Showing posts with label gold reserves. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gold reserves. Show all posts

Monday, March 03, 2025

BSP’s Gold Reserves Policy: A Precursor to a Higher USD-PHP Exchange Rate?

 

Central banks and finance ministries do not hold copper, aluminum, or steel supplies, yet they hold gold. The only explanation for central bank gold hoards is the obvious one - gold is money― James Rickards

In this issue 

BSP’s Gold Reserves Policy: A Precursor to a Higher USD-PHP Exchange Rate?

I. BSP’s Contradicting Official Statements

II. Why the Rhetorical Shift? World’s Largest Gold Seller in 2024—BSP

III. BSP’s Gold Sales: Supporting the USD-PHP Soft Peg

IV. Other Reserve Assets (ORA) and Financial Derivatives: Did the BSP Short Gold?

V. Broader Economic Pressures: 11-Year High January Balance of Payments (BoP) Deficit and Soaring External Debt

VI. Signaling Channel: The BSP’s Softening Rhetorical Stance on the USDPHP Cap

VII. Conclusion: Inevitable Devaluation of the Philippine Peso? 

BSP’s Gold Reserves Policy: A Precursor to a Higher USD-PHP Exchange Rate? 

The BSP’s gold reserves have been shrinking since 2020, ultimately contributing to the devaluation of the Philippine peso. The BSP sold the most gold in 2024—how low will the peso fall? 

I. BSP’s Contradicting Official Statements 

So, the BSP’s caught up in the wild storm of election season, and guess what? They’re back at it, defending their whole deal with gold reserves. 

BSP, February 24: "The country’s GIR is not used for any other purpose other than meeting the country’s forex requirements. Tasked to manage the country’s external accounts, among other functions, the BSP has been buying and selling gold over the years as part of its core functions. When the BSP sells gold, the proceeds revert to and stay within the GIR. Last year, the GIR rose to USD 106.3 billion from USD 103.8 billion in 2023. Similar to other central banks, the BSP maintains a portion of its reserves in gold as part of the country’s GIR mostly to hedge against/offset movements in the market price of other assets. It buys or sells gold to maintain an optimum level for this purpose, not too much, not too little. This follows basic portfolio-management principles. Gold prices tend to move in the opposite direction of other assets. Therefore central banks hold some gold as a hedge against price declines in other assets in the reserves. However gold prices can be volatile, earns little interest, and has storage costs, so central banks don’t want to hold too much." (bold added) 

Back in September, after basking in the limelight, the BSP defended its decision to sell gold.

BSP, September 24, 2024: "The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) sold gold during the first half of the year as part of its active management strategy of the country’s gold reserves, which form part of the country’s Gross International Reserves (GIR). The BSP took advantage of the higher prices of gold in the market and generated additional income without compromising the primary objectives for holding gold, which are insurance and safety." (bold added) 

There is a stark shift in the BSP’s stance on gold reserves. Earlier, they described gold as essential for "insurance and safety," yet last month they’ve characterized it as a "dead asset" that "earns little interest and has storage costs." 

II. Why the Rhetorical Shift? World’s Largest Gold Seller in 2024—BSP


Figure 1

The World Gold Council (WGC) noted that the BSP "confirmed its gold sales—totaling 30 tonnes"—the largest sale by a central bank in 2024. (Figure 1, upper image)

While some other central banks also sold gold, their sales were on a significantly smaller scale.

Globally, central banks were net buyers in 2024, particularly emerging market central banks. The WGC reported that "Central banks added 1,045 tonnes to global gold reserves in 2024."

Since the 2008 financial crisis, global central banks have been rebuilding reserves. (Figure 1, lower pane)


Figure 2

Notably, China’s PBOC and the Central Bank of India were among the most aggressive buyers—not just in 2024, but for several years. (Figure 2, upper window)

Alongside Russia, their gold holdings have matched or even exceeded those of some developed nations, closing the gap with the US. (Figure 2, lower chart—excludes unpublished holdings)

Given this trend, BSP’s claim that "central banks don’t want to hold too much" appears misleading—an appeal to the false majority (argumentum ad populum).

It seems more like an attempt to justify its selling spree rather than reflect actual central bank behavior globally.

