Showing posts with label propaganda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label propaganda. Show all posts

Sunday, July 13, 2025

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility

 

Fake numbers lead to a phony economy, with fraudulent policies, chasing a mirage—Bill Bonner 

In this issue 

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility

Part I. The BSP’s Statistical Magic: From Crisis to Boom Overnight

I. A. Statistics as Spectacle — The Real Estate Index Makeover

I. B. The Tale of Two Indices: Deflation and Vacancies Erased: RPPI’s Parallel Universe of Price Optimism

I. C. Multiverse Economic Logic, Pandemic Pricing Without Mobility

I. D. BSP’s Statistical Signaling as Policy: Reflation by Design

Part II: The Confidence Transmission Loop and Liquidity Fragility

II. A. Confidence as Catalyst: BSP’s Keynesian Animal Spirits Playbook

II. B. Benchmark Rate Cuts and the Wealth Effect Mirage

II. C. Developer Euphoria: Liquidity, Debt, and Overreach

II. D. Affordability Fallout: Mispricing New Entrants

II. E. Vacancy vs. Real Demand: The Phantom of Occupancy, Market Hoarding and the Developer Divide

II. F. The Squeeze on Small Property Owners: Valuation Taxes and Hidden Costs

II. G. Sentiment Engineering: Policy Windfalls, Redistribution, Inequality

Part III: Policy Transmission: Consumer Debt, Market Dispersion, and the Mounting Fragility

III. A. Capital Market Transmission: Where Confidence Becomes Signal

III. B. Price Divergences and Latent Losses: Fort Bonifacio & Rockwell

III. C. Liquidity Spiral: From Losses to Liquidation Risk

III. D. Concentration Risk in Consumer Lending

III. E. Credit-Led Growth: Ideology and Fragility

III F. Employment Paradox and Inflation Disconnect

III G. Fragile Banking System: Liquidity Warnings Flashing

IV. Conclusion: The Dangerous Game of Inflating Asset Bubbles 

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility 

How benchmark-ism and sentiment engineering are used to buoy real estate and stock prices to back banks amid deepening stress. 

Part I. The BSP’s Statistical Magic: From Crisis to Boom Overnight 

I. A. Statistics as Spectacle — The Real Estate Index Makeover 

In a fell swoop, the real estate industry’s record vacancy dilemma has been vanquished by the BSP. 

All it took was for the monetary agency to overhaul its benchmark—replacing the Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) with the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI). (BSP, July 2025) 

And voilĂ , prices have been perpetually booming, and there was never an oversupply to begin with! 

Regardless of the supposed “methodological upgrade”—anchored in hedonic regression and presented as aligned with global best practices—the index is built on assumptions and econometric modeling vulnerable to error or deliberate manipulation. 

Let us not forget: the BSP is a political agency. Its goals are shaped by institutional motives, and there’s no third-party audit of its inputs or underlying calculations. The only true litmus test for the data? Economic logic. 

I. B. The Tale of Two Indices: Deflation and Vacancies Erased: RPPI’s Parallel Universe of Price Optimism


Figure 1

Under the original RREPI, national price deflation was recorded during the pandemic recession: Q3 2020 (-0.4%), Q1 2021 (-4.2%), Q2 2021 (-9.4%). Deflation returned in Q3 2024 at -2.3%. (Figure 1, upper visual) 

But under RPPI? No deflation at all. 

Instead, the same quarters posted gains: Q3 2020 (6.3%), Q1 2021 (4.1%), Q2 2021 (2.4%), and Q3 2024 (7.6%). Not even a once-in-a-century health and mobility crisis could dent the official boom narrative. 

The new RPPI also shows a material deviation from the year-on-year (YoY) price changes in residential and commercial prices in Makati reported by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Figure 1, lower pane) 

The BSP’s narrative: “Property prices rise in Q1 2025, highest in the NCR.” 

Yet media sources paint a starkly different picture—perhaps reporting from another universe—or even permanently bullish analysts observed that the vacancy woes were intensifying. 

Just last April 29th, BusinessWorld noted

"The vacancy rate for residential property in Metro Manila will likely hit 26% by the end of this year, with condominium developers reining in their launches to dispose of inventory, according to property consultant Colliers Philippines." (italics added) 

On April 8th, GMA News also reported: 

"The oversupply of condominium units in Metro Manila is now estimated to be worth 38 months, as the available supply has continued to increase while there have been 9,000 cancellations, a report released by Leechiu Property Consultants (LPC)." (italics added) 

LPC reported last week that due to prevailing ‘soft demand,’ the NCR condominium oversupply slightly decreased to 37 months in Q2 2025. 

