Monday, January 27, 2020

Why the Continuing Shortfall of the GDP, Despite Massive Stimulus in 2019? Risks Barely About POGOs, But About Concentration!



The core of the fallacy lies in the equating of the community as a unit, in some aggregated national accounting sense, with the individuals-in-the-community, in some political sense as participants, direct or indirect, in collective decision making—James Buchanan

In this issue

Why the Continuing Shortfall of the GDP, Despite Massive Stimulus in 2019? Risks Barely About POGOs, But About Concentration!
-An Incredible Record of Wrong Predictions
-Despite the Record “Shot in the Arm” Steroids, Why the Shortfall of the GDP?
-Forecasting Errors: In Defiance of Data, Trend and Theory, Mainstream Sells Hope!
-Why State Capitalism or Neo-Socialism Destroys Wealth
-The Clashing Trends of Consumer GDP and Trade GDP, Bank Loans Favored Consumers over Trade
-Has the Real Estate Industry Been Booming? Anecdotes and Prices Say Yes, GDP Says No!
-GDP and Financial Risks: It’s Hardly from the POGOs, It is Risks of Concentration!

Why the Continuing Shortfall of the GDP, Despite Massive Stimulus in 2019? Risks Barely About POGOs, But About Concentration!

An Incredible Record of Wrong Predictions

At the outset of 2019, these were some of the predictions made by mainstream institutions. (bold mine)

Panay News (December 26, 2018): The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) said on Saturday that they expected the country’s economy to grow at an accelerated pace in 2019 on the back of robust consumer and government spending. “We agree with the projections of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) that see a growth rate of 6.7 percent in 2019 despite rising global uncertainty,” the PCCI said in a statement. “Indeed, we continue to be recognized as one of the more resilient economies in Asia.”

Inquirer (January 16, 2019): The Philippines will likely return to a high-growth, low-inflation regime this year, allowing the local stock barometer to recover to as high as 8,800 after a challenging period last year, local investment house First Metro Investment Corp. said. In a separate research note, however, Dutch financial giant ING said Philippine growth might hit a speedbump in the next two quarters with still-high levels of inflation and higher borrowing expected to somewhat sap both consumption and investment momentum. In a joint briefing with the University of Asia and the Pacific (UA&P) on Tuesday, FMIC said the Philippine domestic economy could expand by at least 6.8 percent to as high as 7.2 percent this year as slower inflation boosts consumer spending.

Inquirer (January 17, 2019): For 2019, the Amro’s growth forecast for the Philippines was 6.3 percent, below the earlier projection of 6.4 percent in its October 2018 report as well as the government’s 7-8 percent target.

Inquirer (February 19, 2019): The regional macroeconomic surveillance organization Asean+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (Amro) has slightly raised its 2019 growth forecast for the Philippines as inflation eases and the government builds more infrastructure this year. In a statement Monday, Amro said its latest projection showed the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP) expanding by 6.4 percent in 2019, up from the downgraded 6.3-percent growth forecast in January.

Businessworld (January 22, 2019) S&P expects Philippine gross domestic product (GDP) to grow by 6.4% this year, which is slower than the 6.6% forecast it gave in November. Still, this is faster than the 6.2% forecast for 2018 but well below the low end of the state’s target.

Inquirer (January 23, 2019): The Philippines nonetheless enjoyed accelerated public investment growth in 2018, “driven mainly by the implementation of large transport development projects,” and the UN expects this to be sustained this year. In 2019 and 2020, the UN projected the Philippines’ GDP growth at 6.5 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively.

Inquirer Gov’t: 7% GDP this year should be easy” (January 24, 2019): Despite expectations of slower global growth, the head of the Duterte administration’s economic team yesterday expressed optimism the Philippines would achieve at least the lower end of its 7-8 percent growth goal in 2019 as the government ramps up infrastructure. “We are maintaining a 7-percent GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate as a fighting target even as major multilateral institutions have adjusted global growth projections. We are building on our own momentum and on the massive economic investments we have programmed for this year,” Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez III told members of the Financial Executives Institute of the Philippines during its inaugural meeting for 2019.

