The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock?

 

THE question of deficit finance is at the center of public discussion of economic matters today, as it is in any society undergoing serious price inflation, and as it should be, for there is no more basic connection in economic affairs than that linking deficit finance and inflation. Though Milton Friedman's aphorism that ''inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon'' is true (or as true as economic aphorisms get), it is equally true that sustained monetary expansions are always and everywhere a consequence of printing money to cover the difference between Government expenditures and tax revenues—Robert E. Lucas 

In this issue

The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock?

I. The Illusion of Fiscal Soundness: Benchmark-ism, Political Signaling, and the Fiscal Narrative

II. The Five-Month Reality Check: The Mask of March’s Spending Rollback

III. Revenue Performance: Strong Headline, Weak Underpinnings

A. May 2025 Revenue Dynamics

B. Five-Month Revenue Trends

IV. DBCC Downgrades 2025 GDP and Macroeconomic Targets

V. The Politics of Economic Forecasting and Revenue Implications

VI. Public Spending Patterns: Election Effects and Structural Trends

A. May 2025 Expenditure Analysis

B. Five-Month Spending Trends

C. Budget Execution and Future Projections

VII. Deficit Financing and Debt Servicing: A Ticking Time Bomb

A. Interest Payment Trends

B. Financing Implications

C. Liquidity, Interest Rate Pressures and the Bond Vigilantes

VIII. Conclusion: Beyond the Headlines: A Looming Fiscal Shock 

 

The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock? 

Fiscal Theater vs. Market Reality: A Critical Look at the 2025 Budget Trajectory Using May and 5-month Performance as Blueprint 

I. The Illusion of Fiscal Soundness: Benchmark-ism, Political Signaling, and the Fiscal Narrative 

This article is an update to our previous piece titled “Is the Philippines on the Brink of a 2025 Fiscal Shock?" 

Are Philippine authorities becoming increasingly desperate in their portrayal of economic health? Is there an escalating reliance on "benchmark-ism"—the artful embellishment of statistics and manipulation of market prices—to project an aura of ‘sound macroeconomics?’ 

Beyond the visible interventions—such as the quasi-price controls of Maximum Retail Prices (MSRPs) and the Php 20 rice initiatives, which signal low inflation—amid the emerging disconnect between market dynamics and banking conditions, does May’s fiscal deficit reflect political signaling? 

This article dissects the National Government’s (NG) fiscal performance for May 2025 and the first five months of the year, revealing structural nuances behind the headline figures and questioning the sustainability of current fiscal policies.

Figure 1

The Bureau of Treasury (BTr) reported: "The National Government’s (NG) fiscal position significantly improved in May 2025, with the budget deficit narrowing to Php 145.2 billion from Php 174.9 billion in the same month last year. This lower deficit was primarily driven by a robust 13.35% growth in revenue collections, alongside a moderation in expenditure growth to 3.81% during the national elections month. The cumulative deficit for the five-month period reached Php 523.9 billion, 29.41% (Php 119.1 billion) higher year-on-year (YoY), as the government accelerated investments in infrastructure and social programs to support inclusive growth. NG remains on track to meet its deficit target for the year through prudent fiscal management and efficient use of resources, in line with its Medium-Term Fiscal Program" (BTr, June 2025) [bold added] [Figure 1, upper graph] 

However, beneath the fog of political rhetoric, the election-induced public spending cap—mainly on infrastructure—appears to be the true catalyst behind May's reported budget improvement. The temporary restraint on government expenditures during the electoral period created an artificial enhancement in fiscal metrics that masks underlying structural concerns. 

II. The Five-Month Reality Check: The Mask of March’s Spending Rollback 

Examining the January-to-May period reveals a more complex narrative. The stated deficit of "Php 523.9 billion, 29.41% (Php 119.1 billion) higher year-on-year" actually reflects a substantial revision in March spending that resulted in a lower reported deficit. 

March public spending was revised downward by 2.2% or Php 32.784 billion, from Php 654.984 billion to Php 622.2 billion. This revision cascaded into a 5.9% reduction in the five-month deficit, from the original Php 556.7 billion to the revised Php 523.9 billion. Authorities attributed this revision to "trust transactions." 

Despite this rollback, the current deficit represents the THIRD-highest level on record, trailing only the unprecedented Php 566.204 billion and Php 562.176 billion recorded in 2021 and 2020, respectively. [Figure 1, lower chart]

Figure 2

Those record-high deficits reflected ‘fiscal stabilization’ policies during the pandemic recession, when deficit-to-GDP ratios reached 7.6% and 8.6% amid negative GDP growth of -8.02% in 2020 (pandemic recession) and +8.13% in 2021 in nominal terms, or -9.5% and +5.7% in real GDP terms.  (Figure 2, topmost window)  

Of course, these were funded by all-time high public debt (excluding indirect liabilities incurred by private firms under PPP projects). 

Remarkably, without a recession on the horizon, the five-month deficit has already surpassed the budget gaps of the last three years (2022-2024) and appears likely to either match or even exceed the 2020-2021 levels. 

This trajectory stands in stark contrast to authorities' optimistic target of a 5.3% deficit-to-GDP for 2025—revised to 5.5% just last week. Just 5.5%! Amazing. 

With financial markets seemingly complacent—barely pricing in any surprises—would the eventual revelation that the early 2025 deficit “blowout” might mimic the fiscal health of 2020–2021 trigger a significant market shock? 

Or has the risk premium been quietly numbed by a narrative of “contained inflation” and headline-driven optimism? 

In this climate, the interplay between fiscal slippage and monetary posture warrants closer scrutiny. If macro fundamentals continue to diverge from market sentiment, will the ‘bond vigilantes’ remain silent—or are they simply biding their time? 

III. Revenue Performance: Strong Headline, Weak Underpinnings 

While the five-month headline figures for revenues and expenditures did set new nominal records, the underlying structural details will ultimately dictate the fiscal year's trajectory. 

A. May 2025 Revenue Dynamics 

Total revenues grew by 13.35% in May 2025, slightly below the 14.6% recorded in May 2024. Tax revenues, comprising 75% of total revenues, expanded by 6.25%—nearly double the 3.35% growth rate of May 2024. This improvement was driven by the Bureau of Internal Revenue's (BIR) robust 10.71% growth, while the Bureau of Customs (BoC) contracted by 6.94%, contrasting with 2024's respective growth rates of 3.35% and 4.33%. 

Non-tax revenues surged 40.9% in May 2025, though this paled compared to the 98.6% spike recorded in May 2024. 

