Showing posts with label capital controls. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capital controls. Show all posts

Sunday, October 12, 2025

The BSP’s Seventh Rate Cut, the Goldilocks Delusion, and Technocracy in Crisis

 

Economic interventionism is a self-defeating policy. The individual measures that it applies do not achieve the results sought. They bring about a state of affairs, which—from the viewpoint of its advocates themselves—is much more undesirable than the previous state they intended to alter—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

The BSP’s Seventh Rate Cut, the Goldilocks Delusion, and Technocracy in Crisis

I. The Goldilocks Delusion: Rate Cuts as Ritual

II. Cui Bono: Government as the Primary Beneficiary

III. Wile E. Coyote Finance: The Race Between Bank Credit Expansion and the NPL Surge

IV. Minsky’s Warning: Fragility Beneath the Easing

V. Concentration and Contagion, The Exclusion of Inclusion: MSMEs and the Elite Credit Divide

VI. A Demand-Driven CPI? BSP’s Quiet Admission: Demand Weakness Behind Low Inflation

VII. Employment at the Edge of Fiction: Volatility, Illusion, and Structural Decay

VIII. The War on Cash and the Politics of Liquidity

IX. The War on Cash Disguised as Corruption Control

X. From Cash Limits to Systemic Liquidity Locks

XI. The Liquidity Containment Playbook and the Architecture of Control

XII. Curve-Shaping and Fiscal Extraction

XIII. When Discretion Becomes Doctrine: From Institutional Venality to Kindleberger’s Signpost

XIV. Conclusion: The Technocrat’s Mirage: Goldilocks Confronts the Knowledge Problem and Goodhart’s Law 

The BSP’s Seventh Rate Cut, the Goldilocks Delusion, and Technocracy in Crisis 

From rate cuts to cash caps: how the BSP’s containment playbook reshapes power and fragility in the Philippine economy

I. The Goldilocks Delusion: Rate Cuts as Ritual 

In delivering its “surprise” seventh rate cut for this August 2024 episode of its easing cycle, the BSP chief justified their decision on four grounds

  • 1 Outlook for growth has softened in the near term
  • 2 Growth was weaker because demand is weaker. This, in turn, is why inflation is low
  • 3 Governance concerns on public infrastructure spending have weighed on business sentiment
  • 4 “We’re still refining our estimates. We had thought that our Goldilocks policy rate was closer to 5 percent, now it’s closer to 4 percent. So we have to decide where we really are between 5 percent and 4 percent.” 

For a supposedly data-dependent political-monetary institution, the BSP never seems to ask whether rate cuts have delivered the intended results—or why they haven’t. The rate-cut logic rests on a single pillar: the belief that spending alone drives growth. 

In reality, the BSP’s spree of rate and reserve cuts, signaling channels, and relief measures has produced a weaker, more fragile economy.


Figure 1

GDP rates have been declining since at least 2012, alongside the BSP’s ON RRP rates. Yet none of this is explained by media or institutional experts. These ‘signal channeling’ tactics are designed for the public to unquestioningly accept official explanations. (Figure 1, upper chart) 

II. Cui Bono: Government as the Primary Beneficiary 

Second, cui bono—who benefits most from rate cuts? 

The biggest borrower is the government. Its historic deficit spending spree hit an all-time high in 1H 2025, reaching a direct 16.71% share of GDP. This is supported by the second-highest debt level in history—ballooning to Php 17.468 trillion in August 2025—and with it, surging debt servicing costs. (Figure 1, lower window) 

As explained in our early October post: 

  • More debt more servicing less for everything else
  • Crowding out hits both public and private spending
  • Revenue gains won’t keep up with servicing
  • Inflation and peso depreciation risks climb
  • Higher taxes are on the horizon 

The likely effect of headline “governance concerns” and BSP’s liquidity containment measures—via capital and regulatory controls—is a material slowdown in government spending. In an economy increasingly dependent on deficit outlays, this amplifies what the BSP chief calls a “demand slowdown.” 

In truth, the causality runs backward: public spending crowding out and malinvestments cause weak demand. 

III. Wile E. Coyote Finance: The Race Between Bank Credit Expansion and the NPL Surge 

Banks are the second biggest beneficiaries. Yet paradoxically, despite the BSP’s easing cycle, the growth rate of bank lending appears to have hit a wall.

Figure 2

Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) surged to a record Php 550 billion up from 5.4% in July to 7.3% in August. (Figure 2, topmost image)

Because lending growth materially slowed from 11% to 9.9% over the same period, the gross NPL ratio rose from 3.4% to 3.5%—the highest since November 2024. This is the Wile E. Coyote moment: credit velocity stalls and NPL gravity takes hold. 

As we noted in September: 

“Needless to say, whether in response to BSP policy or escalating balance sheet stress, banks may begin pulling back on credit—unveiling the Wile E. Coyote moment, where velocity stalls and gravity takes hold.” 

Even BSP’s own data confirms that the past rate cuts have barely permeated average bank lending rates. As of July 2025, these stood at 8.17%—still comparable to levels when BSP rates were at their peak (8.23% in August 2024). The blunting of policy transmission reveals deep internal imbalances. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

Production loans (9.8%) signaled the slowdown in lending, while consumer loans (23.4%) continued to sizzle in August. The share of consumer loans reached a historic 15.5% (excluding real estate loans). (Figure 2, lowest visual) 

IV. Minsky’s Warning: Fragility Beneath the Easing 

The BSP’s admission that the economy has softened translates to likely more NPLs and an accelerating cycle of loan refinancing. Whether on the consumer or supply side, this incentivizes rate cuts to delay a reckoning 

From Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, this deepens the drift toward Ponzi finance: insufficient cash flows from operations prompt recycling of loans and asset sales to fund mounting liabilities. (see Reference)


Figure 3

As major borrowers, lower rates also benefit banks’ own borrowing sprees. While banks trimmed their August bond and bill issuances (-0.79% YoY, -3.7% MoM, share down from 6.52% to 6.3%), both growth rates and shares remain on an uptrend. (Figure 3, topmost graph) 

The slowdown in bank borrowing stems from drawdowns from BSP accounts—justified by recent reserve rate ratio (RRR) cuts. BSP’s MAS reported a Php 242 billion bounce in liabilities to Other Depository Corporations (ODC) in August, reaching Php 898.99 billion. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

Ultimately, the seventh rate cut—deepening the easing cycle—is designed to keep credit velocity ahead of the NPL surge, hoping to stall the reckoning or spark productivity-led credit expansion. Growth theater masks the real dynamics. 

