Economic
interventionism is a self-defeating policy. The individual measures that it
applies do not achieve the results sought. They bring about a state of affairs,
which—from the viewpoint of its advocates themselves—is much more undesirable
than the previous state they intended to alter—Ludwig von Mises
In this issue:
Stagflation Part 10: The Politics of Contradiction—Rate
Hikes, Liquidity Addiction, and External Constraint Under Balance-Sheet Stress
I. The Contradiction Nobody Wants to Discuss
II. The Market Rally That Allowed the BSP to Blink
III. BSP: Tightening with One Hand, Accommodating with the
Other
IV. Economic Fragility, Political Fragility
V. Mounting External Constraints Under Balance-Sheet Stress
VI. USD 2.5 Billion Borrowing, Refinancing Risk, and the
Deepening Dollar Short
VII. Conclusion: Stagflation and the Political Economy of
Deferred Adjustment
Stagflation Part 10: The Politics of Contradiction—Rate
Hikes, Liquidity Addiction, and External Constraint Under Balance-Sheet Stress
The BSP tightened, markets celebrated, and the government borrowed another $2.5 billion abroad. What appears as stability increasingly depends on intervention, leverage, and external financing.
I. The Contradiction Nobody Wants to Discuss
The BSP raised rates for a second time.
It also raised its inflation forecasts for both 2026 and
2027. The peso rallied. Treasury yields fell. The PSEi posted one of its
strongest advances of the year.
Authorities extended salary-loan maturities.
Domestic liquidity continued expanding.
The government returned to international markets for
another USD 2.5 billion in dollar borrowing.
Meanwhile, regulators openly warned about rising foreign
exchange exposure and a growing wall of corporate refinancing obligations over
the next several years.
Viewed individually, each development appears manageable.
Viewed together, something does not fit.
If inflation risks are rising, why are financial
conditions easing?
If tighter monetary policy is necessary, why are new
forms of credit accommodation being introduced?
If external conditions are improving, why is additional
foreign borrowing required?
If peso stability is fundamentally secure, why is
increasing attention being paid to foreign exchange behavior and refinancing
risk?
The contradiction is becoming difficult to ignore because
it is increasingly the structure of policy itself.
Officially, authorities acknowledge inflation pressures,
external vulnerabilities, slowing growth, and rising financial risks.
Operationally, policy continues to prioritize liquidity
preservation, leverage maintenance, and the postponement of adjustment.
Figure 1
Even the government's own think tank, the Congressional
Policy and Budget Research Department, has begun openly discussing
conditions consistent with stagflation and warning against further expansionary
spending. (Figure 1, upper image)
That admission is
an affirmation of this series' thesis: the symptoms — persistent
inflation alongside weakening economic activity — have become too visible to
dismiss even from within the policy establishment itself.
When official diagnostics begin to register
stagflation-like conditions while policy continues to operate in a mixed
tightening–accommodation regime, the gap between competing explanations narrows
in practice even if it remains formally unresolved. The direction of causality
is therefore asymmetrical: lived and financial conditions shift first,
institutional recognition follows.
This is where stagflation is often misunderstood.
It is treated as a statistical condition—inflation plus
stagnation plus unemployment. Yet statistics are not lived reality. They are
delayed summaries of processes already unfolding.
What matters is not when the data finally “recognizes”
stagflation, but what produces it.
As
previously discussed, the Philippine experience of the 1970s makes this clear.
After the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, the economy did not
immediately register a textbook stagflationary outcome. There was no clean
recession. Output did not collapse on cue. On paper, the system remained
functional. (Figure 1, lower window)
But lived conditions told a different story.
Prices rose. Shortages emerged. Purchasing power eroded.
Rationing and administrative allocation became more visible. Household welfare
deteriorated even as aggregate statistics continued to suggest motion.
But policies that suppress adjustment in order to
preserve activity do not remove imbalances. They relocate them forward in time.
External borrowing expanded. Credit was extended. State
intervention deepened. Financial accommodation smoothed over the gaps.
Adjustment was not eliminated; it was deferred and financed.
The system continues to operate, but increasingly on the
basis of accumulated leverage, external dependence, and postponed correction.
The 1983 debt crisis manifested through financial
distress, tightening external constraints, and systemic funding breakdown, with
its statistical expression—recession, inflation pressures, and broader
financial stress—appearing only in the subsequent data as a lagging record of
developments already underway.
