Showing posts with label rotational process. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rotational process. Show all posts

Monday, August 31, 2026

The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part III: The Fulcrum Cracks—Benchmark-ism Unravels

 

You can't do well in investments unless you think independently. And the truth is, you're neither right nor wrong because people agree with you. You're right because your facts and your reasoning are right. In the end, that's all that counts. And there wasn't any question about the facts or reasoning being correct—Warren Buffett 

In this issue: 

The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part III: The Fulcrum Cracks—Benchmark-ism Unravels

I. Ghost Month, Real Losses

II. The ICTSI Fulcrum Cracks

III. Breadth Confirms the Divergence

IV. From Prop to Drag: The Mechanics of Concentration in Reverse

V. Rotation Without Broadening: Speculative Capital in Search of the Next Punt

VI. The Arrière-Pensée: Confidence Is the Cover Story, Collateral Is the Point

VII. Conclusion: Benchmark-ism Meets Its Own Arithmetic 

The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part III: The Fulcrum Cracks—Benchmark-ism Unravels 

When one stock becomes the market, its reversal becomes the market's problem: August exposes the concentration, liquidity, and benchmark-ism beneath the PSEi's manufactured confidence 

In Part I we flagged ICTSI as the PSEi 30's single point of vulnerability. In Part II we showed how that vulnerability had metastasized into concentrated liquidity, shrinking participation, and outright benchmark-ism. August supplied the arithmetic Part II warned was coming. 

I. Ghost Month, Real Losses


Figure 1

August is conventionally excused as the market's "ghost month"—a superstition with Chinese roots, ironically applied by the establishment commentaries to a market that isn't Chinese. The historical record hardly justifies the fear: from 2010 through 2025, August produced gains in only six of sixteen years, with an average loss of a marginal -0.33%. Mostly noise. (Figure 1, upper window)  

This August wasn't noise. The PSEi 30 fell 4.49% month-on-month—the fourth-largest monthly loss since 2010—dragging the year-to-date return to roughly -1.60% and the year-on-year figure to -3.24%. (Figure 1, lower table)


Figure 2 

The damage was compressed: a single closing week's 4.52% plunge erased three months of the index's ICTSI-driven advance. (Figure 2, upper image) 

Ghost month or not, the mechanism behind the reversal is the one this series has tracked for some time, but which intensified last June: ICTSI had become the fulcrum propping up the PSEi 30, and a fulcrum that lifts a benchmark on the way up can just as easily accelerate its fall. 

The timing again matters. 

The final week's plunge did not arrive in isolation. 

On Friday, the USDPHP closed at Php 62.265, a record, extending Thursday's prior record-low close of Php 61.888. Markets were also absorbing the BSP's latest policy signals, and the 7-month record fiscal and trade deficits. (Figure 2, lower chart) 

The PSEi 30 fell in lockstep, down for a fourth consecutive session and closing below 6,000, erasing gains since June. 

A rate hike aimed at defending the currency and a benchmark sliding on the same day are not coincidences to be filed separately from the ICTSI story. They are another expression of the same "resistance to adjustment" pattern this (stagflation) series has tracked across fiscal, monetary, and FX-regime policy: administrative efforts to keep the peso, the yield curve, and the index from clearing at levels the underlying imbalances would otherwise dictate. 

When that resistance gives way on the currency side, it rarely leaves the equity side untouched—not when equity "confidence" was doing double duty as collateral support in the first place. 

II. The ICTSI Fulcrum Cracks 

The same stock that manufactured the June-July rally supplied most of August's decline. ICTSI fell 7.86% week-on-week and 8.1% month-on-month, accounting for roughly 46% and 48%, respectively, of the PSEi's weekly and monthly losses. 

This is simply capitalization-weighting running in reverse. The identical arithmetic that let one company's 57% first-half return mask a negative-6.8% average constituent return in Part II is now transmitting one company's reversal directly into the headline index. 