Rate cuts today are less about the economy and more about survival management within the financial system. 

V. Concentration and Contagion, The Exclusion of Inclusion: MSMEs and the Elite Credit Divide 

MSME lending—the most vital segment—continues to wane. Its share of total bank lending fell to a paltry 4.6% in Q2, the lowest since 2009. Ironically, MSME lending even requires a mandate. BSP easing has little impact here. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Some borrowers engage in wholesale lending or microfinancing—borrowing from banks to relend to SMEs. But if average bank lending rates haven’t come down, why would this segment benefit? 

Informal lenders, who fill the gap left by banks, absorb this risk—keeping rates sticky, as in the case of 5-6 lending

If lending to MSMEs remains negligible, who are the real beneficiaries of bank credit?

The answer: elite-owned, politically connected conglomerates.


Figure 4

In 1H 2025, borrowings of the 26 non-financial PSEi members reached a record Php 5.95 trillion—up Php 423.2 billion YoY, or 7.7%. That’s about 16.92% of total financial resources (TFR) as of June 2025. Bills Payable of the PSEi 30’s 4 banks jumped 64.55% YoY to P 859.7 billion. (Figure 4, topmost graph) 

This concentration is reflected in total financial resources/assets: Philippine banks, especially universal-commercial banks, hold 82.7% and 77.1% of total assets respectively as of July. 

Mounting systemic fragility is being masked by deepening concentration. A credit blowup in one major sector or ‘too big to fail’ player could ripple through the financial system, capital markets, interest rate channel, the USD–PHP exchange rate—and ultimately, GDP. 

The structure of privilege and fragility is now one and the same.

VI. A Demand-Driven CPI? BSP’s Quiet Admission: Demand Weakness Behind Low Inflation 

The BSP chief even admitted "demand is weaker. This, in turn, is why inflation is low."

Contrastingly, when authorities present their CPI data, the penchant is to frame inflation as a supply-side dynamic. Yet in our humble opinion, this marks the first time that the BSP confesses to a demand-driven CPI. 

September CPI rose for the second consecutive month—from 1.5% to 1.7%. If the ‘governance issues’ have exacerbated the demand slowdown, why has CPI risen? Authorities pointed to higher transport and vegetable prices as the culprit. 

Yet core CPI slowed from 2.7% in August to 2.6% in September, suggesting that the lagged effects of earlier easy money have translated to its recent rise. 

But that may be about to change. 

The drop in core CPI to 2.6% YoY was underscored by its month-on-month (MoM) movement, as well as the headline CPI’s MoM, both of which were flat in September. Historically, a plunge in MoM tends to signal interim peaks in CPI. (Figure 4, middle and lowest diagrams) 

So, while the unfolding data suggest that public spending may slow and bank lending continues to decelerate, “demand is weaker” would likely mean not only a softer GDP print but an interim “top” in CPI. 

If inflation reflects weak demand, labor data should show the same — yet the opposite is being claimed 

VII. Employment at the Edge of Fiction: Volatility, Illusion, and Structural Decay 

Authorities also produced another remarkable claim—on jobs.


Figure 5

They say employment rates significantly rebounded from 94.67% in July to 96.1% in August, even as the August–September CPI rebound supposedly showed that “demand is weaker.” This rebound was supported by a sudden surge in labor force participation—from 60.7% in July to 65.06% in August. (Figure 5, topmost and middle charts) 

The PSA’s employment data defies structural logic. Labor swings like stocks despite rigid labor laws and weak job mobility. The data also suggest that the wide vacillation in jobs indicates abrupt shifts between searching for work and refraining from doing so—as reflected in the steep changes in labor force participation. 

Furthermore, construction jobs flourished in August even amid flood-control probes, reflecting either delayed fiscal drag—or inflated data, to project immunity of labor markets from governance scandals. (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

Yet high employment masks poor-quality, low-literacy work—mostly in MSMEs—which explains elevated self-rated poverty and hunger rates. 

Additionally, both employment and labor force data have turned ominous: a rounding top in employment rates, while labor force participation also trends downward. 

Despite tariff woes, the slowdown in manufacturing jobs remains moderate. 

Nonetheless, beneath this façade, record consumer credit and stagnant wages reveal a highly leveraged, increasingly credit-dependent household sector. 

Labor narrative inflation—the embellishment of job metrics—would only exacerbate depressed conditions during the next downturn, leading to sharper unemployment. 

When investors interpret inaccurate data as fact, they allocate resources erroneously. The resulting imbalances won’t just show up in earnings losses—they’ll manifest as outright capital consumption. 

And while public spending may be disrupted, authorities can always divert “budget” caught in controversies to other areas. 

That said, jobs decay could rupture the banks propping up this high-employment illusion. 

VIII. The War on Cash and the Politics of Liquidity 

This week puts into the spotlight two developments which are likely inimical to the banking system, the economy and civil liberties. 

This Philstar article points to the banking system’s implementation of the BSP’s Php 500,000 withdrawal cap, which took effect in October. 

We earlier flagged seven potential risks from the BSP’s withdrawal limit: financial gridlock that inhibits the economy; capital controls that permeate into trade; indirect rescue of the banking system at the expense of the economy; possible confidence erosion in banks—alongside CMEPA; tighter credit conditions; rising risk premiums and capital flight; and, finally, the warning of historical precedent. (see reference) 

For instance, we wrote, "these sweeping limits target an errant minority while penalizing the wider economy. Payroll financing for firms with dozens of employees, capital expenditures, and cash-intensive investments and many more aspects of commerce all depend on such flows." 