B. Five-Month Revenue Trends 

May's revenue outperformance lifted the cumulative five-month results. From January to May 2025, total revenue grew by 5.4%, representing significant deceleration from the 16.34% surge in the corresponding 2024 period. (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

Tax revenues, accounting for 89.7% of total collections, increased by 10.5%, marginally down from 2024's 11.2%. The BIR demonstrated resilience with 13.8% growth compared to 12.8% in 2024. However, the BoC stagnated with a mere 0.22% increase, dramatically lower than the previous year's 6% growth. 

Despite May's surge, non-tax revenues contracted by 24.8% in the first five months of 2025, a sharp reversal from the 60.6% growth spike recorded last year. 

While the BIR shows resilience, the BoC and non-tax revenues lag, signaling vulnerabilities in revenue diversification. 

IV. DBCC Downgrades 2025 GDP and Macroeconomic Targets 

Authorities markedly lowered their GDP target for 2025. According to ABS-CBN News on June 26, "The Philippines has again revised its growth target for the year, citing heightened global uncertainties such as the conflict in the Middle East and the imposition of US tariffs. The Development and Budget Coordination Committee on Thursday said it was targeting an economic growth range of 5.5 to 6.5 percent. In December last year, the target for 2025 was set at 6 to 8 percent." (bold added) (Figure 2, lower image) 

The BSP's June rate cut also hinted at growth moderation. As reported by ABS-CBN News on June 19: "BSP Deputy Governor Zeno Abenoja said the central bank also eased rates due to the possible 'moderation' in economic activity." (bold added) 

The most striking revision involved reducing the upper end of the growth target from 8% to 6.5%—a substantial markdown that signals underlying economic concerns! 

V. The Politics of Economic Forecasting and Revenue Implications 

The Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC), as an inter-agency body, represents an inherently political institution plagued by ‘optimism bias’—the tendency to overestimate GDP growth. This bias stems from multiple sources: political pressure to maintain public confidence for approval ratings, the need to justify ambitious economic targets for budget and spending projections, and the imperative to maintain access to affordable financing through public savings. 

Authorities also embrace the Keynesian concept of ‘animal spirits,’ believing that overly optimistic predictions boost business and consumer confidence, thereby spurring increased spending to drive GDP growth. 

Likewise, by promoting investor sentiment, they hope that buoyant markets will create a ‘wealth effect’ that further bolsters spending and economic growth. Rising asset markets may translate capital gains into increased consumption, while higher collateral values encourage more debt-financed spending to energize GDP. 

However, because authorities rely on “data-dependent” approaches, they turn to economic models anchored in historical data and rigid assumptions—often constructed through ex-post analysis. 

Yet effective forecasting requires more than backward-looking templates; it demands grappling with the complexities of purposive human action, where theory operates not as a passive derivative of data, but as a deductive logical framework for validation or falsification. 

As economist Ludwig von Mises observed: 

"Experience of economic history is always experience of complex phenomena. It can never convey knowledge of the kind the experimenter abstracts from a laboratory experiment. Statistics is a method for the presentation of historical facts concerning prices and other relevant data of human action. It is not economics and cannot produce economic theorems and theories." (Mises, 1998) (bold added) 

Because the DBCC relies on “data-dependent” econometric models that essentially project the past into the future, authorities attempt to smooth out forecasting errors through revisions. 

They often rely on ‘availability bias or heuristic’ to inject perceived relevance into their projections.  

They also embrace ‘attribution bias’—crediting positive developments as their accomplishments, while assigning blame for adverse outcomes to exogenous factors. 

Last week’s GDP downgrade exemplifies this pattern. Authorities cited the Middle East conflict and new US tariffs to justify the lower projections—an example of political messaging shaped by both availability and attribution biases. 

This GDP downgrade carries significant implications, as revenues depend on both economic conditions and collection efficiency. If authorities have already observed signs of economic “moderation” that warranted substantial downward revisions—yet continue to overstate targets—this suggests that actual GDP may fall well below projections. 

A lower GDP would likely erode public revenues, potentially setting off a vicious cycle of fiscal deterioration. 

VI. Public Spending Patterns: Election Effects and Structural Trends 

A. May 2025 Expenditure Analysis 

Public spending barely grew in May—the mid-term election period—increasing by only 0.22% compared to 22.24% in 2024. National disbursements remained virtually unchanged at 0.12% versus 22.22% in 2024. Local government unit (LGU) spending increased 14.5%, accelerating from 8.54% last year. Interest payments jumped 14.5% compared to 47.8% in 2024. 

The national government commanded the largest expenditure share at 69.9%, followed by LGUs at 16.15% and interest payments at 12.1%. 

B. Five-Month Spending Trends 

Though public spending in the first five months of 2025 reached record levels in peso terms, growth moderated to 9.7% from 10.6% in 2024. LGU spending growth of 13.2% exceeded 2024's 10.6%. Both national government and interest payments registered lower growth rates of 9.24% and 11.14% respectively, compared to 14.83% and 40% in the previous year.

Figure 3 

Despite decreased growth rates, interest payments hit record highs in peso terms, with their expenditure share reaching 14.43%—the highest level since 2010. (Figure 3, upper visual) 

C. Budget Execution and Future Projections 

The selective infrastructure ban during elections, combined with March's spending cuts, clearly reduced five-month disbursements and the fiscal deficit. Public spending in the first five months totaled Php 2.447 trillion, representing 39.16% of the annual budget. 

With seven months remaining to utilize the annual allocation of Php 6.326 trillion, government outlays must average Php 549.83 billion monthly. If the executive branch continues asserting dominance over Congress, the six-year trend of budget excess will likely extend to a seventh year in 2025. (Prudent Investor, May 2025) 

Crucially, with authorities anticipating a potential significant shortfall in GDP, the recent spending limitations due to the exercise of suffrage could translate into a substantial back-loading of the budget in June or Q3. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

That is to say, even if June 2025's deficit merely hits its four-year average of Php 200 billion, the six-month budget gap would soar to Php 723.9 billion, surpassing the 2021 record of Php 716.07 billion! 

Thus, it defies sensible logic for authorities to assert, "NG remains on track to meet its deficit target for the year through prudent fiscal management," as this would amount to a complete inversion of economic reality. 

The crucial question is, ‘how would markets react to a likely fiscal blowout?’

VII. Deficit Financing and Debt Servicing: A Ticking Time Bomb 

How will the current deficit be financed? 

A. Interest Payment Trends 

While 2025's five-month interest payment growth of 11.14% was considerably slower than 2024's 40%, nominal values reached record highs, with interest payments' share of public expenditure rising to its highest level since 2010.

