Showing posts with label kenneth rogoff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kenneth rogoff. Show all posts

Friday, May 30, 2014

Kenneth Rogoff’s War on Cash

Sovereign Man’s Simon Black warns of the suggestions for a cashless Society: (bold mine)
Rogoff begins asking the question: “Has the time come to consider phasing out anonymous paper currency, starting with large-denomination notes?”

He goes on to explain that getting rid of paper currency would provide two critical benefits:

1) It would reduce crime and tax evasion;

2) It would allow central banks to drop interest rates BELOW ZERO.

I was stunned. Though given the status quo thinking we have to put up with today, I really shouldn’t have been.

In fairness, Mr. Rogoff is an academic. It’s his job to dispassionately analyze data and render conclusions, whatever they may be. What’s scary is that some dim-witted politician will likely jump all over this.

People have been deluded into believing that only criminals and tax cheats hold cash in large denominations. And the conclusion is that if we ban cash, criminals will simply quit their craft because they’ll no longer have an officially-sanctioned medium of exchange.

This is total baloney, obviously. Banning cash doesn’t eliminate crime. It just creates a new cottage industry for cash alternatives.

Drug deals can just as easily go down swapping share certificate of Apple. Or title to a new car. Any number of things.

Perhaps the more important point, however, is the notion that eliminating cash frees up central bankers to force interest rates into negative territory.

The contention is that the official data tells us that inflation is tame. Consequently, central banks should be free to expand the money supply and ratchet down interest rates even more. 

There’s just one problem: interest rates are basically at zero already.

Technically a central banker could drop interest rates to below zero.

But if they did that, who in his/her right mind would hold their savings at a bank where they would have to PAY THE BANK to make wild bets with their money? 

People would just go to physical cash instead.

Solution? Eliminate cash! Then people would be forced to suffer NEGATIVE interest rates… and thus have a HUGE INCENTIVE to spend as much as they can as quickly as they can. Forget about putting something aside for a rainy day.

But hey, at least the stock market would probably rise.

Now, I highly doubt that physical cash is going to be sucked out of the system… tomorrow. But the War on Cash is very real indeed.

As I travel around the world, I’ve seen with my own eyes– CASH has become the #1 hot button item for customs agents everywhere. They even have highly trained cash sniffing dogs now.

It’s becoming more and more obvious that people should divorce themselves from this system and consider holding at least a portion of their savings in something other than fiat currency.

And of all the options out there, it’s hard to beat the convenience and tradition of precious metals.
Indeed governments have increasingly been waging war on cash. 

The latest: Israel’s government has recently declared limits on cash transactions.

From Reuters: Cash transactions between businesses will be limited to 5,000 shekels ($1,400) under an Israeli government plan to fight money laundering and tax evasion.

I have previously shown that various governments have waged war on cash like Mexico, Italy, Russia, Nigeria and Ghana or even in the US.

In the Philippines I had my share of nightmare with the domestic authorities at the domestic airport whom harassed me for bringing slightly excess cash (based on the mandated limits) for an outbound trip predicated on a regulation that I wasn’t even aware of then. As a side note, the slightly excess cash was meant as gift for my Mom who resides overseas!!

Money laundering or tax evasion has served as the stereotyped alibi or scapegoat for the war on cash. But such is a sign of desperation. Remember cash as currency or medium of exchange, are issued to the citizenry by the respective governments who wield the monopoly seignorage. So by waging war on cash, governments have not only assailed on their basic function, they reveal signs of dissatisfaction with current revenues from such seignorage privilege.

War on cash serves as an extension of financial repression policies. 

The fundamental reason is that governments intend to capture even more of the public’s resources (directly and indirectly) to fund the interest of political agents and their private sector allies. It's is a sign of unmitigated greed imposed on society by force.

The real targets are really not money laundering or tax evasion but the cash holding society, particularly the informal economy. Again this is a sign of desperation.

Statist always conjure up reasons for state control over everything.They always point to so-called benefits without looking at the costs. But costs are not benefits. 