The Philstar article noted, "Several social media users, particularly small business owners, expressed frustration over the stricter requirements and said that the P500,000 daily cash limit could disrupt operations and delay payments to suppliers."

Sentiment is yet to diffuse into economic numbers, but our underlying methodological individualist deductive reasoning is on the right track. 

IX. The War on Cash Disguised as Corruption Control

One of the critical elements in the BSP withdrawal cap is its requirement that the public use ‘traceable channels.’

The “traceable channels” clause reveals the BSP’s dual intent. 

On media, it’s about anti–money laundering and transaction transparency. In practice, it forces liquidity to remain inside the banking perimeter—deposits, e-wallets, and interbank transfers that cannot exit as cash. 

Cash, the last bastion of transactional privacy and immediacy, is being sidelined. This is not a war on crime; it’s a war on cash. 

The effect is to silo money within the formal system, preventing it from circulating freely across the real economy.


Figure 6

In August, cash-to-deposit at 9.84% remained adrift near all-time lows, while the liquid-asset-to-deposit ratio at 47.72% hit 2020 pandemic lows—both trending downward since 2013. (Figure 6, topmost pane) 

X. From Cash Limits to Systemic Liquidity Locks 

What looks like a compliance reform is, in truth, a liquidity containment measure. 

By capping withdrawals at Php 500,000, the BSP traps liquidity in banks already facing balance sheet strain. This buys temporary stability, allowing institutions to meet reserve ratios and avoid visible stress, but it starves the cash economy—especially small businesses dependent on operational liquidity. 

Economic losses eventually translate to non-performing loans, erasing whatever short-term relief liquidity traps provided. When firms struggle to repay, banks hoard liquidity to protect themselves—contracting credit and deepening the slowdown. The policy cure becomes the crisis catalyst. 

XI. The Liquidity Containment Playbook and the Architecture of Control 

This is not an isolated act; it fits a broader policy playbook: 

  • Easy Money Policies: Reduce the cost of borrowing in favor of the largest borrowers, often at the expense of savers and small lenders. 
  • CMEPA: The Capital Market Efficiency Promotion Act, which expands regulatory reach over capital flows and market behavior, while rechanneling private savings toward state and quasi-state instruments. 
  • Soft FX Peg: The USDPHP peg, designed to constrain inflation, masks currency fragility and limits monetary flexibility. 
  • Price Controls: MSRP ceilings distort price signals and suppress market clearing, especially in essential goods. 
  • Administrative Friction: Regulatory hurdles replace fiscal support, extracting compliance and liquidity rather than injecting relief. 

Add to that the BSP’s ongoing yield curve-shaping—suppressing long-term yields to sustain public debt rollover—and what emerges is a clear strategy of financial containment: liquidity is captured, redirected, and immobilized to defend a strained financial order. 

XII. Curve-Shaping and Fiscal Extraction 

The post–rate cut yield curve behavior in the Philippines reveals a dual narrative that’s more tactical than organic. On one hand, the market is signaling unease about inflation—particularly in the medium term—yet it stops short of pricing in a runaway scenario. This ambivalence is reflected in the belly of the curve, where yields have dropped sharply despite flat month-on-month CPI and only modest year-on-year upticks. (Figure 6, middle and lowest graphs) 

On the other hand, the BSP appears to be engineering a ‘bearish steepening’ through tactical easing, likely aimed at supporting bank margins and stimulating credit amid a backdrop of rising NPLs, slowing loan growth, and liquidity hoarding. 

The rate cut, coming on the heels of July’s CMEPA and amid regulatory tightening, suggests a deliberate attempt to offset balance sheet stress without triggering overt inflation panic. 

Each of these measures—cash caps, regulatory absorption of savings, and engineered curve shifts—forms part of a single containment architecture. What looks like fragmented policy is, in reality, coordinated liquidity triage. 

In sum, fiscal extraction, liquidity controls, and curve manipulation are now moving in tandem. Each reinforces the other, ensuring that capital cannot easily escape the system even as trust erodes. 

The war on cash, then, is not about corruption or transparency—it’s about preserving liquidity in a system that has begun to run dry.

XIII. When Discretion Becomes Doctrine: From Institutional Venality to Kindleberger’s Signpost 

And then the BSP hopes to expand its extraction-based “reform.” This ABS-CBN article reports that the central bank plans to issue "a new policy on a possible threshold for money transfers which will cover even digital transactions." It would also empower banks to "refuse any transaction based on suspicion of corruption." 

Ironically, BSP Governor Eli Remolona cited as an example a contractor’s ‘huge’ withdrawal from the National Treasury—deposited into a private account—which he defended as "legitimate." 

The war on financials is evolving—from capital controls to behavioral nudging to arbitrary discretionary thresholds. BSP’s move to cap money transfers reframes liquidity as suspicion, and banks as moral adjudicators

Discretion to refuse transactions—even without proof—creates a regime where access to private property is conditional, not on law, but on institutional discomfort. 

Remolona’s defense of a bank that released a “huge amount” to a contractor despite unease confirms what we’ve recently argued: the scandal was never hidden—it was institutionally tolerated. 

Bullseye! 

Two revelations from this: 

First, it validates that this venal political-economic framework represents the tip of the iceberg—supported by deeply entrenched gaming of the system, extraction, and control born of top-heavy policies and politics. 

