Showing posts with label geopolitics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label geopolitics. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 08, 2025

PSE Divergence Confirmed — The September Breakout That Redefined Philippine Mining in the Age of Fiat Disorder

 

The choice of the good to be employed as a medium of exchange and as money is never indifferent. It determines the course of the cash-induced changes in purchasing power. The question is only who should make the choice: the people buying and selling on the market, or the government? It was the market that, in a selective process going on for ages, finally assigned to the precious metals gold and silver the character of money. For two hundred years the governments have interfered with the market’s choice of the money medium. Even the most bigoted étatists do not venture to assert that this interference has proved beneficial—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue 

PSE Divergence Confirmed — The September Breakout That Redefined Philippine Mining in the Age of Fiat Disorder

I. April 2023: The Thesis That Time Has Now Validated

II. September’s Seismic Shift: Mining Index Outpaces the PSEi

III. The Fiat Fracture: Gold's Three-Legged Bull Market and the Chronicle of Monetary Rupture

IV. Gold as Signal of Systemic Stress

V. Fracture Points: Tumultuous Geopolitics and the New War Economy

VI. A Militarized Global Economy and The Fiscal–Military Feedback Loop

VII. Economic Warfare: Tariffs, Fragmentation, and Supply Chain Bifurcation

VIII. World Central Banks Signal Distrust: The Gold Accumulation Surge and Fiat Erosion

IX. The Paradox of Philippine Mining Reform: Bureaucratic Control over Market Forces

X. The Philippine Mining Index Breakout: Gold Leads, Nickel Surprises, Copper Lags and the Speculative Spillover

XI. Conclusion: The Uneasy Return of Hard Assets in a Soft-Money World 

PSE Divergence Confirmed — The September Breakout That Redefined Philippine Mining in the Age of Fiat Disorder 

Beyond the PSEi: Tracking the Philippine Mining Index's decoupling, the gold-fiat fracture, and the systemic risks that power resource equities. 

I. April 2023: The Thesis That Time Has Now Validated


Figure 1 

Back in April 2023, we predicted that rising gold prices would boost the Philippine mining index for several reasons: (see reference) 

1. Unpopular – It is the most unpopular and possibly the "least owned" sector—even "the institutional punters have likely ignored the industry." As proof, it had the "smallest share of the monthly trading volume since 2013." 

2. Lack of Correlation – "its lack of correlation with the PSEi 30 should make it a worthy diversifier" 

3. Potential Divergence – We wrote that "the current climate of overindebtedness and rising rates seen with most mainstream issues, the market may likely have second thoughts about this disfavored sector. Soon." 

4. Formative Bubble – We posed that "If the advent of the era of fragmentation or the age of inflation materializes, could the consensus eventually be chasing a new bubble?" 

Well, media coverage hardly noticed it, but the relative performance of the Mining sector vis-à-vis the PSEi 30—or the Mining/PSEi ratio—made significant headway last September. It critically untethered from its 5-year consolidation phase. (Figure 1, topmost chart) 

Recall: mines suffered a brutal 9-year bear market from 2012 to 2020. The Mining/PSEi ratio hit its secular low during the pandemic recession, pirouetted to the upside, peaked in September 2022, but remained rangebound—nickel lagged, and gold lacked sufficient momentum to lift the index. 

II. September’s Seismic Shift: Mining Index Outpaces the PSEi 

That dramatically changed in September. The Mining/PSEi ratio experienced a seismic breakout, powered by a decisive thrust in gold mines, buoyed further by surging nickel mines. 

But this time may be different. The 2002–2012 bull cycle was driven by Mines outrunning a similarly bristling PSEi 30. Today, the Mines are diverging—operating antithetically from the broader index—a potential reflection of gradual and reticent transition of market leadership. (Figure 1, middle graph) 

The September numbers underscore the shift (Figure 1, lowest table) 

PSEi 30: –3.28% MoM, –18.14% YoY, –6.46% QoQ, –8.81% YTD

Mining Index: +25.86% MoM, +47.97% YoY, +35.07% QoQ, +63.96% YTD 

So yes, it fulfilled our projections of a bull market in motion while validating our ‘diversifier’ thesis. Still, despite its massive run, the sector remains disfavored—its share of the monthly main board volume remains the smallest.


Figure 2

Even with the gaming sector’s bubble showing cracks, speculative interest in PLUS and BLOOM (at 4.38%) nearly matched the ten-issue Mining Index (4.46%) in September. In short, market sentiment still favors gaming over mining. (Figure 2, topmost image) 

Ultimately, the mining sector’s performance—and its transition to a potential secular bull market—will hinge on its underlying commodities. 

In 2016, we wrote, 

Divergence or rotation can only be affirmed when gold mining stocks will move independently from the mainstream stocks. The best evidence will emerge when both will move in opposite directions. This had been the case from 2012 through 2015 when miners collapsed while the bubble industries blossomed. It should be a curiosity to see when both trade places. Time will tell. [italics original] (Prudent Investor, 2016) 

That’s a bullseye!

III. The Fiat Fracture: Gold's Three-Legged Bull Market and the Chronicle of Monetary Rupture 

Gold’s long-term ascent is a chronicle of monetary rupture. (Figure 2, middle chart) 

The first major break came under Franklin D. Roosevelt, with Executive Order 6102 (1933) and the Gold Reserve Act (1934), which outlawed private gold ownership and revalued the dollar’s gold peg from $20.67 to $35 per ounce. This statutory debasement set the modern precedent for political interference in money. 

The second rupture—Nixon’s 1971 “shock” ending Bretton Woods convertibility—ushered in the fiat era. Untethered from monetary discipline, gold surged from $35 to ~$670 by September 1980, a 19x return over nine years, driven by double-digit inflation, oil shocks, and institutional distrust. This marked the first leg of the post-gold-standard bull cycle under the U.S. dollar’s fiat regime. 

The second leg (2001–2012) unfolded over eleven years, beginning around $265 in February 2001 and peaking near $1,738 in January 2012—a 6.6x return

This phase reflected a response to cascading financial crises and aggressive monetary easing: the dotcom bust, 9/11, the Global Financial Crisis, and the Eurozone debt spiral. Central bank interventions—QE and ZIRP from the Fed and ECB—amplified gold’s role as a hedge against fiat dilution. 

The third leg (2015–) began in late 2015, bottoming near $1,050 in the aftermath of China’s devaluation. Over the next decade thru today, gold climbed past $3,800—a ~3.6x return—driven by global central bank accumulation, geopolitical fracture, asset bubbles, inflation spillovers, and record leverage across public and private sectors. 

As a sanctuary asset, gold has not only preserved purchasing power but also signaled systemic fragility. Real (inflation-adjusted) prices have reached all-time highs, underscoring gold’s function as a monetary barometer. (Figure 2, lowest diagram) 

Today, its strength reflects more than cyclical momentum—it mirrors the widening cracks of the fiat era. 