Inquirer (January 26, 2019):The Philippines’ economic growth is expected to further slow and remain below government target in 2019 due to global economic uncertainties coupled with sluggish investment prospects in the domestic front. In a Jan. 24 report titled “Philippine Economy Unlikely To Gather Steam In 2019,” Fitch Solutions said expected the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) to grow by only 6.1 percent this year.

From ABS-CBN (January 29): The Philippine economy needs a "shot in the arm" on the fiscal and monetary fronts to achieve at least the low end of its 7 to 8 percent growth target this year, an analyst said Tuesday. Election-related spending is expected to stimulate consumption growth this year, as it did during the 2010, 2013 and 2016 polls, ING Bank senior economist Nicholas Mapa said in a statement.

Businessworld (February 13, 2019): “I don’t think you can have that kind of capital formation this year. One, the BSP hiked rates by 175 basis points (bp) — capital formation will take a hit. Second… you don’t have that public construction boom,” Mr. Mapa said, referring to the delayed enactment of the 2019 budget. “We’ll still get a decent number — maybe 3.3% — but it’s not gonna be enough to bring you back to close to 7% growth just because it’s an election year.” ING sees 2019 growth at 6.3%, which if realized will slightly pick up from last year’s pace but will miss the 7-8% target set by the Duterte administration.

Such excerpts constitute a splendid showcase of “When everyone thinks the same, no one is thinking.”

A puffed-up number of the statistical economy that fits into the political agenda can be easily presented by the National Government, which it has been done so. Even with this, the consensus has missed badly with their projections.

Or, in spite of this ability of fudge data, it has come with no surprise how mainstream economic wisdom can be so out of bounds!

That said, the real economy must be in a position worse than has been popularly perceived.

And yet, a "shot in the arm" on the fiscal and monetary fronts has been prescribed as an elixir to boost the economy.

Despite the Record “Shot in the Arm” Steroids, Why the Shortfall of the GDP?
Figure 1

Where we not provided with more than just shots, but an avalanche of policy ‘steroids’???

Let us count the ways.

From the fiscal side, the 11-month deficit of Php 409 billion has just been Php 149 billion short of the 2018’s record Php 588.3 billion, yet the second-largest deficit in history! Given 2019’s annual GDP data, December’s deficit must have narrowed this gap substantially. (Figure 1, topmost pane)

On the monetary side, haven’t the BSP dramatically slashed the ReserveRequirementRatio (RRR) by 400 bps that released about Php 400 billion of cash into the financial system, measures of which resonated with the RRR cuts taken against the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s? (Figure 1, middle window)

And had overnight lending rates been slashed by the BSP by 75 bps in 2019? While not a record, 2019's aggregate cuts should be seen in the light of combined policies.

And most importantly, through debt monetization, has the BSP not revitalized its inflationary tool by infusing Php 150.6 billion in November, or by Php 208 billion in 11-months, to lift the BSP’s net claims to the central government to an unprecedented Php 2.12 trillion? (Figure 1, lowest pane)

Again, in the face of such historic sale of inventions, why then the sustained downtrend of the statistical economy, the GDP, which climaxed in 2016?

Have such interventions been insufficient? Should the BSP and the NG double or triple down to achieve their objectives? To reach the optimal growth, exactly what extent of stimulus must be applied?

But ironically, why did the GDP perform better before all these?

Forecasting Errors: In Defiance of Data, Trend and Theory, Mainstream Sells Hope!
Figure 2

The itemized breakdown of the spending of the key sectors constitutes the expenditure side of the GDP.

In the 4Q, the near doubling of real public spending to 18.7% from 9.6% a quarter ago has functioned as the critical factor for the headline number of 6.4%! (Figure 2, upmost window)

After all the buzz about domestic demand, household consumption GDP even fell to 5.6% from 5.9% in the 3Q!

In the meantime, Capital Formation, Exports, and Imports GDP registered paltry gains of .4%, 2% and .3% from the 3Q’s -2.6%, .7% and -.2%, respectively.

