Showing posts with label geopolitics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label geopolitics. Show all posts

Monday, November 25, 2024

US Dollar-Philippine Peso Retests Its All-Time High of 59, the BSP’s "Maginot Line": It’s Not About the Strong Dollar

  

interventionism destroys the purchasing power of the local currency by breaking all the rules of prudent monetary policy and financing an ever-increasing government size printing a constantly devalued currency—Daniel Lacalle

US Dollar-Philippine Peso Retests Its All-Time High of 59, the BSP’s "Maginot Line": It’s Not About the Strong Dollar 

Last week, the USD-Philippine peso retested its all-time high of 59, or the BSP's "Maginot Line," which they misleadingly attribute to the "strong USD." The historic savings-investment gaps translate into a case for a weaker peso. 

I. The USDPHP Retest the 59 ALL Time High Level; The "Strong Dollar" Strawman 

The US dollar-Philippine peso exchange rate $USDPHP hit the 59-level last Thursday, November 21st—a two-year high and the upper band of the BSP’s so-called "Maginot Line" for its quasi-soft peg. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) attributed this development to the strength of the US dollar, explaining: "The recent depreciation of the peso against the dollar reflects a strong US dollar narrative driven by rising geopolitical tensions…The peso has traded in line with the regional currencies we benchmark against."


Figure 1 

To validate this claim, we first examine the weekly performance of Asia's currencies. While the US Dollar Index $DXY surged by 0.8% this week, most of the gains were driven by the euro's weakness.  (Figure 1, upper window) 

Among Bloomberg’s quote of Asian currencies, 8 out of 10 saw declines; however, the Thai baht bucked the trend and rallied strongly, while the Malaysian ringgit also closed the week slightly higher. (Figure 1, lower graph) 

The US Dollar averaged a 0.4% increase against Asian currencies this week. 

However, the strength of the Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit contradicts or disproves the idea that all regional currencies have weakened against the USD.


Figure 2
 

A second test of the claim that a "strong dollar is weighing on everyone else, therefore not a weak peso" is to exclude the US dollar and instead compare the Philippine peso against the currencies of our regional peers: the Thai baht $THBPHP, Malaysian ringgit $MYRPHP, Indonesian rupiah $IDRPHP, and Vietnamese dong $VNDPHP. (Figure 2) 

From a one-year perspective, the Philippine peso has weakened against all four of these currencies, providing clear evidence that its decline was not limited to the US dollar but extended to its ASEAN neighbors as well. 

Ironically, the same ASEAN majors have recently joined the BRICS. Have you seen any reports from the local media on this? 

The $USDPHP ascent to 59 has been accompanied by a notable decline in traded volume and volatility, suggesting that the BSP has been "pulling out all stops" to prevent further escalation. 

This includes propagating to the public the "strong US dollar" strawman. 

II. BSP’s Interventions and the Case for a Weaker Peso: Record Savings-Investment Gap 

Figure 3

Since the BSP is among the most aggressive central banks engaged in foreign exchange intervention (FXI), it can surely buy some time before the USDPHP breaks through this upper band and tests the 60-level. (Figure 3) 

We have long been bullish on the $USDPHP for the simple reason that the historic credit-financed savings-investment gap (SIG), manifested primarily through its "twin deficits" (spending more than producing), translates to diminished local savings. 

This, in turn, means more borrowing from the savings of other nations to fund excessive domestic consumption. 

Accordingly, the SIG is inherently inflationary, which results in the debasement of the purchasing power of the peso—an indirect consumption of the public's savings. 

In any case, the USD Philippine Peso exchange rate ($USDPHP) should be one of its best barometers and hedge against inflation (Prudent Investor, April 2024) 

In other words, since there is no free lunch, someone will have to pay for the nation’s extravagance.


Figure 4

The Philippine external debt's streak of record highs coincides with the pandemic-era deficit spending levels. Apparently, this stimulus suffers from diminishing returns as well. 

This is apart from the BSP’s financial repression policies or the inflation tax, which redistributes the public’s savings to the government and the elites. 

Such capital-consuming "trickle-down" policies combine to strengthen the case for a weak peso. 

Yet, the continued rise in external debt indicates that the Philippines has insufficient organic US dollar resources (revenues and holdings), despite the BSP’s claims through its Gross International Reserves (GIR). 

To keep this shorter, we will skip dealing with the BSP’s GIR and balance sheet. 

Nonetheless, rising external debt compounds the government’s predicament, as the lack of revenues necessitates repeated cycles of increased borrowing to fund gaps in the BSP-Banking system’s maturity transformation, creating a "synthetic US dollar short." (Snider, 2018) 

As a result, the country becomes more vulnerable to a dollar squeeze. 

Hence, the BSP hopes that, aside from cheap credit, loose monetary conditions will prevail, allowing them to easily access cheap external funding. 

However, by geopolitically aligning with the West against the Sino-Russian-led BRICS, the Philippines increases the risks of reduced access to the world’s savings. 

