Showing posts with label bubble policies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bubble policies. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

IMF to Central Bankers: Keep Blowing Bubbles

The IMF’s advice to central bankers is an example why we can expect central bankers to keep blowing asset bubbles. 

That’s of course until bubbles pop by their own weight, or until the stagflation menace emerges or a combo of both.

But stagflation has been absent based in the econometric papers of the IMF, that’s according to the Bloomberg:
Monetary stimulus deployed by advanced countries to spur growth is unlikely to stoke inflation as long as central banks remain free of outside influence to react to challenges, according to a study by the International Monetary Fund.

In a chapter of its World Economic Outlook released today, the Washington-based IMF said that inflation has become less responsive to swings in unemployment than in the past. Inflation expectations have also become less volatile, according to the report.

“As long as inflation expectations remain firmly anchored, fears about high inflation should not prevent monetary authorities from pursuing highly accommodative monetary policy,” IMF economists wrote in the chapter called “The dog that didn’t bark: Has inflation been muzzled or was it just sleeping?”
Considering the distinctive political-economic structure of each nations, such pursuit of bubble policies will translate to varying impacts on specific markets and economies. For instance, emerging markets are likely to be more vulnerable to price inflation.

And by simple redefinition and measurement of inflation as based on econometric models and statistics, the IMF has given the green light for central bankers do more.

This also means that the IMF has prescribed to central bankers to throw fuel on the inflation fire.

Based on mainstream’s twisted definition of inflation, such as being predicated on demand and supply “shocks”, hyperinflation ceases to exist. 

Interestingly too the IMF hardly see current policies as having “compromised” central bank independence.

Again from the same article:
The BOJ’s new policy “is something that we hope will lift inflation durably into positive territory, which would help the economy,” said Jorg Decressin, deputy director of the IMF’s research department. “We see in no way the operational independence of the BOJ compromised at all.”
This is a rather absurd claim. When central banks buy government debt, they effectively encroach into the realm of fiscal policies. 

Instead of voters determining the dimensions of fiscal policies via taxation, central bank financing of fiscal deficits motivates government profligacy that enhance systemic fragility through higher debts and the risks of price inflation (stagflation) or even hyperinflation.

As fund manager and professor John Hussman notes at HussmanFunds.com in 2010:
Historically, and across the world, the primary driver of inflation has always been expansion in unproductive government spending (think of Germany paying striking workers in the early 1920s, or the massive increase in Federal spending in the 1960s that resulted in large deficits and eventually inflation in the 1970s). But unproductive fiscal policies are long-run inflationary regardless of how they are financed, because they distort the tradeoff between growing government liabilities and scarce goods and services.

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For instance, Japan’s government will increasingly become dependent on the Bank of Japan via Kuroda’s “shock and awe” Abenomics policies. This makes Japan vulnerable to a debt or a currency crisis.

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And recent interventions on the fiscal space by central banks of developed economies essentially reveals of the closely intertwined relationship between governments and central banks. (charts above from Zero Hedge)

This only validates the hypothesis of the Austrian school of economics that the fundamental role played by the central banks has been to support the government (welfare-warfare state) and the cartelized crony banks, which essentially means that central bank independence is a myth.

As refresher let me quote anew the great dean of Austrian economics explained: (bold mine) [The Case against the Fed page 57]
The Central Bank has always had two major roles: (1) to help finance the government's deficit; and (2) to cartelize the private commercial banks in the country, so as to help remove the two great market limits on their expansion of credit, on their propensity to counterfeit: a possible loss of confidence leading to bank runs; and the loss of reserves should any one bank expand its own credit. For cartels on the market, even if they are to each firm's advantage, are very difficult to sustain unless government enforces the cartel. In the area of fractional-reserve banking, the Central Bank can assist cartelization by removing or alleviating these two basic free-market limits on banks' inflationary expansion credit
Yet here is the IMF’s prescription for more bubble blowing, from the same article:
“The dog did not bark because the combination of anchored expectations and credible central banks has made inflation move much more slowly than caricatures from the 1970s might suggest - - inflation has been muzzled,” the IMF staff wrote. “And, provided central banks remain free to respond appropriately, the dog is likely to remain so.”
As I explained before, inflationism represents a political process employed by governments to meet political goals. Inflationism, which is an integral part of financial repression, signify the means (monetary) to an end (usually fiscal objectives). And when governments become entirely dependent on money printing from central banks, hyperinflations occur.

Just because money printing today has not posed as substantial risks to price inflation, this doesn’t mean such risks won’t ever occur.

And that the current low inflation environment basically implies "free lunch" for central banks.

Price controls, market manipulations (via central bank), the Fed’s Interest rate on reserves (IOR) and even productivity issues have also contributed significantly to subdue price inflation over interim.

And again since monetary inflation represents a process, such take time to unfold via different stages, which is why price inflation tend to occur with suddenness to become a significant threat.

IMF’s reckless advocacy of bubble policies will have nasty consequences for the world.

The IMF experts or bureaucrats, who are paid tax free and are tax consumers, hardly realize such blight will affect them too. 

The existence of the IMF depends on quotas or contributions from members which come from taxes. Such applies to other multilateral agencies such as the UN, OECD ADB or etc, which is why these institutions almost always campaign for more state interventions.

Yet should a crisis of a global dimension emerge, and where a chain of defaults by governments on their liabilities (such may include developed economies, BRICs, Asia and elsewhere), their privileges, if not their existence, will likewise be jeopardized, as governments retrench or have their respective budgets severely slashed or faced with real "austerity"

Let me venture a guess, such scenarios haven’t been captured by the IMF's econometric models. 

When the late Margaret Thatcher warned that "the problem with socialism is that eventually you run out of other people's money [to spend]", this applies to multilateral institutions too.

Saturday, December 15, 2012

China’s Stock Markets: Sovereign Funds and Central Banks Open to Invest More

The Chinese government has a bias for international political contemporaries. 

They prefer central banks and government controlled Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to have greater exposure in their stock markets in the assumption that these entities are “long term” investors than the private sector counterparts

From Bloomberg,
China scrapped a ceiling on investments by overseas sovereign wealth funds and central banks in its capital markets, part of government efforts to encourage long-term foreign ownership and shore up slumping equities.

SWFs, central banks and monetary authorities can now exceed the $1 billion limit that still applies to other qualified foreign institutional investors, according to revised regulations posted yesterday on the State Administration of Foreign Exchange’s website.

The Shanghai Composite Index (SHCOMP) jumped the most since October 2009 yesterday after the head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said Dec. 13 that China may relax or abolish a rule that requires Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors to keep most of their funds in bonds. The China Securities Regulatory Commission has cut trading fees, pushed companies to increase dividends and allowed trust companies to buy equities since Guo Shuqing took over as chairman last year.

Introducing more long-term funds from abroad will help improve market confidence, promote stable growth in capital markets and provide “robust” investment returns to domestic investors, the regulator said in May, a month after the government more than doubled the total quota for QFIIs to $80 billion from $30 billion….

QFIIs can repatriate their principal and investment returns after a lock-up period ends, though the monthly net remittances cannot exceed 20 percent of their total onshore assets as of the previous year, according to yesterday’s rules. Open-ended China funds can remit funds on a weekly basis under the new regulation, compared with monthly in the previous version announced in 2009.

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Norges Bank, Government of Singapore Investment Corp. and Temasek Holdings Pte.’s Fullerton Fund Management Co. have all reached the $1 billion limit as of Nov. 30, with QFIIs’ approved quotas totaling $36.04 billion, according to SAFE, the currency regulator. Foreign investors can only invest in capital markets through QFIIs.
The benefits from capital intermediation seems well understood by the Chinese government. 

It is only in the prism where the incentives driving public sector ownership appears to have been mistakenly lumped as purely profit oriented enterprises similar to private corporations which gave SWFs the precedence.