For instance, the importance of cash came into the limelight when the western banking system nearly collapsed in 2008. In Europe, many took shelter by hoarding € 500 cash. So the assumption to migrate to a cashless society extrapolates that the banking sector and the governments are risk free.

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But this is something untrue. In fact both the government and banks are the major sources of risks. Just look at the massive build up of debt levels of major economies. What happens when all these unravels? 

Yet the war on cash is also based on the mirage that growth in debt and transfer of resources will have little or even NO limits or repercussions. This is utterly wrong. The war on cash only allows the establishment to buy time before their unsustainable system implodes.

Monday, May 20, 2013

The Flaws of BSP’s Real Estate Monitoring and Banking Stress Tests

Rushing in defence over growing concerns of the risks of asset bubbles, the Philippine central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas conducted a real estate exposure test monitoring which included a partial banking stress test[1].

In the report the BSP has not explicitly issued a confirmation or a denial of the risks of a domestic bubble. But they placed into the context the following

-The Philippines’s total banking exposure on real estate was at Php 821.7 billion as of December 2012.

-The BSP continues to monitor the 20 percent cap on RELs since 1997 where current report includes “loans by developers of socialized and low-cost housing, loans to individuals, loans supported by non-risk collaterals or Home Guarantee Corporation guarantee as well as exposures by bank trust departments and thrift banks.”

-The thrust to examine the banking sector’s exposure in real estate “is in line with the BSP’s pursuit of financial stability”

-The BSP hasn’t shown any signs of worries, due to stable non-performing RELs ratio which was “reported at 3.7 percent as of end-December 2012”

-And the BSP seems confident there is enough capital to withstand any potential shocks “with capital adequacy ratio of tested U/KBs and TBs will stand at 15.77 percent despite a 50 percent simulated default on residential real estate loans.”

First of all, the BSP does not mention that Real Estate Loans (REL) at 821.7 billion pesos and with a total loan portfolio TLP (net of interbank lending) of 3,938.9 billion pesos, real estate loans as a share of TLP would now account for 20.86%.

And so if my interpretation of their data is accurate then the banking sector has essentially hit its speed limits on issuing loans to the property sector. Will the BSP put on the brake and reverse the boom? How?

Next, it isn’t clear what the BSP means by “financial stability”? If they are referring to controlling price inflation my question is—are there no opportunity costs in in implementing “financial stability” measures? Or why should moderating price inflation come at the costs of blowing asset bubbles?

Let me cite the former chief of Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank of International Settlement’s William R. White in his 2006 paper who argued against price stability policies (bold mine)[2]
…price stability is indeed desirable for a whole host of reasons. At the same time, it will also be contended that achieving near-term price stability might sometimes not be sufficient to avoid serious macroeconomic downturns in the medium term. Moreover, recognising that all deflations are not alike, the active use of monetary policy to avoid the threat of deflation could even have longer term costs that might be higher than the presumed benefits. The core of the problem is that persistently easy monetary conditions can lead to the cumulative build-up over time of significant deviations from historical norms – whether in terms of debt levels, saving ratios, asset prices or other indicators of “imbalances”.
Also Non Performing Loans (NPLs) are coincident if not lagging indicators. NPLs are low because the current boom continues. NPLs become reliable indicators, when asset quality deteriorates or when the credit boom is in the process of reversing itself into a bust. Again they are coincident if not lagging indicators.

In addition, the BSP appears to have isolated its bank stress test by limiting “simulated default on residential real estate loans”. Why? Doesn’t the BSP know that economies are complex and vastly interdependent such that economies do not operate on isolation as the BSP model presumes?

A bursting bubble will ripple through not only through the residential real estate segment but would also impact commercial property sectors (office, shopping malls, casinos etc...) or firms that are highly leveraged.

More importantly, once the real estate sector gets slammed by the entwined factors of financial losses and deleveraging, such will likewise impact all sectors that have exposure on them, and so with the banks.

And affected secondary sectors will also hit firms from different industries connected to them, and so forth.

Thus the complex latticework of commercial networks means that the feedback mechanisms from the bubble busts will have a domino effect and thus spawn a crisis.

