Showing posts with label penetration level. Show all posts
Showing posts with label penetration level. Show all posts

Sunday, June 07, 2026

PSEi 30: The ICTSI Show

 

For most people, the most dangerous self-delusion is that even a falling market will not affect their stocks, which they bought out of a canny understanding of value—Leon Levy

In this issue

PSEi 30: The ICTSI Show

I. PSEi’s 30 Regional Outperformance

II. Misleading Index Performance (MSCI World, KOSPI)

III. The Ideological Foundation

IV. How Does This Relate to the PSEi?

V. One Stock, One Index

VI. Volume, Float, and the Shape of the Market

VII. The Intraday Pattern

VIII. Participation Collapse and Capital Consumption

IX. Conclusion: A Late-Cycle Signal 

PSEi 30: The ICTSI Show 

How concentration, liquidity, and selective speculation are reshaping the Philippine benchmark 

I. PSEi’s 30 Regional Outperformance 

Amid simmering political controversy over control of Senate leadership—which will ultimately oversee the forthcoming impeachment proceedings against the Vice President—the Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSEi) emerged as Asia’s top-performing equity benchmark for the week, rising 2.94%.


Figure 1

This occurred against an otherwise weak regional backdrop. Rising sovereign yields and continued geopolitical uncertainty weighed on sentiment, leaving most Asian bourses under pressure. While a few benchmarks—such as Japan’s Nikkei, Singapore’s STI, and Taiwan’s Taiex—briefly touched intraweek highs, softer closes erased much of the momentum. Indonesia’s sharp correction and weakness in South Korea’s KOSPI dragged broader regional averages lower. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Yet headline index performance can mislead. 

II. Misleading Index Performance (MSCI World, KOSPI) 

Indices are not neutral reflections of reality; they are constructed representations shaped by methodology, market capitalization, and momentum. They measure a perspective. 

Take the MSCI World Index. The MSCI World purports to track 23 developed markets, yet the US now accounts for roughly 72.45% of the benchmark, with information technology alone at 30.6% and financials at 15.33%. (Figure 1, lower image) 

In practice, the MSCI World has become a proxy for US mega-cap tech. The label has quietly decoupled from what's actually being measured. 


Figure 2

South Korea's KOSPI presents a more dramatic case. Samsung and SK Hynix—dominant in global memory chip supply—recently comprised more than half the KOSPI's market capitalization, piggybacking on the speculative melt-up in US AI stocks. (Figure 2, upper diagram) 

SK Hynix joined the trillion-dollar club in late May. The consequence: the KOSPI's headline performance increasingly reflects two companies, not the broader market nor the national economy. 

The dislocation is visible in the underlying data. The Korean won hit an all-time low last week as bond yields climbed—a sharp divergence between price signals and fundamental conditions. 

Market breadth confirms the distortion: stocks hitting new lows spiked even as those hitting new highs continued to fade. (Figure 2, lower visual) 

As liquidity becomes more selective, capital crowds into a narrowing set of perceived winners. Momentum attracts momentum. FOMO and greater-fool dynamics amplify upside moves, especially when leverage enters the system. The result is not broad-based prosperity but increasingly concentrated leveraged speculative blowoffs.


Figure 3

China offers a parallel. Margin financing has surged to levels exceeding those seen during the 2015 equity boom, even as the Shanghai Composite remains below its prior peak. Reaching lower index highs despite greater leverage suggests diminishing returns from credit-fueled speculation: progressively more debt is required to generate the same market effect. (Figure 3) 

Rising concentration, speculative blowoffs, and record leverage: these are not isolated anomalies. They are convergent signals of late-cycle excess.

III. The Ideological Foundation 

This matters because modern central banking increasingly views asset prices as transmission mechanisms of economic policy. 

The logic is straightforward: higher asset prices generate wealth effects, encourage borrowing, support collateral values, and stimulate spending. In this framework, liquidity injections and policy backstops become implicit supports for financial assets. 

Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke summarized this philosophy in the aftermath of the dot-com era:

There’s no denying that a collapse in stock prices today would pose serious macroeconomic challenges for the United States. Consumer spending would slow, and the U.S. economy would become less of a magnet for foreign investors. Economic growth, which in any case has recently been at unsustainable levels, would decline somewhat. History proves, however, that a smart central bank can protect the economy and the financial sector from the nastier side effects of a stock market collapse 

That single quote explains the architecture that followed: the successive rounds of monetary accommodation, the reflexive backstops, the tolerance for leverage—all premised on the belief that a competent central bank can contain the fallout from any speculative excess it helped create. Markets did not merely become politicized. They became instruments of policy, kept elevated by design. 

IV. How Does This Relate to the PSEi? 

The Philippine market increasingly displays similar characteristics.


Figure 4

The long-term divergence between the PSEi and International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI) has become difficult to ignore. 

Since the PSEi peaked in 2017 and entered a prolonged period of stagnation—a bear market, ICTSI has continued to surge, with recent price action increasingly resembling a parabolic advance. (Figure 4, upper window) 

As ICTSI reached a record high of Php 875 on June 3, its weight in the PSEi climbed to roughly 25.5%. (Figure 4, lower chart) 

The implications are significant. 

V. One Stock, One Index 

For the week, the PSEi gained a net 169.72 points, or 2.94%. Yet ICTSI alone contributed approximately 177.63 points to the index. Put differently, ICTSI accounted for more than 100% of the benchmark’s weekly advance (gross), while the remaining components collectively added little or acted as offsets. 

The broader composition of returns reinforces this imbalance.


Figure 5 

Across the PSEi’s 30 members, average weekly performance was only around 0.12%, with 16 issues actually posting losses. Although four of the biggest market cap issues advanced, ICTSI’s 13.62% surge overwhelmingly dominated benchmark performance. (Figure 5, topmost pane) 

Even outside the benchmark, the divergence becomes evident. The broader All Shares Index rose only 1.63%, while aggregate market capitalization increased 2.17%—both materially below the PSEi’s gain. 

Year-to-date performance paints an even starker picture: ICTSI’s share price has surged by 50.8%, while 22 of the 30 listed issues have declined. Remarkably, ICTSI’s strong gains have helped compress overall market losses to an average of just 6.7%! (Figure 5, middle chart) 

VI. Volume, Float, and the Shape of the Market 

Liquidity concentration tells a similar story. 

ICTSI accounted for roughly 29.5% of main board trading volume during the week, exceeding 32% in the final three sessions. 

Foreign buying represented around 9.3% of ICTSI turnover. 

Yet in today’s financialized system, “foreign buying” deserves nuance: overseas registration does not necessarily imply independent foreign institutional capital, as such flows may also reflect affiliates, intermediaries, or networked financial structures linked to domestic interests. 

Broker concentration adds another layer. The top ten brokers accounted for an average of approximately 64% of main-board turnover, underscoring the degree to which market activity remains concentrated among a relatively narrow set of big cap issues. 

This raises a fundamental question about representation. 

The PSEi 30 is intended to track the performance of the country’s 30 largest and most actively traded listed firms and is commonly treated as a barometer of Philippine business conditions. 

Yet context makes the weight anomaly stranger still: ICTSI ranks 16th among PSEi 30 constituents by published assets—Php 568 billion as of Q1 2026. It is not the largest company in the index. 

It is simply the one commanding the most speculative attention or one company has increasingly come to define the behavior of a benchmark meant to represent an entire market. 

Notably, unlike the AI-driven concentration seen in global technology benchmarks, there is little evidence of comparable speculative spillover among ICTSI’s global peers. 

Adani Ports and Shanghai International Port—both larger operators—show no equivalent price behavior. The parabola is local. (Figure 5, lowest images) 

That divergence makes ICTSI’s acceleration even more striking. 

