2008 US Mortgage Crisis: The US Federal Reserve and Crony Capitalism as Principal Causes

Stanford University’s John B. Taylor reviewed Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner’s newest book, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon.

He finds that the Ms. Morgenson and Mr. Rosner placed the blame mostly on a complex crony based system between the financial industry and US Federal Reserve.

Mr. Taylor writes, (hat tip David Boaz) [bold emphasis mine]

The book focuses on two agencies of government, Fannie Mae and the Federal Reserve. The mutual support system is better explained and documented in the case of Fannie, the government-sponsored enterprise that supported the home mortgage market by buying mortgages and packaging them into marketable securities which it then guaranteed and sold to investors. The federal government supported Fannie Mae — and the other large government-sponsored enterprise, Freddie Mac — by implicitly backing up those guarantees and by providing favorable regulatory treatment and protection from competition. These benefits enabled Fannie to rake in excess profits — $2 billion in excess, according to a 1995 study by the Congressional Budget Office.

Fannie Mae was established as a government agency but became a private, shareholder owned company with a charter from Congress requiring the company to support the housing finance system. During the culmination of the crisis in 2008 Fannie Mae along with another Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) Freddie Mac was nationalized.

The point is that politically motivated enterprises operate distinctly from the incentives of free market forces. Such entities are wards of the state.

Yet none of this is new to followers of the Austrian school.

Murray N. Rothbard narrated on a parallel unholy relationship between the US Federal Reserve and the commercial banks [bold emphasis mine]

It should now be crystal clear what the attitude of commercial banks is and almost always will be toward the Central Bank in their country. The Central Bank is their support, their staff and shield against the winds of competition and of people trying to obtain money which they believe to be their own property waiting in the banks' vaults. The Central Bank crucially bolsters the confidence of the gulled public in the banks and deters runs upon them. The Central Bank is the banks' lender of last resort, and the cartelizer that enables all the banks to expand together so that one set of banks doesn't lose reserves to another and is forced to contract sharply or go under. The Central Bank is almost critically necessary to the prosperity of the commercial banks, to their professional career as manufacturers of new money through issuing illusory warehouse receipts to standard cash.

So whether it is the politically backed GSEs or the commercial banks, the US Federal Reserve implicitly treats them as natural political constituents.

Mr. Taylor adds,

The book then gives examples where Fannie’s executives — Jim Johnson, CEO from 1991 to 1998, is singled out more than anyone else — used the excess profits to support government officials in a variety of ways with plenty left over for large bonuses: They got jobs for friends and relatives of elected officials, including Rep. Barney Frank, who is tagged as “a perpetual protector of Fannie,” and they set up partnership offices around the country which provided more jobs. They financed publications in which writers argued that Fannie’s role in promoting homeownership justified federal support. They commissioned work by famous economists, such as Nobel Prize-winner Joseph Stiglitz, which argued that Fannie was not a serious risk to the taxpayer, countering “critics who argued that both Fannie and Freddie posed significant risks to the taxpayer.” They made campaign contributions and charitable donations to co-opt groups like the community action organization ACORN, which “had been agitating for tighter regulations on Fannie Mae.” They persuaded executive branch officials — such as then Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers — to ask their staffs to rewrite reports critical of Fannie. In the meantime, Countrywide, the mortgage firm led by Angelo Mozilo, partnered with Fannie in originating many of the mortgages Fannie packaged (26 percent in 2004) and gave “sweetheart” loans to politicians with power to affect Fannie, such as Sen. Chris Dodd of Connecticut. The authors write that “Countrywide and Fannie Mae were inextricably bound.”

The above only shows that political distribution, whether it is in the Philippines or in the US, are apportioned not by merits but by political affiliations. And on the same plane, the gaming of the system by vested interest groups.