And with the 4Q CPI falling to a 3.5 year low to 1.6% from 3Q’s 1.7%, the depressed PCE deflator used to arrive at the GDP must have been a crucial factor for ballooning these numbers. The Expenditure 4Q GDP’s implicit YoY index posted .38%, a smidgen above 3Q’s .37. (Figure 2, lowest left window)

And because 4Q actions constituted a continuation of the driving dynamic for the year, or more importantly since 2017, the annual data paints the same picture. (Figure 2, middle pane)

The crux: As the GDP construct shifted towards public spending, the contribution from the other segments have been weakening significantly.

The annual per capita GDP and per capita household consumption data exhibits such entropy.
Real per capita GDP of 4.3% in 2019 has stumbled to a 2015 low. Real per capita GDP has steadily been in decline, again, since 2016.

While real household spending per capita improved marginally to 4.1% in 2019 from 3.9% in 2018, it has been way down from the 2016 high of 5.4%. (Figure 2 lowest right pane)

That is, even from the mainstream’s standpoint of anchoring on statistics of national accounts, instead of a boom, the GDP has been emaciating!

Yet, institutional and establishment analysts have repeatedly been dismissing or overlooking the data, trends, and economic dynamics underpinning these, by forecasting high GDPs!

And because of such stubborn defiance, why wouldn’t their highly sanguine start of the year forecast miss badly by the year’s end?

And here’s the thing. What are the costs or penalties of failed predictions and advice? Nothing! Should anything go wrong, they would wash their hands by passing the blame on certain external factors that hugged the headlines. For them, to ensure access to savings, they would keep selling hope to the public…only cloaked with economic terminologies!

Perhaps they’ve all been smitten by John Maynard Keynes’ observation on investment crowds, “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”

Why State Capitalism or Neo-Socialism Destroys Wealth

Hardly any of these experts ever seem to explain that in the world of scarcity, known as economics, there are opportunity costs to every action. Such that when the government spends and consumes resources, these would have to come at the expense of someone else, through present taxes, future taxes (debt), and or currency debasement (inflation). And such actions merely destroy savings by diverting scarce resources to unproductive projects, as well as, creates powerful vested interest groups.

And accompanying the increased demand for resources would be the enlargement of the political bureaucracy, which will exercise expanded control through regulations, prohibitions, and mandates over the distribution of resources.

Besides, the intensifying leverage used to satisfy such political transfers would eventually become intractable to render the economy, and the NG vulnerable to risks from sharp changes in interest rates, credit, as well as currency.

And has it not been a puzzle to them that attendant to the increased centralization or expanded politicization of the economy leads to MORE, and not less, corruption?  

From the Inquirer (January 23): The Philippines slipped 14 notches from its previous ranking in the latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a rating of global anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International has shown. In the group’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, the Philippines scored 34 to land in the 113th spot – a decline of 14 places from its previous rank at 99 in 2018.

As the great Ayn Rand warned in her magnum opus the Atlas Shrugged, (bold added)

When you see that trading is done, not by consent, but by compulsion - when you see that in order to produce, you need to obtain permission from men who produce nothing - when you see that money is flowing to those who deal, not in goods, but in favors - when you see that men get richer by graft and by pull than by work, and your laws don't protect you against them, but protect them against you - when you see corruption being rewarded and honesty becoming a self-sacrifice - you may know that your society is doomed.

Or as the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises admonished also in his masterpiece Human Action:

A society that chooses between capitalism and socialism does not choose between two social systems; it chooses between social cooperation and the disintegration of society. Socialism is not an alternative to capitalism; it is an alternative to any system under which men can live as human beings.

So why should anyone think that the progressive transformation towards centralization/big government/crony/state capitalism or neo-socialism will deliver prosperity?

Only because we’ve been told so?

The Clashing Trends of Consumer GDP and Trade GDP, Bank Loans Favored Consumers over Trade
Figure 3

I would even say that the GDP represents a hodgepodge of statistical flimflams.

For example, the consumer GDP and trade GDP data emits contradictory signals.

Consumer spending GDP is supposed to represent the demand side, while trade GDP is supposed to account for the supply side. Or, when consumers buy from stores, they are accounted for by the household GDP. (Figure 3, upper pane)

On the other hand, the trade industry GDP exhibits sector’s spending, representing investments/expansions, inventory replenishment, labor spending, etc., from the supply side.