Two. It serves as a Kindleberger’s timeless signpost—that swindles, fraud, and defalcation are often signals of crashes and panic: 

"The propensities to swindle and be swindled run parallel to the propensity to speculate during a boom. Crash and panic, with their motto of sauve qui peut, induce still more to cheat in order to save themselves. And the signal for panic is often the revelation of some swindle, theft, embezzlement, or fraud." (Kindleberger, Bernstein)

In this sense, the BSP’s moralistic posture and arbitrary discretion may not be acts of reform, but symptoms of a system inching toward its own reckoning. The façade of prudence conceals a liquidity-starved order struggling to maintain legitimacy—where control replaces confidence, and “reform” becomes a euphemism for survival. 

All this suggests that, should implementation be rigorous, the recent earthquakes may not be confined geologically but could spill over into financial institutions and the broader economy. If these signify a “do something” parade of ningas cogon policies, then the moral decay born of the public spending spree will soon resurface. 

Either way, because of structural sunk costs, the effects of one intervention diffusing into the next guarantees the acceleration and eventual implosion of imbalances that—like a pressure valve—will find a way to ventilate. 

XIV. Conclusion: The Technocrat’s Mirage: Goldilocks Confronts the Knowledge Problem and Goodhart’s Law 

Finally, the BSP admits to either being afflicted by a knowledge problem or propagating a red herring: "We’re still refining our estimates. We had thought that our Goldilocks policy rate was closer to 5 percent, now it’s closer to 4 percent. So we have to decide where we really are between 5 percent and 4 percent." 

This confession exposes the technocratic folly of believing that economic equilibrium can be engineered by formula. It ignores the fundamental truth of human action—there are no constants—and the perennial lesson of Goodhart’s Law: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. Protecting the status quo, therefore, translates to chasing short-term fixes while evading long-term consequences. 

What this reveals is not calibration but confusion—policy reduced to trial-and-error within a liquidity-starved system. The “Goldilocks” rhetoric masks a deeper instability: that each attempt to fine-tune the economy only amplifies the distortions born of past interventions. 

We close this article with a quote from our October issue: 

"The irony is stark. What can rate cuts achieve in “spurring demand” when the BSP is simultaneously probing banks and imposing withdrawal caps? 

And more: what can they do when authorities themselves admit that CMEPA triggered a “dramatic” 95-percent drop in long-term deposits, or when households are hoarding liquidity in response to new tax rules—feeding banks’ liquidity trap?" 

____

References 

Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy, p.119 NEW HAVEN YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1944, mises.org 

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, May 1992 

Charles P Kindleberger & Peter L. Bernstein, The Emergence of Swindles, Manias Panics and Crashes, Chapter 5, p.73 Springer Nature link, January 2015 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Philippine Flood Control Scandal: Systemic Failure and Central Bank Complicity, Substack, October 5, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Q2–1H Debt-Fueled PSEi 30 Performance Disconnects from GDP—What Could Go Wrong, Substack, August 24, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap, Substack, September 14, 2025

 

Sunday, October 05, 2025

The Philippine Flood Control Scandal: Systemic Failure and Central Bank Complicity

 

Today the fashionable philosophy of Statolatry has obfuscated the issue. The political conflicts are no longer seen as struggles between groups of men. They are considered a war between two principles, the good and the bad. The good is embodied in the great god State, the materialization of the eternal idea of morality, and the bad in the "rugged individualism" of selfish men. In this antagonism the State is always right and the individual always wrong. The State is the representative of the commonweal, of justice, civilization, and superior wisdom. The individual is a poor wretch, a vicious fool—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

The Philippine Flood Control Scandal: Systemic Failure and Central Bank Complicity

I. ‘Shocked’ or Complicit? The Nexus of Policy and Corruption

II. A Financial System in Cartel’s Grip

III. Structural Failure, Not Just Regulatory Lapse; Virtue-Signaling Over Solution

IV. BSP Withdrawal Caps as Capital Controls: Six Dangers

V. Liquidity Theater and the Politics of Survival

VI. Systemic Risks on the Horizon

VII. Political Survival via Institutional Sacrifice; The Kabuki Commission

VIII. The Political Playbook: Delay, Distract, Dissolve

IX. Historical Parallels: When Economics Ignite Revolutions

X. The Strawman of Fiscal Stability and Revenue Realities

XI. Expenditure Retrenchment and the Infrastructure Dependency Trap

XII. The Keynesian Paradox, Liquidity Trap and Deposit Flight

XIII. PSE’s Sleight of Hand on CMEPA

X. The Horizon Has Arrived

XI. Statolatry and the Endgame 

The Philippine Flood Control Scandal: Systemic Failure and Central Bank Complicity 

What looks like an infrastructure scam is really a mirror of the Philippines’ deeper malaise: politicized finance, central bank accommodation, and a brittle economy propped by debt. 

I. ‘Shocked’ or Complicit? The Nexus of Policy and Corruption 

Media reported that BSP was “shocked” by the scale of corruption. The Philstar quoted the BSP Chief, who also chairs the AMLC: “It was worse than we thought… We knew there was corruption all along, but not on this scale… as much of a shock to the central bank as to the public.” 

“Shocked” at the scale of corruption? Or at their own complicity?


Figure 1

Easy-money ‘trickle-down’ policies didn’t just enable anomalies—they fostered and accommodated them. Banks, under BSP’s watch, have financed the government’s ever-expanding debt-financed deficit spending binge—including flood control projects—through net claims on central government (NCoCG), which hit Php 5.547 trillion last July, the third highest on record. Public debt slipped from July’s record high to Php 17.468 trillion in August. (Figure 1, upper window) 

II. A Financial System in Cartel’s Grip 

Meanwhile, operating like a cartel, bank control of the financial system has surged to a staggering 82.7% of total financial resources/assets, with universal commercial banks alone commanding 77.1% (as of July 2025). (Figure 1, lower chart) 

This mounting concentration is no mere market feature—the scandal exposes the financial system’s structural vulnerability. The scale of transactions, personalities, and institutional fingerprints involved in the scandal was never invisible. It was ignored. 

III. Structural Failure, Not Just Regulatory Lapse; Virtue-Signaling Over Solution 

This isn’t just a regulatory lapse. 