Again from Mr. Taylor,

The Fed takes a beating throughout the book. Early on the authors take on the Boston Fed, and in particular its research director Alicia Munnell, for using a study documenting racial discrimination in mortgage lending to justify the relaxation of credit standards, even though the study’s findings were found to be flawed by other researchers. And they criticize the very low interest rate set by the Fed when Alan Greenspan was chairman and Ben Bernanke was a Fed governor, saying it “contributed mightily to the mortgage lending craze,” adding that “with the Fed on a rate-cutting rampage, demand for adjustable-rate mortgages with relatively low initial interest costs had become incendiary.”

Well aside from low interest rates and the administrative policies to boost homeownership, there had been many other factors that has likewise contributed to the bubble, such as tax policies which encouraged exposure on debt rather than equity, agency problems and moral hazard (implicit backing from the Fed or the Greenspan Put), regulatory arbitrage which resulted to the creation of the (off balance sheet) shadow banking system, regulatory capture which played a substantial part of the crony relationships, the conflict of interest on credit rating agencies which had skewed incentives in favor debt issuers (investment banks) and many more.

Inflationism compounded by various forms of interventions represents as the anatomy of a bubble.

News from The 1990s Foretold of this Crisis

Debating who had been responsible for this crisis can take lots of academic vernacular to support or debunk the premises.

But we don’t need it.

By looking at the past, we can note that some news reports during the ‘90s appear to have actually “sensed” or predicted today’s fateful occurrence.

This excerpt from an LA TIMES article…

Minorities’ Home Ownership Booms Under Clinton but Still Lags Whites’

By Ronald Brownstein May 31, 1999

``All of this suggests that Clinton’s efforts to increase minority access to loans and capital also have spurred this decade’s gains. Under Clinton, bank regulators have breathed the first real life into enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, a 20-year-old statute meant to combat “redlining” by requiring banks to serve their low-income communities. The administration also has sent a clear message by stiffening enforcement of the fair housing and fair lending laws. The bottom line: Between 1993 and 1997, home loans grew by 72% to blacks and by 45% to Latinos, far faster than the total growth rate.

``Lenders also have opened the door wider to minorities because of new initiatives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–the giant federally chartered corporations that play critical, if obscure, roles in the home finance system. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy mortgages from lenders and bundle them into securities; that provides lenders the funds to lend more.

``In 1992, Congress mandated that Fannie and Freddie increase their purchases of mortgages for low-income and medium-income borrowers. Operating under that requirement, Fannie Mae, in particular, has been aggressive and creative in stimulating minority gains. It has aimed extensive advertising campaigns at minorities that explain how to buy a home and opened three dozen local offices to encourage lenders to serve these markets.

``Most importantly, Fannie Mae has agreed to buy more loans with very low down payments–or with mortgage payments that represent an unusually high percentage of a buyer’s income. That’s made banks willing to lend to lower-income families they once might have rejected…

``The top priority may be to ask more of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The two companies are now required to devote 42% of their portfolios to loans for low- and moderate-income borrowers; HUD, which has the authority to set the targets, is poised to propose an increase this summer. Although Fannie Mae actually has exceeded its target since 1994, it is resisting any hike. It argues that a higher target would only produce more loan defaults by pressuring banks to accept unsafe borrowers. HUD says Fannie Mae is resisting more low-income loans because they are less profitable."

From the New York Times article by Steven Holmes Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending, September 30, 1999

``Fannie Mae, the nation’s biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits.

“In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But the government subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the saving and loan industry in the 1980’s.

“‘From the perspective of many people, including me, this is another thrift industry growing up around us,’ said Peter Wallison a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. ‘If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them out the way it stepped up and bailed out the thrift industry.’”

Hat tip Prieur Du Plessis

As author Steven Landsburg reminds us, ``Most of economics can be summarized in just four words: People respond to incentives. The rest is commentary." (Hat tip Mark Perry )

Fannie And Freddie Bailout Designed To Save The US Dollar Standard System

``Over the past few years, the Agencies were central to the process that brought the emerging world’s savings to the US housing market. And governments were involved every step of the way. When the world’s central banks (and other big bond investors) decided that the implicit US government backing for the Agencies wasn’t enough, the US government had to make the backing explicit.”-Brad Setser, Council of Foreign Relations, So true …

 

It was a highly volatile market out there this week.