As an aside, the Philippines attempts to mimic the United States. However, because the US has the deepest capital markets and functions as the world’s de facto currency reserve, it has funded its "twin deficits" by absorbing the world’s "surpluses"—the "exorbitant privilege." 

Unfortunately, not even the US dollar standard, operating under present conditions, will last forever, as it fosters both geopolitical and trade tensions. 

III. USDPHP: Quant Models and the Lindy Effect

Figure 5

We are not fans of analytics based on exchange rate quantitative models such as the Deviation from Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (DBEER), the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER), and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), but a chart from Deutsche Bank indicates that the Philippine peso is among the most expensive world currencies. 

Needless to say, all we need is to understand the repercussions of free-lunch policies. 

People have barely learned from past lessons. The USDPHP remains on a 54-year long-term uptrend, even after enduring episodic bouts of financial crises—such as the 1983-84 Philippine debt restructuring and the 1997-98 Asian crisis. 

The sins of the past have been resurrected under the alleged auspices of "this time is different; we are doing better." 

Following the Asian Crisis, a relatively cleansed balance sheet allowed the peso to stage a multi-year rally from 2005 to 2013. 

Unfortunately, we have since relapsed into the old ways. 

Because the elites benefit from the trickle-down policies, there is little incentive for radical reform. 

The "strong US dollar" only exposes the internal fragilities of a currency. 

Therefore, trends in motion tend to stay in motion until a crisis occurs. 

The USD-PHP seems to exemplify the Lindy effectthe longer a phenomenon has survived, the longer its remaining life expectancy. 

___

References

Prudent Investor, Navigating the Risks of the Record Philippines’ Savings-Investment Gap, February Public Debt Hits All-Time High and March CPI Reinforces the Deficit-CPI Cycle Tango April 8, 2024

Jeffrey P Snider, The Aid of TIC In Sorting Shorts and ShortagesOctober 17, 2018


Sunday, November 03, 2024

Fear the ‟Trump Trade‟ or a Pushback on Fed Policies? Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon us


An election is a moral horror, as bad as a battle except for blood; a mud bath for every soul concerned in it—George Bernard Shaw

In this issue

Fear the ‟Trump Trade‟ or a Pushback on Fed Policies? Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon us

I. US Election Narrative: Fear the Trump Trade!

II. Market Chaos Erupts after Fed’s September Rate Cut

III. Global Economic War and the Inflation Scorecard: Trump versus Biden-Harris; Trump’s Tariffs as Negotiation Card

IV. Emerging Market and ASEAN Stocks, the PSEi 30 Hit a Record High in Trump’s Term, Philippine Peso Flourished Under Trump!

V. The Biden-Harris Legacy of "Proxy Wars"

VI. Trends in Motion Tend to Stay in Motion: World War III’s Multifaceted Aspects

VII. Global Kinetic Warfare and the Cold War as Products of the Fed’s and Global Central Bank’s Easy Money Regime

VIII. Conclusion: Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon Us 

Fear the Trump Trade or a Pushback on Fed Policies? Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon us 

Is the "Trump Trade" responsible for recent market convulsions, or does this represent a pushback against the Fed’s actions? Why political-economic trends in motion tend to stay in motion. 

I. US Election Narrative: Fear the Trump Trade!

Trump's Rising Election Odds Sends Emerging Markets Into Tailspin, Causes Biggest Stock Drop In 10 Months (Yahoo, October 27) 

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) might have to do more to support the Philippine economy if former US President Donald Trump returns to power and starts a global trade war, which can hurt the entire world and, in turn, dim local growth prospects. (Inquirer.net, October 28, 2024) 

THE RETURN of Donald J. Trump to the US presidency could cause Asian currencies such as the Philippine peso to weaken, analysts said. (Businessworld, October 29, 2024) 

At first glance, it may seem that the following headlines or excerpts were conveyed for Halloween. 

Then, I realized that the U.S. elections are coming up this week. 

Mainstream media has painted an impression that the recent setbacks in the marketplace mean that a Trump win/presidency, or the "Trump Trade," could be detrimental to the markets. 

Let us examine what led to this perspective. 

In October, the Bloomberg spot U.S. dollar index surged by nearly 3% compared to the previous month. The S&P 500 slipped by 0.99%, the iShares MSCI Emerging Market ETF (EEM) dived by 3.07%, and the Global X FTSE ASEAN ETF (ASEA) tanked by 3.9%. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield surged by 48 basis points (12.7%). 

Meanwhile, at home, the Philippine peso plunged by 3.6%, and the PSEi 30 plummeted by 1.78%. 

The prevailing sentiment in the speculative marketplace has shifted from excessive optimism to risk aversion.

Who else to blame but the leading contender in the prediction markets, Trump!

II. Market Chaos Erupts after Fed’s September Rate Cut 

But does this widely accepted perception accurately reflect causation, or is it intended to shift the Overton Window in favor of the opposing contender, Kamala Harris?

Figure 1 

The rising 10-year yield actually started just after the US Federal Reserve initiated its 50-basis-point rate cut on September 18th. (Figure 1, topmost chart)

It is rare to witness such a combination of powerful forces ripple through other market indicators.