Figure 4

Including amortizations, public debt servicing costs declined significantly by 42.22% compared to the previous year, which had posted a 48.5% growth spike. This wide gap primarily resulted from a 61.4% plunge in amortizations. (Figure 4, topmost graph) 

However, the five-month foreign exchange (FX) share of debt servicing accelerated dramatically from 18.94% in 2024 to 38.6% this year. (Figure 4, middle window) 

B. Financing Implications 

Several critical observations emerge from the data. 

First, authorities may currently be paying less due to scheduling reasons, 2024 prepayments, or political considerations—to avoid arousing public concern or triggering uproar over the rising national debt. 

Second, the widening deficit represents no free lunch—someone must fill the financing void. In the first five months, debt financing surged 86.24%, from Php 527.248 billion to Php 981.94 billion. (Figure 4, lowest image) 

Regardless of how authorities obscure these costs, sustained borrowing will inevitably translate into higher servicing burdens. 

As we noted last May: 

This trend suggests a potential roadmap for 2025, with foreign borrowing likely to rise significantly. The implications are multifaceted: 

-Higher debt leads to higher debt servicing—and vice versa—in a vicious self-reinforcing feedback loop.  

-Increasing portions of the budget will be diverted toward debt repayment, crowding out other government spending priorities. In this case, crowding out applies not only to the private sector, but also to public expenditures.  

-Revenue gains may yield diminishing returns as debt servicing costs continue to spiral.  

-Inflation risks will heighten, driven by domestic credit expansion, and potential peso depreciation  

-Mounting pressure to raise taxes will emerge to bridge the fiscal gap and sustain government operations. (Prudent Investor, May 2025)

Figure 5

Third, public debt surged 10.24% YoY to hit a fresh all-time high of Php 16.95 trillion in May and will likely continue climbing through bond issuance to finance a swelling deficit! (Figure 5, topmost pane) 

The increase in May’s public debt was partly muted by a stronger peso. The BTr noted, "The decrease was due to P3.55 billion in net repayments and the strengthening of the peso, which reduced the peso value of foreign debt by P29.35 billion." 

But of course, this represents statistical "smoke and mirrors," as FX debt will ultimately be repaid in foreign currency—not pesos. In a nutshell, the strong peso disguises the actual extent of the public debt increase. 

Fourth, despite record-high government cash holdings of Php 1.181 trillion, the Bureau of the Treasury reported a cash deficit of Php 23.14 billion in May—underscoring underlying liquidity strains. 

Fifth, banks will likely remain the primary vehicle for deficit financing. While their Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets slightly declined from a record Php 4.06 trillion in March to Php 4.036 trillion in April, this was mirrored in net claims on the central government (NCoCG), which moderated from Php 5.58 trillion in March to Php 5.5 trillion in May (+9.36% YoY). Notably, NCoCG has closely tracked the trajectory of HTM assets. (Figure 5, topmost and middle visuals) 

C. Liquidity, Interest Rate Pressures and the Bond Vigilantes 

Beyond government debt affecting bank liquidity conditions, competition for public savings between banks and non-financial conglomerates continues to tighten financial conditions—via liquidity constraints and upward pressure on interest rates. 

The crowding-out effect from rising issuance of government, bank, and corporate debt further diverts savings toward non-productive ends: debt refinancing, politically driven consumption, and speculative “build-and-they-will-come” ventures. 

Despite this, Philippine Treasury markets and the USD-PHP exchange rate appear defiant in the face of the BSP’s easing cycle—even as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) trends lower—as previously discussed) 

Globally, rising yields amid mounting debt loads have reawakened the specter of “bond vigilantes”—their resurgence partly driven by balance sheet reductions and Quantitative Tightening. Their presence is evident in the upward drift of sovereign yields (e.g. Japan 10Y, US 10Y, Germany 10Y and UK 10Y), posing a risk that could reverberate across local markets. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

In response, the Philippine government has redoubled efforts to lower rates through a variety of channels—ranging from quasi-price controls to market interventions to an intensified BSP easing cycle. 

Yet perhaps most telling is its increasing reliance on statistical legerdemain or "benchmark-ism"—notably, the reconstitution of the real estate index to erase prior deflationary prints, despite soaring commercial vacancy rates—a subject, of course, for another post. 

VIII. Conclusion: Beyond the Headlines: A Looming Fiscal Shock 

What authorities frame as "prudent fiscal management" increasingly looks like an exercise in political optics designed to pacify markets and voters, while deeper structural risks build beneath the surface. Headline improvements in the deficit mask the reality of slowing revenue momentum, surging financing needs, rising reliance on FX debt, and a likely surge in second-half deficit. 

As markets remain lulled by political signaling, the Philippines moves closer to a fiscal reckoning — one where statistical smoothing and policy theater will no longer suffice. 

The key question: how will markets and the public react when the full weight of these imbalances becomes undeniable? 

___

References 

Bureau of Treasury, National Government’s Budget Deficit Narrows to Php 145.2 Billion in May 2025 Amid Sustained Strong Revenue Growth June 26, 2025 https://www.treasury.gov.ph/

Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, p.348 Mises Institute, 1998, Mises.org 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Fiscal Performance in Q1 2025: Record Deficit Amid Centralizing Power, Substack May 4, 2025

Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees, Unveiling Its Hidden Messages

There is no escape from debt. Paying for the government’s fictitious promises in paper money will result in a constantly depreciating currency, thereby impoverishing those who earn a wage or have savings. Inflation is the hidden tax, and it is very convenient for governments because they always blame shops or businesses and present themselves as the solution by printing even more currency. Governments want more inflation to reduce the impact of the enormous debt and unfunded liabilities in real terms. They know they can’t tax you more, so they will tax you indirectly by destroying the purchasing power of the currency they issue—Daniel Lacalle

 In this issue

Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees, Unveiling Its Hidden Messages

I. Unveiling the Likely Hidden Messages Behind the Declaration of Victory Over Inflation

II. Treasury Curve was Spot On about Inflation, Short-Term Treasury Yields Plunge! Will the BSP Cut by 50 bps?

III. Supply-Side Disinflation? Despite Strong Credit Growth, Manufacturing Remains in the Doldrums, as Reflected by PPI Deflation and Output Sluggishness

IV. Supply-Side Disinflation? Lethargic Consumer Imports and July FDI Reflect Frail Capital Goods Imports

V. Demand-Side Disinflation? September CPI Plunged Despite Vigorous August Consumer Bank Lending, Liquidity Growth Dived

VI. Disinflation with Employment at Near Historic Highs Backed by a Credit Boom? Slower Deficit Spending Puts Pressure on Liquidity Strains

VII. SWS’s Self-Rated Poverty Survey versus the Government’s CPI 

Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees: Unveiling Its Hidden Messages

A Philippine media outlet proclaimed that the Philippine government won its battle against inflation, while a private survey contradicted this view. Who's right?