VII. The Intraday Pattern


Figure 6 

Four of the five trading sessions this week followed a recognizable structure: early pumps, momentum that faded or peaked into the close, and pre-close dumps in three of those four sessions. (Figure 6) 

The sequence is not random. Concentrated positions—anchored around largest cap names with broker coordination—set up a strong open. When momentum peaks or the desired level is reached, supply materializes into the closing dump, leaving retail and non-cartel institutional participants on the wrong side of the book. And insiders rearm for the next day’s trade. 

The redistribution dynamic here is straightforward: those who set the opening tone capture the gains; those who follow the signal absorb the unwind. 

The result is similar: headline index strength masks increasingly fragile breadth underneath. 

It is visible in the intraday data with unusual clarity.

VIII. Participation Collapse and Capital Consumption 

Despite repeated modernization initiatives—including digital onboarding, reduced board lots, REIT expansion, market-structure reforms, and other capital-market development programs—active participation in the Philippine equity market has continued to deteriorate.


Figure 7

Active investor participation fell to a record low of 11.8% in 2025. More strikingly, institutional participation did not merely decline in activity; the absolute number of enrolled institutions contracted from 32,284 in 2024 to 29,910 in 2025. (Figure 7, upper pane) 

The participation collapse is not a failure of access. It is a rational response to a market that has repeatedly demonstrated that insiders capture the gains while latecomers absorb the distribution. 

This has broader political-economy implications. 

Sustaining elevated asset prices is not solely about investor confidence or market optics. Equities also function as collateral. Rising share prices support credit expansion directly through pledged securities and indirectly through valuation effects on parallel assets, balance sheets, and spending behavior. 

The reflexive relationship between asset prices and credit expansion is not a side effect of the system. It is one of its central operating mechanisms of fiat systems. 

In this sense, supporting financial asset prices becomes intertwined with a broader economic model dependent on liquidity, leverage, and wealth effects. Policies such as CMEPA, PERA, and related capital-market initiatives reflect this orientation by theoretically channeling savings toward financial assets and expanding the investor base upon which asset-price support depends. 

Instead, what this produces over time is capital consumption disguised as capital formation. Savings intermediated through a distorted pricing mechanism do not necessarily accumulate into productive capital; increasingly, they facilitate redistribution and economic maladjustments

The weekly headline performance of the PSEi may communicate one story. Market breadth, volume concentration, and participation trends suggest another. 

Concentration, however, carries its own tradeoffs. 

The more a benchmark depends on a single company, a dominant narrative, or a narrow liquidity channel, the less representative—and potentially more fragile—it becomes. 

When one stock increasingly becomes the market, the benchmark may no longer be signaling broad economic strength. Instead, it may be signaling the progressive narrowing of the channels through which liquidity continues to flow. 

IX. Conclusion: A Late-Cycle Signal 

The PSEi's recent outperformance may say less about broad Philippine corporate strength, the economy and more about the extraordinary influence of a single firm. 

ICTSI's dominance increasingly resembles concentration dynamics observed in other late-cycle markets: narrow leadership, selective liquidity, weakening breadth, and a widening divergence between financial performance and underlying participation. 

The key question is not whether ICTSI can continue to rise indefinitely or even whether its advance can catalyze a broader re-rating across PSEi constituents. Rather, it is whether a benchmark increasingly dependent on a single stock reflects the progressive narrowing of liquidity channels, exposing deeper market, financial, and economic fragilities characteristic of a late-cycle environment. 

A market sustained by increasingly narrow leadership may prove particularly vulnerable to external shocks, especially when global liquidity conditions tighten. The recent crash of Indonesia's JKSE amid mounting currency pressures illustrates how quickly seemingly stable market narratives can unravel once economically sensitive conditions turn less favorable. (Figure 7 lowest diagram)

Saturday, August 28, 2010

The Power of Slow Change: Older Adults Adapt To Social Media

In the US, older adults (ages 50-64) are now steadily adapting to social changes brought about by technology. (who says they’re luddites?)

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Slowly but surely, the penetration of web usage has been diffusing into a larger segment of the US population. I’d say that this represents a worldwide phenomenon, not limited to the US.