Figure 2

Rising Treasury yields have been accompanied by an appreciating U.S. dollar index, which has also contributed to increased volatility in the bond market (MOVE Index) and volatility premiums across asset markets—including equities, oil, and foreign exchange—as well as a spike in U.S. Credit Default Swaps (CDS). (Figure 1, middle and lower graphs, Figure 2 topmost and lower images)

Figure 3

This dynamic coincided with a spike in the Economic Surprise Index and gold's widening outperformance against the TLT iShares 20-Year U.S. Treasury bond prices. (Figure 3, middle topmost and middle visuals) 

Incredible. 

The most striking indicator of the impact of the Fed's rate-cutting cycle that began in September is that it occurred under the loosest financial conditions since at least December 2022. (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

In other words, global financial markets have significantly pushed back against the Fed’s easing policy by effectively re-tightening conditions! 

Of course, one could interpret this as "buy the rumor, sell the news." 

Still, other factors are at play—such as unrestrained public spending, surging debt levels, escalating debt servicing costs, geopolitics and more!

Nevertheless, resonating with the "Overton Window" during the pandemic in support of lockdowns and vaccines, the Gramsci-cult elite-controlled media shifted the rhetoric to blame Trump’s predilection for tariffs.

III. Global Economic War and the Inflation Scorecard: Trump versus Biden-Harris; Trump’s Tariffs as Negotiation Card 

First and foremost, yes, while it is true that global trade restrictions did rise in during Trump 1.0 (2017-2021) regime, his successors, the Biden-Harris tandem, pushed for MORE trade barriers, which hit a record high in at least 2022! 

Figure 4

As the IMF chart reveals, the global economic conflict spans both parties, with both candidates appearing inclined toward de-globalization. 

(Note this shouldn’t be seen in a simplistic lens but related to geopolitical developments) 

Second, financial easing amidst the loosest monetary conditions translates to a potential comeback of inflation, which aligns with the perspective that Trump’s trade war results in higher inflation. 

However, that shouldn’t hold water; inflation under Trump’s administration was milder than the inflation epidemic during the Biden-Harris administration. 

Consequently, with higher inflation came higher interest rates as well. 

Third, Trump’s push for tariffs represents a carryover from his 2016 campaign trail. 

He used tariffs as leverage for negotiation but eased up on strict currency regulations, as noted in this Yahoo article. 

Trump has likened his tariff plan to a new "ring around the collar" of the US, with tariffs often described not as part of negotiations but with those high duties as an end goal in themselves to protect US industry… 

He promised during that campaign to impose tariffsrenegotiate NAFTA, and withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. "Promise kept," PolitiFact said of all three. 

Trump also took action on a fourth promise to declare China a currency manipulator but ended up compromising, according to the group. 

IV. Emerging Market and ASEAN Stocks, the PSEi 30 Hit a Record High in Trump’s Term, Philippine Peso Flourished Under Trump!

Figure 5

Fourth, stock markets haven’t been exactly hostile to Trump.

The ASEAN ETF (ASEA) reached an all-time high in 2018 or during the early phase of his administration, and the Emerging Markets ETF (EEM) also hit a milestone that year and also surged to a fresh record toward the close of Trump’s term. Both markets, however, eventually succumbed to the pandemic recession.

Similarly, the Philippine PSEi 30 hit a significant peak in January 2018, also coinciding with Trump’s administration.

On the currency front, the Philippine peso rallied from October 2018 to the end of 2021.

In fact, contrary to contemporary analysis, the USDPHP fell by 3.7% from January 20, 2017, to January 20, 2021 (Trump’s tenure).

In contrast, under the Biden-Harris administration, the USDPHP has increased by an astounding 21% from January 20, 2021, to the present (October 31, 2024)!

While past performance does not guarantee future outcomes, the scorecard between the contending parties shows a stark difference in the accuracy of the current predominating narratives. 

In a word, propaganda. 

Nota Bene: Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Our purpose is to highlight inaccuracies in media claims. We don’t endorse any candidates. 

V. The Biden-Harris Legacy of "Proxy Wars"

Fifth, the world is on the brink of, or already embroiled in, a form of World War III, fought across multiple spheres. 

The U.S. suffered a humiliating defeat in the 20-year Afghanistan War, ultimately withdrawing in the face of a relentless war of attrition led by the Taliban’s guerilla tactics. Both the Trump and Biden administrations negotiated withdrawal terms, but the Biden-Harris administration oversaw a controversial chaotic exit in August 2021. 

That aside, a series of conflicts has marked the Biden-Harris administration’s legacy. 

The kinetic conflict began with the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, spread to the Israel-Palestine/Hamas war in 2023, and has since escalated to include confrontations involving Israel-Hezbollah or the "Third Lebanon War," and even the precursory phase of Israel-Iran Conflict in 2024. 

Simultaneously, following Obama’s failed "Pivot to Asia," geopolitical tensions have been mounting in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, Central Asia, and other parts of the world. 

Notably, these ongoing and emerging conflicts are interconnected.

For example, the U.S. has been supplying not only aid but also arms to its allies to counter hegemonic rivals.