 

The initial salvo was wild cheering from global equity markets on the recent action by the US Treasury to take its Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE)-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- into “convervatorship” (quasi-nationalization). However, the festiveness quickly dissipated when the realities of “a weakening global economy”, the ramifications from the credit event of the F&F takeover on the Credit Default Swap Market and concerns over the persistent deterioration of US financial conditions as manifested by the lackluster capital raising quandary by Lehman Bros, which until recently, was the 4^th largest investment bank in the US, sunk into the consciousness of global investors which resulted to a retreat from most of the earlier gains.

 

The conservatorship program includes the taking over of management control of Fannie and Freddie (F&F) by its regulator the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), where common and preferred stock would be diluted and not eliminated. The takeover now alters the corporate objective of the GSEs to “improving mortgage financing conditions” from “maximizing common shareholder returns”.

 

The program also includes capital injection into the GSEs by US Treasury and FHFA to maintain the positive net worth of these agencies in order to fulfill its financial obligations, where in exchange the US Treasury receives “senior” preferred equity shares and warrants aimed at securing solvency.

 

Aside, a new credit facility designed to secure liquidity concerns will be introduced to backstop F&F and Federal Home Loan Banks, and which is set to expire on December 2009. Lastly, a temporary program will also be put in place to acquire GSE Mortgages in order to secure market liquidity of mortgage securities also slated to expire on December of 2009.

 

For starters, Agency securities are one of the world’s most widely held securities by both private and the public sectors (Sovereign Wealth Funds and Central banks).

 

Morgan Stanley’s Stephen Jen has a great breakdown on these (highlight mine),

 

`` Total foreign holdings of long-term USD securities increased from US$7.8 trillion in 2006 to US$9.8 trillion in 2007, with US$1.3 trillion of this annual increase from increased foreign holdings of US long-term debt securities, including US Treasuries, agencies, agency ABS and corporate bonds.  Foreigners are dominant in some of these markets.  For example, some 57% of the marketable Treasury securities are held by foreign investors. 

 

``Foreign investors’ appetite for US agencies – both straight agency debt and agency-backed ABS (also called agency pass-throughs) – has risen sharply.  (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with two main activities.  First, they securitise mortgages by converting conforming mortgage loans into tradable mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  Second, they have an ‘investment portfolio’ business, whereby they issue AAA rated agency debt to finance the holding of MBS or other assets.  The latter is a ‘carry trade’, capitalising on the then-implicit government guarantee.  One key part of the policy discussion regarding F&F is whether their second activity is justified.)   Of close to US$7.5 trillion in outstanding US agency debt and agency-backed ABS, some US$1.54 trillion (according to Fed flow of funds data, June 2008) is held outside the US, with China, Japan and AXJ being the largest holders of these securities, with US$985 billion of this latter figure held by foreign central banks. (The share of total US long-term securities held by foreign investors has more than doubled since 1994 (from 7.9% of the US$16 trillion in securities back then to 18.8% of the US$49 trillion outstanding as of 2007).” 

 

We featured a chart on the composition of foreign holdings of the F&F in Inflation: Myths And Beneficiaries. Nonetheless, private ownership of Agency backed papers appears to have stagnated since 2005 while foreign public ownership has steadily increased as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Northern Trust: Foreign Public-Private Exposure On F&F

 

In perspective, aside from foreign holdings GSE debt securities are likewise owned by US households and institutions or financial entities as commercial banks, savings banks, credit unions, pension funds, life insurance companies mutual funds, brokers, ABS issuers and REITs.

 

However, as % of total outstanding debt, in 2007 ownership of GSE debt in pecking order: foreigners comprise 19.92%, followed by commercial banks 13.87%, households 12.06%, mutual funds 7.67% and ABS 5.13% (Northern Trust).

 

So when US Secretary Paulson was asked of the US government’s takeover of F&F, his reply as quoted by the Washington Post,

 

``"The U.S. government had no choice," he said.

 

``Mr. Paulson, in an interview with CNBC on Monday, said foreign pressure was not the "major driver" of the takeover, but acknowledged that "there's no doubt that there's fragility in the capital markets."

 

``"These companies are so big, and they are owned by investors all around the world. You are obviously going to get concerns," Mr. Paulson said. "It was definitely concerning overseas, but there was concern in this country. I tell you, my phone is ringing the most from investors here." 

 

This means the US financial system have reached a near calamity. 

 

However many had been quick to lash at the “conservatorship” program as virtually a bailout of foreign owners of agency securities.

 

While this perception seems partly correct, I think most of these critics ignore the fact that these actions basically signify a remedial patchwork to the emerging cracks at the Fiat Paper Money “US Dollar” standard system. The massive current account imbalances a common feature in today’s world tends to amplify on the systemic flaws especially amidst today’s heightened volatility.

 

At present, countries with current account surpluses at one side of the ledger need to be offset by countries with current account deficits at the opposite side. As an example, deficits of the US have been more than sufficiently covered for by capital flows from mostly emerging markets paving way for the unorthodox pattern of “Poor countries Financing The Rich”.

 

Yes, while various politicians and experts from around the world have boisterously decried about “social inequality”, unknowing to most is that such inflationary “inequality” mechanism appears to be the imbedded on the US dollar standard platform. Think of it, while profits are privatized, losses are socialized! Wall Street’s politically connected gets rescued, while the masses pay for the mess created by the former. The failed F&F model was demonstrative of the Keynesian brand of capitalism and not of the laissez faire genre. (Please don’t associate the fiat paper money standard as epitomizing laissez faire or free markets too. Same with currency markets, interest rate markets or even oil markets! These markets are controlled heavily by governments notably on the supply side. As an aside, the “anarchy” in the Shadow Banking System wasn’t symptomatic of a free market mess, but one of going around banking regulations or taking advantage of “regulatory loopholes” in order to take on added leverage by assuming more risk to magnify returns by the establishment of off-balance sheet Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV). Going around loopholes do not signify free market paradigms).

 

Going back to the unorthodox pattern of “Poor countries Financing The Rich”, during the gold standard, current account imbalances had effectively been curtailed by the shifts in the gold reserves by nation states engaged in trade. This essentially accounted for as an automatic adjustment mechanism, which is absent today under the digitalized and unlimited printing capabilities of central banks to churn out money “from thin air”.

 

And as we noted above, current account imbalances today need to be offset. During the recent past, the nations with current account surpluses signified as subsidies to domestic export-oriented industries but came at the expense of domestic consumers, i.e. China, Asia and other emerging markets. On the other hand, current account deficit nations run subsidies on domestic consumers via expanding domestic debt (financed by current account surplus countries) at the expense of domestic production. From which the transmission mechanism had been mainly via currency pegs or dollar links.

 

The foreign buying of agency papers or US debts were meant to sustain mercantilists’ policies by frontloading currency and interest rate risks in order to keep the exchange rate undervalued and thus promote domestic export oriented industries in order to expand employment. Hence, the currency manipulation policies that led to the current account imbalances had primarily been meant as a tool to manage domestic political risks.

 

In other words, the US dollar standard system paved way for political imperatives over economic goals, see figure 3.

Figure 3: Asianbondsonline.com: China-US yield curve

 

What sense would it make for a current account surplus country as China to buy or load up on assets of a depreciating currency, thereby suffer from currency loss? What sense too for current account country as China to buy assets whose yield is less than what is offered domestically, thereby suffer from opportunity cost of low interest rate spreads (assuming holding bonds until maturity)? And this has been going on for years!

 

The same for deficit countries, domestic consumers had been financed to go into a debt driven asset buying binge which resulted to overleveraged driven massive speculation, again for political goal of sustaining finance driven economic booms, where the demand from domestic consumption boom has greased the industries of current account surplus countries as China and emerging countries.

