Showing posts with label Philippine Peso. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philippine Peso. Show all posts

Sunday, March 08, 2026

The Php3.9 Trillion Savings-Investment Gap: How the Middle East Conflict Exposed the Philippines’ Economic Fragility

 

“War,” Mises observed, “is harmful, not only to the conquered but to the conqueror. Society has arisen out of the works of peace; the essence of society is peacemaking. Peace and not war is the father of all things. Only economic action has created the wealth around us; labor, not the profession of arms, brings happiness. Peace builds; war destroys.”—Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr 

In this issue 

The Php3.9 Trillion Savings-Investment Gap: How the Middle East Conflict Exposed the Philippines’ Economic Fragility

I. Geopolitical Shock: Philippine Markets React

II. February Yield Curve: Fragility Already Forming

III. What the Yield Curve Reflects: The Consumption of Savings

IV. The Defective Anchor: Savings Is a Residual of GDP

V. The Php3.9 Trillion Gap: Structural, Not Cyclical

VI. Inflation and the Erosion of Real Savings

VII. Fiscal Absorption, and Budget Excess

VIII. Record Public Debt Magnifies the Crowding Out

IX. Micro Signals: Consumption Recalibration (Marks and Spencer, SM Foot Traffic)

X. BSP Increases Cash Withdrawal Limits and Financial Stability

XI. External Shock Transmission: When Geopolitics Meets Structural Fragility

A. Energy and Food Inflation

B. Industrial Supply Chain Disruptions

C. OFWs, Tourism and Service Sector Exposure

D. Financial Transmission and Emerging Market Stress

XII. Strategic Vulnerability: Drift to a War Economy, Thucydides Trap Geopolitics

XIII. Systemic Shock Scenario

XIV. Conclusion: The Real Constraint: Savings Scarcity in a Volatile World 

The Php3.9 Trillion Savings-Investment Gap: How the Middle East Conflict Exposed the Philippines’ Economic Fragility 

Rising oil prices, supply chain risks, and widening external imbalances are revealing deeper structural weaknesses in savings, fiscal dynamics, and financial markets. 

The Php3.9 Trillion Savings-Investment Gap: How the Middle East Conflict Exposed the Philippines’ Economic Fragility 

I. Geopolitical Shock: Philippine Markets React 

Last week we wrote: 

For the Philippines, the combined pressures of higher oil prices, currency weakness, policy constraints, and potential remittance volatility point to heightened market volatility and widening sectoral divergence amid slowing GDP growth. This increases stagflationary and credit risks. 

The escalation of the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict triggered a sharp repricing across Philippine financial markets.


Figure 1 

  • The USD–Philippine peso reclaimed the 59 level, the BSP’s Maginot Line. 
  • Despite rescue pumps centered on International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI), the primary equity benchmark, the PSEi 30, fell by 4.4%. (Figure 1, topmost pane)
  • Worse, yields of the Philippine Treasury curve rose across maturities, drastically shifting direction from bullish to bearish steepening, reflecting a broad rise in rates. (Figure 1 , middle image) 

However, the adjustment was not uniform across maturities. 

Yields in the belly of the curve — particularly in the five-to-ten-year segment — rose the most, suggesting that investors were reassessing medium-term inflation and fiscal risks rather than short-term policy expectations. Such a pattern is consistent with a rise in the term premium, where investors demand additional compensation for holding duration amid heightened uncertainty. 

Relative pricing reinforces this interpretation. 

Philippine ten-year yields have recently risen faster than their U.S. Treasury counterparts, widening the spread between the two benchmarks. If the move were purely a global risk-off adjustment, local yields would likely mirror U.S. Treasuries. (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

Instead, the divergence suggests that global shocks are interacting with domestic vulnerabilities already embedded in the curve — including rising sovereign absorption of liquidity and persistent fiscal supply. 

In that sense, the geopolitical shock did not create the steepening dynamic; it exposed and accelerated pressures that were already forming within the Philippine yield structure. 

The Middle East conflict may therefore reveal something deeper about the Philippine economic development model — particularly the country’s persistent savings-investment gap. 

II. February Yield Curve: Fragility Already Forming 

Prior to the outbreak of the Middle East conflict, the Philippine yield curve in February already exhibited subtle signs of structural tension.


Figure 2

The curve experienced bullish steepening: short-dated yields fell sharply as markets priced policy relief, while the belly of the curve declined more modestly. Yet the longest maturities — particularly the 20- to 25-year segment — failed to rally alongside the front end. (Figure 2, topmost window) 

This divergence reflected optimism over near-term liquidity conditions but lingering skepticism over long-horizon risks. 

Investors appeared willing to price policy accommodation in the short run, while still demanding continued compensation for holding ultra-long duration amid persistent fiscal issuance and the possibility that easing could eventually translate into renewed inflation pressure. 

In short, the curve suggested that markets were optimistic about near-term liquidity but cautious about long-term stability. 

That skepticism would later prove meaningful once geopolitical risks intensified. 

III. What the Yield Curve Reflects: The Consumption of Savings 

The yield curve’s structure is ultimately a reflection of accumulating imbalances arising from the persistent consumption of savings. 

When investment chronically exceeds domestic savings, the difference must be financed through borrowing, foreign capital inflows, or monetary accommodation (financial repression/inflation tax). 

As this imbalance widens, the bond market begins to reflect the underlying funding pressure through changes in yield levels and curve structure. 