Figure 6

Aside from supplying 70% of conventional weapons, U.S. military aid/grants to Israel soared to all-time highs in 2024! (Figure 6, topmost chart)

That is to say, the current conflicts represent "proxy wars" where the U.S. led NATO forces engage indirectly to pursue hegemonic objectives.

VI. Trends in Motion Tend to Stay in Motion: World War III’s Multifaceted Aspects

The Global Warfare has also entered the economic and financial spheres—seen in the weaponization of the U.S. dollar through asset confiscations targeting so-called "axis of evil" nations, and in the reinforcement of a modern-day "Iron Curtain" marked by significant restrictions on trade, investments, capital flows, and social mobility.

Mounting trade imbalances, which helped fuel the rise in trade barriers from the Trump administration to Biden-Harris, have also laid the groundwork for today’s outbreak of kinetic conflicts.

Geopolitical tensions have surfaced as a growing cold war in other regions as well.

This hegemonic competition to expand sphere of influences has percolated to Africa, Latin America, the South Pacific, and the Global South (BRICs), some of which channeled through mercenary or gang wars and local civil wars. (Dr. Malmgren, 2024)

Ironically, four of the five ASEAN majors, specifically, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam recently signed up for the BRICs membership.

The implicit cold war has also extended into previously uncharted areas: underwater territories, space, the Arctic, the Pacific, mineral resources (like rare earth elements), and technological domains such as DNA research, cyberspace, and microchips (Malmgren, 2023).

The point is that these evolving conflicts underscore the interconnectedness of U.S. foreign and domestic policy.

Given the powerful forces behind this trajectory or the "deep state"—including the Military-Industrial Complex, the National Security State, Straussian neoconservatives promoting the "Wolfowitz Doctrine," the energy industrial complex, Big Tech, and Wall Street—it is unlikely these developments will cease, whether under a Trump 2.0 administration or (Biden carryover through) a Harris regime.

Put simply, while media narratives may further lobotomize or impair the public’s critical thinking, potentially deepening societal division, a meaningful change in the U.S. and global sociopolitical and economic landscape remains unlikely if elections continue to focus on what I call as "personality-based politics."

As investor-philosopher Doug Casey rightly observed, "Trends in motion tend to stay in motion until they reach a crisis."

VII. Global Kinetic Warfare and the Cold War as Products of the Fed’s and Global Central Bank’s Easy Money Regime

Lastly, the public tends to overlook that current trends are merely symptoms of deeper issues or mounting disorders stemming from the decadent U.S. dollar standard.

As investor Doug Noland astutely wrote 

Bubbles are mechanisms of wealth redistribution and destruction – with detrimental consequences for social and geopolitical stability. Boom periods engender perceptions of an expanding global pie. Cooperation, integration, and alliances are viewed as mutually beneficial. But late in the cycle, perceptions shift. Many see the pie stagnant or shrinking. A zero-sum game mentality dominates. Insecurity, animosity, disintegration, fraught alliances, and conflict take hold. It bears repeating: Things turn crazy at the end of cycles. (bold mine) [Noland, 2024] 

Easy money has long fueled, or been instrumental in financing, the global war machine, leading to today's bellicose conditions.

Easy money has also powered the growth of big government and contributed to economic bubbles and their eventual backlash, as evidenced by China’s unparalleled panicked bailout policies to prevent a confidence crisis from imploding. 

The push for easy money is likely to persist, whether under a Trump 2.0 or a Harris administration. 

As Professor William Anderson noted, 

The unhappy truth is that both platforms will need the Federal Reserve System to expand its easy money policies, despite the massive damage the Fed has already done by bringing back inflation. While Harris claims to defer to the “experts” at the Fed, Trump wants the president to have more power to set interest rates. Obviously, neither candidate is acknowledging the economically perilous situation in which the government ramps up spending, which distorts the markets, and then depends upon the Fed to monetize the resulting federal deficits. As the debt grows and the economy becomes progressively less responsive to financial stimulus, the threat of stagflation grows. The present path of government borrowing and spending all but guarantees this outcome, and the candidates have neither the political will nor the economic understanding to do what needs to be done. (Anderson, 2024) 

U.S. debt is fast approaching $36 trillion, while global debt reached $315 trillion in Q2 2024 and counting. (Figure 6, middle and lower charts) 

"Trends in motion tend to stay in motion until they reach a crisis."

VIII. Conclusion: Trump or Harris: The Era of the Bond Vigilantes is Upon Us 

While the "Trump trade" provides a convenient pretext for the current tremors in the global financial market, this narrative relies on inaccurate premises and misleading speculative claims that are unsupported by empirical evidence. Instead, these assertions aim to sway the voting audience ahead of this week’s elections. 

In contrast, the current financial market convulsions reflect a significant pushback against the Fed’s and global central banks’ prolonged easy-money policies. As investor Louis Gave of Gavekal recently noted, "Zero rates were a historical aberration that need not be repeated." 

Needless to say, regardless of who wins the U.S. presidency, political agendas will continue to advocate for easy money and various forms of social entropy and conflict. 