Gold’s trajectory—marked by 9-, 11-, and 10-year legs—suggests that mining valuations may be more tightly coupled to global monetary dysfunction than domestic policy alone. 

With gold now approaching USD 4,000, history suggests we may well see prices reach at least USD 6,000.

For resource-driven economies like the Philippines, this episodic repricing offers a potent lens for evaluating mining equities.  Rising gold valuations, persistent inflation, and the flight to real assets amid waning faith in fiat systems suggest that mining performance may be more tightly coupled to global monetary dysfunction than domestic policy alone. 

Still, each leg has emerged from distinct fundamentals—past performance may rhyme, but not reprise. 

IV. Gold as Signal of Systemic Stress 

Last March, we launched a three-part series forecasting that gold would sustain its record-breaking run. 

In the first installment, we argued that gold has historically served as a leading indicator of economic and financial stress: "gold’s record-breaking runs have consistently foreshadowed major recessions, economic crises, and geopolitical upheavals."


Figure 3 

Today, that reflexive relationship remains in play. 

As global growth falters under the weight of fiscal imbalance and geopolitical strain, central banks have turned decisively toward rate cuts, reversing the tightening cycle that began in 2022. By September, the scale of collective policy easing has already approached pandemic-era levels, underscoring a synchronized monetary response to mounting economic stress. (Figure 3, topmost window) 

V. Fracture Points: Tumultuous Geopolitics and the New War Economy 

In the second part, we explored how monetary disorder underpins gold’s sustained upside. "Gold’s record-breaking rise may signal mounting fissures in today’s fiat money system, " we wrote, “fissures expressed through escalating geopolitical and geoeconomic stress. "  

Those fissures have widened. Over the past month, geopolitical tensions have intensified across multiple fronts, amplifying systemic risks for both commodity markets and global capital flows. In Europe, the Ukraine war has evolved from proxy engagement to near-direct confrontation, punctuated by Putin’s claim that "all NATO countries are fighting us.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán echoed this unease, posting on X: (Figure 3, middle picture) 

"Brussels has chosen a strategy of wearing Russia down through endless war… sacrificing Europe’s economy, and sending hundreds of thousands to die at the front. Hungary rejects this. Europe must negotiate for peace, not pursue endless war." 

Paradoxically, Hungary is part of EU and NATO. 

In the Middle East, Trump’s proposed Gaza peace plan has been welcomed by parts of the EU but criticized by both Israeli hardliners and Hamas, exposing deep political rifts that could derail any lasting truce. 

Washington has also expanded its Caribbean military buildup apparently eyeing Venezuela—a Russian ally—under the pretext of targeting “drug smugglers.” 

Compounding these tensions are the looming U.S. government shutdown, ICE-fueled riots, EU fragmentation, and territorial disputes across Asia (including the Thai-Cambodia and South China Sea flashpoints). Together, these developments erode international interdependence and deepen the sense of global instability. 

VI. A Militarized Global Economy and The Fiscal–Military Feedback Loop 

Adding fuel to the fire, debt-financed fiscal stimulus through military spending has reached unprecedented scale. According to SIPRI, global military expenditures rose 9.4% in real terms to $2.718 trillion in 2024—the highest total ever recorded and the tenth consecutive year of increase. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

This war economy buildup echoes historical patterns, where militarism became not just a tool of statecraft but a structural imperative. 

Modern defense economies increasingly resemble historical warrior societies such as Bushido Japan, Sparta, and Napoleonic France, where militarism evolved from a tool of power into a systemic necessity. 

In these societies, idle warriors or elite military classes threatened internal stability, compelling leaders to redirect aggression outward. Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, for instance, was less about conquest than about pacifying a restless samurai class. 

Today’s massive defense spending serves a parallel function: sustaining industrial output, protecting elite interests, and demanding perpetual geopolitical justification. The result is a fiscal–military feedback loop in which peace itself undermines the architecture of power

This militarized economic order breeds a dangerous paradox: when growth depends on arms production and deterrence, the line between defense and aggression dissolves. As nations over-arm to preserve influence and momentum, the world risks sliding into a self-fulfilling conflict dynamic—where fiscal expansion, political ambition, and national pride coalesce into the very forces that once ignited global wars. 

VII. Economic Warfare: Tariffs, Fragmentation, and Supply Chain Bifurcation 

These geopolitical flashpoints are layered atop escalating geoeconomic risks that mirror economic warfare. 

The U.S. has rolled out sweeping new tariffs—10% on lumber and 25% on furniture and cabinetry—adding to earlier steel and aluminum levies that have rattled European industries. With a stronger euro hurting export competitiveness and rising trade barriers disrupting supply chains, Europe’s manufacturing base faces mounting stress. 

The U.S. recently raised tariffs on Philippine exports to 19%, part of a broader “reciprocal” trade posture that threatens ASEAN and EU economies alike. Export controls targeting Chinese tech and semiconductor firms underscore the growing bifurcation of global supply chains, especially in the AI and chip sectors. 

VIII. World Central Banks Signal Distrust: The Gold Accumulation Surge and Fiat Erosion


Figure 4

Amid this widening fragmentation, central banks have accelerated their gold accumulation—buying despite record-high prices. 

As the World Gold Council reported, central banks added a net 15 tonnes of gold in August, consistent with the March–June monthly average, marking a rebound after July’s pause. Seven central banks reported increases of at least one tonne, while only two reduced holdings. (Figure 4, topmost and middle charts) 

Notably, as political institutions, central bank reserve management decisions are not profit but politically driven

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), additionally, was the world’s largest seller of gold reserves in 2024, citing profit-taking at higher prices. Yet in 2025, it resumed small purchases—ironically, at even higher price levels. (Figure 4, lowest graph)  


Figure 5 

Measured in Philippine pesos, gold and silver prices are extending their streak of record-breaking highs (Figure 5, upper window) 

As history reminds us, the BSP’s massive gold sales in 2020 preceded the 2022 USD/PHP spike, suggesting that the 2024 divestment—intended to support the peso’s soft peg—could again foreshadow a breakout above PHP 59, perhaps by 2026? 

Most strikingly, global central banks’ gold reserves have grown so rapidly that their aggregate gold holdings are now nearly on par with U.S. Treasury holdings—a clear sign of eroding faith in the contemporary U.S. dollar-based order. (Figure 5, lower image) 

The modern-day Thucydides Trap—intensifying hegemonic competition expressed not only in geopolitics, but also in economic, financial, and monetary spheres—has increasingly powered the gold-silver tandem. 

Viewed in this light, as gold rises against all currencies, the message is clear: it is not gold that’s appreciating, but fiat money that’s depreciating. Gold is no longer just insurance asset— it is, and remains, money itself. 