III. BSP’s Gold Sales: Supporting the USD-PHP Soft Peg

As part of its "active management strategy," the BSP has been selling gold to finance the USD-PHP soft peg, capping the exchange rate at 59 per USD. This is not just about portfolio rebalancing—it’s a deliberate move to influence the USDPHP exchange rate. 

But that’s not the whole story.

There are costs to this approach. Central banks are political institutions and are not driven by profit-and-loss activities. When the BSP came under scrutiny for its aggressive selling, not only did they stop, but they also started repurchasing gold in August—at much higher prices. In essence, they sold high but bought higher, leading to opportunity losses.


Figure 3

Despite recent incremental purchases, BSP’s gold reserves remain at their lowest level since at least 2019, according to BSP and IMF’s data template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity (IRIFCL) data. 

Data further highlights historical trends, including BSP’s two waves of gold sales. (Figure 3, topmost graph) 

First Wave (2020-2021 Pandemic Recession): BSP sold gold even as the USD-PHP was weakening. This suggests it anticipated the pesos’ depreciation. 

Second Wave (Nov 2023 - July 2024): Gold sales preceded another test of the USD-PHP 59 level in June 2024, implying an effort to manage exchange rate volatility. 

Despite record-high gold prices, BSP’s overall reserves increased due to valuation gains rather than inventory growth. (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

In any case, the all-time high in gold prices has led to an increase in gold’s share of the GIR, reaching 2020 levels. (Figure 3, lowest image) 

On the other hand, the BSP’s demonstrated preference for gold sales reveals its dogmatic proclivities, which barely acknowledges gold as a function of ‘insurance and safety.’ 

Still, despite a reduction in inventory, the BSP owes a significant share of its GIR to gold prices. 

IV. Other Reserve Assets (ORA) and Financial Derivatives: Did the BSP Short Gold? 


Figure 4

Beyond public external borrowings, (Figure 4, topmost graph) which bolster the GIR through National Government deposits with the BSP, Other Reserve Assets (ORA) have played a prominent role since 2018. 

ORA has been rising since January 2024, when the BSP accelerated its gold sales. (Figure 4, middle window) 

ORA has played a conspicuous role in the USDPHP. Its surge from 2018 to 2020 coincided with the fall of the USDPHP, and vice versa (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

ORA includes: 

-Mark-to-market financial derivatives (forwards, futures, swaps, options)

-Forwards and options on gold

-Short-term foreign currency loans

-Other financial assets used for immediate liquidity

-Repo assets 

This raises key questions: 

-Has BSP been ‘shorting’ gold via ORA while conducting physical sales to settle delivery? 

-Is BSP boosting its reserves with derivatives and repos via transactions with international financial intermediaries, particularly US-based institutions? 

While the BSP claims that gold "earns little interest and has storage costs," financial derivatives also incur commissions and fees, which are paid to banks, brokers, and dealers. These costs include premiums on options and other transaction fees. 

-Why has the BSP been prioritizing financial derivatives and repos over gold, which serves as "insurance and safety"? Are these instruments not costlier and riskier? 

-Has geopolitics influenced the BSP’s decision-making trade-offs? Aside from its geopolitical alignment with the U.S., could this shift toward Wall Street-linked instruments be connected to the Philippines' removal from the FATF’s money laundering grey list? 

To sum up, has the BSP’s increasing use of financial leverage to sustain the USDPHP soft peg led to diminishing returns? And is its shrinking gold stock a symptom of this trend? 

V. Broader Economic Pressures: 11-Year High January Balance of Payments (BoP) Deficit and Soaring External Debt 

Yet more symptoms. 

BSP, February 19: "The country’s overall balance of payments (BOP) position posted a deficit of US$4.1 billion in January 2025, higher than the US$740 million BOP deficit recorded in January 2024. The BOP deficit in January 2025 reflected the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ (BSP) net foreign exchange operations and drawdowns by the national government (NG) on its foreign currency deposits with the BSP to meet its external debt obligations."


Figure 5

That is, the January BoP deficit widened to an 11-year high! Ironically, the NG raised USD 3.3 billion in January. This suggests that the BOP deficit largely reflects the net cost of defending the USDPHP soft peg. Remarkable!