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as free lunch forever. 

Although trends in motion tend to stay in motion, the era of the bond vigilantes is upon us 

Things have been turning a whole lot crazy. 

___

References 

Yahoo Finance, What Trump promised in 2016 on tariffs. And what he delivered (a lot). October 28, 2024, 

Dr. Pippa Malmgren The Cold War in Hot Places, March 12, 2024 

Dr. Pippa Malmgren WWIII: Winning the Peace, October 28, 2023 drpippa.substack.com 

Doug Noland, Vigilantes Mobilizing, Credit Bubble Bulletin, November 1,2024 

William L. Anderson  The Great Retreat: How Trump and Harris Are Looking Backward, August 30, 2024 Mises.org 

Louis-Vincent Gave, Behind The Bond Sell-Off, Evergreen Gavekal October 31, 2024

Sunday, May 12, 2024

Philippine Q1 2024 5.7% GDP: Net Exports as Key Driver, The Road to Financialization and Escalating Consumer Weakness

 

GDP is the most common out-of-context stat used by governments to convince the citizenry that all is well. It is yet another stat that is entirely manipulated by inflation. It is also manipulated by the way in which modern governments define "economic activity"—Brandon Smith

 

In this issue:

Philippine Q1 2024 5.7% GDP: Net Exports as Key Driver, The Road to Financialization and Escalating Consumer Weakness

I. As Predicted, Q1 2024 5.7% GDP Retreated and Reinforced the Secondary Trendline

II. Why the GDP is Not the Economy

III. Net Exports as Key Driver of Q1 2024 GDP

IV. The Money Illusion: Net Exports Increased Due to the Peso’s Devaluation

V. Despite Record Low Unemployment Rates, Entropy in Consumers’ Spending Capacity

VI. Weakening Consumers: Aggressive Consumer Borrowing and Drawdown in Savings

VII. Consumer Entropy: The Lagged Crowding Out Effects of Fiscal Deficit Spending

VIII. Export Boom? Manufacturing Bounced in Q1 2024, But Finance Industry Dominated the Field

IX. Q1 2024 Outperformance Led by Construction, Accommodation and Service Sectors

X. Trade and Real Estate Malinvestments: Supply Side Expands even as Demand Sputters

XI. Summary and Conclusion

 

Philippine Q1 2024 5.7% GDP: Net Exports as Key Driver, The Road to Financialization


The 5.7% GDP growth in Q1 2024 highlights net exports as the primary driver, alongside the trend toward financialization and a significant deceleration in consumer spending.

 

I. As Predicted, Q1 2024 5.7% GDP Retreated and Reinforced the Secondary Trendline

 

Reuters, May 9, 2024: The Philippine economy accelerated less than expected in the first quarter as weaker consumer spending restrained growth, reinforcing expectations that the central bank will leave interest rates unchanged next week, despite rising inflation. Gross domestic product grew 5.7% in the first three months from the same period last year, the statistics agency said on Thursday, up from the previous quarter's 5.5% but below the 5.9% forecast in a Reuters poll.

 

Let us begin this analysis by examining the GDP trend.

Figure 1 


After the Q4 seasonal breach, Q1’24 GDP dropped back to the exponential trendline support level, reinforcing it. (Figure 1, upper chart)

 

Originating from the pandemic recession in 2020, the secondary trend indicates that GDP growth will be significantly slower than in the pre-pandemic era.

 

Q1 GDP’s confirmation of this trendline validates our analysis from last November:

 

Regardless of consensus opinion, the coming GDPs will likely bounce within the range of the second trendline marked by the ceiling (exponential trend) and the floor (trend support).  The percentage change will be a function of base effects. (Prudent Investor 2023) [bold original]

 

It also implies that any pompous projections that disregard this trendline are likely to deviate.

 

Additionally, given the fragility of the nascent trendline and considering the evolving internal conditions, the likelihood leans towards a downside break rather than an upside.

 

Of course, since expenditures underpin GDP, authorities could induce another breach through monetary easing—essentially flooding the economy with currency—similar to the 2020 episode. However, this would result in a surge of inflation, which should offset the initial effects.

 

Or, incidences of an upside break could be "transitory" or unsustainable.

 

As a side note, the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) revised the national accounts data from Q1 2022. 

 

II. Why the GDP is Not the Economy

 

The GDP is a statistical construct of the economy, calculated based on technical assumptions embedded in its model. This model presupposes a perspective that the economy is centrally or top-down driven, making GDP a political statistic susceptible to biases and subject to the stratagem of incumbent political authorities, without any (independent) auditing process.

 

For example, the headline GDP can be inflated by understating inflation. While inflation increases the top-line or nominal numbers, a suppressed inflation rate widens the gap—the real or headline GDP. (Figure 1, lower graph)

 

One of the primary purposes of "painting the GDP tape " is to provide the government with easy access to the public’s income and savings by justifying taxes and borrowings, while another is to rationalize the exercise of political control over its subjects.

