Showing posts with label risk concentration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk concentration. Show all posts

Sunday, July 13, 2025

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility

 

Fake numbers lead to a phony economy, with fraudulent policies, chasing a mirage—Bill Bonner 

In this issue 

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility

Part I. The BSP’s Statistical Magic: From Crisis to Boom Overnight

I. A. Statistics as Spectacle — The Real Estate Index Makeover

I. B. The Tale of Two Indices: Deflation and Vacancies Erased: RPPI’s Parallel Universe of Price Optimism

I. C. Multiverse Economic Logic, Pandemic Pricing Without Mobility

I. D. BSP’s Statistical Signaling as Policy: Reflation by Design

Part II: The Confidence Transmission Loop and Liquidity Fragility

II. A. Confidence as Catalyst: BSP’s Keynesian Animal Spirits Playbook

II. B. Benchmark Rate Cuts and the Wealth Effect Mirage

II. C. Developer Euphoria: Liquidity, Debt, and Overreach

II. D. Affordability Fallout: Mispricing New Entrants

II. E. Vacancy vs. Real Demand: The Phantom of Occupancy, Market Hoarding and the Developer Divide

II. F. The Squeeze on Small Property Owners: Valuation Taxes and Hidden Costs

II. G. Sentiment Engineering: Policy Windfalls, Redistribution, Inequality

Part III: Policy Transmission: Consumer Debt, Market Dispersion, and the Mounting Fragility

III. A. Capital Market Transmission: Where Confidence Becomes Signal

III. B. Price Divergences and Latent Losses: Fort Bonifacio & Rockwell

III. C. Liquidity Spiral: From Losses to Liquidation Risk

III. D. Concentration Risk in Consumer Lending

III. E. Credit-Led Growth: Ideology and Fragility

III F. Employment Paradox and Inflation Disconnect

III G. Fragile Banking System: Liquidity Warnings Flashing

IV. Conclusion: The Dangerous Game of Inflating Asset Bubbles 

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility 

How benchmark-ism and sentiment engineering are used to buoy real estate and stock prices to back banks amid deepening stress. 

Part I. The BSP’s Statistical Magic: From Crisis to Boom Overnight 

I. A. Statistics as Spectacle — The Real Estate Index Makeover 

In a fell swoop, the real estate industry’s record vacancy dilemma has been vanquished by the BSP. 

All it took was for the monetary agency to overhaul its benchmark—replacing the Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) with the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI). (BSP, July 2025) 

And voilĂ , prices have been perpetually booming, and there was never an oversupply to begin with! 

Regardless of the supposed “methodological upgrade”—anchored in hedonic regression and presented as aligned with global best practices—the index is built on assumptions and econometric modeling vulnerable to error or deliberate manipulation. 

Let us not forget: the BSP is a political agency. Its goals are shaped by institutional motives, and there’s no third-party audit of its inputs or underlying calculations. The only true litmus test for the data? Economic logic. 

I. B. The Tale of Two Indices: Deflation and Vacancies Erased: RPPI’s Parallel Universe of Price Optimism


Figure 1

Under the original RREPI, national price deflation was recorded during the pandemic recession: Q3 2020 (-0.4%), Q1 2021 (-4.2%), Q2 2021 (-9.4%). Deflation returned in Q3 2024 at -2.3%. (Figure 1, upper visual) 

But under RPPI? No deflation at all. 

Instead, the same quarters posted gains: Q3 2020 (6.3%), Q1 2021 (4.1%), Q2 2021 (2.4%), and Q3 2024 (7.6%). Not even a once-in-a-century health and mobility crisis could dent the official boom narrative. 

The new RPPI also shows a material deviation from the year-on-year (YoY) price changes in residential and commercial prices in Makati reported by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Figure 1, lower pane) 

The BSP’s narrative: “Property prices rise in Q1 2025, highest in the NCR.” 

Yet media sources paint a starkly different picture—perhaps reporting from another universe—or even permanently bullish analysts observed that the vacancy woes were intensifying. 

Just last April 29th, BusinessWorld noted

"The vacancy rate for residential property in Metro Manila will likely hit 26% by the end of this year, with condominium developers reining in their launches to dispose of inventory, according to property consultant Colliers Philippines." (italics added) 

On April 8th, GMA News also reported: 

"The oversupply of condominium units in Metro Manila is now estimated to be worth 38 months, as the available supply has continued to increase while there have been 9,000 cancellations, a report released by Leechiu Property Consultants (LPC)." (italics added) 

LPC reported last week that due to prevailing ‘soft demand,’ the NCR condominium oversupply slightly decreased to 37 months in Q2 2025. 

And in a more sobering global perspective, on July 10 BusinessWorld cited findings from the 2025 ULI Asia-Pacific Home Attainability Index: 

"The Philippine capital was identified as one of the most expensive livable cities in the Asia-Pacific region. Condominium prices in Metro Manila are now 19.8 times the median annual household income, far exceeding affordable levels. Townhouses are even more unattainable at 33.4 times the average income." (bold added) 

More striking still, price inflation has persisted amid record oversupply. 

I. C. Multiverse Economic Logic, Pandemic Pricing Without Mobility


Figure 2

The old RREPI captured the downturn in NCR condo units—four straight quarters of deflation in 2020–2021 and again in Q3 2024. But the new RPPI virtually erased this distress. According to its logic, speculative frenzy thrived even during ECQ lockdowns. (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

But real estate isn’t like equities. Its transactions require physical inspection, legal documentation, and bureaucratic transfer procedures. To suggest booming prices during lockdowns implies buyers magically toured properties, exchanged notarized documents, and signed title transfers—while under mobility restrictions. 

Only statistics can conjure such phenomena. 

When vacancies surged again in Q3 2024, RPPI recorded a +5.3% gain. One quarter of mild contraction in Q4 2023 (-4.8%) is the lone blemish on its multiverse logic. 

RPPI now behaves as if oversupply has nothing to do with prices—either the law of supply and demand has inverted, or RPPI reflects a speculative parallel reality 

I. D. BSP’s Statistical Signaling as Policy: Reflation by Design 

This isn’t just mismeasurement. It’s perceptional distortion

The BSP’s policy appears aimed at hitting “two birds with one stone”: rescue the real estate sector—and by extension, shore up bank balance sheets. 

Via rate cuts, RRR adjustments, market interventions, and benchmark-ism, statistics have been conscripted into policy signaling. 

