Showing posts with label Philippine bailout. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine bailout. Show all posts

Monday, July 21, 2025

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble


All is not hopeless. Markets are turbulent, deceptive, prone to bubbles, infested by false trends. It may well be that you cannot forecast prices. But evaluating risk is another matter entirely—Benoit Mandlebrot 

In this short issue

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble

I. The Philippine Gaming Bubble Is Bursting in Real Time

II. Implications: Sucked into a Cesspool of Losses

III. The Buyback Mirage

IV. The Deeper Malaise: A Speculative Society

V. Financial and Economic Policies as Catalysts; CMEPA: A Gamified Economy in the Making

VI. Regulators to the Rescue?

VII. The Damocles Sword Overhead: San Miguel’s Plummeting Share Prices

VIII. Conclusion: A System Engineered for Bubble Blowing 

The PLUS Economy: A Symptom of Policy-Driven Bubble 

Fiscal fragility and easy money laid the groundwork for a drift to a casino economy; tax distortion threatens to ignite the speculative tinder 

For continuity, this post follows my earlier piece: "The Ghost of BW Resources: The Bursting of the Philippine Gaming Stock Bubble" 

I. The Philippine Gaming Bubble Is Bursting in Real Time 

Trading activity now reveals raw emotion driving wild pendulum swings. 

As summarized:


Figure 1 

DigiPlus Interactive Corp. [PSE: PLUS] surged 15.7% on Friday, with turnover hitting Php 2.33 billion—an all-time high—accounting for 31.75% of mainboard volume! This marks the second-highest volume share after the July 4th collapse of 23.9%, when PLUS’s share skyrocketed to 33.33%. Friday’s rally mirrored the July 7th oversold recoil of +14.6%, when volume share hit 30.2%, the third highest on record. (Figure 1) 

This incredible volatility, backed by stunning trading volumes, shows that the bubble's deflation is still very much underway. 

II. Implications: Sucked into a Cesspool of Losses 

PLUS’s massive footprint in PSE volume underscores how deeply—both retail and institutional players—are entangled in its downside volatility vortex—sucked into a cesspool of losses, where investors have morphed into gamblers.


Figure 2

Many who suffered losses are pouring in more—anteing up or doubling down on losing positions to lower their average entry, hoping that a recovery might redeem them or restore their capital. This Martingale approach—catching a falling knife with both hands—only heightens the risk of ruin. (Figure 2, upper image)

Moreover, nursing drawdowns, many retail accounts will be sidelined, deactivated, or rendered inactive. 

Worse, we don’t know how much of this frenzy is credit-fueled or margin-driven. 

Yet, the biggest question: how exposed are financial institutions—and how compromised? 

III. The Buyback Mirage 

Bulls have pinned hopes on a Php 6 billion buyback. 

But as shown above, it’s a smidgen of total trade—worth less than this week’s volume. 

Down by 40.2%, PLUS’s weekly turnover hit Php 6.4 billion, or 19.3% of mainboard volume—an all-time high. 

Yet, the buyback is not capital formation—it’s capital consumption. Its intent is to support a price bubble, an unsustainable dynamic. Instead of being channeled into productive activity, capital is consumed in positional losses, resulting in both income shortfalls and balance sheet erosion. 

Other gaming issues, Bloomberry Resorts Corporation [PSE: BLOOM] and Philweb [PSE: WEB], likewise plummeted 6.32% and 17.4% week on week, respectively, reinforcing their recent price declines. (Figure 2, lower graph) 

IV. The Deeper Malaise: A Speculative Society 

This episode reveals just how desperate the market has become for a return to the bull days of the PSE. Chasing yields at any cost has become the new normal. 

But the gaming bubble is a symptom, not the disease. 

The gambling boom has gripped not only ordinary people reeling from inflation, but has also migrated into the PSE itself. 

The PLUS bubble has become a second front for digital gamblers. Or put differently, casino-style gambling has migrated to the stock market. 

Media and gaming apologists have deflected focus to the politics of a potential gambling ban. 

Yet given the sanctimonious cries of social democratic politicians who campaign to ban everything unpopular—should regulators now ban the stock market, too? 

Remember: drugs were the political obsession of the last administration. Now, gambling is the new public enemy. 

The war on POGOs has now morphed into a broader war on gambling. But do prohibitionists really think they can control human behavior through force alone? Will they succeed in imposing virtue—or will they help blow up the fiscal position (already at risk of hitting another record deficit) and magnify systemic corruption? 

Yet, haven’t you noticed? A political trend with every new administration is the use of its coercive political machinery to wage war against an unpopular minority—portrayed as evil. From drugs, to POGOs, to speculative finance—public enemies are manufactured, and the cycle repeats. 

These symptoms are not new.


Figure 3

The unraveling of the 1999 BW Resources bubble was followed by another boom-bust episode with the 2000 SSO-Philweb merger. These misallocations ultimately dragged the Phisix (now PSEi 30) to its knees by 2002. (Figure 3 upper diagram) 

Are we seeing echoes of that dynamic now? 

