Showing posts with label international currency reserve. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international currency reserve. Show all posts

Sunday, October 06, 2024

Marcos-Nomics Stimulus Update: August Budget Deficit Narrows, Strong Peso Reduces Public Debt, and Amortization Payments Reach All-Time High!

 

Lowering rates is a tool to rescue the government, but it will also make the Treasury add more debt in the next few months. If you make it easy for governments to borrow, they will gladly do it and continue printing currency, leading to the currency’s slow decline—Daniel Lacalle 

In this issue

Marcos-Nomics Stimulus Update: August Budget Deficit Narrows, Strong Peso Reduces Public Debt, and Amortization Payments Reach All-Time High!

I. A Growing Dependence on Non-Tax Revenue Growth? Or, Padding the Government’s Top line?

II. August’s Decline in Public Spending Due to Technicalities, Robust Pre-Election LGU Spending

III. Eight-Month Amortization Payments Hit All Time, Debt Servicing Cost at Annual 2023 Levels!

IV. Mounting Neo-Corporatism/Fascism Policies: Privatize Profits, Socialize Costs

V. Strong Peso Resulted in Lower Public Debt Last August

VI. Conclusion

Marcos-Nomics Stimulus Update: August Budget Deficit Narrows, Strong Peso Reduces Public Debt, and Amortization Payments Reach All-Time High! 

The "Marcos-nomics Stimulus" remains intact. Though deficit spending "narrowed" and public debt fell in August, technicalities and political agenda like pre-election spending points to the government’s deferred actions. 

GMA News, September 25, 1965: The Philippine government yielded a narrower fiscal shortfall in August amid growth in state collections and contraction in expenditures during the period. Data released by the Bureau of the Treasury on Wednesday showed the national government’s budget deficit stood at P54.2 billon last month, lower by 59.25% than the P133-billion fiscal gap seen in August 2023. “The lower deficit was brought about by the 24.40% growth in government receipts alongside a minimal 0.68% contraction in government expenditures,” the Treasury said. August’s fiscal balance brought the year-to-date budget shortfall to P697 billion, down 4.86% from the P732.5-billion deficit in the same period last year. 

Since the government has shifted VAT collections to an end-of-quarter basis, and given that the majority of public spending is typically programmed for the end of the quarter, the essence of the government’s balance sheet scorecard will be most relevant at the end of each quarterly period. 

In any case, we’ll do a short analysis. 

I. A Growing Dependence on Non-Tax Revenue Growth? Or, Padding the Government’s Top line?

Figure 1 

Although it is true that the fiscal deficit improved in August—largely due to a combination of decreased expenditures (-0.7% YoY and -9.4% MoM) amidst a mixed performance in revenues (+24.4% YoY and -15.5% MoM)—the most significant aspect is that the year-to-August deficit dropped from the third highest to the fourth highest in the Treasury's records. 

Nonetheless, nominal figures suggest that August's performance aligns with the exponential trendline for both variables. Additionally, the general uptrends in revenues and spending remain intact. (Figure 1, topmost pane) 

As such, since peaking in 2020, 8-month financing by the Bureau of Treasury has slowed compared to last year. The Treasury remains liquid, with approximately Php 504 billion in cash, marginally lower than Php 509 billion last year. (Figure 1, second to the highest chart) 

But the thing is, non-tax revenues have anchored a substantial segment of the progress in revenue collections. Non-tax revenues rocketed 252% year-over-year last August and soared 58.9% year-to-date compared to the same period in 2023. This growth spike pushed up the segment’s share of revenue to 17.12%—its sixth consecutive month of double-digit representation. In the eight months of 2024, the non-tax revenue pie swelled to 14.53%—the highest since 2015 (Figure 1, second to the lowest and lowest graphs) 

According to the Bureau of Treasury: Income collected and generated by the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) rose to P16.5 billion in August, more than twice its collections in the same period a year ago. The increase was primarily driven by PSALM’s P10.0 billion settlement of guarantee fee arrears, alongside increased PAGCOR income. Compared with January-August 2023’s actual collections of P150.1 billion, BTr’s YTD income for the current year has similarly improved by 33.46% (P50.2 billion) to P200.3 billion, largely due to higher dividend remittances, interest on advances from GOCCs, guarantee fee collections, and the NG share from PAGCOR income. Collections of other offices (other non-tax, including privatization proceeds, fees and charges, and grants) in August surged to P49.6 billion, nearly quadrupling last year’s outturn. (BTR, September 2024) [bold mine] 

Has the government been padding their revenue numbers partly by inflating the non-tax revenue component? Or are they becoming dependent on it? Unlike previous episodes where non-tax revenues spiked in a month or two, this marks the first time the share of this segment has been in double digits for six consecutive months 

II. August’s Decline in Public Spending Due to Technicalities, Robust Pre-Election LGU Spending 

The next item is expenditure.