So models will not be able to capture the contagion effects from a real-estate-stock market bust for the simple reason that models tend to mathematically oversimplify what truly is a complex reality.

The fundamental flaw with BSP’s implied defence of the risks of asset bubbles has been to interpret statistics as economics.
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The above diagram represents the compounded average of 15%. A compounded average of 15% means a doubling of anything in 5 years. This applies to leveraging or economic imbalances.

Let us assume that a doubling of leveraging or imbalances will put an economy to a state of vulnerability to financial risks. It would not be helpful to say that, if we are at the T-3 stage, where statistics show only 152.09, to claim that there is no risk because of the current state. While such statement may be true, it essentially denies the imminence based on the trajectory.

In other words, the shifting of the burden of risk analysis from the rate of growth to reading today’s numbers would represent as misleading analysis and a denial.

The same logic applies to a pre-debt crisis build up as shown by history.
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In the chronicle of about 250 crisis in 8 centuries, Harvard’s Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff notes of the same pattern[3] (bold mine)
domestic debt is not static around default episodes. In fact, domestic debt often shows the same frenzied increases in the run-up to external default as foreign borrowing does. The pattern is illustrated in Figure 5, which depicts debt accumulation during the five years up to and including external default across all the episodes in our sample. Presumably, the comovement of domestic and foreign debt is produced by the same procyclical behavior of fiscal policy documented by previous researchers. As shown repeatedly over time, emerging market governments are prone to treating favorable shocks as permanent, fueling a spree in government spending and borrowing that ends in tears.
Again it is the trajectory that matters.

In short, it is the presence or absence of the factors that drives the incentives for these frenzied desire to accumulate debt that needs to be identified and curtailed.

Unfortunately since the genesis of such incentives have been political which have been effected through social policies, and from which the untoward impact from such polices are invisible and incomprehensible to the public, such policies will hardly be stopped until a blowback from the marketplace occurs.

And as for the state of euphoria, where governments think that they have reached a state of presumed perfection, the passing of the bank stress test in Cyprus in 2011 should serve as a fantastic example:

From the Cyprus Mail[4],
In Nicosia the Finance Ministry issued a statement saying: “The measures which the banks are taking or planning to take will further increase solvency.”

The statement also referred to a “removed possibility” of having to support the banks, stating the government was ready to “immediately take any necessary measures to maintain financial stability.”

BoC “successfully passed the test” because of its strong capital base, fluidity and satisfactory profitability, Bank of Cyprus’ Chief Executive Officer, Andreas Eliades.
Strong capital base, fluidity, increase solvency and satisfactory profitability, all turned on its head, March this year. The rest is history.

I know, the Philippines is not Cyprus. But the important lesson from the Cyprus episode is one of overconfidence that leads to complacency that further enhances systemic buildup of risks.

Remember bubbles are manifestations of the reflexive feedback loop between expectations as influenced by prices, and actions as influenced by expectations, which are enabled and facilitated by debt and incentivized by policies.

Overconfidence and complacency fosters systemic instability which is hardly “the pursuit of financial stability”

The BSP’s Wealth Transfer

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These two charts embody the structural deficiencies of the Philippine political economy.

The BSP estimates that only 21.5% of households have access to the formal banking sector[5].

Yet domestic credit provided by the banking sector accounts for 51.54% of the GDP in 2011[6]. I would guess that the latter figure would be substantially higher today, given the credit boom mostly channelled through the banking sector.

Yet what these two diagrams say is that statistical economic growth has been immensely tilted towards those less than 21.5 households who have access and or have used credit from the banking system.

Not all depositors like me have used credit from the banking sector for whatever purpose. Yes I have credit cards but I which I use infrequently.

The BSP confirms this; they estimate that only 4% households have credit cards.

The lopsided exposure to the banking industry has been likewise reflected on the stock market.

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As of 2011, according to Bloomberg/Matthews Asia[7] the wealthy elites control 83% of the market capitalization of the Philippine Stock Exchange

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And considering the low penetration levels to the banking system and to the stock market, it would be even more conceivable that the general public hardly has any access to the more complex bond markets.