Again the implication: changes in the way things are going to get done (commerce, social relationships, lifestyle, regulations, and more).

Read the rest from Pew Research here

Monday, August 02, 2010

The New Trading Platform Of The Philippine Stock Exchange

``There’s a simple and elegant test of whether there is skill in an activity: ask whether you can lose on purpose. If you can’t lose on purpose, or if it’s really hard, luck likely dominates that activity. If it’s easy to lose on purpose, skill is more important.” Michael J. Mauboussin

Mayhem struck the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), this week. What was expected to be a smooth transition in the migration of the old MakTrade system to the New Trading System turned out to be quite messy.

Aside from the erroneous data feed which resulted to a whopping one day 14% jump in the Phisix on the first day of the new system, news reports say that it took more than three hours[1] to correct the figures in the benchmark index.

The glitch wasn’t just seen in the major benchmark figures. This extends all the way to the data, particularly on the daily quotes. Previous computations for foreign trade seem to have been altered, so as with the breadth (daily number of issues traded-formerly sum of advance, decline and unchanged issues), this I would have to clarify with the PSE.

So unless the PSE resolves to align this week’s quote with the past, the new system will render our previous data as invalid.

Though this is a technical issue which eventually should be resolved, I am not sure how the PSE will make good the right adjustments, considering that it could be costly to reprogram (if this is included in the package).

In addition, the posting of the daily quotes at the PSE website has been way delayed. The quote for July 30th trading session had been uploaded only this morning, August 1st.

The Unseen Cost Of Inefficiencies

Meanwhile, a PSE official, quoted by media, rushed to exculpate the disorderly transition by insensibly claiming that such transition represents as a mere “minor” issue and emblematic of normal “birth pains”. This is not only ridiculous, but is unwarranted.

Such statement exemplifies on what we call as the stakeholder’s problem—where the urgency to know and act is fundamentally based on the perceived stake by the agent involved.

In this case, because the officer’s stake isn’t in the trading business, but as an employee of the PSE, his sentiment reveals of the seeming paucity in the urgency to patch up the system, as well as, the undeserved insensate remarks.

One should realize that distortions in the price signals engender imbalances in the capital markets.

This includes an increase in the perception of operational uncertainty which could result to heightened volatility, the expanded risk premium of holding local equities relative to other local and foreign assets, higher cost of transactions and a higher hurdle rate required by both local and foreign institutional investors for them to consider allocating their funds to Philippine equities.

In short, uncertainty translates to the risks of lesser investments!

Proof of this is that even if the Phisix bellwether did register a marginal gain this week, the average volume fell by 13% (Php 2.9 billion) and the average number of daily trades fell by 23%!

So when we are talking of billions of pesos per day (estimated at Php 3 billion or US $66 million), “minor” problems and “birth pangs” translate to Php 100 millions+ (US $2.2 million) lost in daily transactions. Think of all the multiplier effect from the lost transactions applied to the participants and to the PSE itself.

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Figure 1: Bloomberg: Year To Date Performance Of The ASEAN 4

I would even suggest that the underperformance of the Phisix relative to our ASEAN neighbours amidst a seemingly sprightly market backdrop (see figure 1) could signify as the unseen ‘negative’ ramifications from the “birth pains” (see blue circle).

Except for Malaysia (orange), all three major ASEAN bourses have broken above the 2010 resistance levels, and this includes the Philippine Phisix (green). However the rally in the Phisix appears to have stalled while the others persisted.

So the lost opportunities in terms of trading volume and a higher Phisix level could have been the side effect of the unwieldy migration to the new system.

New Trading System Positioned For Derivatives Markets

The New Trading System (NTS) reportedly cost a staggering Php 197.39 million[2] (US $4.32 million-current exchange rate) whose trading platform is supposedly designed from one of the world’s largest stock market companies. According to the Inquirer.net[3],

``trading software product developed by NYSE Technologies SAS, the commercial technology unit of NYSE Euronext, which in turn operates the largest exchanges around the world including the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext.”

