Quote of the Day: “Crazy” Anarcho-Capitalism

The lesson: "Crazy" is relative to expectations.  A thousand years ago, everyone was used to despotism.   No one expected a defeated incumbent to voluntarily hand over power.  As a result, refusing to hand over power didn't seem crazy.  Since it didn't seem crazy, incumbents who refused to hand over power after losing an election probably would have managed to retain power.  In modern Sweden, in contrast, everyone is used to democracy.  Everyone expects a defeated incumbent to voluntarily hand over power.  Refusing to hand over power seems crazy.  As a result, refusing to hand over power would end not democracy, but the incumbent's career.

Why bring this up?  Because like the democrat of a thousand years ago, I advocate a radical political change: anarcho-capitalism.  After we've privatized everything else, I think we should privatize the police and courts, and abolish the government...

Since we've never had anarcho-capitalism, this peaceful equilibrium sounds like wishful thinking.  But it's no more wishful thinking than stable democracy.  Both systems sound crazy when first proposed.  Neither can be stable as long as people expect them to be unstable.  But both can be stable once people expect them to be stable.

You could object: The expectations necessary to sustain anarcho-capitalism are highly unlikely to ever arrive.  But the same was true for democracy a thousand years ago.  Yet somehow, expectations radically changed and stable democracy arrived.  How did expectations change so dramatically?  It's complicated.  But can expectations change dramatically?  Absolutely.

This is from author and professor Bryan Caplan at the Library of Economics and Liberty blog (Econolog)

Video: Privatize Everything

Producing laws is not an easier problem than producing cars or food, so if the government's incompetent to produce cars or food, why do you expect it to do a good job producing the legal system within which you are then going to produce the cars and the food?

That's from the video interview of David Friedman, author, philosopher, and professor at Santa Clara University, from ReasonTv (hat tip: Econolog's Professor David Henderson)

Fiscally Pressured Governments go for Crony based Privatizations of ‘Public Goods’

Money pressured governments are looking to privatization of parts of politically sensitive functions such as security services.

The Telegraph reports,

Private companies will be running large parts of the UK's police service within five years, according to the world's biggest security firm.

David Taylor-Smith, the head of G4S for the UK and Africa, said he expected police forces across the country to sign up to similar deals to those on the table in the West Midlands and Surrey, which could result in private companies taking responsibility for duties ranging from investigating crimes to transporting suspects and managing intelligence.

The prediction comes as it emerged that 10 more police forces were considering outsourcing deals that would see services, such as running police cells and operating IT, run by private firms.

Privatization of government functions are akin to Public-Private Partnership (PPP) enterprises on political controlled or regulated sectors. They really NOT about free markets but about cronyism.

As I previously pointed out

PPP’s signifies as politically privileged economic rent/concessions to favoured private entities that will undertake the operations in lieu of the government. They will come in the form of monopolies, cartels or subsidies that will benefit only the politically connected.

Since the private partner partnerships aren’t bound by the profit and loss discipline from the consumers, the interest of the private partners will most likely be prioritized or aligned to please the whims of the new political masters.

And because of it, much of the resources that go into these projects will not only be costly or priced above the market to defray on the ‘political’ costs, but likewise, they will be inefficiently allocated.

Moreover, PPPs risk becoming ‘milking cows’ for these politically entitled groups and could be a rich source of corruption.

In the US even Keynesian high priest, Paul Krugman, who I vehemently disagree with on most issues, resonates with our perspective over the issue of phony privatizations (in Krugman’s case he refers to New Jersey’s “new kind of privately run halfway house” prison systems).

From Paul Krugman (hat tip Bob Wenzel, bold emphasis added)

So what’s really behind the drive to privatize prisons, and just about everything else?

One answer is that privatization can serve as a stealth form of government borrowing, in which governments avoid recording upfront expenses (or even raise money by selling existing facilities) while raising their long-run costs in ways taxpayers can’t see. We hear a lot about the hidden debts that states have incurred in the form of pension liabilities; we don’t hear much about the hidden debts now being accumulated in the form of long-term contracts with private companies hired to operate prisons, schools and more.

Another answer is that privatization is a way of getting rid of public employees, who do have a habit of unionizing and tend to lean Democratic in any case.

But the main answer, surely, is to follow the money. Never mind what privatization does or doesn’t do to state budgets; think instead of what it does for both the campaign coffers and the personal finances of politicians and their friends. As more and more government functions get privatized, states become pay-to-play paradises, in which both political contributions and contracts for friends and relatives become a quid pro quo for getting government business. Are the corporations capturing the politicians, or the politicians capturing the corporations? Does it matter?