Part II: The Confidence Transmission Loop and Liquidity Fragility 

II. A. Confidence as Catalyst: BSP’s Keynesian Animal Spirits Playbook 

Steeped in Keynesian orthodoxy, the BSP continues to lean on “animal spirits” to animate growth. Confidence—organic or manufactured—is viewed as a tool to boost consumption, inflate GDP, and quietly ease the government’s debt burden. 

Having redefined its benchmark index, the BSP now uses RPPI not just as data, but as a signaling instrument

It projects housing resilience at a time of monetary easing, giving shape to a narrative of strength amid systemic stress. RPPI becomes a cornerstone of "benchmark-ism"—targeting real estate equity holders, property developers, and households alike. 

II. B. Benchmark Rate Cuts and the Wealth Effect Mirage 

The timing is telling. 

This narrative engineering coincides with the underperformance of real estate equities. With property stocks dragging the Philippine Stock Exchange, "benchmark-ism" functions as a tactical lifeline to inflate valuations, revive confidence, and activate the so-called "wealth effect." 

Rising property prices are meant to induce consumption—not only among equity holders but among homeowners who perceive themselves as wealthier. But this is stimulus by optics, not fundamentals. 

II. C. Developer Euphoria: Liquidity, Debt, and Overreach 

This ideological windfall extends to property developers. Easier financial conditions could boost demand, sales, and liquidity—justifying their ballooning debt loads and encouraging further capital spending. 

Or, developers, emboldened by statistical optimism, may pursue growth despite structural weakness, compounding risks already embedded in their debt-heavy balance sheets. 

For example, the published debt of the top five developers (SM Prime, Ayala Land, Megaworld, Robinsons Land and Vista Land) has a 6-year CAGR of 7.88%, even as their cash holdings grew by only 2.16% (Figure 2, middle image) 

Additionally, the supply side real estate portfolio of Universal-commercial bank loans has accounted for 24% of production loans, total loans outstanding 20.68% net of Repos (RRP) and 20.28% gross of RRPs. This excludes consumer real estate loans, which in Q1 2025 accounted for 7.54%.  (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

But this is where the Keynesian blind spot emerges: artificially inflated prices distort economic signals. 

II. D. Affordability Fallout: Mispricing New Entrants 

In equities, inflated valuations misprice capital, leading to overcapacity and overinvestment in capital-intensive sectors like real estate or malinvestments

In housing, speculative price increases distort affordability, widening the gap not only between renters and owners, but also between incumbent homeowners and prospective buyers—including those targeting new project launches by developers. 

As developers capitalize on inflated valuations, pre-selling prices rise disproportionately to income growth, pushing ownership further out of reach for middle-income and first-time buyers. 

This dynamic not only excludes a growing segment of the population, but also risks creating inventory mismatches, where units are sold but remain unoccupied due to affordability constraints. 

The ULI Asia-Pacific Home Attainability Index pointed to such price-income mismatches 

II. E. Vacancy vs. Real Demand: The Phantom of Occupancy, Market Hoarding and the Developer Divide 

Vacancies extrapolate to an oversupply. 

Even when a single buyer or monopolist absorbs all the vacancies, this doesn’t guarantee increased occupancy. 

Demographics and socio-economic conditions—not speculative fervor—drive real demand. 

Meanwhile, rising property prices also translate to higher collateral values, encouraging further credit expansion and balance sheet leveraging in the hope of stimulating consumption. 

But this cycle of debt-fueled optimism risks compounding systemic fragility. 

Rising prices also create friction between small developers and elite firms, the latter leveraging cheap capital and financial heft to dominate the industry. 

Owners of large property portfolios can afford to hoard inventories, allowing prices to rise artificially while sidelining smaller players. 

II. F. The Squeeze on Small Property Owners: Valuation Taxes and Hidden Costs 

Beyond affordability, rising property prices carry compounding burdens for small-scale owners. 

As valuations climb, so do real property taxes, which are pegged to assessed values and can reach up to 2% annually in Metro Manila. 

Insurance premiums and maintenance costs—from association dues to repairs—rise in tandem. These escalating expenses disproportionately impact small owners, who lack the financial buffers of large developers or elite asset holders. 

The result is a quiet squeeze: ownership becomes not just harder to attain, but harder to sustain. 

II. G. Sentiment Engineering: Policy Windfalls, Redistribution, Inequality 

Governments reap fiscal windfalls via inflated valuations, using funds to back deficit spending. But these redistributions often fund projects detached from systemic equity or real productivity.

Despite the optics, only a sliver of the population truly benefits

Aside from the government, the other primary beneficiaries of asset inflation are the elite of the Forbes 100, not the broader population 

This "trickle-down strategy", rooted in sentiment and asset inflation, risks deepening inequality and fueling balance sheet-driven malinvestments. 

Part III: Policy Transmission: Consumer Debt, Market Dispersion, and the Mounting Fragility 

III. A. Capital Market Transmission: Where Confidence Becomes Signal 

Here is how the easing-benchmarkism policy is being transmitted at the PSE.


Figure 3

The PSE’s property index sharply bounced by 8.2% (MoM) in June 2025, while the bank-led financial index dropped 4.9%. This divergence reveals that asset reflation via statistical optics has buoyed developers—but failed to restore investor confidence in the banking sector. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

During the first inning of the ‘propa-news’ campaign that “Easing Cycle equals Economic Boom” in Q3 2024, both indices had surged—property by 16.41% and financials by 19.4%. But Q2 2025 tells a different story: while property stocks outperformed the PSE again, financial stocks weighed it down. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

This magnified dispersion reflects the imbalance at play. As a ratio to the overall PSE, property stocks are gaining market cap dominance. At the same time, the free float market capitalization of the PSEi 30’s top three banks have declined—mirrored by the rising share of the two biggest property developers. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Unless bank shares recover, gains in the property sector will likely be capped. After all, property developers remain the biggest clients of the Philippine banking system. 

Put another way: whatever confidence boost the BSP engineers through easing and revised benchmarks, markets eventually push back against artificial gains

Signal may dominate short-term sentiment—but fundamentals reclaim price over time. 

III. B. Price Divergences and Latent Losses: Fort Bonifacio & Rockwell 

There is more.


Figure 4

The widening divergence in pre-selling and secondary prices of condominiums in Fort Bonifacio and Rockwell Center signifies a deeper signal: the BSP’s implicit rescue of banks via the property sector is being tested on the ground. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

The widening price gap implies mounting losses for pre-selling buyers—early investors who are now exposed to valuation markdowns in the secondary market.

