Will IMF’s bailout of Euro Reach $ 3.5 trillion?

From the Daily Mail,

Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the IMF, said the current war chest of around £250billion ‘pales in comparison with the potential financing needs of vulnerable countries’ and needs to be expanded to deal with ‘worst-case scenarios’.

Sources in Washington said the IMF’s pot of cash could be expanded to £2.6trillion although officials in London said that figure looked ‘incredibly high’.

Mrs Lagarde’s warning came as U.S. President Barack Obama said the debt crisis in Europe was ‘scaring the world’ and that eurozone leaders were not dealing with the issue quickly enough.

And a top Bank of England economist urged leaders around the world to stop the world plunging back into recession. ‘It’s doing something rather than just saying something that counts,’ said Ben Broadbent, a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee charged with setting UK interest rates.

Danger: U.S. President Barack Obama said the debt crisis in Europe was 'scaring the world'

Britain is liable for 4.5 per cent of IMF funding – meaning it would have to contribute around £115billion to an enlarged bailout fund, or £4,600 per household.

It is conceivable that figure may turn out to be slightly lower because Britain’s share is falling as rapidly growing economies such as China contribute more.

Britain has already handed over £12.5billion in emergency loans to Greece, Ireland and Portugal to help prop up the euro.

The staggering rescue package proposed by the IMF signify that the rest of the world will be included. This would be led by the United States which reinforces their backdoor participation (aside from the monetary channels).

(Wikipedia.org: IMF)

And the proposed bailout implies of the inclusion of ASEAN and the Philippines with 3.94% voting share.

IMF: IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power

Yet such humongous bailout scheme, if it does become a reality, would adversely impact global economic growth as resources are shifted from productive use towards saving the skins of Euro bankers and the political class. Filipinos will pay for this with higher taxes or inflation.

Moreover, there are no guarantees that shock and awe bailout tactics will work over the medium term or the long term. Just look at what has been happening to the US, whose economy continues to flag despite the trillions of dollars expended by the US Federal Reserve and the US government.

Also, by funneling large amounts of resources to current rescue programs, the world would have depleted or drained their resources should another crisis arise anytime.

Lastly, the use of scare tactics to secure political deals, seem to be acknowledged by politicians. Except that for some, they pretend to fight them, when they in truth—they have impliedly been promoting them.

End The IMF

The sexual molestation scandal has compelled the resignation of IMF’s Dominique Strauss Khan.

Now there are have been speculations on his replacement.

As of yesterday bookmakers have placed the odds on some possible replacement candidates.

This from the Economist

Here are some of the people viewed to be plausible contenders to replace Mr Strauss-Kahn, and the odds on their getting the top job according to William Hill, a British bookmaker. A win for a non-European would be a first for the IMF, as would the appointment of Christine Lagarde, who would be the first woman to head the organisation.

Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal describes part of how IMF politics works.

From the WSJ

Because the U.S. and European nations together have always held a majority voting stake in the IMF, that unwritten convention has guided the leadership process for the past six decades. Any executive directors on the 24-member board — representing the IMF’s 187 governments — can propose candidates for consideration, generally based on guidance from their home countries. In turn, the board has used informal straw polls — rather than formal recorded votes — to gauge support for the candidates. (Though formal voting isn’t used, the distribution of voting shares helps determine who can garner enough support as a candidate.)

At times, though, the U.S. and Europe have been divided on their options. In 2000, for instance, the European Union formally backed German deputy finance minister Caio Koch-Weser to take the top post at the fund, replacing longtime IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus of France. But the U.S. balked, leading the White House press secretary at the time to publicly oppose the choice. Many developing nations wanted then-Acting Managing Director Stanley Fischer, an American born in Zambia, to fill the job.

After a month of heated public debate, the IMF eventually settled on German national Horst Kohler, who was president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The U.S. has been expected to take a back-seat role in choosing the next managing director, focusing instead on its traditional role of picking the IMF’s No. 2 official. The current No. 2, John Lipsky, is slated to leave his post in August. For now, though, U.S. officials have put that process on hold considering the rush to fill the top post.

Since the IMF’s founding, all 10 IMF managing directors have come from Europe. The managing director is typically a former finance minister or central bank governor from a Western European country.

So the IMF has been mostly been a US-Europe turf, where the US has allowed Europeans to take the helm since.

Yet some have floated that the Kahn episode could even be a frame up.

Writes Bob Wenzel,

I continue to believe that the most likely explanation for him coming out of the bathroom naked is that he was expecting someone.

If he did make a call to an escort service than I fully believe a government agency could have set DSK up. What's more, this is a major French hotel, which means it his highly likely that French government agents are floating around the hotel as guests and employees.