A benchmark built to amplify a single stock's ascent is, by the same construction, built to amplify its descent.


Figure 3

ICTSI's share of the PSEi's free-float market cap slipped to 25.58% by month's end, down from a peak of 27.37% in the first week of August. (Figure 3, upper pane)         

The combined weight of the top five constituents eased from July's peak of 56.12% to about 54.7%. 

Small retreats in percentage terms—large in what they signal: the "national team" support that Part II documented in the daily trading choreography appears to be losing its grip on the tape. 

III. Breadth Confirms the Divergence 

Beneath the headline, the market's breadth told a different story from the index. 

Only 10 of the PSEi's 30 constituents rose in August; the average constituent decline was roughly -2.92%—materially less than the benchmark's -4.49%, as ICTSI's outsized free-float market-cap weight amplified its decline in the headline index. (Figure 3, lower visual)


Figure 4

The divergence was even more pronounced during the final week's meltdown: only 7 of the 23 constituents that traded that week rose, while the average change was -2.78%—another example of how free-float market-cap weighting magnified the impact of ICTSI's decline on the benchmark. (Figure 4, upper diagram) 

Exchange-wide breadth stayed only marginally negative—1,783 advances against 1,818 declines—a spread nowhere near as lopsided as the ICTSI-driven index move would suggest. (Figure 4, lower image) 

That gap between a nearly even advance-decline line and a sharply negative benchmark is itself the tell: the index and the market it purports to summarize are increasingly telling two different stories, exactly as Part II's mid-year data showed in reverse. 

IV. From Prop to Drag: The Mechanics of Concentration in Reverse


Figure 5 

The unraveling wasn't confined to price. It showed up in the plumbing of trading activity too. ICTSI's % share of Main Board volume fell sharply from 28.23% in July to 21.91% in August as foreign flows shifted from net buying (Php 5.265B in July) to net selling (Php 1.59B in August). (Figure 5, upper graph) 

The same expansion in ICTSI's trading dominance that Part II attributed to both rising ICTSI activity and shrinking activity elsewhere is now reversing on both counts at once: as ICTSI volume recedes, there is no offsetting pickup in the rest of the market to cushion the loss of liquidity. 

The pattern increasingly resembles South Korea's KOSPI, where Samsung and SK Hynix now function as the index in practice. The difference is that Korea's concentration rides a global AI-hardware cycle with real earnings behind it; ICTSI's had no comparable confirmation from global port-operator peers, a point already established in Part II. (Figure 5, lower chart) 

Main Board volume fell 17.24% year-on-year to about Php 113.108 billion; aggregate turnover fell 4.5% to Php 142.976 billion. Cross trades made up 18.74% of Main Board volume, a four-month high—more of the exchange's already-shrinking activity conducted off the central order book, away from open price discovery. 

V. Rotation Without Broadening: Speculative Capital in Search of the Next Punt 

As the dominant ICTSI trade weakened, the other big caps failed to fill the gap—or the expected ‘rotation’ didn’t happen. Instead, trading activity shifted toward smaller, more speculative names—restructuring rumors, backdoor-listing chatter, M&A gossip—even as overall volume contracted. 

Near-even breadth on falling volume is not a healthy broadening of participation. It looks more like speculative capital searching for the next short-term story once the previous market leader loses momentum, not new capital entering the market on improved fundamentals. 

The extraordinary ICTSI ascent that carried the PSEi through June and July appears to have reached its inflection point. What follows this kind of top is rarely a broad-based handoff to the rest of the index; it's usually a scramble among smaller, thinner names while the index itself searches for a new prop. 

The progression is telling: from speculation to outright gambling, as capital searches less for value than for the next trade capable of replacing the momentum it has lost—more recipe for capital consumption. 

VI. The Arrière-Pensée: Confidence Is the Cover Story, Collateral Is the Point 

In Part II, we named this dynamic “benchmark-ism”: political and institutional narrative management that uses market and economic statistics to manufacture the appearance of stability—or to keep the Overton window of acceptable economic outcomes from shifting toward adjustment. 