So far, these losses have not translated into Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). Continued financing, sunk-cost inertia, buyer risk aversion, and an economy growing more through credit expansion than productivity have suppressed the impact.

But if these losses scale—or if the economy tips into recession or stagnation—underwater owners may surrender keys. This leads to cascading vacancies and NPLs, raising systemic risk. 

III. C. Liquidity Spiral: From Losses to Liquidation Risk 

Losses, once translated into constrained liquidity, spur escalating demand for liquid assets. This pressure breeds forced liquidations—not just by individual buyers of pre-selling projects, developers but among holders of debt-financed real estate. 

Banks, as financial intermediaries, face direct exposure. When collateral values fall, they may issue a ‘collateral call—requiring borrowers to post more assets—or a ‘call loan,’ demanding immediate repayment.

If rising NPLs escalate into operational or capital deficits, banks themselves become sellers—dumping assets to raise cash. This synchronized selloff in a buyer’s market fuels fire sales and elevates the risk of a broader debt crisis.

III. D. Concentration Risk in Consumer Lending

Last week, the Inquirer cited a Singaporean fintech company which raised concern about the extreme dependence on credit card usage in the Philippines, noting: “The 425-percent debt-to-income ratio in the Philippines—the worst in the region—indicates a ‘severe financial stress.’” (Figure 4, middle image)

Downplaying this, an industry official clarified that since the total credit card contracts were at 20 million, credit card debt averaged 54,000 pesos per contract. Since the number of individuals covered by the contracts was not identified, a person holding multiple credit card debt contracts could, collectively, contribute to a debt profile resembling the 425% debt-to-income ratio (for contract holders).

Based on BSP’s Q4 2023 financial inclusion data, only a significant minority—just 8.1% of the population as of 2021 (World Bank Findex)—carry credit card debt. Even if this figure has doubled or tripled, total exposure remains below 30%, highlighting mounting concentration risks among debt-laden consumers. (Figure 4, lowest table)

III. E. Credit-Led Growth: Ideology and Fragility

The seismic shift toward consumer lending has been driven not only by interest rate caps on credit cards, but by ideological faith in a consumer-driven economy.

Universal and commercial bank consumer credit surged 23.7% year-on-year in May. Credit card loans alone zoomed by 29.4%, marking the 34th consecutive month of 20%+ growth.


Figure 5

From January 2022 to May 2025, consumer and credit card loan shares climbed from 8.8% and 4.4% to 12.7% and 7.5%, respectively. Last May, credit card debt represented 59% of all non-real estate consumer loans. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

Yet how much of credit card money found its way into supporting speculative activities in the stock market and real estate? 

What if parts of bank lending to various industries found their way into asset speculation? 

Once disbursed, banks and the BSP have limited visibility on end-use—adding opacity to the cycle they’re stimulating. 

III F. Employment Paradox and Inflation Disconnect 

Interestingly, this all-time high in debt coincides with near-record employment rates. The May employment rate rose to 96.11%, not far from the all-time highs of 96.9% in December 2023 and 2024, and June 2024. The employed population of 50.289 million last May was the second highest ever. (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

Yet CPI inflation remains muted. Despite collapsing rice prices driven by the Php 20 rollout, inflation ticked up only slightly in June—from 1.3% to 1.4%. 

With limited savings and shallow capital market penetration, the Philippines faces a precarious juncture. What happens when credit expansion and employment reverses from these historic highs? 

And this won’t affect only residential real estate but would worsen conditions of every other property malinvestments like shopping malls/commercial, ‘improving’ office, hotel and accommodations etc. 

III G. Fragile Banking System: Liquidity Warnings Flashing 

Beneath the surface, bank stress is already visible.


Figure 6

Even as NPLs remain officially low—possibly understated—liquidity strains are worsening:

-Cash and due from banks posted a modest 3.4% MoM increase in May—but fell 26.4% YoY

(Figure 6, topmost image)

-Deposit growth edged from 4.04% in April to 4.96% in May

-Cash-to-deposit ratio bounced slightly from 9.68% to 9.87%, yet remains at its lowest level since at least 2013

-Liquid assets-to-deposit ratio fell from 48.29% in April to 47.5% in May

-Bank investment growth slowed from 8.84% to 6.5% (Figure 6, middle diagram)

-Portfolio growth dropped from 7.82% to 5.25% 

Despite these constraints, banks continued lending. 

Interbank lending (IBL) surged, pushing the Total Loan Portfolio (inclusive of IBL and Reverse Repos) from 10.2% to 12.7%, sending the loan-to-deposit ratio to its highest level since March 2020. 

Beyond Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets, underreported NPLs—particularly in real estate lending—may be compounding the liquidity strain and masking deeper fragility. The surge in HTMs has coincided with a steady decline in cash-to-deposit ratios, signaling stress beneath the statistical surface. (Figure 6, lowest visual) 

IV. Conclusion: The Dangerous Game of Inflating Asset Bubbles 

Despite the Q3 2024 surge in the Property Index—helping power the PSEi 30 upward—combined with a 6.7% rebound in the old real estate index in Q4, vacancy rates soared to record highs in Q1 and remain near all-time highs as of Q2 2025

This unfolds amid surging consumer and bank credit, all-time high public liabilities fueled by near-record deficit spending, and peak employment rates. 

Ironically, the distortions in stock markets—and the engineered statistical illusions embedded in the old property index—have barely moved the needle against real estate oversupply, as measured by vacancy data.  

Not only has the BSP sustained its aggressive easing campaign, it is now amplifying statistical optics to reignite animal spirits—hoping to hit two birds with one stone: rescuing property sector balance sheets as a proxy for bank support. 

Yet inflating asset bubbles magnifies destabilization risks—accelerating imbalances and expanding systemic leverage that bank balance sheets already betray. 

Worse, the turn toward benchmark-ism and sentiment engineering in the face of industry slowdown signals more than strategy—it reeks of desperation.

When monetary tools fall short, propaganda steps in to fill the gap—instilling false premises to manufacture resilience.

And the louder the optimism, the deeper the dissonance. 