Again capital markets and the banking system have been greatly biased to the formal economy and to the oligarchs and plutocrats who control them.

Though we know that this has been an inherited problem, there has been little attempt by the powers-that-be to distribute them through liberalization ever since.

The procrastination by the PSE to hook up with the ASEAN trading link or the integration of ASEAN bourses[8] is an example. Philippine political and economic elites seem apprehensive over the prospects of losing their privileges with an ASEAN interconnection. The same applies with the lack of commodity markets where such markets would undermine the privileges of these plutocrats.

The much ballyhooed policy reforms has been more of the same. For example, government spending based on public-private partnerships, would only mean that the politically connected will be rewarded with such economic opportunities or concessions.

Yet foisting a zero bound rates in order to supposedly boost domestic demand doesn’t really help the real economy, for the simple reason that the informal economy has little direct access to the formal sector. And this will not change unless the government deregulates or liberalizes.

On the contrary credit easing policies has only boosted the wealth of the politically privileged elite.

As to quote anew the Atlantic[9]:
In 2012, Forbes Asia announced that the collective wealth of the 40 richest Filipino families grew $13 billion during the 2010-2011 year, to $47.4 billion--an increase of 37.9 percent. Filipino economist Cielito Habito calculated that the increased wealth of those families was equivalent in value to a staggering 76.5 percent of the country's overall increase in GDP at the time.
In short, BSP policies represent transfers of resources from the real economy to the political class (via bigger government spending and bigger bureaucracy) and politically connected economic elites.

Thus the manipulated boom, which has been peddled by media and bought for by the gullible public, has been used as license via populist mandate to extend on such privileges.

BSP’s Underbelly: The Philippines’ Shadow Banks

Now going back to the direction of BSP policies.

Promoting “domestic demand” through expanded access of credit has been the purported reason for zero bound rates and the lowering of interest rates of the SDAs[10].

Combine these with the recent credit rating upgrades from major international credit agencies, all these means subsidizing or rewarding debt. Thus the natural outgrowth of accelerating debt.

So the BSP’s direction has been to promote debt. But on the other hand they claim that they would regulate or control it. So the BSP essentially operates in a cognitive dissonance, holding two conflicting ideas as policies. This is a wonderful example of the idiom “the left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is doing”: a self-contradiction

Now that the real estate sector has reached its limits as noted above, the question is will the BSP act?

Even if the BSP does, I am quite sure that many market participants would resort to regulatory arbitrage to circumvent them.

They may shift the use of loans even if they are classified as non-real estate into real estate or into the stock market, such as the fateful Bangladesh stock market crash in 2011[11]. Banks may use off balance sheets. Others may resort to bribery.

Of course, given the huge domestic informal economy, the most likely avenue for regulatory arbitrage is to use the nexus between the formal and the informal economy: the shadow banking system.

The BSP believes that they have the banking sector within their palms, but the World Bank says otherwise 

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Shadow banking system in Philippines and Thailand accounts for more than one-third of total financial system assets[12]. One would note in the right chart that the Philippine shadow banking system has seen an intensifying rate of growth which has polevaulted since 2009 and has nearly surpassed Thailand’s level.

Aside from common informal microfinancing[13] as 5-6 lending, “paluwagan” or pooled money, “hulugan” instalment credit, much of the growth in the shadow banking system has reportedly been in the real estate sector, particularly the in-house financing from developers[14].

The BSP claims that it would investigate[15] these even if they hardly control the formal system.

The shadow banking system has become a worldwide phenomenon and has grown to as high as $67 trillion in 2011 according to the CNBC[16] or nearly 83% of the $80 trillion world economy. The risks of the shadow banking sector doesn’t intuitively or automatically emerge out of “lack of regulation”, rather, the shadow banking industry has been largely a product of overregulation via regulatory arbitrage. Where an economic or financial system has been hobbled by politics, risks becomes centralized and thus systemic.