I. Unveiling the Likely Hidden Messages Behind the Declaration of Victory Over Inflation

Figure 1 

Two interesting headlines that hallmark this week’s conflicting message on inflation. 

Inquirer.net, October 7, 2024: The Philippines may now declare victory in its long and painful fight against inflation after price growth last month eased to a four-year low, helping create the perfect economic condition for gradual interest rate cuts…The BSP is now at a point where it has to undo its most forceful tightening actions in two decades, which had sent the benchmark rate to its highest level in 17 years to tame stubbornly high inflation. Cutting borrowing costs is necessary amid market predictions that the economy may grow below the government’s target for this year after consumption showed signs of weakening…Moving forward, Governor Eli Remolona Jr. said the central bank would take “baby steps” until the key rate falls to 4.5 percent by the end of 2025, suggesting that monetary authorities would unlikely resort to jumbo cuts that may stir up market fears that the economy is headed for a hard landing. (bold mine)

SWS.org.ph, October 9, 2024: The national Social Weather Survey of September 14-23, 2024, found 59% of Filipino families rating themselves as Mahirap or Poor, 13% rating themselves as Borderline (by placing themselves on a line dividing Poor and Not Poor), and 28% rating themselves as Hindi Mahirap or Not Poor. The September 2024 percentage of Self-Rated Poor families rose by 1 point from 58% in June 2024, following a significant 12-point rise from 46% in March 2024. This was the highest percentage of Self-Rated Poor families since June 2008. The estimated numbers of Self-Rated Poor families were 16.3 million in September 2024 and 16.0 million in June 2024. The percentage of respondent households rating themselves as poor was applied to the Philippine Statistics Authority medium-population projections for 2024 to arrive at the estimated numbers of Self-Rated Poor families… The September 2024 survey found the percentage of Borderline families at 13%, up by 1 point from the record low 12% in June 2024 following an 18-point decline from 30% in March 2024… As of September 2024, the percentage of Not Poor families was at 28%, 2 points below the record high 30% in June 2024. (bold mine)

First and foremost, what does "declare victory in its long and painful fight against inflation" mean? (Figure 1, upper tweet)

The Philippine CPI posted two straight months of DEFLATION (statistical price decreases) in September (-0.37%) and October (-0.19%) 2015; yet, the media and establishment experts barely made such a brazen pronouncement until now.

Yes, Q3 2024 statistical inflation of 3.2% has dropped to its 9-year support level, but this doesn’t mean that the inflation cycle has been broken.

Figure 2 

In Q3 2015, the CPI slipped into deflation at -0.1%, which prompted banks to accelerate their net claims on central government (NCoCG) or indirect QE. Ironically, this germinated the current inflation cycle, which is now on its ninth-year.  (Figure 2 upper image)

Despite its recent decline, given that the CPI has remained on an uptrend since 2015 and appears to have settled at the support levels, what assurances does the establishment hold that it won’t be subject to a third wave?

Second, the September CPI of 1.9% doesn’t translate to the evisceration of inflation; it only means that GENERAL prices have risen at REDUCED rates (or have dropped to within the BSP’s target), but they are still RISING!

In fact, BSP data tell us that even in the context of the understated inflation rate, over 99% of the purchasing power of the peso has been eroded since 1957! How is that for "declaring victory over inflation"? (Figure 2, lower chart)

On the other hand, while authorities and media bask in this pretentious statistical feat, a private sector survey tell us a different story: slower inflation has exposed the persistent and growing burden of a lower standard of living! (More on this below.) (Figure 1, lower tweet)

Third, "declaring victory over inflation" was NEVER a goal of the BSP’s monetary policy anchored on inflation targeting.

From the BSP: The primary objective of the BSP's monetary policy is “to promote price stability conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy” (Republic Act 7653). The adoption of inflation targeting framework of monetary policy in January 2002 is aimed at achieving this objective. Inflation targeting is focused mainly on achieving a low and stable inflation, supportive of the economy’s growth objective. This approach entails the announcement of an explicit inflation target that the BSP promises to achieve over a given time period. (bold mine)

There is no defined quantification or qualification of "low and stable inflation" because statistical inflation has always been a subjective measure, arbitrarily defined by the BSP.

That said, the goal of the politics behind inflation targeting has been to keep the inflation "genie" confined within the boundaries of the BSP’s proverbial "lamp."

That’s because inflation, as a hidden tax, benefits the government most.

However, the inflation genie has been set loose, or has gone beyond its bounds, marking the difference between the previous era and today.

In this way, the BSP can be conservatively said to have been "asleep at the wheel."

At worst, and unbeknownst to the public, the BSP’s policies have unleashed the inflation genie!

Or, although authorities continue to push the narrative of supply-side-driven inflation to shift the blame onto the private sector, the current inflation cycle signify an unintended consequence of their policies!

Yet, has anyone among the array of establishment experts, including those in government, been correct in predicting the incumbent inflation cycle? 

Fourth, the CPI is just a statistic. While its intent is to approximate changes in general prices, it neither reveals the full accuracy nor explains the causes of those changes. 

The fact is that inflation statistics are misleading.

My inflation rate and yours are different.  This is because of dynamic individual spending habits and ever-changing preferences that vary not only over time but also differs across individuals. 

Is it not the averaging a Netflix subscription and rice an exercise of apples-to-oranges comparison?  If so, would this not be applied to the CPI? 

Or, not only is the weighted averaging of goods and services across different groups of people a flawed metric, but people’s spending preferences are constantly changing! 

How accurate is an inflation rate derived from averaging the spending patterns of billionaires with those of the bottom 30%? 

Even on a personal level, my preferences are always changing. If I prefer sautéed prawns with bread this moment, adobo with rice later, and only sinigang for tomorrow, how could the inputs used to create these meals be accurately averaged? How would this apply to a population of 110 million people? 

Furthermore, because the CPI is a politically sensitive statistic—created and calculated by politically sensitive institutions—it is prone not only to errors (in assumptions, inputs, etc.) but also to political biases. 

For instance, changing the base year of the CPI can lead to different outcomes. If I’m not mistaken, using the now-defunct 2006 base would produce a much higher CPI today than the current 2018 base. 

Since the CPI is used as a primary benchmark for the market’s pricing of interest rates, wouldn’t the government—as the biggest borrowers—have the incentive or motivation to suppress it to influence the cost of borrowing? 

Fifth, what happened to journalism? 

Isn’t journalism about "seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues"? 

