Showing posts with label inequality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inequality. Show all posts

Sunday, June 29, 2025

A Rescue, Not a Stimulus: BSP’s June Cut and the Banking System’s Liquidity Crunch

 

The ultimate cause, therefore, of the phenomenon of wave after wave of economic ups and downs is ideological in character. The cycles will not disappear so long as people believe that the rate of interest may be reduced, not through the accumulation of capital, but by banking policy—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

A Rescue, Not a Stimulus: BSP’s June Cut and the Banking System’s Liquidity Crunch

I. Policy Easing in Question: Credit Concentration and Economic Disparity

II. Elite Concentration: The Moody's Warning and Its Missing Pieces

III. Why the Elite Bias? Financial Regulation, Market Concentration and Underlying Incentives

IV. Market Rebellion: When Reality Defies Policy

V. The Banking System Under Stress: Evidence of a Rescue Operation

A. Liquidity Deterioration Despite RRR Cuts

B. Cash Crunch Intensifies

C. Deposit Growth Slowdown

D. Loan Portfolio Dynamics: Warning Signs Emerge

E. Investment Portfolio Under Pressure

F. The Liquidity Drain: Government's Role

G. Monetary Aggregates: Emerging Disconnection

H. Banking Sector Adjustments: Borrowings and Repos

I.  The NPL Question: Are We Seeing the Full Picture?

J. The Crowding Out Effect

VI. Conclusion: The Inevitable Reckoning 

A Rescue, Not a Stimulus: BSP’s June Cut and the Banking System’s Liquidity Crunch 

Despite easing measures, liquidity has tightened, markets have diverged, and systemic risks have deepened across the Philippine banking system. 

I. Policy Easing in Question: Credit Concentration and Economic Disparity 

The BSP implemented the next phase of its ‘easing cycle’—now comprising four policy rate cuts and two reductions in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR)—complemented by the doubling of deposit insurance coverage. 

The question is: to whose benefit? 

Is it the general economy? 

Bank loans to MSMEs, which are supposedly a target of inclusive growth, require a lending mandate and still accounted for only 4.9% of the banking system’s total loan portfolio as of Q4 2024. This is despite the fact that, according to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), MSMEs represented 99.6% of total enterprises and employed 66.97% of the workforce in 2023. 

In contrast, loans to PSEi 30 non-financial corporations reached Php 5.87 trillion in Q1 2025—equivalent to 17% of the country’s total financial resources. 

Public borrowing has also surged to an all-time high of Php 16.752 trillion as of April. 

Taken together, total systemic leverage—defined as the sum of bank loans and government debt—reached a record Php 30.825 trillion, or approximately 116% of nominal 2024 GDP. 

While bank operations have expanded, fueled by consumer debt, only a minority of Filipinos—those classified as “banked” in the BSP’s financial inclusion survey—reap the benefits. The majority remain excluded from the financial system, limiting the broader economic impact of the BSP’s policies. 

The reliance on consumer debt to drive bank growth further concentrates financial resources among a privileged few. 

II. Elite Concentration: The Moody's Warning and Its Missing Pieces 

On June 21, 2025, Inquirer.net cited Moody’s Ratings: 

"In a commentary, Moody’s Ratings said that while conglomerate shareholders have helped boost the balance sheet and loan portfolio of banks by providing capital and corporate lending opportunities, such a tight relationship also increases related-party risks. The global debt watcher also noted how Philippine companies remain highly dependent on banks for funding in the absence of a deep capital market. This, Moody’s said, could become a problem for lenders if corporate borrowers were to struggle to pay their debts during moments of economic downturn." (bold added) 

Moody’s commentary touches on contagion risks in a downturn but fails to elaborate on an equally pressing issue: the structural instability caused by deepening credit dependency and growing concentration risks. These may not only emerge during a downturn—they may be the very triggers of one. 

The creditor-borrower interdependence between banks and elite-owned corporations reflects a tightly coupled system where benefits, risks, and vulnerabilities are shared. It’s a fallacy to assume one side enjoys the gains while the other bears the risks. 

As J. Paul Getty aptly put it: 

"If you owe the bank $100, that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem." 

In practice, this means banks are more likely to continue lending to credit-stressed conglomerates than force defaults, further entrenching financial fragility. 

What’s missing in most mainstream commentary is the causal question: Why have lending ties deepened so disproportionately between banks and elite-owned firms, rather than being broadly distributed across the economy?

The answer lies in institutional incentives rooted in the political regime. 

As discussed in 2019, the BSP’s trickle-down easy money regime played a key role in enabling Jollibee’s “Pacman strategy”—a debt-financed spree of horizontal expansion through competitor acquisitions. 

III. Why the Elite Bias? Financial Regulation, Market Concentration and Underlying Incentives 

Moreover, regulatory actions appear to favor elite interests. 