The NG’s data shows that the consumer spending GDP has been slowing steadily from 2016 through 2019. Bizarrely, in the face of the diminishing consumer strength, the trade GDP has been booming!

Again consumer GDP grew 5.6% in the 4Q down from 5.9% a quarter ago, has been trending lower since hitting a pinnacle of 7.2% in 2Q of 2016. Meanwhile, trade GDP spiked to 8.6%, the second-highest rate since 2Q of 2016’s 8.9%. Trade GDP began to ascend sharply since its bottom in the 3Q of 2018.

If these data have some accuracy, then the economy is shown as undergoing a disproportionate buildup of supply relative to demand, which should compound the problem of excess capacity.

Second, again if this represents close to actual activities, the weakening trend of consumer spending should be bad news to the GDP.

In the context of business planning, stores should keep inventories at the minimum, expansion plans should also be conservative or shelved until household consumption shows adequate signs of strengthening.

Of course, consumer recovery would be unlikely, considering the aggressiveness of transfers undertaken from the average citizenry to the government mainly channeled through deficit spending, higher taxes, and the increasing bureaucratic economy. The cronies benefit from these too.

One notable example: The dilemma being faced by motorcycle taxis represented by the Angkas, resonates with the Transport Network Vehicle Services (TNVS) experience. The TNVS have been subjected to repeated onslaughts from authorities on the demand side (pricing caps), operations (licenses, driver requirements, and other operational regulations), and supply-side (limits).  

Interestingly, the BSP’s data on banking loans to the consumers and trade has been diametric to the GDP trends.

Despite slowing consumer GDP, banking loans to the consumers have been booming! In contrast, bank lending to the trade industry has been flagging even when its GDP has supposedly been soaring. (figure 3, lower window)

Here’s a question, if the GDP data is accurate, then how has the trade industry been financing its expansion, if bank loans had become a less preferred option? By drawing down on its savings (retained earnings)?

Between the GDP and bank loans, which of these have been defective, and which have been accurate? Or could both have been amiss?

Has the Real Estate Industry Been Booming? Anecdotes and Prices Say Yes, GDP Says No!

The data on the real estate sector also exhibits signs of contradiction.

Demand from the mainland Chinese have been driving up prices of real estate has been a popular knowledge.

Back in the 1Q of 2019, the Philippines topped the IMF’s Global Housing Watch in price appreciation, while taking the eighth place in the real credit growth in support of this.

And since the demand from the mainlanders has powered sales and rent occupancy of many developers sending end-user (property and rent) prices rocketing, the supply-side should be expected to follow. 
Figure 4

But the odd part has been that commercial prices, for the first time since 2017, has lagged condo prices through Q3 2019, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements. Also, the GDP data obscures such a perspective. (Figure 4, upmost window)

According to the GDP, after peaking in 2013, rent has been in a downtrend and stagnating, while real estate activities have hardly been booming. On the contrary, its GDP trend has been sliding since Q1 2014.

Real rent GDP was only 2.3% in Q4, while real property GDP was 5.3%, below the headline rate of 6.4%.  Gross value added for the sector was a dismal 3.3%. (Figure 4, middle window)

In the meantime, bank loan data suggest that the growth rate of real estate loans have been improving since January 2019, while loans to the trade industry have sharply slowed (discussed above). (Figure 4, lowest pane)

The advancing growth rate of real estate loans must be signaling speculative positions on the end-user units than acquiring inventory, operations, and construction projects. Meanwhile, the mixed signals from trade muddle the actual conditions of the sector.

Additionally, since peaking in Q4 2018, construction permits, a leading indicator, has not only failed to produce a boom in the GDP in 2019 but has also been slowing dramatically through the 3Q. Have these permits vanished in a vacuum?

That said, rent and property prices, GDP, bank loans, and permits have been producing contradictory numbers suggesting a collision course in the economic picture from mainstream anecdotes, statistics, and economic theory.

A better viewpoint would likely come from the annual reports of listed firms from the sector.