The lesson is not that stagflation suddenly “arrived” in
1983.
It is that it had
already been produced long before, and was merely waiting for the
mechanisms of suppression to fail.
The issue is not simply empirical—whether inflation is
high, growth is weak, or unemployment is rising. Those are late or lagging
indicators.
The issue is
causal.
A system that repeatedly uses policy to preserve
liquidity, stabilize financial conditions, and defer balance-sheet adjustment
does not eliminate economic constraints. It attenuates the feedback mechanism and the economy's innate ability
to cope with changes. Instead, imbalances accumulate.
Each intervention may stabilize the present.
Collectively, they reduce the economy’s adaptive capacity. Over time, fragility
increases.
This is why focusing exclusively on whether the current
data meets the textbook definition of stagflation misses the point.
By the time the statistics confirm it, the adjustment
process is already well underway.
Recent developments suggest this same pattern is
re-emerging.
Stagflation, in this sense, is not a starting point. It
is a late-stage expression of
a deeper political economy problem—the attempt to maintain stability in the
face of constraints that are no longer fully compatible.
II. The Market Rally That Allowed the BSP to Blink
The PSEi 30 posted its biggest one-day gain of 6.14% on
June 15th since May 27 2021’s 5.11%, while its 3.81% weekly advance was the
largest in 2026.
Yet beneath the headline, the rally was remarkably
narrow.
Figure 2
Over the week, the three largest banks accounted for more
than half—or ~50.94%—of the index's gain. Their cumulative market share of the
PSEi 30 bounced from 18.35% in June 11 to 19.28% in June 18. (Figure 2, topmost
pane)
Adding ICTSI raised that contribution to nearly
two-thirds, or ~62.96% of the entire advance.
Concentration was not limited to index leadership, but
extended to participation and trading activities as well.
For the week, while ICT commanded 23.84% of main board
volume, the top 3 banks accounted for an average of 17.9%. Top 10 brokers
averaged about 64% of main board volume—underscoring the degree to which price
formation was concentrated in a small
number of dominant institutional channels responsible for setting marginal prices across the index.
This was not a broad-based repricing of Philippine growth
prospects.
It was a liquidity-driven, orchestrated repricing
concentrated in heavyweight financial issues — sufficient to move the index
while leaving much of the broader market still lagging, despite this week's
broad-based gains. (Figure 2, second to the highest graph)
As an aside, outsized one-day gains—as statistical
tails—rarely emerge under ordinary market conditions. They tend to cluster
near:
- major bottoms, where panic is exhausted
- major tops, where liquidity temporarily overwhelms
deteriorating fundamentals
- or regime transitions, where expectations reprice
abruptly
Examples include:
- Jan 22, 2001 +17.6% (EDSA II / Estrada ouster)
- Aug 21, 2007 +9.82% (Great Financial Crisis credit panic
rebound)
- Mar 26, 2020 +7.44% (COVID collapse rebound)
The bond market delivered a similar signal.
Treasury yields declined across the curve, particularly
in the belly and long end, producing another episode of bullish flattening.
(Figure 2, second to the lowest and bottom images)
Figure 3
Global markets interpreted the collapse in oil prices
following the US-Iran ceasefire as increasing the probability of easier
monetary conditions.
The PSE’s financials responded accordingly.
In theory, banks benefit mechanically from declining yields:
improved credit demand conditions, stronger mark-to-market positions, easing
funding stress, and higher collateral values.
Yet this is where the sequence becomes more revealing.
For months, the BSP had signaled openness to stronger ‘anti-inflation’
responses, including larger rate hikes and potential off-cycle action.
Inflation risks were repeatedly emphasized.
Instead, the BSP delivered another modest increase last
week while simultaneously
raising inflation forecasts for both 2026 (from 6.3% to 6.4%) and 2027
(from 4.3% to 4.5%). (Figure 3, upper image)
Taken at face value, and using the BSP’s own internal
trajectory assumptions, this implies CPI pressures approaching roughly 8% on
a near-term horizon (remaining eight months) as cumulative effects of past
policy and external shocks propagate through the system.
The significance is not the precision of any single point
estimate, but the directional signal embedded in successive forecast revisions
despite incremental tightening.
The significance is not the magnitude of the revision
alone.
