Monday, January 18, 2016

Phisix 6,450: Macro Stability: Peso, Government Bonds and Stocks Dumped! Bears Take Command!

And that’s how market downturns start: investors open their eyes – sometimes suddenly – and they don’t like what they’re seeing. So they poke around and peel away some of the covers, and they’re discovering risks that have been there all along, and they behold the ugliness and smell the putrefaction, and they get skittish, and some lose their appetite. –Wolf Richter

In this issue

Phisix 6,450: Macro Stability: Peso, Government Bonds and Stocks Dumped! Bears Take Command!
-Bond Yields Surge Across The Curve as Negative Spreads Reappear!
-Tumbling Peso is a Symptom of a Hissing Bubble, The Chinese Yuan Experience
-PSEi Crashes Right Into the Bear Market’s Lair!
-Property Sector Leads Sectoral Losses, Has the Philippine Property Bubble Imploded?
-Chart Patterns: Déjà vu 1994-1997?
-Domestic Bank Funds in Cash; An Enrique Razon Effect?

Phisix 6,450: Macro Stability: Peso, Government Bonds and Stocks Dumped! Bears Take Command!

The Philippines allegedly represents a paragon of macro stability. That’s what authorities and mainstream media, as mouthpieces for the interests for the establishment, keeps on impressing on us. This worked during boom. Each time mainstream media and their band of experts hollered G-R-O-W-T-H, like Pavlov’s dogs, domestic financial markets reverberated with a reflexive bid on financial assets, hence the asset price boom. This marked the era which the mainstream saw as ‘this time is different’—a permanent path to prosperity.

And so it was held.

Apparently the hypnotic effect of public expectations management seems to be fading. Today, while mainstream media and their coterie of ‘experts’ continue to screech ‘G-R-O-W-T-H’, financial markets have been pushing back—violently.

Last year I noted how the establishment has tediously worked to preserve the image of the boom, even when ‘fundamentals’ have been manifesting symptoms of deterioration or divergences1

The reason why the Philippine assets remain relatively sturdy has been because sellers have NOT yet been aggressive since the HEADLINES tell them so. The establishment believes that the boom can still be maintained even when the core has been eroding.  They are relying on HOPE. And this is the reason behind the headline management. They manage statistics and the markets to keep intact what they see as ‘animal spirits’.

If market actions during the first two weeks of 2016 should resonate on the dominant actions for the rest of the year, then 2016 won’t just be a year of the grizzly bears but a year where the establishment’s headline management will decisively fail to mask upcoming economic bust.

It’s NOT just stocks, but domestic bonds and the peso were all crushed over the week! Yes actions at the domestic financial markets belie assertions of macro stability!

Bond Yields Surge Across The Curve as Negative Spreads Reappear!


With the exception of the yields of 2 year notes, yields across the curve for Philippine government bonds surged over the week (topmost window). Stated in the context of prices, Philippine bonds were dumped last week!

Yields of 1 month bills and 5 year bonds spiked most (or were sold most). The resultant increases in yields have led to a regression for the belly of the curve (10yr-5yr) or the reversion to NEGATIVE spreads! The 10yr-3yr spread has also reverted close to zero (19 bps). Recall that the 10-3yr spread was inverted for four straight weeks during the last quarter of 2015. So despite attempts to forcibly improve the conditions of the curve during the previous two weeks possibly as part of the yearend window dressing, like stocks, bond markets have eventually foiled on such interventions.

Moreover, higher bond yields eventually translate to HIGHER interest rates! If the current trend will be sustained, then not only have the profits from the arbitrage windows of the yield curve been closing (bane for maturity transformation and NET INTEREST margin), interest rates are bound to move significantly higher! This implies for a double whammy for the financial system, specifically, first, the cost of debt servicing will go up, and second, higher lending rates will extrapolate to lesser demand for credit!

The statistical economy tells us that in 3Q 2015, Php 3 of bank credit were used to generate every peso of G-R-O-W-T-H. I believe that since statistical G-R-O-W-T-H have been inflated through the statistical artifice of price deflators, the ratio of credit to growth or credit intensity should be higher than Php 3 to 1. So a credit squeeze will essentially undermine capex, reduce profits, strain output and accentuate debt problems. And these will have secondary real economic repercussions on prices, jobs, capacity as well as to the many other factors in the economy.