GDP and Financial Risks: It’s Hardly from the POGOs, It is Risks of Concentration!

Finally, as I have been repeatedly saying: when in front of the public, the BSP will whitewash all forms of risks.

In response to a Fitch report stating higher risks from increased exposure of POGOs to the banks and the real estate sector, here’s a quote from the Philstar (January 20)…

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has downplayed the risks posed by the offshore gaming industry to the real estate and banking sectors, saying measures are in place to manage the exposure of banks.

In a press briefing, BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno said the reliance of the real estate sector to Philippine offshore gaming operators (POGOs) does not yet pose a major risk to banks and property developers.

I do not need to repeat the BSP’s quotes at the Financial Stability Report.

Instead, the following graphs should tell us, that with or without POGOs, concentration risk has been mounting on the GDP, which has matched by the banking system’s loan portfolio!

Figure 5

The % share of Real estate, construction, and retail GDP to the headline GDP, have soared to 35.8% as of the 4Q, which including financial GDP expands to 42.8%. The latter reached a record 45.92% nearly half of the real GDP in 3Q! (Figure 5, upper window)

The % share of Real estate, construction, and retail loans to the total, have soared to 36.4% as of November, which including financial loans expands to 46.7%, that’s almost half of all loans! (Figure 5, lower window)

These numbers tell us that once these credit-dependent sectors suffer a considerable slowdown, due to the feedback loop of their connectivity with each other, and with the general economy, severe dislocations will ripple across the real economy, and not just the GDP.

POGOs? They are just an aggravating factor.

Remember, since the online gaming industry is illegal in China, which most POGOs here cater to, one shouldn’t expect demand from this sector to be lasting.

When will the public and officials learn to distinguish between artificial and organic or natural?
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Sunday, January 26, 2020

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat? The Pig-Rat’s Nasty Tandem



Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement, I've kinda lost track myself. But being this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your head clean off, you've got to ask yourself one question: 'Do I feel lucky?' Well, do you, punk?—Dirty Harry (Callahan), played by Clint Eastwood

In this issue

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat? The Pig-Rat’s Nasty Tandem
-Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat?
-Shocks from The Pig-Rat Tandem: Symptoms of the Credit Cycle
-The Metal Rat May Be Inclined Towards the USD and Less Eager on Stocks
-The Pig-Rat Tandem’s Contribution to Economic Shocks and Underperformance

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat? The Pig-Rat’s Nasty Tandem

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat?

How should we take the following events as a precursor to the fortunes of the Chinese zodiac year of the Metal rat?
Figure 1

Due in part to the outbreak of the deadly coronavirus, which originated in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, China’s major equity benchmark, the Shanghai Composite Index, plunged 2.75% on Thursday, January 23rd, posting its worst loss for the end of the lunar year in three decades. (Figure 1 topmost pane)

And as the Chinese government aims to contain the virus from morphing into an epidemic or pandemic, social activities are being stringently controlled, which included the lockdown of some cities affecting as many as 56 million people, for now.


China's government imposed travel restrictions, as well as ordered shut the nation’s 70,000 movie theaters. Disney closed its Shanghai Disneyland in response to the outbreak, and had later been joined by several branches of Starbucks and McDonald's.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s government announced a citywide coronavirus emergency, which suspended classes until February 17, aside from the cancellation of all official travel to the mainland.

That’s aside from the Chinese government’s latest measure of suspending all inter-provincial road passenger transport from and to Beijing. Likewise, twenty-five provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in covering more than 1.2 billion people have activated the Level-I alert of public health incident, according to the China Daily.

The US and French governments also announced plans to evacuate citizens and diplomats from Wuhan.

Last night, China’s President Xi Jinping warned of the “spread of a deadly new virus is accelerating”, and thus declared that following the first 1000 room hospital, a second 1,300 room, will be built in a month or less.

And exacerbating this, major East Asian benchmarks have suffered deficits from the start of the year. The worst year-to-date performers have been national bellwethers of Laos (-5.17%), the Philippines (-2.45%), and China (-2.41%). (Figure 1, lowest pane)

With New Year’s celebration virtually aborted and turned upside down, would these signify as good Feng Shui for the metal rat?