It is the coexistence of three signals:
- incremental tightening on the policy rate side
- upward revision of inflation expectations
- and easing in broader financial conditions
That combination reflects a policy regime operating under
conflicting constraints.
Containing inflation requires tighter financial
conditions.
Preserving growth, managing sovereign financing, and
preventing financial stress increasingly require easier ones.
This is where the market move becomes analytically
relevant—as a temporary offset to policy.
The rally in equities, decline in yields, and
strengthening peso collectively loosened
financial conditions at precisely the moment policy communication was
attempting to maintain an anti-inflation stance.
In effect, markets temporarily absorbed part of the
tightening dilemma by easing financial conditions through asset price and yield
movements—functioning as an indirect signal transmission channel for BSP
policy expectations.
This gave policymakers additional room to avoid a sharper
trade-off between inflation control and financial stability, thus, the modest
rate hike that effectively buys time
and reduces the immediacy of the further
policy tightening.
The BSP’s reaction function therefore remains constrained
not only by domestic inflation dynamics, but by the sensitivity of asset markets and funding conditions to
policy signaling.
And this reveals
the contradiction increasingly visible throughout the framework.
While monetary authorities continue speaking in
inflation-hawk language, the system continues to rely on liquidity-sensitive
transmission channels that behave as if easing conditions remain structurally
necessary.
Inflation pressures, however, did not begin with the
recent oil shock.
- Monetary aggregates had already accelerated.
- Credit growth remained strong.
- Asset markets continued to reflect dependence on
accommodative financial conditions.
Oil shocks can catalyze inflation dynamics, but they do
not create them in isolation.
Sustained broad based or general inflation requires
demand pressure—and in this case, that demand pressure has been increasingly
supported by financial accommodation embedded in the system itself.
The recent spike in CPI has been accompanied by a surge
in M3 ahead of the oil shock. (Figure 3 lower chart)
Despite tightening rhetoric, that accommodation remains
visible across credit, liquidity, and asset pricing channels.
III. BSP: Tightening with One Hand, Accommodating with the
Other
Perhaps the clearest example emerged from the BSP's
decision to extend the maximum repayment period for salary-based general
purpose loans from five
years to seven years.
Authorities described the measure as improving
affordability without encouraging excessive borrowing.
Yet extending maturities is itself a form of
accommodation—a subsidy delivered through time.
Lower monthly amortizations increase borrowing capacity.
Borrowers qualify for larger loans. Existing debts become
easier to service.
Financial stress is reduced not by repayment,
restructuring, or liquidation, but by stretching obligations further into the
future.
In an environment of persistent inflation, this matters.
As purchasing power erodes, households increasingly
resort to balance-sheet expansion to maintain consumption and bridge the gap
between stagnant real incomes and rising living costs. What cannot be financed
through income growth is financed through leverage.
The policy therefore addresses symptoms while reinforcing
the mechanism that produced them.
This is the great economist Frédéric Bastiat’s “Seen and Unseen” at work.
The seen effect is immediate relief. Monthly payments
fall. Borrowers gain breathing room. Delinquencies may temporarily stabilize.
The unseen effects emerge gradually. Household leverage
increases. Financial resilience weakens. Future income becomes increasingly
encumbered by past borrowing decisions. Lenders become more exposed to a
deteriorating credit cycle. Economic growth slows.
Stress is not eliminated. It is redistributed across
time.
In many respects, the measure mirrors earlier
interventions involving credit-card lending interest rate caps.
Temporary relief mechanisms gradually evolved into
semi-permanent features of the financial landscape.
Credit expanded.
Non-performing loans expanded alongside it.
The appearance of stability was maintained through
continued balance-sheet growth.
Figure 4
Salary loans now appear to be moving along a similar
trajectory.
Outstanding
salary loans in pesos reached record highs during the first quarter of
2026. At the same time, peso non-performing loans continue to rise and have
already neared the record set in Q2 2024. (Figure 4, topmost graph)
Along with credit card non-performing loans, salary loans
have powered consumer NPLs to record highs. (Figure 4, middle window)
Rapid credit
growth can temporarily suppress delinquency ratios through a "Wile E.
Coyote dynamic" operating through the denominator effect. Bad
loans continue rising, but total loans rise even faster. The result is a statistical mirage
in which headline indicators appear manageable even as underlying stress
accumulates.
April's universal
and commercial (UC) banking data revealed a similar pattern.
