Showing posts with label Philippine Peso. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine Peso. Show all posts

Sunday, August 10, 2025

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy


National product statistics have been used widely in recent years as a reflection of the total product of society and even to indicate the state of “economic welfare.” These statistics cannot be used to frame or test economic theory, for one thing because they are an inchoate mixture of grossness and netness and because no objectively measurable “price level” exists that can be used as an accurate “deflator” to obtain statistics of some form of aggregate physical output. National product statistics, however, may be useful to the economic historian in describing or analyzing an historical period. Even so, they are highly misleading as currently used—Murray N. Rothbard 

 

In this issue: A brief but blistering breakdown of the 5.5% GDP mirage. 

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy

I. Q2 GDP: A Mirage of Momentum

II. The Secondary Trendline: Pandemic’s Lingering Scar; GDP: A Flawed Lens, Still Worshipped

III. Economic Wet Dreams, Statistical Kabuki and Confirmation Bias

IV. The GDP Illusion, Poverty Amid Growth: Cui Bono?

V. Policy Theater, the Real Economy and The Credit–Consumption Black Hole

VI. Jobs Boom, GDP Drag

VII. Policy Vaudeville: July .9% Inflation, MSRP and the Php 20 Rice Rollout

VIII. Core vs Headline CPI: A Divergence Worth Watching

IX. Deflator Manipulation, GDP Inflation

X. Inflation-GDP Forecasting as Folklore

XI. The Official Narrative: A Celebration of Minor Gains

XII. The Real Driver: Government Spending, Not Households

XIII. The Consumer Illusion: Retail as a Misleading Proxy

XIV. Expenditure Breakdown: Only Government Spending Beat the Headline

XV. Inconvenient Truth: The Rise of Big Government—Crowding Out in Action, The Establishment’s Blind Spots and Tunnel Vision

XVI. More Inconvenient Truths: Debt-Fueled GDP—A Statistical Shell Game

XVII. The Debt-Deficit Trap: No Way Out Without Pain—Sugarcoating Future Pain

XVIII. Tail-End Sectors Surge: Agriculture and Real Estate Rebound

XIX. The Policy Sweet Spot—and Its Expiry Date: Diminishing Returns of Stimulus

XX. Conclusion: Narrative Engineering and the Keynesian Free Lunch Trap

XXI. Post Script: The Market’s Quiet Rebuttal: Flattening Curve Exposes GDP Mirage 

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy 

Beneath the headline print lies a fragile economy propped up by CPI suppression, statistical distortion, and unsustainable public outlays.

I. Q2 GDP: A Mirage of Momentum 

The Philippines clocked in a Q2 GDP of 5.5% — higher than Q1 2025’s 5.4% but lower than Q2 2024’s 6.5%. 

For the first half, GDP posted a 5.4% expansion, above the 5.2% of the second half of 2024 but still below the 6.2% seen in the first half of 2024.


Figure 1

While this was largely in line with consensus expectations, what is rarely mentioned is that both nominal and real GDP remain locked to a weaker post-2020 secondary trendline — a legacy of the pandemic recession. (Figure 1, topmost graph) 

II. The Secondary Trendline: Pandemic’s Lingering Scar; GDP: A Flawed Lens, Still Worshipped 

Contra the establishment narrative, this lower secondary trend illustrates a slowing pace of increases—a theme we’ve repeatedly flagged. 

GDP now appears to be testing its own support level, underscoring the fragility of this fledgling trendline and the risk of a downside break. 

Though we’re not fans of GDP as a concept, we analyze it within the dominant lens—because everyone else treats it as gospel. 

But let’s be clear: GDP is a base effect—a percentage change from comparative output or expenditure figures from the same period a year ago. 

III. Economic Wet Dreams, Statistical Kabuki and Confirmation Bias 

When pundits claim GDP will breach 6% or that the Philippines is nearing “upper middle class” status, they’re implying that aside from seasonal Q4 strength, the rest of the year will recapture the original trendline and stay there. What a wet dream! 

These forecasts come from either practitioners afflicted by the Dunning-Kruger syndrome or sheer propagandists. 

The PSA’s national accounts data offer contradictory insights. But this isn’t just about statistics—it’s about confirmation bias. The public is told what it wants to hear. 

IV. The GDP Illusion, Poverty Amid Growth: Cui Bono? 

GDP is a quantitative estimate—built on assumptions, inputs, and econometric calculations. It hopes to objectively capture facts on the ground, but in aggregate, it overlooks individual preferences, distributional effects, financing mechanisms, and policy responses. 

Worse, its components (from rice to cars to Netflix) are averaged in ways that can distort reality. Aside, input or computational errors, or even manipulation, are always possible. 

Yes, GDP may be 5.5%, but SWS’s June self-rated poverty survey still shows 49% of Filipino families identifying as poor, with 10% on the borderline. While this is sharply down from December 2024’s 63%, the numbers remain considerable. (Figure 1, middle image) 

So, who benefits from the recent inflation decline that distilled into a 5.5% GDP? 

At a glance, the 41%—but even within this group, gains are uneven. Or, even within the 41% who are “non-poor,” gains are concentrated among larger winners while most see only modest improvements (see conclusion) 

V. Policy Theater, the Real Economy and The Credit–Consumption Black Hole 

The real economy doesn’t operate in a vacuum. It is a product of interactions shaped by both incumbent and anticipated socio-political and economic policies. 

The BSP began its easing cycle in 2H 2024, delivering four rate cuts (the fifth in June), two reserve requirement ratio cuts, doubled deposit insurance, a soft peg defense of the peso, and a new property benchmark that eviscerated real estate deflation. 

Theoretically, the economy ought to be functioning within a policy ‘sweet spot’. 

Despite blistering nominal growth and record-high universal-commercial bank credit—driven by consumer lending—real GDP barely budged. (Figure 1, lowest pane) 

Interest rates were hardly a constraint. Bank lending surged even during the 2022–23 rate hikes. Yet the policy transmission mechanism seems blunted: credit expansion hasn’t translated into consumer spending, rising prices or real GDP growth. 