In reality, the positioning of political or public financial institutions on international capital markets are different. They are based on (political) priorities and parameters diverse from their private sector peers (such technical operating differences may due politically determined guidelines).

This article gives us a clue, from ai-cio.com
SWFs, similar to other institutional investors, are less likely to invest in private equity versus public equity internationally, according to a newly published paper, written by Sofia Johan of York University, April Knill of Florida State University, and Nathan Mauck from the University of Missouri.

However, the economic significance of this impact is surprisingly low, the paper asserted. "Unlike other institutional investors, SWFs are more likely to invest in private equity versus public equity in target nations where investor protection is low and where the bilateral political relations between the SWF and target nation are weak." The research demonstrates that contrary to non-governmental institutional investors, SWFs do not seek protection by investing in private equity in nations that provide strong investor protection.

Surprisingly, cultural differences play a marginally positive role in the choice to invest in private equity outside of a SWF's own sovereign nation. "Comprehensively, we find that SWFs act distinctively from other traditional institutional investors when investing in private equity," the authors claimed.

Furthermore, according to the paper, SWF investment in private equity may be primarily financially motivated as SWFs tend to underperform in the public markets.
As one can note the degree of bilateral relations differs and serves as example to a politically determined SWF fund management framework.

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In 2009, pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds dominated long term investing with over US$65 trillion in OECD economies. The share of SWF has also grown, given their hefty $4 trillion stockpile, but represents a fragment relative to the overall investible exposure by the private sector.


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In addition, given the highly volatile politically charged environment, such priorities may change. Past performance may not serve as a useful guide for future actions. Long term may become short term and vice versa depending on how changes evolve.

Also, there is no technocratic magic on public investments. Bureaucrats don't outsmart the private sector.

Public funds like sovereign wealth funds are manned by people too. They are seduced to the herding effect as evidenced by their recent price chasing action of Emerging Market debt

This anecdotal evidence from Reuters.com
Sovereign wealth funds, along with other crossover investors, such as European pension funds, were in hot pursuit of EM credit in 2012, but US pension funds "missed the boat" after buying one too many underperforming EM equity trades, said Chang.
So SWFs can be short term as much as it can be long term
 
And to repeat the earlier point: The priorities of the public funds can be influenced by political circumstances whether domestic or international.

Take for instance, California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), the US largest public pension fund recently filed for bankruptcy in response to the bankruptcy proceedings made by two cities Stockton and San Bernandino. 

Bankruptcy may turn long term investments into short term.

Bottom line: While the Chinese government’s thrust to liberalize her capital markets should be seen in a good light, which I believe encapsulates her path or grand design towards the yuan’s convertibility in order to challenge the US dollar hegemony as international currency reserve, her order of priorities in favor of SWFs seems unjustified. 

Instead, China’s government should aggressively liberalize her capital markets. Capital flows are not the problem. Bubble policies are.

Finally, the above report has allegedly bolstered the Shanghai Index to break above the 50-day moving averages with Friday’s eye popping 4.32% gains


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Such sharp recovery seems to indicate of a major inflection point for China's major benchmark. Part of which may be intended to paint a welcoming picture for the ushering in of the newly appointed leaders.

As I wrote last Sunday:
Given the recent record liquidity injections by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) which coincided with the latest leadership changes, and improving signs of credit growth, perhaps from stealth stimulus coursed through State Owned Enterprises (SoE), accelerating signs of improvements on infrastructure investments, and with retail investors almost abandoning the stock market out of depression, China’s reflationary policies may yet spark new bubbles in both the stock market and the property sectors…

Recovering prices of industrial metals also seem to underpin and or portend for China’s stock market recovery.

A reflation of China’s asset bubbles will likely be supportive of the recent gains attained by ASEAN bourses.
Recent surge in industrial metals (GYX) have presaged this. And I believe that China’s market participants have been looking for an excuse to push up the stock market and found one in the liberalization report that favored SWFs.