When media outlets use ambiguous qualifications like " declare victory against inflation" to describe the "perfect economic condition for gradual interest rate cuts" intended to support "consumption (which) showed signs of weakening," could this not signify cheerleading or an advocacy for a biased policy stance? For whose benefit? 

Might this be seen as advancing the interests of vested groups, particularly the primary beneficiary, the government and the politically connected elites? How is this different from propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation? 

Importantly, if an alleged news article makes an economic generalization, why would it lack narratives supported by economic logic? 

Or, are low rates a GUARANTEE of an INCREASE in consumption? How so, and based on what theory and evidence? 

Why cite partisan and non-sequitur explanations from "establishment experts" whose principal-agent problems have hardly been laid bare to the public? 

Have media outlets distilled such insights or selected statements for print that only promote their biases? I’ve seen this happen (personally) before, which is why I refuse interviews. 

Sixth, if media pronouncements reflect exuded marketplace confidence, could such article/s signify a manifestation of the magazine/headline cover indicator or express an extreme state of sentiment? 

Or have the media’s declarations echoed the "overconfidence" stemming from recent euphoria over the price spikes in Philippine assets (stocks, bonds, and the peso)? 

Seventh and lastly, could this be related to the upcoming elections? 

Will declaring 'victory in its long and painful fight against inflation' be part of the campaign to promote the electoral chances of the administration’s national slate in the 2025 midterm elections? 

Ultimately, the establishment's obsession has been to promote a regime of easy money, using the declaration of triumph over inflation as justification. 

As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises once explained 

The popularity of inflation and credit expansion, the ultimate source of the repeated attempts to render people prosperous by credit expansion, and thus the cause of the cyclical fluctuations of business, manifests itself clearly in the customary terminology. The boom is called good business, prosperity, and upswing. Its unavoidable aftermath, the readjustment of conditions to the real data of the market, is called crisis, slump, bad business, depression. People rebel against the insight that the disturbing element is to be seen in the malinvestment and the overconsumption of the boom period and that such an artificially induced boom is doomed. They are looking for the philosophers' stone to make it last (Mises, 2019)  

II. Treasury Curve was Spot On about Inflation, Short-Term Treasury Yields Plunge! Will the BSP Cut by 50 bps? 

While the headline CPI plummeted from 3.3% in August to 1.9% in September—its lowest monthly rate since May 2020—excluding food and energy, the core CPI slipped to 2.4%, signifying 17 of 18 months of decline (one unchanged) since peaking at 8% in March 2023. 

Before that, we showed how changes in the Philippine yield curve have accurately predicted the CPI slump. 

despite the 4.4% CPI bump in July (and Q2 6.3% GDP), the Philippine treasury market continues to defy inflationary expectations by maintaining a deep inversion of the curve’s belly, which again signals slower inflation, upcoming BSP cuts, and increased financial and economic uncertainty. (Prudent Investor, August 2024) 

… 

Moreover, the curious take is that despite all the massive stimulus, the belly’s inversion in the Philippine treasury market has only deepened at the close of August.  

This does not suggest a build-up of price pressures or a strong rebound in the private sector. On the other hand, rising short-term rates indicate intensifying liquidity issues.   

In the end, while Marcos-nomics stimulus seems to have reaccelerated liquidity, a resurgence of inflation is likely to exacerbate "stagflationary" pressures and increase the likelihood of a bust in the Philippines’ credit bubble. (Prudent Investor, September 2024) 

Volatility has crescendoed in the Philippine treasury curve.

Figure 3

The present slope exhibits an astounding collapse in short-term rates (STIR), manifesting institutional market expectations of substantial cuts in BSP rates. Will the BSP cut by 50 bps this October? (Figure 3, upper graph) 

Yet, the curve’s magnified volatility has been incredible: following the gradual transition from flat to an inverted curve, then swiftly to a bullish steepening, and next to the current abrupt regression to a partial belly inversion—even with the plunge in STIR—how could this not be conducive to the rising risks of stagflation?

III. Supply-Side Disinflation? Despite Strong Credit Growth, Manufacturing Remains in the Doldrums, as Reflected by PPI Deflation and Output Sluggishness 

While we perceive government statistics with cynicism, we still use them because almost every financial market participant does.

Instead of focusing on the potential factors for the drop, the mainstream fixates on the prospective policy easing by the BSP.

Could the plunge in inflation have been a supply-side phenomenon marked by a glut?

In a word: Barely.

Manufacturing value grew by 2.9% in June, 6.45% in July, and 1.78% in August, while volume was up by 3.2%, 6.9%, and 2.8% over the same period.

Meanwhile, despite strong Universal Commercial Bank (UCB) loan growth to this sector—rising by 8.9%, 9.5%, and 9.8%—the Producer Price Index (PPI) deflated by -0.2%, -0.4%, and -1%. (Figure 3, lower chart)

Here’s the question: Why has robust credit growth not been reflected in output performance?

Worse yet, why is the deflation in the PPI escalating? PPI defined by the Philippine Statistics Authority, "measures the average change over time in the prices of products or commodities produced by domestic manufactures and sold at factory gate prices."

Where has all the credit money generated gone?

Has it been diverted to real estate or other undeclared allocations? Or has it been used for refinancing existing liabilities?

IV. Supply-Side Disinflation? Lethargic Consumer Imports and July FDI Reflect Frail Capital Goods Imports

If manufacturing growth has been unimpressive or sluggish, the situation is even worse for imports.

Imports in USD posted a 7.3% YoY contraction in June, then rose by 7.3% in July and 1.8% in August.

Converted to average pesos, imports were down by 2.63% YoY in June, surged by 14.3% in July, and grew by 4.6% in August, with the last month’s growth reflecting revaluation effects from a strong peso.

Figure 4

Here’s the thing: Consumer goods USD imports contracted by 7.3% in June, increased by 3.1% in July, and remained unchanged in August. (Figure 4, topmost pane)

Meanwhile, capital goods imports shrank by 8.8% in June but surged by 9.5% and 9.6% in the next two months. A substantial segment of the YoY changes reflects base effects. (Figure 4, middle diagram)

Nonetheless, the growth in capital goods imports partly reflected foreign direct investment (FDI).

The prosaic July FDI growth of 5.5% YoY (7.5% year-to-date) resonated with mediocre import growth. (Figure 4, lowest graph)

Yet, debt accounted for 74.3% of total FDI inflows and 63.5% of year-to-date FDI inflows. How much of this represent actual investments?

Still, why is the growth rate of FDIs declining?

Importantly, where are the investment pledges from the US-NATO allies?

V. Demand-Side Disinflation? September CPI Plunged Despite Vigorous August Consumer Bank Lending, Liquidity Growth Dived

Was the CPI slump a function of demand?