It is structural, systemic, and political—failure implicating not only the heads of finance and monetary agencies, but extends up to political leadership past and present. The iceberg runs deep. 

Worse, the economy’s deepening dependence on deficit spending to prop up the GDP kabuki only enshrines the “gaming” of the system—a choreography sustained by a network of national and local politicians, bureaucrats, financiers, media, and their cronies. 

Corruption scandals of this kind are therefore not confined to infrastructure—it permeates every domain tethered to policy-driven redistribution 

Yet instead of accountability, the BSP hides behind virtue-signaling optics. It flaunts probes and caps withdrawals, likely oblivious to the systemic damage it may inflict on beleaguered banks, stained liquidity, and an already fragile economy. 

The predictable ramifications: lingering uncertainties lead to a potential tightening of credit, and erodes confidence in Philippine assets and the peso. 

Ironically, this impulse response risks amplifying the very imbalances the BSP aims to contain—Wile E. Coyote dynamics in motion

Banks attempt to camouflage record NPLs via ‘denominator effects’ from a growth sprint on credit expansion while simultaneously scrambling to mask asset losses via intensifying exposure to Available for Sale Securities (AFS)—a desperate sprint toward the cliff’s edge—as previously discussed. (see reference section for previous discussion) 

IV. BSP Withdrawal Caps as Capital Controls: Six Dangers 

As part of its histrionics to contain the flood-control scandal, the BSP imposed a daily withdrawal cap of Php 500,000

First, these sweeping limits target an errant minority while penalizing the wider economy. Payroll financing for firms with dozens of employees, capital expenditures, and cash-intensive investments and many more aspects of commerce all depend on such flows. The economy bears the cost of institutional failure. 

Second, withdrawal caps are a form of capital control—another step in the state’s creeping centralization of the economy. Price controls (MSRP and "20 rice" rollouts), wage controls (minimum wages), and exchange-rate controls (the USDPHP soft peg) are already in place. Capital controls, by nature, bleed into trade restrictions and signal deeper interventionist intent. 

Third, with strains in the banking system worsening, the caps effectively lock in liquidity—an indirect rescue effort for banks at the expense of depositors. This is moral hazard in action: prudence is punished while recklessness is protected. But locking liquidity in stressed institutions risks triggering a velocity collapse, where money exists but refuses to circulate—amplifying systemic fragility. 

Fourth, once the public realizes that siloed money can be unilaterally withheld at will, the credibility of financial inclusion erodes, risking a collapse in confidence. Combined with CMEPA’s assault on savings, these measures push households and firms toward informal channels, further eroding trust in the banking system itself. The behavioral signal is chilling: your money is conditional; your trust is optional. 

Fifth, such public assurance measures expose the banking system’s inherent weakness. Rather than calming markets, they sow doubt over BSP’s capacity to safeguard stability—risking a surge in cash hoarding outside the formal system and spur credit tightening. 

Sixth, international investors may interpret this as mission creep in financial repression—adding pressure on Philippine risk premiums and the peso. Capital flight doesn’t need a headline—it just needs a signal. 

Finally, history warns us: Argentina’s 2001 corralito, Greece in 2015, and Lebanon in 2019 all saw withdrawal limits destroy trust in banks for a generation. The Philippines now flirts with the same danger. 

What begins as optics may end as rupture. 

V. Liquidity Theater 

Efforts to win public approval by “doing something” haven’t stopped at withdrawal caps or capital controls. The BSP has widened its response to include probes into the industry’s legal, administrative, and compliance frameworks—an escalation designed more for optics than systemic repair. 

While the BSP chief admitted that freezing bank funds tied to the flood control scandal could affect liquidity, he downplayed broader risks, claiming: “Our banks are very, very liquid at this point... No bank runs.” (italics added) 


Figure 2

But BSP’s own metrics tell a different story (as of July 2025): (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

-Cash-to-deposit ratio is at all-time lows

-Liquidity-to-deposit ratio has fallen to 2020 levels 

This isn’t stability—it’s strain. 

VI. Systemic Risks on the Horizon 

Beyond tighter liquidity and credit conditions, several systemic risks loom: 

1) Funding Stigma: Banks under investigation face counterparty distrust. Interbank markets may shrink access or charge higher spreads, amplifying liquidity stress. 

2) Reputational Contagion: Even unaffected banks risk depositor anxiety, particularly if they share infrastructure or counterparties with implicated institutions. Concentration risk thus becomes contagion risk. 

3) Depositor Anxiety: The public often interprets targeted probes as systemic signals. Precautionary withdrawals may accelerate, caps notwithstanding. Was BSP anticipating this when it chopped RRR rates last March and doubled deposit insurance? 

4) Regulatory Overreach: To signal credibility, BSP may impose stricter KYC/AML protocols—slowing onboarding, increasing balance sheet friction, and chilling transaction flows. 

5) Market Pricing of Risk: Equity prices, bond spreads, interbank rates, and FX volatility may rise—exposing incumbent fragilities and financial skeletons in the closet. Philippine assets have been the worst performers per BBG. (Figure 2, middle image) 

6) Earnings Pressure and Capital Hit: Sanctions, fines, and reputational damage translate to earnings erosion and capital buffer depletion—weakening the very liquidity BSP claims is “ample.” 

7) AML Fallout: The probe exposes systemic AML blind spots, risking FATF graylisting. Compliance costs may rise, deterring foreign capital. This episode reveals how the statistical criteria behind AMLA and credit ratings are fundamentally flawed. 

8) Political Pressure: The scandal’s reach into lawmakers and officials may trigger clampdowns on regulators, budget delays, and a slowdown in infrastructure spending. 

VII. Political Survival via Institutional Sacrifice; The Kabuki Commission 

One thing is clear: Diversionary policies—from the war on drugs to POGO crackdowns to nationalism via territorial disputes—have boomeranged. Now, the political war is being waged on governing institutions themselves. 