And in a more sobering global perspective, on July 10 BusinessWorld cited findings from the 2025 ULI Asia-Pacific Home Attainability Index: 

"The Philippine capital was identified as one of the most expensive livable cities in the Asia-Pacific region. Condominium prices in Metro Manila are now 19.8 times the median annual household income, far exceeding affordable levels. Townhouses are even more unattainable at 33.4 times the average income." (bold added) 

More striking still, price inflation has persisted amid record oversupply. 

I. C. Multiverse Economic Logic, Pandemic Pricing Without Mobility


Figure 2

The old RREPI captured the downturn in NCR condo units—four straight quarters of deflation in 2020–2021 and again in Q3 2024. But the new RPPI virtually erased this distress. According to its logic, speculative frenzy thrived even during ECQ lockdowns. (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

But real estate isn’t like equities. Its transactions require physical inspection, legal documentation, and bureaucratic transfer procedures. To suggest booming prices during lockdowns implies buyers magically toured properties, exchanged notarized documents, and signed title transfers—while under mobility restrictions. 

Only statistics can conjure such phenomena. 

When vacancies surged again in Q3 2024, RPPI recorded a +5.3% gain. One quarter of mild contraction in Q4 2023 (-4.8%) is the lone blemish on its multiverse logic. 

RPPI now behaves as if oversupply has nothing to do with prices—either the law of supply and demand has inverted, or RPPI reflects a speculative parallel reality 

I. D. BSP’s Statistical Signaling as Policy: Reflation by Design 

This isn’t just mismeasurement. It’s perceptional distortion

The BSP’s policy appears aimed at hitting “two birds with one stone”: rescue the real estate sector—and by extension, shore up bank balance sheets. 

Via rate cuts, RRR adjustments, market interventions, and benchmark-ism, statistics have been conscripted into policy signaling. 

Part II: The Confidence Transmission Loop and Liquidity Fragility 

II. A. Confidence as Catalyst: BSP’s Keynesian Animal Spirits Playbook 

Steeped in Keynesian orthodoxy, the BSP continues to lean on “animal spirits” to animate growth. Confidence—organic or manufactured—is viewed as a tool to boost consumption, inflate GDP, and quietly ease the government’s debt burden. 

Having redefined its benchmark index, the BSP now uses RPPI not just as data, but as a signaling instrument

It projects housing resilience at a time of monetary easing, giving shape to a narrative of strength amid systemic stress. RPPI becomes a cornerstone of "benchmark-ism"—targeting real estate equity holders, property developers, and households alike. 

II. B. Benchmark Rate Cuts and the Wealth Effect Mirage 

The timing is telling. 

This narrative engineering coincides with the underperformance of real estate equities. With property stocks dragging the Philippine Stock Exchange, "benchmark-ism" functions as a tactical lifeline to inflate valuations, revive confidence, and activate the so-called "wealth effect." 

Rising property prices are meant to induce consumption—not only among equity holders but among homeowners who perceive themselves as wealthier. But this is stimulus by optics, not fundamentals. 

II. C. Developer Euphoria: Liquidity, Debt, and Overreach 

This ideological windfall extends to property developers. Easier financial conditions could boost demand, sales, and liquidity—justifying their ballooning debt loads and encouraging further capital spending. 

Or, developers, emboldened by statistical optimism, may pursue growth despite structural weakness, compounding risks already embedded in their debt-heavy balance sheets. 

For example, the published debt of the top five developers (SM Prime, Ayala Land, Megaworld, Robinsons Land and Vista Land) has a 6-year CAGR of 7.88%, even as their cash holdings grew by only 2.16% (Figure 2, middle image) 

Additionally, the supply side real estate portfolio of Universal-commercial bank loans has accounted for 24% of production loans, total loans outstanding 20.68% net of Repos (RRP) and 20.28% gross of RRPs. This excludes consumer real estate loans, which in Q1 2025 accounted for 7.54%.  (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

But this is where the Keynesian blind spot emerges: artificially inflated prices distort economic signals. 

II. D. Affordability Fallout: Mispricing New Entrants 

In equities, inflated valuations misprice capital, leading to overcapacity and overinvestment in capital-intensive sectors like real estate or malinvestments

In housing, speculative price increases distort affordability, widening the gap not only between renters and owners, but also between incumbent homeowners and prospective buyers—including those targeting new project launches by developers. 

As developers capitalize on inflated valuations, pre-selling prices rise disproportionately to income growth, pushing ownership further out of reach for middle-income and first-time buyers. 

This dynamic not only excludes a growing segment of the population, but also risks creating inventory mismatches, where units are sold but remain unoccupied due to affordability constraints. 

The ULI Asia-Pacific Home Attainability Index pointed to such price-income mismatches 

II. E. Vacancy vs. Real Demand: The Phantom of Occupancy, Market Hoarding and the Developer Divide 

Vacancies extrapolate to an oversupply. 

Even when a single buyer or monopolist absorbs all the vacancies, this doesn’t guarantee increased occupancy. 

Demographics and socio-economic conditions—not speculative fervor—drive real demand. 

Meanwhile, rising property prices also translate to higher collateral values, encouraging further credit expansion and balance sheet leveraging in the hope of stimulating consumption. 

But this cycle of debt-fueled optimism risks compounding systemic fragility. 

Rising prices also create friction between small developers and elite firms, the latter leveraging cheap capital and financial heft to dominate the industry. 

Owners of large property portfolios can afford to hoard inventories, allowing prices to rise artificially while sidelining smaller players. 

II. F. The Squeeze on Small Property Owners: Valuation Taxes and Hidden Costs 

Beyond affordability, rising property prices carry compounding burdens for small-scale owners. 

As valuations climb, so do real property taxes, which are pegged to assessed values and can reach up to 2% annually in Metro Manila. 

Insurance premiums and maintenance costs—from association dues to repairs—rise in tandem. These escalating expenses disproportionately impact small owners, who lack the financial buffers of large developers or elite asset holders. 

The result is a quiet squeeze: ownership becomes not just harder to attain, but harder to sustain. 

II. G. Sentiment Engineering: Policy Windfalls, Redistribution, Inequality 

Governments reap fiscal windfalls via inflated valuations, using funds to back deficit spending. But these redistributions often fund projects detached from systemic equity or real productivity.

Despite the optics, only a sliver of the population truly benefits

Aside from the government, the other primary beneficiaries of asset inflation are the elite of the Forbes 100, not the broader population 

This "trickle-down strategy", rooted in sentiment and asset inflation, risks deepening inequality and fueling balance sheet-driven malinvestments. 

Part III: Policy Transmission: Consumer Debt, Market Dispersion, and the Mounting Fragility 

III. A. Capital Market Transmission: Where Confidence Becomes Signal 

Here is how the easing-benchmarkism policy is being transmitted at the PSE.


Figure 3

The PSE’s property index sharply bounced by 8.2% (MoM) in June 2025, while the bank-led financial index dropped 4.9%. This divergence reveals that asset reflation via statistical optics has buoyed developers—but failed to restore investor confidence in the banking sector. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

During the first inning of the ‘propa-news’ campaign that “Easing Cycle equals Economic Boom” in Q3 2024, both indices had surged—property by 16.41% and financials by 19.4%. But Q2 2025 tells a different story: while property stocks outperformed the PSE again, financial stocks weighed it down. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

This magnified dispersion reflects the imbalance at play. As a ratio to the overall PSE, property stocks are gaining market cap dominance. At the same time, the free float market capitalization of the PSEi 30’s top three banks have declined—mirrored by the rising share of the two biggest property developers. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Unless bank shares recover, gains in the property sector will likely be capped. After all, property developers remain the biggest clients of the Philippine banking system. 

Put another way: whatever confidence boost the BSP engineers through easing and revised benchmarks, markets eventually push back against artificial gains

Signal may dominate short-term sentiment—but fundamentals reclaim price over time. 

III. B. Price Divergences and Latent Losses: Fort Bonifacio & Rockwell 

There is more.


Figure 4

The widening divergence in pre-selling and secondary prices of condominiums in Fort Bonifacio and Rockwell Center signifies a deeper signal: the BSP’s implicit rescue of banks via the property sector is being tested on the ground. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

The widening price gap implies mounting losses for pre-selling buyers—early investors who are now exposed to valuation markdowns in the secondary market.

So far, these losses have not translated into Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). Continued financing, sunk-cost inertia, buyer risk aversion, and an economy growing more through credit expansion than productivity have suppressed the impact.

But if these losses scale—or if the economy tips into recession or stagnation—underwater owners may surrender keys. This leads to cascading vacancies and NPLs, raising systemic risk. 

III. C. Liquidity Spiral: From Losses to Liquidation Risk 

Losses, once translated into constrained liquidity, spur escalating demand for liquid assets. This pressure breeds forced liquidations—not just by individual buyers of pre-selling projects, developers but among holders of debt-financed real estate. 

Banks, as financial intermediaries, face direct exposure. When collateral values fall, they may issue a ‘collateral call—requiring borrowers to post more assets—or a ‘call loan,’ demanding immediate repayment.

If rising NPLs escalate into operational or capital deficits, banks themselves become sellers—dumping assets to raise cash. This synchronized selloff in a buyer’s market fuels fire sales and elevates the risk of a broader debt crisis.

III. D. Concentration Risk in Consumer Lending

Last week, the Inquirer cited a Singaporean fintech company which raised concern about the extreme dependence on credit card usage in the Philippines, noting: “The 425-percent debt-to-income ratio in the Philippines—the worst in the region—indicates a ‘severe financial stress.’” (Figure 4, middle image)

Downplaying this, an industry official clarified that since the total credit card contracts were at 20 million, credit card debt averaged 54,000 pesos per contract. Since the number of individuals covered by the contracts was not identified, a person holding multiple credit card debt contracts could, collectively, contribute to a debt profile resembling the 425% debt-to-income ratio (for contract holders).

Based on BSP’s Q4 2023 financial inclusion data, only a significant minority—just 8.1% of the population as of 2021 (World Bank Findex)—carry credit card debt. Even if this figure has doubled or tripled, total exposure remains below 30%, highlighting mounting concentration risks among debt-laden consumers. (Figure 4, lowest table)

III. E. Credit-Led Growth: Ideology and Fragility

The seismic shift toward consumer lending has been driven not only by interest rate caps on credit cards, but by ideological faith in a consumer-driven economy.

Universal and commercial bank consumer credit surged 23.7% year-on-year in May. Credit card loans alone zoomed by 29.4%, marking the 34th consecutive month of 20%+ growth.


Figure 5

From January 2022 to May 2025, consumer and credit card loan shares climbed from 8.8% and 4.4% to 12.7% and 7.5%, respectively. Last May, credit card debt represented 59% of all non-real estate consumer loans. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

Yet how much of credit card money found its way into supporting speculative activities in the stock market and real estate? 

What if parts of bank lending to various industries found their way into asset speculation? 

Once disbursed, banks and the BSP have limited visibility on end-use—adding opacity to the cycle they’re stimulating. 

III F. Employment Paradox and Inflation Disconnect 

Interestingly, this all-time high in debt coincides with near-record employment rates. The May employment rate rose to 96.11%, not far from the all-time highs of 96.9% in December 2023 and 2024, and June 2024. The employed population of 50.289 million last May was the second highest ever. (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

Yet CPI inflation remains muted. Despite collapsing rice prices driven by the Php 20 rollout, inflation ticked up only slightly in June—from 1.3% to 1.4%. 

With limited savings and shallow capital market penetration, the Philippines faces a precarious juncture. What happens when credit expansion and employment reverses from these historic highs? 

And this won’t affect only residential real estate but would worsen conditions of every other property malinvestments like shopping malls/commercial, ‘improving’ office, hotel and accommodations etc. 

III G. Fragile Banking System: Liquidity Warnings Flashing 

Beneath the surface, bank stress is already visible.


Figure 6

Even as NPLs remain officially low—possibly understated—liquidity strains are worsening:

-Cash and due from banks posted a modest 3.4% MoM increase in May—but fell 26.4% YoY

(Figure 6, topmost image)

-Deposit growth edged from 4.04% in April to 4.96% in May

-Cash-to-deposit ratio bounced slightly from 9.68% to 9.87%, yet remains at its lowest level since at least 2013

-Liquid assets-to-deposit ratio fell from 48.29% in April to 47.5% in May

-Bank investment growth slowed from 8.84% to 6.5% (Figure 6, middle diagram)

-Portfolio growth dropped from 7.82% to 5.25% 

Despite these constraints, banks continued lending. 

Interbank lending (IBL) surged, pushing the Total Loan Portfolio (inclusive of IBL and Reverse Repos) from 10.2% to 12.7%, sending the loan-to-deposit ratio to its highest level since March 2020. 

Beyond Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets, underreported NPLs—particularly in real estate lending—may be compounding the liquidity strain and masking deeper fragility. The surge in HTMs has coincided with a steady decline in cash-to-deposit ratios, signaling stress beneath the statistical surface. (Figure 6, lowest visual) 

IV. Conclusion: The Dangerous Game of Inflating Asset Bubbles 

Despite the Q3 2024 surge in the Property Index—helping power the PSEi 30 upward—combined with a 6.7% rebound in the old real estate index in Q4, vacancy rates soared to record highs in Q1 and remain near all-time highs as of Q2 2025

This unfolds amid surging consumer and bank credit, all-time high public liabilities fueled by near-record deficit spending, and peak employment rates. 

Ironically, the distortions in stock markets—and the engineered statistical illusions embedded in the old property index—have barely moved the needle against real estate oversupply, as measured by vacancy data.  

Not only has the BSP sustained its aggressive easing campaign, it is now amplifying statistical optics to reignite animal spirits—hoping to hit two birds with one stone: rescuing property sector balance sheets as a proxy for bank support. 

Yet inflating asset bubbles magnifies destabilization risks—accelerating imbalances and expanding systemic leverage that bank balance sheets already betray. 

Worse, the turn toward benchmark-ism and sentiment engineering in the face of industry slowdown signals more than strategy—it reeks of desperation.

When monetary tools fall short, propaganda steps in to fill the gap—instilling false premises to manufacture resilience.

And the louder the optimism, the deeper the dissonance. 

____

References 

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas BSP's new Residential Property Price Index more accurately captures market trends June 27, 2025 bsp.gov.ph

 

Monday, July 07, 2025

The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock?

 

THE question of deficit finance is at the center of public discussion of economic matters today, as it is in any society undergoing serious price inflation, and as it should be, for there is no more basic connection in economic affairs than that linking deficit finance and inflation. Though Milton Friedman's aphorism that ''inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon'' is true (or as true as economic aphorisms get), it is equally true that sustained monetary expansions are always and everywhere a consequence of printing money to cover the difference between Government expenditures and tax revenues—Robert E. Lucas 

In this issue

The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock?

I. The Illusion of Fiscal Soundness: Benchmark-ism, Political Signaling, and the Fiscal Narrative

II. The Five-Month Reality Check: The Mask of March’s Spending Rollback

III. Revenue Performance: Strong Headline, Weak Underpinnings

A. May 2025 Revenue Dynamics

B. Five-Month Revenue Trends

IV. DBCC Downgrades 2025 GDP and Macroeconomic Targets

V. The Politics of Economic Forecasting and Revenue Implications

VI. Public Spending Patterns: Election Effects and Structural Trends

A. May 2025 Expenditure Analysis

B. Five-Month Spending Trends

C. Budget Execution and Future Projections

VII. Deficit Financing and Debt Servicing: A Ticking Time Bomb

A. Interest Payment Trends

B. Financing Implications

C. Liquidity, Interest Rate Pressures and the Bond Vigilantes

VIII. Conclusion: Beyond the Headlines: A Looming Fiscal Shock 

 

The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock? 

Fiscal Theater vs. Market Reality: A Critical Look at the 2025 Budget Trajectory Using May and 5-month Performance as Blueprint 

I. The Illusion of Fiscal Soundness: Benchmark-ism, Political Signaling, and the Fiscal Narrative 

This article is an update to our previous piece titled Is the Philippines on the Brink of a 2025 Fiscal Shock?" 

Are Philippine authorities becoming increasingly desperate in their portrayal of economic health? Is there an escalating reliance on "benchmark-ism"—the artful embellishment of statistics and manipulation of market prices—to project an aura of ‘sound macroeconomics?’ 

Beyond the visible interventions—such as the quasi-price controls of Maximum Retail Prices (MSRPs) and the Php 20 rice initiatives, which signal low inflation—amid the emerging disconnect between market dynamics and banking conditions, does May’s fiscal deficit reflect political signaling? 

This article dissects the National Government’s (NG) fiscal performance for May 2025 and the first five months of the year, revealing structural nuances behind the headline figures and questioning the sustainability of current fiscal policies.


Figure 1

The Bureau of Treasury (BTr) reported: "The National Government’s (NG) fiscal position significantly improved in May 2025, with the budget deficit narrowing to Php 145.2 billion from Php 174.9 billion in the same month last year. This lower deficit was primarily driven by a robust 13.35% growth in revenue collections, alongside a moderation in expenditure growth to 3.81% during the national elections month. The cumulative deficit for the five-month period reached Php 523.9 billion, 29.41% (Php 119.1 billion) higher year-on-year (YoY), as the government accelerated investments in infrastructure and social programs to support inclusive growth. NG remains on track to meet its deficit target for the year through prudent fiscal management and efficient use of resources, in line with its Medium-Term Fiscal Program" (BTr, June 2025) [bold added] [Figure 1, upper graph] 

However, beneath the fog of political rhetoric, the election-induced public spending cap—mainly on infrastructure—appears to be the true catalyst behind May's reported budget improvement. The temporary restraint on government expenditures during the electoral period created an artificial enhancement in fiscal metrics that masks underlying structural concerns. 

II. The Five-Month Reality Check: The Mask of March’s Spending Rollback 

Examining the January-to-May period reveals a more complex narrative. The stated deficit of "Php 523.9 billion, 29.41% (Php 119.1 billion) higher year-on-year" actually reflects a substantial revision in March spending that resulted in a lower reported deficit. 

March public spending was revised downward by 2.2% or Php 32.784 billion, from Php 654.984 billion to Php 622.2 billion. This revision cascaded into a 5.9% reduction in the five-month deficit, from the original Php 556.7 billion to the revised Php 523.9 billion. Authorities attributed this revision to "trust transactions." 