Bottom line: Loans to the real estate sector have significantly been more than the caps set by the BSP. Easy money policies have apparently filtered into the informal sector. This means systemic leverage has been far more than what the BSP oversees and supervises. Lastly the BSP hardly has solid control over the formal sector. The same is amplified with the informal or shadow banking system.

Like almost every central bankers today, BSP policies supposedly meant to promote “domestic demand” will be pushed to the limits, despite the rhetoric. And this will further fuel the mania phase in both the stock market and the property sector.




[2] William R. White Is price stability enough? Bank of International Settlement April 2006

[3] Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt September 21, 2010 Harvard University

[4] Cyprus Mail Cyprus banks pass EU stress test, July 16, 2011

[5] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 2012 Annual Report Volume 1


[7] Kenneth Lowe Kicking the Tires Asian Insight Matthews Asia 2013





[12] Swati Ghosh, Ines Gonzalez del Mazo, and İnci Ötker-Robe Chasing the Shadows: How Significant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets? World Bank September 2012


[14] Businessworld Research The pros and cons of shadow banking February 8, 2013


Sunday, March 17, 2013

Phisix and the BSP: This Time is Different?

All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.- Arthur Schopenhauer, German philosopher

So the much needed breather has finally arrived.

The Phisix fell by a hefty 2.62% this week accounting for the second weekly loss for the year and a year to date return of 14.48%.

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This week’s pause means Phisix 10,000 on August 2013 will be postponed but nevertheless remains a target for this year or 2014.

Again Phisix 10,000 will depend on the rate of progress of the manic phase, which I earlier described as
characterized by the acceleration of the yield chasing phenomenon, which have been rationalized by vogue themes or by popular but flawed perception of reality, enabled and facilitated by credit expansion.
Also the weekly loss has allowed Thailand’s SET (14.81% y-t-d, nominal currency returns) to overtake on the Phisix.

Nonetheless, equities of developed economies continue to sizzle. The Dow Jones Industrials are at fresh record highs (12.18% y-t-d), the US S&P 500 (11.29% y-t-d) also at the level of the previously established record highs in 2007 with the imminence of a breakout, while the Japan’s Nikkei continues to skyrocket from promises of more “liquor” from the Bank of Japan. Major European bellwethers have also been marginally up this week, UK’s FTSE 100 (9.52%), the German DAX (5.65%) and the French CAC (5.57%).

Yet signs are that the Phisix correction will likely be short-lived.

The media narrative of this week’s correction has been one of “valuations”.

A foreign analyst rationalizes this by saying[1] “While the story is a good one, there’s a limit to how much you can pay. It’s about the most expensive in the world.”

Mainstream media and the experts they cite, hardly reckon or explain on how and why valuations became the “most expensive in the world”. Most just seems satisfied with oversimplified interpretation that links “effects” as “causes”.

Philippine equities have reportedly been valued at 19.7 times projected 12 month earnings compared to her emerging market peers, where the MSCI Emerging market index supposedly trades at 10.9 times.

Yet a local buy side analyst from the same article claims that such profit taking phase represents an opportunity “to re-enter the market” supposedly because of “bullish” outlook of fundamentals.

So if 18-19 times earnings have been considered as a “buy”, then what indeed is “the limit to how much one can pay” for local stocks?

Bubble Mentality: This Time is Different

Such mentality reflects on the refusal for the market to retrench, a conviction that we have attained a “brave new world” or of the “denigration of history”—where people have come to believe that bad things will never happen to them

As I wrote last week[2],
And as perilous as it is, as the mania develops, the sweeping rationalizations and justifications from mainstream experts, such as “the Philippines is resilient to external forces”, “is not crisis prone”, “has low debt levels”, among the many others, has reinforced the view that the boom is a one way street.
Such an outlook is shared not by mainstream “experts” but has been the evangelistic message preached by political authorities.

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In a March 12th speech at the Euromoney Philippine Investment Forum, Philippine central bank Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) governor Amando M Tetangco, Jr admits that[3] “Domestic credit to-GDP ratio at 50.4 percent (Q4 2012) still ranks one of the lowest in the region”.