On June 17, 2025, ABS-CBN reported: 

"In a statement, the SEC said the licenses [of over 400 lending companies] were revoked for failing to file their audited financial statements, general information sheet, director or trustee compensation report, and director or trustee appraisal or performance report and the standards or criteria for the assessment." 

Could this reflect regulatory overreach aimed at eliminating competition favoring elite-controlled financial institutions? Is the SEC becoming a tacit ‘hatchet man’ serving oligopolistic interests via arbitrary technicalities? 

Philippine banks—particularly Universal Commercial banks—now control a staggering 82.64% of the financial system’s total resources and 77.08% of all financial assets (as of April 2025). 

Aside from BSP liquidity and bureaucratic advantages, political factors such as regulatory captureand the revolving door’ politics further entrench elite power. 

Many senior officials at the BSP and across the government are former bank executives, billionaires and their appointees, or close associates. Thus, instead of striving for the Benthamite utilitarian principle of “greatest good for the greatest number,” agencies may instead pursue policies aligned with powerful vested interests. 

This brings us back to the rate cuts: while framed as pro-growth, they largely serve to ease the cost of servicing a mountain of debt owed by government, conglomerates, and elite-controlled banks. 


Figure 1 

However, its impact on average Filipinos remains negligible, with official statistics increasingly revealing the diminishing returns of these policies. 

The BSP’s rate and RRR cuts, coming amid a surge in UC bank lending, risk undermining GDP momentum (Figure 1) 

IV. Market Rebellion: When Reality Defies Policy 

Even markets appear to be revolting against the BSP's policies!


Figure 2

Despite plunging Consumer Price Index (CPI) figures, Treasury bill rates, which should reflect the BSP's actions, have barely followed the easing cycle. (Figure 2, topmost window) 

Yields of Philippine bonds (10, 20, and 25 years) have been rising since October 2024 reinforcing the 2020 uptrend! (Figure 2, middle image) 

Inflation risks continue to be manifested by the bearish steepening slope of the Philippine Treasury yield curve. (Figure 2, lower graph)


Figure 3

Additionally, the USD/PHP exchange rate sharply rebounded even before the BSP announcement. (Figure 3, topmost diagram) 

Treasury yields and the USD/PHP have fundamentally ignored the government's CPI data and the BSP's easing policies. 

Importantly, elevated T-bill rates likely reflect liquidity pressures, while rising bond yields signal mounting fiscal concerns combined with rising inflation risks. 

Strikingly, because Treasury bond yields remain elevated despite declining CPI, the average monthly bank lending rates remain close to recent highs despite the BSP's easing measures! (Figure 3, middle chart) 

While this developing divergence has been ignored or glossed over by the consensus, it highlights a worrisome imbalance that authorities seem to be masking through various forms of interventions or "benchmark-ism" channeled through market manipulation, price controls, and statistical inflation. 

V. The Banking System Under Stress: Evidence of a Rescue Operation 

We have been constantly monitoring the banking system and can only conclude that the BSP easing cycle appears to be a dramatic effort to rescue the banking system. 

A. Liquidity Deterioration Despite RRR Cuts 

Astonishingly, within a month after the RRR cuts, bank liquidity conditions deteriorated further: 

·         Cash and Due Banks-to-Deposit Ratio dropped from 10.37% in March to 9.68% in April—a milestone low

·         Liquid Assets-to-Deposit Ratio plunged from 49.5% in March to 48.3% in April—its lowest level since March 2020 

Liquid assets consist of the sum of cash and due banks plus Net Financial assets (net of equity investments). Fundamentally, both indicators show the extinguishment of the BSP's historic pandemic recession stimulus. (Figure 3, lowest window) 

B. Cash Crunch Intensifies


Figure 4

Year-over-year change of Cash and Due Banks crashed by 24.75% to Php 1.914 trillion—its lowest level since at least 2014. Despite the Php 429.4 billion of bank funds released to the banking system from the October 2024 and March 2025 RRR cuts, bank liquidity has been draining rapidly. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

C. Deposit Growth Slowdown 

The liquidity crunch in the banking system appears to be spreading. 

The sharp slowdown has been manifested through deposit liabilities, where year-over-year growth decelerated from 5.42% in March to 4.04% in April due to materially slowing peso and foreign exchange deposits, which grew by 5.9% and 3.23% in March to 4.6% and 1.6% in April respectively. (Figure 4, middle image) 

D. Loan Portfolio Dynamics: Warning Signs Emerge 

Led by Universal-Commercial banks, growth of the banking system's total loan portfolio slowed from 12.6% in March to 12.2% in April. UC banks posted a deceleration from 12.36% year-over-year growth in March to 11.85% in April. 

However, the banking system's balance sheet revealed a unmistakable divergence: the rapid deceleration  of loan growth. Growth of the Total Loan Portfolio (TLP), inclusive of interbank lending (IBL) and Reverse Repurchase (RRP) agreements, plunged from 14.5% in March to 10.21% in April, reaching Php 14.845 trillion. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

This dramatic drop in TLP growth contributed significantly to the steep decline in deposit growth. 