____

References 

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas BSP's new Residential Property Price Index more accurately captures market trends June 27, 2025 bsp.gov.ph

 

Sunday, June 22, 2025

Behind the Retail Surge: Dissecting the PSE’s 2024 Investor Profile Amid Heightened Volatility and Economic Strain

  

The world has never been so awash in speculative finance, ensuring aberrant market behavior. Never has the global leveraged speculating community been as colossal and powerful. Egregious Treasury “basis trade” leveraging drives unprecedented overall hedge fund leverage. Household (loving dip buying) market participation is unparalleled, with the proliferation of online accounts, options trading, and herd-like speculation creating extraordinary market-moving power—Doug Noland 

In this issue

Behind the Retail Surge: Dissecting the PSE’s 2024 Investor Profile Amid Heightened Volatility and Economic Strain

I. Introduction: A Record-Breaking Year for Retail Accounts

II. The Retail Activity Paradox; The Real Drivers Behind the Surge: A PSEi 30 Bull Market?

III. Institutional Dominance, Trading Concentration and Market Manipulation

IV. Concentration Risks: National Team, Other Financial Corporations and Total Financial Resources

V. 2024’s Economic Operating Conditions, Financial Distress and Unintended Consequences

VI. The Savings Illusion and the Generational Shifts: Herding Among Youth, Decline Among Seniors

VII. The Digital Divide in Brokerage: Traditional Brokers Under Pressure

VIII. Conclusion: A Mirage of Growth 

Behind the Retail Surge: Dissecting the PSE’s 2024 Investor Profile Amid Heightened Volatility and Economic Strain 

What’s really driving the surge in Philippine retail investors? A closer look reveals economic desperation, distortion, and deepening divides beneath the surface of stock market optimism 

I. Introduction: A Record-Breaking Year for Retail Accounts 

The PSE reported on June 9, 2025: "The number of stock market accounts in the Philippine Stock Exchange reached 2.86 million in 2024, up by 50.1 percent from 1.91 million in 2023. This was fueled by a 62.0 percent surge in online accounts to 2.47 million from 1.53 million. “This 50 percent jump in number of accounts is the highest we have recorded since we started tracking the investor count and profile in 2008. This substantial growth was made possible by the enabling of digital platforms to connect to PSE”s trading engine, thereby facilitating the trading by investors in the market. PSE is committed to being true to its advocacy of promoting financial inclusion,” said PSE President and CEO Ramon S. Monzon. “More than the numbers, what is important is that retail investors are equipped with investment know-how to avoid investing pitfalls. We address this need for investor education through our various investing literacy initiatives. We also actively work with trading participants and government and private entities to spread the word about personal finance and stock market investing,” Mr. Monzon added." (bold added)


Figure 1

The PSE seems exhilarated by this unprecedented surge. Yet beneath the celebratory tone lies a paradox: they appear unsure why this spike occurred. Their attribution to the "enabling of digital platforms" seems insufficient, especially since such infrastructure has been in place since 2013. (Figure 1, topmost graph) 

This inability to explain the surge becomes more apparent when considering their bewilderment over the depressed number of active accounts. 

As the PSE acknowledged: "While growth in retail accounts has been remarkable, the real challenge is getting retail investors to participate more actively in our market as they only contribute 16 percent to total value turnover. We are optimistic that the upcoming reduction in stock transaction tax (STT) to 0.1 percent from 0.6 percent, along with the various investor education programs and upcoming pipeline of products of the Exchange, will encourage greater investor activity for the remainder of 2025," Mr. Monzon noted. (bold added) 

The low contribution of retail investors to market turnover—underscores the PSE’s challenge: Understanding the essence and the development of the capital markets in line with economic freedom, rather than using it as a covert political redistribution, which drives malinvestments and inequality.

II. The Retail Activity Paradox; The Real Drivers Behind the Surge: A PSEi 30 Bull Market?

Three critical questions emerge from this phenomenon: 

One, is the PSE experiencing a bull market, fueling frenzied retail participation? 

Two, could the torrent of enrollment reflect symptoms of economic desperation—people seeking to plug income gaps amid stagnant living standards?  Or, is this a case of instant gratification through asset speculation? 

Three, has a sudden boom in savings driven retail investors into stocks? 

"Is the PSE experiencing a bull market driving frenzied retail participation?" 

With the PSEi 30 returning just 1.22% in 2024, the surge in new participants seems disconnected from its performance. (Figure 1, middle window) 

However, breaking down this performance by quarters reveals important insights. 

While Q1 2024's 7.03% increase may have been a contributing factor, Q3's phenomenal 13.4% returns likely lured the bulk of these newcomers into stocks. (Figure 1, lowest chart) 

Of course, they were also likely swayed by the constant "propagandizing" or the bombardment by media and establishment "talking heads" of a "return of a bull market!" 

Even more, one critical aspect highlighted by the PSE deserves attention: retail investors "contribute 16 percent to total value turnover." This means retail trades represent a significant minority in the PSE’s turnover.


Figure 2

According to PSE infographics, retail active accounts represented 23.1% of total accounts and 24.5% of online accounts, totaling 660,714 retail accounts. The massive influx of new participants helped boost the active account ratio from an all-time low of 17.5% in 2023 to 23.1% in 2024. (Figure 2, topmost and middle images) 

Our underlying assumption is that the data reflects the ratio of active to total accounts, rather than the proportion of active accounts relative to total market turnover. 

As further proof of the PSE's lackadaisical activities, gross volume turnover rose by just 1.37% in 2024—the second lowest peso level since at least 2014. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

III. Institutional Dominance, Trading Concentration and Market Manipulation


Figure 3 

This raises a striking question about the remaining 84% share of total turnover. The answer lies with institutional investors—both local and foreign. Foreign money accounted for 48.8% of gross turnover, with foreigners selling local equities worth Php 25.253 billion in 2024. (Figure 3, topmost chart) 

Foreign investors represented 36% of active online activities, though the distribution between retail and institutional foreign activities remains unspecified. 

The data reveals a staggering concentration of trading activities in 2024:

  • The top 10 brokers accounted for a daily average of 58.9% of mainboard turnover. (Figure 3, middle window)
  • The top 10 and 20 most actively traded issues averaged 64% and 83% respectively, and
  • The Sy Group (among the top 3 of the five biggest market capitalizations) averaged 21.19% of market activity.

The scale of concentrated activities also elucidates evidence of "coordinated price actions," such as the post-lunch recess "afternoon delight" and the 5-minute pre-closing "float pumps-and-dumps"—as demonstrated by some of the major activities in 2025. (Figure 3, lowest charts) 

Basically, the PSEi 30 has been "propped up" or "cushioned" by local institutional investors.


