Has the Wile E. Coyote Moment Been Triggered by China and Russia?

I have been pounding on the table that the current bubble dynamics will evolve from the periphery-to-the-core sequence. Despite denials by the mainstream that there will be no contagion from the recent emerging market meltdown, I keep pointing out that changes in prices will affect people’s preferences, knowledge and economic calculation and thus eventually expressed through the allocations of resources. And the impact of such derivative actions would be to reverberate on prices, thus the slomo or gradual transition or the market’s time consuming process. Politics is just one avenue expressive of the response from the recent emerging market crisis.

I share fund manager Doug Noland opinion[1] that emerging markets, who had been last shoe to drop in the 2007-8 global crisis, has become the US crisis equivalent of the global subprime.

Here is what I wrote about the potential transmission link from Emerging Markets to Developed economies[2].

Even when the exposure would seem negligible, if the adverse impact of emerging markets to the US and developed economies won’t be offset by growth (exports, bank assets and corporate profits) in developed nations or in frontier nations, then there will be a drag on the growth of developed economies, which would hardly be inconsequential. Why? Because the feedback loop from the sizeable developed economies will magnify on the downside trajectory of emerging market growth which again will ricochet back to developed economies and so forth. Such feedback mechanism is the essence of periphery-to-core dynamics which shows how economic and financial pathologies, like biological contemporaries, operate at the margins or by stages.

I recently pointed to the ongoing slowdown in exports of major exporting nations as reinforcing signs of a significantly slowing global economy[3]. 

More importantly the biggest emerging market, the Chinese economy has been showing signs of fatigue from credit based economic inflationism. Aside from the February export collapse, recently the growth rate of Chinese retail sales (slowest pace since 2004), fixed asset investment (13-year low) and industrial production (weakest start since 2009) has fallen significantly[4].

In addition, prices of Dr. Copper have recently crashed and so with signs of renewed weakening of the Baltic Dry Index. Meanwhile the Chinese yuan continues to weaken vis-à-vis the US dollar, this should continue to put pressure on firms with US dollar indentures.

When I said that the bubble bust process will undergo first, financial market disruptions, then liquidity squeeze and lastly either we see economic crisis trigger a financial crisis or vice versa, we can see this progression in China.

From Bloomberg[5]:

Chinese steel companies, the world’s largest, helped drive a regional industry benchmark index to a seven-month low as concern builds that some mills face financial difficulty amid a government credit squeeze…

Closely-held steel mills in China are struggling to get funding at the moment and that’s led to panic selling of iron ore, according to Morgan Stanley. The nation’s top banking regulator said yesterday strict credit guidelines will be imposed on mills that were big polluters and users of energy.

The sharp reduction in the access of credit will magnify on China’s credit problems. On the other hand, amplified credit problems will mean a spreading of losses in companies and more defaults which should translate to a pronounced economic slowdown. For an economy that has been horribly distorted by both inflationism and myriad of political interventions or financial repression, I doubt if the transition to clear such existing credit excesses will be orderly. 

The Shanghai composite lost 2.6% this week but this would have been even deeper whereas not from the growing expectations by mainstream that the Chinese government will be conducting a stimulus. China’s stock market rallied as Premier Li spoke in the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress[6]. This reaction is pure Pavlovian. The mainstream has been so desperate as to fail to recognize that China’s current debt problem has been an offspring of the 2008 stimulus.

If you see in the above charts, the German Dax has broken two support levels. UK’s FTSE seems headed in Germany’s path and the Nikkei crashed 6.2% this week.

A note on Japan. I wrote that “a bet on the Nikkei is a bet on the direction of stimulus”[7]. Japan’s sales taxes is about to come online in April. I believe that this will backfire on the struggling Japanese economy also heavily distorted by interventions and inflationism. The market seems to recognize this, but has latched on to the Bank of Japan for short term panacea. This week, the Bank of Japan refused to accommodate[8] their expectations for expanded stimulus and thus the 6.2% crash. The reaction is pure Pavlovian

And out of desperation to raise wages, the Japanese government has embarked on ridiculing or putting to shame on public, companies that refuse to hike pay[9].

Such reaction reminds me of former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression by implementing the New Deal which forced companies to pay salaries higher than should be.

In a study by two UCLA professors Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian they discovered that artificially elevated wages then resulted to substantially higher employment[10].

President Roosevelt believed that excessive competition was responsible for the Depression by reducing prices and wages, and by extension reducing employment and demand for goods and services. So he came up with a recovery package that would be unimaginable today, allowing businesses in every industry to collude without the threat of antitrust prosecution and workers to demand salaries about 25 percent above where they ought to have been, given market forces. The economy was poised for a beautiful recovery, but that recovery was stalled by these misguided policies.

So China won’t just be the culprit to more financial tremors, expect Japan’s added role post-sales tax April.

Yet today’s pressures come from another front: the standoff by Russia and the West via the Ukraine political crisis.

The US Federal Reserve reported a record $104.5 billion plunge in US government bonds held in custody by them in favor of foreign central banks and other overseas investors. Rumors have floated that the Russian government, in fear of economic sanctions by the West, may have initiated a move out of the US Federal Reserve[11].

On the other hand, other reports say that out of the same fear of economic and financial sanctions, Russian investors have been pulling out of Western banks[12]. So aside from the impact of China, possibly part of the ongoing market liquidations may have emanated from Russians bailing out of Western markets and banks. 

So has China and Russia triggered the spreading of the Wile E. Coyote moment?

We will see.

Yet by the second quarter, Japan may play a bigger role in the unfolding saga.

So if my suspicions will hold true then we are likely to see permeation and intensification of financial market jitters and economic earthquakes on a global scale as time goes by.

It seems time to batten down the hatches.

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[1] Doug Noland EM, Hedge Funds and Corporate Debt Credit Bubble Bulletin February 7, 2014 PrudentBear.com

[2] See Phisix: Will the Global Risk OFF Environment Intensify? February 3, 2014

[3] See EM Contagion: Based on Exports, Global Economic Growth appears to be Downshifting Fast March 12, 2014

[4] Bloomberg.com China Data Show Economy Cooling March 13, 2014

[5] Bloomberg.com China Steel Mills Slide as Credit Squeeze, Iron Ore Panic Grips March 12,2014

[6] Bloomberg.com China Stimulus Decision Looms as Investment Slows March 14, 2014

[7] See Japan’s Ticking Black Swan February 24, 2014

[8] Bloomberg.com Bank of Japan Sticks to Easing Plan as Sales-Tax Increase Looms March 11, 2014

[9] Japan Times Japan to name, shame firms that refuse to hike pay March 13, 2014

[10] UCLA Newsroom FDR's policies prolonged Depression by 7 years, UCLA economists calculate August 10, 2004

[11] Wall Street Journal Money Beat Blog Did Russia Just Move Its Treasury Holdings Offshore? March 14, 2014

[12] Financial Times Russian companies withdraw billions from west, say Moscow bankers March 14, 2014

Financial Reform Bill And Regime Uncertainty

``But the law is made, generally, by one man, or by one class of men. And as law cannot exist without the sanction and the support of a preponderant force, it must finally place this force in the hands of those who legislate. This inevitable phenomenon, combined with the fatal tendency that, we have said, exists in the heart of man, explains the almost universal perversion of law. It is easy to conceive that, instead of being a check upon injustice, it becomes its most invincible instrument.” Frédéric Bastiat, The Law

Yo-yo Markets And The Financial Reform Bill

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, hedge fund manager and author Andy Kessler seems right; the actions of the US markets, which directly affects other financial markets, will be in a state of a Yo-yo for as long as the US government continually intervenes to suppress market forces from revealing its true conditions.

Mr. Kessler writes[1],

``Call it the yo-yo market—from the top of the wall to the bottom of the pit and back—and you better get used to it. It's hard to tell which market moves are real and based on prospects for better profits, as opposed to moves that are driven by all the extraordinary government measures to prop up the world economy. Until a few things are resolved, you'd better learn the yo-yo sleeper trick—that is, keep spinning at the bottom without going up.”

Mr. Kessler appears to echo what we’ve been saying all along[2]---that politics has and will shape the outcome of the markets.

Mr. Kessler cites the pervasive impact of the Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP), the assorted “crutches” or the guarantees, stimulus packages, and money printing, and importantly, the impact of the changes in the regulatory environment.

Since we had exhaustively discussed on the first two factors, in the light of the passage of the Financial Reform Bill[3], we’d tackle more on the aspects of the regulatory environment.

After having a rather promising start for the week, the US markets fell hard Friday after the ratification Financial Reform Bill. The losses virtually expunged on the early gains made whereby the net weekly result for the US S&P 500 had been a net loss of 1.21% (see figure 1).

Figure 1: US Global Investors[4]: Sectoral Performance

Nevertheless the degree of losses had been uneven, where some sectors of the S&P 500 have managed to escape the clutches of the selling pressures, such as the Consumer staples and the Technology sector.

True, correlation doesn’t automatically translate to causation. The Financial Reform bill may or may not have directly affected Friday’s performance.

However, given that the largest victim of the selloff had been in the financial sector, which is the target of the slew of new regulations, then I must argue that there could have been a substantial connection in the way the markets perceive how these purported reforms would affect the industry.

In other words, markets may have seen more downside risks to the industry, as a result of the law, and these perceptions have filtered into the other sectors.

Yet it’s simply amazing how some mainstream analysts fail to acknowledge of the vital role played by the regulatory environment in shaping the allocation of resources.

They seem to think that investment is merely consequence of waking up on a particular side of the bed which determines their “animal spirits”, or that, confidence is simplistically established as a function of random temperaments or moods—and largely detached from the coordination of consumers and producers in the marketplace.

Thus, many make specious arguments that new regulations won’t affect the business operations.

Importantly, the same experts fail to take into account that entrepreneurs invest with the aim to profit from providing or servicing the needs or desires of the consumers. Thus, a material change in the regulatory environment may affect the fundamental profit and loss equation. And the ensuing changes could also alter the feasibility of the operations of any enterprises, to the point which could lead to either closures, or impair the business operations. The net effect should be more losses and rising unemployment.

In short, business confidence is a function, not of some mood swings, but of property rights. Likewise confidence relative to investment should be predicated not just with the return ON capital, but with the return OF capital.

Regime Uncertainty From Arbitrary Laws

Economist Robert Higgs calls this reduced confidence factor as “regime uncertainty” where he argues[5] (bold emphasis mine)

``To narrow the concept of business confidence, I adopt the interpretation that businesspeople may be more or less “uncertain about the regime,” by which I mean, distressed that investors’ private property rights in their capital and the income it yields will be attenuated further by government action. Such attenuations can arise from many sources, ranging from simple tax-rate increases to the imposition of new kinds of taxes to outright confiscation of private property. Many intermediate threats can arise from various sorts of regulation, for instance, of securities markets, labor markets, and product markets. In any event, the security of private property rights rests not so much on the letter of the law as on the character of the government that enforces, or threatens, presumptive rights.”

Thus, to allege that new regulations will hardly be a factor in the investment environment would redound to utter detachment with reality.

Well, what can we expect from so-called ivory tower “experts” who seem to think that they own the monopoly of knowledge, via mathematical models and aggregates, when their sources of income depends on wages than from wagering on the dynamic trends of the marketplace? (Pardon me for the ad hominem, but perspectives are mostly shaped by interests)

Take the Great Depression (GD) of 1930s, which many prominent bears have anchored their projections as the probable direction of today’s market.

From the monetarist viewpoint, the GD had been all about monetary contraction, whereas from the Keynesian perspective this had been about falling aggregate demand. Both of which has been diagnosed by the incumbent Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke[6] as the major causes from which current policies have been designed to address. Yes—the solution? The printing press!

While both did have a role to play, the oversimplistic account of the GD fails to incorporate the havoc generated by the legion of intrusive laws enacted by the US government’s New Deal program, aimed at keeping prices at status quo ante or from adjusting to the realities of the unsustainable misdirection of capital from the inflation boom induced depression. These policies, which threatened property rights, had greatly exacerbated and prolonged the grim conditions then.

These laws included[7]:

1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, National Industrial Recovery Act, Emergency Banking Relief Act, Banking Act of 1933 Act, Federal Securities Act, Tennessee Valley Authority Act, Gold Repeal Joint Resolution, Farm Credit Act, Emergency Railroad Transport Act, Emergency Farm Mortgage Act National Housing Act, Home Owners Loan Corporation Act

1934 Securities Exchange Act, Gold Reserve Act, Communications Act, Railway Labor Act

1935 Investment Company Act, Revenue Act of 1940, Bituminous Coal Stabilization Act, Connally (“hot oil”) Act, Revenue Act of 1935, National Labor Relations Act, Social Security Act, Public Utilities Holding Company Act, Banking Act of 1935, Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act

1936 Soil Conservation & Domestic Allotment Act, Federal Anti-Price Discrimination, Revenue Act of 1936

1937 Bituminous Coal Act, Revenue Act of 1937, Act Enabling (Miller-Tydings) Act

1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Civil Aeronautics Act, Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act

1939 Administrative Reorganization Act

1940, Second Revenue Act of 1940

Figure 2: Wikipedia.org[8]: US Income Tax (left window), Higgs: Government Purchases (Current$) and Gross Private Investment (Current$) Relative to Gross Domestic Product (Current$), 1929–1950

For instance, one should also take into account how the surge in taxation (left window) to fund the explosion in government expenditures during the Great Depression (right window) contributed to stymie investments or production (see figure 2)

As Henry Hazlitt aptly described how taxes affect investment or production[9]

``When the total tax burden grows beyond a bearable size, the problem of devising taxes that will not discourage and disrupt production becomes insoluble.”

In other words, when the expectations for profits are reduced, borne out of the expectations of higher taxes or from other regulatory interdictions which places property rights at risks, then investments will obviously follow—and decline.

Therefore the regulatory and tax regime functions as crucial factors to the conditions of confidence in the marketplace.

Paradoxically, one function of the law is the avoidance of this “regime uncertainty”. But when the state is unclear about the direction of policies and regulation, the “means” can contradict the “end”. So, instead of stability, such laws could engender or promote “regime uncertainty”. Yet, these are commonplace feature of many arbitrary laws.

Take the recently enacted Financial Reform Bill, it has been reported to contain 2,319 pages (see figure 2)

Figure 2: Mark Perry[10]: Major Financial Legislation: Number of Pages

The sheer mountain of pages by itself would make the reformist law seem like a regulatory quagmire and appears appallingly political relative to the enforcement issues.

Heritage’s Conn Carroll explains[11],

``With the single stroke of a pen, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank financial regulation bill that set in motion 243 new formal rule-makings by 11 different federal agencies. Each of the 243 rule-makings will employ hundreds of banking lobbyists as they try to shape what the final actual laws will look like. And when the rules are finally written, thousands of lawyers will bill millions of hours as the richest incumbent financial firms that caused the last crisis figure out how to game the new system.”

The implication is that where financial firms compete, not to please customers, but to gain the favour of regulators, this essentially represents as the hallmarks of corporatism or crony capitalism.

Thus, the financial reform bill is likely to foster political privileges which entrenches the “too big too fail” institutions, who will profit from economic rent.

The litany of adverse effects from such ambiguous bill will be one of expanded corruption, lack of credit access for consumers, reduced consumers protection (in contrast to the purported letter of the law), regulatory capture, regulatory arbitrages, higher risks to taxpayers on greater risk appetite for the politically privileged firms (moral hazard issue), increased red tape via an expanded bureaucracy, higher compliance costs, more government spending and reduced competition which overall translates to broad based economic inefficiencies.

Yet the reformist law is also said not only to be opaque, but gives undue confiscatory power based on the whims of regulators.

Mr. Kessler writes[12], ``What is even more troubling is the prospect of government seizures built into the Dodd-Frank financial bill. This is much like the seizure of property from auto industry bond holders (denounced as speculators) in the bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler.

``Dodd-Frank also provides government leeway to seize firms it considers a systemic risk, without really defining what that systemic risk is. Why anyone would provide debt to large financial institutions (or auto makers) is beyond me, certainly not without demanding a huge premium for the seizure risk. The cost of capital for the U.S. economy is sure to rise, slowing growth.”

This means that Financial Reform bill also entails that the political favoured institutions are likely to become veiled instruments for political agenda of those in power.

And laws of this nature is what Frédéric Bastiat long admonished[13],

``But, generally, the law is made by one man or one class of men. And since law cannot operate without the sanction and support of a dominating force, this force must be entrusted to those who make the laws.

``This fact, combined with the fatal tendency that exists in the heart of man to satisfy his wants with the least possible effort, explains the almost universal perversion of the law. Thus it is easy to understand how law, instead of checking injustice, becomes the invincible weapon of injustice. It is easy. to understand why the law is used by the legislator to destroy in varying degrees among the rest of the people, their personal independence by slavery, their liberty by oppression, and their property by plunder. This is done for the benefit of the person who makes the law, and in proportion to the power that he holds.”

In short, arbitrary laws, as the Financial Reform bill, can function as instruments of injustice.

Thus, it is NOT impractical or improbable to argue that in the wake of the enactment of the Financial Reform Bill, the ambiguity and arbitrariness of the law and the increased politicization of the financial industry would likely result to greater perception of risks which may be reflected on the “Yo-yo” actions or a more volatile US markets.

At the end of the day, regulatory obstacles will likely compel capital to look for a capital friendly environment from which to flourish.

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[1] Kessler, Andy, The Yo-Yo Market and You, Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2010

[2] See How Political Tea Leaves Will Shape The Investment Landscape

[3] Bloomberg, U.S. Congress Passes Wall Street Regulation Bill, July 15, 2010

[4] US Global Investors, Investor Alert, July 16, 2010

[5] Higgs, Robert Regime Uncertainty, Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and Why Prosperity Resumed after the War

[6] Bernanke, Ben Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here, Speech Before the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C. November 21, 2002

[7] Higgs, Ibid

[8] Wikipedia.org, Income tax in the United States

[9] Hazlitt, Henry Taxes Discourage Production, Chapter 5 Economics In One Lesson

[10] Perry, Mark ‘I Didn’t Have Time to Write a Short Bill, So I Wrote a Long One Instead,’ Part II The Enterprise Blog July 16

[11] Carroll, Conn Morning Bell: The Lawyers and Lobbyists Full Employment Act, Heritage Blog, July 16, 2010

[12] Kessler, Andy Ibid.

[13] Bastiat, Frédéric The Law

Burt Folsom On The Franklin D Roosevelt Myth

Professor and author Burt Folsom Jr. argues in Wall Street Journal why President Franklin D. Roosevelt's perceived heroism is a myth.

Quoting Professor Folsom: (bold highlights mine)

``Let's start with the New Deal. Its various alphabet-soup agencies—the WPA, AAA, NRA and even the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority)—failed to create sustainable jobs. In May 1939, U.S. unemployment still exceeded 20%. European countries, according to a League of Nations survey, averaged only about 12% in 1938. The New Deal, by forcing taxes up and discouraging entrepreneurs from investing, probably did more harm than good.

``What about World War II? We need to understand that the near-full employment during the conflict was temporary. Ten million to 12 million soldiers overseas and another 10 million to 15 million people making tanks, bullets and war materiel do not a lasting recovery make. The country essentially traded temporary jobs for a skyrocketing national debt. Many of those jobs had little or no value after the war.

``No one knew this more than FDR himself. His key advisers were frantic at the possibility of the Great Depression's return when the war ended and the soldiers came home. The president believed a New Deal revival was the answer—and on Oct. 28, 1944, about six months before his death, he spelled out his vision for a postwar America. It included government-subsidized housing, federal involvement in health care, more TVA projects, and the "right to a useful and remunerative job" provided by the federal government if necessary.

``Roosevelt died before the war ended and before he could implement his New Deal revival. His successor, Harry Truman, in a 16,000 word message on Sept. 6, 1945, urged Congress to enact FDR's ideas as the best way to achieve full employment after the war.

``Congress—both chambers with Democratic majorities—responded by just saying "no." No to the whole New Deal revival: no federal program for health care, no full-employment act, only limited federal housing, and no increase in minimum wage or Social Security benefits.

``Instead, Congress reduced taxes. Income tax rates were cut across the board. FDR's top marginal rate, 94% on all income over $200,000, was cut to 86.45%. The lowest rate was cut to 19% from 23%, and with a change in the amount of income exempt from taxation an estimated 12 million Americans were eliminated from the tax rolls entirely.

``Corporate tax rates were trimmed and FDR's "excess profits" tax was repealed, which meant that top marginal corporate tax rates effectively went to 38% from 90% after 1945.

``Georgia Sen. Walter George, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, defended the Revenue Act of 1945 with arguments that today we would call "supply-side economics." If the tax bill "has the effect which it is hoped it will have," George said, "it will so stimulate the expansion of business as to bring in a greater total revenue."

``He was prophetic. By the late 1940s, a revived economy was generating more annual federal revenue than the U.S. had received during the war years, when tax rates were higher. Price controls from the war were also eliminated by the end of 1946. The U.S. began running budget surpluses.

``Congress substituted the tonic of freedom for FDR's New Deal revival and the American economy recovered well. Unemployment, which had been in double digits throughout the 1930s, was only 3.9% in 1946 and, except for a couple of short recessions, remained in that range for the next decade."