Banking sector balance sheets suggest a black hole between credit and the economy—likely a repercussion of overleveraging or mounting balance sheet imbalances. 

More financial easing won’t fix this bottleneck. It’ll worsen it. 

VI. Jobs Boom, GDP Drag


Figure 2

We’re also treated to the spectacle of near-record employment. In June, the employed population reached its second-highest level since December 2023, driving the employment rate to 96.3% and lifting Q2’s average to 96.11%. 

That should be good news. But is it? If so, why has headline GDP moved in the opposite direction? (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

This labor boom coincided with over 25% credit card growth—normally a recipe for inflation (too much money chasing too few goods). (Figure 2, middle visual)

Instead, CPI fell, averaging just 1.4% in Q2. Near-record employment met falling prices, with barely a whisper from the consensus about softening demand. (Figure 2, lowest diagram)

VII. Policy Vaudeville: July .9% Inflation, MSRP and the Php 20 Rice Rollout

Authorities reported July inflation at 0.9%—approaching 2019 lows. But this is statistical kabuki, driven by price controls and weak demand.


Figure 3

Rice prices, partly due to imports, were already falling before January’s MSRP. The Php 20 rice rollout only deepened the deflation. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)

July saw rice prices drop 15.9%. Despite earlier MSRP, meat prices remained elevated—9.1% in June, 8.8% in July.

Because rice carries an 8.87% weight in the CPI basket, its deflation dragged down Food CPI (34.78% weight), driving July’s headline CPI to 2019 lows.

This divergence reveals the optics. MSRP failed on pork, so it was quietly lifted. But for rice, it was spun as policy success—piggybacking on slowing demand, punctuated by the Php 20 rollout even though it simply reinforced a downtrend already in motion.

VIII. Core vs Headline CPI: A Divergence Worth Watching

The growing gap between core and headline CPI is telling. The negative spread is now the widest since June 2022. Historically, persistent negative spreads have signaled inflection points—2015–16, 2019–2020, 2023. (Figure 3, middle window)

Moreover, MoM changes in the non-food and energy core CPI suggest consolidation and its potential terminal phase. An impending breakout looms—implying rising prices across a broader range of goods. (Figure 3, lowest graph)

IX. Deflator Manipulation, GDP Inflation 

Here’s the kicker: statistical histrionics are inflating GDP by repressing the deflator.

Real GDP is not a raw measure of economic output—it’s a ratio: nominal GDP divided by the GDP deflator. That deflator reflects price levels across the economy. Push the deflator down, and—voilĂ —real GDP pops up, even if nominal growth hasn’t changed. 

Q2’s 5.5% real GDP print looks better partly because the deflator was suppressed by statistical and policy factors: rice imports, price controls, Php 20 rice rollouts or targeted subsidies, and peso defense all helped drag reported inflation to multi-year lows. Rice alone, with an 8.87% CPI weight, deflated nearly 16% in July, pulling down the broader food CPI and, by extension, the GDP deflator. 

If the deflator had stayed closer to its Q1 level, Q2 real GDP would likely have landed closer to the 4.5–4.8% range—well below the official figure. This isn’t economic magic; it’s arithmetic. The “growth” came not from a sudden burst in output, but from lowering the measuring stick. 

Q2 GDP is another "benchmark-ism" in action. 

X. Inflation-GDP Forecasting as Folklore 

Amused by media’s enthrallment with government inflation forecasts, we noted at X.com: "Inflation forecasting is the game of ‘pin the tail on the donkey’ — a guess on a statistical guess, dressed up as science. The mainstream reinforces an Overton-window narrative that serves more as diversion than insight" 

The real economy—fragile, bifurcated, and policy-distorted—remains unseen.

XI. The Official Narrative: A Celebration of Minor Gains 

The establishment line, echoed by Reuters and Philstar, goes something like this: 

"Slowing inflation also helped support household consumption, which rose 5.5% year-on-year in the second quarter, the fastest pace since the first quarter of 2023" … 

"Faster farm output and strong consumer spending helped the Philippine economy expand by 5.5 percent in the second quarter"


Figure 4

But beneath the headlines lies a more sobering truth: a one-basis-point rise in household spending growth has been heralded as a “critical factor” behind the GDP expansion. 

While the statement is factually correct, it masks the reality: household spending as a share of GDP has been rangebound since 2023, showing no real breakout in momentum

XII. The Real Driver: Government Spending, Not Households 

The true engine of Q2 GDP was government spending, which rose 8.7%, down from 18.7% in Q1 but still dominant. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

Over the past five quarters, government spending has averaged 10.7%, dwarfing household consumption’s 5.1%.  

This imbalance exposes the fragility of the consumer-led growth narrative. When per capita metrics are used, the illusion fades further: Real household per capita GDP was just 4.5% in Q2, barely above Q1’s 4.4%, and well below Q1 2023’s 5.5%.

This per capita trend has been flatlining at secondary trendline support, locked in an L-shaped pattern—inertia, not resurgence—and still drifting beneath its pre-pandemic exponential trend.  The per capita household consumption “L-shape” shows spending per person collapsing during the pandemic and never meaningfully recovering — a flatline that belies the GDP growth narrative. (Figure 4, middle graph)

XIII. The Consumer Illusion: Retail as a Misleading Proxy

Despite the BSP’s promotion of property prices as a proxy for consumer health—and the Overton Window’s deafening hallelujahs—SM Prime’s Q2 results reveal persistent consumer strain: (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

  • Rent revenues rose only 6.3%, the weakest since the pandemic recession in Q1 2021.
  • Property sales stagnated, up just 0.2% despite new malls in 2024 and 2025 

So much for the “strong consumer” thesis. 

XIV. Expenditure Breakdown: Only Government Spending Beat the Headline 

In the PSA’s real GDP expenditure table, only government spending exceeded the headline:

  • Household: 5.5%
  • Gross capital formation: 0.6%
  • Exports: 4.4%
  • Imports: 2.9%
  • Government: 8.7% 

Notably, government spending excludes public construction and private allocations to public projects (e.g., PPPs). Due to the May mid-term elections, real public construction GDP collapsed by 8.2%. 