In short, yes!

We should put into context the seismic transformation of the Philippine banking system, with its recent focus on consumer loans coming at the expense of the supply side.

Figure 5

Universal Commercial (UC) bank consumer lending slowed from 24.3% year-over-year (YoY) in July to 23.7% in August, marking its slowest pace since November 2023. (Figure 5, topmost chart)

Consumer loan growth was strong across all segments in August: credit cards +27.44%, auto loans +19.3%, salary loans +16.4%, and others +26.8%.

Meanwhile, production loans continue to accelerate, expanding from 8.8% in July to 9.4% YoY in August, primarily in the real estate and trade sectors.

Overall, UC bank lending grew from 10.4% to 10.9% in August (Figure 4, second to the highest graph)

Despite mainstream claims of "restrictiveness" or "tightness" due to elevated rates, UC Bank's loan growth has been on an uptrend. Still, the CPI continues its downward trajectory!

Worse yet, despite this, financial liquidity plummeted in August.

M3 growth, which was 7.3% in July, dived to 5.5% in August. Incredible.

Incidentally, the yield curve inversion reflected this!

Once again, what happened to all the record money creation by the banking system and the BSP? Why the black hole?

VI. Disinflation with Employment at Near Historic Highs Backed by a Credit Boom? Slower Deficit Spending Puts Pressure on Liquidity Strains

Why could this be happening when employment rates are near all-time highs?

It was 96% last August, only a smidgen lower than the 96.9% record set last December 2023. (Figure 5, second to the lowest window)

Could it be that, aside from trade, government jobs were the primary source of growth in August? (Figure 5, lowest image)

Or could it also have been that employment growth has been mostly about low-quality labor? Alternatively, could the employment data also have been embellished?

Figure 6

Moreover, as we previously noted, because Philippine public spending has slowed, the fiscal deficit slightly "narrowed" year-to-date (YTD) as of August. Public spending has tracked the CPI over the long-term. (Figure 6, topmost diagram) 

As a result, aided by the strong peso, public debt marginally weakened in August.

Moreover, has the stalling growth in system leverage (UC bank credit + public debt) contributed to the demand pressures reflected in the CPI? (Figure 6, second to the highest graph)

Consequently, net claims on the central government (NCoCG) by banks and the BSP plateaued or consolidated. (Figure 6, second to the lowest chart)

Or, aside from the BSP, liquidity injections channeled through banks have slowed slightly.

This, combined with a stealth rise in bank non-performing loans (NPLs) and elevated levels of held-to-maturity assets (HTMs), has contributed to the liquidity squeeze.

And this has occurred despite the record nominal bank credit expansion and historically high employment rates. The plunge in September’s CPI might reflect a downturn in public and private demand, possibly worsened by mounting signs of a liquidity shortfall.

VII. SWS’s Self-Rated Poverty Survey versus the Government’s CPI 

Things don’t happen in a vacuum.

The BSP suddenly announced a massive reduction of the banking system’s reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on September 20th, obviously in response to such developments. The adjustment takes effect on October 25.

The PSA’s September CPI data exhibits a broad-based decline in price growth. While food prices had the biggest influence on the CPI’s significant downside volatility, slowing aggregate demand reflected the diminishing pace of price increases across most sectors. (Figure 6, lowest image)

All these factors point to the SWS Q3 data indicating an increase in self-rated poverty, which not only highlights the decline in living standards for a significant majority of families but also emphasizes the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots.

As a caveat, survey-based statistics are vulnerable to errors and biases; the SWS is no exception.

Though the proclivity to massage data for political goals is higher for the government, we can’t discount its influence on private sector pollsters either.

In any case, we suspect that a phone call from the office of the political higher-ups may compel conflicting surveys to align as one.

____

References 

Ludwig von Mises, The Boom Is Worse than the Bust, November 30, 2018 Mises.org 

Prudent Investor, The Philippines' July 4.4% CPI: Stagflation Remains a Primary Political, Economic, and Financial Risk August 12, 2024

 

Prudent Investor, Philippine Government’s July Deficit "Narrowed" from Changes in VAT Reporting Schedule, Raised USD 2.5 Billion Plus $500 Million Climate Financing September 1, 2024

  

The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects

In economics, hope and faith coexist with great scientific pretension and also a deep desire for respectability—John Kenneth Galbraith 

In this issue

The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects

I. 2024 SONA Pump: Are Philippine Stocks and the Peso Immune to Global De-Risking and Deleveraging?

II. The History of BBM's Pre-SONA PSEi 30 Pumps 

III. Explaining the Index Pump: Concentrated Gains and Rotational Activities

IV. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentrated Trading Activities amidst Decadent Volume

V. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentration in Broker Activities with Marginal Brokers Squeezed Dry 

VI. More Signs of Liquidity Squeeze: Decaying Market Depth and Weakening Market Breadth 

VII. Divergent Signals from the SONA 2024 Pump: Key Points to Ponder

VIII. 2024 SONA Pump: Foreign Money Cushions Domestic Savings Deficiency

IX. 2024 SONA Pump: Engineered by Domestic Financial Institutions?

X. 2024 SONA PUMP: PSEi 30 at 6,800: Windfall from Liquidity Expansion and Conclusion 

The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects 

As the Philippine President is about to deliver his third SONA, the PSEi 30 has surged for a fourth straight week to 6,800. What makes these gains artificial? 

I. 2024 SONA Pump: Are Philippine Stocks and the Peso Immune to Global De-Risking and Deleveraging? 

The Philippine PSEi 30 closed the week ending July 19th just shy of the 6,800 level. 

Philstar.com, July 20: The local stock market inched its way closer to the 6,800-level, finishing the week on a high note despite a downtrend in Asian shares. The local stock market inched its way closer to the 6,800-level, finishing the week on a high note despite a downtrend in Asian shares… a stronger peso and optimistic economic prospects buoyed local market sentiment… also anticipating the second quarter corporate earnings results. 

In addition to the above, 'strong net foreign buying' contributed to this outperformance. 

Previously, a more prominent explanation had been expectations of rate cuts by the Fed and potential monetary easing by the BSP. 

Financial market news coverage has been mechanically influenced by current events—specifically, the 'availability bias' described in post hoc narratives: because of this event, therefore that. As a result, recent events receive disproportionate attribution and focus. 

However, there seems to be a crucial event missing from this coverage: the political leadership is slated to deliver the annual State of the Nation Address (SONA) on July 22nd, Monday. 