In such an environment, the yield curve becomes more than a signal of growth expectations. It becomes a barometer of the economy’s capacity to finance its own investment demand

The Philippine curve’s evolving shape therefore hints at a deeper structural issue: the scarcity of domestic savings relative to the scale of investment being pursued. 

IV. The Defective Anchor: Savings Is a Residual of GDP 

The Philippines reported a record savings-investment gap in 2025. Gross domestic savings reached Php2.35 trillion, equivalent to 8.4% of GDP, while investment reached Php 6.25 trillion, or 22.3% of GDP, resulting in a Php 3.9 trillion gap, about 5.4% higher than in 2024. (Figure 2, lower chart) 

However, the savings figure itself is derived from the GDP framework. 

Gross domestic savings is not directly observed thrift. Instead, it is calculated as: 

GDP – Final Consumption Expenditure 

This means the savings figure is fundamentally an accounting residual, not a direct measurement of household or corporate saving behavior. 

Several implications follow:

  • If GDP is overstated, savings is automatically overstated.
  • If government spending inflates GDP, savings mechanically rises — even if households are financially strained.
  • If inflation boosts nominal GDP, “savings” increases on paper without improving real financial capacity.
  • A GDP powered by debt expansion does not necessarily entail rising savings, but rather extended leveraging. 

An 8.4% savings rate does not necessarily mean households saved more. It means the national income accounting identity indicates that they did.


Figure 3

In a deficit-driven economy where public spending is elevated, GDP itself can be propped up by the very borrowing used to finance the savings-investment gap. This makes the savings measure partially endogenous to debt expansion. 

In 2025, the increase in nominal borrowing exceeded growth of nominal and real GDP! (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

In effect, the economy is using a debt-inflated denominator to measure the shortage of savings required to fund debt-driven investment. 

That circularity matters. 

V. The Php3.9 Trillion Gap: Structural, Not Cyclical 

The magnitude of the imbalance becomes clearer when the savings-investment gap is examined directly.

In 2025:

  • Savings: Php2.35 trillion
  • Investment: Php6.25 trillion
  • Gap: –Php3.90 trillion

This represents the largest gap in recent years and marks a continuation of a widening trend since 2022. 

Such an imbalance is not merely a statistical curiosity. It represents the scale of financing required from outside the domestic savings pool to sustain the country’s investment program.

When investment persistently exceeds domestic savings, the difference must be financed through: 

  • external capital inflows
  • increased public or private borrowing
  • monetary accommodation
  • or some combination of all three. 

There is no automatic equilibrium mechanism that closes such a gap organically. The imbalance can narrow only through:

  • higher real savings, lower investment,
  • or a cyclical downturn that compresses demand. 

Yet the Philippine economy is attempting to sustain an investment rate exceeding 22 percent of GDP while maintaining a single-digit domestic savings rate. 

Maintaining this configuration requires continuous financial intermediation and leverage expansion. 

In effect, investment persists even when the domestic financial base capable of supporting it remains limited. 

VI. Inflation and the Erosion of Real Savings 

Inflation dynamics further complicate the savings constraint. 

Even moderate price increases reduce the real purchasing power of the savings that households and firms are able to accumulate. When inflation is concentrated in essential expenditures—such as food, energy, and housing—the erosion of savings becomes particularly pronounced among lower- and middle-income households. 

While headline inflation may remain within official target ranges, its composition and distribution matters. Food inflation and other essential expenditures absorb a large share of household income, limiting the ability of households to build financial buffers. 

For instance, February data show that the Food CPI for the bottom 30% jumped from 0.6% to 2.2%, signaling rising pressure on the consumption basket of poorer households and foreshadowing renewed stress in hunger and self-rated poverty indicators. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

Which raises a simple question: whatever happened to the nationwide Php20 rice rollout and the MSRP regime? Or has the law of diminishing returns quietly reasserted itself? (Figure 3, lowest chart) 

These pressures are emerging even before any potential spillovers from the evolving Middle East conflict. 

This means that even if nominal savings appear stable within national accounts, the real savings available to finance domestic investment may be shrinking. 

In such an environment, the effective savings-investment gap becomes wider than what the nominal accounting framework suggests.


Figure 4

In any case, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ easing cycle has contributed to the recent acceleration in CPI, reinforcing the broader inflationary cycle. If current liquidity trends persist, these dynamics may generate a third wave of inflation cycle (as we continually forecast), which would continue to erode the real value of household savings. (Figure 4, topmost diagram) 

VII. Fiscal Absorption, and Budget Excess 

Fiscal dynamics have increasingly played a central role in bridging the savings-investment imbalance. 

Large public investment programs and persistent fiscal deficits require sustained government borrowing. As sovereign issuance expands, the state absorbs a growing share of the available liquidity within the domestic financial system. 

Another dimension of fiscal dynamics involves the difference between released budget allocations and actual spending disbursements. 

When government agencies receive funding releases ahead of actual project implementation, liquidity enters the financial system before real economic activity materializes. This can temporarily ease financial conditions even as underlying fiscal supply continues to accumulate. 

The result is a financial environment where liquidity conditions may appear accommodative in the short run while structural funding pressures continue to build beneath the surface. 