Curiously, because the yields of 2 year bonds plunged (or were bid higher) as yields of 10 year counterpart increased (bonds sold), the spread of the 10yr-2yr fantastically widened! My guess, the half of the month may be time were institutions (like the ADB) makes an update on the numbers for their assessment of the Philippines. So manipulators ensured that the key benchmark spread would look good, even when all the rest have emitted signs of decay. Potemkin Village.

If bond yields continue to rise, as spreads compress, which means that the Philippine financial markets have been tightening, then I expect the BSP to counter this by easing. They will likely reduce reserve requirements or slash rates or a combination of both. Add stock market turbulence to the factors that may prompt the BSP to ease.

Yet like China’s 6 interest rate cuts plus all other forms of monetary financial or fiscal stimulus, whatever the BSP does will only have a short term effect.

Tumbling Peso is a Symptom of a Hissing Bubble, The Chinese Yuan Experience

The peso was hammered hard last week. Based on official rates, the USD PHP soared by a staggering 1.22%. 

 

For the week, among Asian nations, the USD claimed its biggest victims in Indian rupee (+1.46%), the South Korean won (+1.28%) and the Philippine peso. Among ASEAN majors, the USD rose most against the peso.

In two weeks or for 2016, the peso signified almost the median among Asian currencies where the USD PHP has been up 1.87%.

Meanwhile, the USD increased most against the Malaysian ringgit (+2.41%) where the peso ranked as the second largest loser among ASEAN majors.

The USDPHP has broken above a key resistance level (lower window). The momentum from this breakout combined by sustained market volatility could signal an acceleration of the USDPHP uptrend

So the USD’s surge against most Asian currencies from the start of the year merely spread to the peso this week. This is a manifestation of the worsening conditions of the Asian currencies relative to the USD. In short, this represents a USD dollar problem. Or the USD has become the main outlet valve for the ventilation of the accrued imbalances (bubbles) from within the region.



The mainstream has fixated on China for its woes.

But it pays to understand what actually has plagued the Chinese or how the USD has become the lightning rod on China’s deflating bubble.

In fear of a credit bubble bust, the Chinese government continues to inflate the system with credit. Albeit credit takeup has been down as state owned banks temper lending due to rising NPL concerns, the concentration of credit activities has apparently moved from banks to the bond markets2: Corporate bonds became a new financing source for Chinese companies that have difficulty in accessing bank loans as the state-dominant banking sector typically favors big state-owned companies. In 2015, companies raised a total of 2.94 trillion yuan by issuing corporate bonds, a 507 billion yuan increase from a year earlier. Corporate bonds also accounted for 19.1% of total social financing, outpacing entrusted loans as the No. 2 source of funds after bank loans for the Chinese economy.

What this tells us is that the Chinese economy seems increasingly being sucked into a deflationary vortex. Corporate bonds and entrusted loans have now become emergency oxygen or major sources for access to credit.

The irony is that as the economy slows, corporate bonds will be increasingly become vulnerable to credit risks. Given that the Chinese economy has an estimated $1.178 trillion in USD dollar debt (BIS as of Q2 2015), domestic deflationary pressures compounded by all the lifeline policies thrown by the government to rescue the economy, e.g. the stockmarket, have only increased demand for the USD. Given all things equal, domestic inflationary policies translates to lower domestic currency relative to foreign currency. So the pressure on the yuan.

With the yuan in decline, the Chinese economy needs to acquire USD just to pay off such massive USD liabilities, at the time when exports have been in a decline in 8 out of 9 months (as of December) while the economy falters.

And falling foreign exchange reserves simply implies that the stock of USD available in the Chinese financial system have been in a decline.

And it’s not just the financial institutions, the average citizens have begun to line up to buy USDs that has created episodes of USD ‘shortages’ in some banks. Such reinforces signs of capital flight.

So as to alleviate the USD imbalance, the Chinese government has not only resorted to banning select banks, as DBS and Standard Chartered, from transacting foreign exchange, this week they attempted to curb ‘speculations’ by burning the yuan ‘shorts’ through the spiking of Hong Kong interbank rates (HIBOR) to a mindboggling record high of 66%!

Like the stock market crash, the Chinese government blames currency speculative attacks as the cause behind the widening of spreads between the USD -offshore yuan (CNH) and USD onshore (CNY). They never seem to ask why the currency, or the yuan, has become the object of speculative ‘attacks’. Or why stocks markets crash. Or what incites people to sell domestic assets at a frenzied pace.