Additionally, Bureau of Treasury data shows that external debt in peso terms—partially reflecting devaluation—continues to surge, growing 11.4% year-over-year, with its uptrend dating back to 2012

FX debt servicing costs (interest and amortization) skyrocketed 47.5% in 2024, increasing its share of total debt to 22.9%, confirming a trend reversal in 2023.

Be reminded: This debt buildup wouldn’t have been necessary had there been sufficient organic FX revenue (e.g., remittances, tourism, service exports, FDI and etc.).

VI. Signaling Channel: The BSP’s Softening Rhetorical Stance on the USDPHP Cap

With declining gold reserves and mounting external pressures, peso devaluation appears increasingly likely.

Inquirer.net, February 15: "A peso fall to the 60-level against the US dollar remains “a possibility” despite the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ (BSP) decision to hold rates steady, Governor Eli Remolona Jr. said, adding that hitting the pause button on easing was the “less disruptive” action for the market." (bold added)

This media communication represents the "signaling channel" approach—where central bankers use public messaging to condition market expectations.

Foreign institutions have begun forecasting a breach of the 59-peso level:

Sunlife: 61

Bank of America: 60

Maybank: 63

BMI: Above 60

HSBC: Beyond 59 

These are hardly typical forecasts or implicit pressure on the BSP; rather, they seem part of the signaling effort in shaping the Overton Window. 

The USDPHP exchange rate operates under a ‘soft peg’ regime, meaning the BSP will likely determine the next upper band or ceiling. In the previous adjustment, the ceiling rose from 56.48 in 2004 to 59 in 2022, representing a 4.5% increase. If history rhymes, the next likely cap could be in the 61-62 range. 

VII. Conclusion: Inevitable Devaluation of the Philippine Peso? 

BSP’s evolving stance on gold raises fundamental questions about its broader strategy. Its aggressive sales, followed by reactive repurchases at higher prices, suggest a focus on short-term currency stabilization—driven by sensationalist politics—rather than strategic reserve management. 

At the same time, the increasing reliance on derivatives and external debt amplifies long-term financial risks. 

Moreover, the BSP appears less committed to defending the 59 level, as indicated by both its rhetoric and evolving fundamentals, including declining gold reserves. 

With external pressures mounting, peso devaluation seems not a matter of IF but WHEN.

 

Monday, May 22, 2023

US Sanctions Russia’s Gold Miners: A War Against Global Central Banks Accumulation of Gold?

Are the sanctions on Russian gold miners aimed at slowing global central bank purchases of gold?



This short post deals with the growing trend of global fragmentation or de-globalization. 


The above sanctions on Russian gold miners translate to the increasing weaponization of natural resources, which could lead to more resource nationalism.

 

And the injunction does not seem to be directed only against Russia—the 2nd largest producer w/ a 10% share of world production—but implicitly also against buyers/consumers of gold. 

 

Since central banks have been significant buyers of gold—which hit a record last 2022—as shown by the chart from the Economist—the intent of this prohibition could be to slow its accumulation. 


Could this signify a countermeasure against the mounting activities of the Global South to establish a rival currency against the US dollar standard?

And as the chart of @VCElements also shows, Australia, Canada & US have only an aggregate 22% share of total production, which means the Global South/emerging markets control the rest. 

The escalation of sanctions could lead to more supply constraints, which scarcity could fuel higher prices as intensifying uncertainties could increase demand for gold. 

Sunday, July 18, 2021

Reality is not Optional, BSP Extends Php 540 billion Loans to the National Government: Another Bailout of the Banking System

 

It is impossible to understand the history of economic thought if one does not pay attention to the fact that economics as such is a challenge to the conceit of those in power. An economist can never be a favorite of autocrats and demagogues. With them he is always the mischief-maker, and the more they are inwardly convinced that his objections are well founded, the more they hate him—Ludwig von Mises 

 

In this issue 

Reality is not Optional, BSP Extends Php 540 billion Loans to the National Government: Another Bailout of the Banking System 