The red line from the chart above indicates of this adjusted official position[4].

Mr. Tetangco downplays the growing credit menace by using logical substitution, particularly comparing apples-to-oranges or by referencing credit conditions of other nations with that of the country.

I have previously pointed out of the irrelevance of such premise stating that “each nation have their own unique characteristics or idiosyncrasies”, such that “it is not helpful to make comparisons with other nations or region. Moreover, while many crises may seem similar, each has their individual distinctions” Importantly, “there has been no definitive line in the sand for credit events”[5]

Current domestic credit to-GDP conditions (50.4%) have almost reached the 1982 peak levels of 51.59%, when the Philippine economy then succumbed to a recession.

Since 2011, the ratio has grown at an average of 9.31% a year. At this rate, we will surpass the 1995 levels of 54.85% in 2013, and will almost reach the 1997 high of 62.2% in 2014 and far exceed the 1997 levels thereafter.

Yet there is nothing constant in social events for us to rely on numerical averages.

There are two ways were the ratio could explode higher that risks amplifying systemic fragility:

One, even if domestic credit growth remains static, the denominator [GDP] slows meaningfully, and

Second, domestic credit growth accelerates far more rapidly than the rate of GDP growth. The latter is the more likely the scenario, given today’s progressing manic phase.

In other words, given the current rate of debt buildup, we will reach or even surpass the pre-Asian Crisis high anytime soon, regardless of the assurances of the BSP.

Harvard’s professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, whose book “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly” covers the historical account of various financial crisis over eight centuries throughout the world, aptly notes of people’s tendency to ignore the lessons of history.

In their preface they write[6], (bold mine)
If there is one common theme to the vast range of crises…it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether it be by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of cash can make a government look like it is providing greater growth to its economy than it really is. Private sector borrowing binges can inflate housing and stock prices far beyond their long-run sustainable levels, and make banks seem more stable and profitable than they really are. Such large scale debt buildups pose risks because they make an economy vulnerable to crises of confidence, particularly when debt is short term and needs to be constantly refinanced. Debt fuelled booms all too often provide false affirmation of a government’s policies, a financial institution’s ability to make outsized profits, or a country’s standard of living. Most of these booms end badly.
I would say that all credit bubbles end badly.

In short, debt fuelled booms camouflages on the financial and economic imbalances that progresses unnoticed by the public. This eventually leads to a bust.

And “false affirmation” of current events reveals of how the public have been deluded or misled by false perceptions of reality only to be exposed as being left holding the proverbial empty bag.

“This Time is Different” as admonished[7] by Professor’s Reinhart and Rogoff
Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing -- and recovering -- their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, 'this time is different', claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters."
Well “this time is different” or “old rules no longer apply” can be seen even in policymaking.

In recognition of the risks of “bubbly behavior” of “interest-rate sensitive” equity and property markets, the good governor Tetangco in the same speech remarked, (bold emphasis mine)
The recent global financial crisis showed that sole focus on price stability is not sufficient to attain macroeconomic stability. Policymakers need to deliver more than stable prices if they are to achieve sustained and stable growth. Price stability does not guarantee financial stability. The BSP, therefore, is attentive to pressure points that could impact on both price stability and financial stability.

To ensure financial stability we have utilized prudential measures to manage capital inflows and moderate, if not prevent, the build-up of excesses in specific sectors and in the banking system. Prudential policies are the instrument of choice and employed as the first line of defense against financial stability risks.

Wow. Not content with targeting “price stability”, the BSP governor deems that expansionary powers is necessary to deal with “surges” in foreign capital whom they associate as the primary cause of imbalances.

Every problem appears as a problem of exogenous origin with hardly any of their policies having to contribute to them.

The BSP also believes that they have the right mix of policy tools to attain their vision of “financial stability” utopia.

SDA Rate Cuts will Fuel Asset Bubbles and Price Inflation

However, in disparity with the confidence exuded by the BSP governor, the BSP seems to be in a big quandary.