XV. Inconvenient Truth: The Rise of Big Government—Crowding Out in Action, The Establishment’s Blind Spots and Tunnel Vision

Figure 5

The first half of 2025 exposes a structural shift the mainstream won’t touch:  Government spending’s share of GDP has surged to an all-time high! 

Meanwhile, consumer driven GDP continues its long descent—down since 2001. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

As the public sector’s footprint swells, the private sector’s relative role contracts. This isn’t theoretical crowding out. It’s empirical. It’s unfolding in real time. (Figure 5, middle image) 

Importantly, this is not a conspiracy theory—these are government’s own data. Yet the establishment’s analysts and bank economists appear blind to it. 

Proof? 

Banks are shifting focus toward consumer lending, even as the consumer share of GDP trends lower. 

The “build-and-they-will-come” crowd remains locked in a form of tunnel vision, steadfastly clinging to a decaying trend. 

XVI. More Inconvenient Truths: Debt-Fueled GDP—A Statistical Shell Game 

Government has no wealth of its own. It extracts from the productive sector—through taxes, borrowing (future taxes), and inflation. 

As Big Government expands, so does public debt — now at Php 17.3 trillion as of June! 

The June debt increase annualizes to Php 1.784 trillion — eerily close to the Php 1.954 trillion NGDP gain over the past four quarters (Q3 2024–Q2 2025). (Figure 5, lowest visual)

Figure 6 

That’s a mere Php 170 billion gap. Translation: debt accounts for 91.3% of NGDP’s statistical value-added. 

The 91.3% “debt as share of NGDP increase” means almost all of the year-on-year nominal GDP expansion came from government borrowing, not private sector growth — in other words, strip out the deficit spending, and the economy’s headline size barely moved. 

Yet this spread has collapsed to its lowest level since the pandemic recession. (Figure 6, upper pane) 

This isn’t growth. It’s leverage masquerading as output — GDP propped up almost entirely by deficit spending! 

This also reinforces the government’s drift toward centralization—where state expansion becomes the default engine of the economy. 

XVII. The Debt-Deficit Trap: No Way Out Without Pain—Sugarcoating Future Pain 

It’s unrealistic for the administration to claim it can “slowly bring down” debt while GDP remains tethered to deficit spending. 

Debt-to-GDP ratios are used to soothe public concern—but the same debt is inflating GDP through government outlays. It’s a circular metric: the numerator props up the denominator

According to the Bureau of Treasury, Debt-to-GDP hit 63.1% in Q2 2025—highest since 2005! 

Ironically, authorities quietly raised the debt-to-GDP threshold from 60% to 70% in Augustan implicit admission that the old ceiling is no longer defensible

This is a borrow-now, pay-later model. Short-term optics are prioritized, while future GDP is sacrificed. 

Even the PSA’s long-term trendline reflects this dragconfirming the trajectory of diminishing returns. 

And we haven’t even touched banking debt expansion, which should have supported both government and elite private sector financing. Instead, it’s compounding systemic fragility. 

We’re no fans of government statistics—but even their own numbers tell the story. Cherry-picking to sugarcoat the truth isn’t analysis. It’s deception. And it won’t hide the pain of massive malinvestments. 

XVIII. Tail-End Sectors Surge: Agriculture and Real Estate Rebound 

From the industry side, Q2 saw surprising strength from GDP’s tailenders: 

Agriculture GDP spiked 7%, the highest since Q2 2011’s 8.3%. Volatile by nature, such spikes often precede plunges. 

Real estate GDP nearly doubled from Q1’s 3.7% to 6.1%, though still below Q2 2024’s 7.7%. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

Yet initial reports of listed property developers tell a different story: 

-Aggregate real estate sales: +4.1% (Megaworld +10.5%, Filinvest -4.96%, SMPH +0.02%) 

-Total revenues: +5.23% (Megaworld +9.6%, Filinvest -1.2%, SMPH +3.83%)

These figures lag behind nominal GDP’s 7.9%, suggesting statistical embellishment aligned with BSP’s agenda. 

Benchmark-ism strikes again!  

XIX. The Policy Sweet Spot—and Its Expiry Date: Diminishing Returns of Stimulus 

Technically, Q2 and 1H mark the ‘sweet spot’ of policy stimulus—BSP’s easy money paired with fiscal expansion. But artificial boosts yield diminishing returns. 

A 5.5% print reveals fragility more than resilience. 

Once again, the entrenched reliance on debt-financed deficit spending inflates GDP at the expense of future stability—while compounding systemic risk.  

XX. Conclusion: Narrative Engineering and the Keynesian Free Lunch Trap 

GDP has been sculpted to serve the establishment’s preferred storyline: 

  • CPI suppression to inflate real GDP
  • Overstated gains in agriculture and real estate
  • Escalating reliance on deficit spending 

Repressing CPI to pad GDP isn’t stewardship—it’s pantomine. A calculated communication strategy designed to preserve public confidence through statistical theater. 

Within this top-down, social-democratic Keynesian spending framework, the objective is unmistakable: Cheap access to household savings to bankroll political vanity projects. These are the hallmarks of free lunch politics. 

The illusion of growth props up the illusion of competence. And both are running on borrowed time. 

Yet, who benefits from this GDP? 

Not the average household. Not the productive base. As The Inquirer.net reports: "The combined wealth of the country’s 50 richest rose by more than 6 percent to $86 billion this year from $80.8 billion in 2024, as the economy got some lift from robust domestic demand and higher infrastructure investments, according to Forbes magazine." 

GDP growth has become a redistribution mechanism—upward. A scoreboard for elite extraction, not shared prosperity. 

Without restraint on free lunch politics, the Philippines is barreling toward a debt crisis. 

XXI. Post Script: The Market’s Quiet Rebuttal: Flattening Curve Exposes GDP Mirage 

Despite headline growth figures and establishment commentary echoing official optimism, institutional traders—both local and foreign—remain unconvinced by the Overton Window of managed optimism rhetoric. 