Figure 2

Although decreases of .68% year-over-year (YoY) and 9.4% month-over-month (MoM) and year-over-year (YoY) were recorded in August, the expenditure for the first eight months grew by 11% YoY to a record Php 3.69 trillion. (Figure 2, topmost window)

The decline in August was primarily due to a -3.7% YoY and -4.1% MoM contraction in the National Government’s disbursement, even though spending by local government units (LGUs) remained vigorous at +9.34% YoY and -4.3% MoM.

But authorities explained the reasons behind this.

Again from the BTR: This can be partly attributed to the lower total subsidy releases to government corporations, and the sizeable outstanding checks recorded in various departments, such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and the Department of Health (DOH), during the period. Outstanding checks represent payments made by line departments for the delivery of goods/services but are not yet presented for encashment at the banks by the concerned contractors or payees. These remain under the accounts of spending agencies in authorized government depository banks and are not yet considered as actual disbursements in the Cash Operations Report. [bold mine]

In short, the most recent uncashed disbursements from the National Government will be reflected in upcoming data.

As it stands, the brisk growth of spending by local government units (LGUs) likely signifies the pre-election (mid-term) spending.  The cumulative data for the first eight months (+9.65% YoY) reached its second highest level since the record set in 2022, which, coincidentally, was the year of the Presidential Elections. (Figure 2, lower window)

This trend is expected to be sustained as we approach the 2025 elections.

III. Eight-Month Amortization Payments Hit All Time, Debt Servicing Cost at Annual 2023 Levels!

Lower interest payments accounted for yet another reason behind the decrease in expenditures last August.

Interest payments fell by 33.6% month-over-month (MoM) but surged by 23.7% year-over-year (YoY).

Despite this, the cumulative interest outlays for the first eight months increased by 31.1% YoY, reaching an all-time high of Php 509.44 billion. Its share of allotment rose from 11.72% in 2023 to 13.81% in August, representing the highest level since 2009! (Figure 2, lowest chart)

That’s not all.

Figure 3

In peso terms, the amortization expenditures from January to August surpassed last year’s high, setting a new record! (Figure 3, topmost image) 

Strikingly, amortization expenditures for 2024 amounted to Php 1.041 trillion, which is 6.7% above the 2023 annual total of Php 975.3 billion.

While interest and amortization levels (in peso terms) reached milestone highs, the cumulative debt servicing costs for the first eight months amounted to Php 1.55 trillion—just 0.33% (Php 53.432 billion) lower than last year’s annual debt servicing cost of Php 1.604 trillion! (Figure 3, middle diagram)

Despite this data being publicly available, there has been little coverage by the mainstream media or commentary from the establishment.

More than anything else, do you see the reason driving the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to cut interest rates and reserve requirements (RRR)?

It’s all about an implicit government bailout through the provision of liquidity support and the lowering of debt servicing costs!

Net claims on the central government (NCoCG) by universal-commercial banks have risen in tandem with public debt. (Figure 3, lowest image)

Figure 4

These measures are part of the 2020 pandemic rescue template, which includes various regulatory accommodations (such as relief measures and subsidies) as well as direct interventions (liquidity injections) from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Even now, the BSP’s net claims on the central government (NCoCG) have mirrored the monthly oscillations in public spending. (Figure 4, upper visual)

Furthermore, considering the political economy's structure derived from trickle-down policies, these rescue efforts are not only designed to benefit the government; they also serve the interests of politically connected elites.

Fundamentally, the BSP provides elite-owned banks with benefits through favorable policies and implicit bailouts. In return, these primary financial institutions partially complying with capital requirement rules provide liquidity to the Philippine treasury markets.

Has the narrowed deficit been engineered to address this? We argue that it has not.