Last week, they lowered interest on Special Deposit Accounts (SDA)[8]. SDAs are fixed-term deposits by banks and trust entities of BSP-supervised financial institutions with the BSP[9]. The BSP have used SDAs as a policy tool to “mop up” or sterilize liquidity in the system.

The lowering of SDA rates has been implemented allegedly to discourage the inflow of foreign portfolio investments that will likewise “temper” the appreciation of the local currency the peso. Moreover, lowering SDA rates has been supposedly meant to encourage “banks to withdraw some of their funds parked in the BSP, thereby increasing money circulating in the economy”. BSP’s Tetangco further dismissed the threat of inflation risks from such actions[10].

So by redefining inflation as hardly a consequence from additional supply of money, the BSP thinks that they can wish away inflation through mere edict. 

Yet if “inflation is always and everywhere”, according to the illustrious Nobel laureate Milton Friedman[11], “a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output”, then the BSP’s policies will backfire pretty much soon.

Unleashing or emancipating part of the record holdings of 1.86 trillion pesos (as of mid February) of SDAs will intensify the inflation of the domestic credit bubble, fuel and exacerbate the manic phase of “bubbly behavior” of property and equity markets and subsequently prompt for a possible spillover to price inflation.

Thus political efforts to attain “financial stability” will lead to the opposite outcome: price instability and the risks of greater financial volatility. Such policies, in essence, underwrite bubble cycles and stagflation.

And because inflation has relative effects on society the likely ramification is that of social upheaval.

As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises wrote[12] (bold mine)
Inflation does not affect the prices of the various commodities and services at the same time and to the same extent. Some prices rise sooner, some lag behind. While inflation takes its course and has not yet exhausted all its price-affecting potentialities, there are in the nation winners and losers. Winners—popularly called profiteers if they are entrepreneurs—are people who are in the fortunate position of selling commodities and services the prices of which are already adjusted to the changed relation of the supply of and the demand for money while the prices of commodities and services they are buying still correspond to a previous state of this relation. Losers are those who are forced to pay the new higher prices for the things they buy while the things they are selling have not yet risen at all or not sufficiently. The serious social conflicts which inflation kindles, all the grievances of consumers, wage earners, and salaried people it originates, are caused by the fact that its effects appear neither synchronously nor to the same extent. If an increase in the quantity of money in circulation were to produce at one blow proportionally the same rise in the prices of every kind of commodities and services, changes in the monetary unit's purchasing power would, apart from affecting deferred payments, be of no social consequence; they would neither benefit nor hurt anybody and would not arouse political unrest. But such an evenness in the effects of inflation—or, for that matter, of deflation—can never happen.
In short, BSP actions on SDAs can be analogized as playing with fire, and those who get burned will be the public.

And today’s correction phase in the PSE will likely be ephemeral.

And the potential shift from SDAs to the market will serve as another enormous force that will underpin the coming rally in the Phisix that would lead to the 10,000 levels.

But there seems to be another story behind the lowering of SDA rates.

Reports say that the BSP has nearly exhausted on the available stock of government bonds on their balance sheet to sell to the public[13]. Domestic sovereign bonds have been used as instrument to intervene in the currency markets by the BSP.

Unlike central bank of other countries as South Korea and India, the BSP is said to be legally constrained to issue their own bonds. The BSP is only allowed to issue “certificates of indebtedness” only “in cases of extraordinary movement in price levels” according to Section 92 Article 5 of the New Central Bank Act (Republic Act 7653).[14] So the BSP has been negotiating with the national government to authorise issuance of BSP bonds.

SDAs have been reported to be the “biggest drain on the BSP finances” resulting to the reduction of the BSP’s “net worth” from a surplus of 115 billion pesos in January 2012 to only 37.9 billion pesos in November of the same year. Earnings from US dollar and euro assets have failed to compensate for SDA operations.

In short, sterilization via the SDAs may have been an obstacle to the BSP’s operations and financial conditions. And this has prompted the BSP to relax on SDAs from where all sorts of rationalizations have been used to justify on such actions. