicators: Cash flows cannot meet obligations; survival depends on rolling over liabilities and selling assets. 

2C. The Mirage of Liquidity 

SMC reports cash reserves (Php 344 billion) rising to nearly matching short‑term debt (Php 358 billion). (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

But internal breakdowns suggest: 

• A portion of “cash” is restricted
• Some is pledged to lenders
• Some sits inside joint ventures 

Balance-sheet “cash” includes mark-to-model items tied to asset transfers 

Meaning: true liquidity is far lower than reported. 

2D. Political Angle: Deals, Influence, and the Administration’s Footprint 

In the current political climate, the administration’s footprint is crucial for every major economic deal. 

SMC’s transactions likely benefited from proximity to the leadership — but political shifts also show how influence-connection-network shapes outcomes across the corporate landscape. 

Take the Villar group: after apparently losing favor with the administration, their Primewater franchise has been terminated in several provinces, and authorities have cracked down on their real estate assets, claiming prior valuations were inflated. The SEC even revoked the accreditation of the appraiser involved. 

Meanwhile, MVP of Meralco reportedly eyes Primewater, underscoring how political favor reshapes corporate fortunes. Where Villar faces contraction, SMC and its allies (Meralco, Aboitiz) secure expansion through administration‑blessed asset transfers. 

In any case, it is possible that the deal had administrative blessing—or at least the nudge, given the proximity of the principals involved. The other possible angle is that this could be an implicit bailout dressed up as a buy-in deal. 

But the more important point is this: 

Even political closeness cannot permanently mask structural insolvency. 

SMC is too big to fail on paper — but too debt-bloated to hide forever, or political cover buys time, not solvency. 

Segment 2.1 — Meralco: A Utility Showing Profit, But Hiding Stress 

2.1A. Chromite Gas Holdings: Meralco’s New Largest Exposure 

Meralco’s Chromite Gas Holdings investment has become its largest exposure among joint ventures and associates, carried at Php 84.08 billion in 2025. Yet, despite the size, Chromite has contributed no direct revenues so far. 

The assets acquired from San Miguel Global are framed as enhancing Meralco’s ability to deliver reliable, stable, and cost‑effective electricity—but the numbers tell a different story—one shaped more by accounting and regulatory pass-throughs than by genuine economic or demand strength. 

2.1B. Q3 and 9M Performance: Meralco’s Money Illusion Revenues

Figure 4 

The headline 4% GDP in Q3 exposed Meralco’s fragility: 

• Revenues in gwh: –2.08% YoY, –6.64% QoQ.
• Electricity sales in pesos: +7.09% YoY, –3.35% QoQ.
• 9M gwh sales: –0.37% YoY, while peso sales rose +6%.
• Profitability: +18.19% in Q3, +9.93% in 9M. 

This is classic money illusion: peso revenues rise while physical demand falls. (Figure 4, upper and lower graphs) 

Operational output is not driving earnings. Instead, tariff pass‑throughs, higher generation charges, and regulatory adjustments inflate nominal sales. It is a regulatory inflation windfall, not genuine demand strength. 

2.1C. GDP Mirage and Debt Surge and Asset Inflation 

Meralco’s results reinforce that Q3 GDP was effectively lower than the 4% headline once adjusted for inflation and real‑sector contraction. Nominal growth masks real decline—exactly the GDP mirage motif you’ve been threading. 

More troubling is the balance sheet: 

• Debt surged +139% to Php 213.4 billion.
• Assets inflated +34.5% to Php 792 billion. 

This scale of short‑term expansion is not normal for a utility. It only happens when major assets are shuffled, revalued, or purchased at non‑market prices. Capex and operations do not explain it. Asset transfers do. 

2.1D. What This Really Means: Meralco as the Balance-Sheet Absorber 

Regulated returns (tariff-based profits) look stable, but the underlying structure is growing riskier. A utility with: 

• falling physical demand,
• surging debt, and
• massive non-operational asset expansion

is not strengthening — it is absorbing leverage for some entity. 