E. Investment Portfolio Under Pressure


Figure 5

Banks' total investments have likewise materially slowed, easing from 11.95% in March to 8.84% in April. While Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities growth slowed 0.58% month-over-month, they were up 0.98% year-over-year. 

Held-for-Trading (HFT) assets posted the largest growth drop, from 79% in March to 25% in April. 

Meanwhile, accumulated market losses eased from Php 21 billion in March to Php 19.6 billion in May. (Figure 5, topmost graph) 

Rising bond yields should continue to pressure bank trading assets, with emphasis on HTMs, which accounted for 52.7% of Gross Financial Assets in May. 

A widening fiscal deficit will likely prompt banks to increase support for government treasury issuances—creating a feedback loop that should contribute to rising bond yields. 

F. The Liquidity Drain: Government's Role 

Part of the liquidity pressures stem from the BSP's reduction in its net claims on the central government (NCoCG) as it wound down pandemic-era financing. 

Simultaneously, the recent buildup in government deposits at the BSP—reflecting the Treasury's record borrowing—has further absorbed liquidity from the banking system. (Figure 5, middle image) 

G. Monetary Aggregates: Emerging Disconnection 

Despite the BSP's easing measures, emerging pressures on bank lending and investment assets, manifested through a cash drain and slowing deposits, have resulted in a sharp decrease in the net asset growth of the Philippine banking system. Year-over-year growth of net assets slackened from 7.8% in April to 5.5% in May. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 


Figure 6

Interestingly, despite the cash-in-circulation boost related to May's midterm election spending—which hit a growth rate of 15.4% in April (an all-time high in peso terms), just slightly off the 15.5% recorded during the 2022 Presidential elections—M3 growth sharply slowed from 6.2% in March to 5.8% in April and has diverged from cash growth since December 2024. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

The sharp decline in M2 growth—from 6.6% in April to 6.0% in May—reflecting the drastic slowdown in savings and time deposits from 5.5% and 7.6% in April to 4.5% and 5.8% in May respectively, demonstrates the spillover effects of the liquidity crunch experienced by the Philippine banking system. 

H. Banking Sector Adjustments: Borrowings and Repos 

Nonetheless, probably because of the RRR cuts, aggregate year-over-year growth of bank borrowings decreased steeply from 40.3% to 16.93% over the same period. (Figure 6, middle graph) 

Likely drawing from cash reserves and the infusion from RRR cuts, bills payable fell from Php 1.328 trillion to Php 941.6 billion, while bonds rose from Php 578.8 billion to Php 616.744 billion. (Figure 6, lowest diagram) 

Banks' reverse repo transactions with the BSP plunged by 51.22% while increasing 30.8% with other banks. 

As we recently tweeted, banks appear to have resumed their flurry of borrowing activity in the capital markets this June. 

I.  The NPL Question: Are We Seeing the Full Picture? 

While credit delinquencies expressed via Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) have recently been marginally higher in May, the ongoing liquidity crunch cannot be directly attributed to them—unless the BSP and banks have been massively understating these figures, which we suspect they are. 

J. The Crowding Out Effect 

Bank borrowings from capital markets amplify the "crowding-out effect" amid growing competition between government debt and elite conglomerates' credit needs. 

The government’s significant role in the financial system further complicates this dynamic, as it absorbs liquidity through record borrowing. 

Or, it would be incomplete to examine banks' relationships with elite-owned corporations without acknowledging the government's significant role in the financial system. 

VI. Conclusion: The Inevitable Reckoning 

The deepening divergent performance between markets and government policies highlights not only the tension between markets and statistics but, more importantly, the progressing friction between economic and financial policies and the underlying economy. 

Is the consensus bereft of understanding, or are they attempting to bury the logical precept that greater concentration of credit activities leads to higher counterparty and contagion risks? Will this Overton Window prevent the inevitable reckoning? 

The evidence suggests that the BSP's easing cycle, rather than supporting broad-based economic growth, primarily serves to maintain the stability of an increasingly fragile financial system that disproportionately benefits elite interests. 

With authorities reporting May’s fiscal conditions last week (to be discussed in the next issue), we may soon witness how this divergence could trigger significant volatility or even systemic instability 

The question is not whether this system is sustainable—the data clearly indicates it is not—but rather how long political and regulatory interventions can delay the inevitable correction, and at what cost to the broader Philippine economy.

 

Sunday, May 25, 2025

The PSEi 30 in 2024: Debt-Fueled Expansion Amid Fiscal and Monetary Shifts

 

Besides, stock prices are primarily information... they tell investors where their capital can be most fruitfully employed. The important thing is not that prices be high or low... but that they be honest—Bill Bonner 

In this issue

The PSEi 30 in 2024: Debt-Fueled Expansion Amid Fiscal and Monetary Shifts

I. Monetary Tailwinds and a Fiscal Inflection

II. PSEi 30: Debt as the Primary Growth Driver

III. Record Revenues, Yet Slowing Growth Momentum

IV. Net Income Challenges: Slow Growth and Declining Margins

V. “Cui Bono?” — Who Benefits from GDP Growth? A Symptom of Trickle-Down Economics

VI. Sectoral Performance: Debt, Revenue, and Income Trends

VII Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights

VIII. Final Notes on Transparency and Accuracy 

The PSEi 30 in 2024: Debt-Fueled Expansion Amid Fiscal and Monetary Shifts 

What the PSEi 30 tells us about the Philippine economy’s fiscal and financial direction in 2024. 