If there is nothing wrong with China, then markets will ensure that these shorts will get burned. Interventions won’t be required at all. To the contrary, interventions will only amplify existing imbalances and hasten its unraveling. And latter has become more evident by the day.

But because government are about force, everything is seen as docile, compliant or submissive to the control by force. To analogize, because the government holds the hammer, they see everything else as nails. Markets, economies and people are seen as subsidiary to the politics of force. Hence, the government’s focus has mostly been on the short term. And by training their eyes on the short term, they ignore or dismiss the longer term consequences behind their actions.

And the zeitgeist of China’s problems has signified an offspring of their political hubris.

So the vacuuming of liquidity in Hong Kong had a fleeting favorable outcome: the spreads narrowed for just one day! HIBOR rates backed down from the record highs, but have yet to normalize. By Friday, the spreads widened again (see above)

Importantly, the draining of liquidity took its toll on the stock market. The Shanghai index crashed by 8.96% this week. The major benchmark has breached the August 2015 ‘lows’ and has fallen to December 2014 levels. This week’s losses essentially negated the massive subsidies thrown by the Chinese government backed by political repression and draconian capital controls to support the stock market or the Xi Jinping Put.

The yuan predicament plus the Chinese stock market crash appears to have partly incited a global stock selloff that has brought many important global indices to bear market levels.

Now of course, subsidies are no free lunches, so stock market losses will translate to balance sheet deficits on China’s state owned companies which participated in the implementation of the Xi Jinping Put. If these companies don’t have sufficient cash flows or savings, then such deficits would have to be filled in by the government. But how will the government finance this, by more debt or by inflation? This again would compound on the pressures on the yuan.

Moreover, the Chinese government’s assault on Hong Kong based yuan speculative ‘shorts’ has spawned another nasty unintended consequence. The Hong Kong dollar posted its biggest 2 day decline against the USD since 1992 as speculators bet that the Hong Kong’s USD currency peg will soon break or end.

Now both Chinese and Hong Kong’s peg are under pressure.

It’s not just China’s soft peg or Hong Kong’s USD peg, Middle East currency pegs have also come under fire.

Economic maladjustments brought about by inflationary policies are being ventilated on currency pegs via the rising USD. Said differently, the problem has not been due to currency pegs, instead pressures on such pegs have been caused by domestic bubble policies.

This brings us back to the Philippines. China and Brazil, a few years back, were the economic darlings which media raved on. Today their economies are teetering to fall into an abyss.

Their economies highlight the transition from a credit fueled economic (phony) boom to an economic bust that have been signaled by pressures on the domestic currency, and subsequently, has percolated into other assets.

The falling peso (as with the ringgit, rupiah and the baht) signifies the same malaise that plagues these bigger emerging market peers. The difference has been in the stages of both the business and the credit cycle on these countries. Think of this as FIFO, first in first out, China and Brazil boomed first, now they are the first to feel the pressures from imbalances or malinvestments brought about by the previous boom. The rest will follow or converge with them.


And no statistical talismans will prevent an economic bust from occurring as consequence to the previous credit inflation boom. What has been borrowed will have to be paid back.

This week’s peso dilemma came even as the BSP celebrated OFW remittances in November which they say sustained G-R-O-W-T-H. Yes the BSP cheers on small bounces as if it were a major event.

The long term trend of OFW remittances growth rate has been falling (as shown by both cash and personal remittances—charts in upper window). This represents a structural dynamic: diminishing returns/marginal productivity given the scale of remittances.

Current applause will not change the coming stagnation of remittances, as well as the likelihood of CONTRACTION in response to a global recession or from major geopolitical crisis which may come in varying events as Middle East war, and or imposition of stringent social mobility controls in response to the refugee crisis in Europe and elsewhere or even the dissolution of the EU.

The BSP also positively noted that October FDIs showed marginal improvements. Since FDI flows are premised on global economic and financial conditions, any downturn or tightening abroad will lead to reduced FDIs. Additionally, once domestic economic headlines show of marked deteriorations, then this will reduce incentives for foreigners to invest, so FDI will fall too.

The BSP noted that net foreign portfolio flows were negative $600 million in 2015. While outflows nearly doubled in 2015 from 2014, it hasn’t been as large in the scale of those inflows in 2012-13.