And that entity is SMC. 

The Chromite/Ilijan/EERI structure effectively places Meralco in the role of balance-sheet absorber for San Miguel’s asset-lightening strategy. 

Meralco’s earnings stability conceals a fragile, debt-heavy balance sheet inflated by SMC-linked asset transfers, not by real demand or utility fundamentals 

Segment 2.2 – AEV: Revenue Spikes as Balance-Sheet Shock Absorption 

Almost the same story applies to Aboitiz Equity Ventures. 

While AEV publicly emphasizes energy security, stability, market dominance, and regulatory influence as its core priorities, the weakening macro economy reveals a different angle.

Figure 5 

AEV posted Q3 revenues of +19.6%, pushing net income up +12.8%. (Figure 5, upper visual) 

But on a 9M basis, revenues were only +2.84% while net income fell –10.6% — a clear mismatch between quarterly momentum and year-to-date weakness. 

In its 17Q report, AEV notes that fresh contributions from Chromite Gas Holdings, Inc. (CGHI) drove the 5% rise in equity earnings from investees. This aligns precisely with the pattern seen in Meralco: newly consolidated or newly transferred assets creating a one-off jump. 

Meanwhile, the balance sheet shows the real story: 

• Debt surged 24.3% to Php 460.7B
• Cash jumped 15% to Php 90.84B
• Assets expanded 14.94% to Php 971B 

A sudden Q3 revenue surge combined with a weak 9M total is entirely consistent with: 

• Newly absorbed assets booking revenue only after transfer
• Acquisition timing falling post–June 2025
• Consolidation effects appearing sharply in Q3 

This means the revenue spike is not organic growth — it is the accounting after-effect of assets acquired or transferred in 1H but only recognized operationally in Q3. 

AEV’s cash swelling amid rapid debt accumulation strongly suggests:

• bridging loans used during staged acquisition payments
• temporary liquidity buffers ahead of full transfer pricing
• staggered settlement structures typical in large utility-energy asset sales
• pending regulatory approvals delaying full cash deployment 

Cash rises first → debt stays elevated → assets revalue → revenue shows up later. 

This pattern is classic in large asset transfers, not in real economic expansion. 

2.2A AEV’s Q3–9M: Not Evidence of Business Growth 

They are the accounting shadow of San Miguel’s 1H asset unloading—financed by AEV’s debt surge and disguised as operational growth. 

What looks like stability is really fragility recycling: AEV, like Meralco, has become a balance-sheet counterparty absorbing the system-wide effects of SMC’s asset-lightening strategy, with short-term profitability masking long-term stress. 

Segment 3.0 — The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI Triangle 

3.A How One Deal Created Three Balance-Sheet Miracles 

If Segment 2 showed the operational weakness across SMC, Meralco, and Aboitiz, Segment 3 explains why their balance sheets still looked strangely “strong.” 

The answer lies in one of 2025’s most consequential but least-understood restructurings: 

The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI triangle. 

This single transaction is the hidden engine behind the debt spikes, asset jumps, and sudden income boosts in Q2–Q3. 

Once you see this triangle, everything else snaps into place. 

1. The Triangle in One Line 

This wasn’t three companies expanding. 

It was one deal split three ways, enabling:

• SMC to book gains and create a “deleveraging” illusion
• Meralco to justify its 139% debt explosion
• Aboitiz to absorb a 24% debt spike while looking “strategically positioned” 

All this happened without producing a single additional unit of electricity. 

While the EERI–Ilijan complex is designed to deliver 1,200–2,500 MW of gas-fired capacity, as of Q3 only 850 MW are fully operational and a 425 MW unit remains uncertified — meaning the promised output exists largely on paper, not yet in reliable commercial dispatch. This reinforces the point: the triangle deal moved balance sheets faster than it delivered power.