Despite this rollback, the current deficit represents the THIRD-highest level on record, trailing only the unprecedented Php 566.204 billion and Php 562.176 billion recorded in 2021 and 2020, respectively. [Figure 1, lower chart]


Figure 2

Those record-high deficits reflected ‘fiscal stabilization’ policies during the pandemic recession, when deficit-to-GDP ratios reached 7.6% and 8.6% amid negative GDP growth of -8.02% in 2020 (pandemic recession) and +8.13% in 2021 in nominal terms, or -9.5% and +5.7% in real GDP terms.  (Figure 2, topmost window)  

Of course, these were funded by all-time high public debt (excluding indirect liabilities incurred by private firms under PPP projects). 

Remarkably, without a recession on the horizon, the five-month deficit has already surpassed the budget gaps of the last three years (2022-2024) and appears likely to either match or even exceed the 2020-2021 levels. 

This trajectory stands in stark contrast to authorities' optimistic target of a 5.3% deficit-to-GDP for 2025—revised to 5.5% just last week. Just 5.5%! Amazing. 

With financial markets seemingly complacent—barely pricing in any surprises—would the eventual revelation that the early 2025 deficit “blowout” might mimic the fiscal health of 2020–2021 trigger a significant market shock? 

Or has the risk premium been quietly numbed by a narrative of “contained inflation” and headline-driven optimism? 

In this climate, the interplay between fiscal slippage and monetary posture warrants closer scrutiny. If macro fundamentals continue to diverge from market sentiment, will the ‘bond vigilantes’ remain silent—or are they simply biding their time? 

III. Revenue Performance: Strong Headline, Weak Underpinnings 

While the five-month headline figures for revenues and expenditures did set new nominal records, the underlying structural details will ultimately dictate the fiscal year's trajectory. 

A. May 2025 Revenue Dynamics 

Total revenues grew by 13.35% in May 2025, slightly below the 14.6% recorded in May 2024. Tax revenues, comprising 75% of total revenues, expanded by 6.25%—nearly double the 3.35% growth rate of May 2024. This improvement was driven by the Bureau of Internal Revenue's (BIR) robust 10.71% growth, while the Bureau of Customs (BoC) contracted by 6.94%, contrasting with 2024's respective growth rates of 3.35% and 4.33%. 

Non-tax revenues surged 40.9% in May 2025, though this paled compared to the 98.6% spike recorded in May 2024. 

B. Five-Month Revenue Trends 

May's revenue outperformance lifted the cumulative five-month results. From January to May 2025, total revenue grew by 5.4%, representing significant deceleration from the 16.34% surge in the corresponding 2024 period. (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

Tax revenues, accounting for 89.7% of total collections, increased by 10.5%, marginally down from 2024's 11.2%. The BIR demonstrated resilience with 13.8% growth compared to 12.8% in 2024. However, the BoC stagnated with a mere 0.22% increase, dramatically lower than the previous year's 6% growth. 

Despite May's surge, non-tax revenues contracted by 24.8% in the first five months of 2025, a sharp reversal from the 60.6% growth spike recorded last year. 

While the BIR shows resilience, the BoC and non-tax revenues lag, signaling vulnerabilities in revenue diversification. 

IV. DBCC Downgrades 2025 GDP and Macroeconomic Targets 

Authorities markedly lowered their GDP target for 2025. According to ABS-CBN News on June 26, "The Philippines has again revised its growth target for the year, citing heightened global uncertainties such as the conflict in the Middle East and the imposition of US tariffs. The Development and Budget Coordination Committee on Thursday said it was targeting an economic growth range of 5.5 to 6.5 percent. In December last year, the target for 2025 was set at 6 to 8 percent." (bold added) (Figure 2, lower image) 

The BSP's June rate cut also hinted at growth moderation. As reported by ABS-CBN News on June 19: "BSP Deputy Governor Zeno Abenoja said the central bank also eased rates due to the possible 'moderation' in economic activity." (bold added) 

The most striking revision involved reducing the upper end of the growth target from 8% to 6.5%—a substantial markdown that signals underlying economic concerns! 

V. The Politics of Economic Forecasting and Revenue Implications 

The Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC), as an inter-agency body, represents an inherently political institution plagued by ‘optimism bias’—the tendency to overestimate GDP growth. This bias stems from multiple sources: political pressure to maintain public confidence for approval ratings, the need to justify ambitious economic targets for budget and spending projections, and the imperative to maintain access to affordable financing through public savings. 

Authorities also embrace the Keynesian concept of ‘animal spirits,’ believing that overly optimistic predictions boost business and consumer confidence, thereby spurring increased spending to drive GDP growth. 

Likewise, by promoting investor sentiment, they hope that buoyant markets will create a wealth effect’ that further bolsters spending and economic growth. Rising asset markets may translate capital gains into increased consumption, while higher collateral values encourage more debt-financed spending to energize GDP. 