The reasons: perhaps because he “broke free from the party line” (may have offended some vested interest groups) with his current policies or perhaps it was about the upcoming national elections in France or a combination of both.

A French poll reveals that about 57% believes that Kahn had been a ‘victim of a plot’

This only shows how politicking could have played a nasty part in the sordid Kahn affair which also reveals on the operational procedures of the IMF—which seems indistinguishable from any national agencies which redistributes resources politically.

Also the US-European political hegemony of the multilateral institution translates to the channeling resources to uphold their political interest. And this is why Emerging Markets are unlikely to gain a leadership foothold in the near future. The division of spoils belong to the winners.

Besides, the fundamental role for IMF’s existence have been exhausted, where the agency’s operations has shifted from ‘monetary’ to ‘developmental’.

As Cato’s Doug Bandow writes, [hat tip Dan Mitchell] (bold highlights mine)

The IMF's founding purpose vanished when the system of fixed exchange rates collapsed in the early 1970s. But instead of closing up shop (no jobs for international bureaucrats in that!), the IMF switched to promoting development. That is, it became a welfare program for Third World governments (and, more recently, for Eastern Europe and even Greece).

So maybe it’s not time to seek a replacement. Maybe it’s time for the IMF to stop meddling in the affairs of nations.

Maybe it’s time for the IMF to stop propping up collectivist regimes, bailing out unsustainable systems and promoting interests of political operatives behind the scenes.

As Leland B. Yeager writes in Cato (Hat tip Don Boudreaux) [bold emphasis mine]

I am inclined to concur in points made by Ian V squez (1997) and Allan Meltzer (1995) about activities of the IMF (and similarly of the World Bank). These tend to support government domination of economies, despite ``conditionality'' purporting to do otherwise; and politicization of economies increases the scope for rent-seeking. Thrusting debt onto poor countries, putting them onto a debt treadmill, ill serves economic development. Funds for bailouts create moral hazard, tending to delay reforming crisis-prone policies (see The Economist 1997b). New issues of SDRs, which the IMF staff likes to propose, accomplish international transfers of wealth in a way that most legislators do not even understand. Self-important international bureaucracies have institutional incentives to invent new functions for themselves, to expand, and to keep client countries dependent on their aid.

Maybe it’s time to abolish the IMF.

Questions and Answers on Philippine Monetary and Fiscal Issues

The following is my to answer some of the questions that my colleagues have posted on facebook group which they say is required for their research.

Role of Central Bank and Currency Interventions

With reference to the record $66.2 billion Gross International Reserves (GIR) the Philippines has tallied for the first quarter of 2011, this can be broken down into Foreign Investments, Gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), foreign exchange and Reserve position in the fund.

Breakdown of Gross International Reserves (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)

Reserve assets can further be broken down into securities mostly in foreign bonds and notes and secondly in foreign currency cash and deposits.

Reserve asset breakdown Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

The role of the BSP, like all other central banks, is to manage exchange rate fluctuation and or the state of balance of payments.

They do this by either indirect foreign currency intervention (tweaking money supply) or indirect foreign currency intervention (buy or sell foreign currencies with local currency) [Steven M. Suravonic, International Finance Theory and Policy]

And in managing capital inflows they can be sterilized or non-sterilized. Non sterilized intervention can result to inflation.

Jang-Yung Lee explains [IMF 1997 Sterilizing Capital Inflows]

Capital inflows result in a buildup of foreign exchange reserves. As these reserves are used to buy domestic currency, the domestic monetary base expands without a corresponding increase in production: too much money begins to chase too few goods and services.

To ease the threat of currency appreciation or inflation, central banks often attempt what is known as the "sterilization" of capital flows. In a successful sterilization operation, the domestic component of the monetary base (bank reserves plus currency) is reduced to offset the reserve inflow, at least temporarily. In theory, this can be achieved in several ways, such as by encouraging private investment overseas, or allowing foreigners to borrow from the local market. The classical form of sterilization, however, has been through the use of open market operations, that is, selling Treasury bills and other instruments to reduce the domestic component of the monetary base. The problem is that, in practice, such sterilization can be difficult to execute and sometimes even self-defeating, as an apparently successful operation may raise domestic interest rates and stimulate even greater capital inflows. Unfortunately, many developing countries also lack the tools available to run a classical sterilization policy, or find it simply too costly to do so. This is often the case wherever the financial system is not fully liberalized.

The Philippines has undertaken both measures with questionable results.