 

Furthermore, news headlines may portray a different economic landscape than that presented by the statistical economy

 

Here are some of the latest:

 

-Businessworld, March factory output falls, steepest in almost 2 years, May 9, 2024

-Inquirer.net, Over 5,000 PH garment factory workers lose jobs May 7, 2024

-ABS-CBN News, SM Investments Q1 net income up 6 percent at P18.4 billion but retail slips, May 8, 2024

-Manila Standard, Trade deficit narrowed to $3.2b as exports, imports fell in March, May 8,2024

-Inquirer.net, SWS: Families who suffer from hunger rises to over 14%; highest rate in NCR, May 01,2024

-GMA News, NCR office space rental prices seen to drop as vacancy levels increase — JLL, April 25, 2024

-GMA News, SWS poll: 46% of Filipino families consider themselves poor, April 25, 2024

 

Even if we somehow reckon that the GDP numbers reflect reality, who benefits from it? Cui bono? These headlines suggest it was not the average Filipinos.


Yet, why is there a difference in the presented number and the headlines?

 

Moreover, if the weighted average of the inflation rates of billionaires and the street poor can be considered as apples-to-oranges, wouldn’t calculating a similar weighted average growth for software design fees and palay harvesting result in a similarly flawed representation of the economy?

 

III. Net Exports as Key Driver of Q1 2024 GDP


Let us examine the expenditure side of the GDP.

Figure 2

 

Consumers were visibly scrimping while the government was also in a penny-pinching mode. Their real GDPs were up by only 4.6% and 1.7% in Q1 2024, respectively. (Figure 2, topmost image)

 

However, government spending excludes government construction and other capex expenditures.

 

Meanwhile, stagnation also affected gross capital formation, and imports, which grew by 1.3% and 2.3%, correspondingly. (Figure 2, second to the highest diagram)

 

On the other hand, exports (goods and services) which surged by 7.5%, delivered the goodies—via the net export route (exports minus imports).

 

In essence, exports signified the cornerstone of Q1 2024’s growth.

 

IV. The Money Illusion: Net Exports Increased Due to the Peso’s Devaluation

 

But other data on merchandise trade from the Philippine Statistics Authority presents a different perspective.

 

Exports in USD shrank by 7.6%. But due to peso devaluation, they rose by 6.9% when calculated using the average peso for the period. (Figure 2, second to the lowest left graph)

 

Semiconductor exports, which accounted for 46% share last March, contracted by .18% after a sizzling 32% growth last February. Though semicon exports (in million USD) bounced in March, it has been on a downtrend since its zenith in October 2022. (Figure 2, second to the lowest right chart)

 

The export slump partially explains the labor retrenchment in garment factories and the two-year drop in factory output.

 

The cited export data pertains solely to goods exports, which, in the context of the GDP, accounted for 46% of the total. Services represented the majority.

 

On the other hand, since the pinnacle in 2022, stagnation has also affected imports of capital and consumer goods (in millions USD).

 

Although consumer imports increased by 6.6% last March, capital goods imports plunged by 14.8%—marking the third straight monthly drop and its largest decline since August 2023.

 

Importantly, since reaching its peak in 2022, global trade (in millions USD) has significantly slowed. (Figure 2, lowest window)

 

Could this be symptomatic of the intensifying geopolitical tensions and monetary disorders?

 

In summary, a substantial segment in the increase in the GDP can be attributed to the effects of peso devaluation! The money illusion!

 

That is to say, inflation presented as economic growth!

 

Incredible.

 

V. Despite Record Low Unemployment Rates, Entropy in Consumers’ Spending Capacity

 

But why the sustained slowdown of consumer spending?

Figure 3

 

Despite the labor force reaching the second-highest employment (or second-lowest unemployment) rates in Q1 2024, consumer per capita income tumbled to its lowest level since 2021! (Figure 3, topmost chart)

 

Why would more jobs lead to reduced consumption? Could it be that the public has increased their savings?

 

Interestingly, retail, government (public administration and defense), and financial sectors have spearheaded year-to-date (YTD) employment gains. (Figure 3, middle image)

 

Has the surge in defense jobs signified a partial transition to a war economy?

 

Despite a 6% drop in March, part-time jobs accounted for 30% of the employed population. (Figure 3, lowest diagram)

 

Part-time jobs comprised almost all of the job gains last February (Prudent Investor, 2024)

 

Could the employment numbers have been exaggerated to boost the GDP and the approval ratings of the administration, or were the increases in jobs primarily low-quality positions?

 

VI. Weakening Consumers: Aggressive Consumer Borrowing and Drawdown in Savings

 

Furthermore, bank lending, primarily through consumers, played a crucial role in driving household consumption and industry GDP.

Figure 4

 

Universal commercial banks saw a significant 9.45% increase in their lending portfolio in March/Q1 2024, marking the third consecutive quarterly growth and reaching its highest level since Q1 2023. (Figure 4, topmost graph)

 

Household borrowing surged at a rapid pace of 25.4%, marking the seventh consecutive quarter of over 20% growth and the highest rate since Q2 2020!

