Showing posts with label financial repression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial repression. Show all posts

Sunday, November 08, 2026

Stagflation Part 19: Twin Deficits, a Third Inflation Wave, and the Bill for Free-Lunch Politics

deficit spending itself inhibits economic growth by causing the Federal Reserve to monetize the federal debt. The Fed lowering interest rates and increasing the money supply distorts the signal interest rates send to market actors. This distortion causes the boom-bust cycle that plagues the American economy—Ron Paul 

In this issue: 

Stagflation Part 19: Twin Deficits, a Third Inflation Wave, and the Bill for Free-Lunch Politics

I. One Imbalance, Two Record Deficits

II. The Debt That Slowed

III. The Export Boom That Imports Itself

IV. The Financial Repression Behind the Free-Lunch Politics

V. Three Markets, One Signal

VI. October: The Third Wave of the Inflation Cycle Affirmed

VII. Interventions Beget Interventions: From Minimum Wages to Struggling Labor Conditions

VIII. The Peso Rally is a Loan, Not a Fix

IX. Conclusion: The Bill Arrives 


Stagflation Part 19: Twin Deficits, a Third Inflation Wave, and the Bill for Free-Lunch Politics 

Record deficits, a peso under siege, a banking system steering credit to the favored, and 7.8% inflation. Free-lunch politics wrote the check. The economy is paying it. 

I. One Imbalance, Two Record Deficits 

A country can consume beyond what it produces, but only by drawing on savings, borrowing from abroad, or running down existing resources. Free-lunch (social democratic) politics makes this imbalance politically attractive: subsidies, welfare spending, price controls, transfers, public works, regulatory mandates such as minimum wages, and deficit spending deliver immediate benefits while postponing the costs. The political rewards are immediate; the economic bill arrives later. 


Figure 1

The nine-month fiscal deficit reached a record Php 1.303 trillion, with Q3 alone registering an unprecedented Php 516.4 billion. (Figure 1, topmost and middle windows) 

The nine-month merchandise trade deficit also reached a record $47.158 billion, exceeding the previous 2022 record of $46.207 billion. 

Both deficits are now at record levels. The coincidence is not the argument; the underlying savings-investment imbalance is. 

But the deeper imbalance lies between national saving and domestic investment. 

Government deficits reduce public saving. Unless private saving rises sufficiently to compensate, national saving falls relative to domestic investment. The resulting savings-investment gap must be financed from abroad. This is the underlying connection between the fiscal imbalance and the external imbalance: the economy is absorbing more resources than its national saving can finance. 

The merchandise trade gap is only one side of the external imbalance. Remittances and services offset part of the deficit, but not enough to eliminate the external financing pressure. The current-account balance captures the broader relationship between national saving and investment, while the balance-of-payments (BoP) position, examined in Section VII, reveals the resulting external financing pressures. 

Part 17 documented eight months of twin deficits. One month later, both had widened. The imbalance was no longer merely persistent. It was growing. 

II. The Debt That Slowed 

September's national debt hit a record Php 19.66 trillion, but increased by only Php 53.46 billion during the month. That looks oddly restrained alongside a record Q3 fiscal deficit of Php 516.4 billion. The apparent disconnect deserves closer examination. (Figure 1, lower image) 

The slower monthly increase should not obscure the cumulative borrowing. National debt had increased by Php 1.952 trillion over the first nine months, the second-largest increase since 2021's Php 2.122 trillion. The nine-month fiscal deficit of Php 1.303 trillion was also 14.4% higher than the comparable Php 1.139 trillion figure. Even so, September's debt stock remained slightly below the Development Budget Coordination Committee's (DBCC) Php 19.77 trillion full-year 2026 target. 

A deficit is a flow; debt is a stock. How much of the deficit translates into additional reported debt, and when, depends on the financing mix, cash balances, debt repayments, and valuation adjustments. A smaller monthly increase in debt after a record quarterly deficit is not evidence of fiscal consolidation. It raises a more important question: where did the financing go, and through which channels was the government's borrowing absorbed? 

One place to look is the banking system. Net claims on central government (NCoCG) have been rising for years, reaching a historic Php 6.499 trillion in September, according to BSP data. This growing exposure matters because government financing does not take place in isolation from the rest of the financial system. Banks' expanding claims on government reflect the increasing absorption of financial resources by the sovereign.


Figure 2

Nor is this exposure confined to banks. In Q2 2026, net claims on central government held by other financial corporations (OFC) reached a record Php 3.18 trillion. BSP holdings stood at Php 491 billion, while banks held Php 6.339 trillion. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

Combined, these positions totaled Php 10.012 trillion. This represented roughly 78% of the Php 12.84 trillion domestic debt stock. The broader point is that sovereign financing increasingly draws on financial resources held across the domestic financial system. 

This brings us to crowding out. As government borrowing competes with private borrowers—mostly elite owned corporations and banks—for domestic savings, it can push up borrowing costs, restrict private-sector access to credit, and divert financial resources from private investment toward government financing. The consequence extends beyond the immediate cost of borrowing: resources absorbed by the sovereign are resources that may otherwise have financed business expansion, productive investment, and capital formation. The government finances present spending demands while potentially constraining the productive capacity needed to support future growth. 

Financial repression can intensify this displacement. When political arrangements channeled through regulatory and monetary policies are redirected to favor sovereign financing or privileged borrowers, credit allocation becomes distorted. The issue is no longer simply how much the government borrows, but how institutional arrangements influence who gets access to credit, at what cost, and at whose expense. 

This concentration of financial-sector claims on the sovereign also creates the conditions for a sovereign-bank feedback loop. 

As financial institutions accumulate government exposure, their balance sheets become deeply intertwined with the government's fiscal position. 

As such, any deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness can transmit stress to financial institutions, potentially restricting private credit and increasing pressure for public support. Such support can further weaken public finances, reinforcing the original fiscal problem. The danger is not that this loop has necessarily reached its terminal stage, but that institutional arrangements are making the financial system have become chronically dependent on sovereign stability. 

Fiscal absorption, crowding out, and financial repression can therefore reinforce one another. The sovereign absorbs financial resources, institutional arrangements privilege its financing, and private capital formation becomes the residual claimant. 

The establishment blames peso depreciation for the record debt. That confuses an accounting consequence with the underlying economic problem. 

True, a weaker peso increases the domestic-currency value of foreign-currency-denominated debt, adding to the reported debt stock. But depreciation is a product of deeper external pressures, including the foreign-exchange demand generated by persistent financing requirements, capital-flow dynamics, and deteriorating confidence. Currency weakness is therefore not merely an accounting explanation of the debt problem. It is a symptom of the broader macroeconomic imbalance. 

III. The Export Boom That Imports Itself 

Philippine exports hit a record $9.87 billion in September, up 35.6% year on year. Electronics accounted for $6.92 billion, or 70.1% of total exports. Semiconductor exports likewise registered record year-on-year growth and a record share of total exports. (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

Much of this expansion rides the global AI boom, which has fueled demand for semiconductors, memory chips, and computing infrastructure. The Philippines is benefiting from this external investment cycle, but the concentration of export growth in electronics also exposes the economy to its reversals. 

But electronics were also the country's largest import category, at $5.80 billion, or 38.6% of total imports. The PSA's September tables show electronic exports increasing by $2.894 billion, against a $2.704 billion increase in electronic imports. (Figure 2, lowest tables) 

The export boom brings a substantial import bill with it. The relatively narrow difference between these incremental gross trade flows also underscores the importance of imported inputs in sustaining export expansion, although it should not be mistaken for a measure of domestic value added. 

The crux is: the concentration also creates and fosters vulnerability. If the AI investment cycle reverses, semiconductor orders and export momentum could drastically weaken. 

The current global technology selloff makes that risk harder to dismiss. 