I. Monetary Tailwinds and a Fiscal Inflection 

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) initiated the first phase of its easing cycle in the second half of 2024, comprising three policy rate cuts alongside a reduction in the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR). 

This coincided with an all-time high in public spending, bolstered by a surge in non-tax revenues. As a result, the Philippine fiscal deficit marginally narrowed to Php 1.506 trillion in 2024—still the fourth largest in history. To fund this gap, public debt rose to a historic high of Php 16.05 trillion. 

Simultaneously, a steep decline in quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) readings during Q3 and Q4 pulled average annual inflation down from 6.0% in 2023 to 3.2% in 2024. 

These three macroeconomic developments—monetary easing, record government expenditure, and easing inflation—served as key underpinnings of GDP growth. Despite noticeable slowdowns in Q3 (5.2%) and Q4 (5.3%), relatively stronger performances in Q1 (5.9%) and Q2 (6.5%) lifted full-year GDP growth to 5.7%, edging up from 5.5% in 2023.

Against this backdrop, how did the elite composite members of the PSEi 30 perform in 2024?

This article examines their financial performance, focusing on debt, revenue, net income, and sectoral contributions, while highlighting the broader implications for the Philippine economy. 

Nota Bene:

PSEi 30 data include redundancies due to the inclusion of assets and liabilities of subsidiaries and their parent holding firms.

Chart Labels:

B 1A Recent Data: Consists of current members and includes possible data revisions from the past year.

1B Data: Reflects comparisons between previous years, consisting of members during the existing period and unaudited publications for the period.

II. PSEi 30: Debt as the Primary Growth Driver


Figure 1 

In 2024, non-financial debt surged by 8.44% to a record Php 5.767 trillion, marking the third largest annual increase since 2018. (Figure 1, topmost pane) 

This Php 449 billion net addition occurred despite elevated borrowing costs, with 10-year BVAL rates remaining high. (Figure 1, middle graph) 

Relative to the broader financial system, non-financial debt accounted for 16.92% of total financial resources (bank and financial assets), slightly above the 16.87% share in 2023. (Figure 1, lowest image) 

On top of this, the top three PSEi 30 banks reported a staggering 49.99% increase in bills payable—from Php 483.58 billion in 2023 to Php 725.30 billion in 2024. Notably, this figure excludes bond issuances. 

III. Record Revenues, Yet Slowing Growth Momentum


Figure 2

The PSEi 30 collectively posted record revenues of Php 7.22 trillion, representing a 7.91% increase or Php 529.07 billion in absolute terms. This slightly surpassed the 7.8% growth or Php 478 billion gain in 2023. (Figure 2, upper chart) 

However, in historical context, the 2024 increase ranked as the third smallest since 2018—reflecting the easing of price pressures as the CPI cooled. 

Systemic leverage—defined here as the sum of public debt and universal/commercial bank loans (excluding fixed-income instruments and FDIs)—rose by 11.1% in 2024, reaching an all-time high of Php 29.96 trillion. (Figure 2, lower chart) 

This expansion in credit, alongside continued deficit spending, substantially supported aggregate demand, thereby contributing to the PSEi 30’s revenue gains. 


Figure 3 

However, viewed from another lens, the slowing contribution of money supply relative to GDP—a key indicator of real economy liquidity—has increasingly revealed slack in both PSEi 30 performance and broader GDP growth. (Figure 3, upper image) 

The 2020 spike in this metric underscored the BSP’s historic role in backstopping the banking system during the pandemic. 

Yet it also marked a turning point in the financialization of the Philippine economy—an underlying force behind demand-side inflation and a structural driver of imbalances between financial sector gains and real-sector productivity. 

Importantly, the deceleration in revenue growth mirrored the nominal GDP trends of 2023 and 2024, highlighting the interconnectedness of corporate performance and macroeconomic trends. (Figure 3, lower visual) 

IV. Net Income Challenges: Slow Growth and Declining Margins


Figure 4

Net income across PSEi 30 firms grew at a sluggish 6.8% to a record Php 971 billion. While this represents a nominal gain of Php 80.31 billion, both the growth rate and the absolute increase were the smallest since 2021. (Figure 4, topmost image) 

Despite widespread corporate participation in government projects, historic public spending growth of 11.04% outpaced net income growth, underscoring the accumulating inefficiencies in the effectiveness of 'trickle-down' policies. (Figure 4, middle graph) 

The PSEi 30 maintained a steady net income margin of 13.44%, slightly lower than last year's 13.45% but still exceeding the 5-year average of 12.15% (2019–2024). (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

Critically, the debt-to-net income ratio revealed that Php 0.46 in debt was needed to generate every Php 1 in profit. 