V. Financial and Economic Policies as Catalysts; CMEPA: A Gamified Economy in the Making 

Is this what the government had in mind with the Capital Market Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA)—a gamified economy modeled after PLUS? 

Read our earlier post on CMEPA "The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design" 

The claim that CMEPA is a tax reform to “benefit stocks” via reducing the stock transaction tax (STT) is superficial at best—a textbook case of the fallacy of division. 

In truth, CMEPA is a reprogramming of the public’s incentive structure—for households, corporations, and even government—towards short-termism, speculation, and consumption. 

Its standardized 20% tax on net income punishes savers, forcing them to seek speculative outlets—exactly what STT “reforms” aim to do. 

Add to this the BSP’s easy money and the crowding-out effects of deficit spending, and you have a perfect recipe for a bubble economy—the PLUS economy. 

Savings and borrowed money alike are being diverted into asset punts—not just in stocks, but in property as well, enabled by the BSP’s distorted, inflated Property Price Index. 

As part of the grand policy of inducing speculative juices—or animal spirits—in the real estate sector, the Social Security System (SSS) reportedly acquired Php 500 million worth of shares in Century Properties Group [PSE: CPG] via a special block sale. The purchase, equivalent to a 6.39% stake, was executed at a discount to market price. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

Since hitting its trough in Q2 2024, CPG’s share prices have more than doubled! 

This move not only signals institutional participation in the speculative drift but also raises questions about how public funds are being deployed to stimulate asset inflation. 

When pension reserves chase yield in property equities—backed by inflated indices and easy liquidity—it reinforces the very fragility the system claims to hedge against. 

VI. Regulators to the Rescue? 

Interestingly, regulators floated the idea of mandatory listings for online gambling firms—in the name of “transparency.” Was this a disguised attempt to rescue PLUS’s hissing bubble? 

Has the PSE been so starved of IPOs that it enlisted the help of regulators to bankroll listings—using mandates and the CMEPA’s policy nudges?


Figure 4

As of Q1 2025, the PSE has posted only one IPO (Topline Business Development, PSE: TOP) against two delistings (voluntary/involuntary)—Philab (DNA) and Keppel Philippines (KPH-KPHB). (Figure 4, upper visual) 

This proposed mandate reveals how authorities increasingly perceive the value of the stock market: a dopamine-laced feedback loop for short-term thrills or a market that hopes to accomplish "something for nothing" or share price inflation built on momentum and easy money. The very definition of a bubble. 

VII. The Damocles Sword Overhead: San Miguel’s Plummeting Share Prices 

As political and market attention fixates on gaming, another looming threat quietly unravels—the Damocles Sword hanging over the markets and the economy: San Miguel Corporation—a Php 1.5 TRILLION+ debt colossus—continues to see its share prices erode as liabilities climb—another potential catalyst for broader market instability. (Figure 4, lower window) 

VIII. Conclusion: A System Engineered for Bubble Blowing 

DigiPlus may be the flashpoint, but the broader market pathology runs far deeper. This is no rogue episode—it is the byproduct of a system engineered to reward velocity over value, status over functionality, dopamine over discipline. 

The convergence of fiscal fragility, monetary excess, and misaligned incentives has transformed the capital market into a gamified arena—one that pulls in both institutions and households into a void of unproductivity and capital consumption. 

CMEPA doesn’t fix this system— it formalizes its dysfunction. It deepens its institutionalization. 

The danger isn’t just the collapse of PLUS. It’s the normalization of a casino economy.  


Sunday, July 20, 2025

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design

 

When you net out all the assets and liabilities in the economy, the only thing that remains is our stock of productive investments, inventions, education, organizational structures, and unconsumed natural resources. Those are the basis of our national wealth—Dr. John P. Hussman 

In this issue 

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design

I. Reform as Spectacle: Bastiat’s Warning and the Mask of Inclusion

II. What is Seen: Promises of Efficiency and Modernization

III. The Unseen: How CMEPA Undermines the Socio-Political Economy

Theme 1: Taxing Savings, Undermining Capital Formation

Theme 2: Systemic Financial Risks and Policy Incoherence

Theme 3: Fiscal Extraction, the Wealth Effect and the Political Economy

Theme 4: Institutional and Socio-Political Deterioration

IV. Conclusion: CMEPA—A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Behavioral Reprogramming and the Unseen Costs of Reform 

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design 

A wolf in sheep’s clothing: A policy not only distorting capital markets but reprogramming society toward short-termism, volatility, and fragility. 

I. Reform as Spectacle: From Rhetoric to Repercussion—CMEPA Through Bastiat’s Eyes 

All legislation arrives adorned in rhetoric—its presentation aimed to evoke public trust and collective good. Much like Potemkin villages, reforms such as CMEPA appear to serve Jeremy Bentham’s ‘greater good,’ yet beneath the façade lies the concealed agenda of entrenched interests. 

Echoing Frédéric Bastiat’s indispensable insight, we must learn to discern between what is seen and what is unseen. 

"The entire difference between a bad and a good Economist is apparent here. A bad one relies on the visible effect while the good one takes account both of the effect one can see and of those one must foresee. 

However, the difference between these is huge, for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favorable the later consequences are disastrous, and vice versa. From which it follows that a bad Economist will pursue a small current benefit that is followed by a large disadvantage in the future, while a true Economist will pursue a large benefit in the future at the risk of suffering a small disadvantage immediately" (Bastiat, 1850) [bold added] 

With this lens, we examine the Capital Markets Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA)—Republic Act No. 12214, enacted on May 29, 2025, effective July 1. 

II. What is Seen: Promises of Efficiency and Modernization 

CMEPA has been billed as a modernization effort to deepen financial markets and enhance participation. Its measures include:

  • A flat 20% tax on passive income, including interest from long-term deposits and peso bonds
  • Reduced stock transaction tax (STT) to 0.1%
  • Expanded definition of “securities” to widen taxable instruments
  • Removal of exemptions for GOCCs and long-term depositors, while retaining perks for FCDUs and lottery bettors 

Portrayed as a reform designed to streamline taxation and deepen the capital markets, CMEPA hides a more troubling reality beneath its glitter. It reveals a policy that taxes the foundations of financial stability and long-term capital formation. While it reduces transaction taxes and simplifies some rates, its deeper impact is a radical shift in how the Philippine state attempts to influence public mindset and choices—how it allocates risk, treats saving, and commandeers private resources. 

III. The Unseen: How CMEPA Undermines the Socio-Political Economy 

This critique identifies several thematic consequences: 

Theme 1: Taxing Savings, Undermining Capital Formation


Figure/Table 1

1 Flattening Tax Across All Maturities 

The new 20% final withholding tax (FWT) rate now applies across all maturities, including long-term deposits and investment instruments previously exempted. (Figure/Table 1) 

Retail savers and retirees, dependent on deposit-based income, now face disincentives for capital preservation. Long-term financial instruments lose their privileged status, undermining capital formation

2 Financial Repression by Design

By taxing time deposits, foreign currency deposits, and peso-denominated long-term instruments, CMEPA imposes a de facto penalty on saving. Rather than encouraging financial inclusion or stability, it aligns with financial repression tactics: using policy tools to channel private savings toward public financing. 

Moreover, savings and capital are diverted from productive sectors to fund fiscal deficits, choking investment and inviting misallocation

3 Regressive Impact on Small Savers 

The uniform tax rate applies regardless of investor profile. Small savers and retirees lose disproportionately. Meanwhile, the wealthy retain flexibility—shifting funds offshore or into tax-exempt alternatives. 

4 Deepening the Savings-Investment Divide 

CMEPA taxes the engine of investment—savings—while encouraging speculative behavior. As domestic savings weaken, investment becomes more reliant on volatile international capital flows and risky leveraging, heightening systemic vulnerability. 

Theme 2: Systemic Financial Risks and Policy Incoherence 

5 Balance Sheet Mismatches 

CMEPA induces short-term liabilities against long-term assets, eroding liquidity buffers. Banks stretch to meet Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) thresholds while chasing yield in speculative sectors—real estate, retail, accommodation, construction. 

FX funding stability worsens as offshore placements rise, increasing currency mismatch risk for entities with dollar-denominated obligations. 

This weakens the stability of the banking system. 

6 Weaker Bank Profitability and Liquidity 

Banks face tighter net interest margins, especially as liabilities are taxed while fixed-yield assets remain unchanged. Asset durations can’t adjust as quickly as funding costs, intensifying balance sheet compression undermining liquidity. 

Combined with BSP’s RRR cuts and other easing, this suggests rising liquidity stress rather than financial deepening.


Figure 2

The weakened deposit base—as revealed by the downtrend in the growth of deposit liabilities—partly explains the doubling of deposit insurance in March, a reactive gesture to rising liquidity risk. Notably, the slowdown appears to have accelerated in 2025. (Figure 2)


Figure 3

But it is not just deposits: the decline in cash and liquid assets—as shown by falling cash-to-deposit and liquid assets-to-deposit ratios—highlights the mounting fragility of bank conditions. (Figure 3)


Figure 4

The law compounds the fragile cash position of Philippine banks, redistributing liquidity into riskier corners of the balance sheet. 

7 Systemic Leverage Risk 

Taxing interest income inflates debt servicing costs, worsening liquidity stress across sectors already burdened with leverage. The gap between savings returns and borrowing costs widens, deepening household and corporate fragility. 

8 Undermining Financial Deepening 

Instead of encouraging broader access to financial instruments, the reform may drive savers toward informal systems, offshore accounts, or speculative assetsincreasing volatility and disintermediation. 

9 Incoherence with Monetary Policy 

When interest income is taxed heavily, monetary policy transmission weakens. A rate hike meant to incentivize saving may be neutralized by post-tax returns that remain unattractive. This creates friction between fiscal and monetary authorities. 

10 Disincentivizing Long-Term Domestic Funding 

Removing exemptions from long-duration peso instruments weakens the domestic funding base. The government may respond by issuing shorter-tenor bonds, amplifying rollover risk—particularly amid widening deficits. 

Theme 3: Fiscal Extraction, the Wealth Effect and the Political Economy 

11 From Market-Based to Tax-Based Government Financing


Figure 5

CMEPA shifts the state's financing strategy from indirect borrowing (via banks' net claims on government) to direct taxation of interest income. This reduces the role of market-based funding and deepens reliance on financial repression. (Figure 5)

Philippine banks have long underwritten the government’s historic deficit spending. But with deposits eroding and liquidity thinning, can CMEPA’s pivot toward direct taxation rebalance this dynamic—or will banks be forced to sustain an inflationary financing regime they may no longer afford?

12 Crowding Out, Capital Misallocation, and Short-Termism

Taxing savings redirects capital from private to public use. Outside of government, the investment community is pushed toward velocity over duration, incentivizing speculative short-term returns rather than productive long-term investments. This leads to boom-bust cycles that consume capital and savings, ultimately lowering the standard of living for the average citizen. 

13 Reform Signals to Mask Fiscal Strain

CMEPA is marketed as efficiency reform, but its primary effect is increased revenue extraction. This is fiscalism masquerading as modernization—a stealth tax hike under the guise of pro-market policy. 

14 Wealth-Effect Ideology and Speculative Diversion 

DOF claims that CMEPA will "diversify income sources," implicitly inviting or encouraging ordinary Filipinos to engage in asset (stock and real estate) speculation. 

The BSP’s inflated real estate index, as discussed last week, aligns perfectly with this narrative. 

Yet if savings have weakened, with what are people supposed to speculate? 

In essence, the law encourages speculative behavior over productive undertakings—gambling on the trickle-down “easy money”-fueled wealth effect to stimulate growth. 

Theme 4: Institutional and Socio-Political Deterioration 

15 Favoring Non-Depository Institutions and Digital Control 

With capital markets shallow, the government’s pivot appears aimed at stock and real estate price inflation to support GDP optics. 

But there might be more to this: could the erosion of savings-based intermediation serve as a stepping-stone—or perhaps a gauntlet—to the advent of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) regime? 

16 Widening Inequality 

As savings erode and productive investment slows, the burden of taxation and financial volatility falls hardest on low- and middle-income households. Elites with offshore access or alternative vehicles thrive—amplifying the wealth gap. 

17 Capital Consumption and the Attack on Private Property 

CMEPA’s redistributive logic undermines the sanctity of private property. Through financial repression, taxation, and inflation, it transforms capital into consumption, violating the very principles of long-term economic development. 

18 Behavioral Reprogramming Toward Short-Termism 

CMEPA reorients household and institutional incentives by elevating time preferences, nudging actors toward short-term consumption and speculative tendencies. The long-term result encompasses not only economic and financial dimensions, but also social, political, and cultural shifts away from prudence. 

19 Increased State Power and Erosion of Economic and Civil Liberties

The flattening of tax treatment and the reallocation of savings toward the state reassert the growing dominance of the government over economic life. As household and institutional financial autonomy is curtailed, this fiscal centralization represents a creeping erosion of civil liberties. This is not merely fiscal policy—by asserting greater command over private savings and reducing the role of banks and savers in capital allocation, the CMEPA accelerates the centralization of economic control. 

20 Desperation, Not Reform 

Beneath the reformist language lies the scent of desperation. As government spending outpaces revenues and "free lunch" policies proliferate, the state appears increasingly willing to extract resources wherever possible, even at the cost of long-term economic damage. 

CMEPA may be seen less as a policy of modernization and more as a pretext to justify a broader power grab for control over the nation’s remaining financial surpluses. Such fiscal maneuvers reveal a growing reliance on coercive tools to finance political programs and preserve power.

IV. Conclusion: CMEPA—A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Behavioral Reprogramming and the Unseen Costs of Reform 

CMEPA is not neutral. 

It is policy with intent—velocity over virtue, spectacle over substance. Beneath its reformist gloss lies a deliberate reordering of incentives: a behavioral reprogramming that elevates time preference across households, businesses, banks, and the state itself. 

The ramifications are profound. As savings erode, the economy pivots toward a spend-and-speculate framework, exposing malinvestments and shortening planning horizons. Bank balance sheets tilt toward short-duration, high-risk assets. Businesses recalibrate toward immediacy, while regulatory structures and political priorities—including education—subtly shift to accommodate the new paradigm: favoring current events over historical depth, short-term fixes over long-term resilience. 

As immediacy becomes institutionalized, political incentives may shift as well—gravitating toward authoritarian tendencies, where centralized authority and executive expedience increasingly replace civic pluralism. 

This drift accelerates leverage and volatility. Coupled with BSP’s easy money, fiscal splurging, deepening economic concentration, the entrenching of the “build and they will come” paradigm, benchmark-ism, and the subtle embrace of a war economy—where economic centralization and speculative asset inflation substitute for organic growth—the system veers toward the bust phase of a boom-bust cycle

CMEPA, dressed in reformist language, delivers structural inversion through a reordering of incentives—substituting short-term economic activity for long-term capital formation. It penalizes saving, rewards speculation, and manufactures stability to perform confidence. Its impact is philosophical as much as economic: undermining the sanctity of private property and sabotaging the long-term architecture of capital. 

As Ludwig von Mises warned: 

Saving, capital accumulation, is the agency that has transformed step-by-step the awkward search for food on the part of savage cave dwellers into the modern ways of industry. The pacemakers of this evolution were the ideas that created the institutional framework within which capital accumulation was rendered safe by the principle of private ownership of the means of production. Every step forward on the way toward prosperity is the effect of saving. The most ingenious technological inventions would be practically useless if the capital goods required for their utilization had not been accumulated by saving. (Mises, 1956) 

The unseen consequences of policy often outweigh the visible promises, as Bastiat warned us. 

CMEPA’s structural tax changes reprogram public incentives in ways that may appear benign, but will likely unleash instability, fragility, and misallocation—outcomes not immediately visible, but deeply consequential. 

Unless reversed, CMEPA’s legacy will be one of hollowed market and social institutions, increased fragility of public governance, and ultimately, social unraveling—where the erosion of savings and stability gives way to volatility, inequality, and the breakdown of trust in both economic and civic life. 

CMEPA is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 

____

References: 

Frédéric Bastiat What is Seen and What is Not Seen, or Political Economy in One Lesson [July 1850], https://oll.libertyfund.org/ 

Ludwig von Mises, The ANTI-CAPITALISTIC MENTALITY, p 39, D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY (Canada), LTD 1956, Mises Institute 2008, Mises.org

 

 

 

Sunday, July 13, 2025

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility

 

Fake numbers lead to a phony economy, with fraudulent policies, chasing a mirage—Bill Bonner 

In this issue 

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Property Index Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility

Part I. The BSP’s Statistical Magic: From Crisis to Boom Overnight

I. A. Statistics as Spectacle — The Real Estate Index Makeover

I. B. The Tale of Two Indices: Deflation and Vacancies Erased: RPPI’s Parallel Universe of Price Optimism

I. C. Multiverse Economic Logic, Pandemic Pricing Without Mobility

I. D. BSP’s Statistical Signaling as Policy: Reflation by Design

Part II: The Confidence Transmission Loop and Liquidity Fragility

II. A. Confidence as Catalyst: BSP’s Keynesian Animal Spirits Playbook

II. B. Benchmark Rate Cuts and the Wealth Effect Mirage

II. C. Developer Euphoria: Liquidity, Debt, and Overreach

II. D. Affordability Fallout: Mispricing New Entrants

II. E. Vacancy vs. Real Demand: The Phantom of Occupancy, Market Hoarding and the Developer Divide

II. F. The Squeeze on Small Property Owners: Valuation Taxes and Hidden Costs

II. G. Sentiment Engineering: Policy Windfalls, Redistribution, Inequality

Part III: Policy Transmission: Consumer Debt, Market Dispersion, and the Mounting Fragility

III. A. Capital Market Transmission: Where Confidence Becomes Signal

III. B. Price Divergences and Latent Losses: Fort Bonifacio & Rockwell

III. C. Liquidity Spiral: From Losses to Liquidation Risk

III. D. Concentration Risk in Consumer Lending

III. E. Credit-Led Growth: Ideology and Fragility

III F. Employment Paradox and Inflation Disconnect

III G. Fragile Banking System: Liquidity Warnings Flashing

IV. Conclusion: The Dangerous Game of Inflating Asset Bubbles 

The Confidence Illusion: BSP’s Statistical Playbook to Reflate Property Bubble and Conceal Financial Fragility 

How benchmark-ism and sentiment engineering are used to buoy real estate and stock prices to back banks amid deepening stress. 

Part I. The BSP’s Statistical Magic: From Crisis to Boom Overnight 

I. A. Statistics as Spectacle — The Real Estate Index Makeover 

In a fell swoop, the real estate industry’s record vacancy dilemma has been vanquished by the BSP. 

All it took was for the monetary agency to overhaul its benchmark—replacing the Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) with the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI). (BSP, July 2025) 

And voilà, prices have been perpetually booming, and there was never an oversupply to begin with! 

Regardless of the supposed “methodological upgrade”—anchored in hedonic regression and presented as aligned with global best practices—the index is built on assumptions and econometric modeling vulnerable to error or deliberate manipulation. 

Let us not forget: the BSP is a political agency. Its goals are shaped by institutional motives, and there’s no third-party audit of its inputs or underlying calculations. The only true litmus test for the data? Economic logic. 

I. B. The Tale of Two Indices: Deflation and Vacancies Erased: RPPI’s Parallel Universe of Price Optimism


Figure 1

Under the original RREPI, national price deflation was recorded during the pandemic recession: Q3 2020 (-0.4%), Q1 2021 (-4.2%), Q2 2021 (-9.4%). Deflation returned in Q3 2024 at -2.3%. (Figure 1, upper visual) 

But under RPPI? No deflation at all. 

Instead, the same quarters posted gains: Q3 2020 (6.3%), Q1 2021 (4.1%), Q2 2021 (2.4%), and Q3 2024 (7.6%). Not even a once-in-a-century health and mobility crisis could dent the official boom narrative. 

The new RPPI also shows a material deviation from the year-on-year (YoY) price changes in residential and commercial prices in Makati reported by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Figure 1, lower pane) 

The BSP’s narrative: “Property prices rise in Q1 2025, highest in the NCR.” 

Yet media sources paint a starkly different picture—perhaps reporting from another universe—or even permanently bullish analysts observed that the vacancy woes were intensifying. 

Just last April 29th, BusinessWorld noted

"The vacancy rate for residential property in Metro Manila will likely hit 26% by the end of this year, with condominium developers reining in their launches to dispose of inventory, according to property consultant Colliers Philippines." (italics added) 

On April 8th, GMA News also reported: 

"The oversupply of condominium units in Metro Manila is now estimated to be worth 38 months, as the available supply has continued to increase while there have been 9,000 cancellations, a report released by Leechiu Property Consultants (LPC)." (italics added) 

LPC reported last week that due to prevailing ‘soft demand,’ the NCR condominium oversupply slightly decreased to 37 months in Q2 2025. 

And in a more sobering global perspective, on July 10 BusinessWorld cited findings from the 2025 ULI Asia-Pacific Home Attainability Index: 

"The Philippine capital was identified as one of the most expensive livable cities in the Asia-Pacific region. Condominium prices in Metro Manila are now 19.8 times the median annual household income, far exceeding affordable levels. Townhouses are even more unattainable at 33.4 times the average income." (bold added) 

More striking still, price inflation has persisted amid record oversupply. 

I. C. Multiverse Economic Logic, Pandemic Pricing Without Mobility


Figure 2

The old RREPI captured the downturn in NCR condo units—four straight quarters of deflation in 2020–2021 and again in Q3 2024. But the new RPPI virtually erased this distress. According to its logic, speculative frenzy thrived even during ECQ lockdowns. (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

But real estate isn’t like equities. Its transactions require physical inspection, legal documentation, and bureaucratic transfer procedures. To suggest booming prices during lockdowns implies buyers magically toured properties, exchanged notarized documents, and signed title transfers—while under mobility restrictions. 

Only statistics can conjure such phenomena. 

When vacancies surged again in Q3 2024, RPPI recorded a +5.3% gain. One quarter of mild contraction in Q4 2023 (-4.8%) is the lone blemish on its multiverse logic. 

RPPI now behaves as if oversupply has nothing to do with prices—either the law of supply and demand has inverted, or RPPI reflects a speculative parallel reality 

I. D. BSP’s Statistical Signaling as Policy: Reflation by Design 

This isn’t just mismeasurement. It’s perceptional distortion

The BSP’s policy appears aimed at hitting “two birds with one stone”: rescue the real estate sector—and by extension, shore up bank balance sheets. 

Via rate cuts, RRR adjustments, market interventions, and benchmark-ism, statistics have been conscripted into policy signaling. 

Part II: The Confidence Transmission Loop and Liquidity Fragility 

II. A. Confidence as Catalyst: BSP’s Keynesian Animal Spirits Playbook 

Steeped in Keynesian orthodoxy, the BSP continues to lean on “animal spirits” to animate growth. Confidence—organic or manufactured—is viewed as a tool to boost consumption, inflate GDP, and quietly ease the government’s debt burden. 

Having redefined its benchmark index, the BSP now uses RPPI not just as data, but as a signaling instrument

It projects housing resilience at a time of monetary easing, giving shape to a narrative of strength amid systemic stress. RPPI becomes a cornerstone of "benchmark-ism"—targeting real estate equity holders, property developers, and households alike. 

II. B. Benchmark Rate Cuts and the Wealth Effect Mirage 

The timing is telling. 

This narrative engineering coincides with the underperformance of real estate equities. With property stocks dragging the Philippine Stock Exchange, "benchmark-ism" functions as a tactical lifeline to inflate valuations, revive confidence, and activate the so-called "wealth effect." 

Rising property prices are meant to induce consumption—not only among equity holders but among homeowners who perceive themselves as wealthier. But this is stimulus by optics, not fundamentals. 

II. C. Developer Euphoria: Liquidity, Debt, and Overreach 

This ideological windfall extends to property developers. Easier financial conditions could boost demand, sales, and liquidity—justifying their ballooning debt loads and encouraging further capital spending. 

Or, developers, emboldened by statistical optimism, may pursue growth despite structural weakness, compounding risks already embedded in their debt-heavy balance sheets. 

For example, the published debt of the top five developers (SM Prime, Ayala Land, Megaworld, Robinsons Land and Vista Land) has a 6-year CAGR of 7.88%, even as their cash holdings grew by only 2.16% (Figure 2, middle image) 

Additionally, the supply side real estate portfolio of Universal-commercial bank loans has accounted for 24% of production loans, total loans outstanding 20.68% net of Repos (RRP) and 20.28% gross of RRPs. This excludes consumer real estate loans, which in Q1 2025 accounted for 7.54%.  (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

But this is where the Keynesian blind spot emerges: artificially inflated prices distort economic signals. 

II. D. Affordability Fallout: Mispricing New Entrants 

In equities, inflated valuations misprice capital, leading to overcapacity and overinvestment in capital-intensive sectors like real estate or malinvestments

In housing, speculative price increases distort affordability, widening the gap not only between renters and owners, but also between incumbent homeowners and prospective buyers—including those targeting new project launches by developers. 

As developers capitalize on inflated valuations, pre-selling prices rise disproportionately to income growth, pushing ownership further out of reach for middle-income and first-time buyers. 

This dynamic not only excludes a growing segment of the population, but also risks creating inventory mismatches, where units are sold but remain unoccupied due to affordability constraints. 

The ULI Asia-Pacific Home Attainability Index pointed to such price-income mismatches 

II. E. Vacancy vs. Real Demand: The Phantom of Occupancy, Market Hoarding and the Developer Divide 

Vacancies extrapolate to an oversupply. 

Even when a single buyer or monopolist absorbs all the vacancies, this doesn’t guarantee increased occupancy. 

Demographics and socio-economic conditions—not speculative fervor—drive real demand. 

Meanwhile, rising property prices also translate to higher collateral values, encouraging further credit expansion and balance sheet leveraging in the hope of stimulating consumption. 

But this cycle of debt-fueled optimism risks compounding systemic fragility. 

Rising prices also create friction between small developers and elite firms, the latter leveraging cheap capital and financial heft to dominate the industry. 

Owners of large property portfolios can afford to hoard inventories, allowing prices to rise artificially while sidelining smaller players. 

II. F. The Squeeze on Small Property Owners: Valuation Taxes and Hidden Costs 

Beyond affordability, rising property prices carry compounding burdens for small-scale owners. 

As valuations climb, so do real property taxes, which are pegged to assessed values and can reach up to 2% annually in Metro Manila. 

Insurance premiums and maintenance costs—from association dues to repairs—rise in tandem. These escalating expenses disproportionately impact small owners, who lack the financial buffers of large developers or elite asset holders. 

The result is a quiet squeeze: ownership becomes not just harder to attain, but harder to sustain. 

II. G. Sentiment Engineering: Policy Windfalls, Redistribution, Inequality 

Governments reap fiscal windfalls via inflated valuations, using funds to back deficit spending. But these redistributions often fund projects detached from systemic equity or real productivity.

Despite the optics, only a sliver of the population truly benefits

Aside from the government, the other primary beneficiaries of asset inflation are the elite of the Forbes 100, not the broader population 

This "trickle-down strategy", rooted in sentiment and asset inflation, risks deepening inequality and fueling balance sheet-driven malinvestments. 

Part III: Policy Transmission: Consumer Debt, Market Dispersion, and the Mounting Fragility 

III. A. Capital Market Transmission: Where Confidence Becomes Signal 

Here is how the easing-benchmarkism policy is being transmitted at the PSE.


Figure 3

The PSE’s property index sharply bounced by 8.2% (MoM) in June 2025, while the bank-led financial index dropped 4.9%. This divergence reveals that asset reflation via statistical optics has buoyed developers—but failed to restore investor confidence in the banking sector. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

During the first inning of the ‘propa-news’ campaign that “Easing Cycle equals Economic Boom” in Q3 2024, both indices had surged—property by 16.41% and financials by 19.4%. But Q2 2025 tells a different story: while property stocks outperformed the PSE again, financial stocks weighed it down. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

This magnified dispersion reflects the imbalance at play. As a ratio to the overall PSE, property stocks are gaining market cap dominance. At the same time, the free float market capitalization of the PSEi 30’s top three banks have declined—mirrored by the rising share of the two biggest property developers. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Unless bank shares recover, gains in the property sector will likely be capped. After all, property developers remain the biggest clients of the Philippine banking system. 

Put another way: whatever confidence boost the BSP engineers through easing and revised benchmarks, markets eventually push back against artificial gains

Signal may dominate short-term sentiment—but fundamentals reclaim price over time. 

III. B. Price Divergences and Latent Losses: Fort Bonifacio & Rockwell 

There is more.


Figure 4

The widening divergence in pre-selling and secondary prices of condominiums in Fort Bonifacio and Rockwell Center signifies a deeper signal: the BSP’s implicit rescue of banks via the property sector is being tested on the ground. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

The widening price gap implies mounting losses for pre-selling buyers—early investors who are now exposed to valuation markdowns in the secondary market.

So far, these losses have not translated into Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). Continued financing, sunk-cost inertia, buyer risk aversion, and an economy growing more through credit expansion than productivity have suppressed the impact.

But if these losses scale—or if the economy tips into recession or stagnation—underwater owners may surrender keys. This leads to cascading vacancies and NPLs, raising systemic risk. 

III. C. Liquidity Spiral: From Losses to Liquidation Risk 

Losses, once translated into constrained liquidity, spur escalating demand for liquid assets. This pressure breeds forced liquidations—not just by individual buyers of pre-selling projects, developers but among holders of debt-financed real estate. 

Banks, as financial intermediaries, face direct exposure. When collateral values fall, they may issue a ‘collateral call—requiring borrowers to post more assets—or a ‘call loan,’ demanding immediate repayment.

If rising NPLs escalate into operational or capital deficits, banks themselves become sellers—dumping assets to raise cash. This synchronized selloff in a buyer’s market fuels fire sales and elevates the risk of a broader debt crisis.