The BSP’s trifecta—capital controls, signaling channels, and probes—is part of a tactical framework to defend the administration’s survival. It sanitizes executive involvement while letting the hammer fall on a few “fall guys.” This is textbook social democratic conflict resolution: high-profile investigations and figurehead resignations to appease public clamor. 

Case in point: the Independent Commission for Infrastructure (ICI), reportedly funded by the Office of the President. How “independent” can it be if the OP bankrolls and decides on its output? 

As I noted on X: (Figure 2, lowest picture)

“That’s like asking the bartender to audit his own till. This ‘commission’ smells more like kabuki.” 

After a week, an ICI member linked to the scandal’s villain resigned. 

VIII. The Political Playbook: Delay, Distract, Dissolve 

Authorities hope for three things:

-That time will dull public anger

-That the probe’s outcome satisfies public appetite

-That new controversies bury the scandal 

But history warns us: corruption follows a Whac-a-Mole dynamic—until it hits a tipping point. 

IX. Historical Parallels: When Economics Ignite Revolutions 

Two EDSA uprisings were preceded by financial-economic upheavals:

1983 Philippine debt crisis 1986 EDSA I

1997 Asian crisis 2000 EDSA II 

The lesson is stark: Economic distress breeds political crisis. Or vice versa. 

X. The Strawman of Fiscal Stability and Revenue Realities 

The fiscal health of the Philippine government has been splattered with piecemeal evidence of the flood control scandal’s impact on the political economy. 

Authorities may headline that Tax Revenues Sustain Growth; Budget Deficit Well-Managed and On Track with Full-Year Target—but this is a strawman, built on selective perception masking structural deterioration. 

In reality, August 2025 revenues fell -8.8%. The Bureau of Internal Revenue’s (BIR) growth slowed to 5.04%, barely above July’s 4.8%, and far below 11.5% in August 2024. Bureau of Customs (BoC) collections slipped from +6% in July to -1.4% in August, versus +4.7% a year ago. Non-tax revenues collapsed -67.8%, deepening from July’s -9.7%, in stark contrast to the +281.6% surge a year earlier.


Figure 3

For January–August, revenue growth has decelerated sharply from 15.9% in 2024 to just 3.1% in 2025. BIR collections slowed to 11.44% (from 12.6%) and BoC to 1.14% (from 5.67%). Non-tax revenues plunged -31.41%, against +58.9% a year earlier. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)

XI. Expenditure Retrenchment and the Infrastructure Dependency Trap 

Meanwhile, August expenditures fell -0.74% YoY, with National Government disbursement contracting 11.8% for the second straight month. It shrank by 11.4% in July. 

Eight-month expenditures slowed from 11.32% in 2024 to 7.15% in 2025, driven by a sharp decline in NG spending from 10.6% to 3.98%. (Figure 3, middle and lowest graphs) 

Infrastructure spending dropped 25% in July, per BusinessWorld. The deeper August slump reflects political pressure restraining disbursements—pulling down the eight-month deficit. 

Though nominal revenues and expenditures hit record highs, the 2025 eight-month deficit of Php 784 billion is the second widest since the pandemic-era Php 837.25 billion in 2021 Ironically, today’s deficit remains at pandemic-recession levels even without a recession—yet. 

As we noted back in early September: 

"The unfolding DPWH scandal threatens more than reputational damage—it risks triggering a contractionary spiral that could expose the fragility of the Philippine top-down heavy economic development model.  

"With Php 1.033 trillion allotted to DPWH alone (16.3% of the 2025 budget)—which was lowered to Php 900 billion (14.2% of total budget)—and Php 1.507 trillion for infrastructure overall (23.8% and estimated 5.2% of the GDP), any slowdown in disbursements could reverberate across sectors.  

"Many large firms are structurally tied to public projects, and the economy’s current momentum leans heavily on credit-fueled activity rather than organic productivity.  

"Curtailing infrastructure outlays, even temporarily, risks puncturing GDP optics and exposing the private sector’s underlying weakness. " 

And it’s not just infrastructure. Political pressure has spread to cash aid distribution. ABS-CBN reported that DSWD is preparing rules “to insulate social protection programs from political influence.” Good luck with that. 

For now, rising political pressure points to a drastic slowdown in spending. 

XII. The Keynesian Paradox, Liquidity Trap and Deposit Flight


Figure 4

Remember: the government’s share of national GDP hit an all-time high of 16.7% in 1H 2025. (Figure 4, upper chart) 

This excludes government construction GDP and private sector participation in political projects (PPPs, suppliers, contractors etc.). Yet instead of a Keynesian multiplier, higher government spending has yielded slower GDP—thanks to malinvestments from the crowding out dynamic

The BSP is already floating further policy easing this October. BusinessWorld quotes the BSP Chief: “If we see [economic] output slowing down because of the lack of demand, then we would step in, easing policy rates [to] strengthen demand.”

The irony is stark. What can rate cuts achieve in “spurring demand” when the BSP is simultaneously probing banks and imposing withdrawal caps?

And more: what can they do when authorities themselves admit that CMEPA triggered a “dramatic” 95-percent drop in long-term deposits, or when households are hoarding liquidity in response to new tax rules—feeding banks’ liquidity trap?

XIII. PSE’s Sleight of Hand on CMEPA

Meanwhile, the PSE pulled a rabbit from the hat, claiming CMEPA attracted foreign investors from July to September 23. As I posted on X.com: The PSE cherry-picks its data. PSEi is significantly down, volume is sliding. The foreign flows came from a one-day, huge cross (negotiated) sale from Metrobank (PSE:MBT) and/or RL Commercial (PSE: RCR)—untruth does not a bull market make.” (Figure 4, lower picture)

What this really signals is that banks will scale up borrowing from the public to patch widening balance sheet imbalances—our Wile E. Coyote moment (see reference to our previous discussion). Banks, not the public, stand to benefit.