More alarmingly, on a net basis, Php 7.3 in new debt was required for every Php 1 increase in profit—a record high. 

The takeaway: Deepening debt dependency to drive profits is not only artificial but also subject to diminishing returns. 

V. “Cui Bono?” — Who Benefits from GDP Growth? A Symptom of Trickle-Down Economics


Figure 5

Revenue as a share of GDP edged up to 27.3% in 2024 from 27.22% in 2023—marking the third-highest level since 2019. (Figure 5 upper window) 

The PSEi 30 accounted for more than a quarter of nominal GDP, excluding additional contributions from other publicly listed firms under elite conglomerate umbrellas. 

This substantial contribution highlights a hallmark of the government and BSP’s “trickle-down” economic development model, characterized by increased business operations through direct state spending, which disproportionately benefits politically connected corporate giants. 

Importantly, the BSP’s easy-money regime functions as an implicit subsidy, enabling elite firms to acquire cheaper credit as a protective moat against competition. 

The result: a centralization of economic gains among the elite, while MSMEs and average Filipinos—Pedro and Maria—bear the costs. 

In essence, the model privatizes profits while socializing costs, exacerbating economic inequality. 

VI. Sectoral Performance: Debt, Revenue, and Income Trends 

In 2024, sectoral performance varied significantly: (Figure 5, lower table) 

Debt: The industrial sector posted the largest percentage increase in debt at 17.33% year-on-year (YoY), but holding firms dominated in peso terms, accounting for a 67.85% share of total debt. 

Revenues: Despite rising vacancies, the property sector recorded the highest percentage revenue gain at 16.6% YoY. However, holding firms led in absolute peso increases and percentage share, contributing 45.9% of total revenue growth. 

Net Income: The services and property sectors outperformed with net income growth of 20.6% and 17.6%, respectively. Banks, however, led in peso growth and accounted for 45.6% of the net income increase. 

Cash Holdings: Non-financial firms’ cash holdings contracted by 1.91%, driven by a 14.6% and 3.35% decline in reserves in the industrial and service sectors, respectively. 

In contrast, PSEi 30 banks saw their cash holdings rise by 14.6%, despite the BSP reporting otherwise. This discrepancy raises questions over possible dual standards in bank reporting. 

VII Top Movers: Individual Firm Highlights


Figure/Table 6 

Debt: San Miguel Corporation (SMC) led all firms with a Php 155 billion increase in debt, bringing its total to a historic Php 1.560 TRILLION—comprising 35% of all non-financial PSEi 30 debt. Ayala Corporation and its energy subsidiary ACEN followed with Php 76.9 billion and Php 54 billion increases, respectively.

Revenues: San Miguel, BPI, and BDO were the top contributors in terms of revenue increases. Conversely, DMC and its subsidiary Semirara reported revenue contractions. 

Net Income: ICT, BPI, and BDO led net income growth in absolute terms, while SMC and SCC posted the largest declines. 

Cash Holdings: The largest cash increases came from SMC and ICT, while Aboitiz Equity Ventures and LTG Group reported the steepest reductions. 

VIII. Final Notes on Transparency and Accuracy 

The credibility of this analysis rests on disclosures from the Philippine Stock Exchange and related official sources. However, questions persist regarding the possible underreporting of debt and the inflation of both top-line and bottom-line figures by certain firms. 

Moreover, when authorities overlook or fail to act on instances of misreporting—especially by large, elite-aligned corporations—this raises serious governance concerns. Such inaction fosters moral hazard and risks entrenching a culture of non-transparency within the corporate sector. 


Sunday, September 08, 2024

Weakening Consumers: Philippine August CPI fell to 3.3% as Q2 2024 Consumer Non-Performing Loans Accelerated

 At the outset, the masses misinterpreted it as nothing more than a scandalous rise in prices. Only later, under the name of inflation, the process was correctly comprehended as the downfall of money—Konrad Heiden in 1944

In this issue

Weakening Consumers: Philippine August CPI fell to 3.3% as Q2 2024 Consumer Non-Performing Loans Accelerated

I. August CPI’s 3.3% Validated the Philippine Yield Curve; Continuing Loss of the Peso’s Purchasing and Magnified Volatility

II. Utilities Overstated the CPI, Headline CPI versus Bottom 30% CPI Translates to Broadening Inequality

III. Plummeting CORE CPI Amidst Record Consumer Bank Loans

IV. Slowing CPI Despite Record Streak in Public Spending and Modest Supply-Side Growth

V. Examining the Discrepancies in Employment Data and Consumer Demand

VI. Philippine Banking System’s Seismic Transformation: The Shift Towards Consumer Lending and its Developing Risks

VII. The Dynamics Behind Record High Consumer Borrowings: Inflation, Addiction and Refinancing

VIII. Surging Consumer NPLs as Driver of Falling Inflation

IX. Expect a Systemic Bailout: Pandemic 2.0 Template; a Third Wave of Inflation 

Weakening Consumers: Philippine August CPI fell to 3.3% as Q2 2024 Consumer Non-Performing Loans Accelerated

I. August CPI’s 3.3% Validated the Philippine Yield Curve; Continuing Loss of the Peso’s Purchasing and Magnified Volatility 

The recent decline in the Philippine CPI, which fell to 3.3% in August, is a symptom of strained consumers. Overleveraging has led to an acceleration in consumer loan NPLs in Q2. 