August is the moment that narrative met its own arithmetic. 

Gains have always been projected as "confidence"—a rising PSEi as evidence of "resilience," useful for a leadership with sagging approval ratings and an economy absorbing the mounting tensions from the aftershocks of the Iran-war oil shock, EO 110's price-suppression architecture, and a cascade of BSP relief measures already tracked in this series. But confidence was never the only objective, and arguably not the primary one. 

Elevated equity prices are collateral. They support asset values on bank and corporate balance sheets, cushioning a financial system already leaning on the BSP's regulatory relief and foreign-exchange interventions to keep the credit cycle turning. 

Put bluntly: a rising PSEi, and specifically a rising ICTSI, was never just about optics. It was about propping up the collateral base that a decaying credit cycle depends on to keep rolling over. That is the arrière-pensée behind the applause Part II described—the second, unstated motive sitting behind the first. 

The trouble with using one stock as collateral infrastructure for an entire financial system is that the mechanism is symmetric

What inflates the collateral on the way up can deplete it on the way down, potentially at a leveraged pace 

August didn't just cost the PSEi 4.49%. It cost the system a slice of the very collateral cushion the whole exercise was designed to build. 

VII. Conclusion: Benchmark-ism Meets Its Own Arithmetic 

This isn't the first time a single Philippine equity story has been mistaken for—or dressed up as—a market. The DigiPlus [PSE: PLUS] gaming-stock bubble of 2025 ran on the same logic: a policy-fueled speculative vehicle inflated past any relationship to its fundamentals, celebrated rather than examined, until the arithmetic of momentum reversed on its own. 

We called that top in real time and traced its roots back to the same boom-bust pattern that took down BW Resources in 1999. 

ICTSI is a larger, more systemically consequential version of the same mechanism—dressed in blue-chip legitimacy instead of casino-stock notoriety, but running on identical fuel: concentrated, momentum-driven flows mistaken for confidence. 

  • Part I called ICTSI the PSEi's single point of vulnerability. 
  • Part II showed that vulnerability metastasizing into concentrated liquidity and narrative management.
  • Part III shows what happens when the fulcrum that was doing the lifting starts doing the dropping instead. 

The PSEi was supposed to represent the market. But once the representation itself becomes something to be managed—because it communicates confidence and supports financial conditions—it begins to substitute for the reality it was meant to represent. That is the simulacrum. 

The episode reconfirms why the PSEi is becoming an increasingly unreliable gauge of the broader Philippine equity market—and, equally, a more fragile one: susceptible to substantial mispricing, disproportionate liquidity exposure, asset-bubble formation, rising concentration risk, and hidden leverage. 

Benchmark-ism can manufacture confidence for a while. It cannot repeal the arithmetic of the index it's built on.

___

References:

Prudent Investor Newsletters, The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part II: When One Stock Becomes the Market, July 19,2026 

Prudent Investor Newsletters, PSEi 30: The ICTSI Show, June 7, 2026

 


Sunday, October 24, 2021

PSEi 30 7,300: A Product of Pre-Closing Pumps; The Crucial Differentials between 4Q 2020 and Today

 

To paraphrase Kahneman, what makes our narratives true isn't their accuracy, but the speed and ease with which we all accept them—Peter Atwater 

 

In this issue 

PSEi 30 7,300: A Product of Pre-Closing Pumps; The Crucial Differentials between 4Q 2020 and Today 

I. PSEi 30 7,300: A Product of Pre-Closing Pumps 

II. The Chronology of Operation PSEi 7,000 

III. PSEi 30 7,300: The Crucial Differentials between 4Q 2020 and Today 

IV. PSEi 30: Rotation Towards the Big 6 Powers Latest Run-up to 7,300 

 

PSEi 30 7,300: A Product of Pre-Closing Pumps; The Crucial Differentials between 4Q 2020 and Today 


I. PSEi 30 7,300: A Product of Pre-Closing Pumps 

 

Figure 1 

 

In a follow-up to the other week’s 4.44% return, the PSEi 30 sprinted to a 10-month high this week backed by a 1.06% advance.  

 

Unknown to most, the 7,300 level was entirely a product of cumulative pre-closing pumps.  

 

The 5-day pre-closing pumps, which totaled 97.54 points or 1.33% this week, signified over 100% (128%) of the week’s advance. (figure 1, upmost pane) 

 

Or, without these marking-the-closes, the index would have closed lower. Perhaps, much, much lower. 

 

Except for rationalizations by media, how is the much-ballyhooed boom from the vaccine-related reopening related to this? 

 

These ubiquitous pre-closing pumps established the steep slope of the index that crafted the two interim patterns: an accelerated uptrend channel and a rising wedge. The PSEi 30 presently sits at the resistance level of these formations. 

 

The thing is, over the short term, charts of the PSEi and their members provide meaningless clues. That’s because the index managers fundamentally draw up these charts. 

 

II. The Chronology of Operation PSEi 7,000 

 

Nevertheless, to extend our explanation of last week, please find the chronology of the events that constitute the mechanics of OPERATION 7,000. (Figure 1 middle pane) 

 

1. The March 2020 trend line (which emerged from the BSP’s rescue) broke twice (at the end of July and on the second week of August). 

2. High-flying ACEN and CNVRG replaced laggards DMC and FGEN in the PSEi 30 on August 16th.  

3. Echoing CNVRG, GLO rocketed, TEL followed. Other non-PSEi 30 telcos failed to keep with their peers. 

4. Resonating ACEN, AP zoomed, tagging parent heavyweight AEV. The leash effect partially revitalized FGEN.   

5. In tandem with these, ICT spiked, the PSEi challenged 7,000. (3-6 Figure 1, lowest pane) 

6. The PSEi broke the 7,000 level but didn’t hold. These high-flying issues exhibited signs of exhaustion. 

7. By October 5th, the Big 6 joined the push. The PSEi 30 finally crossed over the 7,000. 

8. The PSE announced the inclusion of WLCON on October 11th, JFC flew. 

9. The bidding mania spilled over to BDO on the same day, triggering the pumps on the financial issues of the index. 

10. Ever since, the PSEi 30 climbed from the alternating pumps of the expanded list of high-flyers and the big 6.  

 

In short order, the share prices of the high-flyers rocketed beginning mid-August, while the share prices of the top 6 heavyweights provided the upside fulcrum to the Index this October. The recent strength of the latter filled in on the signs of exhaustion exhibited by the former or the high-flyers. The entire transition (from high flyers to the big 6) signified a process.  

 

Figure 2 

 

The contributions of the high-flyers and the big-6 to the PSEi 7,300 are showcased by their charts respectively.  

 

Needless to say, this week’s pre-closing pumps in aggregate were instrumental in boosting the share prices of the heavyweights that heaved the index to 7,300. 

 

One may ask, might all these represent a coincidence? Perhaps. But including the institutionalized regular end-session pumps, these seemingly concerted events signify a seeming pattern from a series of binding purposive actions. 

 

At the end of the day, whether coincidence or by design, the mounting distortions from the institutionalized marking the closes abets the gross mispricing of the stock market.  The BSP’s historic zero-bound and QE regime signifies its primary fuel.  

 

III. PSEi 30 7,300: The Crucial Differentials between 4Q 2020 and Today 


People see charts and look for similarities or patterns in price formations. From that point, these observers project outcomes and payoffs.  

 

But yes, price watermark levels provide attractive incentives for the cheering echo chambers.  

 

In lieu of econometrics used by statisticians and economists, chartists use various indicators and oscillators, mixing them to create a scenario. Some use this to reinforce their biases. 

 

And because technical abstractions provide an aura of intellectualism, the average participants readily embrace these tools assuming their efficacies.  Such technicalities provide an intellectual disguise for "expertise." 

 

Unfortunately, bereft of the spectrum of probabilities, these tools lack measures of effectivity. While one pattern may fulfill its desired outcome, it may not do so on the others. No one bothers to see how and why it differed or how this pattern performed relative to the probabilities of previous incidences. 

 

Besides, the mainstream provides no theoretical explanations on the likely effects of institutionalized end-session pumps on price pattern formations of the PSEi 30 index. 

 

More importantly, because of the variability of the underlying conditions, historical price similarities represent an inferior metric for analysis. 

 

Figure 3 

 

As proof, there are considerable differences between the run-up to the 7,300 in the 4Q 2020 and today. 

 

In 2020, the dash to 7,300 started from October to November.  

 

Because of fading volume, the rally ran out of steam. The index plateaued by December to January 2021 then began to descend hereafter. 

 

And because of the intense retail exposure in 2020, volume was not only significantly higher than today, but market breadth also supported the run-up.  

 

The 4Q 2020 ramp represented a faint shadow of a genuine bull market (2009-2012).  (Figure 3, second to the highest pane) 

 

Today, while the index bears a robust appearance, again, mainboard volume lags its 4Q 2020 predecessor (Figure 2, middle pane) 

 

Likewise, the average daily trade and traded issues pale in comparison to 4Q 2020. (Figure 3, upmost left and right pane) 

  

Further, the 7,300-level have little support from the market breadth of the PSE as sellers dominate the margins. (Figure 2, lowest window) 

  

And such strength is an illusion because the bull market is limited to only select composite members of the PSEi 30.  The skewed distribution of the index also magnifies its performance. 

 

As such, the inferior health of market internals only highlights the limited participation of the retail segment. 

 

Or, in examining the charts of ALL the listed firms, the bull market covers only a handful of issues outside the PSEi 30. 

 

And like 4Q 2020, foreign money participation remained on the sidelines as today. (Figure 3, second to the lowest pane) 

 

The process of elimination suggests that only sectors inundated by the BSP’s liquidity, particularly the financials and the government, may have constituted the forces behind the present selective price ramps at the PSE. 

 

Despite the massive liquidity injections by the BSP in 2020 through early 2021, the growth of M2 savings deposits appears to have stalled. (Figure 3, lowest pane) 

 

IV. PSEi 30: Rotation Towards the Big 6 Powers Latest Run-up to 7,300 

 


Figure 4 

 

There’s more. 

 

Behind the run-up to 7,300 in the 4Q 2020 were the heavyweights of the real estate sectors, and secondarily, the holding firms as signified by the expanding share of markets caps. 

 

In essence, aside from increased retail participation that powered the broader market, the biggest market cap issues stewarded in the index higher. The charts of the top 6 heavyweights illustrate this dynamic.  

 

But then, the PSEi 30 benchwarmers were sidelined.  

 

Since the 4Q 2020 model failed to sustain the run-up, a new paradigm was required to remedy the previous flaws.  

 

As noted earlier, this time, primed as leaders were the energy producers, TELCOs, and ICTSI.   

 

The benchwarmers took the lead role while the principal players or the Big 6 assumed the supporting role. 

 

As proof, SM's 4.34% advance contributed substantially to the PSEi 30's weekly gains of the week and the push towards 7,300 as the parabolic rally of the leaders faded.  

 

As of October 22, the share of the free float market cap of the big-6 remains at 52%. 

 

Except for BDO and SMPH, it was the week of the Big 6. SM was supported by JGS, ALI and AC.  

 

Since the (private and public) financial system may have engineered the current rally, how much more liquidity reserves do they have to sustain it? 

 

Curiously, while financials are supposed to benefit from this reopening, we read that some banks have tightened anew in the Q3. If so, how will this boost liquidity? 

 

With the sustained inflation of the bubble in everything worldwide, in the meantime, anything is possible.  

 

Yours in liberty, 

 

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