I. Introduction 

II. The Causal Realist Framework: Reality Isn’t Optional 

III. Confusing Rebound with Growth: June Vehicle Sales 

IV. Confusing Slowdown with Growth: The BSP’s Foreign Direct Investments 

V. More Ghost Data? Despite Downtrend: Hurrah for the OFW Remittances Boom! Why Labor Exports will Persists 

VI. GIR Falls in June as the BSP Offloads Gold to Defend the Peso, Will the US Fed Policy in the End-2022? 

VII. BSP Extends Php 540 billion Loans to the National Government: Another Bailout of the Banking System 


Reality is not Optional, BSP Extends Php 540 billion Loans to the National Government: Another Bailout of the Banking System 

 

I. Introduction 

 

No matter how people deny the truth: Reality is not an option. (To borrow from Thomas Sowell) 

  

There appears to be a media campaign to boost the animal spirits by interpreting a boom from the low-base effect with growth: From the perspective of vehicle sales, FDIs, and OFW Remittances.  

  

June GIR drops as the BSP sold gold to defend the peso. 

  

The bailout of the banking system continues as the BSP extends direct loans to the National Government. 


II. The Causal Realist Framework: Reality Isn’t Optional 

 

Using a causal realist framework, I have endeavored to bring reality closer or provide a better perspective of the truth to my audience. 

 

Let us start with… 

 

From the Businessworld (July 16): THE CENTRAL BANK approved another short-term loan worth P540 billion to the National Government to boost its coffers as the pandemic continues. “We recently extended our arrangement with them — P540 billion, we just renewed our assistance to the government,” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Governor Benjamin E. Diokno said at a briefing on Thursday. This is the fourth time the National Government has received support from the central bank, which has extended a direct advance of P300 billion in March 2020, P540 billion in October 2020 and another P540 billion in December 2020. “They paid the P540 billion (last month), now they’re asking for a renewal and the Monetary Board has approved it,” Mr. Diokno said. Under Republic Act 7653 or The New Central Bank Act, the BSP is allowed to lend 20% of its average revenue to the government, which is equivalent to P540 billion. This was increased to 30% or up to P850 billion by the Republic Act 11494 or the Bayanihan to Recover as One Act which allowed direct provisional advances within two years since the law’s effectivity. (italics added) 

 

Despite the assurance of a significant economic recovery, we shall say again, interest groups benefiting from easing policies will demand more interventions from the BSP in the face of broken promises. 

 

More easing (interest rates cuts or QE) will spur inflation that pressures interest rates upwards that should ripple adversely through the banking system’s loan and investment portfolios.  

 

If the BSP pursues deleveraging, while this should be long term healthy, the unintended consequence would be the oscillation of pressures on profits of the credit-dependent unproductive and maladjusted (bubble) segments of the economy, thereby vitiating their creditworthiness. 

 

The Diokno led BSP is, thus, caged. 


January Banking Woes: Cash Reserves Loss Accelerates!  Loan and Deposit Liabilities Growth Plunged! FX Deposits Halve! March 11 2019 

 

Also, the ink has barely dried from our outlook last week… 

 

And to contain the slump, the BSP can be expected to intervene directly either by borrowing MORE/bring back the use of derivatives, or offload its USD holdings when the borrowing access becomes scarce.  

 

 

 

And yes, a switch in the mainstream narrative can be expected, focusing on the supposed positives of devaluation: help exports, OFWs, and tourism, as well as reduce debt. Blah blah blah. 

 

See Ka-Boom! USD-Php Smashes Through the Php 50 Barrier! July 11, 2021 

 

…now comes these… 

 

From the Philstar (July 12): In a Monday morning interview with ABS-CBN News Channel, BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno said the central bank is already intervening in the foreign exchange market to temper the local unit’s weakness by converting some of its dollar reserves into peso. But the BSP chief said monetary authorities still trust in the market-determined exchange rate. … “The BSP will continue to adopt at market-determined exchange rate policy. That’s our approach. We deal with exchange rate volatility, looking at supply and demand of foreign exchange,” he said. “At the same time, our role is smoothen the fluctuations, and to make sure market conditions are orderly rather than steering peso to a particular level, whether it’s stronger or weaker than other currencies,” he added. (italics mine) 

 

From the Businessworld (July 12) THE PESO’S recent depreciation to P50-per-dollar rate could provide a mild boost to the pandemic-stricken exports sector still struggling with high shipping costs and additional taxes, according to an industry group. (italics mine) 

 

The causal feedback loops have been proceeding according to our proposed directions. 