The market’s posture suggests skepticism toward the government’s narrative of resilience.


Figure 7
 

Following a Q2 steepening (end-June Q2 vs. end-March Q1), the Philippine Treasury curve has flattened in August (mid-Q3), though it remains steep in absolute terms. While the curve remains steep overall, the recent shift reveals important nuances: 

Short end (T-bills): August T-bill yields are marginally lower than June Q2 but still above March Q1 levels. 

Belly (3–5 years): Rates have been largely static or inert, showing no strong conviction on medium-term growth or market indecision 

Long end (10 years): Yields have fallen sharply since March and June, suggesting softer growth expectations or rising demand for duration. 

Ultra-long (20–25 years): Rates remain elevated and sticky, reflecting structural fiscal and inflation concerns. 

After July’s 0.9% CPI print, the peso staged a brief rally, yet the USDPHP remains above its March lows. Meanwhile, 3-month T-bill rates softened slightly post-CPI, hinting at the BSP’s intent to maintain its easing stance. 

Q3’s bearish flattening underscores rising risks of economic slowdown amid stubborn inflation or stagflation. 

The divergence between market pricing and statistical growth exposes the mirage of Q2 GDP—more optical than operational, more narrative than organic.

  

Sunday, August 03, 2025

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock


In the final analysis, it’s just central banks printing money, reducing its value and causing inflation as they support dishonest governments that refuse to be fiscally responsible and continually run massive deficits. Such policies flow from the “elite’s” greed and their insatiable thirst for power, benefiting themselves at the expense of the middle class and working poor… When a society loses its moral foundation, it’s only a matter of time before the economy and currency deteriorate and the wealth gaps between the rich and poor increase dramatically—Jonathan Wellum  

In this issue

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock 

I. A Delayed Reckoning: Anatomy of a Fiscal Shock

1. Easy Money–Financed Free Lunch Politics

2. The Political Cult of Spending-Led Ideology: Trickle-Down by Government Fiat

3. Chronic Policy Diagnostic Blindness

4. Econometric Myopia: Forecasting the Past

5. Behavioral Fragility: The Psychology of Denial

II. Countdown to Fiscal Shock: The Hidden Story of June’s Blowout

III. Q2 Slowdown, Q1 Surge: Anatomy of the Half-Year Blowout—From Past Binge to Present Reckoning

IV. Technocratic Overreach, Authorized Expenditures, Congressional Irrelevance

V. Deficit Forecasting: Averaging Toward a Crisis

VI. Financing Strain and the Debt-Debt Servicing Spiral

VII. Tax Dragnet, CMEPA’s Forced Financial Rotation: The Economic Asphyxiation Tightens

VIII. Bank’s Fiscal Complicity, Liquidity Strains, Treasury Market’s Mutiny

IX. Mounting USDPHP Exchange Rate Tension

X. Conclusion: The Structural Fragility of Deficit Philosophy 

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock 

When deficits become destiny: the fiscal countdown accelerates—a convergence of easy money and political overreach

I. A Delayed Reckoning: Anatomy of a Fiscal Shock 

A fiscal shock rarely emerges from a single misstep. It crystallizes from compound misalignments across policy, ideology, and behavior. It’s the law of unintended consequences—unfolding in real time. Where economic orthodoxy meets political convenience, stability is hollowed out. And just as critically, it’s a delayed consequence of systemic denial. 

Here are the five pillars of this reckoning: 

1. Easy Money–Financed Free Lunch Politics 

A regime of entitlement—fueled by populist spending and post-pandemic ultra-low rates—fostered a seductive illusion: 

Deficits don’t matter. Debt is painless. 

Years of stimulus, subsidies, and politically popular transfers hardened into fiscal habit— habits that now resist restraint, and are rooted in beliefs that are difficult to dismantle. 

2. The Political Cult of Spending-Led Ideology: Trickle-Down by Government Fiat 

At the heart of the Philippine development model lies a flawed political-economic ideology: that elite consumption and state expenditure will "trickle down" to the broader economy. 

Massive infrastructure programs, defense outlays, and subsidy-heavy welfare budgets may deliver short-term optics—but they also crowd out private investment, misallocate capital, and accelerate savings erosion. 

The result: an economy that becomes top-heavy, brittle, and structurally vulnerable. 

This heavy-handed, statist-interventionist, anti-market bias is what Ludwig von Mises called "statolatry"—the worship of the state. 

3. Chronic Policy Diagnostic Blindness 

In the social democratic playbook, populist tools dominate. And with them comes a dangerous neglect of structural realities:

  • Crowding out is ignored
  • Balance sheet mismatches are waved off
  • Price distortions go unexamined
  • Resource misallocations are dismissed
  • Economic trade-offs are neglected 

Intervention becomes the default—not the diagnosis. The result? Mispriced assets, distorted capital structures, and risk narratives untethered from fundamentals. 

The same statolatry—elevating state action above market signals—undergirds this blindness. It promotes interventionist reflexes at the expense of incentive clarity and institutional coherence. 

Fragility escalates—masked by the optics of populist-driven fiscal theatrics. 

4. Econometric Myopia: Forecasting the Past 

The establishment clings to econometric models built on frangible assumptions—historical baselines, linear extrapolation, and trend mimicry. These tools overlook what matters most: 

  • Nonlinear disruption
  • Inflection points
  • Complex feedback loops
  • Tail risks and structural breaks 

With ZERO margin for error, fragility festers beneath the surface. 

That fragility was laid bare by a maelstrom of paradigm shifts: 

  • The pandemic rupture
  • Deglobalization and trade fragmentation
  • Raging asset bubbles
  • Debt overload
  • Mountains of malinvestments
  • Hot wars and geopolitical shockwaves
  • Inflation surges
  • Financial weaponization 

This isn’t noise—it’s a new architecture of global and domestic uncertainties. And econometric orthodoxy isn’t equipped to model it. 