IX. The Paradox of Philippine Mining Reform: Bureaucratic Control over Market Forces 

In the absence of commodity spot and futures markets—a critical handicap to price discovery, risk management, and capital formation—the state’s default response has been to expand taxation and administrative controls instead of developing genuine market mechanisms. 

Rather than pursuing market liberalization or introducing commodity exchanges to improve efficiency and productivity, the Philippine social democratic paradigm of reform remains fixated on taxation, administration, and bureaucratic control. 

The passage of the Enhanced Fiscal Regime for Large-Scale Metallic Mining Act (RA 12253) and the push for the Mining Fiscal Reform Bill mark the government’s latest attempt to "modernize" the fiscal framework of the mining industry. 

On paper, these reforms promise stronger oversight, greater transparency, and a "fairer share" of mineral wealth between the state and the private sector. The new regime introduces margin-based royalties, a windfall profits tax, and project-level accounting rules meant to simplify tax compliance and reduce leakages. Yet, beyond the reformist veneer lies a system still anchored on bureaucratic discretion—where regulators retain broad authority to interpret profitability thresholds, accounting standards, and tax computations. 

In practice, this discretion perpetuates the opacity and arbitrariness that the law sought to correct. Rather than institutionalizing transparency, the framework risks entrenching regulatory capture, enabling bureaucrats to negotiate or manipulate fiscal obligations behind closed doors. 

The very mechanisms intended to enhance oversight—royalty audits, windfall assessments, and transfer pricing reviews—may instead become new venues for rent-seeking and selective enforcement. This tension between statutory ambition and administrative reality leaves the industry vulnerable not only to corruption but also to uneven enforcement across operators and regions—cronyism. 

In the short term, elevated metal prices could conceal these governance flaws, boosting fiscal receipts and lifting mining equities under the illusion of reform-led success. But when the commodity cycle turns, the cracks will widen: weak oversight, inconsistent standards, and arbitrary taxation could resurface as deterrents to investment and valuation stability. 

Thus, what was framed as a fiscal modernization drive may ultimately reinforce the industry’s old paradox—where boom times mask systemic fragility, and reforms collapse when prices fall

X. The Philippine Mining Index Breakout: Gold Leads, Nickel Surprises, Copper Lags and the Speculative Spillover 

Lastly, while gold mining shares primarily contributed to the breakout of the Philippine Mining Index, nickel mines also sprang to life and added to the rally. The Philippine Stock Exchange recalibrated the composition of the Mining Index last August to reflect sectoral momentum. 

Gold-copper Lepanto A and B replaced Benguet A and B, while gold-silver miner Oceana Gold was newly included.


Figure 6

This partial reconstitution, combined with price action, reshaped the index’s internal weightings: as of October 3, gold-copper mines accounted for 74.65%, nickel 23.53%, and oil just 1.83%—a notable shift from March 31’s 68.3%-27.44%-4.25% distribution. (Figure 6 topmost graph)

From March 31st to October 3rd, gold mining shares surged 112%, driven by tailwinds from soaring gold and silver prices. Nickel mining shares, surprisingly, jumped 66.4% despite depressed global nickel prices. Meanwhile, solo oil exploration firm PXP Energy sank 16.5%. 

The biggest ranked mines in the index, in descending order, were Apex Mining, OceanaGold, Philex, Nickel Asia, and Atlas Consolidated. (Figure 6, second to the top image) 

USD prices of Silver and Copper surging while Nickel consolidates. (Figure 6 second to the lowest visual) 

While gold’s rally was the primary engine of the index breakout—amplified by the inclusion of more gold-heavy names—the rebound in nickel miners was more ironic. 

With easy money fueling an “everything bubble,” a rising tide appears to be lifting all mining boats. 

Another factor is that local nickel miners have mirrored the moves of international ETFs such as the Sprott Nickel Miners ETF [Nasdaq: NIKL], which advanced largely on global liquidity flows rather than on improvements in the underlying metal market. (Figure 6, lowest diagram) 

In essence, the surge in nickel shares reflects financial rotation and speculative spillover—capital chasing laggards and cyclical exposure amid abundant liquidity—rather than any meaningful recovery in nickel fundamentals. If the bids are to be believed, nickel prices would eventually have to rise and remain elevated; otherwise, the rally risks running ahead of earnings reality. 

Meanwhile, despite a resurgent copper price—also mirrored in ETFs like the Sprott Copper Miners ETF [Nasdaq: COPP]—some local copper mines have made little progress in scaling higher. 

We are yet to see substantial breakouts from the peripheral mines, suggesting that speculative flows have been highly selective, favoring liquidity and index-weighted names over broader participation. 

Ironically, the divergence between copper and nickel prices underscores the fragility of the latter’s mining rally. 

While copper’s surge has been confirmed by both spot prices and mining equities—reflected in the coherent ascent of ETFs like COPP—nickel’s stagnation contrasts sharply with the outsized gains in nickel mining shares and ETFs like NIKL. 

This disconnect suggests mispricing: a speculative equity bid front-running a commodity rebound that hasn’t arrived. Without confirmation from the metal itself, the feedback loop sustaining nickel equities risks collapse, exposing the rally as a liquidity mirage rather than a durable trend. 

XI. Conclusion: The Uneasy Return of Hard Assets in a Soft-Money World 

The Philippine mining sector’s transformation from pariah to rising star is both cyclical and structural. It reflects not only higher commodity prices but also the global search for hard assets in an era of currency debasement, geopolitical fracture, and policy incoherence. 

Gold’s rise tells a story of distrust in fiat money; nickel’s divergence, of speculative excess born of liquidity overflow. 

The mining index’s ascent thus mirrors the world’s economic psychology—a blend of fear and greed, of safe-haven accumulation and ultra-loose money–financed speculative rotation

Whether this is a sustainable repricing or a liquidity mirage will depend on whether global monetary and fiscal regimes stabilize—or fracture further. The former seems close to impossible; the latter, increasingly probable. 

Either way, the Philippine mining story has become a proxy for something much larger: the uneasy return of hard assets in a soft-money world. 

Postscript: No trend moves in a straight line. Gold, silver, and Philippine mining shares are now extensively overbought—inviting a countercyclical pause, not an end, to their ascent. 

____

References 

Ludwig von Mises, The Real Meaning of Inflation and Deflation, January 2, 2024, Mises.org 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Investing Gamechanger: Commodities and the Philippine Mining Index as Major Beneficiaries of the Shifting Geopolitical Winds! Substack, April 27, 2023 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Phisix 6,650: Resurgent Gold, Will Mining Sector Lead in 2016? Negative Yield Spread Hits 1 Month Bill-10 Year Treasuries!, Blogspot February 15, 2016 

Prudent Investor Newsletter Do Gold’s Historic Highs Predict a Coming Crisis? Substack, March 30, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Gold’s Record Run: Signals of Crisis or a Potential Shift in the Monetary Order? (2nd of 3 Part Series), Substack, March 31, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, How Surging Gold Prices Could Impact the Philippine Mining Industry (3rd of 3 Series), Substack, April 02, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Long-Term Price Trend and Investment Perspective of Gold, Blogspot, August 02, 2020  


Sunday, June 15, 2025

Is the Philippine Peso’s Rise a Secret Bargaining Chip in Trump’s Trade War?