Curiously, despite the sharp selloff at the PSE during the past two weeks in 2016, net outflows according PSE data remains moderate. This means don’t blame the foreigners, the locals have joined selling spree.

Have locals been buying USD too?

At the end of the day, the falling peso represents a symptom of the unwinding of domestic economic bubble. And mainstream’s rationalization, which has blamed the peso woes on external sources (China, the Fed rate hike), only exhibits the self–attribution bias error and denial. And there will be hefty a price to pay for denying reality.

Additionally, aside from signs of ‘shortages’, the USD has served as the traditional lightning rod during turbulent times.

For the USD today, tradition becomes a convention.

PSEi Crashes Right Into the Bear Market’s Lair!

With bonds guttered and the peso disgorged, stocks were similarly dumped this week.


Philippine stocks were among the biggest losers for the week and for 2016.

The PSEi posted a 1.92% decline this week. Losses by Singapore’s STI (-4.38%), Vietnam’s VN (-3.04%) and South Korea’s KOSPI (-2.02%) surpassed the Philippine equivalent. In two weeks, the PSEi ranked third (-7.23%) in order of losses which was led by Singapore (-8.74%) and Vietnam (-6.22%)

With all three assets fumbling, the so-called shining star of Asia seems to be losing its glitter fast.

2016 is supposed to be the year of the red monkey. However, based on how the domestic stock market behaved since the start of the year, 2016 increasingly looks like the year of the ferocious bears. [As a side note, Chinese New Year starts on February 4th, the red monkey is supposed to be bullish for metals]

Following the first week’s considerable 5.42% fall, the Phisix opened this week with a thud. On Monday, January 11, the Phisix stumbled by a petrifying 4.36%. So for the first six trading days of 2016, the PSEi bled by an astounding 9.78%!

What a way to start the year!

Monday’s 4.36% dive looked very much like a technical reaction: it signified a breakdown from three coincidental patterns: a major and a minor head and shoulders, and a major descending triangle. The resistance trends of two of the major patterns originated from April 2015 record.

I previously shown the said chart patterns here.

Yet last Monday’s debacle represented a continuing motion from the first week of the year’s sharp 5.42% decline.

Moreover, based from the record April 10 high of 8,127.48, Monday’s meltdown brought the PSEi, which then nursed a 22.63% deficit, into the bear market or a downturn of 20% or more…over at least a two month period, as defined by Investopedia.

From Monday’s panic selling, bulls fought fiercely back to recover the losses. Unfortunately, languid volume, partly compounded or aggravated by external events, doused cold water on the week’s rally. So by the end of the week, the bulls were able to pare losses down by just 56%. PSEi closed 1.92% lower.

Year to date or in two weeks through 2016, again losses have accrued to 7.23%.

Despite the reduction of this week’s loss, at 6,450, the PSEi remained a captive of the bears down 20.65% from the zenith.

Monday’s meltdown combined by the excessive volatility during the succeeding days of the week seems to replicate the August episode.

If Monday’s closing price of 6,288.56, which was at the session low, holds over the coming days, then the PSEi may likely go on a consolidation or rangebound phase. Here, 6,288.56 will serve as support while 6,600 the resistance. The PSEi may go on a gap filling phase, by testing the resistance. [I posted the charts below]

Again for the PSEi to push back against the bear market forces, it would need to, not only hold on to the present support levels, but importantly, build sufficient volume at current or at improved price levels. Only from here can a successful breakout of the resistance level occur.

Otherwise, with a dearth of volume, the PSEi may struggle to find support even at current price levels. This means that the recently carved support level may be tested, and possibly, may give way or relinquish to sellers where a new lower base would be established.


Volume has been the key as to why the Phisix continues to wither. (upper window)

It’s a bad sign to see volume rise when the indices have been dominated by sellers. Add to such troubling sign is when benchmarks rise on thin volumes. But this has been the character of the volume performance for the rest of 2015 through today. Even the path to etch April’s record high had been a showcase of conspicuous divergence.

Additionally broad market health needs to markedly improve. (lower window)

It’s the second straight week of intense selloffs for both PSEi and non PSEi isssues. The first week’s spread, which was lopsidedly in favor of sellers at 366, was a record margin. This week, sellers still dominated by a huge 223 margin, one of the largest five since 2015.

Two weeks of broadbased selloff suggest of oversold conditions. But in bearmarkets, oversold conditions may remain oversold for a lengthy time. This is converse to bullmarkets, where overbought conditions may remain overbought for an extended period.