IX. The Debt Spiral Tightens

The bigger issue behind policy easing is government financing

As we’ve repeatedly said, the recent slowdown in debt servicing may stem from: “Scheduling choices or prepayments in 2024—or political aversion to public backlash—may explain the recent lull in debt servicing. But the record and growing deficit ensures borrowing and servicing will keep rising.” (see reference)


Figure 5

August 2025 proved the point: Php 601.6 billion in amortization pushed eight-month debt service to Php 1.54 trillion—just shy of last year’s Php 1.55 trillion, and already near the full-year 2023 total (Php 1.572 trillion). (Figure 5, topmost and middle graphs)

Foreign debt servicing’s share rose from 19.86% to 22.3%. 

Eight-month interest payments hit a record Php 584 billion, raising their share of expenditures from 13.8% to 14.8%—the highest since 2009.  (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

All this confirms: BSP’s rate cuts serve the government, banks, and politically connected elite—not the public. (see reference) 

X. The Horizon Has Arrived 

As we noted last August: (See reference) 

-More debt more servicing less for everything else

-Crowding out hits both public and private spending

-Revenue gains won’t keep up with servicing

-Inflation and peso depreciation risks climb

-Higher taxes are on the horizon 

That horizon is here. Higher debt, more servicing, more crowding out, faltering revenue gains, and higher taxes in motion (new digital taxes, DOH’s push for sin tax expansion…). 

Inflation and peso depreciation are coming. 

XI. Statolatry and the Endgame 

The paradox is sobering: Reduced public spending may slow diversion from wealth consumption and unproductive activities to a gradual build-up in savings—offering a brief window for capital formation. 

The bad news? Most still believe political angels exist, and that governance can only be solved through statism—a cult which the great economist Ludwig von Mises called statolatry

For the historic imbalances this ideology has built, the endgame can only be crisis. 

____

References 

Banks and Fiscal Issues 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap, Substack, September 14, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, When Free Lunch Politics Meets Fiscal Reality: Lessons from the DPWH Flood Control Scandal, Substack, September 7, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock, Substack, Substack, August 3, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock?, Substack, July 7, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, Goldilocks Meets the Three Bad Bears: BSP’s Sixth Rate Cut and the Late-Cycle Reckoning, Substack, August 31, 2025 

CMEPA 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback July 27, 2025 (substack) 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design July 20,2025 (substack)  

Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy, NEW HAVEN YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1944. p.74  Mises.org

 

 

Sunday, September 10, 2023

The PSE’s Proposed Capital Controls, Metro Pacific’s Mounting Liquidity Challenges: Is the GSIS Providing an Implicit Backstop?

 

All crises have involved debt that, in one fashion or another, has become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. – John Kenneth Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria 

 

In this issue 

The PSE’s Proposed Capital Controls, Metro Pacific’s Mounting Liquidity Challenges: Is the GSIS Providing an Implicit Backstop? 

I. The PSE Proposes its Version of Capital Controls: Raise the Barriers of Exit for Listed Firms 

II. Two Perspectives from MPI’s GSIS Transactions 

III. Public Financial Institutions as the Core Driver of the PSE’s Liquidity 

IV. Possible Reason for Delisting? Metro Pacific’s Intensifying Liquidity Challenges 

V. GSIS Expanded Holdings of MPI: A Bailout? An Implicit Backstop? 

 

The PSE’s Proposed Capital Controls, Metro Pacific’s Mounting Liquidity Challenges: Is the GSIS Providing an Implicit Backstop? 

 

The Philippine PSE wants to stanch the "wave of companies" delisting with more rules.  Is the GSIS providing a tacit backstop to the liquidity-challenged Metro Pacific? Are public financial firms the core of PSE's liquidity? 


I. The PSE Proposes its Version of Capital Controls: Raise the Barriers of Exit for Listed Firms 

 

Inquirer.net, September 4: The Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) is tightening the rules on voluntary delistings amid a wave of companies going private during the market slump. The PSE is revisiting the guidelines anew after amending the rules in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic in December 2020. This came as principals of large firms such as infrastructure-focused Metro Pacific Investments Corp. and cement giant Holcim Philippines announced plans to go private at relatively cheaper valuations, frustrating minority stockholders. One of the key features is the scrapping of the 95-percent ownership threshold to successfully complete a voluntary delisting. This also means the bourse’s proposed revisions could make delisting buyouts more costly in certain cases to protect small investors. 


A company decides to delist when the cost overshadows the benefits of being a publicly listed company.  Those costs include financial, political (regulatory, etc.), economic, a combination of, and even psychic.  

 

The reaction of the PSE manifests the public's mood, reflexively influenced by market actions described hereinto as a "slump," which should be unsurprising. 

 

That is to say, while different reasons may have prompted the "wave of companies" to exit, the bear market could be their common denominator. 

 

Since mainstream institutions have programmed the public's perception of the stock market as an "entitlement," its parallelism in expectations is that speculations deliver "prosperity." 

 

In turn, aside from amplifying volatility, the ramifications of the overriding sentiment—driven by high-time preference or short-term orientation—have been to consume capital.   

 

Turning the stock market into a "casino" has led to material shrinkages in peso volume, which are symptomatic of decreased savings/capital.  

 

Ergo, in response to popular pressures, the PSE proposes to increase the cost of "barriers to exit" to discourage delisting.  In essence, it is the PSE's version of capital controls.  

 

If the PSE does that, high "barriers to exit" will likely transform into high "barriers to entry."  

 

Goodbye to those IPO goals. 

 

Worse, it could also motivate other listed companies to head for the exit doors before its enforcement.  

 

Nonetheless, these collective "denials" reinforce the symptoms of a bear market.  

 

II. Two Perspectives from MPI’s GSIS Transactions 

 

One of the week's prominent developments has been the positioning for Metro Pacific's delisting, which may have culminated with the GSIS's increased exposure to the firm last September 4th.   

 

Inquirer.net, September 5: State pension fund Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) delivered a surprise on Tuesday as it announced an increase in its stake in Manuel V. Pangilinan-led Metro Pacific Investment Corp. by nearly four times to about 12 percent days before the conclusion of the company’s P55-billion privatization bid…GSIS’ upsized stake, worth about P17.8 billion at the tender offer price of P5.20 per share, gives the pension fund enough boardroom sway to block the delisting plan…But several market observers said GSIS was likely strengthening its position to negotiate better buyout terms from the bidding consortium—composed of Indonesian tycoon Anthoni Salim’s First Pacific Group, the Ty family conglomerate GT Capital Holdings, Japan’s Mitsui Group and Manuel V. Pangilinan, chair and CEO of Metro Pacific…Then through a letter to Metro Pacific on Sept. 4, it was revealed that GSIS was aggressively buying the company’s shares from Aug. 23 through Sept. 4, acquiring 2.49 billion shares during this period to arrive at its present stake of 11.98 percent. GSIS shares are classified as public shareholdings, meaning the bidding consortium would need to purchase these to reach the required 95 percent ownership threshold before proceeding with the voluntary delisting. GSIS’ stake would be considered nonpublic once it obtains a board seat in the company, based on a series of revisions being proposed by the PSE. 

 

PSE, September 5: Metro Pacific Investments Corporation (MPIC) received a letter from GSIS dated September 4, 2023 informing MPIC that during the period from August 23,2023 to September 4,2023, GSIS purchased 2,490,509,574 common shares of MPIC. GSIS also mentioned that as a result of these purchases, GSIS owns 3,438,549,038 common shares which represents approximately 11.98% of the total outstanding common shares of MPIC. 

 

Here are two perspectives from last week's event. 

 

First, Public financial institutions may be dominating the trading activities at the PSE. 

 

Two, the increased MPI shareholdings of GSIS may represent insurance against the financial risk.   

 

III. Public Financial Institutions as the Core Driver of the PSE’s Liquidity 

 

Monday's trading could be one for the books. 

 

The Php 9.011 billion volume of Metro Pacific [PSE: MPI] accounted for 81.96% and 79.6% of the Php 10.995 billion main board (MB) and Php 11.322 billion total turnover.   

 

Cross trades of MPI shares accounted for over Php 4 billion.  As such, the top 10 brokers shanghaied 74.7% share of the mainboard trading volume.  

 

Alternatively, ex-MPI shares, the MB, and the total volume shrunk to an incredible Php 1.984 billion and Php 2.311 billion, respectively. 

 

This means that while the attention shifted to MPI, liquidity in the broader market dissipated. 

Figure 1 


As evidence, the volume in pesos and % share of the Sy group of companies (SM, SMPH, and BDO) representing the top 3 PSEi 30 heavyweights plummeted to 2.9%, a multi-year low.  Meanwhile, cumulative peso volume receded to a mere Php 318 million! 

 

To this point, institutional investors, most likely represented by public financial firms like GSIS, could be the core source of the PSE's liquidity. 

 

In any case, the increased exposure by the GSIS on MPI could further reduce the market's liquidity should the (tender offer) sellers of MPI opt not to plow back the sales proceeds to the PSE.  

 

Since the GSIS announcement, MB trading volume has averaged less than Php 3.5 billion daily! 

 

IV. Possible Reason for Delisting? Metro Pacific’s Intensifying Liquidity Challenges 

 

Departing from the Overtone Window on MPI's delisting, as propounded last May, deteriorating liquidity conditions could signify a critical factor in the company's decision. 

 

I could be wrong; however, does the unrecognized/unappreciated "intrinsic value" constitute the outgrowth of debt over income in the face of falling cash reserves? 

 

Could taking MPI into the private indicate its undertaking remedial liquidity measures through ownership restructuring—post-delisting? That's a guess, though. (Prudent Investor, May 2023) 

 

MPI's Q2 17-Q provides us an overview.  

 

Figure 2 


The downward sloping trend of MPI's cash reserves has more than halved since Q1 2020.  

 

For the first time, short-term debt of Php 35.64 billion surpassed its cash reserves of Php 29.10 billion.  MPI's current ratio was .68 for the period.  

 

Nominal debt has been outpacing gross revenues.   

Figure 3 

 

In marginal net peso changes, sales increased by Php 2.8 billion in Q2 YoY, while debt expanded by Php 22 billion.  Net income?  Php 1.694 billion.  So MPI borrowed Php 10.6 pesos for every Php 1 of sales growth and Php 13 for every peso of net income increase.   

 

Interest expense?  Php 899 million increase in Q2 YoY.  Interest expense has mirrored the surge in BSP rates, which has been gnawing at the profit margins.  

 

Clearly, the liquidity-challenged position by MPI has had a crucial role in its decision to delist. 

 

All these assume the accuracy of the published 17Q. 

 

V. GSIS Expanded Holdings of MPI: A Bailout? An Implicit Backstop? 

 

Now, to the expanded exposure of GSIS (in my humble opinion). 

 

If this tender offer event tacked in sales of some treasury shares, this represents a partial bailout by the GSIS of MPI. 

 

Nevertheless, the expanded exposure of GSIS provides an implicit backstop on MPI.  Should MPI encounter financial turbulence, GSIS could appeal to the BSP and DoF (or even the Office of the President) for a bailout on the pretext that the latter's beneficiaries could be at stake.  

 

In any case, the surge of GSIS exposure as the liquidity-challenged MPI undergoes a delisting process looks like a political maneuver rather than merely about "investments"—as presented by the consensus. 

 

If anything, MPI's episode showcases why the BSP has been dithering over its policies.  The BSP's "trickle-down" effect is in jeopardy, demonstrated by the debt-to-eyeballs firms of the elites, which are on the precipice. 


___ 

references 


Prudent Investor, Is the Delisting of Metro Pacific a Bullish or Bearish Sign for the Philippine PSE? May 3, 2023: SubstackBlogger