5. Behavioral Fragility: The Psychology of Denial 

Heuristics shape policy—and not in ways that reward foresight. Beyond populist signaling and econometric hindsight, cognitive distortions rule: 

  • Recency bias
  • Rear-view heuristics
  • Political denialism masked as institutional confidence 

Years of perceived “resilience” dulled vigilance: 

  • Every deficit was shrugged off
  • Every peso slide deemed temporary
  • Every fiscal blowout “absorbed” by the system 

This cultivated an expectation: past stability ensures future resilience. It doesn’t. That assumption—embedded deep within policy reflexes—has left institutions blind to volatility and ill-equipped for disruptions and rupture. 

II. Countdown to Fiscal Shock: The Hidden Story of June’s Blowout


Figure 1

In May, we warned that if June 2025's deficit merely hits its four-year average of Php 200 billion, the six-month budget gap would surge to Php 723.9 billion—surpassing the pandemic-era record of Php 716.07 billion. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Inquirer.net, July 25, 2025: The Marcos administration exceeded its budget deficit limit in the first half of 2025 after narrowly missing both its spending and revenue targets. This happened amid a gradual fiscal consolidation program. Latest data from the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) showed the government logged a budget gap of P765.5 billion in the first six months, which it needed to plug with borrowings. This was 24.69 percent bigger compared with a year ago. (italics added) 

Then came the payload: Php 241.6 billion in fresh red ink last June!   

The government’s first-half deficit reached Php 765.5 billion—24.69% higher than last year and larger than even our most aggressive baseline x.com forecast (Php 745.18–Php 756.53 billion). (Figure 1, table)


Figure 2 

Bullseye! Our projections weren't just close—they were surgical. And the final blowout went further still. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

Curiously underreported, June’s deficit marked an all-time high, driven by expenditure growth of 8.5% outstripping revenue growth of 3.5%. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

  • BIR Collections: Up 16.24% YoY—a strong bounce from 10.71% in May and 4.71% in June 2024.
  • BoC Collections: Recovered 3.23% YoY, compared to –6.94% in May and 0.67% in June 2024.
  • Non-Tax Revenues: Plunged 43.25% YoY—from 40.93% in May and 81.7% in June 2024. 

Behind the aggregate improvement lies deeper fragility: June’s revenue outperformance was narrow, uneven, and ultimately insufficient to contain the programmed spending expansion—a predictable artifact of the conventional socio-democratic ochlocratic political model. 

Populist instincts override structural diagnostics. And the fiscal narrative remains hostage to crowd-pleasing interventionism rather than incentive discipline or institutional coherence.

III. Q2 Slowdown, Q1 Surge: Anatomy of the Half-Year Blowout—From Past Binge to Present Reckoning 

Despite June's record deficit, Q2 posted just Php 319.5 billion, the second slowest since 2020. That means the bulk of the six-month deficit—Php 446.03 billion—was frontloaded in Q1. 

Even then, authorities revised March spending down by Php 32.784 billion, artificially narrowing the Q1 deficit. Adjustments may mask the underlying magnitude but not the fiscal trajectory. 

This six-month outcome validates what we’ve long emphasized: programmed spending vs. variable revenues is no longer an assumption—it’s a structural vulnerability, a primary source of instability 

Importantly, this wasn’t an emergency stimulus. Unlike 2021, there’s been no recession nor one in the immediate horizon—per consensus. 

Yet the deficit beat that year’s record—despite BSP’s historic easing:

  • Policy rate cuts
  • Reserve requirement reduction
  • USDPHP cap
  • Liquidity injections
  • Deposit insurance expansion 

Behind the optics: a quiet financial bailout, not of households or industries, but of the banking system. 

IV. Technocratic Overreach, Authorized Expenditures, Congressional Irrelevance 

As we earlier noted: the government continues to use linear extrapolation in a complex environment. Even with declared economic slowdown, the BIR posted 14.11% growth, buoyed by May–June outperformance. (Figure 2, lowest image) 

But has "benchmark-ism" inflated performance claims? Have authorities padded the numerator (tax data) to rationalize a fragile denominator (spending data)?


Figure 3

Non-tax revenue was the Achilles’ heel—its 2024 spike became the baseline for 2025’s enacted spending binge. The result: forecast miscalibration leading directly to fiscal shock. Beyond mere overconfidence, it was technocratic hubris that helped trigger today’s blowout. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

Again, an underperforming economy—whether a below-target GDP, sharp slowdown, or even recession—would only reinforce this SPEND-and-RESCUE dynamic, repackaged and sold as stimulus. 

Meanwhile, authorized expenditures: Php 3.026 trillion. Remaining balance: Php 3.3 trillion, implying a floor monthly average of Php 550.05 billion. 

Budgets have been breached 6 years in a row—highlighting a redistribution of budgetary power from Congress to the Executive. 

Whether through creative reinterpretation or technical loopholes, these breaches signal a quiet transfer of fiscal power from Congress to the Executive. 

V. Deficit Forecasting: Averaging Toward a Crisis 

Looking at pandemic-era averages:

  • Q3 deficits averaged Php 374 billion
    • Q3 2024 hit Php 356.32 billion (–5.7% below average)
  • Q4 averaged Php 537.9 billion Q4 is typically the largest—as government drops all remaining balance and more
    • Q4 2024 deficit: Php 536.13 billion (–0.4% deviation)
  • 2H Average: Php 911.6 billion
    • 2H 2024: Php 892.45 billion (–2.6% vs trend) 

If 2025 follows this pattern, the full-year deficit could hit Php 1.677 trillion—Php 7 billion above prior records. 

But averages conceal real-world volatility, political discretion, and data manipulation—can skew results. 

Once again, it bears emphasizing: all this unfolded as the BSP eased aggressively—through rate and RRR cuts, doubled deposit insurance, capped USDPHP volatility, and expanded credit (mostly consumer-focused). 

Despite the stimulus, vulnerabilities not only persist—they’re escalating. 