GMANews, September 5, 2024: The Philippines’ inflation rate eased in August, after an acceleration seen in the prior month, due to slower increases in food and transportation cost during the period, the Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA) reported on Thursday. At a press conference, National Statistician and PSA chief Claire Dennis Mapa said that inflation —which measures the rate of increase in the prices of goods and services— decelerated to 3.3% last month, slower than the 4.4% rate in July. This brought the year-to-date inflation print in the first eight months of 2024 to 3.6%, a slowdown from the 5.3% rate in the same period last year and still within the government’s ceiling of 2% to 4%. 

Quotes from previous posts… 

despite the 4.4% CPI bump in July (and Q2 6.3% GDP), the Philippine treasury market continues to defy inflationary expectations by maintaining a deep inversion of the curve’s belly, which again signals slower inflation, upcoming BSP cuts, and increased financial and economic uncertainty. (Prudent Investor, August 2024)

__ 

Moreover, the curious take is that despite all the massive stimulus, the belly’s inversion in the Philippine treasury market has only deepened at the close of August. 

This does not suggest a build-up of price pressures or a strong rebound in the private sector. On the other hand, rising short-term rates indicate intensifying liquidity issues.  

In the end, while Marcos-nomics stimulus seems to have reaccelerated liquidity, a resurgence of inflation is likely to exacerbate "stagflationary" pressures and increase the likelihood of a bust in the Philippines’ credit bubble. (Prudent Investor, September 2024) 

Let us examine the data in relation to other relevant metrics.

First, the August Consumer Price Index (CPI) fundamentally confirmed the signals provided by the Philippine yield curve regarding the resumption of its downtrend. We will explore this in more detail later.

Figure 1

Second, a slowing CPI does not imply that prices are falling, as some officials have suggested. Rather, it indicates a deceleration in the rate of price increases for the average goods and services in the government’s CPI basket. That is to say, authorities continue to use the inflation channel as an indirect means of taxation. Even from the standpoint of the CPI, the Philippine peso has lost over 99% of its purchasing power since 1957. (Figure 1, topmost chart)

Third, the headline CPI has become increasingly volatile, as evidenced by its significant fluctuations: it surged from 3.7% in June to 4.4% in July, then decreased to 3.3% in August. The rate of change in the Month-on-Month (MoM) data illustrates this volatility. (Figure 1, middle image) 

Notably, with the largest weighting in the CPI basket, food is usually the culprit for this volatility. 

II. Utilities Overstated the CPI, Headline CPI versus Bottom 30% CPI Translates to Broadening Inequality 

Fourth, the upside spike in housing, water, gas, and other utilities inflated the headline CPI. Rent and utilities were the only categories that experienced an increase in August on a month-on-month (MoM) basis. (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

Without the impact of rent and utilities, the headline CPI would have been drastically lower. This category has a significant weighting in the CPI basket, with a 21.4% share.

Figure 2

Fifth, the decline in the rate of price increases, as indicated by the headline CPI of 3.3% in August, had minimal impact on the bottom 30% of households, who experienced a CPI of 4.7% (down from 5.8% in July). However, the disparity between these categories remains at 2018 levels. (Figure 2, topmost diagram) 

Even with its flawed measurement, the government’s CPI highlights the broadening inequality

III. Plummeting CORE CPI Amidst Record Consumer Bank Loans 

Sixth, the volatility of the headline CPI hasn’t been corroborated by the non-food, non-energy Core CPI, which continues to decline. 

Although the gap between the headline CPI and the Core CPI has narrowed, it remains substantial due to the relatively faster decline in the Core CPI. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

Seventh, the law of supply and demand dictates that if the supply of goods or services exceeds demand, prices will fall. Conversely, if demand outstrips supply, prices will rise. 

In the current context, the weakening of the Core CPI is a symptom of the sustained erosion of domestic demand. 

This is exemplified by the consistently diminishing rate of price increases in retail components such as furnishing household equipment and maintenance, clothing and footwear, and personal care and miscellaneous goods. (Figure 2, lowest chart)

Figure 3

Eighth, the growth of total universal-commercial bank loans remains on a remarkable streak, posting a 10.4% growth rate last July—its third consecutive month of 10% growth. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

Moreover, universal commercial bank household credit grew at an even faster pace of 24.3%, marking its twenty-third consecutive month of over 20% growth! (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

Given this explosive growth in consumer and overall bank credit, which should have theoretically stimulated demand, why hasn’t it boosted the CPI?