 

In the meantime, production loans also saw growth, rising by 7.7% for the third consecutive quarter, reaching the highest level since Q1 2023.

 

In other words, without the growth in bank credit, consumer GDP would have cratered, potentially causing the GDP to contract!

 

Alternatively, even with the magnified use of consumer credit, the downward trend in household spending growth persists.

 

What would the household GDP look like without it?

 

Nevertheless, this represents a symptom that credit has supported household expenditures rather than productivity growth.

 

In the face of high inflation, consumers resorted to borrowing from banks and financial institutions to sustain their lifestyles.

 

But that’s not all; they have also drawn from their savings.

 

Consequently, for the banked population, this resulted in a sharp slowdown in peso savings growth from 3.13% in February to 2.15% in March. (Figure 4, middle diagram)

 

As a result, total bank deposit growth inched up from 7.86% to 8% over the same period, primarily due to the jump in FX deposits from 22% in February to 24.7% in March in response to the peso’s devaluation.

 

Rising domestic interest rates have barely induced savings; it is the fall in the peso that has driven increases in FX deposits.

 

So, does this represent confidence in the Philippine economy?

 

The thing is, consumers have been aggressively borrowing from banks and drawing from savings to cover their lifestyle deficit caused by persistent inflation and malinvestments.

 

It is unsurprising that this has limited their purchasing capacity regardless of the actual conditions of the labor market, which authorities have declared to be near full employment.

 

Surveys indicating the rising prevalence of hunger and increased incidences of self-poverty can be explained by this phenomenon.

 

VII. Consumer Entropy: The Lagged Crowding Out Effects of Fiscal Deficit Spending

 

Moreover, all this occurs even as the government has slowed its deficit spending.


The deficit to GDP ratio dropped to 4.5%—the lowest since Q2 2020. (Figure 4, lowest image)

 

Yes, government spending was subdued in Q1, but that represented direct expenditures. Nonetheless, the government's share of GDP continues to rise, which simultaneously comes at the expense of consumers.

Figure 5

 

The share of Household GDP fell from 75.1% in Q4 2023 (75.3% in Q1 2023) to 74.5% in Q1 2024, while the share of government surged from 11.9% to 14.1% over the same period. (Figure 5, topmost graph)


Q1 2024 GDP reinforced its respective long-term trends.

 

The redistribution effects of deficit spending and malinvestments become increasingly apparent over time.

 

VIII. Export Boom? Manufacturing Bounced in Q1 2024, But Finance Industry Dominated the Field

 

Like balance sheets, the obverse side of the GDP’s expenditure side is the industry.

 

If exports were booming as so-indicated by the Expenditure GDP, then manufacturing must be outperforming.

 

At 20%, manufacturing has the largest share of the industry GDP, nonetheless, it posted a 4.5% GDP—below the headline GDP, but signified the highest since Q1 2022.

 

Labor retrenchment in parts of the sector and the March plunge in factory data contradicts the PSA’s national accounts data.

 

What sectors boomed in Q1 2024?

 

Financials emerged as one of the fastest-growing sectors, registering a real GDP growth rate of 10%. Notably, the sector's share of the total GDP reached an all-time high of 11.5%, making it the third-largest sector after manufacturing (20%) and retail (16.4%). (Figure 5, middle window)

 

Banks significantly outperformed their non-bank financial counterparts, expanding by 12.7% in Q1 2024 and increasing their share of the industry's pie from 49.3% in Q4 to a historic 61.1% in Q1 2024.

 

The share of banks relative to Total Financial Resources hit the second-highest level of 83.42% last February, indicating the increasing GDP's financialization orfinancialization of the GDP or characterized by intensifying gearing or leveraging.

 

However, despite banks' substantial contribution to the GDP, Q1 2024 profit growth was only 2.95%, marking its lowest level since the pandemic recession in 2020!  (Figure 5, lowest graph)

 

Crucially, profit growth has been on a downward trend since peaking in Q3 2022, largely impacted by sharp declines in non-interest income influenced by rising rates, as well as the decrease in interest income.

 

Rising GDP, falling (inflated) profits while increasing systemic credit risks via massive expansion in leverage.

 

Incredible.


 

Figure 6

 

As a side note, the BSP declared that the country should benefit from the deluge of equity FDI flows for the month of February, which "came from the Netherlands with investments directed mostly to the financial and insurance industry." Equity and investment funds growth rocketed by 480% to USD 830 million, which pushed higher total FDI flows by 29.3% to USD 1.364 billon. (Figure 6, topmost chart)

 

If true, this translates to more players entering a saturated industry. We shall soon see how this impacts the economy.

 

IX. Q1 2024 Outperformance Led by Construction, Accommodation and Service Sectors

 

The construction industry is another sector that outperformed in Q1 2024. Despite its real GDP growing by 7%, its share of the national accounts' pie fell from 7.2% to 6%.