Figure 1 

With a 2.16% advance this week, the PSEi 30 has enjoyed its fourth consecutive weekly winning streak. This weekly gain has propelled the Philippine benchmark to be the second-best performer among its regional peers, following Mongolia’s MSE. (Figure 1, topmost image) 

Remarkably, the PSEi outperformed amidst a prevailing downturn in the Asian market, where 12 out of the 19 national benchmarks closed lower by an average of 0.53%. 

Furthermore, the increased risk appetite for Philippine assets was also reflected in the Philippine peso, which was the only Asian currency to advance this week amidst a strong USD. (Figure 1, middle graph) 

The US dollar index $DXY grew by 0.27% WoW, but eight of the nine regional currencies, excluding Japan, closed lower. 

The USD-Philippine peso $USDPHP retraced by 0.08%, from last July 12’s quote of Php 58.38 to Php 58.335. 

While the yield of the Philippine 10-year bond dived a week earlier, paving the way for its outperformance in the region, it remained unchanged this week as most of the regional peers experienced declines. (Figure 1, lowest diagram)

Figure 2

In contrast, Emerging Asia’s 5-year credit default swap (CDS) exhibited a 520-basis points spike in Philippine CDS (ADB data), indicating that while it comes from a low base, a sustained regional risk-off sentiment could reverse any recent gains. China’s CDS soared by 930 bps. (Figure 2, topmost and middle charts) 

How do the causalities cited by the local media fit into this context? 

The strengthening dollar, falling bond yields, declining stocks, and rising CDS are likely symptoms of de-risking and deleveraging in the face of slowing economies and potential rate cuts. 

Are Philippine stocks and the peso suggesting immunity to this emerging phenomenon? 

II. The History of BBM's Pre-SONA PSEi 30 Pumps

Here is the most important thing the echo chamber has critically missed: 

Since the inauguration of the incumbent President in 2022, the PSEi 30 has enjoyed a series of pre-State of the Nation Address (SONA) pumps. 

The incumbent's previous SONAs were on July 25, 2022, and July 24, 2023. 

From the 6,065.23 trough on June 23, 2022, the PSEi 30 soared to a peak of 6,863.86 on August 19 of the same year, delivering a 13.17% return. (Figure 2, lowest graph) 

The PSEi 30 then surrendered all of those gains and more but found a second post-election honeymoon in October, alongside the UK’s Bank of England (BoE) rescue of its emerging pension crisis, which saw global stocks bottom and reverse to the upside. 

The second SONA pump began on July 7, 2023. It emerged from an interim low of 6,379.03 to reach an interim high of 6,679.13 on July 26, 2023, resulting in a 4.7% return. 

In both instances, the PSEi 30 surrendered all its fleeting gains in no time. 

The third SONA pump came at the temporary bottom of 6,158.48 on June 21, 2024, following the Ayungin Shoal incident. Through July 19th or at 6,791.69, the PSEi 30 has returned by 10.3%. 

How will this time be different compared to its recent predecessors? 

Nota Bene: The SONA pumping cycle doesn’t necessarily end on its actual date, as factors such as momentum and domestic and local liquidity flows may determine its lifespan. 

III. Explaining the Index Pump: Concentrated Gains and Rotational Activities 

Why is it an index pump?

Figure 3

This week's 2.16% gain represents the largest week-before-SONA returns. (Figure 3, topmost chart). The difference between the present and previous environments doesn't provide a relevant comparison or suitable probabilities for making a forecast. For instance, the political-economic landscape of 2009 and 2010 was influenced by the climax of the Great Financial Crisis. 

This week’s gains were once again concentrated on the (free float) market cap heavyweights. 

While it may be true that 20 of the 30 member issues were up this week, the outsized gains of the top 10 issues, which carried an astounding 72% share of the PSEi 30 (as of July 19th), delivered the gist of this week’s 2.16%. (Figure 3, middle graph) 

On average (equal-weighted price change), the weekly return was only .92%. 

The substantial difference between the average and the change in the headline index was principally due to the free float weights. 

And this week’s activities resonated with the last four-week performance. 

Fundamentally, while the PSEi 30 was up 10.3% from June 21st to July 19th, the accrued gains were largely derived from the top 5. 

Again, while 22 of the 30 member issues rose during this period, the average gain was 5.48% indicating the spread caused by distortions of the free float market cap relative to the equal-weighted price change. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Moreover, the top 5 issues, which expanded by an average of 15.4%, accounted for most of the 5.5% four-week average growth. 

Figure 4

In addition, the 51.17% pie of the top 5 heavyweights have drifted close to their recent milestone levels, with the index pumps rotating among the heavyweights. (Figure 4, topmost graph)

That is, shifting or rotational pumps from ICTSI to the financial 3 to the other market cap heavies—which presently includes the real estate members! (Figure 4, middle and lowest windows)

IV. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentrated Trading Activities amidst Decadent Volume

Figure 5

Aside from the incredible pre-closing pumps and dumps contributing to the headline returns, the 2024 version of SONA pumps has emerged against the backdrop of a DETERIORATING mainboard volume! (Figure 5, topmost graph)

As an aside, we omitted posting recent charts of pre-closing massive pumps and dumps to conserve space.

At least there was some volume surge in previous SONA pumps, which is certainly lacking today. And incredibly, little is known about how cross-trades have padded such low-volume pumps.

However, it has not just been the PSEi 30 market cap weightings; the lean trading volume has also been concentrated among the heavyweights.

For instance, the Sy Group's share of the main board volume has been rising in support of the pumps to its shares. (Figure 5, middle pane)

Additionally, the volume share of the top 20 traded issues accounted for 83.6% over the 4-week period, slightly higher than the 83.1% year-to-date. This means that less than 20% of the volume has been dispersed among the other 264 listed companies. Duh!

The PSE noted that there are 284 listed firms as of the second quarter. 

V. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentration in Broker Activities with Marginal Brokers Squeezed Dry

More to this point:

Although the overwhelmingly dominant share of the top 10 brokers decreased from 59.16% YTD to 57% in the four-week SONA pump, the number of total active participating brokers fell to its lowest level (since I began plotting it). (Figure 5, lowest image)

This means that while transactional volume has spread to a wider scope of brokers, which is good news, the plunge in the active share of participants implies that current conditions have squeezed the marginal brokers, which is bad news.

The PSE also noted that there are a total of 122 active brokers in their Second Quarter Report. 

Could this be confirmation of our prediction that a large segment of marginal brokers will become extinct soon?

And the above data reveals the extent of concentration of trading volumes and trading participants to an elite cabal, who are likely managing the PSEi 30 levels.

VI. More Signs of Liquidity Squeeze: Decaying Market Depth and Weakening Market Breadth

Figure 6

Naturally, the insufficiency in volume and market depth translates to the underperformance of market breadth.