IV. Slowing CPI Despite Record Streak in Public Spending and Modest Supply-Side Growth 

Ninth, what has happened to the "Marcos-nomics stimulus" and the ramping up of Q2 record debt-financed public spending? Why have these measures not bolstered demand and the CPI? (Figure 3, lowest chart)

Figure 4

Tenth, the supply side has hardly been a factor in the CPI slowdown.

The slackening of imports, which were down 7.5% (in USD million) in June, was not an anomaly but a trend since peaking in August 2022.  (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

Domestic manufacturing has also not shown excessive growth. Manufacturing posted a 4.7% value growth and 5.25% volume growth last July, marking the third highest monthly growth since August 2023 (a year ago). (Figure 4, lower left chart) 

The headline S&P Global Philippines Manufacturing PMI reported an unchanged index of 51.2 in August, unchanged from July. (Figure 4, lower right chart) 

The PMI index has been consolidating with a downside bias, as demonstrated by the "rounding top." 

If the supply side had managed to grow at a minor to moderate rate in recent months, then demand represents the weak link behind the sliding CPI rate.  

The lack of significant supply-side expansion suggests that the primary driver of the CPI slowdown is the erosion of domestic demand

V. Examining the Discrepancies in Employment Data and Consumer Demand 

Why so?

The employment data is unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation. 

Aside from the questionable nature of the statistics, the government attributed the swelling of July's employment rate to fresh graduates entering the workforce.

 

GMANews, September 6: The number of unemployed Filipinos increased in July as millions of young individuals, who graduated from college or senior high school and entered the labor force, did not land jobs during the period, the Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA) reported on Friday.

The decrease in the labor force participation rate from 66% in June to 63.5% in July likely underestimated the true number of unemployed individuals.

Figure 5

It's worth noting that a "rounding top" appears to be a persistent trend in the labor participation rate. (Figure 5, topmost diagram)

If this pattern continues, then for whatever reasons, it's likely that the labor force will shrink, which would negatively impact the employment population.

While most sectors reported decreases in employment (MoM) last July, the government (public administration and defense), finance, and IT sectors reported significant gains. The increase in government jobs is not surprising, given that they are one of the largest employers, particularly with the record high public spending in Q2. (Figure 5, middle image)

In any case, despite the second-highest employment rate in June, the rise in unemployment in July suggests that the substantial growth in bank credit has not been sufficient to create enough investments to absorb new graduates. 

The irony is that even if this data were close to accurate, the high employment rate demand story has been incongruous or inconsistent with the slowing consumer, the record high consumer bank credit levels, and the CPI. 

Another paradox is that the volatility in the labor data may be influenced by social mobility. In reality, the Philippine labor market has been beset by the byzantine nature of onerous labor regulations. 

VI. Philippine Banking System’s Seismic Transformation: The Shift Towards Consumer Lending and its Developing Risks 

Beyond that, the slope of the Philippine Treasury markets provides insights into economic conditions, inflation, and potential risks. 

Not only has it accurately predicted CPI dynamics, but it has also indicated the likelihood of increased economy-related risks. 

Consider this: Why has the CPI been on a temporary downtrend despite record levels of Universal Commercial bank consumer lending? This observation applies even to production loans, but our focus here is on consumer loans. 

The banking system’s total consumer loans, including real estate loans, surged to an all-time high of PHP 2.81 trillion in Q2 2024. This represents a record 21.75% of total bank lending, meaning that one-fifth of all Universal Commercial bank lending has been directed towards consumers.  (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

Four-fifths of these, which also demonstrates a declining share, represent lending to the supply side sector, primarily benefiting the elites.


Figure 6

This data represents evidence that Philippine banks have undergone a seismic transformation: a preference for consumers over producers. 

From a sectoral perspective, banks have also shifted their lending preferences toward high-risk, short-term lending—specifically credit cards and salary loans

Since 2017, the percentage share of credit cards relative to the total has surged to a milestone high, while the share of salary loans has also increased since 2021. Notably, the rapid growth of these segments has come at the expense of real estate and motor vehicle loans. (Figure 6, topmost image) 

Strikingly, the share of consumer real estate loans peaked at 45% in Q4 2021 and then nose-dived to 37% by Q2 2024. 

In a nutshell, banks have "backed up their trucks" to rapidly leverage Philippine consumers. 

VII. The Dynamics Behind Record High Consumer Borrowings: Inflation, Addiction and Refinancing 

The all-time high in consumer lending did not emerge in a vacuum. 

Primarily, consumers have turned to credit cards and salary loans to compensate for the loss of purchasing power due to inflation

Secondly, this trend has deepened consumers' reliance on credit cards and salary loans

Thirdly, the extended leveraging of consumers' balance sheets necessitates further credit to refinance or roll over existing debt. Some individuals use multiple credit cards, while others may tap into salary loans or borrow from the supply side for the refinancing of existing debt. 