2. How the Triangle Worked 

Here’s the real flow: 

• SMC restructured and monetized its stakes in Ilijan, Excellent Energy Resources Inc. (EERI) and Batangas LNG terminal
• Meralco bought in — financed almost entirely by new debt
• AboitizPower bought in — also financed by new debt 

The valuation uplift flowed back to SMC, booked as income and “deleveraging progress” 

The result: 

• All three balance sheets expanded
• None of them improved real output
• This was transaction-driven balance-sheet inflation, not industrial growth. 

3. Why This Triangle Matters: It Solves Every Q3 Puzzle 

Without this transaction, Q3 numbers look impossible:

• Meralco’s debt doubling despite falling electricity volume
• AEV’s Php 90B debt jump despite declining operating income
• SMC’s “improving leverage” despite worsening cash burn 

Once the triangle is added back in, the contradictions vanish:

• Meralco and AEV levered up to buy SMC’s assets
• SMC booked the valuation uplift as earnings
• All three appeared financially healthier — e.g. cash reserves jumped— without becoming economically healthier (Figure 5, middle graph) 

Q3 looked disconnected from reality because it was. 

4. The Illusion of Progress 

On paper:

• SMC: higher profit
• Meralco: larger asset base
• AEV: greater scale 

In substance:

• SMC gave up future revenue streams
• Meralco and AEV loaded up on liabilities
• System-wide fragility increased— e.g. accelerates the rising trend of financing charges. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

The triangle recycles the same underlying cash flows, but layers more leverage on them. 

This is growth by relabeling, not growth by production. 

5. What This Signals for 2025–2026 

The triangle exposes the real state of Philippine corporate finance:

• cash liquidity is tight
• banks are reaching their risk limits
• debt has become the default funding model
• GDP “growth” is being propped up by inter-corporate transactions, not capex
• conglomerates are supporting each other through balance-sheet swaps 

Most importantly: 

This is a leverage loop, not an investment cycle. The mainstream is confusing balance-sheet inflation for economic progress. 

The Batangas LNG–Ilijan–EERI triangle created no new power capacity. Instead, it created the appearance of corporate strength.

Segment 4.0: Conclusion: How Concentration Becomes Crisis: The Philippine Energy Paradox 

The Philippine energy sector operates as a political monopoly with only the façade of market competition. 

The triad of San Miguel, Aboitiz, and Meralco illustrates deepening centralization, pillared on a political–economic feedback loop. 

Major industry transactions, carried out with either administration blessing or tacit nudging, function as implicit bailouts channeled through oligarchic control. 

This further entrenches concentration, while regulatory capture blinds the BSP, DOE, and ERC to mounting risks—encouraging moral hazard and ever-bolder risk-taking in expectation of eventual government backstops. 

This concentration funnels public and private savings into monopolistic hands, fueling outsized debt that competes directly with banks and government borrowings, intensifying crowding-out dynamics, resulting in worsening savings conditions, suppressing productivity gains, and constraining consumer growth. 

Fragility risks do not stop with the borrowers: counterparties—savers, local and foreign lenders, banks, and bond markets—are exposed as well, creating the potential for contagion across the broader economy. 

The feedback loop is self-reinforcing: policies fuel malinvestments, these malinvestments weaken the economy, and weakness justifies further interventions that deepen concentration, heighten vulnerability, and accelerate structural maladjustments. 

Viewed through a theoretical lens, San Miguel’s ever-expanding leverage fits a Minsky-style financial instability pattern—now extending into deals that serve as camouflaged backstops. This reflects what I call "benchmark-ism": an engineered illusion of stability designed to pull wool over the public’s eyes, mirroring Kindleberger’s cycle of manipulation, fraud, and corruption. 

Taken together, these dynamics reveal unmistakable symptoms of late-cycle fragility. 

What is framed as reform is, in truth, a vicious cycle of concentration, political capture, extraction, and systemic decay. 