However, because authorities rely on “data-dependent” approaches, they turn to economic models anchored in historical data and rigid assumptions—often constructed through ex-post analysis. 

Yet effective forecasting requires more than backward-looking templates; it demands grappling with the complexities of purposive human action, where theory operates not as a passive derivative of data, but as a deductive logical framework for validation or falsification. 

As economist Ludwig von Mises observed: 

"Experience of economic history is always experience of complex phenomena. It can never convey knowledge of the kind the experimenter abstracts from a laboratory experiment. Statistics is a method for the presentation of historical facts concerning prices and other relevant data of human action. It is not economics and cannot produce economic theorems and theories." (Mises, 1998) (bold added) 

Because the DBCC relies on “data-dependent” econometric models that essentially project the past into the future, authorities attempt to smooth out forecasting errors through revisions. 

They often rely on ‘availability bias or heuristic’ to inject perceived relevance into their projections.  

They also embrace ‘attribution bias—crediting positive developments as their accomplishments, while assigning blame for adverse outcomes to exogenous factors. 

Last week’s GDP downgrade exemplifies this pattern. Authorities cited the Middle East conflict and new US tariffs to justify the lower projections—an example of political messaging shaped by both availability and attribution biases. 

This GDP downgrade carries significant implications, as revenues depend on both economic conditions and collection efficiency. If authorities have already observed signs of economic “moderation” that warranted substantial downward revisions—yet continue to overstate targets—this suggests that actual GDP may fall well below projections. 

A lower GDP would likely erode public revenues, potentially setting off a vicious cycle of fiscal deterioration. 

VI. Public Spending Patterns: Election Effects and Structural Trends 

A. May 2025 Expenditure Analysis 

Public spending barely grew in May—the mid-term election period—increasing by only 0.22% compared to 22.24% in 2024. National disbursements remained virtually unchanged at 0.12% versus 22.22% in 2024. Local government unit (LGU) spending increased 14.5%, accelerating from 8.54% last year. Interest payments jumped 14.5% compared to 47.8% in 2024. 

The national government commanded the largest expenditure share at 69.9%, followed by LGUs at 16.15% and interest payments at 12.1%. 

B. Five-Month Spending Trends 

Though public spending in the first five months of 2025 reached record levels in peso terms, growth moderated to 9.7% from 10.6% in 2024. LGU spending growth of 13.2% exceeded 2024's 10.6%. Both national government and interest payments registered lower growth rates of 9.24% and 11.14% respectively, compared to 14.83% and 40% in the previous year.


Figure 3 

Despite decreased growth rates, interest payments hit record highs in peso terms, with their expenditure share reaching 14.43%—the highest level since 2010. (Figure 3, upper visual) 

C. Budget Execution and Future Projections 

The selective infrastructure ban during elections, combined with March's spending cuts, clearly reduced five-month disbursements and the fiscal deficit. Public spending in the first five months totaled Php 2.447 trillion, representing 39.16% of the annual budget. 

With seven months remaining to utilize the annual allocation of Php 6.326 trillion, government outlays must average Php 549.83 billion monthly. If the executive branch continues asserting dominance over Congress, the six-year trend of budget excess will likely extend to a seventh year in 2025. (Prudent Investor, May 2025) 

Crucially, with authorities anticipating a potential significant shortfall in GDP, the recent spending limitations due to the exercise of suffrage could translate into a substantial back-loading of the budget in June or Q3. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

That is to say, even if June 2025's deficit merely hits its four-year average of Php 200 billion, the six-month budget gap would soar to Php 723.9 billion, surpassing the 2021 record of Php 716.07 billion! 

Thus, it defies sensible logic for authorities to assert, "NG remains on track to meet its deficit target for the year through prudent fiscal management," as this would amount to a complete inversion of economic reality. 

The crucial question is, ‘how would markets react to a likely fiscal blowout?’

VII. Deficit Financing and Debt Servicing: A Ticking Time Bomb 

How will the current deficit be financed? 

A. Interest Payment Trends 

While 2025's five-month interest payment growth of 11.14% was considerably slower than 2024's 40%, nominal values reached record highs, with interest payments' share of public expenditure rising to its highest level since 2010.


Figure 4

Including amortizations, public debt servicing costs declined significantly by 42.22% compared to the previous year, which had posted a 48.5% growth spike. This wide gap primarily resulted from a 61.4% plunge in amortizations. (Figure 4, topmost graph) 

However, the five-month foreign exchange (FX) share of debt servicing accelerated dramatically from 18.94% in 2024 to 38.6% this year. (Figure 4, middle window) 

B. Financing Implications 

Several critical observations emerge from the data. 

First, authorities may currently be paying less due to scheduling reasons, 2024 prepayments, or political considerations—to avoid arousing public concern or triggering uproar over the rising national debt. 

Second, the widening deficit represents no free lunch—someone must fill the financing void. In the first five months, debt financing surged 86.24%, from Php 527.248 billion to Php 981.94 billion. (Figure 4, lowest image) 

Regardless of how authorities obscure these costs, sustained borrowing will inevitably translate into higher servicing burdens. 

As we noted last May: 

This trend suggests a potential roadmap for 2025, with foreign borrowing likely to rise significantly. The implications are multifaceted: 

-Higher debt leads to higher debt servicing—and vice versa—in a vicious self-reinforcing feedback loop 

-Increasing portions of the budget will be diverted toward debt repayment, crowding out other government spending priorities. In this case, crowding out applies not only to the private sector, but also to public expenditures.  

-Revenue gains may yield diminishing returns as debt servicing costs continue to spiral.  

-Inflation risks will heighten, driven by domestic credit expansion, and potential peso depreciation  

-Mounting pressure to raise taxes will emerge to bridge the fiscal gap and sustain government operations. (Prudent Investor, May 2025)


Figure 5

Third, public debt surged 10.24% YoY to hit a fresh all-time high of Php 16.95 trillion in May and will likely continue climbing through bond issuance to finance a swelling deficit! (Figure 5, topmost pane) 

The increase in May’s public debt was partly muted by a stronger peso. The BTr noted, "The decrease was due to P3.55 billion in net repayments and the strengthening of the peso, which reduced the peso value of foreign debt by P29.35 billion." 

But of course, this represents statistical "smoke and mirrors," as FX debt will ultimately be repaid in foreign currency—not pesos. In a nutshell, the strong peso disguises the actual extent of the public debt increase. 

Fourth, despite record-high government cash holdings of Php 1.181 trillion, the Bureau of the Treasury reported a cash deficit of Php 23.14 billion in May—underscoring underlying liquidity strains. 

Fifth, banks will likely remain the primary vehicle for deficit financing. While their Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets slightly declined from a record Php 4.06 trillion in March to Php 4.036 trillion in April, this was mirrored in net claims on the central government (NCoCG), which moderated from Php 5.58 trillion in March to Php 5.5 trillion in May (+9.36% YoY). Notably, NCoCG has closely tracked the trajectory of HTM assets. (Figure 5, topmost and middle visuals) 

C. Liquidity, Interest Rate Pressures and the Bond Vigilantes 

Beyond government debt affecting bank liquidity conditions, competition for public savings between banks and non-financial conglomerates continues to tighten financial conditions—via liquidity constraints and upward pressure on interest rates. 

The crowding-out effect from rising issuance of government, bank, and corporate debt further diverts savings toward non-productive ends: debt refinancing, politically driven consumption, and speculative “build-and-they-will-come” ventures. 

Despite this, Philippine Treasury markets and the USD-PHP exchange rate appear defiant in the face of the BSP’s easing cycle—even as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) trends lower—as previously discussed) 

Globally, rising yields amid mounting debt loads have reawakened the specter of “bond vigilantes”—their resurgence partly driven by balance sheet reductions and Quantitative Tightening. Their presence is evident in the upward drift of sovereign yields (e.g. Japan 10Y, US 10Y, Germany 10Y and UK 10Y), posing a risk that could reverberate across local markets. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

In response, the Philippine government has redoubled efforts to lower rates through a variety of channels—ranging from quasi-price controls to market interventions to an intensified BSP easing cycle. 

Yet perhaps most telling is its increasing reliance on statistical legerdemain or "benchmark-ism"—notably, the reconstitution of the real estate index to erase prior deflationary prints, despite soaring commercial vacancy rates—a subject, of course, for another post. 

VIII. Conclusion: Beyond the Headlines: A Looming Fiscal Shock 

What authorities frame as "prudent fiscal management" increasingly looks like an exercise in political optics designed to pacify markets and voters, while deeper structural risks build beneath the surface. Headline improvements in the deficit mask the reality of slowing revenue momentum, surging financing needs, rising reliance on FX debt, and a likely surge in second-half deficit. 

As markets remain lulled by political signaling, the Philippines moves closer to a fiscal reckoning — one where statistical smoothing and policy theater will no longer suffice. 

The key question: how will markets and the public react when the full weight of these imbalances becomes undeniable? 

___

References 

Bureau of Treasury, National Government’s Budget Deficit Narrows to Php 145.2 Billion in May 2025 Amid Sustained Strong Revenue Growth June 26, 2025 https://www.treasury.gov.ph/

Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, p.348 Mises Institute, 1998, Mises.org 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Fiscal Performance in Q1 2025: Record Deficit Amid Centralizing Power, Substack May 4, 2025