 

Learning from the great Austrian Economist, Ludwig von Mises, (bold mine) 

 

Cognizance of the relation between a cause and its effect is the first step toward man's orientation in the world and is the intellectual condition of any successful activity. All attempts to find a satisfactory logical, epistemological, or metaphysical foundation for the category of causality were doomed to fail. All we can say about causality is that it is a priori not only of human thought but also of human action. 

 

Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science p.20 Mises.org 

 

We shall deal with the above issues later. 

 

We can opt to deny the truth, but it won’t go away. Reality isn’t optional.  

 

As the 19th century Norwegian playwright Henrik Johan Ibsen wrote in the Pillars of Society (Lona Act IV)… 

 

The spirit of truth and the spirit of freedom — these are the pillars of society. 

 

III. Confusing Rebound with Growth: June Vehicle Sales 

 

Will an economic recovery be attained from the constant stretching of reality? 

 

The mainstream thinks so. 

 

From the Businessworld (July 14): VEHICLE SALES in June jumped 45% compared with the same month last year as the auto industry continues to grapple with the impact of the pandemic. Sales increased by 44.8% to 22,550 units in June compared with 15,578 units sold a year ago, a joint report from the Chamber of Automotive Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMPI) and Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) released on Tuesday showed. 

 

 

Figure 1 

The % growth cited by media signifies a comparison of this year’s relatively “open” economy with last year’s economic shutdown.  Thus, the low-base effect magnified the % gains. 

 

Yet, what growth?  

 

The trend of unit sales continues to cascade ever since its zenith in December 2017 or the eve of the imposition of TRAIN. Is a downtrend equivalent to growth? 

 

Further, bank consumer auto loans shrank by a record 13.8% in May, for its eight-straight month, suggesting that cash purchases or in-house dealer financing for auto sales instead. 

  

Meanwhile, the growth of vehicle NPLs relative to the Total NPLs and Total Loans also soared in the 1Q 2021, a rising trend since 2018. The political response to the pandemic accelerated it.  

 

Growth is found in the NPLs and not in sales. 

 

Yet, the picture provided by the above points to excess supply in the face of limited demand, which, apart from an income squeeze, has been constrained by reduced credit availability.  

 

What growth? Where? 


IV. Confusing Slowdown with Growth: The BSP’s Foreign Direct Investments 

 

Here’s more.  

 

 

Figure 2 

 

From the BSP (July 12): Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows continued its growth momentum in April 2021, rising by 114.4 percent year-on-year to US$679 million from US$317 million in April 2020 (Table 1). This brought the FDI net inflows for the first four months of 2021 to US$3.1 billion, a 56.3 percent increase from US$2 billion in the comparable period last year. The higher cumulative FDI net inflows was due to the improvements in all components, led by non-residents’ net investments in debt instruments, which rose by 115.2 percent to US$1.9 billion from US$897 million. Net placements of equity capital also grew by 8.1 percent to reach US$818 million from US$756 million. Reinvestment of earnings increased slightly by 2.0 percent to US$307 million from US$301 million a year ago. FDI net inflows in April 2021 rose on the back of positive foreign investor sentiment on the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals and strong growth prospects. In particular, FDI net inflows during the month increased due mainly to the 121.2 percent expansion in non-residents’ net investments in debt instruments to US$500 million from US$226 million in April 2020.  

 

A picture, they say, is worth a thousand words.  

 

As it is, FDIs are another case of booming % data from the low base effects. For those who swallow headlines hook, line, and sinker, that should be a good feed.  

  

To be sure, April’s growth represents the recent set of lower highs that only reinforces the FDI downtrend from 2016. Unfortunately, this set is what the consensus sells to the public as growth! 

 

Furthermore, instead of equity infusion, debt has dominated FDI growth. Or, even from the prism of FDIs, leverage dominates the system. 

 

Put this way, "positive…macroeconomic fundamentals and strong growth prospects" have been driven by incremental growth financed by debt.  

 

War is Peace, Ignorance is Strength, Downtrend is Growth. Baghdad Bob lives! 