While this week's market internals showed advancing issues marginally higher by 53 against declining issues, from the June 21st low to the present (SONA pump 2024), decliners remained ahead of advancers 1,924 to 1,888, a spread of 36 in favor of decliners.

This means that the headline performance has starkly diverged from the PSE universe. Incredible.

Another likely indicator of general market sentiment is the participation level of traded issues.

Unlike in the prior SONAs where the number of traded issues saw slight increases, we have been witnessing the opposite in the present conditions—a contraction!

The decreasing rate of average daily traded issues accentuates the ongoing liquidity squeeze at the PSE.

Other measures, such as the average daily number of trades and the average daily volume per trade, exhibit the same worsening liquidity drought.

VII. Divergent Signals from the SONA 2024 Pump: Key Points to Ponder

Yet, for prudent investors, here are some critical points to ponder:

-How can this be a bullish sign when the 10% increase in the Index has been accompanied by a drought in volume supported by stagnant participation and decaying breadth?

-Why would the increasing concentration of the index, trading, and market activities not signify an INCREASING risk to financial stability?

-How could the ARTIFICIAL embellishment of the index signify a bullish sign?

Lastly, why and how would these orchestrated campaigns to impose price distortions not magnify increasing imbalances and malinvestments in the PSE, the local capital markets, and the economy?

VIII. 2024 SONA Pump: Foreign Money Cushions Domestic Savings Deficiency

What is the source of financing for the SONA pump?

In essence, savings or credit are the sources of investments (real or financial).

Under the classical gold standard, credit represents the savings of another individual, intermediated by depository institutions.

Under the current fiat money, the US dollar standard, credit can account for "money from thin air."

How has the PSE's low volume signified a sign of increased savings? Or has institutional money been tapping credit for the SONA pump?

Or has the PSEi 30 been reliant on foreign savings and leverage (carry trades)?

PSE data provides some clues:

True, aggregate foreign money flows surged to PHP 2.8 billion this week, the largest since May 17, 2024. 

However, the degree of flow has failed to boost the PSEi 30 during the SONA pump in 2023 and may represent a temporary dynamic today.

As it stands, in the world of global financialization, foreign money flows may account for fund flows by affiliates or subsidiaries of PSE-listed firms registered abroad and offshore firms of allies and colleagues, rather than from money managers in search of higher returns.

These fund flows may be used to artificially inflate statistics to show increased interest by foreigners "to paint the tape."

In any case, while foreign flows cushioned the ongoing decline in trading volume this week, these inflows accounted for a mere PHP 93.6 million from the June 21st trough. 

The spike in this week's flows reveals that foreign flows have largely been absent in the previous three weeks, and it is likely that the 2024 SONA pump has been engineered by domestic financial institutions. 

Our guess: Could this partly be the handiwork of the Maharlika Sovereign Wealth Fund and other government financial institutions? 

More importantly, despite foreign flows, trading volume remains in the doldrums, exposing only the deficiency in savings. 

Yes, the Philippine Statistics Authority declared an increase in gross savings in 2023. However, the broader picture tells us a different story: a marginal rebound following a collapse. 

Yet, questionably, this savings data is determined by GDP! 

IX. 2024 SONA Pump: Engineered by Domestic Financial Institutions?

There are clues pointing to this possibility. 

The SONA pumps may involve Other Financial Corporations (OFCs). 

For instance, according to BSP data covering Q3 2023: "Based on preliminary results of the Other Financial Corporations Survey, the domestic claims of the other financial corporations grew by 2.4 percent in Q3 2023… the other financial corporations’ claims on the other sectors, particularly the private sector, grew as the sector extended more loans to households and increased its holdings of equity shares in other nonfinancial corporations" (bold added)

Figure 7 

Claims on the private sector surged at the end of Q2 2023 going into Q3 2023. (Figure 7, topmost graph) 

Did flows from the OFCs account for the SONA 2023 pump? 

What about in 2022? 

While the Q3 2022 data was silent on claims on the private sector, the reversal from outflows in Q2 2022 could have been indirectly responsible for the June to August 2022 SONA pump, which delivered a 13% gain. 

X. 2024 SONA PUMP: PSEi 30 at 6,800: Windfall from Liquidity Expansion and Conclusion

Furthermore, signs of accelerating liquidity growth could extrapolate to money diffusion into the PSEi 30, channeled through orchestrated or engineered asset pumps. 

May's fourth largest public spending, possibly representing an early-stage distribution of liquidity from the pre-Election "Marcos-nomics stimulus," may also have been used by banks and non-bank financial institutions for the 2024 SONA pump. 

This has a precedent. 

An uptrend in the growth of cash in circulation financed the previous national (Presidential) elections, which percolated into the pumps of SONA 2022 and the 2022 post-election stock market honeymoon. 

Another factor was the spillover from the historic PHP 2.3 trillion liquidity injections in 2020-2021 by the BSP to rescue the banking system—which was sold to the public as benefiting the economy. 

An uptick in the growth of cash in circulation from April to October 2023 also supported the 2023 SONA and the Q4 2023 rally in the PSEi 30. 

How does this apply to the present? 

May 2024's cash in circulation growth of 6.1% represents the highest level since December 2022, which fund flows have likely spurred this SONA 2024 pump. (Figure 7, middle image) 

It is unsurprising that a substantial part of liquidity growth has been partly funded by bank credit expansion. 

Universal Commercial Bank lending growth, which may have been used to finance pre-election spending in 2021-2022, has been manifested in the pumps of SONA 2022 and the post-election honeymoon. And its reduced growth may have depressed the returns of the SONA 2023 pump. (Figure 7, lowest chart) 

Finally, the accelerating UC bank lending growth from Q4 2023 to the present has been instrumental in financing the 2024 SONA pump. 

As previously explained, though disinflation could prevail in the interim due to the slowing real economy, supported by the rise in non-performing loans (NPLs), which may constrain the uptrend in bank lending, sustained increases in deficit spending should put a floor on inflation. 

A resurgence of inflation, which should cap interest rate cuts, will further expose imbalances and malinvestments resulting from all these orchestrated attempts to create an artificial economic and financial boom through credit expansion, price manipulation, and statistical artifices. 

Although the political leadership did not explicitly mention the stock market to boost his political capital during the previous SONAs, the message—implying "strong earnings growth ", "optimistic economic prospects", a "stronger peso," and so on—represents the commonplace conveyance by institutional mouthpieces in explaining the recent spike in the PSEi 30. 

However, when everything goes off the rails, it has to be either the US Federal Reserve or something foreign, but hardly ever local affairs (attribution bias). 

QED.