It is important to note that the consumer credit data reveals an escalation in concentration risks. 

The surge in consumer lending indicates that only a small segment of the population has access to formal credit systems. 

The BSP’s Q2 2023 Financial Inclusion data reveals that consumer credit, including credit cards, salary loans, and other forms of bank credit, is limited to a minority segment of the Philippine population. (Figure 6, middle table)

Not only in finances, this group—primarily from the high-income sector—has been capturing a significant portion of the nation’s resources funded by credit. They are the primary beneficiaries of the BSP’s inflation policies. 

However, they also represent the most fragile source of a potential crisis

Conversely, the low level of participation in formal banking does not equate to a low level of leverage for the unbanked population. Instead, this larger segment relies on informal sources for credit. 

However, they also represent the most fragile source of a potential crisis.

Lastly, having reached their borrowing limits, some consumers have begun to default. 

VIII. Surging Consumer NPLs as Driver of Falling Inflation

Have the media or mainstream experts addressed this issue? 

Not when financial services are being marketed or deposits solicited; discussing conflicts of interest remains a taboo.

Despite subsidies and relief measures, the Non-Performing Loans (NPL) in consumer lending have been rising, driven primarily by credit cards and salary loans. (Figure 6, lowest chart)

Figure 7

Again, the all-time high in credit card and salary loans has led to a surge in NPLs. According to the BSP’s various measures, the NPLs for credit cards and salary loans relative to total NPLs in the Total Loan Portfolio (TLP) have been intensifying since 2021 (for salary loans) and 2023 (for credit card loans). (Figure 7, topmost, second to the highest and lowest-left and right graphs)

Despite the massive BSP support, the fastest-growing segments for banks are also the primary sources of their weaknesses. 

Published banking and financial data may be understated due to these relief measures and other factors. 

Why are banks significantly borrowing (focusing on short-term loans), competing with San Miguel, both listed and unlisted non-financials, financials, and the government? 

So, there you have it. The slowing inflation in the face of rampant credit growth is a symptom of the mounting balance sheet problems faced by consumers. 

Borrowings are not only used for spending but are increasingly being utilized to recycle loans—the Minsky Ponzi syndrome process is in motion. 

Extending balance sheet leveraging has not only weighed on consumer spending but has also caused a rise in credit delinquency. 

It also exposes the façade of a 6.3% Q2 GDP. 

The lesson is: current conditions reveal not only the fragile state of consumers but, more importantly, exposes the vulnerability of Philippine banks. 

The treasury markets have been signaling these concerns. 

IX. Expect a Systemic Bailout: Pandemic 2.0 Template; a Third Wave of Inflation 

But it doesn’t end here. 

Do you think the government would allow GDP to sink, which would deprive them of financing for their boondoggles? 

Naturally, no. So, authorities have embarked on a tacit "Marcos-nomics stimulus" to prevent cross-cascading defaults, initially marked by a resurgence of illiquidity. 

With the upcoming elections, public spending has surged, leading to increased monetary growth, as indicated by the most liquid measure, M1 money supply. 

Yes, this exposes the artificiality of a so-called "restrictive" or "tightening" regime.

Needless to say, this process will only foster more economic imbalances, which will manifest through the enlarged “twin deficits.”

Economic maladjustments will become evident in the growing mismatch between demand and supply, as well as between savings and investment (record savings-investment gap), leading to increased fragility in the banking system’s balance sheet

This, in turn, will prompt more easing policies from the BSP and accelerated interventions and liquidity injections from the tandem of financial institutions (led by banks) and the BSP. 

We should expect the BSP to expand and extend its relief measures to the banking system in an effort to buy time.

Or, the BSP’s strategy to address an escalating debt problem is to facilitate accelerated debt absorption. Amazing! 

As such, we should expect a third wave of inflation, in the fullness of time, which will exacerbate the leveraging of the economic system and worsen the current predicament. 

The political path dependency is driven primarily by perceived "free lunches" (or throwing money into the system). 

The promised bull market will not be in Philippine assets but in debt, leveraging, and its attendant risks. 

So, despite the Philippine peso floating along with its regional peers, benefiting from the perceived "Powell Pivot," the USD/PHP exchange rate should eventually reflect the developing economic and financial strains. 

Until a critical disorder surfaces, a reversal in this political direction is unlikely.

Eventually, the treasury curve will indicate when this reversal might occur. 

The point is that even when distorted by interventions, markets are reliable indicators of future events. 

___

References 

Prudent Investor, The Philippines' July 4.4% CPI: Stagflation Remains a Primary Political, Economic, and Financial Risk August 12, 2024

Prudent Investor, Philippine Government’s July Deficit "Narrowed" from Changes in VAT Reporting Schedule, Raised USD 2.5 Billion Plus $500 Million Climate Financing September 1, 2024