Figure 4

As a result, the share of the top five free-float heavyweights reached its highest level at 52% in December and averaged 50.3% in 2024—meaning their free-float share accounted for more than half of the index. SM, ICT, BDO, BPI, and SMPH delivered returns of 3.01%, 56.04%, 10.34%, 17.54%, and -23.6%, respectively, resulting in an average return of 12.76% in 2024—a clear sign of divergence from the rest of the PSEi 30. (Figure 4, upper pane) 

Furthermore, given that the aggregate advance-decline spread was generally negative, albeit better than in 2023, this shows why novice "traders" morphed into "investors." Or, the negative spread signifies that losses dominated the overall performance of listed firms at the PSE—a continuing trend since 2013. (Figure 4, lower visual) 

With the PSEi returning 1.22% in 2024, the asymmetric performance reinforces the massive divergence between the PSEi 30 and the broader PSE universe. 

Put simply, the synchronized and mostly coordinated pumps and dumps of the top five—or even the top ten—have fundamentally kept the PSEi 30 from a free fall. 

IV. Concentration Risks: National Team, Other Financial Corporations and Total Financial Resources


Figure 5

It is no coincidence that the ebbs and flows of the domestic private sector claims of Other Financial Corporations (OFCs) have dovetailed with the PSEi 30 level. (Figure 5, upper graph) 

In short, OFCs appear to have played a very substantial role in propping up the PSEi 30. 

Could they be part of the local version of the "national team" aimed at supporting price levels of the PSEi 30? 

It is also not a coincidence that banks have been deepening their hold on the nation’s total financial resources (assets), a trend that further reveals the depth of systemic concentration risks. 

Although the growth of Total Financial Resources has been slowing from its July 2024 peak of 11.23% to 5.06% in April 2025, the share of Philippine banks and universal banks in the total has been drifting at all-time highs of 82.64% and 77.08%, respectively. (Figure 5, middle diagram) 

Could all these actions have been designed to keep asset prices or "collateral values" afloat to stave off risks of credit deflation, which would imperil the banking system? 

V. 2024’s Economic Operating Conditions, Financial Distress and Unintended Consequences 

"Could the torrent of enrollment reflect symptoms of economic desperation?" 

Let us also not forget the operating conditions in 2024. The BSP initiated its easing cycle in the second half of 2024 (rate cuts and RRR cut), while public spending rose to a record high. 

The unintended consequences of the PSEi 30's 'Potemkin village' effect extend beyond price distortionsovervaluing capital goods and fostering spillover effects through excess capacity and malinvestments. More importantly, it redistributes wealth through zero-sum transactions, where institutions sell holdings at elevated prices while naive retail participants are 'left holding the bag.' 

Once again, downside volatility has 'emasculated' these neophytes, transforming their initial short-term trading positions into long-term or 'buy-and-hold investments.' More precisely, their failed attempts to generate short-term income resulted in a 'trading freeze.' 

That is to say, many novice traders were drawn in by the pursuit of short-term yield—whether to compensate for insufficient income, recover lost purchasing power, or escape excessive debt—by engaging in stocks, a true 'Hail Mary Pass!' 

It is no surprise that this period aligned with milestone highs in sentiment-driven surveys on self-rated poverty and hunger incidences. 

In essence, many newcomers likely perceived the PSE not as a structured investment market but as a high-stakes gamble—a 'lottery ticket' or a 'casino' offering a chance to escape financial hardship. 

VI. The Savings Illusion and the Generational Shifts: Herding Among Youth, Decline Among Seniors

"Has a sudden boom in savings driven retail investors into stocks?" 

Using the Philippine banking system's deposit liabilities and cash balances as proxies, the answer is definitively no. In 2024, despite record-high bank credit expansion, bank deposit liabilities reported their lowest growth rate of 7.04% since 2012, while PSE volume increased by only 1.4%. (Figure 5, lowest chart)


Figure 6

Next, bank cash and due balances fell to their lowest level since 2018, wiping out the historic liquidity injections by the BSP during the pandemic recession in 2020. (Figure 6, topmost pane) 

Circling back to retail accounts, distributed by generations, the accounts with the biggest gains emerged from Gen Y and Gen Z, posting 48.8% and 26.5% growth in 2024, respectively. (Figure 6, middle image) 

This category hints that with likely insufficient income, these age groups could have fallen prey to the ‘herding effects’ of the PSEi 30's Q1 and Q3 upside volatility. 

In contrast, seniors' growth fell sharply from 14.8% in 2023 to 7.3% in 2024. Seniors, likely with the most savings, topped in 2023, but they accounted for the least growth (3.7%) in online accounts in 2024. 

VII. The Digital Divide in Brokerage: Traditional Brokers Under Pressure 

The surge in online accounts, representing 86.42% of total accounts, has reduced traditional brick-and-mortar accounts to just 13.58%. However, non-online brokers still represent the vast majority of trading participants. 

According to PSE's 2024 infographics, there were 121 active trading participants, but only 37 offered online accounts—meaning 30% of brokers accounted for the bulk of total turnover. (Figure 6, lowest graph) 

This implies that brick-and-mortar brokers are fighting for a rapidly dwindling share of PSE volume, making many vulnerable to sustained low-volume conditions and an extension of the prevailing bear market. 

VIII. Conclusion: A Mirage of Growth 

The Philippine Stock Exchange's reported surge in new accounts in 2024, while seemingly a triumph of financial inclusion and capital market deepening, masks a more complex and potentially troubling reality. 

Our analysis suggests that this growth isn't primarily a result of a robust bull market or a sudden boom in savings. Instead, it reflects heightened volatility, a concentrated market, and a populace grappling with economic hardship

The significant disconnect between the dramatic increase in accounts and the persistently low level of active participation—coupled with the overwhelming dominance of institutional investors—paints a picture of a market, where retail investors, particularly younger generations, may be making a "Hail Mary Pass" amid limited economic opportunities. 

The “Potemkin village” nature of the PSEi 30’s performance—propped up by institutional activities and circumstantial signs of coordinated activity—raises deeper concerns: price distortions, misallocated capital, and the quiet transfer of wealth from uninformed and gullible retail players to more sophisticated institutions. 

Moving forward, it’s no longer enough for the PSE to simply lower transaction taxes, launch new products, or expand investor education programs. 