Figure 3
 

Meanwhile, consumer goods imports fell 4.25%, suggesting weaker household demand. Manufacturing's S&P PMI fell to 49.1 in October, its second consecutive month of contraction, with output, new orders, and employment all declining. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

Exports are booming while domestic manufacturing contracts. The economy is riding an externally driven technology boom while its broader domestic production base shows signs of weakness. 

IV. The Financial Repression Behind the Free-Lunch Politics 

The government's financing requirements do not operate independently of the private economy. Financial repression extends crowding out beyond competition for savings. Through captive savings, directed credit, regulatory accommodation, and suppressed financing costs, financial arrangements can steer resources toward government and politically favored borrowers. 

Bank lending grew 11.4% in September, while M3 expanded 9.3% to Php 20.7 trillion. Slower money growth does not mean monetary contraction. M3 is still expanding on an already enlarged base, adding to the outstanding stock of money. 

Bank lending is also a channel of money creation. When commercial banks extend loans, they generally create matching deposit liabilities, expanding deposit money in the economy. Loan repayments, conversely, extinguish deposit money. The resulting purchasing power does not enter every sector equally; it flows through the credit allocation decisions of banks and the institutional arrangements shaping those decisions. The issue is therefore not simply how much money and credit are created, but where the newly created purchasing power goes. 

Electricity, water supply, and transportation and storage continued to register strong credit growth, while household borrowing continues to weaken.(Figure 3, middle chart)  Credit expansion was therefore far from uniform. 

This sectoral concentration becomes more interesting when viewed against the institutional landscape. Electricity and transport are not simply market sectors operating independently of political decisions. Their economics are heavily shaped by regulatory decisions, concessions, pricing arrangements, public policy, and government intervention. 

From power-sector tax relief and corporate deals (e.g., SMC-AEV-MER, Prime Infra-FGEN) to renewable-energy payment arrangements (discussed last year) and transport fare adjustments, political decisions influence the distribution of costs, revenues, and financial risks. The resulting credit expansion deserves examination not just as lending growth, but in terms of the activities and institutional arrangements it finances. 

Consumer lending continues to reveal sustained softening. Growth peaked at 25.63% in May 2024, reached another peak of 23.91% in August 2025, and then decelerated for 13 consecutive months to 16.17% in September 2026. Consumer credit is still expanding, but its growth impulse is weakening. (Figure 3, lowest image) 

The contrast exposes the uneven transmission of liquidity: aggregate credit continues to grow, but household credit is losing momentum while selected politically favored sectors maintain stronger expansion. 

Credit creation is not capital formation. A growing financial system does not automatically mean a growing productive economy. 

V. Three Markets, One Signal 

Emergency policies did not abolish adjustment. They displaced it. EO 110's price suppression, BSP relief measures, and the managed foreign-exchange regime shifted costs among government, corporate, bank, and household balance sheets. 

Those costs are now surfacing in three markets.


Figure 4

The peso repeatedly set new lows, breaking Php 64 to the dollar at the end of October.

BVAL Treasury yields across the 1-to-25-year curve climbed to multi-year highs.

Meanwhile, the PSEi remained within a managed range even as market breadth narrowed. (Figure 4, topmost and middle diagrams) 

The signals differ, but point toward the same underlying pressure: the growing cost of sustaining an economy whose imbalances remain unresolved. 

The BSP raised its policy rate by 50 basis points to 5.5%, an increase described by the media as ‘jumbo’ or ‘aggressive’. Yet with headline inflation at 7.8%, the policy rate remained deeply negative in real terms, at approximately -2.3%. 

The 2022–2023 experience offers a revealing precedent. Despite 350 basis points of rate increases between July 2022 and February 2023, lending growth slowed to 6.65% by September 2023, while M3 growth remained around 6–8%. Lending subsequently resumed its upward trajectory. Higher rates slowed credit expansion but did not reverse the underlying monetary and credit dynamics. (Figure 4, lowest graph) 

Higher interest rates cannot manufacture electricity, fuel, food, or productive capacity. They raise financing costs precisely when manufacturing demand and household credit momentum are weakening. 

The BSP was already behind the inflation curve in 2023. The same question confronts it now: does monetary tightening lead price adjustment, or merely follow it? A central bank reacting to already-established price movements can raise the price of credit, but it cannot retroactively create the goods whose scarcity helped drive inflation. 

The price of credit moved. The supply constraints did not. 

VI. October: The Third Wave of the Inflation Cycle Affirmed 

The monetary expansion examined earlier provides the financial backdrop to this inflation wave. Deficit spending sustains nominal demand, while the twin deficits and peso depreciation raise the domestic cost of imported goods and production inputs. The 2026 oil shock compounds these existing pressures.


Figure 5

October headline inflation reached 7.8%, the highest since February 2023, against just 1.7% a year earlier. Core inflation climbed to 5.4%, its fastest since September 2023, while inflation for the bottom 30% of households reached 9.5%. (Figure 5, topmost chart) 

Transport inflation surged to 20.1%, and rice inflation reached 20.7%, despite the price cap. (Figure 5, middle and lowest graphs) 

The oil shock lit the fuse; accumulated monetary expansion and continued credit creation provided the conditions for broader price pressures to persist. This is no longer simply an energy-price disturbance. The rise in core inflation points to a wider deterioration in purchasing power, extending beyond the immediate effects of higher fuel and food prices. 

The third wave has already surpassed the first wave's 6.7% peak in 2018 and stands just 0.9 percentage points below the second wave's 8.7% peak in January 2023. 

And 7.8% is not the entirety of the household experience. CPI tracks the prices of a defined basket, but cannot fully capture every deterioration in product quantity, quality, or value and even stealth charges. 

Shrinkflation, skimpflation, and sneakflation can erode purchasing power beyond what headline inflation communicates. Nor does the official index necessarily capture unrecorded transactions in informal and black markets. As an aside, authorities deny shrinkflation on some of commodities. 

Here is the thing: the problem extends beyond measurement. 

Official statistics influence monetary policy, government financing costs, indexed liabilities, wage adjustments, and collateral valuations. Governments therefore have powerful incentives to influence not only inflation itself, but also how inflation is measured, represented, and communicated. 

Benchmarkism is not merely about the numbers published nor the market’s headline output, it concerns the institutional incentives surrounding numerical representation and the economic decisions anchored to those benchmarks. Lower reported inflation can ease pressure on interest rates, government financing costs, and collateral valuations. 

Governments therefore have incentives to influence or even ‘manage’ not only economic and market outcomes, but also how those outcomes are measured and communicated. Argentina's statistical manipulation under the Kirchners illustrates that these incentives are not merely theoretical. 

We have been warning about this trajectory for years. 

In 2023, we argued that the slowdown in the second inflation wave would be a transition toward a more potent third wave, anchored in deficit spending and the BSP's priority of maintaining ample liquidity. 

"And yes, we may be seeing peak inflation for this second wave.  The first wave was in 2015-2018.  The cracks in bank lending have emerged while Treasury markets exhibit a sharp tightening.   

Furthermore, both banks and the BSP have scaled down their liquidity interventions.  The BSP has reversed most of the December injections.   

But the coming CPI slowdown may be a transition to a more potent third wave—all of which will be anchored on the path dependency politics of deficit spending by the executive branch and the priority of maintaining and expanding liquidity by the BSP. (Prudent Investor, 2023)" 

In 2025, before the infrastructure scandal and the 2026 oil shock, we warned of a fiscal shock and its stagflationary consequences. 

"As fiscal risks mount, so too does the potential for cross-sectoral contagion and cascading effects. The banking system—already struggling with liquidity depletion—faces heightened exposure due to its expanding claims on sovereign securities (implicit quantitative easing). 

Again, though partially obscured, stagflationary pressures, deteriorating credit quality, and rising funding costs may converge, amplifying broader macro-financial instability. 

In short, the fiscal storm is no longer a distant threat—it is approaching fast, and its first casualties may already be visible in the cracks forming across the financial system. " 

The third wave is no longer a forecast. It is showing up in the price data. 

VII. Interventions Beget Interventions: From Minimum Wages to Struggling Labor Conditions 

Price suppression postpones price adjustment. Subsidies shift the burden. Cheap credit props up claims, while currency defense consumes reserves. Each intervention creates pressures that invite another intervention. The adjustment is displaced, not eliminated. 

Western Visayas is the latest example. A Php 40–45 daily minimum-wage increase takes effect on November 19, following increases in Central Visayas and NCR. It cannot explain October's inflation, which has already been recorded. But it adds another cost to firms already facing dearer inputs, weaker orders, and tighter financing. Wages can be raised by decree; productivity cannot. Businesses absorb the difference through thinner margins, higher prices, reduced investment, or fewer jobs. Consumers ultimately pay part of the bill.


Figure 6

September's labor data reveal the deterioration beneath the employment headlines. (Figure 6, upper image) 

The labor force expanded by 629,000 month on month (MoM) to 53.19 million, but employment increased by only 543,000, while unemployment rose by 96,000 to 2.86 million. The employment rate slipped from 94.7% to 94.6%, while unemployment increased from 5.3% to 5.4%. Year on year, unemployment surged from 1.96 million to 2.86 million, and the employment rate fell from 96.2% to 94.6%. 

Part-time employment, despite retreating in September, has also followed a rising trend since January. (Figure 6, lowest graph) 

Fishing presents another revealing contradiction. Employment expanded by 303,000 in the quarterly comparison, while fisheries production value contracted 8.5% to Php 50.86 billion in Q3. Labor is entering an activity whose economic output is declining. This raises a more important question than the employment headcount: are labor and financial resources being sustained in activities that cannot generate adequate returns? 

These developments expose the deeper problem of capital allocation. Government can sustain economic activity through subsidies, transfers, and credit accommodation, but sustaining activity is not the same as generating wealth. Real savings finance productive investment; productive investment expands the capital base and creates sustainable employment via productivity. 

Hiring depends on expected profitability, precisely what stagflation undermines. Inflation erodes household purchasing power and real savings, while higher financing and operating costs raise the hurdle every new project must clear. Firms facing weaker demand and rising costs postpone investment and hiring. Add minimum wages to this pressure. 

The labor market is not simply adding workers; it is revealing the economy's declining capacity to absorb them productively. 

Employment headcounts cannot substitute for capital formation, and government-supported activity cannot substitute for wealth creation. 

VIII. The Peso Rally is a Loan, Not a Fix 

In response to the peso's record Php 64.17 close on October 27, President Marcos urged Filipinos not to panic. The peso subsequently returned to the Php 63 range, closing the week at Php 63.055. But the exchange-rate rally does not change the underlying balance sheet.


Figure 7

The September balance-of-payments deficit (BoP) reached $3.144 billion, bringing the cumulative January–September deficit to a record $9.087 billion, almost the BSP's entire $9.2 billion full-year projection. (Figure 7, upper chart) 

Meanwhile, Gross international reserves (GIR) fell further from $99.494 billion in September to $97.350 billion in October, a decline of $2.143 billion and a three-year low. (Figure 7, lowest visual) 

The record external deficit echoes the domestic financing imbalance examined earlier: net claims on central government have reached historic highs, reflecting the growing absorption of financial resources by the sovereign. 

A currency rally does not erase a record external financing deficit or replenish depleted reserves. The peso may recover temporarily, but the demand for dollars generated by the underlying imbalance remains. 

Defending the peso has costs. The BSP can supply dollars from reserves, but that depletes its external buffer. It can rely on foreign borrowing, but that adds liabilities. Foreign-exchange swaps and derivatives can provide temporary liquidity, but creates future obligations. The latter two adds to the “dollar shorts.” 

Alternatively, genuine monetary tightening would attack the debt financed savings-investment imbalance by withdrawing the liquidity that sustains excessive domestic absorption and demand for foreign currency. 

But this is where the debt trap becomes apparent. In an economy dependent on deficit spending, cheap credit, and continued liquidity to sustain politically protected claims, genuine monetary tightening would expose the accumulated malinvestments and debt dependency. Higher financing costs and shrinking liquidity would undermine debt servicing, force spending and investment contractions, and trigger recession or financial crisis. 

This is precisely why free-lunch politics resists genuine monetary restraint: it would expose the savings-investment gap that continued intervention has concealed. Yet postponing adjustment through further borrowing and monetary accommodation only deepens the dependency and increases the eventual cost. 

The country cannot indefinitely defend its currency while ignoring the fiscal, monetary, and external forces generating the demand for dollars. 

A peso rally can buy time. It cannot buy an external adjustment. 

IX. Conclusion: The Bill Arrives 

The third inflation wave is not an isolated statistical event. It is the cumulative outcome of fiscal expansion, monetary accommodation, financial repression, and the suppression of economic price signals. 

The oil shock intensified the process. The corruption scandal exposed its political costs. Neither created the underlying vulnerability. 

We warned of the fiscal shock before either event. 

The bill has arrived. The question is no longer whether the economy must adjust, but how much more real savings, purchasing power, and productive capacity will be sacrificed in the attempt to postpone that adjustment. 


 

References: 

Stagflation Part 17: Eight Months of Twin Deficits, Record Debt, and the Bill for Deferred Adjustment, October 4, 2026 

Predictions on 

Fiscal shock… 

Liquidity Under Pressure: Philippine Banks Struggle in Q1 2025 Amid a Looming Fiscal Storm, May 18, 2025 

Third wave of the inflation cycle…

Philippine Core CPI Forged a New 22-year High! Signs of Peak 2nd Wave Inflation: Pullback in Bank Lending and BSP Injections, March 12, 2023


Sunday, November 01, 2026

Three Markets, One Signal: How the PSEi, Peso and BVAL Priced Suppression in October

 

Price controls take some time for their flaws and distortions to develop: for the longer they last, the more do their controlled prices diverge from the prices that would be obtaining on the free market—Murray N. Rothbard 

In this issue: 

Three Markets, One Signal: How the PSEi, Peso and BVAL Priced Suppression in October

I. The PSEi’s “Rotation” Is the Cover Story

II. A Floor Is a Price Control

III. GCASH: The IPO With a Subsidy Bid Underneath

IV. “Don’t Panic” Is a Policy

V. The Yield Curve Takes No Orders

VI. Whac-a-Mole Economics

VII. Periphery to Core

VIII. What October Priced: The Cost of Suppressing Adjustment

VIII. Conclusion: October’s Cost of Suppressing Adjustment 

Three Markets, One Signal: How the PSEi, Peso and BVAL Priced Suppression in October 

Every intervention bought stability in one market and billed another. In October, the bill is showing up in bond yields and FX reserves as global liquidity drains from the outside 


I. The PSEi’s “Rotation” Is the Cover Story


Figure 1

The PSEi 30 ended October almost unchanged month on month (-0.02%). It is still down 6.16% year to date and 4.2% year on year. The headline hides a redistribution of index leadership. (Figure 1, table) 

ICTSI, the largest heavyweight, surrendered 89.54 gross points (-5.84%). The next four largest names (SM +7.84%, BDO +4.42%, BPI +1.08%, SMPH +10.34%) contributed 91.23 points and more than offset it. Breadth tilted positive at 18 advancers against 12 decliners. Yet heavier losses in SCC, DMC and CNPF dragged the simple average change across the 30 members to -0.66%. (Figure 1, middle image) 

The gap between -0.02% and -0.66% comes from free-float market-cap weighting. A handful of names decide the headline. After ICTSI’s drop, the five largest still command 55.24% of the index. (Figure 1, lowest graph) 


Figure 2 

The wider PSE tells the real story. 

Breadth was 1,811 advancers against 2,113 decliners, which extends broad-market selling to eight of the first ten months of 2026. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

Main Board volume (MBV) rose 20.4% year on year to Php 129.67 billion, but cross transactions took 27.71% of it. (Figure 2, middle diagram) SM’s Php 8.736 billion block alone was about 24% of the month’s cross volume. 

ICTSI’s share of Main Board volume (MBV) climbed from 19% in September to 23.75% in October, while foreigners net sold about Php 1.3 billion of the stock as it fell. Local institutional buying absorbed the selling. (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

The index’s “stability” rests on an engineered domestic support for a heavyweight under foreign liquidation. 

II. A Floor Is a Price Control


Figure 3 

The top 10 brokers averaged 66.8% of daily MBV, and the top 10 issues averaged 72%. That concentration put an implicit floor near 5,600 under the PSEi all month. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

A floor held by a few brokers and a few issues is a price control, whatever name it goes by. 

The PSEi is a free float market capitalization-weighted benchmark. It does not measure the breadth or health of the equity market. The media and the establishment treat it as if it did, though five issues decide most daily outcomes. Confusing the two is how benchmarkism disguises concentration as stability. 

Leadership rotated in October, but concentration did not go away. It only changed where the support was pointed. Extreme trading concentration, persistent negative breadth and thinning liquidity are the symptoms, and the distorted price signals they produce misallocate capital. 

Ironically, almost no one comments on it—as if it is a taboo. 

III. GCASH: The IPO With a Subsidy Bid Underneath 

The GCash listing offered another illustration of the market's dependence on concentrated liquidity. 

GCASH’s weekly share of Main Board volume fell from 34.9% to 9.22%. The stock swung -5% on the week of October 23 and +5.42% the following week. It closed at Php 6.61, a hair above the Php 6.60 offer price. The price is where it is because someone is buying it. (Figure 3, middle image) 

UBS, the sole stabilizing agent, bought 786.57 million shares at an average of Php 6.571 in the week ending October 23. That cost about Php 5.17 billion and used up 65% of its maximum stabilization buying capacity in the first trading week. The budget is the 1.204 billion overallotment shares, worth Php 7.95 billion at the offer price. That leaves about 417.5 million shares, roughly Php 2.75 billion. The support window runs about 30 days from the October 20 listing. There is no update on this as of October 30th. 

The mechanism is simple. The agent sells the overallotment shares short at the offer price, then buys them back in the open market to defend it. A bid sits just under Php 6.60 until the money runs out. It is the PSEi’s floor in miniature: a price held by a dedicated buyer and not by savings. 

An IPO can generate enormous turnover and retail participation without leaving behind durable secondary-market liquidity. The question is what happens when the support expires. 

IV. “Don’t Panic” Is a Policy 

The peso is the second signal. 

The peso touched Php 64.17 per dollar on October 27. That was its 33rd record low of 2026, the eighth in October, and the fifth consecutive record session from October 21 to 27. The President then said, “Don’t panic...we have defenses,” and USDPHP retreated to Php 63.74 by the week’s close. 

No leader makes that statement without his agencies behind it. It signals that the political leadership will do what it takes to “stabilize” the peso. The motive is to look stable. The policy is intervention. The effects arrive later… or in other prices. 

A managed retreat does not touch the cause, which is the savings-investment gap. Free-lunch politics and the policies behind it sustain spending beyond what the economy can finance from its own production. 

The USDPHP rose 1.76% in October, taking its gain to 8.42% year to date and 8.31% year on year. That was the second biggest monthly rise of 2026 after March’s 5.35% (from February's 57.665 to March's 60.748). (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

The external side of the gap is tightening. OFW remittances, tourism, FDI and portfolio inflows have all weakened. BPO and AI-linked electronics exports help but cannot close the gap, and they carry their own exposure. 

A reversal in AI capital spending would move from global markets into Philippine export receipts and widen the deficit. 

Administered prices, regulatory relief, FX management and accommodative monetary measures have postponed the recognition of the imbalance. Postponement is not resolution. The pressure surfaces through other prices, balance sheets and markets. 

With the balance of payments (BoP) under record pressure and reserves falling, the BSP’s quasi-soft peg has given way to a low-volume, low-volatility crawl. The string of records is that adjustment showing up. 

The BSP still has “tools,” but none is free. It can run down reserves, lever up through repos and derivatives, monetize part of its gold, borrow more (via the National Governnment) or turn to trade and price controls. These extend the process, but none creates dollars, domestic savings or productive resources. 

September shows the cost. Gross international reserves fell from $104.846 billion to $99.494 billion, a $5.352 billion drop to a three-year low. 



Figure 4 

The BSP attributes it mainly to its net foreign exchange operations. The composition is the tell. Other Reserve Assets, the bucket that holds net derivative positions, repo assets and investment pools, fell from $15.471 billion to $9.985 billion, about $5.5 billion and 35% in one month. That is larger than the entire decline. Gold valuation took off another $1.287 billion. Total currency and deposits rose about $1.54 billion. The drain came from the derivative and repo positions behind the peso defense, not from the plain securities and deposits the headline suggests. (Figure 4, topmost image) 

The September BOP deficit was a record $3.144 billion, taking the year-to-date deficit to a historic $9.087 billion—which is just a hairline short of the DBCC’s revised 2026 target of US$9.2 billion (1.8 percent of GDP) with a quarter to go. Borrowed support can defer the adjustment. It cannot remove the financing constraint. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

V. The Yield Curve Takes No Orders 

The sovereign bond market supplied the third signal. 

The public watches the PSEi and the peso. It pays little attention to government bonds, and that is where the cost of financing the state shows up. 

More than anything else, these pressures are most clearly reflected in the interest rate environment, as evidenced by the Philippine Treasury's BVAL yield curve. 

The yield curve shifted upward across all tenors in October compared with September, with positive spreads and the largest increases concentrated in the belly of the curve—a bulge. (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

More importantly, from the one-year tenor onward, yields are at or near multi-year highs. Rising yields are the market’s way of repricing inflation, duration risk and the cost of financing the state. 

The fiscal connection is direct. Government borrowing competes with private investment for finite pools of savings. As financing needs rise, the state’s demand for funds presses against the resources available to businesses (and even banks) seeking capital for production and expansion. 

This is the crowding out effect—and it does not require a textbook interest-rate shock to operate. 

Financial repression adds another channel. Directed credit, captive institutional demand and policies that steer savings toward government or favored borrowers can suppress the visible cost of financing while displacing alternative uses of capital. The allocation changes even when the headline rate does not fully reveal the pressure. 

The result is a distorted investment process: financing follows political and institutional priorities rather than the unrestrained signals of market prices, risk and expected returns. 

The rising yield curve is the market pushing back against that arrangement. Government can influence the terms under which savings are mobilized. It cannot command away scarcity.


Figure 5 

Equities hide the weakness through benchmark concentration. The peso absorbs external pressure through intervention. Bonds reprice the cost of the state. As evidence, the Philippine 10-year Treasury yield has climbed to multi-year highs even as the PSEi tests its 2025 lows (Figure 5, topmost window) 

Three markets, one imbalance. 

VI. Whac-a-Mole Economics 

This is the intervention spiral I call Whac-a-Mole Economics. Support the PSEi and the pressure moves to the peso and bonds. Lean on the peso and the valve opens in equities and bonds. Suppress one price and the imbalance resurfaces in another. 

The mechanism is not mysterious. Prices coordinate competing claims over scarce resources. Interfering with their adjustment does not remove the scarcity. It changes where the pressure builds, who absorbs it and when the cost becomes visible. 

The price signal is not the disease. It is the information that reveals scarcity. Suppress the signal and the distortion grows while its symptoms migrate across markets and time. 

VII. Periphery to Core 

The Philippines is not alone in this. 

The magnified paroxysm across several equity benchmarks—the Indonesian JKSE, Korea’s AI-heavy KOSPI, and, more recently, Brazil’s Bovespa—exhibits a common denominator.  (Figure 5, middle visual) 

As an aside, in Brazil, Lula's reelection triggered a rout in Brazilian stocks, deepening an already prolonged contraction in Latin America's equity-fund industry, where more than 400 equity funds have disappeared and IPO activity has stalled. (Figure 5, lowest image) 

Yet each crash has a local headline, whether politics or AI, but they share the global liquidity cycle. 

The crashes did not need to arrive on the same day to demonstrate this. Peaks came at different points in the year, and the common condition is liquidity withdrawal. 

I call this periphery-to-core transmission. 

Withdrawal first exposes the weakest links: the markets, sectors, and balance sheets most dependent on cheap financing, leverage, and steady inflows. Rising yields then collide with accumulated malinvestments and balance-sheet mismatches. The war economy, supply disruptions, incumbent monetary policies, and fiscal conditions add further pressure.


Figure 6 

Even gold has become an ATM for liquidity-strapped investors. Its sharp declines alongside Bitcoin reflect forced liquidation and the demand for cash, not a change in its long-term monetary role. (Figure 6, upper chart) 

The core is now under pressure. This week’s AI dumpfest hit the Nasdaq Composite with a 2.0% weekly loss, its third consecutive weekly decline, and a 7.04% slide over three weeks. Friday’s 2.9% drop was its largest one-day percentage decline since June 5, following disappointing results from Intel and Amazon. 

Meanwhile, hyperscalers are financing build-outs in debt markets, adding leverage to an already capital-intensive cycle. AI off balance sheet commitments hits $4.1 trillion: Up 1 trillion in 90 days.  (Figure 6, lower graph) 

When the cost of capital rises, the expected returns on long-duration investments become harder to justify. What starts as an equity repricing can migrate into corporate credit, debt servicing, and investment spending. 

The danger is contagion: falling asset prices, tighter financing, forced deleveraging, and contracting credit. A global recession is the risk embedded in this process, and a broader debt crisis is becoming highly probable. 

The periphery is not insulated from the core, and the core is not immune to the financing constraints already visible at the periphery. 

VIII. Conclusion: October’s Cost of Suppressing Adjustment 

Free lunch politics is NEVER FREE. 

The PSEi is held up by the five biggest market caps, a persistent concentrated broker bid and a stabilizing agent for GCASH. 

The peso crawls to records while the BSP burns reserves and the President says don’t panic.

Yields rise from the one-year tenor outward to multi-year highs. 

The motive behind each intervention is the same: to show stability before the financing gap is closed. The policy is price support, administered relief and reserve burn. The effect is that pressure moves to the next price. Postponement has a cost, and the cost compounds. 

Almost everyone has been programmed to believe that spending drives the economy. Spending is the visible half. Before anyone can spend, someone has to have made something others want: a harvest, a service, a product, an export. A fisherman buys rice with the fish he sold. Money is the claim ticket, and the claim is worth only what stands behind it. What you can buy is set by what you or others produced. Or imagine booking a vacation at a resort on the Moon. There may be demand, but there is no supply. 

So printed money, borrowed money and extended credit can raise spending today. They cannot create the rice, or the dollars, that the spending needs to meet. They only change who gets the existing output and push the bill onto future output. 

That is why the pressure shows up where it does. Dollars come from selling something to the world. Savings come from producing more than you consume. When spending commitments outrun both, the gap appears as a record BOP deficit, a weaker peso and higher yields, because savings are scarce and the state is bidding for them. 

A stock, a peso and a bond are all claims on real output and real savings. A floor can hold a quote, but it cannot create the output behind the claim. Indices, GDP and gross savings add up claims into one number and hide who actually produces and who just holds paper. That is the difference between accounting stability and economic resilience. 

The three markets are not telling three different stories. In October, they converged on one signal: the growing cost of suppressing adjustment. Support the PSEi and the pressure shows up in the peso. Lean on the peso and it shows up in the bond curve. 

Close one valve in a system under rising pressure and the pressure does not disappear. It finds the weakest seam. In October, the seams were the PSE’s market internals, the peso and the bond curve. 

The next one may not be in Philippines’ hands at all. Global liquidity is draining, and the pressure is now being fed from outside.


Sunday, October 04, 2026

Stagflation Part 17: Eight Months of Twin Deficits, Record Debt, and the Bill for Deferred Adjustment

 

The financial history of the last century shows a steady increase in the amount of public indebtedness. Nobody believes that the states will eternally drag the burden of these interest payments. It is obvious that sooner or later all these debts will be liquidated in some way or other, but certainly not by payment of interest and principal according to the terms of the contract– Ludwig von Mises  

In this issue:

Stagflation Part 17: Eight Months of Twin Deficits, Record Debt, and the Bill for Deferred Adjustment

I. Introduction: The Path, Not the Print

II. The Fiscal Leg: Php 1.054 Trillion of Deficit, Php 756 Billion of Amortization

III. The Debt Leg: Php 19.61 Trillion and the Peso's Hand in It

IV. Stein's Law and the Two Exits

V. The Trade Leg: Record Exports, Record Imports, Record Gap

VI. Borrowed Stability, Again: August BOP, GIR, and the July Remittance Bounce

VII. Interventions Beget Interventions: The Fare, Wage, and Excise Cascade

VIII. The Global Vise: Bond Vigilantes, Whac-a-Mole Reserves, and a Thinning Treasury Market

IX. The Malinvestment Footprint: The Master Builder's Hotels

X. Conclusion: The Bill Has Arrived


Stagflation Part 17: Eight Months of Twin Deficits, Record Debt, and the Bill for Deferred Adjustment 

Php 19.61 trillion of debt, Php 1.9 trillion added in eight months, and the free-lunch politics of price suppression, transfers, and debt finally moving through the balance sheet

I. Introduction: The Path, Not the Print 

Eight months into 2026, the same message keeps appearing on different balance sheets. The adjustment did not disappear. It migrated. 

  • The National Government's January–August deficit reached Php 1.054 trillion, up 21.3% from a year earlier and above the pandemic-year 2021 mark for the same stretch, which was just underPhp 1 trillion.
  • National Government debt reached a recordPhp 19.61 trillion, withPhp 1.899 trillion added since December.
  • The merchandise trade deficit reached $41.56 billion, up 26.3%, with exports and imports both at record year-to-date levels. 

Our Stagflation Part 13 identified the twin deficits. This installment shows the accelerating migration into the sovereign balance sheet, the currency, prices, wages, and the bond market. 

A word on how to read these numbers. This series does not treat official statistics as accurate to the decimal, nor does it litigate their underlying meaning. It does not need to. 

Rather, a process shows in direction, persistence, and the pattern across ledgers, not in whether a figure lands within a rounding error of a forecast. August's blowout is not a surprise to be explained. It is one more step along a path. 

That path was described in our August 2025 piece: "June 2025: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock." The driver was never the oil shock, the pandemic, or any single budget line. It has been the FREE LUNCH POLITICS embedded in Philippine democracy: 

These systems don't just elect leaders—they ratify an ethos: that deficit-fueled expansion is not only moral but inevitable. Redistribution becomes ritual. The annual SONA pipelines new spending schemes, boosting short-term political capital—but the structural anchors are threadbare. Compassion without discipline sedates policy. Time preferences spiral, gravitating toward the instant dopamine hit of political dispensation… 

When such convictions are deeply embedded, a disorderly reckoning is inevitable. 

The 2026 data are that ethos on a bigger stage, and running on a faster clock. The pandemic-era rate and reserve-requirement cuts, the doubling of deposit insurance, and the quiet USDPHP cap intensified the savings-investment gap. 

Today’s EO 110's price suppression, balance-sheet transfers, BSP relief measures, three consecutive timid rate hikes, and an exchange-rate regime the BSP declines to name are accelerating it. Each layer was sold as temporary. 

The deferred cost is what the August data are made of. 

II. The Fiscal Leg: Php 1.054 Trillion of Deficit, Php 756 Billion of Amortization 


Figure 1 

August's deficit was ₱161.3 billion, 90.2% above a year earlier. [Figure 1, upper image] 

The Treasury's explanation: Php 58.6 billion went to settle PhilHealth's arrears, and local governments received larger tax shares. 

Take PhilHealth out and August is still Php 102.7 billion, 21% wider than a year ago. That is the same pace as the eight-month total. The "one-off" did not create the trend. It joined it. An arrears payment is spending that was owed earlier: deferred adjustment arriving on schedule. 

In the eight months of 2026, revenue grew 4.3% to Php 3.22 trillion. Spending grew 8% toPhp 4.27 trillion. Spending is outrunning revenue at nearly twice the speed. 

But the deficit is only the first line of the bill. It does not include amortization. The Treasury's debt service report does. [Figure 1, lower table] 

Total debt service is 1.4 times the deficit and equals roughly 45% of everything the government collected. Interest alone takes about 21% of revenue. The Php 756 billion of principal, Php 631 billion of it—domestic and concentrated in February and April—is not paid from revenue. It is rolled: new borrowing retires old borrowing. Add it to the deficit and the year-to-date gross financing need approaches Php 1.8 trillion.


Figure 2 

In fairness to the data, August itself was a light month for debt service: Php 76.1 billion, the lowest of the year, with amortization at only Php 10.5 billion. The August deficit widened on spending, not on debt service. That makes the YTD picture worse, not better. The heavy rollover months have already passed, and the deficit is still 21% wider. 

YTD debt servicing—interest plus amortization—was lower from last year, but third highest on record. [Figure 2, topmost diagram] 

Now the targets. The 2026 deficit program was ₱1.61 trillion when the year began. It is Php 1.658 trillion now. When the debt ratio reached 62% in 2025, the benchmark was moved to 70%. A ceiling that moves up whenever it is touched is a forecast, not a ceiling. 

The eight-month deficit already equals 64% of the program. Staying inside it requires Php 151 billion a month for the last four months, against a year-to-date average of Php 132 billion. 

Last year's final four months came to Php 708 billion, in a year when the flood-control probe was throttling disbursements. Repeat only that, and 2026 closes near Php 1.77 trillion, about Php 103 billion over program. That is arithmetic, not a forecast. 

III. The Debt Leg: Php 19.61 Trillion and the Peso's Hand in It 

Debt rose Php 217.62 billion in August to ₱19.61 trillion, 12.2% above a year ago and 10.7% above December. The milestone is not that debt is high. It is that nearly Php 1.9 trillion of fresh claims on future income piled up in eight months. 

At Php 1.899 trillion, the January–August increase is the largest eight-month increase in the available series, edging above the Php 1.88 trillion increase recorded during the pandemic period. [Figure 2, middle graph] 

Notice what else the numbers say. Debt grew Php 1.899 trillion. The deficit was Php 1.054 trillion. The Php 845 billion difference comes from valuation and from cash the Treasury borrowed ahead of need, in proportions the Treasury's financing report would show. The stock of claims is growing much faster than the deficit that officially explains it. 

The currency is part of that gap. The Treasury valued external debt at 62.209 pesos per dollar in August, against 61.327 in July and 57.042 a year ago. A 1.4% depreciation applied to the roughly Php 6.28 trillion July external-debt stock implies a peso-translation effect of about Php 90 billion. The external stock actually rose Php 87.25 billion, while total NG debt rose Php 217.62 billion. On this simple calculation, the exchange-rate effect alone is equivalent to roughly 41% of August's total increase in NG debt. This treats the external stock as dollar-denominated and holds its foreign-currency amount constant; it is an approximation, not a Treasury decomposition. 

The exposure has hardly been ever static. External debt accounted for 32.47% of outstanding NG debt in August, and its share has been rising from its March 2021 low. [Figure 2, lowest chart] 

As fiscal pressure raises financing requirements, the peso comes under pressure; depreciation then raises the peso value of foreign-currency debt, feeding back into the fiscal burden. 

A weaker peso does double duty: it raises the peso price of imports and the peso value of foreign-currency liabilities. Our Stagflation Part 16's peso discussion feeds directly into this one. The FX problem and the fiscal problem are one problem. 

Two ideas from Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's study of eight centuries of sovereign debt help explain why the ratio alone is not the number to watch. 

The first is debt intolerance. A government's ability to carry debt depends not only on the current debt-to-GDP ratio but also on its repayment history, inflation history, institutional credibility, and access to financing. Countries with histories of default or monetary instability can encounter financing constraints at debt levels that would be manageable for countries with stronger records. Creditors price the stock of debt, but they also price the history behind it. 

The Philippines has a 1983 debt crisis in that history. A debt-to-GDP ratio approaching two-thirds, with a benchmark moved upward once the ratio touched it, is therefore not just an exercise in comparing one ratio with another country's. It is a question of how much confidence the sovereign can command as the stock keeps rising. 

The second is financial repression. A government that will not sufficiently reduce its deficit can lower its effective financing burden by keeping real interest rates low and creating institutional demand for government paper. The cost does not disappear. It is transferred, often quietly, to savers and financial institutions. 

The pieces are in view. Banks' net claims on the central government were ₱6.24 trillion, about a fifth of their assets, in June. 

Last August, the policy rate was 5.0% against 6.1% inflation, a negative real rate of 1.1 percentage points. 

Against the regulatory and institutional machinery documented throughout this series—portfolio constraints, directed liquidity, reserve and capital rules, and the policy measures that have progressively enlarged the banking system's exposure to the sovereign—this is not merely a low-rate environment. It is financial repression: the cost of financing the state is being shifted onto savers and financial institutions while the sovereign balance sheet continues to expand. 

IV. Stein's Law and the Two Exits 

Herbert Stein's law says that if something cannot go on forever, it will stop. It says that unsustainable dynamics will not last—but says nothing about the timing or the manner. In this case, the political economy decides both. 

Essentially, a deficit that grows faster than the revenue available to service it cannot continue indefinitely. It can stop in two ways. 

  • The voluntary exit is a political system choosing to spend less or tax more.
  • The involuntary exit is creditors declining to roll the debt at the old price. 

That is the sudden stop: a confidence crisis in which creditors cease to believe that the existing financing path can continue on the old terms. Refinancing suddenly becomes scarce or prohibitively expensive. The adjustment then arrives through some combination of higher yields, capital outflows, currency depreciation, reserve losses, and forced fiscal contraction. The market does not need to refuse every peso. It only needs enough creditors to withdraw or demand a materially higher price for the financing chain to break. 

Our 2025 fiscal shock argument was that the voluntary exit is politically closed, because the system rewards the opposite: voters are offered benefits and billed later. This year's SONA offered more of the same: a higher income-tax threshold, implying about ₱66 billion in forgone revenue, and the removal of system-loss charges. Every proposal moves cost into the future. A political system built that way does not stop itself. 

That leaves the second exit, and the second exit has a door: the Php 756 billion of amortization, and counting. Every maturity has to be refinanced, repaid from available cash, or otherwise absorbed by the balance sheet. So far, the creditors have rolled, with BSP relief measures, held-to-maturity accounting, and banks' captive appetite making the rolling easier. That is why the fiscal story and the bond-market story in Section VIII are one story. 

Stein's Law does not tell us the date. It tells us the constraint: a debt crisis is what happens when an unsustainable political process finally meets an arithmetic constraint it cannot repeal. 

V. The Trade Leg: Record Exports, Record Imports, Record Gap 

The August export headline was spectacular. Exports hit an all-time monthly high of $9.11 billion, up 27.8%. The trade deficit narrowed to $3.85 billion, the smallest in 15 months. 


Figure 3 

Read the same release for what it also says. Over eight months, exports are up 14.8% to $64.04 billion. Imports are up 19.1% to $105.6 billion. The deficit is $41.56 billion. [Figure 3, topmost image] 

The DBCC's full-year assumption was exports +3% and imports +5%, so the planning numbers were off by a factor of roughly four in both directions. 

Exports are production and services sold abroad. The trade deficit is the excess of imports over exports, and it must be financed by other foreign-exchange income or foreign capital. That is why the celebratory export headline is only half the story. The other half is the financing requirement. 

The composition matters too. Electronics comprised 68.1% of August's exports, semiconductors alone 57.6%.  Chip exports surged 73.5%. [Figure 3, middle window] 

The surge is occurring alongside a broader data-center investment boom. In the United States, spending on data-center construction rose 7.5% in August from July and 73% year over year, reaching a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $85 billion, according to Wolf Street—an indication of the infrastructure buildout underpinning the current semiconductor cycle. [Figure 3, lowest diagram] 

A trade balance that improves because one export category keeps gaining share is not, by itself, evidence of broad-based adjustment. It increases the economy's exposure to the investment cycle driving that category—in this case, the global semiconductor and AI buildout.

If that investment cycle weakens—perhaps partly because of rising global rates, and partly because of potential excess capacity—the export engine weakens with it. 

The global capital-spending cycle becomes part of the Philippine balance sheet. 

The fiscal gap and the trade gap are one fact told in two currencies. The government spends more than it collects. The economy absorbs more tradable goods than it sells abroad. The difference has to be financed. 

Someone had to lend. Debt can finance spending. Foreign capital can finance imports. Remittances can finance consumption. Credit can postpone adjustment. None of them creates the productive capital that makes the structure self-sustaining. 

Carl Menger's point was that production rests on complementary goods and resources arranged through time. Machines, materials, skills, and savings must exist before the output does. A financial claim is not one of those goods. 

You cannot borrow your way around scarcity. 

VI. Borrowed Stability, Again: August BOP, GIR, and the July Remittance Bounce 

The Philippines still has genuine buffers. But cushions are not cures. Part 13 showed that June's BOP surplus ($3.4 billion) and the GIR's bounce to $104.74 billion were borrowed: a $2.5 billion eurobond and a $1 billion World Bank package. Borrowed stability has a half-life. 

August's BOP was a $596 million deficit, against a $359 million surplus a year earlier. The eight-month deficit is $5.94 billion, up 10.11%. The GIR is $104.8 billion, almost exactly where June's borrowed reading left it, 5.4% below end-2025 and 7.5% below February's $113.3 billion peak. 

How do reserves rise in a month when the BOP is negative? 

The BOP counts transactions. The GIR also counts revaluation. The BSP attributes the $1.5 billion rise to gold revaluation and income on foreign investments, partly offset by national government drawdowns of FX deposits for debt service. Gold holdings rose $1.62 billion, more than the entire gain. 


Figure 4 

Foreign-currency securities fell $3.11 billion. Other reserve assets (ORA), the repo-and-derivatives bucket, rose $3.352 billion to $15.48 billion, or 14.8% of August GIR. The BSP does not say what moved that bucket. [Figure 4, upper graph] 

The pattern (securities down, other reserve assets up, peso at records on suppressed volatility) is what intervention through derivative and repo positions would look like. 

Despite the BSP's public characterization of its intervention as selective and aimed at smoothing volatility rather than defending a particular level, the reserve changes—and the intervention evidence traced in Part 16—point to a much larger role for intervention than the official description suggests. The issue is not whether the BSP intervenes. It does. The issue is the extent of interventions. 

Meanwhile, July cash remittances rose 1.9% to $3.24 billion, up 6.6% from June, with school-opening seasonality doing part of the lifting. In dollars, the currency that pays for the import bill, growth is about 2%. In pesos it is roughly 10%, because the peso lost about 9% over the year. However, despite the monthly growth, cumulative remittance growth continues to slow—since peaking in 2014. [Figure 4, lower chart] 

The same depreciation that gives remittance households more pesos per dollar also raises the peso value of the government's dollar liabilities. In Section III, that translation effect was roughly Php 90 billion on the external debt stock. One peso, two ledgers. 

The crux of the matter is whether the economy generates foreign exchange fast enough to support its growing claims on it. The trade gap says those claims are growing faster. 

VII. Interventions Beget Interventions: The Fare, Wage, and Excise Cascade 

Look at the calendar. 

  • Sept 25: EO 125 suspends the excise on LPG and kerosene, the second suspension this year:Php 3.36 per kilo of LPG (aboutPhp 37 per 11-kilo tank) and Php 5.60 per liter of kerosene, for three months or until the monthly Dubai average falls below $80.
  • Sept 26: Wage Order NCR-28 takes effect: Php 60 on a Php 695 floor (+8.6%).
  • Sept 28: the fare hike takes effect after six months of administered delay.
  • Oct 14: Central Visayas follows with Php 42, 7.8% to 8.4%. 

Four interventions in 19 days. And these are just the significant ones. 

That is the sequence a price control produces. EO 110 suppressed fares. Operators responded by cutting trips as costs outran revenues. Eventually fares had to rise. The fare hike is a partial repeal: the market getting its price back. 

Let there be no mistake: this is a revelation that price controls eventually fail. 

They can suppress a price, but they cannot suppress the scarcity, cost, or resource constraint that produced it. The adjustment therefore migrates elsewhere—into supply, quality, queues, producer margins, fiscal transfers, or eventually the price itself. 

And yet, almost simultaneously, the next offsetting interventions landed. 

Ludwig von Mises called this the interventionist spiral: each intervention fails on its own terms, and the failure becomes the case for the next one. Suppress one price, and distortion accumulates. Another price adjusts. Policymakers intervene again. But as the maladjustments spread, the intervention dragnet widens. Each intervention pushes another cost onto consumers, producers, taxpayers, or the government's balance sheet—a vicious feedback loop. 

This is what I call Whac-a-mole economics: suppress one manifestation of the imbalance and it reappears somewhere else. 

The recurring architecture of emergency economics is:

    price suppression → fiscal transfer → balance-sheet transfer → debt 

And this is where the deeply ingrained POLITICS of the FREE LUNCH enters. Price controls make the benefit visible now and the cost invisible until later.  The voter sees the cheaper fare, the cheaper LPG tank, or relief from a price increase. The deferred cost lands elsewhere—on the producer’s margin, the taxpayer, the fiscal balance, the banking system, or the next year’s budget. The political reward is immediate. The adjustment bill is somebody else’s future problem. 

Notice how the NCR order was built. The Php 85 raise under NCR-27 was frozen by a Pasig court injunction. The wage board did not wait for the court. It issued NCR-28, carrying the same Php 60, outside the injunction’s reach. Two orders, one raise. When the court said no, the board reissued the yes. 

The seen: Php 37 off an LPG tank, Php 60 more wage a day, a fare that was overdue. 

The unseen is where each cost lands. 

The excise holiday takes revenue from a deficit already 21% wider. The IMF mission chief's own defense of it is that higher VAT receipts on pricier gasoline have offset the loss. That is a rebate on the Treasury's own windfall: the price spike taxed at 12% and a slice returned through LPG. The underlying scarcity remains. The cost simply moves from the pump to the fiscal balance. 

The wage orders land on the part of the economy with the least access to capital. A mandated raise of 8% or more is a cost increase, not a gain in output. It falls hardest on the small enterprises that employ most workers and receive 4.48% of bank credit (Part 15). Employers absorb it first in margins, and where there are no margins, in hiring, hours, and informality. Labor data lag those decisions, which is why July's jump in unemployment (Part 16) is more likely the first reading of this series than the last. 

A wage floor above what output supports is a regulatory tax on capital, and it widens the savings-investment gap from a second direction. 

Every one of these measures was designed to ease a price. None produced a single additional unit of fuel, a single additional bus trip, or a single additional peso of savings. 

The intervention changes who absorbs the scarcity. It does not remove the scarcity. 

VIII. The Global Vise: Bond Vigilantes, Whac-a-Mole Reserves, and a Thinning Treasury Market 

The external environment is becoming less accommodating just as the domestic economy becomes more dependent on financing.


Figure 5 

On October 1, the US 10-year Treasury yield touched 5.34%, its highest since 2002, before closing at 5.24%. It rose almost 90 basis points in the third quarter, the biggest quarterly increase of this century. The UK 30-year touched 6% for the first time since 1998. US gross debt crossed $40 trillion on August 18. When the world's collateral reprices, every sovereign that borrows against it faces a different price of money. [Figure 5, upper window] 

Philippine yields have repriced too. The 10-year BVAL reference rate stood at 7.6182% on September 30, up roughly 154 basis points year to date, although still below its May 20 peak of 7.8094%. That May peak was already above the 7.72% reached on November 10, 2022, during the Russia-Ukraine oil shock. The September close therefore remains around the territory reached during that earlier episode of external stress. 

It would be too simple to call this a mechanical spillover from US rates. Philippine bonds are mostly sensitive to domestic conditions, policy actions and the peso's exchange rate.  The streak of USD/PHP highs has come alongside—and amplified—the pressure on Philippine yields. [Figure 5, lower visual] 

A rising yield says financing is becoming more expensive. 


Figure 6 

Look at what stands beneath it. BVAL is a valuation model that produces reference rates from available quotes and trades, and it is only as good as the trades beneath it. The PDS data show the market thinning as yields rise. September's market volume was Php 613.8 billion, the lowest month of 2026: 37% below August, 63% below January, and 26% below the average month of 2024. On September 25 alone, government-securities turnover fell to Php 13.54 billion from Php 24.19 billion a week earlier. Daily turnover has slumped to 2024 levels. [Figure 6, topmost window] 

On that score, yields are rising while volume is falling. The reference price is being formed in a market that is becoming thinner precisely as the government needs that market to absorb more financing. 

And this is the market that is supposed to absorb the incremental demand associated with JP Morgan index inclusion. 

Inclusion may attract investors. It cannot manufacture liquidity. Markets price risk, not press releases. 

Then there is the outside world's own relief habit. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell to 283.8 million barrels in the week ending September 25, the lowest since October 1982, after a 172-million-barrel release. [Figure 6, middle chart] 

US diesel set a record of $6.53 a gallon on September 22. Crude tanker rates recently hit all-time highs. The Middle East conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war continue to disrupt supply. The BSP raised its 2027 inflation assumption on El Niño risk. Agricultural commodity prices, as noted in Part 16, remain elevated. 

This is Whac-a-mole economics at the global level: suppress one price, draw down a reserve, subsidize another input, borrow against the future. The shock reappears somewhere else. 

The US draws down its strategic reserve to hold today's price down. The Philippines draws on its balance sheet to do the same. Both buy a quieter price now and leave a smaller buffer for the adjustment ahead—even as the war has not ended. 

Nor is oil the only pressure. The record Bloomberg agricultural index discussed in Part 16, together with the potential effects of El Niño, adds another layer of supply risk. 

IX. The Malinvestment Footprint: The Master Builder's Hotels 

The twin deficits are not only financing problems. They leave a footprint in the allocation of real capital. 

Cheap credit, policy incentives, and optimistic demand assumptions push capital toward projects whose economics depend on conditions that may not persist. The Philippine hotel sector is one example. 

The great Ludwig von Mises told the story of a master builder who miscounts his materials: the foundation is too large for the bricks available, and the house cannot be finished. The builder may execute perfectly. The error lies in the signal he built on: the apparent availability of resources that do not, in fact, exist in sufficient quantity. 

That is the mechanism of malinvestment. When financing conditions understate the scarcity of savings and capital, investment can be pulled forward into projects that appear viable at the distorted price of credit but cannot all be completed or profitably sustained once the underlying constraint reasserts itself. 

The Philippine hotel pipeline shows the footprint. Of the 20,509 room keys projected for 2026 delivery, 29% have been canceled and fewer than 6,000 delivered on schedule. Yet the 2026–2032 pipeline has grown to 45,884 keys across 213 projects, with Php 387 billion committed. 

The foundation keeps getting larger. 

Demand tells the other half. Foreign arrivals are up only 0.99% year to date through August, while Bohol's first-half arrivals fell 22%. [Figure 6, lowest chart] 

The divergence matters: capital commitments are expanding far faster than the demand evidence that is supposed to justify them. 

Canceled projects are not merely missing hotel rooms. They are evidence that resources were committed on assumptions that did not survive contact with reality. The capital cannot necessarily be redeployed without loss, delay, or impairment. 

The mistake is rarely visible during the boom. It becomes visible when the financing conditions and demand assumptions that supported the investment change. 

That is the malinvestment footprint of deferred adjustment: the distortion does not remain in the financial system. It eventually appears in the physical structure of the economy. 

X. Conclusion: The Bill Has Arrived 

The Philippine economy is now carrying a

  • Php 1.054 trillion fiscal deficit,
  • Php 756 billion of principal to refinance or repay,
  • $41.56 billion trade deficit, and
  • Php 19.61 trillion of national debt that grew Php 1.9 trillion in eight months 

It faces higher global financing costs, an energy shock, currency pressure, and renewed commodity inflation.

The policy response remains the same: suppress the price, subsidize the difference, transfer the balance-sheet damage, borrow, repeat. The process runs: 

deficits → debt → debt service → reduced fiscal space → more intervention → more distortion. 

It does not run in isolation. It interacts with the trade deficit, the peso, imported inflation, interest rates, and private balance sheets. The adjustment moves from one ledger to another. 

The numbers say how little room is left. 

The Php 19 trillion-plus debt level that the DBCC had projected for 2026 has already been breached: national government debt reached Php 19.61 trillion in August. The projection did not survive to year-end; the debt stock crossed it with four months still remaining. 

The deficit program has four months to absorb a final-quarter spending pattern that has run above Php 700 billion. 

Foreign reserves are rising through gold revaluation and leveraged based other reserve assets (ORA) rather than an improvement in the underlying external balance. 

The market that must absorb the issuance trades at a fraction of January's volume. 

Economics eventually sends the bill. 

It appears first in prices. Then wages. Then the currency. Then government debt. Then bond yields. And eventually in investment and growth. 

Every debt cycle has its alibi: this time is different. 

This time it was the oil shock. It wasn't. 

The oil shock was the alibi. The underlying cause was the embedded political structure that made deficit-fueled expansion appear both moral and inevitable. Each intervention postponed the adjustment and made the next intervention necessary. Each postponement moved the cost into another ledger. 

Stein's Law does not negotiate with it. 

The adjustment did not disappear. 

It migrated. 

It migrated from prices to wages, from wages to fares, from fares to fiscal transfers, from fiscal transfers to debt, from debt to the currency and bond market, and from the financial system into the allocation of real capital. 

It is now visible in the sovereign balance sheet itself. 

The bill for deferred adjustment has arrived. 

Batten down the hatches. 

_____

References: 

Last four Stagflation series:

Stagflation Part 16: The Peso's 24th Record Low — When the Pressure Valve Widens, September 13, 2026

Stagflation Part 15: The PSEi 30 1H 2026 Earnings Mirage — Nominal Growth, Record Debt, Real Stagnation, August 30, 2026

Stagflation Part 14: Q2 GDP at 2.3% and Falling — A GDP Built on Suppression and Debt, August 9, 2026

Stagflation Part 13: Record Twin Deficits Signal the Cost of Deferred Adjustment August 2, 2026