IV. Mounting Neo-Corporatism/Fascism Policies: Privatize Profits, Socialize Costs

Haven’t you noticed that this administration has been gradually appointing members of the elite circle to higher echelons of political power?

While the intention may be to create a "business-friendly" environment, this situation reeks of "pro-big business" rent-seeking cronyism.

How will MSMEs thrive in the face of the onslaught of inflation, taxes, and regulations being imposed?

For instance, due to mandates and new taxes, major online eCommerce platforms have required SME sellers to register with the government, comply with new regulations, and pay new taxes.

In response, an influx of aspiring online entrepreneurs has led to a significant surge in business registrations, which both the media and the government are celebrating as a boom!

But how many of these businesses will survive the sustained rise in inflation and the increase in compliance and transaction costs?

How many of these hopeful entrepreneurs—whether driven by necessity due to a lack of jobs or insufficient income—will be able to employ people, especially with recent increases in minimum wages?

Yet, who benefits from the reduction of competition? SMEs or the elites?

We read that some elites have partnered with the government to embark on initiatives to promote MSMEs.

While partnerships like these may seem ideal, how do raising barriers to entry actually promote entrepreneurship?

These initiatives, which the public perceives as beneficial political "do something" actions, are, in fact, a display (smack) of hypocrisy largely intended for election-related public relations.

Moreover, some proponents have advocated for the privatization of certain infrastructure institutions.

While this may seem beneficial in "simple" theory, without competition, tax relief, and the easing of regulatory and administrative obstacles, such privatization is likely to result in the privatization of costs while socializing losses, or could deepen the embrace of neo-fascism, corporatism, or crony capitalism.

V. Strong Peso Resulted in Lower Public Debt Last August 

Apart from inflation, the surge in debt servicing costs represents a secondary symptom of deficit spending, with the direct effect manifested through public debt.

From the Bureau of Treasury (BTR): National Government’s (NG) total outstanding debt stood at P15.55 trillion as of the end of August 2024, reflecting a 0.9% or P139.79 billion decrease from the end July 2024 level…Meanwhile, NG external debt amounted to P4.76 trillion, a decrease of 3.6% or P178.25 billion compared with the end of July 2024 level. The decline was brought about mainly by peso appreciation, which trimmed P194.90 billion, as well as net repayments of P4.17 billion, although stronger third-currencies added P20.82 billion in valuation effects (BTR, October 2024) [bold added]

As the BTR admitted, the revaluation effects stemming from a rare 3.9% appreciation spike in the Philippine peso, based on their data, contributed to a marginal reduction in Philippine debt. 

Breaking down the data: external debt decreased by 3.6% month-over-month (MoM) but rose by 4.4% year-over-year (YoY). Meanwhile, domestic debt increased by 0.4% MoM and 10.22% YoY. (Figure 4, middle image) 

As a result, the spike in the Philippine peso pulled down the percentage share of external debt relative to the total, which has been rising since its trough in March 2021. 

Although the narrowing of the budget deficit from July to August, driven by a slowdown in public spending, may alleviate some pressure to increase borrowings, it is likely that the government has merely deferred its spending pressures to the end of the quarter and the end of the year.  (Figure 4, lowest image) 

Second, the government announced that it raised USD 2.5 billion last August

Figure 5

This addition will contribute to the external debt stock, which reached an all-time high in Q2 2024 and is expected to increase further in Q3. (Figure 5, topmost graph)

External debt has now surpassed the Gross International Reserves (GIR), even though part of these borrowings is counted as part of the GIR. For instance, when the National Government raised USD 2 billion last May, the proceeds were incorporated into the June GIR: "The month-on-month increase in the GIR level reflected mainly the National Government’s (NG) net foreign currency deposits with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which include proceeds from its issuance of ROP Global Bonds." (bold added) (Figure 5, second to the highest chart) 

Make no mistake: borrowed reserves require payment, and treating them as retained earnings or savings misrepresents actual reserves

Third, it is doubtful that the recent appreciation of the Philippine peso is sustainable. 

In contrast, the rising trend of the USD-Peso exchange rate partly reflects the "twin deficits" as a consequence of the government’s deep embrace of Keynesian policies that posit spending will lead to economic prosperity. (Figure 5, second to the lowest and lowest graph) 

These deficit spending policies, which depend on an easy money regime favoring the elite, have led to a record savings-investment gap that must be funded by a domestic population constrained by low savings, making it increasingly reliant on overseas savings. 