If so, the DBCC's revised deficit-to-GDP target of 5.5% would be breached, necessitating another substantial upward adjustment. (Figure 3, middle table) 

Authorities would be mistaken to treat this as mere statistical noise; its implications extend far beyond the ledger into the real economy

VI. Financing Strain and the Debt-Debt Servicing Spiral 

Treasury financing soared 86.2%, from Php 665 billion to Php 1.238 trillion in H1 2025. (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

Even with record high cumulative cash reserves of Php 1.09 trillion, June alone posted a residual cash deficit of Php 90.09 billion—evidence that surplus buffers are already depleted.


Figure 4
 

As such, in June, public debt spiked Php 1.783 trillion YoY (+11.52%) or Php 348 billion (+2.06%) MoM to reach a historic Php 17.27 trillion! (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

Critically, this growth has outpaced the spending curve, suggesting potential deficit understatement or an acceleration of off-book liabilities. (Figure 4, middle image) 

Despite this, external debt share rebounded in June—a pivot back to foreign financing amid domestic constraints. (Figure 4, lowest graph)


Figure 5

Meanwhile, total debt servicing fell 40.12% YoY due to a 61% plunge in amortizations, even though interest payments hit a record. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

Why?

Likely causes:

  • Scheduling choices
  • Prepayments in 2024
  • Political aversion to public backlash 

But the record and growing deficit ensures that borrowing—and debt servicing—will keep RISING. This won’t be deferred—it will amplify. 

As we warned last May

  • More debt more servicing less for everything else.
  • Crowding out hits both public and private spending.
  • Revenue gains won’t keep up with servicing.
  • Inflation and peso depreciation risks climb.
  • Higher taxes are on the horizon 

VII. Tax Dragnet, CMEPA’s Forced Financial Rotation: The Economic Asphyxiation Tightens 

Debt-to-GDP hit 62%, triggering a quiet revision: Malacañang raised the ceiling to 70%. 

To accommodate this, authorities imposed a hefty tax on interest income via the Capital Markets Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA), engineering a forced rotation out of long-dated fixed income into leverage-fueled speculation and spending— (see previous discussions) 

This fiscal extraction dragnet is poised to widen—ensnaring more of the economy and constricting what little fiscal breathing room remains. 

VIII. Bank’s Fiscal Complicity, Liquidity Strains, Treasury Market’s Mutiny 

Banks continue to stockpile government securities through net claims on the central government (NCoCG). (Figure 5, middle image) 

Yet despite BSP’s easing, treasury yields barely moved—fueling further Held-to-Maturity (HTM) hoarding and deepening the industry's liquidity drain. 

At end of July, despite dovish guidance: (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

  • Yields across the curve stayed above ONRRP, muting or blunting transmission
  • Curve flattened unevenly: front and long ends softened, belly firmed—signaling hedging against medium-term risk
  • T-bill rates remained elevated signaling inflation fears and short-term funding stress 

Despite rate cuts, the treasury market refused to follow. Monetary policy faces bond mutineers. 

IX. Mounting USDPHP Exchange Rate Tension


Figure 6 

Following the June fiscal report, the USDPHP surged 1.29% on July 31, wiping out prior losses to post a modest 0.52% year-to-date return. 

With wider deficits on deck, foreign borrowing becomes more attractive—and a weaker dollar, further incentivized by the BSP’s soft peg, adds fuel to that pivot. But beneath the surface, this dynamic strain long-term currency stability. 

While global dollar softness might offset domestic fragilities, the USDPHP’s recent breakout hints at further testing—possibly probing the BSP’s 59-Maginot line, a psychological and tactical policy threshold. (Figure 6 upper chart) 

Should that line give, external financing costs and FX volatility could surge, exposing cracks in the peg architecture. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

X. Conclusion: The Structural Fragility of Deficit Philosophy

The Php 17.27 trillion debt—and growing—isn’t the cost of failure. It’s the price of consensus under a soft-focus ochlocratic social democracy. 

These systems don’t just elect leaders—they ratify an ethos: that deficit-fueled expansion is not only moral but inevitable. Redistribution becomes ritual. The annual SONA pipelines new spending schemes, boosting short-term political capital—but the structural anchors are threadbare. 

Compassion without discipline sedates policy. Voters misread rhetoric as reform, empathy as capability, largesse as virtue, and control as stewardship. Time preferences spiral, gravitating toward the instant dopamine hit of political dispensation. 

Alas—the tragedy is not merely fiscal. It’s intergenerational erosion. Each electoral cycle mortgages future agency, compounding fragility over time. 

What’s swelling isn’t just debt. It’s a philosophical incoherence—subsidizing dysfunction and labeling it 'development.’ 

When such convictions are deeply embedded, a disorderly reckoning is inevitable. 

____

References 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock? Substack July 7, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Is the Philippines on the Brink of a 2025 Fiscal Shock? Substack June 8, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Fiscal Performance in Q1 2025: Record Deficit Amid Centralizing Power, Substack May 4, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design, Substack, July 20, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback, Substack, July 27, 2025

Sunday, July 20, 2025

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design

 

When you net out all the assets and liabilities in the economy, the only thing that remains is our stock of productive investments, inventions, education, organizational structures, and unconsumed natural resources. Those are the basis of our national wealth—Dr. John P. Hussman 

In this issue 

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design

I. Reform as Spectacle: Bastiat’s Warning and the Mask of Inclusion

II. What is Seen: Promises of Efficiency and Modernization

III. The Unseen: How CMEPA Undermines the Socio-Political Economy

Theme 1: Taxing Savings, Undermining Capital Formation

Theme 2: Systemic Financial Risks and Policy Incoherence

Theme 3: Fiscal Extraction, the Wealth Effect and the Political Economy

Theme 4: Institutional and Socio-Political Deterioration

IV. Conclusion: CMEPA—A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Behavioral Reprogramming and the Unseen Costs of Reform 

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design 

A wolf in sheep’s clothing: A policy not only distorting capital markets but reprogramming society toward short-termism, volatility, and fragility. 