Universal and commercial bank lending accelerated to its
fastest pace in nine months.
Meanwhile, M3 growth remained above 12%, sustaining the
double-digit expansion that has persisted since before the February oil shock.
At first glance, the numbers appeared reassuring.
Yet the composition of liquidity tells a different story.
- Cash in circulation growth slowed.
- Transactional money steadied.
- Savings deposits accelerated.
Liquidity increasingly migrated toward precautionary
balances and interest-bearing instruments. (Figure 4, lowest diagram)
In other words, money continued expanding significantly even as
economic behavior became more defensive.
Figure 5
On the other hand, universal and commercial bank credit
continued growing, but where that credit flowed into continues to be revealing:
- Net
claims on the national government in pesos reached another record high in
April along with the banking system’s Held to Maturity (HTM) presently
reclassified as Debt Securities—net of amortization (Figure 5, topmost window)
- Electricity-sector lending maintained its high-octane record
setting growth.
- Consumer credit growth remained robust despite signs of
plateauing demand.
- Manufacturing lending barely recovered despite
persistent narratives of industrial ‘recovery’. (Figure 5, middle visual)
A growing share of
credit creation appears directed toward sovereign financing, consumption
maintenance, utilities, and stabilization or (energy) bailout mechanisms rather
than broad-based productive investment.
Why this matters.
Credit expansion can sustain spending and support asset
prices. It can generate the appearance of activity. It cannot, by itself,
expand productive capacity.
Debt can temporarily substitute for income.
It cannot substitute for real savings.
And ultimately
it is real savings—not liquidity, leverage, or credit expansion—that determine
an economy's capacity to sustain investment, absorb shocks, adapt to changing
conditions, and expand productive output over time.
IV. Economic Fragility, Political Fragility
This is where the present policy contradiction becomes
most visible.
Even as authorities acknowledge inflation risks and
tighten at the margin, the broader
policy response continues to favor accommodation, balance-sheet preservation,
and the postponement of adjustment.
Yet, politics dominates mainstream incentives. Record-low
approval ratings for the national administration are not merely a
consequence of weaker growth, high inflation, and fragmented institutions —
they are also the reason policymakers keep choosing accommodation over
adjustment. (Figure 5, lowest graph)
A government with
cratering approval cannot afford the short-term pain that genuine adjustment
requires.
The objective
is clear: preserve status quo activities, maintain confidence, and avoid
financial stress.
The consequence is
equally clear. The longer adjustment is deferred, the more resources remain
committed to existing arrangements rather than reallocated toward productive
conditions. Credit sustains the structure of the economy as it exists, not
necessarily as it needs to evolve.
The result is apparent stability.
The cost is
declining adaptive capacity, rising fragility, and a widening gap between
reported conditions and underlying economic reality. That gap does not stay
statistical indefinitely. When lived experience and official narrative diverge
long enough, confidence erodes because the data stopped describing what people
feel.
That erosion is
itself a political risk. A population that no longer trusts the
official account of its own conditions does not simply vote differently. It
begins disengaging from the institutional channels through which grievances are
normally mediated and resolved. As that gap widens, political fragility
compounds economic fragility, increasing
the risk that future shocks are expressed through social instability rather
than orderly adjustment.
This is the convergence this series has been tracking
from the start: economic fragility and political fragility are not parallel
risks. They share a single root cause.
Both are downstream of the same decision — to repeatedly postpone adjustment
while the underlying constraints continue to build.
Stagflation, in
this sense, was never just a statistical condition. It is what postponement
looks like once it has run long enough for the costs to surface in both the
balance sheet and the body politic.
V. Mounting External Constraints Under Balance-Sheet Stress
The external sector increasingly reveals the same
contradiction visible elsewhere in the economy.
Figure 6
One of the more curious developments during the first
quarter of 2026 was
the easing in external debt growth despite a record balance-of-payments
deficit. Although the
BoP registered a marginal $131 million surplus in April, the cumulative
deficit remained at roughly USD 7.28 billion, still higher than the 2022 annual
of USD 7.26 billion. (Figure 6, topmost pane)
Persistent external deficits imply greater dependence on
external financing because they must be financed, through borrowing, through
capital inflows or through reserve deployment or a combination of these.
If external debt remained relatively stable despite a
record deficit, reserves likely absorbed a larger share of the adjustment
burden.
That said, authorities remain actively engaged in
managing peso stability.
Gross international reserves fell to USD 103.99 billion
in May, their lowest level since January 2025.
Despite the modest (+.42% YoY) growth in external debt
during the Q1 2026, total external obligations continue to exceed reserve
levels. (Figure 6, middle image)
At the same time, the economy remains structurally dependent on
imported fuel, imported capital goods, and external financing.
The problem is not merely the stock of obligations. It is
the growing uncertainty surrounding both
the flow of dollars needed to sustain them, and importantly, the domestic
conditions upon which expectations of profits, refinancing, and repayment
ultimately depend.
Organic sources of foreign exchange are showing signs of
strain.
- OFW
remittance growth slowed to 2% in April, the weakest pace in nearly four
years. Middle East tensions create additional uncertainty for overseas workers.
(Figure 6, lowest chart)
- Tourism continues to underperform expectations.
- Global
growth is slowing.
- The BPO industry increasingly faces pressure from the diffusion
of AI-driven automation across segments of its business model.
Taken as a whole, these
developments suggest that future foreign-exchange generation may become less
certain amid an insufficient domestic stock of dollar liquidity, precisely when
demand for dollars remains elevated.
The BSP’s latest Financial Stability Report offers a
glimpse into the harsh reality of external dependence.
Figure 7
Regulators cited potential market risk involving roughly
Php 1.6 trillion in debt maturities and foreign-exchange obligations—a “wall
of maturities” concentrated among major conglomerates between 2027 and
2029. This includes
“US dollar-denominated debt averaging 37.6 percent of conglomerate debt over
the next five years” (Figure 7, upper graph)
The largest exposures are concentrated in real estate,
power, energy, and ICT. (Figure 7, lower chart)
These sectors benefited enormously from years of abundant
liquidity, low financing costs, stable exchange rates, and favorable
refinancing conditions.
They are also among the most exposed to higher energy
costs, tighter global dollar liquidity, elevated interest rates, and
refinancing risk.
This configuration matters because it links past
conditions of abundant external liquidity to future vulnerabilities under
tighter global financial conditions.
It is within this context that the BSP’s concern over
activity in non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) becomes particularly revealing.
Authorities have warned
banks against speculative peso positioning using NDFs.
Yet firms facing refinancing needs, energy exposure, and
substantial foreign-currency liabilities increase their demand for dollar
protection.
Under conditions
of uncertainty—rather than quantifiable risk in the Knightian sense—the
distinction between hedging, insurance, liquidity management, and speculation
becomes inherently blurred. The same action can simultaneously function as
protection against loss, adjustment to perceived funding constraints, and
positioning for potential gain.
What matters is not the label attached to the behavior,
but the environment that makes increased demand for dollar assets a rational
response across multiple motives at once.
The BSP may discourage specific transactions.
Yet it cannot
eliminate the underlying conditions that generate reflexive demand for
protection.
That demand emerges
endogenously from the structure of the system: persistent external
deficits, refinancing obligations, exposure to foreign-currency liabilities,
limited domestic dollar buffers, and uncertainty over future dollar
availability.
In that sense,
dollar demand is not a discrete behavioral category. It is a system-wide reflex
under conditions of uncertainty.
Speculation thus becomes the visible symptom—or a
political scapegoat—of deeper underlying pressures.
VI. USD 2.5 Billion Borrowing, Refinancing Risk, and the
Deepening Dollar Short
The contradiction becomes clearer when viewed alongside
the government’s latest
USD 2.5 billion bond issuance.
Officials highlighted strong demand and oversubscription.
But oversubscription only indicates willingness to lend.
It does not address why continued external borrowing remains structurally
necessary.
Foreign borrowing functions as a balance-sheet extension
mechanism:
- It supports reserve adequacy.
- It finances fiscal and external gaps.
- It smooths rollover pressures.
- It maintains access to foreign-currency liquidity.
Yet each issuance also expands the stock of
foreign-currency liabilities that must eventually be serviced through
foreign-exchange earnings.
The result is not simply higher debt, but a progressively more leveraged external
balance sheet in which refinancing becomes a recurring requirement rather
than a contingent event.
This is the logic of a rising “dollar short” at the economy-wide level: a structural
condition in which foreign-currency liabilities increasingly exceed the
economy’s internally generated and reliably convertible foreign-exchange
capacity.
In such a configuration, external borrowing is not a
policy choice operating in isolation. It is a response to an underlying constraint: a persistent record
savings–investment gap in which domestic spending and investment
requirements exceed domestically generated savings, particularly in
foreign-currency form.
For an extended period, this gap was accommodated by
abundant global liquidity, low interest rates, and stable capital flows. Under
those conditions, refinancing appeared routine rather than fragile.
That regime condition is no longer stable.
As external liquidity tightens, the underlying balance-sheet structure is revealed more clearly.
Balance-of-payments deficits, repeated external issuance,
and growing reliance on FX-linked financing mechanisms all point to the same
configuration: external obligations
accumulating faster than reliable foreign-exchange generation capacity.
In this setting, the exchange rate does not determine the
constraint. It reflects it.
USDPHP
movements are the price signal of a balance sheet increasingly exposed to FX
mismatch and refinancing dependence.
The vulnerability is not created by exchange rate
movements or external liquidity shifts. Those are transmission channels.
The vulnerability is created
and nurtured internally, through the accumulation of FX-denominated obligations
against a constrained and uneven foreign-exchange earning base.
External liquidity conditions do not determine the existence of the vulnerability, but
they shape its expression, timing, and intensity by affecting refinancing
terms, rollover capacity, and the pricing of FX risk. Even in periods of
abundant global liquidity, as seen post-2008, balance-sheet fragilities in
several emerging markets (e.g., Pakistan, Sri Lanka) still culminated in stress
when domestic constraints became binding despite favorable external conditions.
This is also the mechanism through which sudden-stop
dynamics emerge: not as an exogenous
shock, but as a binding constraint on an already leveraged external position
when refinancing and rollovers can no longer be smoothly refinanced.
VII. Conclusion: Stagflation and the Political Economy of
Deferred Adjustment
The contradiction is increasingly difficult to ignore.
Authorities acknowledge inflation risks, domestic and external
vulnerabilities, and slowing growth. Yet policy remains focused on preserving
liquidity, extending credit, supporting asset prices, and securing additional
external financing.
None of these measures eliminate underlying constraints.
They merely postpone their recognition.
Rising inflation, a weakening peso, and growing debt are
not the disease. They are symptoms — the visible residue of a policy regime
that increasingly relies on accommodation to manage the consequences of earlier
accommodation. Each round of intervention treats the damage from the last one,
while leaving the underlying constraint untouched.
That is the central lesson of stagflation. Stability
purchased through ever-greater intervention becomes progressively more costly
to maintain — in finance, in adaptability, in wealth generation, and eventually
in social order.
The feedback loop compounds. Interventions beget further Interventions,
and the economy that results is not stable but sclerotic: rigid, slow to
adjust, and increasingly dependent on the next intervention to avoid
confronting the constraints the previous one deferred.
Left to run, this is a trajectory toward socio-political
decay, not merely economic stagnation.
The timing of any inflection point cannot be known. What
can be known is the direction. As imbalances accumulate and adaptive capacity
weakens, the gap between official stability and underlying conditions widens —
quietly, then not quietly at all.
Markets do not ease into that recognition. They reprice
it. Political-economic reality reasserts itself. It always does.
____
References:
Stagflation Part 9: The Good News Mirage —
Statistical Stability Amid Structural Fragility
Stagflation Part 8: Manufacturing
Resilience — The PSEi 30 Under Stagflationary Pressure, BSP Accommodation, and
the Financialization of Fragility
Stagflation Part 7: The Return of
Constraint—Oil Shock, Treasury Revolt, and the Politics of Inflation
Suppression
Stagflation Part 6: The Banking System
Under Siege—Bond Selloffs, Liquidity Illusions, and the Coming Balance Sheet
Reckoning
Stagflation Part 5: The Q1 2026 GDP
Illusion and the Gathering Recession Risk Beneath Price Suppression
Stagflation Then and Now: Why Philippine
Markets Are Repricing Like the 1970s (Part 4)
The Anatomy of Philippine Stagflation: BSP
Rate Hikes, Record External Deficits, and Fiscal Expansion (Part 3)
Stagflation by Design: Policy
Contradictions and the Return of the Pandemic Rescue Playbook
Stagflation Is Already Here—Emergency
Policies Are Now Entrenching It
Seed Article
EO-110 and the Politics of Price
Suppression: How the Energy Emergency Is Becoming a Nationwide Economic
Intervention