The point, then, is that you shouldn’t imagine that what The Times discovered about prison privatization in New Jersey is an isolated instance of bad behavior. It is, instead, almost surely a glimpse of a pervasive and growing reality, of a corrupt nexus of privatization and patronage.

Additional thoughts:

This is proof that governments have really been getting desperate over their state of finances.

But, privileges are hard to let go. Instead, politicians have used austerity from today’s crisis as opportunity to dispense concessions to friends, allies or favored special interest groups for political goals. This signifies a form of economic fascism

Politicians use accounting trickery to shield reforms.

Moreover, such privatizations represent fundamental admissions that even the most sensitive ‘public goods’, whether security or defense and prison services, can be delegated or outsourced to the private sector. This implies that these services can be depoliticized and delivered, through the competitive marketplace or (hold your breath) even without government.

The answer isn't to privatize (euphemism for fascism-cronyism) but to depoliticize and liberalize the sector.

Lastly, these are writings on the wall in favor of the growing forces of decentralization.

When governments become totally bankrupt then the de-politicization or decentralization process of political functions will become apparent.

Video: The Ideas Behind the Ron Paul Revolution

(hat tip Lew Rockwell Blog)

A Booming Anarcho-Capitalist City in India?

At the Mises Blog, Stephan Kinsella points to this fascinating article about a booming city in India.

Gurgaon appears to operate on a very unusual or unorthodox dynamic which the author calls as ‘dysfunctional’.

The New York Times, (bold emphasis mine)

With its shiny buildings and galloping economy, Gurgaon is often portrayed as a symbol of a rising "new" India, yet it also represents a riddle at the heart of India's rapid growth: how can a new city become an international economic engine without basic public services? How can a huge country flirt with double-digit growth despite widespread corruption, inefficiency and governmental dysfunction?

In Gurgaon and elsewhere in India, the answer is that growth usually occurs despite the government rather than because of it…

In Gurgaon, economic growth is often the product of a private sector improvising to overcome the inadequacies of the government.

To compensate for electricity blackouts, Gurgaon's companies and real estate developers operate massive diesel generators capable of powering small towns. No water? Drill private borewells. No public transportation? Companies employ hundreds of private buses and taxis. Worried about crime? Gurgaon has almost four times as many private security guards as police officers.

The article continues with the success story.

Today, Gurgaon is one of India's fastest-growing districts, having expanded more than 70 percent during the past decade to more than 1.5 million people, larger than most American cities. It accounts for almost half of all revenues for its state, Haryana, and added 50,000 vehicles to the roads last year alone. Real estate values have risen sharply in a city that has become a roaring engine of growth, if also a colossal headache as a place to live and work.

Before it had malls, a theme park and fancy housing compounds, Gurgaon had blue cows. Or so Kushal Pal Singh was told during the 1970s when he began describing his development vision for Gurgaon. It was a farming village whose name, derived from the Hindu epic the Mahabharata, means "village of the gurus." It also had wild animals, similar to cows, known for their strangely bluish tint.

"Most people told me I was mad," Mr. Singh recalled. "People said: 'Who is going to go there? There are blue cows roaming around.' "

And makes a comparison with the sibling city which has been managed by orthodox means…

Gurgaon was widely regarded as an economic wasteland. In 1979, the state of Haryana created Gurgaon by dividing a longstanding political district on the outskirts of New Delhi. One half would revolve around the city of Faridabad, which had an active municipal government, direct rail access to the capital, fertile farmland and a strong industrial base. The other half, Gurgaon, had rocky soil, no local government, no railway link and almost no industrial base.

As an economic competition, it seemed an unfair fight. And it has been: Gurgaon has won, easily. Faridabad has struggled to catch India's modernization wave, while Gurgaon's disadvantages turned out to be advantages, none more important, initially, than the absence of a districtwide government, which meant less red tape capable of choking development.

Gurgaon’s success comes amidst a seeming absence of central planning agencies…

Ordinarily, such a wild building boom would have had to hew to a local government master plan. But Gurgaon did not yet have such a plan, nor did it yet have a districtwide municipal government. Instead, Gurgaon was mostly under state control. Developers built the infrastructure inside their projects, while a state agency, the Haryana Urban Development Authority, or HUDA, was supposed to build the infrastructure binding together the city.

And that is where the problems arose. HUDA and other state agencies could not keep up with the pace of construction. The absence of a local government had helped Gurgaon become a leader of India's growth boom. But that absence had also created a dysfunctional city. No one was planning at a macro level; every developer pursued his own agenda as more islands sprouted and state agencies struggled to keep pace with growth.

Where public services have been delivered by the private sector…

Even at the fringes of Gurgaon's affluent areas, large pools of black sewage water are easy to spot. The water supply is vastly inadequate, leaving private companies, developers and residents dependent on borewells that are draining the underground aquifer. Local activists say the water table is falling as much as 10 feet every year.

Meanwhile, with Gurgaon's understaffed police force outmatched by such a rapidly growing population, some law-and-order responsibilities have been delegated to the private sector. Nearly 12,000 private security guards work in Gurgaon, and many are pressed into directing traffic on major streets.

Well the above somewhat or partly resembles a society which Austrians call as anarcho-capitalism, where

law enforcement, courts, and all other security services would be provided by voluntarily-funded competitors such as private defense agencies rather than through taxation, and money would be privately and competitively provided in an open market.

Gurgaon's development may not be perfect, but her unorthodox model seems to have vastly outclassed her politically oriented development models adapted by her peers.

Nevertheless Gurgaon’s experience isn’t about attaining perfection but about relative efficiencies.

It’s one development model which should be look at, learned from and possibly assimilated.

Video: Attack On Libertarianism Using Somalia

Here is a terse video attacking Libertarianism which misleadingly uses Somalia as a "Libertarian's Paradise". (hat tip Bob Wenzel)

Why the video is short?

Because it deliberately applies the “cum hoc ergo propter hoc” or correlation is causation fallacy. The video's implication: Because Somalia has no government therefore she is poor PERIOD. By making it short the video eludes the required proofs. So this easily would dupe the ignorant.

Again, reference point matters.

I would like to say that Somalia IS NO LIBERTARIAN UTOPIA. But we certainly can learn some lessons from her experiences.

Yet it is very important to point out that even before Somalia overthrew her government she has already been poor. So it would be wrong to adduce poverty to statelessness.

And the reason for the impoverished state is that Somalia had been ruled by a nasty communist regime; the Somali Democratic Party (1969-1991). So essentially Somalia has swung from the extremes of total government to statelessness.

So the appropriate question is “has Somalia been better off at her current state or with the communists?”

The obvious answer is that Somalis said NO to communism.

Here is a briefer of Somalia from Wikipedia,

Somalia, from 1991 to 2006, is cited as a real-world example of a stateless society and legal system. Since the fall of Siad Barre's government in January 1991, there had been no permanent national government in Somalia until the current Transitional Federal Government. Large areas of the country such as Puntland, and Galmudug are internationally unrecognized autonomous regions, while Somaliland is a de facto sovereign state. The remaining areas, including the capital Mogadishu, were divided into smaller territories ruled by competing warlords. In many areas there were (and still are) no formal regulations or licensing requirements for businesses and individuals.

One would ask, if Somalis has been better off why the civil wars?

Again the Wikipedia,

With worsening conditions in Somalia, rebels of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Mohamed Farrah Aidid attacked Mogadishu and on January 26, 1991, Barre's government was taken out of power.

In May 1991, the northernwestern Somaliland region of Somalia declared its independence. This Isaaq-dominated governing zone is not recognized by any major international organization or country, although it has remained more stable and certainly more peaceful than the rest of Somalia, neighboring Puntland notwithstanding.

UN Security Council Resolution 794 was unanimously passed on December 3, 1992, which approved a coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the United States to form UNITAF, tasked with ensuring humanitarian aid being distributed and peace being established in Somalia until the humanitarian efforts were transferred to the UN. The UN humanitarian troops landed in 1993 and started a two-year effort (primarily in the south), known as UNOSOM II, to alleviate famine conditions.

Many Somalis opposed the foreign presence. In October, several gun battles in Mogadishu between local gunmen and peacekeepers resulted in the death of 24 Pakistanis and 19 US soldiers (total US deaths were 31). Most of the Americans were killed in the Battle of Mogadishu. The incident later became the basis for the book and movie Black Hawk Down. The UN withdrew on March 3, 1995, having suffered more significant casualties. Order in Somalia still has not been restored.

Yet again another secession from Somalia took place in the northeastern region. The self-proclaimed state took the name Puntland after declaring "temporary" independence in 1998, with the intention that it would participate in any Somali reconciliation to form a new central government.

A third secession occurred in 1998 with the declaration of the state of Jubaland. The territory of Jubaland is now encompassed by the state of Southwestern Somalia and its status is unclear.

A fourth self-proclaimed entity led by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was set up in 1999, along the lines of the Puntland. That "temporary" secession was reasserted in 2002. This led to the autonomy of Southwestern Somalia. The RRA had originally set up an autonomous administration over the Bay and Bakool regions of south and central Somalia in 1999.

So we have a combination of foreign meddling and competing tribes. We might say that foreign meddling to impose a national government may have been a significant factor in creating tribal frictions.

We see such relevance in the repeated foreign incursions on Somalia’s fishing grounds which partly depleted local fisherman’s livelihood that has spawned famously notorious Pirate Industry which I earlier wrote about.

How about today?

Again the Wikipedia, (bold highlights mine)

The various Somali militias had at that point developed into security agencies for hire. Due to that development, security had much improved and an economic rebound occurred. Somalia was then arguably partly in a state of anarcho-capitalism, where all services were provided by private ventures. According to the CIA, Somalia's telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent.

In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected to lead the Transitional National Government (TNG).

This was followed in 2004 by the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia, the most recent attempt to restore national institutions to the nation after the 1991 collapse of the Barre regime and the ensuing civil war. On October 10, 2004, Somali parliament members elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the former President of Puntland, to be the next president and head of the TFG. The other institutions adopted at this time were the Transitional Federal Charter and the selection of a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament.

Though internationally recognized, the TFG's support in Somalia was waning until the United States-backed 2006 intervention by the Ethiopian military, which helped drive out the rival Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu and solidify the TFG's rule. Following this defeat, the ICU splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and oppose the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to withdraw from the country, leaving behind an underequipped African Union (AU) peacekeeping force.

Over the next few months, a new President was elected from amongst the more moderate Islamists, and the Transitional Federal Government, with the help of a small team of African Union troops, began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to retake control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its control of southern Somalia, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union and other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid 2009.

As a truce, in March 2009, Somalia's newly established coalition government announced that it would implement shari'a as the nation's official judicial system.

As one would note, there has been so many and continuous foreign meddling in Somalia in the attempt to foist a national government, on what seems to be a society averse to government.

As Professor Ben Powell writes, (bold highlights mine)

The Somalis again have united against this attempt by outsiders to force a government on them. Unfortunately, the result has been an increase in the power of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), who, since June, has gained control over much of southern Somalia, including the former capital, Mogadishu. An estimated 600 militias have joined the UIC since the TFG moved into Baidoa in February.

Every government of Somalia has exploited the country’s population. International meddling created the TFG and, unintentionally, a more powerful UIC. If either group were to become a true government, the population likely will once again become oppressed. In the meantime, the two groups appear headed back into civil war, which will likely result in the kind of chaos the country has not experienced since 1995.

Prime Minister Gedi of the TFG recently said, “It is totally misguided not to accept the government. The alternative is chaos.” Unfortunately, he’s got it exactly backwards. It is, in fact, the attempts to impose a government on Somalia that create chaos.

Aside from the wireless services which offers the “lowest international call rates on the continent” as cited by above by Wikipedia, the current economy of the 9.1 m population of Somalia, again as tersely described by Wikipedia, (bold emphasis mine)

Although it states that no reliable statistics are available for the period in question, the United Nations claims that Somalia, already one of the poorest countries in the world, has become even poorer as a result of civil war. However, the CIA Factbook maintains that gains were made during the early 2000s; "despite the seeming anarchy, Somalia's service sector has managed to survive and grow. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to the newest electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate, and militias provide security."

When extreme poverty (percentage of individuals living on less than PPP$1 a day) was last measured by the World Bank in 1998, Somalia fared better than many other countries in Africa, over some of whom Somalia also had superior infrastructure. The CIA World Factbook counsels that "Statistics on Somalia's GDP, growth, per capita income, and inflation should be viewed skeptically", while estimating Somalia's GDP per capita at $600.

In the absence of a Somali state and its institutions, the private sector grew "impressively" according to the World Bank in 2003, particularly in the areas of trade, commerce, transport, remittance and infrastructure services and in the primary sectors, notably in livestock, agriculture and fisheries. In 2007, the United Nations reported that the country's service industry is also thriving. Economist Peter T. Leeson, in an event study of "the impact of anarchy on Somali development", found that "[t]he data suggest that while the state of this development remains low, on nearly all of 18 key indicators that allow pre- and post-stateless welfare comparisons, Somalis are better off under anarchy than they were under government." Powell et al. concur that in absolute terms, Somalia’s living standards have improved and compare favorably with many existing African states, but also report that living standards have often improved "relative to other African countries since the collapse of the Somali central government."

It would be a nightmare for governments and politicians around the world to see a stateless society succeed. So the intuitive response is to view data from a stateless government “sceptically”.

Just imagine if Somalia should succeed then there could be mass revolutions to overthrow governments around the world. That's something governments won't want to happen.

So obviously there will always be a reason to keep Somalia poor.

And this video is part of such propaganda.