What’s truly needed is a political economy that fosters real economic freedom—grounded in long-term thinking or lower time preference—so savers can build genuine wealth by channeling their capital into productive enterprise and transparent capital markets. 

Above all, capital markets must operate with integrity: free from manipulation, insulated from rigged dynamics, and designed to protect—not exploit—retail investors from becoming cannon fodder in a system tilted toward institutional dominance. 

___

References 

Doug Noland, Uncertainty Squared, June 7, 2025, Credit Bubble Bulletin 

Philippine Stock Exchange, Stock market accounts breach 2M mark, June 9, 2025 pse.com.ph

 

Sunday, February 23, 2025

BSP’s Aggressive RRR Cuts: A High-Stakes Gamble?

 

If there is one common theme to the vast range of the world’s financial crises, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of cash can make a government look like it is providing greater growth to its economy than it really is. Private sector borrowing binges can inflate housing and stock prices far beyond their long-run sustainable levels and make banks seem more stable and profitable than they re­ally are. Such large-scale debt buildups pose risks because they make an economy vulnerable to crises of confidence, particularly when debt is short term and needs to be constantly refinanced—Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 

In this issue

BSP’s Aggressive RRR Cuts: A High-Stakes Gamble?

I. Decline in 2024 Bank Non-Performing Loans Amidst Record-High Debt Levels and a Slowing Economy

II. Deepening Financialization: Financial Assets Surge in 2024 as Banks Drive Industry Monopolization

III. Viewing Bank’s Asset Growth Through the Lens of the PSE

IV. March 2025 RRR Cuts and the Liquidity Conundrum: Unraveling the Banking System’s Pressure Points

V. Liquidity Drain: Record Investment Risks and Elevated Marked-to-Market Losses

VI. Despite Falling Rates, Bank’s Held-to-Maturity Assets Remain Near Record High

VII. Moral Hazard and the "COVID Bailout Playbook"

VIII. The Bigger Picture: Are We Headed for a Full-Blown Crisis?

IX. Conclusion: RRR Cuts a High-Risk Strategy? 

BSP’s Aggressive RRR Cuts: A High-Stakes Gamble?

The BSP announced another round of RRR cuts in March amid mounting liquidity constraints. Yet, the reduction from 20% in 2018 to 7% in 2024 has barely improved conditions. Will this time be different?

I. Decline in 2024 Bank Non-Performing Loans Amidst Record-High Debt Levels and a Slowing Economy

Inquirer.net, February 14, 2025: Soured loans held by Philippine banks as a ratio of total credit eased to their lowest level in a year by the end of 2024 as declining interest rates and softer inflation helped borrowers settle their debts on time. However, a shallower easing cycle might keep financial conditions still somewhat tight, which could prevent a big decline in bad debts this year. Preliminary data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed the gross amount of nonperforming loans (NPLs)—or credit that is 90 days late on a payment and at risk of default—had cornered 3.27 percent of the local banking industry’s total lending portfolio as of December, down from November’s 3.54 percent. That figure—also known as the gross NPL ratio—was the lowest since December 2023, when bad loans accounted for 3.24 percent of banks’ total loan book.

An overview of the operating environment 

In any analysis, it is crucial to understand the operating environment that provides context to the relevance of a statistic in discussion.

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) initiated its ‘easing cycle’ in the second half of 2024, which included three rate cuts and a reduction in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Meanwhile, inflation (CPI) rebounded from a low of 1.9% in September to 2.9% in December. Additionally, the BSP tightened its cap on the USDPHP exchange rate. Fiscal spending over the first 11 months of the year reached an all-time high.

Yet, there are notable contradictions.

Despite record-high bank lending—driven largely by real estate and consumer loans—GDP growth slowed to 5.2% in the second half of 2024 primarily due to the weak consumer spending. The employment rate was also near an all-time high.


Figure 1

Meanwhile, real estate prices entered deflationary territory in Q3, with the sector’s real GDP growth falling to its lowest level since the pandemic-induced recession. Its share of total GDP also dropped to an all-time low. 

Notably, the real estate sector remains the largest borrower within the banking system (encompassing universal, commercial, thrift, and rural/cooperative banks). (Figure 1, topmost chart) This data depends on the accuracy of the loans reported by banks. 

However, despite recent rate cuts and significant reductions in RRR, the sector remains under pressure. Additionally, sluggish GDP growth suggests mounting risks associated with record levels of consumer leverage. 

Upon initial analysis, the decline in non-performing loans (NPLs) appears inconsistent with these economic developments. Gross NPLs dropped to one-year lows, while net NPLs reached levels last seen in June 2020. (Figure 1, middle window) 

Ironically, the BSP also announced another round of RRR cuts this March.

II. Deepening Financialization: Financial Assets Surge in 2024 as Banks Drive Industry Monopolization

Let's now turn to the gross assets of the financial system, also known as Total Financial Resources (TFR).

The BSP maintained its policy rate this February.

Ironically, BSP rates appear to have had little influence on the assets of the bank-financial industry. 

In 2024, TFR surged by 7.8% YoY, while bank resources jumped 8.9%, reaching record highs of Php 33.78 trillion and Php 28.255 trillion, respectively. 

Why does this matter? 

Since the BSP started hiking rates in April 2022, TFR and bank financial resources have posted a 9.7% and 10.9% compound annual growth rate (CAGR), respectively. In short, the growth of financial assets has accelerated despite the BSP’s rate hikes. 

Or, the series of rate hikes have barely affected bank and financial market operations. 

By the end of 2024, TFR stood at 128% of headline GDP and 152% of nominal GDP, while bank resources accounted for 107% and 127%, respectively. This reflects the increasing financialization of the Philippine economy—a growing reliance on credit and liquidity—as confirmed by the Money Supply (M series) relative to GDP. (Figure 1, lowest image)

Banking Sector Consolidation


Figure 2

More importantly, the rate hikes catapulted the bank's share of the TFR from 82.3% in 2023 to an all-time high of 83.64% in 2024, powered by universal and commercial banks, whose share jumped from 77.6% to 78.3%! (Figure 2, topmost diagram) 

Effectively, the banking industry—particularly UCBs—has been monopolizing finance, leading to greater market concentration, which translates to a build-up in systemic concentration risk. 

As of December 2024, bank assets were allocated as follows: cash, 10%; total loan portfolio (inclusive of interbank loans and reverse repurchase agreements), 54%; investments, 28.3%; real and other properties acquired, 0.43%; and other assets, 7.14%. 