Actual 2025 spending hit Php6.49T, exceeding the Php 6.33T enacted GAA—the second-largest overrun since 2021 and the seventh straight year of excess. (Figure 4, middle graph) 

Persistent post-enactment augmentation weakens Congress’s budget authority and shifts fiscal discretion to the executive. 

Meanwhile, the Bureau of the Treasury reported a Php1.577 trillion fiscal deficit in 2025—third widest in history, as government expenditures reached a record Php6.03 trillion while revenues totaled Php4.453 trillion. (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

The Php 6.49 trillion represents total allotments released—spending authority exercised during the year—while the Php6.03 trillion reflects actual cash disbursements recorded by Treasury. Allotments and cash outflows do not perfectly align due to timing lags, multi-year obligations, and accounting adjustments. Both figures are valid, but they measure different stages of fiscal execution. 

VIII. Record Public Debt Magnifies the Crowding Out 

Public debt dynamics reinforce this absorption effect.


Figure 5 

As fiscal deficits accumulate, the government must continuously refinance maturing obligations while issuing additional securities to fund new borrowing requirements. This process steadily expands the sovereign’s claim on domestic and external savings pools. (Figure 5, topmost window) 

Recent data from the Bureau of the Treasury show that national government debt continued to climb in January 2026 to reach a record Php 18.134 trillion, reflecting the cumulative impact of sustained fiscal deficits, elevated interest costs, and ongoing borrowing to finance development programs. The rate of debt growth has steadily been rising since 2023. (Figure 5, middle image) 

While debt expansion can support public investment in the near term, it simultaneously increases the financial system’s exposure to sovereign credit and interest-rate risk

Rising debt levels therefore deepen the interaction between fiscal policy and domestic liquidity conditions. As government securities issuance expands, banks, pension funds, and institutional investors allocate a larger share of their portfolios to sovereign instruments, potentially crowding out private sector credit over time 

The Bank’s net claims on the central government spiked to a record Php 6.135 trillion in December 2025—equivalent to about 35% of outstanding government debt now effectively monetized by the banking system. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

Nonetheless, treasury markets often register these pressures first, particularly through changes in the term structure of interest rates. 

IX. Micro Signals: Consumption Recalibration (Marks and Spencer, SM Foot Traffic) 

Macroeconomic imbalances often surface first in microeconomic behavior. 

Recent developments in Philippine retail illustrate subtle shifts in consumption patterns. 

The recalibration of operations by international retailers such as Marks & Spencer (M&S) suggests increasing sensitivity of discretionary spending to economic conditions. 

Premium and mid-tier consumption categories are typically among the earliest segments to reflect shifts in household purchasing power. When real income growth slows or financial buffers weaken, consumers tend to prioritize essential spending while reducing discretionary purchases. 

The cautionary signal from M&S is reinforced by declining mall activity reported by SM Prime Holdings, with foot traffic in SM Supermalls reportedly falling by roughly 26 percent (from a record 1.9 billion visitors in 2024 to 1.4 billion in 2025. This coincides with a moderation in per-capita GDP growth, which slowed to 2.9 percent in the fourth quarter and 3.7 percent for 2025. 

Supermarket operators have likewise reported weaker-than-expected demand, alongside signs of customer migration toward lower-priced distributors and wholesalers. These developments have also been attributed partly to the impact of recent minimum-wage adjustments, which may be affecting both consumer purchasing patterns and retail cost structures.


Figure 6

At the same time, the recent softness in per-capita household income growth has been accompanied by plateauing credit expansion among universal banks and a gradual easing in employment growth. (Figure 6, upper and lower graphs) 

Taken together, these indicators point to deepening signs of demand-side fatigue and raise the possibility of emerging stagflationary pressures. 

The pattern suggests sustained compression in consumption velocity and discretionary elasticity—conditions under which portfolio recalibration, such as M&S’s operational adjustments, becomes economically rational. 

Such responses are consistent with an economic environment where investment remains elevated while fiscal expansion absorbs a significant share of domestic resources (crowding out effect). In this context, increasingly leveraged balance sheets may constrain income generation and limit the capacity for household savings formation. 

In this sense, retail recalibration may represent a microeconomic reflection of the broader macroeconomic imbalance. 

X. BSP Increases Cash Withdrawal Limits and Financial Stability 

As the savings–investment imbalance widens, maintaining financial stability increasingly depends on liquidity management. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ increase of the AML cash-withdrawal trigger from Php500,000 to Php1 million illustrates how regulatory measures—aimed at curbing corruption—interact with liquidity conditions in a system where domestic savings alone cannot fully support investment. 

When access to deposits is subject to thresholds or enhanced monitoring, behavior adjusts. Firms stagger transactions, households hoard cash, and informal channels gain marginal attractiveness. The earlier Php 500,000 threshold already intersected routine commercial flows, so even small frictions can influence normal business activity. Raising the trigger reflects calibration, signaling awareness that liquidity behavior matters for stability. 

External shocks further expose structural constraints. Rising energy prices or currency pressures reveal the fragility of a growth model reliant on debt-financed investment amid limited domestic savings. In this environment, regulatory calibration becomes a recurring feature of financial governance, shaping behavior at the margins and influencing the circulation of money in the economy. 

Legal definitions may distinguish between “capital controls” and “AML thresholds,” but economic agents respond to function, not classification. If large withdrawals attract friction, delay, or reputational risk, behavior adjusts. Firms stagger transactions. Households pre‑emptively hoard cash. Informal channels gain marginal attractiveness. Velocity softens at the edges. Such policy creates forced trade‑offs in the use of private property. 