I. Reform as Spectacle: From Rhetoric to Repercussion—CMEPA Through Bastiat’s Eyes 

All legislation arrives adorned in rhetoric—its presentation aimed to evoke public trust and collective good. Much like Potemkin villages, reforms such as CMEPA appear to serve Jeremy Bentham’s ‘greater good,’ yet beneath the façade lies the concealed agenda of entrenched interests. 

Echoing FrĂ©dĂ©ric Bastiat’s indispensable insight, we must learn to discern between what is seen and what is unseen. 

"The entire difference between a bad and a good Economist is apparent here. A bad one relies on the visible effect while the good one takes account both of the effect one can see and of those one must foresee. 

However, the difference between these is huge, for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favorable the later consequences are disastrous, and vice versa. From which it follows that a bad Economist will pursue a small current benefit that is followed by a large disadvantage in the future, while a true Economist will pursue a large benefit in the future at the risk of suffering a small disadvantage immediately" (Bastiat, 1850) [bold added] 

With this lens, we examine the Capital Markets Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA)—Republic Act No. 12214, enacted on May 29, 2025, effective July 1. 

II. What is Seen: Promises of Efficiency and Modernization 

CMEPA has been billed as a modernization effort to deepen financial markets and enhance participation. Its measures include:

  • A flat 20% tax on passive income, including interest from long-term deposits and peso bonds
  • Reduced stock transaction tax (STT) to 0.1%
  • Expanded definition of “securities” to widen taxable instruments
  • Removal of exemptions for GOCCs and long-term depositors, while retaining perks for FCDUs and lottery bettors 

Portrayed as a reform designed to streamline taxation and deepen the capital markets, CMEPA hides a more troubling reality beneath its glitter. It reveals a policy that taxes the foundations of financial stability and long-term capital formation. While it reduces transaction taxes and simplifies some rates, its deeper impact is a radical shift in how the Philippine state attempts to influence public mindset and choices—how it allocates risk, treats saving, and commandeers private resources. 

III. The Unseen: How CMEPA Undermines the Socio-Political Economy 

This critique identifies several thematic consequences: 

Theme 1: Taxing Savings, Undermining Capital Formation


Figure/Table 1

1 Flattening Tax Across All Maturities 

The new 20% final withholding tax (FWT) rate now applies across all maturities, including long-term deposits and investment instruments previously exempted. (Figure/Table 1) 

Retail savers and retirees, dependent on deposit-based income, now face disincentives for capital preservation. Long-term financial instruments lose their privileged status, undermining capital formation

2 Financial Repression by Design

By taxing time deposits, foreign currency deposits, and peso-denominated long-term instruments, CMEPA imposes a de facto penalty on saving. Rather than encouraging financial inclusion or stability, it aligns with financial repression tactics: using policy tools to channel private savings toward public financing. 

Moreover, savings and capital are diverted from productive sectors to fund fiscal deficits, choking investment and inviting misallocation

3 Regressive Impact on Small Savers 

The uniform tax rate applies regardless of investor profile. Small savers and retirees lose disproportionately. Meanwhile, the wealthy retain flexibility—shifting funds offshore or into tax-exempt alternatives. 

4 Deepening the Savings-Investment Divide 

CMEPA taxes the engine of investment—savings—while encouraging speculative behavior. As domestic savings weaken, investment becomes more reliant on volatile international capital flows and risky leveraging, heightening systemic vulnerability. 

Theme 2: Systemic Financial Risks and Policy Incoherence 

5 Balance Sheet Mismatches 

CMEPA induces short-term liabilities against long-term assets, eroding liquidity buffers. Banks stretch to meet Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) thresholds while chasing yield in speculative sectors—real estate, retail, accommodation, construction. 

FX funding stability worsens as offshore placements rise, increasing currency mismatch risk for entities with dollar-denominated obligations. 

This weakens the stability of the banking system. 

6 Weaker Bank Profitability and Liquidity 

Banks face tighter net interest margins, especially as liabilities are taxed while fixed-yield assets remain unchanged. Asset durations can’t adjust as quickly as funding costs, intensifying balance sheet compression undermining liquidity. 

Combined with BSP’s RRR cuts and other easing, this suggests rising liquidity stress rather than financial deepening.


Figure 2

The weakened deposit base—as revealed by the downtrend in the growth of deposit liabilities—partly explains the doubling of deposit insurance in March, a reactive gesture to rising liquidity risk. Notably, the slowdown appears to have accelerated in 2025. (Figure 2)


Figure 3

But it is not just deposits: the decline in cash and liquid assets—as shown by falling cash-to-deposit and liquid assets-to-deposit ratios—highlights the mounting fragility of bank conditions. (Figure 3)


Figure 4

The law compounds the fragile cash position of Philippine banks, redistributing liquidity into riskier corners of the balance sheet. 

7 Systemic Leverage Risk 

Taxing interest income inflates debt servicing costs, worsening liquidity stress across sectors already burdened with leverage. The gap between savings returns and borrowing costs widens, deepening household and corporate fragility. 

8 Undermining Financial Deepening 

Instead of encouraging broader access to financial instruments, the reform may drive savers toward informal systems, offshore accounts, or speculative assetsincreasing volatility and disintermediation. 

9 Incoherence with Monetary Policy 

When interest income is taxed heavily, monetary policy transmission weakens. A rate hike meant to incentivize saving may be neutralized by post-tax returns that remain unattractive. This creates friction between fiscal and monetary authorities. 

10 Disincentivizing Long-Term Domestic Funding 

Removing exemptions from long-duration peso instruments weakens the domestic funding base. The government may respond by issuing shorter-tenor bonds, amplifying rollover risk—particularly amid widening deficits. 

Theme 3: Fiscal Extraction, the Wealth Effect and the Political Economy 

11 From Market-Based to Tax-Based Government Financing


Figure 5

CMEPA shifts the state's financing strategy from indirect borrowing (via banks' net claims on government) to direct taxation of interest income. This reduces the role of market-based funding and deepens reliance on financial repression. (Figure 5)

Philippine banks have long underwritten the government’s historic deficit spending. But with deposits eroding and liquidity thinning, can CMEPA’s pivot toward direct taxation rebalance this dynamic—or will banks be forced to sustain an inflationary financing regime they may no longer afford?

12 Crowding Out, Capital Misallocation, and Short-Termism

Taxing savings redirects capital from private to public use. Outside of government, the investment community is pushed toward velocity over duration, incentivizing speculative short-term returns rather than productive long-term investments. This leads to boom-bust cycles that consume capital and savings, ultimately lowering the standard of living for the average citizen. 

13 Reform Signals to Mask Fiscal Strain

CMEPA is marketed as efficiency reform, but its primary effect is increased revenue extraction. This is fiscalism masquerading as modernization—a stealth tax hike under the guise of pro-market policy. 

14 Wealth-Effect Ideology and Speculative Diversion 

DOF claims that CMEPA will "diversify income sources," implicitly inviting or encouraging ordinary Filipinos to engage in asset (stock and real estate) speculation. 

The BSP’s inflated real estate index, as discussed last week, aligns perfectly with this narrative. 

Yet if savings have weakened, with what are people supposed to speculate? 

In essence, the law encourages speculative behavior over productive undertakings—gambling on the trickle-down “easy money”-fueled wealth effect to stimulate growth. 

Theme 4: Institutional and Socio-Political Deterioration 

15 Favoring Non-Depository Institutions and Digital Control 

With capital markets shallow, the government’s pivot appears aimed at stock and real estate price inflation to support GDP optics. 

But there might be more to this: could the erosion of savings-based intermediation serve as a stepping-stone—or perhaps a gauntlet—to the advent of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) regime? 

16 Widening Inequality 

As savings erode and productive investment slows, the burden of taxation and financial volatility falls hardest on low- and middle-income households. Elites with offshore access or alternative vehicles thrive—amplifying the wealth gap. 

17 Capital Consumption and the Attack on Private Property 

CMEPA’s redistributive logic undermines the sanctity of private property. Through financial repression, taxation, and inflation, it transforms capital into consumption, violating the very principles of long-term economic development. 

18 Behavioral Reprogramming Toward Short-Termism 

CMEPA reorients household and institutional incentives by elevating time preferences, nudging actors toward short-term consumption and speculative tendencies. The long-term result encompasses not only economic and financial dimensions, but also social, political, and cultural shifts away from prudence. 

19 Increased State Power and Erosion of Economic and Civil Liberties

The flattening of tax treatment and the reallocation of savings toward the state reassert the growing dominance of the government over economic life. As household and institutional financial autonomy is curtailed, this fiscal centralization represents a creeping erosion of civil liberties. This is not merely fiscal policy—by asserting greater command over private savings and reducing the role of banks and savers in capital allocation, the CMEPA accelerates the centralization of economic control. 

20 Desperation, Not Reform 

Beneath the reformist language lies the scent of desperation. As government spending outpaces revenues and "free lunch" policies proliferate, the state appears increasingly willing to extract resources wherever possible, even at the cost of long-term economic damage. 

CMEPA may be seen less as a policy of modernization and more as a pretext to justify a broader power grab for control over the nation’s remaining financial surpluses. Such fiscal maneuvers reveal a growing reliance on coercive tools to finance political programs and preserve power.

IV. Conclusion: CMEPA—A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Behavioral Reprogramming and the Unseen Costs of Reform 

CMEPA is not neutral. 

It is policy with intent—velocity over virtue, spectacle over substance. Beneath its reformist gloss lies a deliberate reordering of incentives: a behavioral reprogramming that elevates time preference across households, businesses, banks, and the state itself. 

The ramifications are profound. As savings erode, the economy pivots toward a spend-and-speculate framework, exposing malinvestments and shortening planning horizons. Bank balance sheets tilt toward short-duration, high-risk assets. Businesses recalibrate toward immediacy, while regulatory structures and political priorities—including education—subtly shift to accommodate the new paradigm: favoring current events over historical depth, short-term fixes over long-term resilience. 

As immediacy becomes institutionalized, political incentives may shift as well—gravitating toward authoritarian tendencies, where centralized authority and executive expedience increasingly replace civic pluralism. 

This drift accelerates leverage and volatility. Coupled with BSP’s easy money, fiscal splurging, deepening economic concentration, the entrenching of the “build and they will come” paradigm, benchmark-ism, and the subtle embrace of a war economy—where economic centralization and speculative asset inflation substitute for organic growth—the system veers toward the bust phase of a boom-bust cycle

CMEPA, dressed in reformist language, delivers structural inversion through a reordering of incentives—substituting short-term economic activity for long-term capital formation. It penalizes saving, rewards speculation, and manufactures stability to perform confidence. Its impact is philosophical as much as economic: undermining the sanctity of private property and sabotaging the long-term architecture of capital. 

As Ludwig von Mises warned: 

Saving, capital accumulation, is the agency that has transformed step-by-step the awkward search for food on the part of savage cave dwellers into the modern ways of industry. The pacemakers of this evolution were the ideas that created the institutional framework within which capital accumulation was rendered safe by the principle of private ownership of the means of production. Every step forward on the way toward prosperity is the effect of saving. The most ingenious technological inventions would be practically useless if the capital goods required for their utilization had not been accumulated by saving. (Mises, 1956) 

The unseen consequences of policy often outweigh the visible promises, as Bastiat warned us. 

CMEPA’s structural tax changes reprogram public incentives in ways that may appear benign, but will likely unleash instability, fragility, and misallocation—outcomes not immediately visible, but deeply consequential. 

Unless reversed, CMEPA’s legacy will be one of hollowed market and social institutions, increased fragility of public governance, and ultimately, social unraveling—where the erosion of savings and stability gives way to volatility, inequality, and the breakdown of trust in both economic and civic life. 

CMEPA is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 

____

References: 

FrĂ©dĂ©ric Bastiat What is Seen and What is Not Seen, or Political Economy in One Lesson [July 1850], https://oll.libertyfund.org/ 

Ludwig von Mises, The ANTI-CAPITALISTIC MENTALITY, p 39, D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY (Canada), LTD 1956, Mises Institute 2008, Mises.org