From the ADB Institute,

As described earlier, the BSP has engaged in both sterilized and unsterilized intervention. A simple correlation analysis indicates that intervention, as measured by the percentage of international reserves, has limited impact on the exchange rate’s level, percentage change, and volatility (Table 11 [ PDF 53.5KB | 1 page ]).¹⁰ The results indicate that intervention had a modicum of success in reducing exchange rate volatility in the Philippines between 1993 and 1996. Meanwhile, intervention prevented a rise in the exchange rate (measured in US$/peso) after the crisis, particularly during the period 2003–2007. In many instances the results are counter-intuitive, i.e. the correlation coefficient is positive, similar to the result of the impulse response function that was presented in Section III (Figure 4 [ PDF 42.8KB | 1 page ]). ADB Institute, Evaluation of Policy Responses, March 5, 2008

External Debt (Fiscal and Monetary Issues)

The question of debt has also been raised.

External debt as defined by the BSP covers all short-term and medium-term obligations of the BSP, commercial banks, public and private sectors payable to non-residents.

One must be reminded that external debt which covers by the national government is a fiscal issue whose repayment is allocated by the Philippine Congress. The 2011 php 1.645 trillion budget allocates 23% to debt servicing (dateline Philippines, President Aquino’s Budget message—Office of the President’s Official Gazette)

The BSP’s role according to Manila Bulletin/Cuervo Far East is to set “internal annual debt ceiling to monitor foreign borrowings, either from commercial sources or from official development assistance funds or donor aids.”

External Objectives and the Role of Forex Currency Reserves

Now domestic monetary policy is about domestic political and economic issues, and is hardly about coordinating inflation with external sources.

External issues are assumed by currencies that play the role of foreign currency reserves, where the conflict of interest between domestic and international objectives engenders what is known as the Triffin Dilemma.

IMF During the 1997 Asian Crisis and the Philippine Debt Moratorium in 1970-80s

During the Asian crisis the left has blamed liberalization, pegged currency and high interest rates (Walden Bello) when the problem has been a global rotational issue of bubble cycles.

Paper money has never been about sound money. It has been about political objectives.

As to whether the restricting Peso ‘inflation’ would hurt the US dollar hegemony, US dollar’s hegemony depends largely on the sustainment of its inflationist policies. If the US recklessly pursues a dollar debasement as their main policy thrust, countries will either jointly devalue (race to the bottom or competitive devaluation) or abandon the US dollar as a foreign currency reserve.

Finally, with regards to the role played by the IMF during the Philippines during the Philippine debt moratorium

Country-data com provides some clue: (bold emphasis mine)

On October 17, 1983, it was announced that the Philippines was unable to meet debt-service obligations on its foreign-currency debt of US$24.4 billion and was asking for a ninety-day moratorium on its payments. Subsequent requests were made for moratorium extensions. The action was the climax of an increasingly difficult balance of payments situation. Philippine development during the decade of the 1970s had been facilitated by extensive borrowing on the international capital market. Between 1973 and 1982, the country's indebtedness increased an average of 27 percent per year. Although government-to-government loans and loans from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank were granted at lower-than-market rates of interest, the debt-service charges on those and commercial loans continued to mount. In 1982 payments were US$3.5 billion, approximately the level of foreign borrowing that year and greater than the country's total debt in 1970. The next year, 1983, interest payments exceeded the net inflow of capital by about US$1.85 billion. In combination with the downturn in the world economy, increasing interest rates, a domestic financial scandal that occurred when a businessman fled the country with debts estimated at P700 million, escalating unrest at the excesses of the Marcos regime, and the political crisis that followed the Aquino assassination, the debt burden became unsustainable (see table 16, Appendix).

The Philippines had turned to the IMF previously in 1962 and 1970 when it had run into balance of payments difficulties. It did so again in late 1982. An agreement was reached in February 1983 for an emergency loan, followed by other loans from the World Bank and transnational commercial banks. Negotiations began again almost immediately after the moratorium declaration between Philippine monetary officials and the IMF. The situation became complicated when it came to light that the Philippines had understated its debt by some US$7 billion to US$8 billion, overstated its foreign-exchange reserves by approximately US$1 billion, and contravened its February 1983 agreement with the IMF by allowing a rapid increase in the money supply. A new standby arrangement was finally reached with the IMF in December 1984, more than a year after the declaration of the moratorium. In the meantime, additional external funds became nearly impossible to obtain.

In each of these arrangements with the IMF, the Philippines agreed to certain conditions to obtain additional funding, generally including devaluation of the peso, liberalization of import restraints, and tightening of domestic credit (limiting the growth of the money supply and raising interest rates). The adjustment measures demanded by the IMF in the December 1984 agreement were harsh, and the economy reacted severely. Because of its financial straits, however, the government saw no option but to comply. Balance of payments targets were met for the following year, and the current account turned positive in FY (fiscal year--see Glossary) 1986, the first time in more than a decade. But there was a cost; interest rates rose to as high as 40 percent, and real GNP declined 11 percent over 1984 and 1985. The dire economic situation contributed to Aquino's victory in the February 1986 presidential election.

Hope this helps,

Benson