In 2024, the banking system’s cash reserves deflated 6.01% YoY, while total loans and investments surged by 10.74% and 10.72%, respectively. 

Yet over the years, cash holdings have declined (since 2013), loan growth has been recovering (post-2018 hikes), and investments have surged, partially replacing both. (Figure 2, middle image) 

Notably, despite the BSP’s historic liquidity injections, banks' cash reserves have continued to erode. 

The catch-22 is that if banks were profitable, why would they have shed cash reserves over the years? 

Why the series of RRR cuts? 

III. Viewing Bank’s Asset Growth Through the Lens of the PSE 

During the Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSEi) 30’s run-up to 7,500, Other Financial Corporations (OFCs)—potentially key players in the so-called "national team"—were substantial net buyers of both bank and non-bank equities. 

BSP, January 31, 2025: "The q-o-q rise in the other financial corporations’ domestic claims was attributable to the increase in its claims on the depository corporations, the other sectors, and the central government. In particular, the other financial corporations’ claims on the depository corporations grew as its holdings of bank-issued debt securities and equity shares increased.  Likewise, the sector’s claims on the other sectors grew as its investments in equity shares issued by other nonfinancial corporations and loans extended to households expanded. The growth in the OFCs’ domestic claims was further supported by the rise in the sector’s investments in government-issued debt securities" (bold added)

The OFCs consist of non-money market investment funds, other financial intermediaries (excluding insurance corporations and pension funds), financial auxiliaries, captive financial institutions and money lenders, insurance corporations, and pension funds.

In Q3 2024, claims on depository corporations surged 12% YoY, while claims on the private sector jumped 8%, both reaching record highs in nominal peso terms.

Meanwhile, the PSEi and Financial Index surged 15.1% and 23.4%, respectively. The Financial Index hit an all-time high of 2,423.37 on October 21st, and as of this writing, remains less than 10% below that peak. The Financial Index, which includes seven banks (AUB, BDO, BPI, MBT, CBC, SECB) and the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) as the sole non-bank component, has cushioned the PSEi 30 from a collapse. (Figure 2, lowest chart)


Figure 3

It has also supported the PSEi 30 and the PSE through the private sector claims. (Figure 3, topmost pane)

The irony is that OFCs continued purchasing bank shares even as the banking sector’s profit growth (across universal-commercial, thrift, and rural/cooperative banks) materially slowed (as BSP’s official rates rose)

In 2024, the banking system’s net profit growth fell to 9.8%, the lowest in four years. (Figure 3, middle chart)

Meanwhile, trading income—despite making up just 2.2% share of total operating income—soared 78.3% YoY. 

The crux is that the support provided to the Financial Index by the OFCs may have enabled banks to increase their asset base via their ‘investment’ accounts, while simultaneously propping up the PSEi 30. 

Yet, this also appears to mask the deteriorating internal fundamentals of Philippine banks. (Figure 3, lowest graph) 

There are several possibilities at play: 

1. The BSP’s influence could be a factor;

2. Banks may have acted like a cartel in coordinating their actions

3. The limited depth of Philippine capital markets may have forced the industry’s equity placements into a narrow set of options.

But in my humble view, the most telling indicator? Those coordinated intraday pumps—post-recess "afternoon delight" rallies and pre-closing floats—strongly suggest synchronized or coordinated activities.

The point of this explanation is that Philippine banks and non-bank institutions appear to be relying on asset inflation to boost their balance sheets. 

Aside from shielding banks through liquidity support for the real estate industry, have the BSP's RRR cuts also been designed to boost the PSEi 30?

IV. March 2025 RRR Cuts and the Liquidity Conundrum: Unraveling the Banking System’s Pressure Points 

Philstarnews.com, February 22, 2025: The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) surprised markets yesterday as it announced another major reduction in the amount of deposit banks are required to keep with the central bank. The BSP said it would reduce the reserve requirement ratios (RRR) of local banks, effective March 28, to free up more funds to boost the economy.  “The BSP reiterates its long-run goal of enabling banks to channel their funds more effectively toward productive loans and investments. Reducing RRRs will lessen frictions that hinder financial intermediation,” the central bank said…The regulator slashed the RRR for universal and commercial banks, as well as non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking functions (NBQBs) by 200 basis points, to five percent from the current level of seven percent. 

The BSP last reduced the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on October 25, 2024. With the next cut taking effect on March 28, 2025, this marks the fastest and largest RRR reduction in recent history.

In contrast, the BSP previously cut RRR rates from 18% to 14% over an eight-month period between May and December 2019.

Why the RRR Cuts if NPLs Are Not a Concern?


Figure 4

BSP’s balance sheet data from end-September to November 2024 shows that the RRR reduction led to a Php 124.5 billion decline in Reserve Deposits of Other Depository Corporations (RDoDC)—an estimate of the liquidity injected into the system. The downtrend in bank reserves since 2018 reflects the cumulative effect of these RRR cuts.  (Figure 4, topmost image)

Yet, despite the liquidity injection, the banking system’s cash and due-from-bank deposits continued to decline through December. It has been in a downtrend since 2013. (Figure 4, middle pane)

Cash reserves dropped 6% in 2024, marking the third consecutive annual decline. The BSP’s 2020-21 historic Php 2.3 trillion injection has largely dissipated.

Since peaking at Php 3.572 trillion in December 2021, cash levels have fallen by Php 828 billion to Php 2.743 trillion in December 2024—essentially returning to 2019 levels.  (Figure 4, lowest chart)


Figure 5

The BSP’s other key liquidity indicator, the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio has also weakened, resonating with the cash reserve trend. This decline, which began in 2013, was briefly offset by the BSP’s historic Php 2.3 trillion liquidity injection but has now resumed its downward trajectory. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

Other Factors Beyond Cash and Reserves

The slowdown isn’t limited to cash reserves. 

Deposit growth has also decelerated since 2013, despite reaching record highs in peso terms. Ironically, a robust 12.7% rebound in bank lending growth (excluding interbank loans and repos) in 2024, which should have spurred deposit growth, failed to translate into meaningful gains. Peso deposits grew by just 7% in 2024. (Figure 5, middle pane) 

The question arises: where did all this money go? 

This brings attention back onto the BSP’s stated goal of "enabling banks to channel funds more effectively toward productive loans and investments." This growing divergence between total loan portfolio growth and peso deposit expansion in the face of RRR cuts—20% before March 2018, now down to just 7% last October—raises further questions about its effectiveness in boosting productive lending and investment.

A Deeper Liquidity Strain: Rising Borrowings

Adding to signs of the increasing liquidity stress, bank borrowings hit an all-time high in 2024, both in gross and net terms. (Figure 5, lowest graph)


Figure 6

Total borrowings surged by Php 394.5 billion, pushing outstanding bank debt to a record Php 1.671 trillion.

More importantly, the focus of borrowing was in bill issuance, which accounted for 65% of total bank borrowings in 2024 (!)—a strong indicator of tightening liquidity. (Figure 6, topmost image)

If banks are highly profitable and NPLs are not a major issue, why are they borrowing so aggressively and requiring additional RRR cuts?

The liquidity squeeze cannot be attributed solely to RRR levels alone—otherwise, the 2018–2020 cut from 20% to 12% should have stemmed the tide.

V. Liquidity Drain: Record Investment Risks and Elevated Marked-to-Market Losses

There’s more to consider.

Beyond lending, bank investments—another key bank asset class—also hit a record high in peso terms in 2024.

Yet, despite lower fixed-income rates, banks continued to suffer heavy losses on their investment portfolios: Accumulated investment losses stood at Php 42.4 billion in 2024, after peaking at Php 122.85 billion in 2022. (Figure 6, middle diagram)

Banks have now reported four consecutive years of investment losses.

These losses undoubtedly strain liquidity, but what’s driving them?

The two primary investment categories—Available-for-Sale (AFS) and Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities—accounted for 40% and 52.6% of total bank investments, respectively.

Accumulated losses likely stem from AFS positions, reflecting volatility in equity, fixed-income, foreign exchange, and other trading activities.

VI. Despite Falling Rates, Bank’s Held-to-Maturity Assets Remain Near Record High

Interestingly, despite easing fixed-income rates, HTM assets remained close to their all-time high at Php 3.95 trillion in December 2024, barely below the December 2023 peak of Php 4.02 trillion.

Since January 2023, HTM holdings have hovered tightly between Php 3.9 trillion and Php 4 trillion.

Government Financing and Liquidity Risks

Yet, this plateau may not persist.

Beyond RRR cuts, the banking system’s Net Claims on Central Government (NCoCG) surged 7% to a new high of Php 5.541 trillion in December 2024.

Per BSP: "Net Claims on CG include domestic securities issued by, and loans extended to, the central government, net of liabilities such as deposits."

While this is often justified under Basel III capital adequacy measures, in reality, it functions as a quasi-quantitative easing (QE) mechanism—banks injecting liquidity into the financial system by financing the government.

The likely impact?

The losses in government securities are categorized as HTMs, effectively locking away liquidity.

BSP led Financial Stability Coordination Council (FSCC) noted in their 2017 Financial Stability Report in 2018 that: "Banks face marked-to-market (MtM) losses from rising interest rates. Higher market rates affect trading since existing holders of tradable securities are taking MtM losses as a result. While some banks have resorted to reclassifying their available-for-sale (AFS) securities into held-to-maturity (HTM), some PHP845.8 billion in AFS (as of end-March 2018) are still subject to MtMlosses. Furthermore, the shift to HTM would take away market liquidity since these securities could no longer be traded prior to their maturity" (bold mine) 

Curiously, discussions of HTM risks vanished from BSP-FSCC Financial Stability Reports after the 2017 and 2018 H1–2019 H1 issues.

VII. Moral Hazard and the "COVID Bailout Playbook"

Although NCoCG has been growing since 2015, banks accelerated their accumulation of government securities as part of the BSP’s 2020 pandemic rescue package. 

Are banks aggressively lending to generate liquidity solely to finance the government? Are they also using government debt to expand the collateral universe for increased lending? Government debt is also used as collateral for interbank loans and repo transactions. 

Have accounting regulations—such as HTM—transformed into a silo that shields Mark-to-Market losses? 

The growth of HTM has aligned with NCoCG. (Figure 6, lowest chart)

While this may satisfy Basel capital adequacy requirements, ironically, it also exposes the banking system to investment concentration risk, sovereign risk, and liquidity risk.

This suggests that reported bank "profits"—likely inflated by subsidies and relief measures—are overshadowed by a toxic mix of trading losses, HTM burdens, and potentially undeclared or hidden NPLs

These pressures have likely forced the BSP to aggressively cut RRR rates.

As anticipated, authorities appear poised to replicate the COVID-era bailout playbook, which they view as a success in averting a crisis.

The likely policy trajectory template includes DIRECT BSP infusions via NCoCG, record fiscal deficits, further RRR and policy rate cuts, accelerated bank infusions NCoCG, a higher cap on the USD/PHP exchange rate, and additional subsidies and relief measures for banks.

This is unfolding before us, one step at a time.

VIII. The Bigger Picture: Are We Headed for a Full-Blown Crisis?

Given the moral hazard embedded in this bailout mindset, banks may take on excessive risks, exacerbating "frictions in financial intermediation". Debt will beget more unproductive debt. "Ponzi finance" risks will intensify heightening liquidity constraints that could escalate into a full-blown crisis. 

Further, given the banking system’s fractional reserve operating framework, riskier bank behavior, whetted by reduced cash buffers, heightens the risks of lower consumer confidence in the banking system—which translates to a higher risk of a bank run

The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) reportedly has funds to cover 18.5% of insured deposits, or P3.53 trillion, as of 2023. 

So, with the RRR cuts, is the BSP gambling with this?

IX. Conclusion: RRR Cuts a High-Risk Strategy?

BSP’s statistics cannot be fully relied upon to assess the true health of the banking system.

1. The decline in non-performing loans (NPLs) is inconsistent with slowing economic growth and the deflationary spiral in the real estate sector. Likewise, falling NPLs contradict the ongoing liquidity pressures faced by banks.

2. Evidence of these liquidity strains is clear: bank borrowings have surged to record levels, with bill issuances dominating the market. The BSP’s RRR cuts only reinforce the mounting liquidity constraints. 

3. Beyond lending, banks have turned to investments to strengthen their balance sheets—including supporting the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), even as asset prices have become increasingly misaligned with corporate earnings.

4. In a bid to further boost systemic liquidity, implied quantitative easing (QE) spiked to an all-time high in December, which will likely translate into a higher volume of Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets.

Through aggressive RRR cuts, is the BSP taking a high-risk approach merely to uphold its statistical narrative?