 

V. More Ghost Data? Despite Downtrend: Hurrah for the OFW Remittances Boom! Why Labor Exports will Persists 

 

Yet, more good news is needed to fire up the animal spirits of the economy.  

 

From the BSP (July 13): Personal remittances from overseas Filipinos (OFs) increased by 13.3 percent to US$2.652 billion in May 2021 from US$2.341 billion in May 2020. This brought the cumulative remittances to US$13.68 billion in the first five months of 2021, a 6.6 percent rise year-on-year  from the US$12.835 billion recorded in the comparable period in 2020…. Likewise, cash remittances from OFs coursed through banks rose by 13.1 percent to US$2.382 billion in May 2021 from US$2.106 billion in the comparable month a year ago.  

 

Figure 3 

 

See, as the communique implies, the falling peso has no basis.  

 

Yet, OFW remittances appear to be the most amazing statistical paradox of them all. Why? Because it defies the other data and economic logic. Remittances continue to sizzle regardless of the sizeable number of displaced OFWs and migrant workforce. Have the 612,000 + repatriated OFWs (as of July 12 OWWA) been sent back or replaced? How about the migrant workers abroad? If not, who is sending these massive amounts of FX under the taxonomy of OFW remittances? Or has the remittance data been padded by ghost overseas labor (BSP FX Debt)? 

 

Yes, the outsized gain of May also signified a magnified number from the low-base effect.  

 

Strikingly, despite the inflated numbers, monthly % growth numbers of cash remittances from 2004 have trended south, reflecting the law of diminishing returns 

 

By extension, the monthly USD figures (in the chart) have likewise been plateauing since 2018 to suggest a rounded top. 

 

More interestingly, if the economy is indeed progressing, then why depend on human exports at all? Why cheer on revenues emanating from policies that have failed to boost local employment and deliver sufficient income or wages for domestic labor? 

 

Proof? 

 

From the CNN (July 13): Export-oriented companies urged the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to revoke a new rule that charges a 12% value-added tax on export products and transactions which were previously VAT-free. In separate letters sent to the finance and trade departments and to the BIR, the Semiconductor and Electronics Industries in the Philippines Foundation (SEIPI), the Confederation of Wearable Exporters of the Philippines (CONWEP), and the Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association asked the government to repeal BIR Revenue Regulation 9-2021 issued in June. Under the new policy, raw materials, packaging supplies and services rendered or sold to export firms engaged in manufacturing, processing, packing or repacking are now subject to VAT after years of exemption. Also covered are the sale of services and lease of properties for companies that produce export goods…Other business leaders warned that the new rule will scare new investors and take away thousands of jobs. Factories will likely resort to importing their supplies as it would still end up cheaper than the additional tax. 

 

According to the law of demand, if you tax something you get less of it. 

 

And haven’t you noticed, taxes are creeping higher even before the installation of a new administration? The education sector has been in an uproar over a tax hike from 10% to 25% 

 

How much MORE tax hikes will emerge in the aftermath of the 2022 national elections? 

 

For exporters, it’s not just VAT, but the costs of shipments have soared as well. Add to their woes, the increasing scarcity of bank financing.   

 

That is to say, at the cost of the marginal entities, the concentration of exports will be coming from elites, who can afford to shoulder higher taxes because of their armies of accountants and lawyers, have the infrastructure for shipments, and have access to cheap credit. 

 

So there you have it, the erosion of competition or the concentration of the industry translates to lesser domestic jobs impelling MORE human exports. 

 

Well, here is a silver lining. Because of intermarriages, the Philippines should become a powerhouse in international beauty contests! 

 

VI. GIR Falls in June as the BSP Offloads Gold to Defend the Peso, Will the US Fed Policy in the End-2022? 

 

The fixation by many social media outfits on the May OFW numbers instead of the June Gross International Reserve (GIR) has been astonishing.  

 

Do they know that FX remittances of June, though yet to be published, are already incorporated into June's Gross International Reserve (Foreign Assets/Balance of Payments)? Or has editorial priority been addressed to highlight the grander growth numbers to boost the animal spirits? 

 

 

Figure 4 

 

From the BSP (July 13): The country’s gross international reserves (GIR) level, based on preliminary data, settled at US$106.08 billion as of end-June 2021 from the end-May 2021 GIR level of US$107.25 billion. The latest GIR level represents a more than adequate external liquidity buffer equivalent to 12.1 months’ worth of imports of goods and payments of services and primary income.1 Moreover, it is also about 7.8 times the country’s short-term external debt based on original maturity and 5.2 times based on residual maturity. The month-on-month decrease in the GIR level was mainly attributed to the downward adjustment in the value of the BSP’s gold holdings due to the decrease in the price of gold in the international market, foreign currency withdrawals of the National Government (NG) from its deposits with the BSP to pay its foreign currency debt obligations and various expenditures, and BSP’s foreign exchange operations. These were partly offset, however, by the inflows from the BSP’s income from its investments abroad. (italics added) 

 

Sure, gold was mainly responsible for the drop of June’s GIR.  

  

Month on month USD gold prices dropped by 7.02% in June. But its gold reserves fell by 10.4%, which likely means the BSP offloaded its gold holdings to defend the peso. Wow. 

 

Based on the IMF’s International Reserve and Foreign Currency Liquidity Report, since June 2020, the BSP’s physical gold reserves have gone down. Gold’s share of the BSP’s GIR has sunk to the lows of 2015. 

  

But the peso has been under pressure since the scaling down of the BSP’s use of Other Reserve Asset (ORA).  Deposits from proceeds of borrowings by the national government replaced this. Yet, the BSP recycles part of the NG FX borrowings through US banks by holding USTs. 

 

That said, we bring back this quote featured above.  

 

From the Philstar (July 12): In a Monday morning interview with ABS-CBN News Channel, BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno said the central bank is already intervening in the foreign exchange market to temper the local unit’s weakness by converting some of its dollar reserves into peso. But the BSP chief said monetary authorities still trust in the market-determined exchange rate. … “The BSP will continue to adopt at market-determined exchange rate policy. That’s our approach. We deal with exchange rate volatility, looking at supply and demand of foreign exchange,” he said. “At the same time, our role is smoothen the fluctuations, and to make sure market conditions are orderly rather than steering peso to a particular level, whether it’s stronger or weaker than other currencies,” he added. (italics mine) 

 

So, the BSP has opted to pare down its FX reserves, most likely with the offloading of more gold, than boost the peso by resuming the use of FX derivatives this July.  

 

They will also continue to 'adopt a market-determined exchange rate policy' but insists on intervening purportedly to 'smoothen the fluctuations.'  

 

Cutting down the winded chase, markets determine exchange rate policy ONLY when the outcome IS palatable to the monetary authorities. When it is NOT, the BSP intervenes in the hope of disciplining market forces. 

 

Unfortunately, a pseudo market-determined exchange rate that skews the economic balance will unlikely attain its goal. As the great Austrian Economist Ludwig von Mises explained, 

 

Interventionism means that the government not only fails to protect the smooth functioning of the market economy, but that it interferes with the various market phenomena; it interferes with prices, with wage rates, interest rates, and profits. 

 

Ludwig von Mises, A Regulated Economy Leads to a Socialist Economy January 17, 2018 Mises.org 

 

And as the news excerpt suggests, the feedback loop of the falling peso and declining GIRs will continue. 

 

As a final note on the peso and GIRs, from the ABS-CBN (July 15): The spread of COVID-19’s delta variant could delay moves by the US Federal Reserve to shift monetary policy, the head of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas said on Thursday.  

 

Do you know that the so-called projected policy shift by the US FED, factored in by the markets, is at the end of 2022?  

 

So we are supposed to believe that the Fed’s policy deferment from end-2022 to some time 2023-2024 should be a peso positive, regardless of its underlying imbalances?  

 

The market implied Fed rate exhibit tenuous convictions that the FED will even pursue a single rate hike at the end of 2022. Delay barely seems in the cards. Falling yields of USTs have underscored this. 

 

VII. BSP Extends Php 540 billion Loans to the National Government: Another Bailout of the Banking System 

 

This brings us to the final topic of the day: an extension of the Php 540 billion direct loans by the BSP to the National Government, the fourth time since March 2020. 

  

Why the need for the BSP to finance the National Government? 

  

First, the budget deficit is running below the 9.4% deficit-to-GDP target. 

  

As of May, the Treasury’s fiscal deficit accrued to Php 566.2 billion, which is just 31% of the target of Php 1.8 trillion, calculated from the 7% GDP goal of the NG. Or, at the current pace, the annual deficit will be below the NG’s target.  

  

Second, the nominal increase in outstanding debt is more than double the deficit.  

  

As of May, outstanding public debt has accrued to Php 1.27 trillion, more than double the deficit and signifying about 70% of the deficit target. 

 

The banking system has Php 12.9 trillion in peso deposits as of May.  If the easy money regime prevails, persuading some depositors to contribute should be a piece of cake. Of course, excluded from these are deposit accounts representing the public’s repository funds.  

 

The Department of Finance projects this year’s borrowing at Php 3.03 trillion, 74% of which will originate from local sources.  

 

With the peso on a waterfall, external borrowing will become a less conducive option. 

 

The thing is, borrowings of Php 3 trillion to fund Php 1.8 trillion of deficit? I know; it is election time.  

  

Perhaps their intended goal is for the BSP to fill that gap. 

 

Well, through headlines, that’s what authorities want the public to believe: The BSP intends to support growth. That is, whatever definition of growth is for them. For instance, is growth conceptualized in the context of the size of the government? If so, they have been successful. 

 

Here is the information withheld by authorities.  

 

The actual goal of asset inflation is to combat deflationary pressures on the banking system. It seeks to prevent collateral values held by institutional creditors, mainly banks, from collapsing. 

 

Stagflation, Ahoy: January CPI Accelerates, Price Controls and QE to Fuel Higher Inflation, Treasury Markets Agree February 7 

 

 

Figure 5 

 

The BSP’s net claims on the central government grew by 26% YoY or Php 144 billion month-on-month to Php 699.02 billion, which was in response to the plunge in cash in circulation. After posting double-digit gains through March, currency issued by the BSP bounced 4.4% YoY in June from .98% in May. 

 

The NG pruned their debt by Php 341 billion in March and April, or only 62% of the Php 540 billion extended last December, but the ensuing liquidity drain was powerful enough to prompt the BSP hands. 

 

So the BSP started to increase its direct lending to the NG in June even before they declared it last week. 

 

There are three tactical approaches by the BSP to contain deflation. As explained last June 

 

One, prevent and contain the losses of the index and financial assets, which deflationary signals may affect collateral values, necessary for bank lending operations, the upkeep of financial assets and support balance sheets of the banking system.  

 

Direct lending by the BSP to the National Government declined in the last two months through April, which depleted some of the excess liquidity in the financial system.  The growth of currency issued by the BSP plunged by a steep .43% in April from 4.06% in March.  

 

 

 

Two, boost market "confidence" to enhance financial liquidity 

 

Credit drought in a system dependent on credit expansion is a recipe for fire sales. That’s why the knee-jerk response by the BSP was to infuse a whopping Php 2 trillion liquidity, hoping that this would be sufficient to disguise, if not forestall, insolvencies.  

 

 

 

Three, allow establishment institutions expanded access to the public’s savings. 

 

As a consequence of tenor mismatching (borrow short-lend long), credit delinquencies emerge from bank operations. Credit impairments hamper operations and erode capital. To fill this gap, banks require fresh funds. 

 

BSP’s Confession: Leverage Represents The Key Risk Today; An Analysis of the State of Financial Stability June 13 

 

YoY changes in the BSP’s assets and YoY changes in the cash reserves of the banking system are closely associated.  Presently, through its easing policies, the BSP determines the changes in the bank's cash reserves. 

 

The BSP’s QE has likewise served as a recent source of bank deposits. However, bank deposit growth has stalled, hence the renewal of the QE. 

 

Banks also acquire securities of the Philippine Treasuries, which it uses as collateral for its borrowing (repo) activities with the BSP. Or banks resell these securities to the BSP (QE secondary market). 

 

The point is that the BSP’s actions have centered on providing support on the credit-collateral dynamic of the banking system. Simply put, the QE is a bailout of the banking system. 

 

Again, the BSP’s latest act serves as fuel to monetary inflation and the peso's fall.