Shocks from The Pig-Rat Tandem: Symptoms of the Credit Cycle

The Chinese zodiac sign of the year of the Pig has a history of being been chain-linked to either financial or economic turmoil, as I warned last year. Superstitions have little to do it with, except as coincidence. Instead, the credit cycle embodies the occurrence of such turbulence.

To recap on the 12-year cycle of the year of the pig:

1947-1949: Precursor to the Foreign Exchange crisis
1958-1960: Economic Slump (1959- year of the pig)
1969-1971: Balance of Payment crisis
1983-1985: Debt Moratorium/ Economic recession
1995-1997: Antecedent to Asian Financial Crisis
2007-2009: Forerunner to the Great Recession

Since the Philippine independence from the US, economic turmoil has shockingly encumbered the year of the pig. Its relations per year differ though.  The year of the pig heralded the crises of 1949, 1997 and 2008. The emergence of a crisis (1983) or its culmination (1971) has also shrouded the year of the pig.

The year of the PIG hasn’t been responsible for such gamut of economic dislocations. Or it hasn’t been superstitions that have plagued the Philippine financial and economic sphere since 1946.

These episodes shared some common denominators: credit expansion. Its ramifications were price inflation, economic slump, recession or a financial crisis or a combination thereof.

Some had external influences. Domestic origins were responsible for the others. 


There had been no let down from the year of the Earth Pig. Credit strains intensified in the banking system.
Figure 2

Exhibiting signs of tightening financial conditions, the Philippine yield curve INVERTED for the FIRST time since at least 2000!  (Figure 2, upper pane)

Such historic and seismic activities, but had largely been unnoticed by the public, had been reflected in the banking system’s liquidity conditions as manifested by the BSP’s KPI of cash-to-deposits, as well as, the liquid assets to deposits ratio. (Figure 2, lower window)

Tighter financial conditions likewise spiked Net NPLs to multi-year highs! (Figure 3 upper window)

Figure 3

The BSP response has likewise been monumental!

Aside from the massive downside adjustments of 400 bps in the banking system's Reserve Requirements Ratio, resonating its response to the 1997 Asian Crisis, not only did it join the global central banks in paring down its policy interest rates, but most importantly, it rekindled its nuclear option of monetizing public spending to unprecedented levels!

As ramifications to an economic downturn, global central banks eased in a panic to lower rates at levels last seen during the Great Recession that sparked a massive risk-on on financial assets in 2019!

And that’s not all.

Not only has the BSP engaged in stealthy rescue measures, but they even transcribed it in a report!

In its 2018 Financial Stability Report, the BSP acknowledged the massive buildup of such imbalances. (p. 19) [bold and underline added]

If there are risk issues to raise, it will have to be the prospects of managing liquidity. Aside from simply having more loans versus deposits, using liquid assets as a source for funding more earning assets needs our attention. However, the bigger issue will be that continuing on the path of being a bank-based financial market means that the provision of credit will require taking on mismatches in tenor and in liquidity. As more credit is dispensed, such mismatches will only increase.

Sadly, mainstream institutions have either dismissed or repressed this.

And in the face of increasing leverage, the BSP also raised concerns about the capability of its platform to handle payments and settlements of the Financial System. (p. 29 to 30)

Developments in the clearing and settlement space are unfolding at two distinct levels. At the most basic, the amounts processed for payments are significant, of the order of 15 times that of the resources of the banking system or of the economy (Figure 3.13). This highlights the substantial amount of (gross) liquidity needed to support financial market activity. This point is not trivial because it means that the magnitude of settlement/pre-settlement risk may be a much bigger concern than credit risk.

It also suggests why unwinding failed transactions can have broad system-level implications. Despite institutionalizing the delivery-versus payment protocol, the system remains vulnerable because a single bilateral failed trade may require a network of unwinding. Unfortunately, such data is not easily accessible and the extent to which these “settlement fails” represent a possible systemic risknot just in size but more so in terms of interlinkages that can spillover to the rest of the economy—is not readily determinable, at least at this time. In general, payments system data remain largely untapped and not having even a cursory view of the dynamics of the payments network leaves financial authorities blind to their possible consequences. This is a major concern

Unfortunately, with its complete dependence on such platforms and the absence of causal factors, the BSP provides no concrete solution to these substantial risks!