It’s not just the broad market, among PSEi issues, 24 posted losses while only 5 closed up. One issue, Robinsons Land, was unchanged.

And based on sectoral performance, the mining sector endured the most selling. This was followed by the property and the service sector. Least affected was financials. Again this represents a curious development considering government bond yields soared across the curve (with the exception of the 2 year) as discussed above.

Property Sector Leads Sectoral Losses, Has the Philippine Property Bubble Imploded?


Fascinatingly, outside mining, the property sector now leads the losses among major industries for this year (-10.74%).

The property sector was second to the holding sector in 2015 as best performers. Both generated positive returns when all the other sectors bled. Early gains have provided sufficient cushion for these sectors to counter the spreading of losses going to the close of the year.

Now the story appears to have radically changed. If the property sector continues to hemorrhage and lead the losers, not only should the loses diffuse into banking stocks, (where property/ real estate sector remains the top client or borrower of the banking system with 19.63% share of production loans as of November 2015) and to equities of the top holding companies (whom are mostly heavily exposed to the real estate sector), this should highlight a real downturn in corporate fundamentals during the last quarter of 2015.

Recall that in late October there had been two week of synchronized media blitz on the property industry which I suspected was made to cover signs of weaknesses. Eventually my suspicions were validated.

Yet if current price actions have been manifesting of a magnified slowdown of Q4 fundamentals of the industry, then the mythical domestic demand G-R-O-W-T-H story will soon be in shambles!

Government statisticians will have little room to wiggle and employ their statistical tools to embellish the GDP.

And since the centerpiece of the Philippine G-R-O-W-T-H bubble has been in the property-shopping mall sectors, which alongside has been supported by bubble in hotel-casinos, and finance, the collapse of the property bubble will shatter the credit fueled house of cards underpinning the Philippine G-R-O-W-T-H bubble!

[As a side note, crashing casino stocks seem headed towards becoming centavo stocks!]

The one way trade from the ‘this time is different mentality’ will be exposed for what it truly is—a sham—brought about by redistributionist easy money policies.

And don’t forget some of the property majors have substantial exposure in China! Worsening conditions in China will only compound on their domestic predicament.

Chart Patterns: Déjà vu 1994-1997?

In early 2014 I presented a chart which showcased on the 1994-1997 topping phase.

Given the eerie resemblance of the three bear market strikes in 2013 with that of 1994-1995 bear markets, I then asked3, If the past should repeat then we should see a final blowoff phase rally prior to the capitulation.

Well here are the updated charts now


Mark Twain once said that history doesn’t repeat but it does rhyme.

The three bear markets of 1994-95 (upper window) showed that the Phisix wanted to meaningful correct but for some reasons this was postponed. The Phisix hit a bottom in November 1995. So instead of a correction the Phisix zoomed by 48% from November 1995 to February 1997. This marked the terminal blow off phase of the era’s bubble.

So when the fourth opportunity to sell arose in 1997, the bears never gave the bulls any leeway. 19 months after, the Phisix collapsed by a shocking 68.6%! And the story behind the crash emerged: the Asian crisis.

Instead of three bear markets, in 2013, the taper tantrum sent the Phisix to the bear market zone THRICE. The bulls tried to lift past from the bear market zone twice but they failed. So somewhat like 1997, there were three hits at the bear market levels. The last touch on the bearmarket was on December 2013. And like 1997, it took a fourth try to succeed. So instead of a correction, like 1997, the Phisix zoomed by 41% from December 2013 to April 2015. This seemingly marks the terminal blow off phase of today’s real time bubble.

Since things have been in state of flux, the title for the present events have yet to be established.

But unlike 1997 where the crash has been fast and furious, so far the Phisix decline has mostly been gradual. But the declines during the first two weeks of 2016 have picked up speed and intensity. Yet the jury is out whether the rate of declines will crescendo or will remain incremental or will mark the bottom phase.

The bear markets of 1994-95 were connected to the shaping of the 1997 climax. In the same manner, the procrastinated bear markets of 2013 helped produced today’s bear market.

But unlike 2013, today’s bear market have been accompanied by a steeper fall in the peso, higher bond yields, flatter yield curve and even signs of inversions, slowing credit growth, a recent slump in money supply growth, falling prices everywhere, a huge increase in debt levels, a contraction of PSE listed firms’ NGDP and a loss of earnings in 2Q, reduced statistical GDP, manufacturing and export slump and plunging job placements.