By concept, the NTS or the new platform seems promising, primarily because it is supposedly a system that would also service “cash, debt and derivative instruments”.

Among the major ASEAN bourses, the Philippines is a laggard in the derivatives markets as we have yet to implement one through the local stock exchange. Hence, the understandable shift to incorporate a trading platform that would allow for this expansion.

In other words, the New Trading System (NTS) is meant to position for a derivatives exchange market and not just the stock exchange.

By allowing investors the instrument to hedge, which is the main function of derivatives, this facility could enhance investor returns, which should ultimately attract more public participation.

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Figure 2: Manila Bulletin: NTS Revised Ticker and Board Lot

There are many salient trading enhancements in the new program. This includes the adoption of a reduced tick size (price fluctuation) and board lot[4] (see figure 2); real-time monitoring of foreign ownership; new order and validity types; and the standardization of the account code[5].

I think some of the most noteworthy, among the many supposed new functions[6], that could be widely used are the following:

-stop order which consists of the stop-loss [order that is queued as a must be filled as soon as the trigger price is reached] and the stop limit [order that is queued as a limit order as soon as the trigger limit price is reached]

-market order [order that is filled irrespective of the price whereby the unfilled quantity will be queued into the order book.]

-market to limit order [order executed at the best opposite price for shares whatever is available; remaining unfilled quantity will be put in the order book at the execution price]

-good till date [order remains valid until the date specified by the user]

So in my view, the transition towards NTS, given the specified features, should extrapolate to a medium to long term advantage, if the PSE would use this platform to expand into financial derivatives, and most importantly, to the much needed commodity futures market.

As a side note, because of the dire lack of capital in the Philippines, despite being a relatively low wage low export country, a large part of the Philippine economy remains mired in the agricultural age. Thus, a commodity futures market should enhance pricing, logistics and distributional efficiency that should positively impact our farmers, as I have long been arguing[7] for.

In short, since I am not a Luddite (political zombies who are afraid of technological adaption), but one who embraces innovation, the NTS, based on its current features, looks enticingly positive.

How Competition Can Improve On The PSE

However, what I have cavilled about is the executional inefficiencies and the lack of sensitivity by the PSE in the migration process.

The PSE should have backtested the new platform with the MakTrade system into near precision first before formally replacing the latter that would have resulted to an orderly transition.

Birth pains serve as no justification in today’s transition towards the information age. Yet if such reasoning holds true, then technology ‘birth pangs’ should translate into catastrophic crashes for the new airplane models as the Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner and the Airbus 380. Such rationalization is effectively a non-sequitur.

Instead, what these shortcomings manifest are symptoms of companies operating, outside of the discipline of consumers (or shareholders in this setting) in a monopolistic environment, which technically is what the Philippine Stock Exchange is.

As Professor Murray N Rothbard explained[8] (bold emphasis added, italics- Professor Rothbard)

``One form of partial product prohibition is to forbid all but certain selected firms from selling a particular product. Such partial exclusion means that these firms are granted a special privilege by the government. If such a grant is given to one person or firm, we may call it a monopoly grant; if to several persons or firms, it is a quasi-monopoly grant. Both types of grant may be called monopolistic. An example of this type of grant is licensing, where all those to whom the government refuses to give or sell a license are prevented from pursuing the trade or business.

``It is obvious that a monopolistic grant directly and immediately benefits the monopolist or quasi monopolist, whose competitors are debarred by violence from entering the field. It is also evident that would-be competitors are injured and are forced to accept lower remuneration in less efficient and value-productive fields. It is also patently clear that the consumers are injured, for they are prevented from purchasing products from competitors whom they would freely prefer. And this injury takes place, it should be noted, apart from any effect of the grant on prices.”