In summary, the widening savings-investment gap—partially expressed through the BSP-Banking system's funding of historic deficit spending via record-high public debt—has contributed to the weakness of the Philippine peso.

Therefore, the current decline in public debt due to the peso appreciation represents an anomaly (a bug, not a feature) rather than a trend

With this context in mind, one must ask: who will bear the rising costs of ever-increasing public debt and its servicing—through higher taxes and inflation? 

Is it the elites, with their army of accountants and tax lawyers, shielding themselves from their direct obligations? Is it the elites who employ financial experts and, indirectly, the government, which allocates resources to benefit from inflationary policies? 

Or is it the average Mario and Juan, who have little means for protection? 

VI. Conclusion

The "Marcos-nomics stimulus" measures remain intact.

The recent cut in the official interest rate, along with an expected series of further cuts and adjustments to reserve requirements, indicates a sustained trend of deficit spending, point to an expansion of monetary easing aimed at jolting the private sector economy and achieving political agendas through spending on pre-election, the war economy, infrastructure, welfare, bureaucratic expansion and etc., in addition to boosting GDP for financing purposes.

____

References 

Bureau of Treasury, August 2024 NG Budget Deficit Down to P54.2 Billion, treasury.gov.ph, September 25,2024

 

Bureau of Treasury, National Government Debt Recorded at P15.55 Trillion as of End-August 2024, treasury.gov.ph, October 1, 2024

Sunday, July 28, 2024

Bullseye! “Marcos-Nomics” Stimulus on a Roll as Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High! BSP Rate Cuts Next?

 

…the deficit may be financed by selling bonds to the banking system. If that occurs, the banks create new money by creating new bank deposits and using them to buy the bonds. The new money, in the form of bank deposits, is then spent by the Treasury, and thereby enters permanently into the spending stream of the economy, raising prices and causing inflation. By a complex process, the Federal Reserve enables the banks to create the new money by generating bank reserves of one-tenth that amount…In short, the government and the banking system it controls in effect “print” new money to pay for the federal deficit. Thus, deficits are inflationary to the extent that they are financed by the banking system; they are not inflationary to the extent they are underwritten by the public—Murray N. Rothbard

In this issue:

Bullseye! “Marcos-Nomics” Stimulus on a Roll as Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High! BSP Rate Cuts Next? 

I. Bullseye! Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High, Partially Affirming Marcos-nomics Stimulus! 

II. The Crowding Out Effect: Q2 2024 Revenue Spike Equals Lower GDP?

III. The 2024 Public Spending Surge: Pre-Election Expenditures via LGUs and COMELEC; Defense, and Infrastructure Budgets

IV. 6-Months Debt Servicing Costs Hit Another All-Time High! 

V. Marcos-Nomics Stimulus: Mounting Debt Servicing Burden Points to the Coming BSP Rate Cuts 

VI. The Inflationary Aspect of Deficit Spending: More Fuel to the Rising USDPHP; Conclusion 

Bullseye! “Marcos-Nomics” Stimulus on a Roll as Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High! BSP Rate Cuts Next? 

The acceleration of June and Q2 2024 spending affirmed the emergence of the "Marcos-nomics stimulus." With debt burdens soaring, a rising public debt stock, and fiscal deficits widening, the BSP may soon cut interest rates.

I. Bullseye! Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High, Partially Affirming Marcos-nomics Stimulus! 

Businessworld, July 25, 2024: THE NATIONAL Government’s (NG) budget deficit narrowed by 7.24% year on year in June, as revenue collection grew at a faster clip than spending, the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) said on Wednesday.  Treasury data showed the budget gap shrank to P209.1 billion in June from P225.4 billion a year ago. Month on month, the budget deficit widened by 19.54% from P174.9 billion in May. In June alone, revenue collections jumped by 10.93% to P296.5 billion from P267.3 billion in the same month last year…On the other hand, state spending increased by 2.62% year on year to P505.6 billion in June. “The increase was mostly attributed to the implementation of capital outlay projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways, and the Department of National Defense under its Revised AFP Modernization Program, the preparatory activities of the Commission on Elections for the 2025 National and Local Elections, and the higher National Tax Allotment shares of local government units (LGUs),” the Treasury said. (bold added)

Defense spending. Domestic elections spending (direct and indirect).