III. D. Concentration Risk in Consumer Lending

Last week, the Inquirer cited a Singaporean fintech company which raised concern about the extreme dependence on credit card usage in the Philippines, noting: “The 425-percent debt-to-income ratio in the Philippines—the worst in the region—indicates a ‘severe financial stress.’” (Figure 4, middle image)

Downplaying this, an industry official clarified that since the total credit card contracts were at 20 million, credit card debt averaged 54,000 pesos per contract. Since the number of individuals covered by the contracts was not identified, a person holding multiple credit card debt contracts could, collectively, contribute to a debt profile resembling the 425% debt-to-income ratio (for contract holders).

Based on BSP’s Q4 2023 financial inclusion data, only a significant minority—just 8.1% of the population as of 2021 (World Bank Findex)—carry credit card debt. Even if this figure has doubled or tripled, total exposure remains below 30%, highlighting mounting concentration risks among debt-laden consumers. (Figure 4, lowest table)

III. E. Credit-Led Growth: Ideology and Fragility

The seismic shift toward consumer lending has been driven not only by interest rate caps on credit cards, but by ideological faith in a consumer-driven economy.

Universal and commercial bank consumer credit surged 23.7% year-on-year in May. Credit card loans alone zoomed by 29.4%, marking the 34th consecutive month of 20%+ growth.


Figure 5

From January 2022 to May 2025, consumer and credit card loan shares climbed from 8.8% and 4.4% to 12.7% and 7.5%, respectively. Last May, credit card debt represented 59% of all non-real estate consumer loans. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

Yet how much of credit card money found its way into supporting speculative activities in the stock market and real estate? 

What if parts of bank lending to various industries found their way into asset speculation? 

Once disbursed, banks and the BSP have limited visibility on end-use—adding opacity to the cycle they’re stimulating. 

III F. Employment Paradox and Inflation Disconnect 

Interestingly, this all-time high in debt coincides with near-record employment rates. The May employment rate rose to 96.11%, not far from the all-time highs of 96.9% in December 2023 and 2024, and June 2024. The employed population of 50.289 million last May was the second highest ever. (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

Yet CPI inflation remains muted. Despite collapsing rice prices driven by the Php 20 rollout, inflation ticked up only slightly in June—from 1.3% to 1.4%. 

With limited savings and shallow capital market penetration, the Philippines faces a precarious juncture. What happens when credit expansion and employment reverses from these historic highs? 

And this won’t affect only residential real estate but would worsen conditions of every other property malinvestments like shopping malls/commercial, ‘improving’ office, hotel and accommodations etc. 

III G. Fragile Banking System: Liquidity Warnings Flashing 

Beneath the surface, bank stress is already visible.


Figure 6

Even as NPLs remain officially low—possibly understated—liquidity strains are worsening:

-Cash and due from banks posted a modest 3.4% MoM increase in May—but fell 26.4% YoY

(Figure 6, topmost image)

-Deposit growth edged from 4.04% in April to 4.96% in May

-Cash-to-deposit ratio bounced slightly from 9.68% to 9.87%, yet remains at its lowest level since at least 2013

-Liquid assets-to-deposit ratio fell from 48.29% in April to 47.5% in May

-Bank investment growth slowed from 8.84% to 6.5% (Figure 6, middle diagram)

-Portfolio growth dropped from 7.82% to 5.25% 

Despite these constraints, banks continued lending. 

Interbank lending (IBL) surged, pushing the Total Loan Portfolio (inclusive of IBL and Reverse Repos) from 10.2% to 12.7%, sending the loan-to-deposit ratio to its highest level since March 2020. 

Beyond Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets, underreported NPLs—particularly in real estate lending—may be compounding the liquidity strain and masking deeper fragility. The surge in HTMs has coincided with a steady decline in cash-to-deposit ratios, signaling stress beneath the statistical surface. (Figure 6, lowest visual) 

IV. Conclusion: The Dangerous Game of Inflating Asset Bubbles 

Despite the Q3 2024 surge in the Property Index—helping power the PSEi 30 upward—combined with a 6.7% rebound in the old real estate index in Q4, vacancy rates soared to record highs in Q1 and remain near all-time highs as of Q2 2025

This unfolds amid surging consumer and bank credit, all-time high public liabilities fueled by near-record deficit spending, and peak employment rates. 

Ironically, the distortions in stock markets—and the engineered statistical illusions embedded in the old property index—have barely moved the needle against real estate oversupply, as measured by vacancy data.  

Not only has the BSP sustained its aggressive easing campaign, it is now amplifying statistical optics to reignite animal spirits—hoping to hit two birds with one stone: rescuing property sector balance sheets as a proxy for bank support. 

Yet inflating asset bubbles magnifies destabilization risks—accelerating imbalances and expanding systemic leverage that bank balance sheets already betray. 

Worse, the turn toward benchmark-ism and sentiment engineering in the face of industry slowdown signals more than strategy—it reeks of desperation.

When monetary tools fall short, propaganda steps in to fill the gap—instilling false premises to manufacture resilience.

And the louder the optimism, the deeper the dissonance. 

____

References 

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas BSP's new Residential Property Price Index more accurately captures market trends June 27, 2025 bsp.gov.ph