 

Government construction registered the highest GDP growth at 12.4%, marking the third consecutive quarterly decline in growth. Meanwhile, financial and non-financial construction posted a real GDP growth of 6.7%, the highest in the last three quarters, but significantly lower rates than those observed from 2022 through Q2 2023. Government and private sector construction accounted for 26% and 43.4% of the industry, respectively. (Figure 6, middle image)

 

However, the industry's GDP doesn’t reveal the distribution of activities or what percentage are part of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

 

Finally, even with a 2.7% share, accommodation and services posted the fastest GDP in Q1 2024 with 13.9%.  The sector has outperformed its contemporaries in the last four quarters. (Figure 6, lowest window)

 

Nevertheless, based on share of the GDP, the sector has fully recovered from the pandemic recession troughs.

Figure 7

 

The surge in "revenge travel " and staycations has propelled accommodation GDP growth to a brisk 18.4%, compared to food services at 11.9%. Nonetheless, food services retain the largest share of the industry at 68.3%.

 

Although the industry zoomed, during the reopening of the economy, the pace of growth has since diminished.

 

In the face of harried and leveraged domestic consumers, the Department of Tourism data suggests a likely peak in inbound visitors. April arrivals grew by 2.92% year-over-year but shrunk by 9.6% month-over-month (MoM) for the second straight month. (Figure 7, upper graph)

 

While investors pursue recent growth by expanding capacity, industry prospects could be poised for a reversal from the current boom.

 

X. Trade and Real Estate Malinvestments: Supply Side Expands even as Demand Sputters

 

How about the trade and the real estate sectors?

 

While consumers struggle, the trade industry GDP improved from 5.2% in Q4 2023 to 6.4% in Q1 2024, its largest since Q1 2023. (Figure 7, lowest chart)

 

Retail GDP substantially improved from 5.7% in Q4 2023 to 7.3% in Q1 2024 while wholesale GDP steadied at 2.3% over the same period.

 

Retail trade accounted for 81.5% of the sector’s GDP, up from 79% in Q4 2023.

 

This divergence suggests that trade investors, like accommodation and food services, have splurged on building capacity, against the backdrop of consumers' diminishing spending capability.

 

The sustained divergence would likely lead to financial pressures on many retail outlets including national retail chains.

 

Financial pressures on the retail segment of SM, an economic titan, showcases this challenge. (SM has yet to report its Q1 17Q)



Figure 8

 

Lastly, the real estate sector, one of the most popular or say the crowd’s favorite, saw its GDP slow considerably from 5.5% in Q4 2023 to 4.1% in Q1 2024. (Figure 8, upper chart)

 

However, its share of the GDP bounced from an all-time low of 5.1% in Q4 2023 to 5.6% in Q1 2024.

 

Despite this, the sector’s share of bank lending continues to mount, it reached 20.7% in Q4 2023 and slipping to 20.6% in Q1 2024.

 

That is to say, while the public have jumped on the bandwagon to chase gains from the industry, often funded by increasing leverage, its contribution to the national economic value continues to decline—a manifestation of malinvestments.

 

Even the mainstream has become aware of the escalating accounts of vacancies, which they see as increasing further due to supply outgrowing demand.

 

While all eyes are on the sector bearing a pipe dream of its revival, oddly, the professional and business services sector has slowly and steadily been outpacing the former. It posted a GDP of 7.5%—its highest rate since Q1 2023.  

 

Interestingly, the sector’s economic contribution—measured by its share of the total—has been steadily outpacing the real estate sector since Q2 2022.  It had a 5.8% share against the 5.6% of the latter in Q1 2024. (Figure 8, lower window)

 

The professional and business services sector encompass various types of services, including legal, photographic, engineering, architectural, veterinary, and all other scientific and technical fields.

 

While many of its services appear to be closely linked with core industry groups, we can infer that its growth contribution arises from a relatively low starting point.

 

Consequently, economic risks may be considerably lower compared to other sectors.

 

So, despite the widespread economic maladjustments, viable opportunities still exist.

 

XI. Summary and Conclusion

 

Q1 2024 GDP retreated and reinforced its second but slower trendline, magnifying the risk of a breakdown.

 

As a result of the peso’s devaluation, net exports contributed most to the Q1 2024 GDP expansion.

 

The risks of violating the downside of the GDP trendline appear supported by the substantial slowing of consumer expenditures, driven by massive bank leveraging and a drain of savings.

 

Furthermore, the "build and they will come" mantra remains a model embraced by popular industries like trade, accommodation and services, and retail, backed by financing from banks, thereby raising systemic risks.

 

Once again, when the economy slows substantially or recession risks mount, monetary authorities will likely resort to the 2020 pandemic playbook: substantially easing interest rates, infusing record amounts of liquidity, and deepening the imposition of relief measures. Alongside this, political authorities are likely to drive deficits to reach record levels.


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References

 

Brandon Smith, Economic Earthquake Ahead? The Cracks Are Spreading Fast, March 7, 2024 Birchgold.com

 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The “Surprise‟ Philippine 5.9% Q3 GDP Powered by Deficit-Spending and Bumped by a Statistical Facade November 12, 2023

 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Jump in February’s Philippine Employment Rate was all about Part-Time Jobs! BSP’s Consumer Sentiment: Stagflation Ahoy! April 14, 2024