Figure 1

Statistical base effects have played a large part in the government and media’s "smoke and mirrors" narrative of fiscal performance last June.  (Figure 1, topmost image)

That is, the lower public spending growth rate was entirely a function of its comparison from a higher base a year ago.

In contrast, distortions from the base effect magnified the revenue growth rate calculated from a lower base last year.

The devil is always in the details.

Yet here are the most important factors that were withheld from the public: 

-June 2024’s public spending was the sixth highest on record. (Figure 1, middle chart)

-Excluding public spending for December, June 2024 represented the third highest after May 2024 and June 2023.

-May and June represented the third-highest two-month public spending.

-Q2 2024 public spending was at an all-time high! (Figure 3, lowest graph)

Figure 2

-June’s deficit was the highest this year. (Figure 2 topmost chart)

-The gap between the 1H 2024 deficit and 2023 widened and was 14.3% and 8.95% below the 2022 and the 2021 historic high. Please take note that the latter two represented a fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic recession. (Figure 2 middle window) 

Yet, June data was a bullseye for us! 

Authorities admitted that aside from infrastructure, defense, and pre-election spending accounted for its outgrowth. 

That, in essence, is our Marcos-nomics stimulus.

VII. "Marcosnomics" Stimulus: Expanded Spending on Pre-Election, Defense Related and Infrastructure? 

Meanwhile, infrastructure, public defense-related projects, pre-election expenditures, and bureaucratic spending were likely funded by the national government, which saw a 22.3% spike in disbursements in May.

This contributed to a 14.8% surge in national government spending over the first 5 months, reaching an all-time high nominal level of Php 1.443 trillion! 

So if we are not mistaken, "Marcosnomics" will be heavy on political expenditures but sold to the public as a "stimulus." (Prudent Investor, 2024)

In his third State of the Nation Address (SONA), the Philippine President advocated for numerous public spending programs, including "Walang Gutom 2027," a war on poverty measure aimed at feeding one million food-poor citizens by February 2027. He also proposed a nationwide "Free Wi-Fi Program" and promoted "green-lane certified" investments, amounting to approximately Php 3 trillion in business projects (PPPs?) related to renewable energy, digital infrastructure, food security, and manufacturing. He also addressed tourism infrastructure, water projects, and more.

"Marcos-nomics" is on a roll, with more free lunches ahead!

II. The Crowding Out Effect: Q2 2024 Revenue Spike Equals Lower GDP? 

What was the contribution of public revenues to the June and Q2 deficit?

Although aggregate collections reportedly grew by 10.93% in June, non-tax revenues, which experienced a remarkable 81.4% growth rate, comprised the bulk of these gains.

Further, Q2 2024 revenues soared by 16.74%.

This is because, after the April growth surge in collections by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (12.7%) and the Bureau of Customs (19.5%), the subsequent monthly performance almost ground to a halt: both tax agencies registered paltry gains in the following months—BIR grew by 2.8% and 4.7% in May and June, respectively, while the BoC was 4.3% and 0.7% higher over the same period.

Despite this growth, revenue year-on-year (YoY) growth spikes have historically accompanied a GDP slowdown, except for one occasion in 2014. This anomaly aside, revenue growth has typically preceded a slowdown in GDP growth.

The crowding-out effect could be a possible reason for this phenomenon.

Figure 3

So far, revenues from the private sector, which have been involved in government projects, bank lending expansion, and inflation (e.g. CORE CPI), have driven the aggregate performance of public revenues. (Figure 3, topmost and second to the highest diagrams)

Notwithstanding historic public spending, record revenues have also kept the fiscal deficit from spiraling out of control. For now. (Figure 3, second to the lowest chart)

But what if the law of diminishing returns on these factors worsens the current economic conditions?

III. The 2024 Public Spending Surge: Pre-Election Expenditures via LGUs and COMELEC; Defense, and Infrastructure Budgets

In the meantime, after providing a crucial perspective on the aggregates in public spending, we will delve into more details. (Figure 3, lowest graph)

Due to base effects, LGU allocations were up by only 2.6%, a decline from 8.54% in May. However, their share of total expenditures rose from 14.6% in May to 16.6% in June.

Firstly, the Mandanas ruling has also been instrumental in driving this uptrend. The previous spike in LGU collections occurred in the second half of 2021, prior to the 2022 national elections. The collections decreased in late 2022 (post-elections), which extended through most of 2023.

Implemented in 2022, the Mandanas ruling (EO 138) decrees an increased share of revenue allocation from the national government to 40%, which includes collections from the Bureau of Customs.

The second wave of increased allocations to the LGU appears to have emerged since Q1 2024 as the 2025 national elections approach.

Another pillar supporting this is the programmed annual increases in budget allocations.

Increased LGU allocations likely include budgets to market or improve the electoral chances of administration candidates in the 2025 general elections.

Also due to base effects, the National Government’s disbursement grew by 8.6% YoY, though this was substantially lower than 22.32% in May. Nonetheless, its share of the aggregate also declined from 72.5% in May to 69.2% in June.

These increases reflected direct election spending via the Comelec, indirect spending via LGUs, as well as infrastructure and defense allotments.

IV. 6-Months Debt Servicing Costs Hit Another All-Time High!

The thing is, the media has omitted a very critical factor: interest payments. On the other hand, the Bureau of Treasury glossed over the discussion of overall debt servicing costs.

Figure 4

Though interest payments increased by only 5.22% in June, down from 47.8% last May due to base effects, their share of the total rose slightly from 10.97% to 11.01%. (Figure 4, topmost image)

However, total debt servicing in the first semester of 2024 vaulted by 41.3% YoY. It hit an UNPRECEDENTED high of Php 1.283 trillion compared to its semestral predecessors and is down by only 20% relative to last year's annual or the 2023 data. (Figure 4, middle and lowest charts)

Again, compared to 2023, the gap has been closing dramatically: June amortization was only 7.16% lower, and interest payments were down by 39.96%.

Figure 5

Importantly, since 2019, authorities have minimized foreign debt servicing, but this trend appears to have reversed in 2024. (Figure 5, topmost diagram)

Nevertheless, it is incredible to see the media put a spin on the lower monthly external debt-servicing ratio (at the end of April) as 'good news' while ignoring the fact that the external debt-service burden spiked in 2023.  The recent decline likely represents a hiatus. (Figure 5, middle window)

Most of all, the surge in the external debt servicing burden has pulled down the GIR-to-debt service ratio, implying reduced liquidity for debt servicing and other domestic FX requirements. (Figure 5, lowest graph)

And one shouldn’t forget that the Philippine GIR also consists of external debt and derivatives or "borrowed reserves."

V. Marcos-Nomics Stimulus: Mounting Debt Servicing Burden Points to the Coming BSP Rate Cuts

Statistics are about the past. They signify historical data predicated on a limited set of assumptions and barely evince or explain the complex causal relationships that led to these captured outcomes.

The fact that the "Marcos-nomics stimulus" is on a roll means that widening fiscal deficits, which should also reverberate into "trade deficits" and expand the "twin deficits," should escalate public debt levels and, correspondingly, increase the debt burden.

With fiscal deficits likely to bulge ahead, prompting more borrowings, the logical sequence would be for the BSP to cut rates to ease the onus of debt servicing.

And that’s only the argument for Philippine government debt.

The BSP’s case for rate cuts will also involve private sector’s mounting debt burden or systemic debt in general. And that excludes shadow banking or informal finance.

Figure 6

Yet, the current spending dynamics also imply that the Bureau of Treasury’s declining cash position in the face of higher deficits translates to a coming reversal in the recent downdraft in the BoTr’s financing (borrowing), which ironically has been celebrated recently by some quarters. (Figure 6, topmost visual)

Above all, such transfers should worsen the strain on public savings and diminish the amount available for investments.  Rising deficits have coincided with slower growth of bank deposit liabilities. (Figure 6, middle chart)

Therefore, BSP rate cuts represent the next phase of the "Marcos-nomics stimulus."

VI. The Inflationary Aspect of Deficit Spending: More Fuel to the Rising USDPHP; Conclusion

With insufficient taxes and borrowings, the government would have to produce more currency to fund it: this translates to higher inflation ahead.

While the government is yet to publish June’s debt burden—slated for next week—banks and other financial institutions have been a primary source of financing for the public debt-financed record deficit and the conduit of unparalleled financial liquidity. (Figure 6, lowest graph)

Banks and financial institutions will be loaded with increasingly riskier government debt.

Figure 7

Furthermore, the BSP’s net claim on the central government (NCoCG), which has shadowed the uptrend in public spending, has fed into the CPI. It will continue to do so. (Figure 7, topmost and middle graphs)

In conclusion, the mounting imbalances from the trickle-down policies manifested by the historic savings-investment gap, supported by an ever-growing dependence on fiscal deficits and asset bubbles to bloat the GDP, translate not only to higher demand for the USD-Philippine peso (USDPHP) but also signify signs of rising systemic risks. (Figure 7, lowest chart)

Inflationary government policies, rather than symptoms like trade deficits and real FX rates, are the root cause of the weak peso. The BSP's interventions may delay or defer its effects, but ultimately, they cannot forestall the inevitable.

Good luck to those who see this as a free lunch for the economy and "bullish" for financial investments.

____

References:

Murray N. Rothbard, Ten Great Economic Myths, September 9, 2023, Mises.org 

Prudent Investor, Could the Philippine Government Implement a 'Marcosnomics' Stimulus Blending BSP Rate Cuts and Accelerated Deficit Spending? June 30,2024

 

Sunday, October 09, 2022

Is the USD-Php 59 the BSP’s Maginot Line? Are Speculators to Blame? GIRs Fall USD 13.8 Billion in 9-Months!

  

For all the glamour, players in the currency markets get by on hard work and tough analysis. Before speculators place their bets, they try to figure out the answers to key questions like, Is the central bank acting responsibly on monetary policy? Is the government allowing social spending to spin out of control beyond the means of the taxpayers? Are the politicians honestly portraying the country’s ability to meet its debts? If the answer to any of these questions is no, the currency traders will swoop down and dump the nation’s currency until leaders deliver honest answers—Todd G. Buchholz 

 

Is the USD-Php 59 the BSP’s Maginot Line? Are Speculators to Blame? GIRs Fall USD 13.8 Billion in 9-Months! 

 

Speculators become the convenient scapegoat once buffers run low and when the other goal is to save face. 

 

Strong Dollar? Peso Falls against the Yuan and Rupee; Gold-Php Nears ALL-Time Highs! 

 

 

Figure 1  

When the USD Php first touched the 59-level in the last week of September, the media disclosed that the political leadership "closely monitored" the unfolding events, which implied a warning to the public. 

 

After repeatedly attempting to cross this threshold level, last week, the BSP warned speculators:   

 

Businessworld, October 5: THE BANGKO Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Tuesday warned currency speculators not to take “undue advantage” of the Philippine peso, which has slumped to a fresh low against the US dollar on Monday. The Philippine peso closed at P58.65 per dollar on Tuesday, gaining 35 centavos from a record-low P59 a day earlier. 

 

Why pass the blame for the faltering peso on speculators than on their policies? 

 

First, hasn't this dilemma allegedly been about a "strong dollar" and not because of the "weak peso"? 

 

Next, what happened to the supposed "decoupling," which had been advocated by the consensus? 

 

Compared to its "fiat" currency peers, the peso has been "weak" not just against the US dollar but relative to the Chinese yuan and the Indian rupee.  Yet, both Asian currencies also experienced sharp depreciation.  

 

The peso has been rangebound compared with the euro.   

 

But yes, it is "strong" compared to embattled currencies, the UK sterling pound, and the Japanese Yen 

 

From here, the peso's performance has been relative to the conditions of its currency pair.  Called the "contrast effect," the peso is "strong" against the weakest currencies but "lags" the relatively stronger one even when all have depreciated against the USD.   

 

It would be inaccurate to conclude that the peso is not weak against others.   

 

But here's the zinger.    

 

USD prices of gold have not been immune from the mounting scarcity of the USD and thus have likewise been on the receiving end of the selloff.  

 

But gold prices in the peso have been adrift at record highs!  

 

It even broke out of its symmetrical triangle pattern, indicating a momentum that could push for a test of the April 2022 All-Time high!  

  

With gold-Php lingering in proximity to the recent milestone, this highlights the frailty of the peso against a commodity previously used as money!  

  

On this score, gold in the peso has manifested the implicit devaluation policies of authorities! 

 

No. It is not that the US dollar is "strong."  It is instead about how a scarce USD exposes the embedded imbalances through a "weak" peso. 

 

BSP’s First Maginot Line: USD-Php 59? 

 

Nonetheless, the 59-level might be the BSP's initial Maginot line. 

Figure 2 

Why so? 

 

The BSP has opted to use its "reserves" than aggressively raising domestic interest rates.  But alas, the BSP's vaunted reserves have been thinning fast because of this! 

 

Since cresting at USD 108.8 billion last December 2021, its Gross International Reserves (GIR) have diluted to USD 95 billion in September 2022.  To defend the peso, it used up about USD 13.78 billion of its GIR in 9-months, or it has exhausted about half of the amount it amassed to reach its milestone highs since 2018!   

 

As repeatedly stated, since 2018, Other Reserve Assets (ORA), which included financial derivatives, short-term currency loans, repo assets, and more, became part of the toolbox of the BSP in expanding its GIR.  (Source: IMF International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity, IRFCL) [figure 2, upper window] 

 

From about 2%, the share of ORA to GIR raced to a record 16% in December 2019.  

 

But perhaps rising rates and collateral issues have increased the cost of these instruments, which may have prompted the BSP to downscale its usage. The diminished use of the ORA has coincided with the spike of the USD peso. 

 

But ORA still accounted for 8.5% of the GIR as of August. 

 

Aside, the external debt has also bolstered the GIRs. 

 

That said, "borrowed reserves" or "USD shorts" paved the path to the record high in the BSP's GIR. 

 

Not anymore.   

 

With the recent ORA reduction, the composition of GIR has likely shifted to external debt.   

 

At any rate, FX reserves are limited. 

 

Blaming Speculators: Thinning FX Buffers May Prompt Authorities to Implement Various Controls 

 

But here is the thing.  

 

The draining of USD liquidity worldwide exposed the inflation of the peso relative to its USD holdings and the fragility of its "US short" positions. 

 

The growth of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) of the BSP and the banking/financial system have slowed significantly or even contracted in the last two months.  Other Deposits Corporation (ODC) represents the Financial Institutions. (Figure 2, lower pane) 


 

Figure 3 

Phiref rates have also risen with the USD-Php, exhibiting emerging strains in the interbank foreign exchange swap market. (Figure 3, upmost window) 

 

Recall that the BSP operates in a de facto US standard, where international reserves serve as an anchor to the growth of its domestic liabilities.  

 

In this case, the stagnation of the growth of the Net Foreign Asset (FX international reserve proxy of the BSP balance sheet) relative to the modest expansion in the domestic money supply indicates the inflationary bias of the BSP policies (zero bound rates and QE). (Figure 2, middle window) 

 

NFA contracted by .81% in August, while M3 expanded by 6.8% over the same period. 

 

The other interrelated or entwined manifestations of these developments are twin (fiscal and current account) deficits. 

 

So how is the above not a function of domestic economic and financial imbalances? 

 

The BSP has yet to publish an update on its balance sheet, where the last one was in March 2022. 

 

In any case, the dwindling FX buffers should translate to the push to seek access to more FX savings by authorities to narrow this gap. 

 

ChannelNewsAsia, October 6: The Philippine government has raised $2 billion from a three-tranche U.S. dollar bond deal, National Treasurer Rosalia de Leon said on Thursday, the first offshore debt issue by the Marcos administration. 

 

The initial influx may help strengthen the peso, but the increase in "USD shorts" eventually should lead to further attenuation.  

 

So aside from embellishing statistics and managing financial market prices, authorities are likely to widen the dragnet of various controls (currency, capital, trade, price and wage, and mobility) in a series of steps. 

 

Taken together, the plight of the peso should not be an isolated development.  The peso's fall represents the intertemporal ramifications of the BSP's monetary policies. 

 

And though oversold conditions may lead to a temporary rebound, the peso remains on a downward trajectory over the long term. (Figure 3, lowest window) 

 

As time goes by, the peso erodes the "decoupling" theme promoted by the establishment. 

 

Said differently, there will be no "decoupling" from global developments. 

 

Finally, though the BSP may blame speculators for political convenience and crucify everyone with controls, sadly, economic reality is not an option.