Yet if 1997 will rhyme, then the rate of declines will crescendo as the year deepens.

Bear markets have significant messages, I wrote about this in 2013. But just because it didn’t happen then, doesn’t mean it won’t or never happen. The lack of fulfillment of a full pledge bear market does not imply an evidence of absence. That would be the Loch Ness fallacy/ or appeal to ignorance

Will the chart patterns of the 1990s rhyme?

Domestic Bank Funds in Cash; An Enrique Razon Effect?

To paraphrase Jackie Chan as Karate Kid mentor most people think with their eyes so they are easily fooled.

In dimension of economics, theories hardly ever appeal to them because it requires extensive mental rigor and effort. So most people just outsource their thinking to what mainstream media says. They rely on ‘experts’ or popular talking heads, who are paid immensely, to merely echo on their biases (confirmation bias).

Also most people depend on opinions of institutional ‘experts’, which have been garbed with economic variables and statistical numbers and presented as economic outlook/s or paper/s, when in reality these represent nothing more than sales pitch/es, intended to generate fees or commissions by unloading the latter’s inventories on the public.

And since many people, including the above ‘experts’ think with their eyes, the same set of people will not be convinced by risk reward conditions as shaped by theories that have been backed by evidences. It’s only tangible developments or numbers that will convince them.

For instance, people think that those who call on market tops when the bull market is raging is a kook or a screwball naysayer. Now that markets have been crashing most of the same people have been scratching their head, if not drowning in sorrow.

And as I have been saying here no matter how the establishment tries to promote the boom in order to benefit from BSP trickle down policies, hissing bubbles will only force reality on them.

So upon stumbling on a Bloomberg article, I was surprised to read that some major bank funds particularly BPI and Union Bank preferred to stay out of the market and on the sidelines, in cash.

Now you know why volume has been drying up.

While the author of the article pressed that valuations have significantly dropped, the position of the quoted fund managers seemed a puzzle to the writer. The article cited mainly China, the bear market and investors ignoring fundamentals as factors determining the position of these fund managers.

The news essentially exposes on the growing fissure within the establishment of the once unanimous bullish outlook.

Serious doubts have begun to rear its ugly head. Yet positions that pins the source of mistakes as internally generated has been avoided. Denial remains strong as with the influence of political correctness on media’s framing of the bad news.

Yet most of the cited reasons are flimsy. This makes me suspect that there may be something more behind the decision to stay away from stocks. Perhaps these managers have said only what the writer of the article wanted to hear.

I could be wrong but perhaps these managers may have been ordered by their big bosses to stand down.

I call this supposition the Enrique Razon effect.

Recall that ICTSI honcho Enrique Razon said in a recent interview at the Nikkei Asia, which was censored or not aired by domestic media, that he expected another crisis to happen ‘just around the corner’.

While domestic media can ignore Mr Razon’s outlook, Mr. Razon has clout on his business and social peers.

Razons, the Aboitizes and the Ayalas are a clique of elites with Spanish ethnicity. The Aboitiz family in partnership with Insular Life and SSS controls Union Bank. An Aboitiz sits at the board of Razon’s ICTSI, while a director of ICTSI also sits at the board of Union Bank. A business grapevine says that a scion of Aboitiz is slated to marry or tie the knot with a scion of the Ayalas this February.

Of course, all these connections establish nothing but represents guess.

However, if I am right Mr. Razon has influenced the Aboitizes and the Ayalas to take a conservative stance. And that the batten down the hatch position may have filtered down to the organizational hierarchy of their companies.

So it might have been a memo from the top of the hierarchy for the bank fund managers to stay on the sidelines.

The only way to confirm or falsify my suspicions will be from the CAPEX announcements of Aboitiz’ AEV and Ayala’s AC. Should they announce CAPEX budget for 2016 SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER than the previous year, then these elites may have joined forces to conserve their resources in anticipation of a crisis.

This also means that the current position of bank managers were most likely at the behest of the big bosses.

Otherwise, my theory is falsified.

Regardless of who was responsible for cash on the sidelines by some the said bank funds, at the end of the day, the bullish headlines have been wearing off. And that’s what matters most.

____

2 Marketwatch.com China's December new bank loans miss expectations January 15, 2016



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