Devaluation is not a tool for exports. It is a tool for cronyism and always ends with the demise of the currency as a valuable reserve—Daniel Lacalle

In this issue 

Is the Philippine Peso’s Rise a Secret Bargaining Chip in Trump’s Trade War?

I. BSP Denies Currency Manipulation Amid Trade Talks

II The Mar-a-Lago Framework: Dollar Devaluation as Trade Strategy

III. Asian Geopolitical Allies Lead Currency Appreciation Against USD

IV. Market Signals Point to Implicit Bilateral Deals

V. Taiwan’s Hedging Frenzy: Collateral Damage of FX Realignment?

VI Gross International Reserves Tell a Different Story

VII. Breaking Historical Patterns: GIR Decline Amid Peso Strength

VIII. Yield Spreads and Market Disruptions Signal Intervention

IX. Conclusion: The Hidden Costs of Currency Leverage; Intertemporal Risks and Economic Feedback Loops 

Is the Philippine Peso’s Rise a Secret Bargaining Chip in Trump’s Trade War? 

How the BSP's currency interventions may be hiding an implicit trade deal with Washington

I. BSP Denies Currency Manipulation Amid Trade Talks 

From a syndicated Reuters news, the Interaksyon reported May 20: "The Philippine central bank said there is no indication that its management of the peso’s exchange rate is part of trade negotiations with the U.S. government, as it signalled a preference for non-interest rate tools to manage capital inflows. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas said while it expected to further ease monetary policy because of a favourable inflation outlook, it favoured a more nuanced approach to managing liquidity and exchange rate volatility. “The BSP does not normally respond to capital flow surges or outflows, or even volatility, using policy interest rate action,” the BSP said in an emailed response to questions from Reuters. Philippine officials met U.S. authorities on May 2 to discuss trade. Although not directly involved in the talks, the BSP said there was no indication foreign exchange considerations were explicitly part of the negotiations. The Philippines has not been spared from President Trump’s tariffs, although it faces a comparatively modest 17% tariff, lower than regional neighbours Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. “The BSP adopts a pragmatic approach in managing capital flow volatility, combining FX interventions when necessary, the strategic use of the country’s foreign exchange reserve buffer, and macroprudential measures,” it said." (bold added)

II The Mar-a-Lago Framework: Dollar Devaluation as Trade Strategy 

Though the Mar-a-Lago Accord, coined by analysts like Zoltan Pozsar and popularized by Stephen Miran, is a speculative framework, it draws inspiration from the 1985 Plaza Accord, where G5 nations coordinated to depreciate the U.S. dollar to boost American exports. Stephen Miran, now Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, published a paper in November 2024 titled ‘A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System.’ 

It argues that the U.S. dollar’s persistent overvaluation harms American manufacturing by making exports less competitive and imports cheaper, contributing to a $1.2 trillion trade deficit in 2024.

To address this, Miran proposed devaluing the dollar by encouraging foreign central banks to sell dollar assets or adjust monetary policies, while using tariffs as a ‘stick’ to pressure trading partners into currency adjustments or trade concessions.

While dedollarization—reducing reliance on the dollar in global trade and reserves—is often cited as the cause of recent dollar weakness, this may apply to countries with geopolitical tensions with the U.S., such as China or Russia or other members of the BRICs.

However, it doesn’t explain the currency strength among staunch U.S. allies like the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, suggesting a different motive: implicit negotiations with the Trump administration.

III. Asian Geopolitical Allies Lead Currency Appreciation Against USD


Figure 1 

Year to June 13, 2025, the USD dropped against 8 of 10 Bloomberg-quoted Asian currencies, led by USDTWD (Taiwan dollar) -9.9%, USDKRW (Korean won) -7.8%, and USDJPY (Japanese yen) -8.35%. (Figure 1, topmost and middle charts) 

These countries, staunch U.S. allies that host American military bases, are the most likely to accommodate Washington’s demands. 

In ASEAN, major currencies appreciated more modestly: USDMYR (Malaysian ringgit) fell 5.05%, USDTHB (Thai baht) 5.49%, and USDPHP (Philippine peso) 2.8%. 

In contrast, USDIDR (Indonesian rupiah) rose 1.06%, indicating rupiah weakening—likely due to Indonesia's neutral stance, persistent fiscal concerns, and weaker ties to the U.S.

IV. Market Signals Point to Implicit Bilateral Deals 

On May 23, MUFG commented: "Markets have seemingly perceived that President Trump is looking for a weaker US dollar versus several Asian currencies as part of bilateral trade negotiations. Bloomberg News recently reported that the Taiwanese authorities had allowed the TWD to appreciate sharply earlier this month. The deputy governor of CBC has said that this strategic move is to allow market expectations for TWD gains to play out. But this is apparently at odds with the Taiwan central bank’s past preference to intervene in the FX market to smooth out volatility. The Korean won has also advanced sharply on the news that the US-South Korea finished the second technical discussions on 22 May." (bold added) (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

This MUFG insight—"A weaker US dollar versus several Asian currencies as part of bilateral trade negotiations"—suggests an implicit bilateral Mar-a-Lago deal.

V. Taiwan’s Hedging Frenzy: Collateral Damage of FX Realignment? 

Notably, Taiwan’s insurers recently suffered massive losses during the USD selloff and may have even contributed to it. Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) summoned insurers for reportedly “rushing to hedge their US bond holdings.” This could reflect unintended effects of TWD appreciation, potentially tied to an implicit Mar-a-Lago deal. 

In a nutshell, it’s likely no coincidence that currency appreciation aligns with the U.S.’s closest allies, suggesting implicit bilateral Mar-a-Lago deals driven by Trump’s tariff leverage, despite official denials. 

VI Gross International Reserves Tell a Different Story 

"Never believe anything in politics until it is officially denied"—Ottoman Bismark 

Taiwan’s central bank’s denial of involvement closely mirrors that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). 

The BSP has washed its hands from using the peso as a tool for negotiation, despite the Philippines status as a client state in ASEAN, bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and hosting U.S. military bases

Given the Mar-a-Lago framework of coupling dollar devaluation with tariffs, trade negotiations with the U.S. would likely involve the BSP, making its denial implausible

While no official agreement exists, the BSP noted it could use a combination of “FX interventions when necessary” and “the strategic use of the country’s foreign exchange reserve buffer” for capital flows management. 