 

The US dollar, functioning as the world’s de facto currency reserve currency, has fundamentally been used by the US government to freely load up on debt, given its special privilege to underwrite from its own currency, by selling almost unlimited financial claims to international investors to finance such speculative unsustainable booms.

 

And as the US real estate and financial boom has basically unraveled, all these seem to be in a transition.

 

Recently there had been some signs of reluctance of nations with current account surpluses to stack up into agency papers. Of course, the recent actions by the US Treasury may seem to have assuaged the concerns of repayment by buying more into US treasuries instead of agency papers.

 

So what can we see from all these?

 

One, current account surpluses nations or foreign central banks seem to have the tolerance bandwidth, given their accrued currency reserves, to suffer from the risks of currency and interest rate losses provided they get repaid for holding these securities until maturity. I guess the actions by the US treasury may have answered such “repayment” concerns.

 

Two, foreigners which have been formerly financing the US real estate securitization boom appears to be bailing out, if not help tacitly ‘nationalize’ the structurally beleaguered industries by buying into agency papers until recently.

 

It also reveals of the extent of overdependence or vulnerability of the US on relying on foreign financing. The risk seems such that if foreign central banks or state owned Sovereign Wealth Funds or affiliated institutions would deem to have accumulated more US dollar reserves than what they might think is required, and change their priorities by reducing finance exposure to the US, which can even lead to more volatility in the US. Political factors can also hold sway to the appetite of foreign financing of US deficits.

 

In addition, understanding its present predicament and limitations, the “capital short” US government seems to be working feverishly to attract or to intermediate for foreign capital participation into buying out its besieged financial institutions. Example, a syndicate led by UK’s 3^rd largest bank, Barclay’s along with a “club rescue” team of “Temasek of Singapore and China Development Bank, was reportedly have shown willingness to back a deal that would put Barclays in the top tier of financial institutions.” (timesonline.co.uk)

 

Three, it’s all about the increasing integration of geopolitics or the decreasing hegemony of the US, as seen in the “Poor financing the Rich” aside from “Autocratic and non-democratic states financing democratic countries”!

 

Some Poor but Autocratic/non democratic nations that have been a beneficiary to the ongoing wealth transfer appear to have accumulated enough political clout as to weigh on the internal political policymaking of the US. 

 

Remember this quote from Yu Yongding, a former adviser to China's central bank quoted last in our Will King Dollar Reign Amidst Global Deflation? ``If the U.S. government allows Fannie and Freddie to fail and international investors are not compensated adequately, the consequences will be catastrophic, if it is not the end of the world, it is the end of the current international financial system.” The recent political actions employed by the US government appeared to underscore such circumstances and Mr. Yu’s prayers seems to have been answered.

 

Or how about Russia’s recent military offensive against Georgia (as discussed in Toynbee’s Generational War Cycle: In Mindanao or In Georgia/South Ossetia?) which has practically left the US as a political nonparticipant to a besieged ally?

 

This only goes to show how the US looks to be losing its imperial edge over the global geopolitical economy and how the US dollar standard system appears to be in greater jeopardy. 

F&F Mix Results: Narrowing F&F Spreads But Defaults from F&F Credit Default Swaps

``In traditional finance, borrowers borrow and lenders lend. The only firms exposed to, say, home mortgages, are the banks that issue them. Thanks to derivatives, a firm with exposure can pass it off, and a firm with no exposure can assume it. Markets thus have less information about where risk lies. This results in periodic market shocks. Put differently, derivatives, which allow individual firms to manage risk, may accentuate risk for the group. Markets were stunned to discover that Long-Term Capital owned outsized portions of obscure derivatives. They dealt with that shock in typical fashion: they panicked.” - Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It’s a Short-Term Memory

 

With the US government’s recent action to preserve the global monetary system, we find that aside from the undefined cost to taxpayers, the US treasury has now assumed the responsibility for the $5.3 trillion of mortgage securities aside from its outstanding $5.3 trillion of treasury securities as of March 2008.

 

So far, the US Treasury’s action has partially eased the yield spread of the F&F papers from its risk-free counterparts as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Danske Bank: Before and After Spread of F&F vis-à-vis Fed Rate and 10 year Treasury

 

 

Even as the Federal rates had been lowered rates by 325 basis points as shown in the left panel in figure 4, the F&F rates have not equally responded. However, after the action taken by the US Treasury, the F&F rates dropped steeply as displayed in the right panel.

 

By lowering of the mortgage rates, the US government hopes to ease the burdens of homeowners smacked by a perfect storm of lack of access to credit, falling asset prices (real estate and stocks), rising unemployment, slowing economy and still high but fast declining energy/ fuel prices. 

 

And by narrowing the spreads from US treasuries, the US government hopes to provide cushion to the fast deteriorating financial and economic conditions by allowing investors access to cheap money which could feed into the mortgage market and buy F&F papers and thus restoring liquidity and confidence, aside from the credit ratings of the F&F papers.

 

But this doesn’t take away the fundamental problem of having too many houses for sale at prices buyers can’t seem to afford.

 

Moreover, the spreading of the mortgage woes to the level above the subprime market seems to be the next wave of credit concerns. The Alt-A mortgages covering about 3 million US household borrowers totaling some $1 trillion in mortgage papers with about $400 billion issued during the height of the boom in 2006 where an estimated 70% of borrowers were said to have exaggerated income (Bloomberg).

 

Aside the recent actions by the US government appear to have triggered a “credit event” in the CDS market of the F&F papers. A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a credit derivative functioning as an insurance contract that pays if a company or “counterparty” defaults on its liabilities.

 

However unlike an insurance contract, the CDS market is many times more than size of the actual bonds referenced. The unregulated CDS market is estimated to be at around $62 trillion. The problem of which is if an outsized default occurs a contagion of non-collection from losses may lead to a systemic loss.

 

The recent “conservatorship” of F&F by the US Treasury has triggered defaults on some CDS contracts referencing to the F&F securities. The contracts affected were estimated at $250-$500 billion which should to result to some $10 to $25 billion in additional losses (Financial Times).

 

And perhaps some of these losses had been accounted for the recent volatility in the global markets.

Fannie & Freddie’s Conservatorship’s Possible Implications To Asia

``The US doesn’t just need US government money to support the US housing market: It needs money from foreign governments as well. And no one more than China. China’s central bank borrows RMB from the state banks (whether by selling sterilization bills or by hiking the reserve requirement) and then uses those funds to buy large quantities of Agencies. The flow of Chinese savings into the US housing market is entirely a government flow.”-Brad Setser, Council of Foreign Relations. So true … 

It’s nothing new from what we have been saying all along or from what we have been saying earlier.

The problem of the US deleveraging isn’t likely the same problem of Asia. Although much of the world’s tightened financial and economic linkages has unduly put to a strain on Asia’s financial markets. Aside from the slowdown in most of the OECD economies, which has likewise added to some pressures on the economic front.

Asia’s exposure to toxic papers remains modest as shown in figure 5.

Figure 5: IMF: Asia’s Exposure To Toxic Papers and External Debt

Next to the low exposure of Asian banks (as measured in % of equity) to toxic papers, the structure of external debt has been mostly long term except for Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which means financing woes have not been much of a significant concern.

 

Although we recently featured Korea as one of the apparent victims of the Fannie and Freddie’s where a foreign broker claimed the return of a currency crisis and a potential meltdown of Asia in Sequel To Asian Financial Crisis?, Costly Bailouts and Bernanke Buys Time, Figure 6 seem to dispel such concern.

Figure 6 IMF: Credit and Money Growth in Indonesia (left) and South Korea (right)

 

In short, much of the credit crunch in the OECD economies could have translated to a meaningful slowdown of liquidity growth in Asia, but this isn’t happening yet.

 

Broad money growth remains robust in South Korea (red) as shown in the right pane amidst a negative real interest rate (blue). In fact, money supply gained 13.2% last July (eastday.com). Yes, following the F&F takeover, Korea’s Kospi recovered by 5.24% while the won bounced from the streak of losses up 1.6%.

 

Meanwhile despite the 10% plunge in Indonesia’s JKSE index last week which had been linked to a sharp downturn in commodity prices. Credit growth seems to remain robust (left pane) courtesy of the IMF.

 

Funny how many of experts dug deep into the investing public’s psyche peddling the myth of how high “inflation” have caused the recent market rout. In terms of Indonesia, now that falling oil and commodity prices should equate to lower “inflation”, the rally in its market which should have happened seemed to have vanished altogether opposite the justifications by mainstream analysts.

 

Considering the dearth or selectivity of global liquidity much of the risk dynamics becomes more of micro than macro.

 

In the same way, these experts created the impression that the cutting of interest rates by the Bernanke’s Federal Reserves would lead to a rally global markets late 2007. It never happened.

 

In the same plane, local experts bruited about how remittances drove the Peso stronger. Where remittances remain at record levels, yet Peso has gone bust.

 

True, we can’t be wildly bullish on Asia because of the prevailing climate of uncertainty across the pond, but we should view this slack as an opportunity to accumulate than as an opportunity to run!

 

We believe that most of the selling that had accrued in Asia had been due to the ongoing deleveraging process (which includes unwinding of pair trades of the US dollar-commodity, momentum driven, aside from covert government support on the US dollar) which has importantly been the key link to most of the infirmities in Asian markets as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: US Global Investors: Declining Trend of Foreign Outflows

 

It is funny too how analysts screaming for us to run for the hills would use different data time frame references to prove or support their views. This cognitive bias is called “framing”.

 

Last August, we pointed out in Phisix: Knocking At The Exit Gates of the Bear Market! that 80% of the money which came into Asia in 2007 had been redeemed. Last week’s panic stricken analyst alluded to the size of foreign inflows from 2001 as a measure to portray a potential stampede amidst the gloomy outlook.

 

Well good enough, a chart provided by US Global Investors gives us a balance perspective. It reveals of almost the same pattern as we had been seeing in the Phisix: declining trend of foreign outflows!

 

According to US Global Investors, ``Net foreign selling in the emerging Asian markets since mid-2007 has exceeded more than half of the investment inflows seen in the 2003-2007 bull market. Capitulation among investors in the region might signal a rebound in stocks ahead.” (highlight mine)

 

Moreover, the recent actuation from the US government appears to give some light to Asian equities. This from the New York Times,

 

``But the takeover of the companies also reinforced concerns about troubles of the American economy and highlighted its significant reliance on foreign investors, particularly in Asia.”

 

If US policy actions had indeed been directed at Asia as caviled by some, then it is a blatant admission of dependence on Asian capital for the survival of the US dollar standard system.

 

Moreover, it also shows how much political capital Asia has generated enough exert influence on US policymaking to favorably act on its interests as in the case of F&F.

 

With the writing on the wall, how could one be bearish on Asia unless for short sighted reasons?

 

Finally I’d like to share this quote from Director of Research Robert J. Horrocks, PhD of Matthews International Capital (emphasis mine),

 

``The recent moves by the Treasury may help the process by which Asia reflates relative to the U.S., and this environment may be helpful for Asian financial stocks. They have been seen for too long as carrying the same kinds of credit risks as the Western banks, and Asian financial stocks suffered as their counterparts in the U.S. fell. Moves to reduce risk in the U.S. and global financial systems seem likely to favor Asian banks, which have clean balance sheets and strong underlying economies. Reducing risk in the U.S. debt market may also take pressure off regional currencies as investors worried that much of the official foreign exchange reserves were held in Fannie and Freddie debt.”

 

Now with the “inflation” scare and the “Fannie and Freddie” woes off the hook, would Asia find its legs and commence on a gradual recovery?

 

We’ll soon find out.