____ 

references 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Q2–1H Debt-Fueled PSEi 30 Performance Disconnects from GDP—What Could Go Wrong, Substack, August 24, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Is San Miguel’s Ever-Growing Debt the "Sword of Damocles" Hanging over the Philippine Economy and the PSE? December 02, 2024

 

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble

All is not hopeless. Markets are turbulent, deceptive, prone to bubbles, infested by false trends. It may well be that you cannot forecast prices. But evaluating risk is another matter entirely—Benoit Mandlebrot 

In this short issue

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble

I. The Philippine Gaming Bubble Is Bursting in Real Time

II. Implications: Sucked into a Cesspool of Losses

III. The Buyback Mirage

IV. The Deeper Malaise: A Speculative Society

V. Financial and Economic Policies as Catalysts; CMEPA: A Gamified Economy in the Making

VI. Regulators to the Rescue?

VII. The Damocles Sword Overhead: San Miguel’s Plummeting Share Prices

VIII. Conclusion: A System Engineered for Bubble Blowing 

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble 

Fiscal fragility and easy money laid the groundwork for a drift to a casino economy; tax distortion threatens to ignite the speculative tinder 

For continuity, this post follows my earlier piece: "The Ghost of BW Resources: The Bursting of the Philippine Gaming Stock Bubble" 

I. The Philippine Gaming Bubble Is Bursting in Real Time 

Trading activity now reveals raw emotion driving wild pendulum swings. 

As summarized:

Figure 1 

DigiPlus Interactive Corp. [PSE: PLUS] surged 15.7% on Friday, with turnover hitting Php 2.33 billion—an all-time high—accounting for 31.75% of mainboard volume! This marks the second-highest volume share after the July 4th collapse of 23.9%, when PLUS’s share skyrocketed to 33.33%. Friday’s rally mirrored the July 7th oversold recoil of +14.6%, when volume share hit 30.2%, the third highest on record. (Figure 1) 

This incredible volatility, backed by stunning trading volumes, shows that the bubble's deflation is still very much underway. 

II. Implications: Sucked into a Cesspool of Losses 

PLUS’s massive footprint in PSE volume underscores how deeply—both retail and institutional players—are entangled in its downside volatility vortex—sucked into a cesspool of losses, where investors have morphed into gamblers.

Figure 2

Many who suffered losses are pouring in more—anteing up or doubling down on losing positions to lower their average entry, hoping that a recovery might redeem them or restore their capital. This Martingale approach—catching a falling knife with both hands—only heightens the risk of ruin. (Figure 2, upper image)

Moreover, nursing drawdowns, many retail accounts will be sidelined, deactivated, or rendered inactive. 

Worse, we don’t know how much of this frenzy is credit-fueled or margin-driven. 

Yet, the biggest question: how exposed are financial institutions—and how compromised? 

III. The Buyback Mirage 

Bulls have pinned hopes on a Php 6 billion buyback. 

But as shown above, it’s a smidgen of total trade—worth less than this week’s volume. 

Down by 40.2%, PLUS’s weekly turnover hit Php 6.4 billion, or 19.3% of mainboard volume—an all-time high. 

Yet, the buyback is not capital formation—it’s capital consumption. Its intent is to support a price bubble, an unsustainable dynamic. Instead of being channeled into productive activity, capital is consumed in positional losses, resulting in both income shortfalls and balance sheet erosion. 

Other gaming issues, Bloomberry Resorts Corporation [PSE: BLOOM] and Philweb [PSE: WEB], likewise plummeted 6.32% and 17.4% week on week, respectively, reinforcing their recent price declines. (Figure 2, lower graph) 

IV. The Deeper Malaise: A Speculative Society 

This episode reveals just how desperate the market has become for a return to the bull days of the PSE. Chasing yields at any cost has become the new normal. 

But the gaming bubble is a symptom, not the disease. 

The gambling boom has gripped not only ordinary people reeling from inflation, but has also migrated into the PSE itself. 

The PLUS bubble has become a second front for digital gamblers. Or put differently, casino-style gambling has migrated to the stock market. 

Media and gaming apologists have deflected focus to the politics of a potential gambling ban. 

Yet given the sanctimonious cries of social democratic politicians who campaign to ban everything unpopular—should regulators now ban the stock market, too? 

Remember: drugs were the political obsession of the last administration. Now, gambling is the new public enemy. 

The war on POGOs has now morphed into a broader war on gambling. But do prohibitionists really think they can control human behavior through force alone? Will they succeed in imposing virtue—or will they help blow up the fiscal position (already at risk of hitting another record deficit) and magnify systemic corruption? 

Yet, haven’t you noticed? A political trend with every new administration is the use of its coercive political machinery to wage war against an unpopular minority—portrayed as evil. From drugs, to POGOs, to speculative finance—public enemies are manufactured, and the cycle repeats. 

These symptoms are not new.

Figure 3

The unraveling of the 1999 BW Resources bubble was followed by another boom-bust episode with the 2000 SSO-Philweb merger. These misallocations ultimately dragged the Phisix (now PSEi 30) to its knees by 2002. (Figure 3 upper diagram) 

Are we seeing echoes of that dynamic now? 

V. Financial and Economic Policies as Catalysts; CMEPA: A Gamified Economy in the Making 

Is this what the government had in mind with the Capital Market Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA)—a gamified economy modeled after PLUS? 

Read our earlier post on CMEPA "The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design" 

The claim that CMEPA is a tax reform to “benefit stocks” via reducing the stock transaction tax (STT) is superficial at best—a textbook case of the fallacy of division. 

In truth, CMEPA is a reprogramming of the public’s incentive structure—for households, corporations, and even government—towards short-termism, speculation, and consumption. 

Its standardized 20% tax on net income punishes savers, forcing them to seek speculative outlets—exactly what STT “reforms” aim to do. 

Add to this the BSP’s easy money and the crowding-out effects of deficit spending, and you have a perfect recipe for a bubble economy—the PLUS economy. 

Savings and borrowed money alike are being diverted into asset punts—not just in stocks, but in property as well, enabled by the BSP’s distorted, inflated Property Price Index. 

As part of the grand policy of inducing speculative juices—or animal spirits—in the real estate sector, the Social Security System (SSS) reportedly acquired Php 500 million worth of shares in Century Properties Group [PSE: CPG] via a special block sale. The purchase, equivalent to a 6.39% stake, was executed at a discount to market price. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

Since hitting its trough in Q2 2024, CPG’s share prices have more than doubled! 

This move not only signals institutional participation in the speculative drift but also raises questions about how public funds are being deployed to stimulate asset inflation. 

When pension reserves chase yield in property equities—backed by inflated indices and easy liquidity—it reinforces the very fragility the system claims to hedge against. 

VI. Regulators to the Rescue? 

Interestingly, regulators floated the idea of mandatory listings for online gambling firms—in the name of “transparency.” Was this a disguised attempt to rescue PLUS’s hissing bubble? 

Has the PSE been so starved of IPOs that it enlisted the help of regulators to bankroll listings—using mandates and the CMEPA’s policy nudges?

Figure 4

As of Q1 2025, the PSE has posted only one IPO (Topline Business Development, PSE: TOP) against two delistings (voluntary/involuntary)—Philab (DNA) and Keppel Philippines (KPH-KPHB). (Figure 4, upper visual) 

This proposed mandate reveals how authorities increasingly perceive the value of the stock market: a dopamine-laced feedback loop for short-term thrills or a market that hopes to accomplish "something for nothing" or share price inflation built on momentum and easy money. The very definition of a bubble. 

VII. The Damocles Sword Overhead: San Miguel’s Plummeting Share Prices 

As political and market attention fixates on gaming, another looming threat quietly unravels—the Damocles Sword hanging over the markets and the economy: San Miguel Corporation—a Php 1.5 TRILLION+ debt colossus—continues to see its share prices erode as liabilities climb—another potential catalyst for broader market instability. (Figure 4, lower window) 

VIII. Conclusion: A System Engineered for Bubble Blowing 

DigiPlus may be the flashpoint, but the broader market pathology runs far deeper. This is no rogue episode—it is the byproduct of a system engineered to reward velocity over value, status over functionality, dopamine over discipline. 

The convergence of fiscal fragility, monetary excess, and misaligned incentives has transformed the capital market into a gamified arena—one that pulls in both institutions and households into a void of unproductivity and capital consumption. 

CMEPA doesn’t fix this system— it formalizes its dysfunction. It deepens its institutionalization. 

The danger isn’t just the collapse of PLUS. It’s the normalization of a casino economy.  

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

 

Bulls of 1929 like their 1990s counterparts had their eyes glued on improving profits and stock valuations.  Not a thought was given to the fact that the rising tide of money deluging the stock market came from financial leverage and not from savings-Dr. Kurt Richebacher 

In this issue:

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

I. An Extension of 2024's Fiscal-Monetary Interplay

II. Debt-Led Growth: Fragile Foundations

III. Revenue Growth: Record Highs, Diminishing Returns

IV. Consumer Sector Strains: Retail and Real Estate Under Pressure

V. Net Income Surge: A Paradox of Profitability

VI. Sectoral Performance: Diverging Trends

VII. Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights

VIII. A Fragile Foundation: The Risks of Fiscal and Financial Leverage

IX. Transparency and Accuracy Concerns

Q1 2025 PSEi 30 Performance: Deepening Debt-Driven Gains Amid Slowing Economic Momentum

Debt-fueled profits mask deeper signs of strain across retail, real estate, and consumer sectors—even as policy easing and fiscal expansion continue.

I. An Extension of 2024's Fiscal-Monetary Interplay 

The PSEi 30’s Q1 2025 performance is largely a continuation of the trends established throughout 2024 and the past decade. 

Fundamentally, it reflects the model of "trickle-down" economic development, underpinned by Keynesian debt-financed spending. This model is anchored primarily on the BSP’s policy of "financial repression"—or sustained easy money—combined with fiscal stabilizers. It has manifested through the persistent "twin deficits," driven by a record-high "savings-investment gap," and rests on the “build and they will come” dogma. 

Q1 2025 also marks the initial impact of the BSP’s first phase of monetary easing, with Q2 expected to reflect the effects of the second round of policy rate and reserve requirement (RRR) cuts. 

At the same time, the all-time high Q1 fiscal deficit—relative to previous first quarters—was clearly reflected in the PSEi 30’s performance. 

Nota Bene:

PSEi 30 data contains redundancies, as consolidated reporting includes both parent firms and their subsidiaries.

Chart Notes:

1A: Based on current index members; may include revisions to past data

1B: Historical comparison; includes only members present during each respective period; based on unaudited releases

 II. Debt-Led Growth: Fragile Foundations

Figure 1

In Q1 2025, non-financial debt among PSEi 30 firms surged by 7.6% to a record Php 5.87 trillion, with a net increase of Php 413 billion, marking the third-highest quarterly rise since 2020. (Figure 1, upper window)         

In context, this debt level accounted for about 17.12% of total financial resources (bank and financial assets), up from 16.92% in 2024, reflecting increased leverage in the financial system 

In addition, bills payable for the top three PSEi 30 banks soared by 117.5%, rising from Php 393 billion to Php 854 billion, a net increase of Php 461 billion, excluding bonds payable. 

This dramatic increase in the bank’s short-term borrowing likely stems from a sharp decline in the banking system’s liquidity metrics—specifically, the cash and due-from-banks-to-deposits ratio and the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio. 

III. Revenue Growth: Record Highs, Diminishing Returns 

Gross revenues for the PSEi 30 rose by 3.92% to a record Php 1.78 trillion in Q1 2025. However, the net revenue increase of Php 67 billion was the smallest in the past four years, signaling a clear deceleration in growth momentum. (Figure 1, lower image)

Figure 2

This revenue softness partly reflected disinflationary trends, as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell to 2.3%—marking its third consecutive quarterly decline. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

This occurred despite the economy operating near full employment, with the average unemployment rate at 4%, all-time high Q1 fiscal deficit, and amid record levels of bank credit growth, particularly in consumer lending. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

Nonetheless, the validity of the near-full employment narrative appears questionable. Our estimates suggest that approximately 32% of the workforce remains 'functionally illiterate,' raising concerns about the accuracy of PSA labor market data. 

Yet, the paradox is telling: even with aggressive fiscal stimulus and sustained easy money policies, economic returns appear to be diminishing. 

The PSEi 30’s revenue slowdown closely mirrored real GDP growth of 5.4% in Q1 2025, reinforcing the broader downtrend. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

Nevertheless, the PSEi 30 revenues accounted for 27% of nominal GDP in Q1 2025, underscoring their substantial footprint in the Philippine economy. Broadening the scope of PSE-listed firms in national accounts would likely magnify this contribution—while simultaneously highlighting the risks posed by mounting economic and market concentration and the fragile underpinnings of "trickle-down" economic development. 

IV. Consumer Sector Strains: Retail and Real Estate Under Pressure

Figure 3

Consumer sector stress was evident in the performance of PSE-listed firms. While retail nominal GDP grew by 7.9% and real consumer GDP by 4.9%, Q1 2025 sales revenue growth for the six largest non-construction listed retail chains—SM Retail, Puregold, SSI Group, Robinsons Retail, Philippine Seven, and Metro Retail Group—slowed to 6.8%, down from 8% in Q4 2024. This deceleration occurred despite aggressive supply-side expansion, underscoring deteriorating growth dynamics. (Figure 3, upper pane) 

Since peaking in 2022, both statistical (GDP) and real indicators (sales) have undergone significant depreciation. Downstream real estate consumer publicly listed retail chains, Wilcon Depot (WLCON) and AllHome (HOME), continue to grapple with substantial challenges, as rising vacancies further deepen the ongoing sales recession. (Figure 3, lower image) 

For example, WLCON reported a 2% quarter-on-quarter increase in store count, but only a 1.2% increase in sales YoY—highlighting excess capacity amid softening demand.

Figure 4

The food services sector also showed signs of strain, despite posting 10.3% revenue growth in Q1 2025—outpacing both nominal and real GDP. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

Jollibee’s domestic operations, which accounted for 80% of total group sales, led the sector with a 14% gain. 

In contrast, McDonald’s reported an 11.5% sales contraction despite its 'aggressive store expansion' strategy, which includes plans to open 65 new outlets in 2025. This disparity underscores uneven, yet broadly weakening, performance across major retail chains. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

Even electricity consumption has recently deteriorated. Meralco’s electricity consumption growth slowed to 1.5% (in GWh), diverging from historical GDP correlations. This downturn signals weakening underlying demand, despite near-full employment and record-high bank credit expansion. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

V. Net Income Surge: A Paradox of Profitability

Figure 5

Despite revenue challenges, the PSEi 30’s net income amazingly surged by 16.02% to a record Php 290.6 billion in Q1 2025, with an absolute increase of Php 40.12 billion, the second-highest since 2020. (Figure 5, topmost diagram)

This was driven by a significant increase in net income margin, which reached 16.3%, the highest since 2020, possibly due to asset sales (e.g., SMC’s divestitures). (Figure 5, middle window)

Excluding SMC’s asset sales, PSEi 30’s net income would have stood at Php 269.3 billion—reflecting only a 7.6% increase. This equates to a net profit rise of Php 19.12 billion, rather than the reported Php 40.12 billion

The record Q1 fiscal deficit likely bolstered incomes, both directly through government contracts (e.g., infrastructure projects) and indirectly via increased consumer spending. However, this came at the cost of record public debt and systemic leverage, which reached Php 30.7 trillion. Public debt hit an all-time high of Php 16.683 trillion. (Figure 5, lowest image)

The PSEi 30’s debt-to-net income ratio revealed that Php 1.42 in net debt additions was required for every peso of profit generated. In terms of absolute gains, Php 10.3 in new debt supported each peso of profit increase, highlighting deepening debt dependency.

 

Figure 6 

Paradoxically, despite record borrowing and improved net income, net cash reserves fell to 2022 levels, raising more concerns about systemic liquidity. (Figure 6, upper chart)

VI. Sectoral Performance: Diverging Trends 

By sector:  (Figure 6, lower table) 

Debt: The industrial sector recorded the largest percentage increase at 48.9%, but holding companies led in absolute peso gains Php 165.644 billon, followed by industrials Php 151.4 billion. 

Revenues: Banks achieved the highest percentage revenue growth at 9.8%, but industrials led in nominal terms with Php 17 billion in gains. 

Net Income: Holding and property sectors posted the largest percentage increases at 31% and 7.6%, respectively, with holding firms leading in peso terms Php 33.8 billion. 

Cash: The services sector saw the largest increases in both percentage (30.9%) and peso terms (Php 56 billion). 

VII. Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights

Figure 7

By firm: (Figure 7, upper table) 

Debt: Ayala Corp, San Miguel Corporation (SMC), and Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) recorded the largest peso increases at Php 74 billion, Php 70 billion, and Php 62 billion, respectively. LT Group (LTG) showed a substantial reduction of Php 24 billion. 

Interestingly, SMC reported a reduction in total debt—from Q4 2024’s record Php 1.56 TRILLION to Php 1.511 TRILLION in Q1 2025—despite substantial capital and operating requirements. This decline coincided with a surge in income, primarily driven by Php 21 billion in energy asset sales (San Miguel Global Power Holding LNG Batangas facility). Even excluding one-off gains, core profits rose by 31% to Php 19 billion. The company also strengthened its cash position, with cash reserves increasing by Php 57 billion year-on-year. How did this happen? (Figure 7, lower graph) 

Revenue: GT Capital (GTCAP) and Meralco posted the largest revenue increases at Php 15.6 billion and Php 9 billion, while SMC recorded the largest decrease at Php 31.8 billion. 

Net Income: SMC led with a Php 34 billion increase, driven by asset sales, while JG Summit (JGS) reported the largest decline at Php 7.2 billion. 

Cash: ICTSI and SMC posted the largest cash expansions at Php 79.9 billion and Php 57.6billion, while LTG (due to debt repayment) and AEV had the largest reductions at Php 38.2 and 15.015 billion 

VIII. A Fragile Foundation: The Risks of Fiscal and Financial Leverage 

Consider the potential impact on the PSEi 30, the broader PSE, and GDP when: 

-Bond vigilantes demand fiscal prudence, pushing interest rates higher

-Heavily leveraged consumer adopt austerity measures.

-Malinvestments from "build and they will come" industries, such as over saturation in real estate (26% residential condominium and office condominium vacancy rates and 22% per Colliers Philippines), and trade sectors, could lead to rising unemployment. 

These risks, compounded by diminishing stimulus effectiveness, threaten the sustainability of PSEi 30 performance and GDP growth. 

For instance, SMC’s business model has become increasingly reliant on recycling its borrowings or asset sales, making it wholly dependent on the sustainability of cheap money to refinance its rapidly growing debt. Neo-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky famously characterized this as 'Ponzi finance.' (Minsky,1992) 

In essence, the structural risks are real—and growing more visible in each earnings season. 

IX. Transparency and Accuracy Concerns 

As previously stated: 

"The credibility of this analysis rests on disclosures from the Philippine Stock Exchange and related official sources. However, questions persist regarding the possible underreporting of debt and the inflation of both top-line and bottom-line figures by certain firms." (Prudent Investor, May 2025) 

These concerns underscore persistent governance challenges—particularly if elite-owned firms are engaged in systematically underreporting liabilities and overstating revenues or profits. Such practices not only contribute to the distortion of market signals but also foster moral hazard, eventually eroding investor confidence and undermining regulatory integrity. 

___ 

References 

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis* The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College May 1992 

Prudent Investor, The PSEi 30 in 2024: Debt-Fueled Expansion Amid Fiscal and Monetary Shifts, Substack May 25, 2025