This rhetoric suggests using the Philippine peso as strategic leverage for trade negotiations, aligning with the Mar-a-Lago goal of weakening the dollar to reduce the U.S.$1.2 trillion trade deficit, including the Philippines’ $5 billion surplus from $14.2 billion in exports.

VII. Breaking Historical Patterns: GIR Decline Amid Peso Strength


Figure 2 

Consider the evidence: When the USDPHP fell in 2012 and 2018, the increase BSP’s Gross International Reserves (GIR) accelerated, evidenced by aggregated monthly inflows. 

As a side note, May’s GIR saw a marginal increase, supported ironically by gold, which has served as an anchor. (Figure 2, topmost and middle images) 

Recall that last February, the BSP dismissed gold’s role, citing the "dead asset" logic: Gold prices can be volatile, earn little interest, and incur storage costs, so central banks prefer not to hold excessive amounts." Divine justice? 

Yet ironically, unlike past trends, the current USDPHP decline has led to a reduction in the GIR. (Figure 2, lowest visual) 

The BSP’s template, repeated in January, March, and April, states: "The month-on-month decrease in the GIR level reflected mainly the (1) national government’s (NG) drawdowns on its foreign currency deposits with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to meet its external debt obligations and pay for its various expenditures, and (2) BSP’s net foreign exchange operations." 

The USDPHP remains far from the BSP’s ‘Maginot Line’ of Php 59—the upper band of its informal ‘soft-peg’ range—so why is its GIR eroding? 

While part of the decline may be due to ‘revaluation effects’ from rising long-term U.S. Treasury yields (falling bond prices) and a softer dollar, this insufficiently explains the GIR’s decline amid an appreciating peso, contrary to historical patterns.


Figure 3

BSP data shows its net foreign assets contracted year-on-year in April 2025, the first decline since July 2023. (Figure 3, topmost diagram) 

This partly reflects changes in the FX assets of Other Deposit Corporations (ODCs), but the primary driver has been the BSP’s dollar-denominated assets. (Figure 3, second to the highest pane) 

Either we are seeing 'revaluation effects' from a GIR heavily weighted in USD assets—given that the BSP was the largest central bank gold seller in 2024, reducing its gold holdings to bolster reserves—or the BSP has been offloading some of its FX holdings to weaken the USD, thereby supporting the peso’s rise. It could be both, distinguished by scale.

VIII. Yield Spreads and Market Disruptions Signal Intervention 

The spread between 10-year Philippine and U.S. Treasury yields has drifted to its widest since 2019, when BVAL rates replaced PDST in October 2018 as the benchmark for Philippine bonds. (Figure 3, second to the lowest and lowest graphs) 

Historically, this was linked to deeper USDPHP declines, but since the BSP adopted its ‘soft-peg’ regime in 2022, its interventions have significantly reshaped this correlation—altering market signals and shifting currency allocations within the financial system


Figure 4

Weak organic FX revenues—contracting FDIs (-45.24% YoY Jan-Mar 2025), tourism (-0.82% Jan-Apr, including overseas Filipino visitors), March 2025 remittances at a 9-month low, and volatile portfolio flows ($923 million Jan-Apr)—don’t support the peso’s strength, except for services exports (+7.2% Q1 GDP). (Figure 4) 

Insufficient FX flows explain the surge in external debt, as the Philippines borrows heavily to bridge the gap, with external debt increasing to support trade, fiscal needs, and the defense of the USDPHP soft peg.


Figure 5 

Philippine external debt surged by a staggering 14% in Q1 2025, driven by a 17.4% rise in public FX debt, which now accounts for approximately 59% of the total! 

The BSP calls a sustained spike in FX debt 'manageable'—color us amazed!

IX. Conclusion: The Hidden Costs of Currency Leverage; Intertemporal Risks and Economic Feedback Loops 

These factors strengthen the case that the BSP is using the peso as leverage for trade negotiations—an implicit bilateral Mar-a-Lago deal. 

These interventions have intertemporal effects—or unintended consequences from pursuing short-term goals—that will likely surface over time. 

The USD’s decline will likely accelerate FX-denominated borrowings, becoming more evident once the peso weakens—similar to the 2018 and 2022 episodes—amplifying currency, interest rate, and other risks through mismatches that could exacerbate market disruptions. 

This poses risks of dislocations in sectors reliant on merchandise trade, remittances, or FX or USD fund flows, potentially triggering feedback loops that could negatively impact the broader economy or lead to economic and financial instability. 

And with escalating risks of a fiscal shock—one that could trigger and amplify unforeseen ramifications—that would translate into a perfect storm, wouldn’t it? 


Sunday, April 06, 2025

Trump’s Tariff Gambit: A Political Win, an Economic Minefield for the Philippines

 

What the circus ringmaster really wants is an iron-clad mechanism – already being developed by his team – that unilaterally imposes whatever level of tariffs Trump may come up with on whatever excuse: could be to circumvent “current manipulation”, to counter a value-added tax, on “security grounds”, whatever. And to hell with international law. For all practical purposes, Trump is burying the WTO—Pepe Escobar  

In this issue

Trump’s Tariff Gambit: A Political Win, an Economic Minefield for the Philippines

I. Introduction: A Tariff with Two Faces

II. Trump’s Sweeping Tariffs: A Policy of Chaos: The Rise of Regime Uncertainty

III. U.S. Stock Market Meltdown Echoes the Smoot-Hawley Era and the Great Depression

IV. The Tariff’s Double-Edged Sword: For the Philippines, Relative Tariffs Represent a Political Win, But a Formidable Economic Challenge

V. Fallout from Tariffs: An Uncertain Future: Tariffs May Deter Investment in the Philippines

VI. Shaky Foundations: Why the Consumer Economy Isn’t Immune

VII. Financial Fragility: Historic Savings-Investment Gap, Record Debt, and Dollar Dependence

VIII. Intertemporal Impact or Short-to-Longer Term Impact on the Philippine Economy

IX. The US Dollar’s ‘Triffin Dilemma’: Global Risks and Philippine Challenges

X. Conclusion: Winnowing the Political Chaff from the Economic Wheat 

Trump’s Tariff Gambit: A Political Win, an Economic Minefield for the Philippines 

Will the Philippines benefit from Trump's sweeping tariff reforms? The realities of the existing economic and political structure suggest otherwise. 

I. Introduction: A Tariff with Two Faces


Figure 1

On April 9, 2025, the United States imposed a 17% tariff on Philippine goods—a lighter burden compared to Vietnam’s 46% or Cambodia’s 49%. The Philippines was listed among the 'worst' tariff offenders against the US. (Figure 1, upper table) 

At first glance, this appears to be a political victory, offering the Philippines a chance to attract investment and outshine its ASEAN neighbors in a global trade war. 

Some experts even argue that because the Philippines is a consumption-driven economy, it would be less affected by the ongoing trade war, potentially insulating it from the worst of the fallout.

However, a closer examination reveals a far more challenging reality.

The Philippines faces deep-seated vulnerabilities: a heavy reliance on trade (42% of its 2024 GDP), a chronic savings shortage that hampers investment, and global risks that could destabilize the U.S.’s dollar dominance.

As the Philippines navigates this turbulent landscape, its ability to transform this political advantage into economic gains hinges on addressing these structural weaknesses amidst an uncertain global economic horizon.

II. Trump’s Sweeping Tariffs: A Policy of Chaos: The Rise of Regime Uncertainty 

On April 3, 2025, President Trump declared a national emergency, citing the U.S.’s $1.2 trillion goods trade deficit in 2024 as a threat to national and economic security. This declaration, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), allowed the administration to impose reciprocal tariffs without Congressional approval, including a baseline 10% tariff on all countries. 

The Trump administration’s formula for these reciprocal tariffs—(trade deficit ÷ imports) ÷ 2—serves as a proxy for what they deem “unfair” trade practices.

This approach, however, oversimplifies the intricate politics of global merchandise trade. The U.S. trade deficit is not merely a result of unfair practices but a symptom of deeper structural dynamics, including the U.S. dollar’s role in the Triffin Dilemma, global easy money policies, various mercantilist practices by numerous nations and more.

The absurdity of using a one-size-fits-all metric like the trade deficit to define “unfair practices” is starkly illustrated by the Trump administration’s decision to impose tariffs on the remote Antarctic outpost of Heard and McDonald Islands. Inhabited primarily by penguins and seals, and unvisited by humans for nearly a decade, this territory faces tariffs despite a complete absence of economic activity.

Ironically, nations like Cuba, North Korea, Belarus, and Russia were exempted from these tariffs due to the absence of bilateral trade with the U.S., a result of existing sanctions. 

The Trump administration’s aggressive tariff regime has pushed U.S. effective tariff rates beyond those of the Smoot-Hawley era, a period infamous for exacerbating the Great Depression. (Figure 1, lower chart) 

As Cato’s Grabow, Lincicome and Handley recently wrote, "The result appears to be the highest US tariffs since 1909, already ten times the size of those in place before Trump took office and at an average rate exceeding even that imposed by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act, which is widely blamed for prolonging the Great Depression."  (Cato, 2025) [bold added]        

This drastic policy shift—a potential abrupt reversal of globalization—introduces significant Regime Uncertainty (Higgs 1997), defined as the perceived lack of protection for property rights due to the unpredictability of government policies and institutional frameworks.

Regime uncertainty distorts economic calculations, obscuring the ‘hurdle rate’—the minimum return required to justify investment in viable projects.

Or it discourages investment by creating an opaque economic horizon where businesses cannot reliably predict future costs, revenues, or risks.


Figure 2

Measured as a trade policy uncertainty metric, regime uncertainty has rocketed to an all-time high, signaling a profound shift in the global economic landscape that could have far-reaching consequences for countries like the Philippines. (Figure 2) 

III. U.S. Stock Market Meltdown Echoes the Smoot-Hawley Era and the Great Depression 

It is hardly surprising that last week’s U.S. stock market meltdown—the largest two-day wipeout in history—serves as a stark symptom of these policy-induced uncertainties.

The regime uncertainty plaguing the economic horizon heightens the risk of profound economic weakness, disrupting supply chains, amplifying hurdles for capital flows and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), magnifying credit delinquencies, and prompting path-dependent responses from central banks—involving "policy easing" to counteract economic slowdowns, which could also fuel inflation risks.

In combination, these factors raise the specter of a global recession or even a financial crisis.

Given the historic highs in global debt and leverage—amounting to $323 trillion as of Q3 2024, or 326% of global GDP, according to the Institute of International Finance—a stagflation-induced financial crisis could render the 2008 Global Financial Crisis a proverbial ‘walk in the park.’ 

Is history rhyming? 

David R. Breuhan offers a historical parallel: "The stock market collapse began on Oct. 28, 1929, as news spread that the Smoot Hawley Tariff Bill would become law. The front-page New York Times article read: ‘Leaders Insist Tariff Will Pass.’ Although the tariff bill didn’t become law until June 1930, its effects were felt eight months prior. Markets reacted immediately, as they discount future earnings. Most economists blame the gold standard for the crash, but this analysis misses the forward-looking nature of the human mind, which is the market itself. Markets need not wait for earnings to decrease due to imminent policies that will result in future losses. Hence the rapid nature of the crash. The use of leverage in the 1920s exacerbated the crash. Margin calls were made, further cascading the markets." (Breuhan, 2024) [bold added]

The parallels are striking. Today’s markets, burdened by high leverage and global debt, are reacting to the uncertainty of Trump’s tariff regime, much like they did to Smoot-Hawley nearly a century ago.

For the Philippines, this global financial instability could exacerbate the economic challenges posed by the tariff, as investors may grow wary of emerging markets amid a potential global downturn. 

IV. The Tariff’s Double-Edged Sword: For the Philippines, Relative Tariffs Represent a Political Win, But a Formidable Economic Challenge


Figure 3

A chart of U.S.-Philippines trade from 1985 to 2024 reveals a persistent trade deficit, peaking at $7 billion in 2022, underscoring the high stakes of this trade war for the Philippines. (Figure 3, upper window)

Trump’s reciprocal tariff exposes the country’s vulnerabilities: a heavy reliance on trade (42% of 2024 GDP), a savings shortage that stifles investment, and global risks that could upend the U.S.’s dollar dominance.

The 17% tariff on Philippine goods, part of President Trump’s strategy to shrink the $1.2 trillion U.S. trade deficit, appears to be a political win at first glance.

Compared to Vietnam’s 46% or Cambodia’s 49%, the Philippines seems to have dodged the worst of this trade war. Mainstream analysts have spun this as an opportunity: with a lower tariff, the Philippines could attract investors looking to shift supply chains away from pricier neighbors. 

Philippine Trade Secretary Cristina Roque even called it a chance to negotiate a sectoral free trade agreement with the U.S., potentially boosting market access. For a country eager to stand out in ASEAN, this lighter tariff feels like a rare edge.

But the economic reality paints a far more daunting picture. 

The Philippines faces formidable structural hurdles that could blunt this political advantage.  Here are some examples. 

1. Energy costs, for instance, are among the highest in the region at $0.20 per kWh—double Vietnam’s $0.10—making manufacturing less competitive (International Energy Agency, 2024). 

2. Regulatory complexity adds another layer of difficulty: the Philippines ranks 95th globally in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, trailing Vietnam (70th) and Indonesia (73rd), with bureaucratic red tape often delaying investments. 

3. Human capital represents another significant hurdle. While the tariff matches Israel’s 17%, the Philippines lacks Israel’s robust R&D ecosystem to export high-tech goods like medical equipment, leaving it reliant on lower-value sectors such as electronics assembly and agriculture. 

Israel invests 6.3% of its 2023 GDP in R&D, one of the highest rates globally, compared to the Philippines’ meager 0.324%, limiting its ability to compete in advanced industries. 

These constraints mean that even a “favorable” tariff doesn’t automatically translate into economic gains—investors may still look elsewhere if the cost of doing business remains prohibitively high. 

The tariff’s silver lining hinges on the Philippines overcoming these challenges, but deeper vulnerabilities lurk beneath the surface. 

High trade exposure and financial-fiscal constraints threaten to turn this political win into an economic missed opportunity, as the country grapples with the fallout of a global trade war. 

V. Fallout from Tariffs: An Uncertain Future: Tariffs May Deter Investment in the Philippines 

The regime uncertainty introduced by Trump’s tariff policy creates an opaque economic horizon, deterring investments even in a country like the Philippines, which some argue is insulated due to its consumption-driven economy (72.5% of its 2024 real GDP). 

However, this narrative overlooks the fundamental economic principle encapsulated in Say’s Law: "supply enables demand" (Newman 2025) or "production precedes consumption." (Shostak 2022) 

The 17% tariff directly threatens this dynamic by reducing demand for Philippine exports, which totaled $12.14 billion to the U.S. in 2024, accounting for 16.6% of total exports. (Figure 3, lower graph) 

Analysts estimate a direct annual loss of $1.6–1.89 billion, cutting income for workers in export sectors like electronics and agriculture, and thus curbing their spending power. 

Nota Bene: These estimates reflect only the direct impact, ignoring the epiphenomenon from complex feedback loops, such as secondary and the nth effects on supply chains, employment, and consumer confidence, which could amplify the economic toll. 

Government data further disproves the notion of immunity.


Figure 4

The share of goods exports and imports in 2024 GDP was 42% (13.8% exports, 28.1% imports), a significant exposure for a supposedly consumer-driven economy. This means trade disruptions hit hard, affecting both production (exports) and consumption (imports of goods like electronics and food). (Figure 4, topmost image) 

Excluded from this discussion are exports and imports of services. If included, exports and imports in real GDP would account for 64.2% of the 2024 GDP! (Figure 4, middle graph) 

AP Lerner (1936) highlighted the mutual dependence of exports and imports in trade economics. A decline in exports limits foreign exchange earnings, which in turn reduces the ability to finance imports. This creates a ripple effect, showcasing the interconnected nature of international trade. 

Even the service sector, a key income source through business process outsourcing (BPO, contributing 8.5% of 2024 GDP), isn’t safe. 

U.S. firms, facing their own tariff costs (e.g., 46% on Vietnam), might cut back on outsourcing to the Philippines, further denting income. 

The opaque economic horizon—marked by unclear earnings projections and obscured hurdle rates—adds to the reluctance to deploy investments. 

Businesses, unable to accurately forecast returns amidst this uncertainty, are likely to delay or cancel projects, from factory expansions to new market entries, exacerbating the Philippines’ economic challenges. 

VI. Shaky Foundations: Why the Consumer Economy Isn’t Immune 

The consumer economy narrative also ignores the role of debt. 

Household debt has skyrocketed to Php 2.15 trillion in 2024, up 24.26% from 2023, with credit card debt alone rising 29.65% year-on-year. But this borrowing isn’t free—high interest rates strain budgets, which comes on top of the loss of purchasing power from inflation. 

Consumer loans as a percentage of NGDP soared to a record 11.7%, while consumer loans relative to consumer NGDP also reached a historic high of 15.32% in 2024. 

In contrast to other developed economies, the Philippine banking sector’s low penetration levels have concentrated household debt growth within higher-income segments. This phenomenon heightens concentration risk, as financial stability becomes increasingly reliant on a limited, affluent demographic. 

Despite this debt-fueled spending, GDP growth slackened to 5.2% in the second half of 2024, down from 6.1% in the first half, while annual core CPI (excluding food and energy) fell from 6.6% in 2023 to 3% in 2024, signaling weak demand. 

Clearly, “free money” hasn’t spruced up the economy. 

Add to this the uncertainty facing export and import firms, which could lead to job losses, and a looming U.S. migration crackdown that threatens remittances—$38.34 billion in 2024, or 8.3% of 2024 GDP, with 40.6% from the U.S. (Figure 4, lowest pie chart) 

If Filipino workers in the U.S. face deportations, remittances could slash household spending, especially in rural areas. 

This could add to hunger rates—which according to SWS estimates—in Q1 2025 have nearly reached the 2020 pandemic historic highs. 

Far from immune, the Philippines’ consumer economy is on shaky ground, vulnerable to both domestic and global pressures. 

VII. Financial Fragility: Historic Savings-Investment Gap, Record Debt, and Dollar Dependence 

The Philippines’ economic challenges are compounded by a chronic savings-investment gap that severely limits its ability to adapt to the tariff. 

Domestic savings are a mere 9.3% of 2024 GDP, while investments stand at 23.7%, creating a staggering 14% gap that forces reliance on volatile foreign capital, such as remittances ($38 billion) and FDI ($8.9 billion in 2024). 

These inflows, however, are increasingly uncertain amid rising global trade tensions. 

This savings scarcity is primarily driven by fiscal pressures. Government spending has soared to 14.5% of GDP, fueled by post-COVID recovery efforts and infrastructure projects, pushing national debt to Php 16.05 trillion (60.72% of GDP) in 2024.


Figure 5

External debt grew 9.8% to USD 137.63 billion, surpassing the country’s gross international reserves (GIR) of USD 106.3 billion—a figure that includes external public sector borrowings deposited with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

The external debt service burden surged 15.6% year-on-year to a record USD 17.2 billion in 2024, pushing its ratio to GDP to the highest level since 2009.  (Figure 5, middle window) 

To finance this ballooning debt, the government borrows heavily, crowding out private investment. 

Banks, holding Php 5.54 trillion in government securities in 2024 (net claims on the central government), prioritize lending to the government while directing credit to riskier private sectors—consumers, real estate, and elite firms—rather than promoting finance to manufacturing or SMEs, which are crucial for adapting to the tariff through innovation or market diversification. 

Not only through deposits, banks have been net borrowers of public savings via the capital markets. In 2024, the banking system’s bills and bonds payable swelled 30.9%, from Php 1.28 trillion in 2023 to Php 1.671 trillion. 

Meanwhile, non-bank sectors, competing for the same scarce savings, also face high interest rates, creating a significant roadblock to investment. 

High fiscal spending also fuels inflation. The Philippine CPI posted 6% in 2023, above the central bank’s 2–4% target. This acts as an inflation tax, eroding household savings as rising costs (e.g., food prices up 20%) force families to spend rather than save. 

Though the CPI dropped to 3.2% in 2024, the fiscal deficit remains near pandemic highs, exacerbating financial pressures.

With banks, the government, and businesses all vying for limited funds, the Philippines struggles to finance the reforms needed to turn the tariff’s political edge into economic gains, such as the CREATE MORE Act’s incentives to lower energy costs and attract investors.

Moreover, uncertainties from the tariffs put at risk the rising systemic leverage (total bank lending + public debt), which rose 11.13% year-on-year in 2024 to Php 29.960 trillion—accounting for 113% of 2024 NGDP! (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

Worse, potential weakness (or a recession) in GDP could spike the fiscal deficit, necessitating more debt, including external financing, which further strains the demand for foreign exchange. 

The Philippines’ dependence on dollars for its external debt and imports makes it particularly vulnerable to global shifts in dollar availability, a risk amplified by the tariff’s broader implications. 

VIII. Intertemporal Impact or Short-to-Longer Term Impact on the Philippine Economy 

The tariff’s impact on the Philippines unfolds over time, with distinct short-term and long-term effects. 

In the short term (0–2 years), the estimated $1.6–1.89 billion export loss, combined with a potential remittance drop, should add pressure on the peso (already at 57.845 in 2024), translating to higher inflation and squeezing consumers. 

Job losses in export sectors like electronics and agriculture, coupled with credit constraints from the savings gap, limit the government’s ability to cushion the blow. GDP growth, already down to 5.2% in the second half of 2024, could dip further, missing the government’s 6–8% target for 2025. 

Over the longer term (3–10+ years), there’s potential for growth if the Philippines leverages reforms like the CREATE MORE Act, which offers power cost deductions and tax breaks to attract investment. 

However, all these take time, effort, and funding, which—unless there is clarity in the economic horizon—could offset whatever gains might occur.


Figure 6
 

Philippine trade balance has struggled even in anticipation of the passage of the CREATE Act. (Figure 6, topmost image)

The BSP’s USDPHP implicit cap or ‘soft peg regime’—which subsidizes the USD—has played a significant role, contributing to surging imports and external debt (previously discussed here). This policy, while stabilizing the peso in the short term, exacerbates the trade deficit and increases reliance on foreign capital, making long-term growth more challenging. 

The savings gap and fiscal pressures make this a steep climb. Without domestic capital, the Philippines remains vulnerable to global capital flow disruptions, which could derail its long-term economic prospects. 

The interplay of these factors underscores the need for a strategic, holistic, and sustained approach to economic reform—one that tackles both immediate challenges and structural weaknesses. 

However, given the tendency of popular politics to prioritize the short term, this vision may seem far-fetched. 

IX. The US Dollar’s ‘Triffin Dilemma’: Global Risks and Philippine Challenges 

These disruptions tie into broader global risks, starting with the Triffin Dilemma. 

The Triffin Dilemma, named after economist Robert Triffin, highlights a fundamental conflict in the U.S.’s role as the issuer of the world’s reserve currency. To supply the world with enough dollars to meet global demand, the U.S. must run current account deficits. 

The Triffin Dilemma arises because running persistent deficits to supply dollars undermines confidence in the dollar’s value over time. If deficits grow too large, foreign holders may doubt the U.S.’s ability to manage its debt (U.S. national debt was $34.4 trillion in 2024, or 121.85% of GDP), potentially leading to a shift away from the dollar as the reserve currency. (Figure 6, middle graph)

Conversely, if the U.S. reduces its deficits (e.g., through tariffs), it restricts the global supply of dollars, which can disrupt trade and financial markets, also eroding the dollar’s dominance. 

The U.S. dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency (58% of global reserves) relies on constant U.S. trade deficits to supply dollars globally. (Figure 6, lowest chart)

The U.S.’s $1.2 trillion deficit in 2024 does just that, supporting its “exorbitant privilege” to borrow cheaply and fund military power. 

But tariffs, by aiming to shrink this deficit, reduce the dollar supply, risking the dollar’s dominance. If countries shift to alternatives like the Chinese yuan (2.2% of reserves) or euro (20%), the U.S. faces higher borrowing costs, potentially curbing military spending ($842 billion in 2024), while the Philippines struggles to access dollars for its USD 191.994 billion external debt and trade deficit in 2024. This could weaken the peso further, raising costs and inflation. 

Meanwhile, if other nations like China or the EU liberalize trade in response, alternative markets could emerge. 

The Philippines might redirect exports to China (which posted a $992 billion surplus in 2024) or leverage the EU-Philippines FTA, but this risks geopolitical tensions with the U.S., its key ally, especially amid West Philippine Sea disputes. 

An “iron curtain” in trade, investments, and capital flows looms as a worst-case scenario, further isolating the Philippines from the global capital needed to bridge its savings gap. The potential erosion of the U.S.’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific, due to financial constraints, could also embolden China, complicating the Philippines’ strategic position. 

X. Conclusion: Winnowing the Political Chaff from the Economic Wheat

While the 17% U.S. tariff on Philippine goods seems to offer a political edge, the economic reality tells a different story.

The regime uncertainty from Trump’s bold tariff regime exposes internal fragility brought about by high trade exposure, a savings-investment gap, and fiscal-financial constraints.

The consumer economy isn’t immune, as export losses, rising debt, and remittance risks threaten investments and spending power.

Global risks, like the erosion of the U.S.’s dollar privilege through the Triffin Dilemma, could further limit the Philippines’ adaptability.

Over the long term, reforms like the CREATE MORE Act could unlock growth, but only if the Philippine government acts swiftly to boost savings by further liberalizing the economy, reforming exchange rate policies, and supporting these efforts with a material reduction in fiscal spending.

Trump’s tariff is a wake-up call: though the drastically shifting tides of geopolitics translate to the need for flexible policymaking ideally, the sunk cost of the incumbent economic structure operating under existing policies hinders this process.

‘Resistance to change’ that works against vested interest groups—such as entrenched political and business elites who benefit from the status quo—will likely pose a significant obstacle too.

As such, drastic changes in the economic and financial climate raise the risk of a recession or a crisis, particularly given the Philippines’ high systemic leverage and dependence on foreign capital.

The next step may be to throw a prayer that Trump eases his hardline stance, offering a reprieve that could buy the Philippines time to adapt to this new global reality. 

___

References 

Colin Grabow, Scott Lincicome, and Kyle Handley, More About Trump’s Sham “Reciprocal” Tariffs, April 3, 2025 Cato Institute 

Robert Higgs, Regime Uncertainty, 1997 Independent.org 

David R. Breuhan A Brief History of Tariffs and Stock Market Crises November 4, 2024, Mises.org 

Frank Shostak, Government “Stimulus” Schemes Fail Because Demand Does Not Create Supply, July 26, 2022, Mises.org 

Jonathan Newman, Opposing the Keynesian Illusion: Spending Does Not Drive the Economy, January 21, 2025 

A. P. Lerner, The Symmetry between Import and Export Taxes, 1936 Wiley jstor.org