Freedom conditioned by compliance is still freedom altered. In functional terms, the BSP withdrawal cap operates as a form of capital control—an indirect restraint on liquidity mobility, justified under the banner of anti‑money laundering. 

The label may differ, but the effect is the same: liquidity is managed not only by market forces but by regulatory thresholds that redefine how money circulates. 

XI. External Shock Transmission: When Geopolitics Meets Structural Fragility 

The Middle East conflict introduces several transmission channels that could amplify the Philippines’ already fragile savings-investment balance. 

Note: In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, the factors outlined above represent only the “seen” or visible channels and their immediate second-order effects. Should the current disorder persist, the transmission mechanisms could extend far beyond this list, propagating through indirect and more diffuse channels that would require a far more exhaustive examination. Even so, the initial escalation of the Middle East conflict is already significant enough to expose underlying imbalances—both domestically and across the global economy. 

A. Energy and Food Inflation 

The Philippines remains heavily dependent on imported energy. A sustained rise in oil prices resulting from instability in the Middle East could increase transportation and production costs across the economy. 

Higher energy prices often translate into food inflation, as logistics, fertilizer costs, and agricultural inputs become more expensive. Because food accounts for a significant share of household expenditure (34.78% in BSP/PSA CPI basket), rising prices reduce the ability of households to accumulate savings. 

In an economy already characterized by limited domestic savings, such inflationary pressures further weaken the financial base—via weakened savings structure—needed to support investment.

B. Industrial Supply Chain Disruptions 

A broader regional conflict could also disrupt global supply chains. 

Industrial inputs, shipping routes, and energy supply lines connecting Asia, Europe, and the Middle East could face delays or increased insurance costs. These disruptions would raise production costs and freight rates, placing additional pressure on import-dependent economies like the Philippines. 

Higher freight costs translate directly into higher import prices, reinforcing inflationary pressures and worsening the country’s trade balance. 

C. OFWs, Tourism and Service Sector Exposure 

Geopolitical instability can affect the Philippines through multiple channels, including overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), travel flows, and tourism confidence.


Figure 7

The country’s reliance on remittances, particularly from the Middle East, creates potential vulnerability: any disruption to regional labor markets could reduce household income and weaken domestic consumption. 

OFW personal and cash remittances grew 3.3% in 2025, marginally above 3% in 2024, but both continue a gradual slowdown in growth since 2010, consistent with diminishing returns. Nevertheless, nominal inflows reached record levels of $39.6 billion (personal) and $35.6 billion (cash). (Figure 7, topmost pane) 

Even though the Philippines is not near the conflict zone, global travel demand often declines during periods of geopolitical uncertainty. 

A slowdown in tourism receipts would reduce foreign exchange inflows and weaken service-sector revenues

Combined with rising energy import costs, lower remittances and tourism earnings could widen the current account deficit, exposing the economy to external shocks

After a significant statistical revision, foreign tourist arrivals shifted from contraction to growth. Foreign arrivals rose 9.2% in 2025, up from 8.7% in 2024, while total arrivals including overseas Filipinos increased 9%, slightly below the 9.2% growth recorded in 2024. Gross arrivals reached 5.9 million, exceeding 2016 levels. (Figure 7, middle graph) 

The Philippines is considered particularly vulnerable to oil price shocks due to its deficit channel, highlighting how geopolitical events can amplify existing structural imbalances in income, savings, and external liquidity. 

Philippine Balance of Payments BoP deficits have accumulated since 2014, broadly coinciding with the increasing share of government spending in GDP. The pandemic recession amplified this trend. In 2025, the BoP recorded a $5.6 billion deficit, the second-largest shortfall since 2022. (Figure 7, lowest chart) 

D. Financial Transmission and Emerging Market Stress 

Financial markets represent another channel through which geopolitical shocks propagate. 

Periods of global uncertainty often push investors toward safe-haven assets such as U.S. Treasuries, US dollar and gold. For emerging markets with structural savings deficits, this shift can lead to tighter financial conditions

Rising global yields and capital outflows can trigger margin calls, balance sheet adjustments, and risk repricing across emerging market debt markets

Countries relying heavily on external financing to sustain investment programs may therefore face increasing borrowing costs or reduced access to capital. 

XII. Strategic Vulnerability: Drift to a War Economy, Thucydides Trap Geopolitics 

The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States also introduces geopolitical considerations. 

The presence of nine U.S. military facilities across several Philippine locations under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement places the country within the broader regional security architecture of the United States. 

In the event that a regional conflict expands beyond the Middle East into a broader geopolitical confrontation, these installations could increase the Philippines’ exposure to geopolitical risk and economic disruption. 

Since the outbreak of the U.S.–Israel–Iran war, U.S. bases in the Middle East have repeatedly become targets of attacks or retaliatory strikes—underscoring how overseas installations can act as magnets for escalation during conflict.


Figure 8

Since the outbreak of the US–Israel–Iran conflict, energy markets appear to be pricing a more prolonged confrontation. Both Brent Crude and West Texas Intermediate have climbed above $90 per barrel (as of March 6th), lifting coal and European natural gas prices and signaling expectations of sustained disruption rather than a short-lived shock. 

The energy price surge suggests that Iran retains the ability to impose meaningful costs on United States and Israel operations—contrary to earlier mainstream assumptions of a swift resolution. 

Combined with Donald Trump’s demand for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” the probability of a protracted confrontation rises, with potentially serious consequences for global markets. 

More broadly, the conflict may reflect a deeper structural shift toward the militarization (Bushido/Sparta) of the global economy (previously discussed)—a transition toward what could be described as a modern war economy. 

Intensifying strategic rivalry between major powers increasingly resembles the dynamics described in the Thucydides Trap, where rising and established powers enter periods of heightened confrontation. 

In this context, several entwined structural forces may be reinforcing the escalation dynamic: 

  • the neoconservatives, dogmatic practitioners of strategic hegemonic doctrines such as the Wolfowitz Doctrine,
  • the deepening influence of the military-industrial complex first warned about by Dwight D. Eisenhower,
  • the geopolitical influence of lobbying organizations such as American Israel Public Affairs Committee, to promote Greater Israel and
  • the role of ultra-loose monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in facilitating large-scale deficit spending, funding military expenditures. 

Taken together, these forces—what might be described metaphorically as the “four horsemen” of the deepening war economy—risk reinforcing a cycle in which expanding military spending, protectionism, and the weaponization of finance and energy reshape the global economic order. 

If sustained, such dynamics could crowd out productive investment, deepen geopolitical fragmentation, and increase the probability that regional conflicts evolve into broader geopolitical confrontation—World War III—alongside rising risks of financial instability. 

XIII. Systemic Shock Scenario 

Taken together, these channels illustrate how a regional conflict could evolve into a broader systemic shock. 

Energy markets, global supply chains, financial markets, remittances and tourism flows are deeply interconnected. A prolonged conflict could therefore produce cascading effects across trade, inflation, capital flows, and financial stability. 

For economies with strong domestic savings buffers, such shocks can often be absorbed through internal financing capacity. 

For economies operating with a persistent savings-investment gap, however, external disturbances can rapidly translate into currency pressure, rising yields, and financial volatility. 

The Middle East conflict did not create the Philippines’ structural vulnerabilities. 

But by simultaneously pressuring energy prices, supply chains, capital flows, and financial markets, it may reveal the limits of an economic model that relies on debt-financed investment amid chronically weak domestic savings

XIV. Conclusion: The Real Constraint: Savings Scarcity in a Volatile World 

The escalation of the Middle East conflict ultimately highlights a deeper structural reality confronting the Philippine economy. 

Statistics record the past, but the savings–investment gap is inherently forward-looking. Investment decisions occur ex-ante, while national accounts measure the results only after the fact. 

The Philippines is attempting to sustain an IDEOLOGICAL development premise in which investment spending remains substantially above the domestic savings rate the economy generates. The resulting imbalance must therefore be continuously bridged through higher taxation, expanding public debt (and thus higher future taxes), financial repression through inflation, or reliance on external capital flows. 

Such a structure can function during periods of easy global liquidity and relative geopolitical stability. But it becomes increasingly fragile when conditions shift—whether through rising energy prices, supply chain disruptions, tightening financial conditions, or other manifestations of unsustainable economic dynamics (external or internal). 

In that environment, the true constraint on economic expansion is no longer the willingness to invest, but the availability of real savings capable of financing that investment without destabilizing the financial system. 

The Middle East conflict did not create this imbalance. 

It merely revealed how narrow the Philippines’ margin of financial stability may already be. 

_____ 

Selected References 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Liquidity at the Top: The PSEi 30’s Two-Months Rally Meets Structural Fragility Amid Middle East War Risks, Substack March 01, 2026 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, PSE Divergence Confirmed — The September Breakout That Redefined Philippine Mining in the Age of Fiat Disorder Substack October 08, 2025


Sunday, February 15, 2026

Liquidity Without Output II: The Philippine Banking System Under Late-Cycle Containment

 

If you depreciate the money, it makes everything look like it’s going up – Ray Dalio 

In this issue: 

Liquidity Without Output II: The Philippine Banking System Under Late-Cycle Containment

I. Nota Bene—Data Revision and Structural Divergence

II. Acceleration Without Circulation; Containment and Redistribution

IIA. When Banks Absorb What the Economy Will Not

IIB. Rising Monetary Aggregates, Mounting Systemic Leverage

IIC. Fiscal Backstopping at Pandemic Scale, Financial Market Signals: Liquidity Without Conviction

IID. Peso Dynamics: Stability Through Management; MAS vs. DCS: Divergence as Structural Signal

III. The Wile E. Coyote Phase: Optics in Motion

IIIA. Broad-Based Plateauing Across Core Sectors

IIIB. Liquidity Redirected, Not Transmitted

IIIC. The NPL Paradox

IIID. Duration Losses Surface First

IIIE. The Redistribution of Strain

IIIF. Reserve Cuts: Policy Choreography in Motion

IIIG. Late-Cycle Containment

IIIH. Concentration, Price Discovery, and Balance-Sheet Feedback

IV. Conclusion Regime Recognition: Liquidity as Containment, Not Expansion 

Liquidity Without Output II: The Philippine Banking System Under Late-Cycle Containment 

Stability by Refinancing: The Philippine Banking System Under Containment 

I. Nota Bene—Data Revision and Structural Divergence 

The BSP revised December’s currency-in-circulation growth from 17.7% to 6.4%. This does not alter the central observation: liquidity creation at the monetary authority level continues to exceed the pace of circulation in the broader economy, which highlights the opacity of late-cycle aggregates. The argument herein rests on persistent balance-sheet divergence, or that stability is maintained through optics rather than fundamentals. 

II. Acceleration Without Circulation; Containment and Redistribution

IIA. When Banks Absorb What the Economy Will Not 

Liquidity is not only rising — it is accelerating again. Money supply is trending higher. Policy rates have been cut. Reserve requirements have been reduced. Deficit spending has widened toward levels last seen during the pandemic. Yet GDP growth has slowed markedly: Q4 2025 expanded just ~3 percent year-on-year, bringing the full-year growth to ~4.4 percent, the slowest post-pandemic pace outside the crisis period. 

When liquidity expands as output contracts, the question is no longer about stimulus. It is about containment — and about who ultimately absorbs the risk.

Figure 1

In our previous post, we noted that the BSP’s currency issuance — or currency in circulation on the central bank’s books — surged by initially reported ~17.7 percent in December to a historic Php 3.205 trillion (Php 2.897 trillion revised).  (Figure 1, topmost and middle charts) 

In the same month, however, currency outside depository corporations — the stock of cash actually held by the public — grew only ~6.6 percent to Php 2.522 trillion. The gap between issuance (as captured in the Monetary Authorities Survey) and circulation outside banks (as captured in the Depository Corporations Survey) is the widest on record. 

This unprecedented growth differential signals a breakdown in monetary transmission. Liquidity is being created at the central bank level, yet it is not translating into proportional expansion of cash held by the public. Instead, it is accumulating within the banking and sovereign balance-sheet perimeter. 

IIB. Rising Monetary Aggregates, Mounting Systemic Leverage 

Despite the revision, broad money and financial system leverage metrics have pivoted higher. (Figure 1, lowest image) 

Monetary aggregates (M1 and M2) and domestic claims relative to GDP moved back up in Q4, reaching roughly 70.4 percent, 71.8 percent, and 80.6 percent, respectively — levels consistent with tighter financial balance-sheet conditions. 

Domestic claims, which include net claims on the central government (NCoCG) and claims on other sectors, broadly measure credit leverage within the financial system. 

In 2025, lending to the government accounted for ~27.2 percent of total claims (slightly higher than in 2024), while lending to the private sector was ~72.8 percent (slightly lower than in 2024), even as overall claims rose ~10 percent YoY and M1/M2/M3 expanded by 7.1 percent, 7.5 percent, and 7 percent YoY, respectively. 

IIC. Fiscal Backstopping at Pandemic Scale, Financial Market Signals: Liquidity Without Conviction 

Fiscal metrics underscore the scale of backstopping. As of end-November 2025, the national government’s budget deficit reached ~Php 1.26 trillion for the first eleven months — second only to the pandemic year 2020 on a cumulative basis, and representing ~81 percent of the government’s full-year Php 1.56 trillion target. Total revenues rose modestly, while expenditures continued to outpace them, driving the gap. 

Figure 2 

The impact of accelerating liquidity is increasingly visible in financial markets

The PSEi 30 has rallied alongside higher turnover despite slowing GDP, while the yield curve has steepened at the front even as long-end yields remain elevated — suggesting that liquidity is facilitating issuance absorption and duration risk transfer rather than signaling stronger real-economy prospects.  PSE & PSEi chart data based on original MAS data. (Figure 2, topmost and second to the highest windows) 

Philippine Treasury market turnover reached record levels in 2025. But volume alone is an incomplete signal of improved confidence. High turnover can reflect repositioning, dealer balance-sheet management, policy alignment, geopolitical shock absorption, or constrained domestic savings with limited real-economy outlets. (Figure 2, second to the lowest image) 

The curve matters more than the prints: its slope embeds term premium, duration appetite, and credibility. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

If confidence were broad-based and durable, normalization would occur across tenors. Instead, activity remains selective, slopes unstable, and duration demand cautious—liquidity without conviction. 

Across equities, fixed income, and foreign exchange, the pattern is consistent: liquidity is sustaining financial asset turnover while real-economy transmission weakens 

IID. Peso Dynamics: Stability Through Management; MAS vs. DCS: Divergence as Structural Signal 

The peso tells a similar story. Periodic strength has coincided with weak-dollar phases and sovereign borrowing inflows, yet the underlying savings–investment gap and elevated fiscal financing requirements continue to exert structural pressure

The Philippine government raised approximately USD 2.75 billion from global capital markets in January. 

Over the past weeks, USD/PHP has fallen from its record highs to test the 58 level. 

Exchange-rate stability appears less a reflection of external balance improvement than of active liquidity management and capital flow support. 

A key structural signal lies in the growing divergence between the BSP’s Monetary and Financial Statistics (MAS) and the Depository Corporations Survey (DCS). The MAS consolidates the central bank’s balance sheet plus the national government’s monetary accounts, including direct currency issuance and central bank operations. The DCS, by contrast, consolidates the balance sheets of the BSP and all other deposit-taking institutions (commercial banks, thrift banks, rural banks, etc.), presenting money supply and credit aggregates after eliminating intra-system holdings. This methodological difference means the MAS can register rapid currency issuance that does not immediately appear in the broader economy’s cash circulation as captured by the DCS — a gap that has rarely been this wide. 

This divergence — excess monetary creation not translating into commensurate growth in broad money or real economic activity — reflects a balance-sheet recession dynamic, where traditional monetary accommodation fails to circulate through productive economic channels. 

As banks and firms prioritize balance-sheet repair over fresh productive lending, excess liquidity remains trapped within the financial system. Consistent with Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and Richard Koo’s balance-sheet recession framework, monetary accommodation increasingly sustains asset turnover and duration/risk transfer rather than output, employment, or external balance improvement. 

III. The Wile E. Coyote Phase: Optics in Motion 

December’s banking data do not depict stabilization. They depict redistribution. 

Slower lending growth emerged despite a string of interest rate cuts — a development even the mainstream press finally acknowledged. 

Universal and commercial bank lending (net of repos) rose 9.2% year-on-year in December — the softest expansion since February 2024’s 8.6%. 

The news pointed to a 5.4% contraction in lending to construction firms, attributing the slowdown to reduced public spending. But construction represents only 3.7% of total bank exposure. It cannot explain system-wide deceleration. 

The drivers were broader — and deeper. 

IIIA. Broad-Based Plateauing Across Core Sectors 

Three major sectors — accounting for roughly 42% of total bank portfolios — drove the slowdown. 

  • Manufacturing (8.6% share) contracted 9.43% year-on-year in December, its seventh consecutive monthly decline and the second-deepest contraction since September 2025’s 10.44% drop. 
  • Real estate (≈20% share) — the system’s largest borrower — slowed to 8.3% growth, its weakest pace since October 2023. 
  • Consumer lending (13.5% share) — previously the fastest-growing segment — decelerated to 21.4%, the slowest since September 2022. This follows an extraordinary 33-month streak of growth exceeding 22%. 

This is not marginal noise.

Figure 3

Credit expansion appears to be plateauing across its core engines, as bank lending to both the production sector and households shows signs of inflection. (Figure 3, topmost pane) 

Meanwhile, GDP growth has slowed for two consecutive quarters — from 3.95% in Q3 to 3% in Q4. (Figure 3, middle image) 

Rate cuts were marketed as stimulus. Yet lending momentum peaked as output weakened. 

IIIB. Liquidity Redirected, Not Transmitted 

As lending to the general economy softened, activity within the financial system intensified.

Interbank lending and reverse repurchase transactions (with both the BSP and other banks) surged toward milestone highs. (Figure 3, lowest graph)

Figure 4

Bank borrowings from capital markets jumped 17.3% to an all-time high of Php 1.96 trillion, largely reflecting bond positioning. Bills payable also rose to one of the highest levels on record. (Figure 4, top and second to the highest images) 

Net claims on the central government increased 10.8% to a fresh record of Php 6.135 trillion. Duration exposure deepened. (Figure 4, second to the lowest diagram) 

Yet Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities increased only modestly (+1.2% YoY), despite the BSP’s reclassification of these instruments under “debt securities net of amortization.” 

Risk did not disappear — it moved.

Despite liquidity injections, bank cash balances contracted 19.5% year-on-year in December.

Cash-to-deposit and liquid-asset-to-deposit ratios improved slightly but remain strategically low. (Figure 4, lowest visual) 

System liquidity appears abundant in headline aggregates. 

At the transactional margin, it is thin.

IIIC. The NPL Paradox

Figure 5 

Non-performing loans had been rising alongside slowing GDP through Q3. 

In November, they softened modestly. In December, they fell sharply. (Figure 5, topmost and middle graphs) 

Gross NPLs declined in peso terms — not merely as a ratio effect — even as output had weakened for two consecutive quarters. While year-end charge-offs, restructurings, and classification adjustments can produce seasonal improvements, the magnitude of the drop contrasts with deteriorating macro conditions. 

Either borrowers experienced an abrupt recovery amid a slowdown — or recognition dynamics shifted. 

There are only a handful of mechanical pathways through which NPL ratios decline in such an environment:

  • Restructurings
  • Charge-offs
  • Denominator expansion
  • Regulatory relief
  • Classification effects 

The burden of proof shifts to fundamentals. 

IIID. Duration Losses Surface First 

While credit metrics improved optically, market losses intensified. 

In December, Available-for-Sale (AFS) securities expanded 22% and now account for roughly 45% of financial assets, rapidly approaching Held-to-Maturity’s 48% share. (Figure 5, lowest chart)

Figure 6

Despite generally easing Treasury yields, financial investment (accumulated) losses surged in December from Php 1.98 billion in November to Php 20.16 billion. (Figure 6, topmost pane) 

For Q4, losses on financial assets reached Php 42.396 billion — the third consecutive quarter exceeding Php 40 billion — levels previously seen only during the pandemic recession. (Figure 6, middle diagram) 

Full-year 2025 financial asset losses totaled Php 159.7 billion, materially weighing on profitability. Banking system net income growth slowed sharply: Q4 net income declined 0.78% year-on-year, while full-year 2025 profit growth decelerated to 3%, down from 9.8% in 2024. 

From Q3 to Q4, return on assets (ROA) decreased from 1.46% to 1.41%, and return on equity (ROE) declined from 11.71% to 11.46%, suggesting both measures may be beginning to trend downward. (Figure 6, lowest chart) 

The pressure came less from exploding credit costs than from market volatility. This is not synchronized improvement. It is stress migration.

IIIE. The Redistribution of Strain 

When securities losses rise, repo dependence increases, sovereign absorption intensifies, liquidity buffers remain fragile — yet NPL metrics improve abruptly — the pattern is not stabilization.

It is reallocation. 

Late-cycle systems often preserve surface calm by shifting where strain appears:

  • Duration losses surface before credit losses.
  • Market volatility compresses earnings before defaults spike.
  • Provisioning pressure eases as classifications adjust.
  • Headline ratios improve even as balance sheets stretch. 

This is the AFS Wile E. Coyote dynamic accelerating. The system appears suspended — supported by liquidity, refinancing structures, sovereign absorption, and accounting elasticity — even as underlying cash-flow conditions soften. 

Stability is maintained through motion, not repair.

IIIF. Reserve Cuts: Policy Choreography in Motion 

In February 2026, the BSP cut reserve requirements across bank-issued bonds, mortgage instruments, and trust accounts. Reserves on bonds fell from 3% to 2% for universal and commercial banks; thrift banks saw their 6% requirement scrapped; long-term negotiable deposits lost their 4% ratio; and most strikingly, trust and fiduciary accounts dropped to zero from double-digit levels. 

The BSP framed the move as liquidity-neutral, but the timing betrays intent: this was balance-sheet relief, not growth. Banks absorbing securities losses, repo dependence, and sovereign absorption were granted regulatory breathing room. 

This is choreography, not repair. Reserve cuts thin liquidity buffers to ease optics, shifting fragility from bank balance sheets into the broader system. Once again, containment through redistribution, not stabilization. 

IIIG. Late-Cycle Containment 

This pattern aligns with Minsky’s late-cycle stabilization phase: fragility becomes politically and financially intolerable, prompting increasingly active management of volatility and balance-sheet optics. Stability is no longer organic — it is administered. 

It also echoes Kindleberger’s late-cycle dynamics, where imbalances are contained and recognition deferred. Transparency thins. Risk redistributes. The system appears calm — until price signals overwhelm narrative control. 

It resembles Kornai’s soft-budget constraint dynamic: losses are socialized, recognition deferred, discipline diluted. 

The system is being managed. 

But when liquidity sustains refinancing more than output, when duration risk migrates faster than credit risk, and when monetary aggregates expand faster than money circulating in the real economy, the adjustment rarely announces itself through ratios.  

It accumulates quietly on balance sheets. Then it emerges through prices — often abruptly. 

And economics does not yield to optics.  

IIIH. Concentration, Price Discovery, and Balance-Sheet Feedback

Figure 7

The Philippine financial system is highly concentrated. Banks control roughly 83.1% of total financial assets, with universal and commercial banks accounting for about 77.4% (as of December 2025). (Figure 7, upper chart) 

At the same time, the PSEi 30 is itself concentrated in a handful of large-cap names. 

Since 2024, the top five heavyweights have accounted for over 50% of the index weight. This concentration has been led by ICTSI, which not only surpassed former leader SM Investments but, through a string of record highs, has pushed its weight in the PSEi 30 to over 18%— a single issue now accounts for nearly one-fifth of the headline index’s performance! (Figure 7, lower graph) 

In such an environment, late-session flows (“afternoon delight” or “pre-closing” activity) into a small number of index-heavy stocks can have disproportionate effects on headline market performance. Whether driven by liquidity management, portfolio rebalancing, balance-sheet considerations, or index performance objectives, this clustering of activity near the close raises questions about the quality and integrity of price discovery. 

This is not merely a capital markets issue. 

When asset prices become reference points for macro stability—and when large financial institutions sit at the center of both credit creation and market intermediation—price management, volatility smoothing, and liquidity containment can feed back into balance sheets. 

The result is a reflexive loop: 

  • Market stabilization supports balance-sheet optics.
  • Balance-sheet stability reinforces the narrative of macro resilience.

But when stabilization becomes a policy objective—whether in equity indices, exchange rates, or the yield curve—intertemporal trade-offs accumulate. 

Those trade-offs do not disappear. They re-emerge in funding structures, duration exposure, and income volatility—and ultimately in market volatility. 

IV. Conclusion Regime Recognition: Liquidity as Containment, Not Expansion 

What we are observing is not a conventional stimulus cycle. It is a containment cycle. 

  • Liquidity is growing — but circulation is narrowing.
  • Credit is refinancing — but not compounding productive output.
  • Market turnover is rising — even as real growth decelerates. 

This is consistent with the balance-sheet recession dynamic outlined previously: private sector caution meets public sector duration absorption, while monetary aggregates expand within the institutional perimeter. 

In such a regime, risk does not disappear. It migrates. 

  • Credit risk becomes duration risk.
  • NPL ratios improve through denominator expansion.
  • Volatility compresses through active management. 

But arithmetic remains.

When liquidity sustains rollover more than real investment, growth slows even as balance sheets expand. And when duration risk concentrates faster than income growth, the system becomes increasingly sensitive to price signals rather than flow indicators. 

The adjustment, when it comes, is rarely triggered by one dramatic data release. It emerges when price discovery outpaces narrative control

That is late-cycle dynamics. 

Policy stimulus eventually fails not because liquidity stops expanding — but because the real capital base can no longer validate the financial claims built upon it. 

Narratives may shape perception, but only economics compounds 

____

Reference: 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Liquidity Without Output: The Balance-Sheet Recession Behind the Philippines’ Q4 and 2025 GDP Slowdown, Substack, February 08, 2026