So the risk baton will be passed over by the Earth Pig to the Metal Rat.

The Metal Rat May Be Inclined Towards the USD and Less Eager on Stocks

Philippine risk assets likewise generated positive returns in 2019, the year of the Pig.

Saved by massive end session pumps, the main equity benchmark eked a meager 4.68% returns in 2019, the second positive return in six outings for the year of the pig since 1959.

Aside from Philippine Treasuries, the peso surged 3.7%.

Will such positive returns continue in the year of the Metal Rat?
Figure 4

In looking at patterns, positive returns might be the result of the alternating performances of the equity benchmark of the year of the rat since 1960. But such gains were accrued following negative returns from the year of the Pig.

But what if this year’s outcome will come in the shade of 2007-2008’s two-year boom-bust cycle? Or, this year’s positive may lead to negative returns in 2020.

Compared to the year of the Pig, the average USD peso has generated strong returns in the year of the Rat. The average USD peso has been up in four of the five years, with an average gain of 17.8%.

Or how about the last appearance of the metal rat, which was in 1960? 

The Pig-Rat Tandem’s Contribution to Economic Shocks and Underperformance

The big jump of the USD-peso and the crash of the equities in 1960 and 1984 had mainly been a consequence of economic shocks.

As noted last year, 1983 was the year the Philippine Government declared a debt moratorium (debt default)!

Figure 5

From Wikipedia: The country was hit hard by the second global oil crisis of the decade, in 1979. And when the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates in the early 80s, the Philippines’ debt ballooned rapidly, pushing the Philippine economy towards an economic nosedive by 1983 (bold italics added)

In the meantime, 2020’s predecessor, the year of the metal rat in 1960, almost shared a similar economic fate.

Aside from the former Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia’s January 26, 1959 SONA, which indicated pressures arising from credit-fueled inflation and a growth slowdown or stagflation, I excerpted Messrs Dohner and Intal from an NBR paper (p.180): “Philippine trade and industrial performance have been determined by a system of protection initiated in 1950. To deal with external imbalance, the Philippine government began licensing imports, in amounts determined by essentiality of the product. The incentives created for domestic production of these goods led to rapid industrialization and growth during much of the decade, but the growth rate had slowed appreciably by 1959.” (bold added)

The Philippines used to be ahead of its neighbors. However, the cumulative effect of such shocks or dislocations resulted in the reversing their relative financial and economic status.

According to the ADB: (bold added)

The Philippines has frequently suffered from periodic macroeconomic instabilities (Figure 3.21). The instabilities often resulted from persistent fiscal and current account deficits, over-borrowing and over-lending activities in the banking sector, and excessive exposure to short-term external debt. These often depressed investor confidence and led to capital flight, sharp currency depreciation, and economic recessions. Sharp monetary contraction and high interest rates to stave off currency depreciation and inflationary pressures during these crisis periods aggravated the economic downturn. The 1984–1985 economic collapse cost the Philippines a decade of potential economic growth and development. Major recession or low growth episodes occurred in 1960, 1970, 1982–1985, 1991– 1993, 1998, and 2001, and were associated with the macroeconomic instabilities in the last five decades. Indeed, these periodic and frequent downturns largely explain why the Philippines lagged behind many of its regional neighbors.

Asian Development Bank Philippines: Critical Development Constraints 2007, ADB.org

And yet the pig rat tandem played critical roles or have been associated with most of these shocks, as indicated in the underline texts.

And let us not forget, a cauldron of miasmic events for 2020: the Taal eruption in the Philippines, which may still be ongoing, the bushfires of Australia, the flare-up of the US-Iran conflict, a Trump impeachment trial and now the outbreak of the coronavirus of China…for January alone!

What a close for the year of Earth Pig! What an inaugural for the year of the Metal Rat!

As SFPD Inspector Harry Calligan in the 1971 film Dirty Harry asked, “Do I feel lucky? Well, do you?”
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