And according to former PSE President Jose Yulo Jr.[9]

``On March 4, 1994 the Securities and Exchange Commission granted the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. its license to operate as a securities exchange in the country stating that “a unified Stock Exchange is vital in developing a strong capital market and a sustainable economic growth.” It simultaneously canceled the licenses of the MSE and the MKSE.

``The Philippine Stock Exchange is currently the only organized exchange in the Philippines licensed for trading stocks and warrants.” (emphasis added)

So while it is true that stock exchanges of Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and Korea are monopolies in a sense (all others have multiple stock exchanges[10] including Pakistan), we see these organizations as more sensitive to the interest of the shareholders due to a deeper penetration level which make them a lot more efficient than the local contemporary.

That’s because shareholders exert pressure on listed companies as well as through the stock exchanges in terms of participation and through shareholder activism—or the use of equity stake to influence corporate management.

And a deep penetration level of shareholder’s base would naturally impact the way the exchange business are operated.

Besides, since the Philippines has a minute shareholder base[11] (less than 1% of the population direct and indirect) and whose listed companies are mostly companies owned by local tycoons, the lack of minority shareholder activism is one of the contributing factor that accentuates the negative dynamics of the monopolistic structure.

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Figure 3: ADB[12]: Average Foreign Holdings of Equity—2003 to 2007 and 2008 (as % of market capitalization)

Another possible variable is the competition to attract foreign investors (see figure 3).

As one would note, except for Malaysia, the other monopolist Korea, Taipei and Thailand comprise the largest in terms of the average share of foreign participation as a percentage of the market capitalization.

This means that the respective markets are seen as highly liquid or has deep public participation levels, are considered sophisticated and shareholder friendly enough to generate large following from foreign funds.

Thus, inefficient management of the trading platform will curtail the interest of foreign investors to the detriment of the economy (lack of avenues to intermediate savings and investment) and to the investment public (returns relative risks).

So the PSE management should not only look slough off the monopolistic attitude, and on the competitive side work to attract investors by having more efficient implementation and a stable upkeep of the trading platform, but likewise have a PR communiqué that won’t be seen as snooty.

As a long time shareholder of the company, which is my expression of optimism for the Phisix and for the domestic capital markets, I hope that this critique would be deemed as constructive enough to make the PSE a more shareholder (market) friendly institution.


[1] Inquirer.net, New system throws Philippine bourse into disarray, July 27, 2010

[2] Philippine Stock Exchange, Security Exchange Commission Form 17-A, May 17, 2010

[3] Inquirer.net, loc. sit.

[4] Manila Bulletin, PSE implements new trading system, July 25, 2010

[5] Business Mirror, SEC approves PSE shift to new trading system, April 26, 2010

[6] Philippine Stock Exchange, NTS Update Session 1, October 2008

[7] See A Prospective Boom in Philippine Agriculture! and see Rice Crisis: The Superman Effect And Modern Agriculture

[8] Rothbard, Murray N. Triangular Intervention: Product Control, Man Economy & State Chapter 12

[9] Yulo, Jose Luis U. Jr. Knowing The Philippine Stock Exchange A guide for Investors

[10] tdd.lt Stock Exchanges Worldwide Links

[11] Philippine Stock Exchange, Less than half of 1% of Filipinos invest in stock market, PSE study confirms, June 16, 2008

[12] Asian Development Bank, Asia Capital Markets, May 2010

Friday, May 01, 2009

Will The US Technology Industry Function As The New Economic Driver?

Pew Research gives us some interesting clues in the changes of consumer habits or consumer preferences of Americans in today's crisis dominated environment.

Seen from the the investing dimension, if we are to bet on a new economic paradigm emerging from today's crisis, some of the "recent" trends may portend or serve as prologue to the future.

According to Pew Research (bold emphasis mine), ``In hard times, the Pew Research survey finds that many Americans are changing their minds about which everyday goods and services they consider essential and which ones they could live without. The survey also shows that "old-tech" household appliances have fared the worst in the public's reassessment of the line between luxury and necessity in their daily lives.

``Of 12 items tested1, six dropped significantly in the necessity rankings from 2006 to 2009, while the other six basically held their own. All of the "old-tech" household appliances on the list dropped in their necessity ratings. For example, the proportion of people who rate a clothes dryer as a necessity fell by 17 percentage points in the past three years. There are similar declines for the home air conditioner (16 points), the dishwasher (14 points) and the television set (12 points).

``A few of the "middle-aged" household appliances and services also declined. The microwave, a kitchen staple since the late 1980s, is currently viewed as a necessity by less than half the public, a 21-point drop in the past three years. The proportion who rate cable and satellite television service as a necessity fell 10 percentage points since 2006, nearly matching the declining value of a television set."

Adds Pew, ``In contrast, none of the newer information-era gadgets and services has fallen in Americans' assessment of what they absolutely need to have. Cell phones and home computers continue to be seen as a necessity by half of the public, unchanged from three years ago. High-speed Internet access is seen as a necessity by about three-in-ten adults, also unchanged from 2006. Two items that came onto the consumer scene in this decade -- iPods and flat-screen TVs -- are still seen as a necessity by a very small share of the public, but that share hasn't declined during the recession."

Why is this important?

First, it shows that the weight of consumer activities or consumer preferences appears to be shifting towards communications in the form of high end TV, iPod or the internet. Despite the recession, while other appliances are suffering from consumption retrenchment, positive growth is still seen on technology based devices or equipments.

This gives further validation to some studies alluding to the ongoing explosive growth in non traditional media as social networking, see our previous post,
Wikinomics: The Exploding Growth In Social Networking Media

Next, note that today's crisis won't last forever which possibly means that some of the recent trend shifts may accelerate when economic growth will be restored.

Third is the issue of demographics.

The cellphone and landline usage depicts of the technology "generational gap" trends between youth and the elderly.


Again from Pew, ``The survey also finds that some consumer products, including some high-tech devices that have entered the marketplace relatively recently, appear so far to be "recession-proof." About half of respondents in the current survey (49%) and a similar proportion in 2006 consider a cellular telephone to be a necessity. That overall finding obscures a considerable generation gap: Currently 60% of adults under the age of 30 say a cell phone is a necessity, compared with 38% of those 65 years old or older. But this generation gap is not significantly larger today than it was three years ago; in fact, views on the need for a cell phone have not changed significantly among any age group since 2006.

``An equally dramatic generation gap opens when Americans are asked whether landline telephone service -- the familiar home phone -- is a luxury or a necessity. But this gap runs in the opposite direction. More than eight-in-ten (84%) adults ages 65 and above say a landline phone is a necessity, while only 49% of those younger than 30 agree. And younger adults are nearly four times as likely as older adults to say an in-home phone is a luxury (51% vs. 14%)."

Our point is that the younger generation appear to be more adaptive in utilizing applications from technological innovation, although even the elderly seems to be fast catching up.

And considering that in 2020, demographic trends as seen from the chart above by nationmaster.com indicates of the probable shift in the weightings of the population distribution in the US, where its bulk is expected to comprise the age levels of 25-39. This effectively extrapolates to today's biggest technology users as the core market for the technology industry.

In short, we may expect a huge surge in industry growth in terms of penetration level or in the diffusion of users.


Barring the risks of imposition of extreme regulations which may restrict and choke off innovations, my predisposition is for unexpected or underappreciated technology originated economic recovery for the US. Albeit I think any solid recovery may not be seen anytime soon as the US could be faced with growing risks of hyperinflation.

Nonetheless, the present outperformance of the technology rich bellwether the Nasdaq relative to the broadmarket as signified by the S&P 500 seems to provide some foundation for such thesis.

As Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams wrote in Wikinomics, ``The future, therefore, lies in collaboration across borders, cultures, companies, and disciplines. Countries that focus narrowly on "national goals" or turn inward will not succeed in the new era. Likewise, firms that fail to diversify their activities geographically and develop robust global innovation webs will find themselves unable to compete in a global world. Effectively it's globalize or die."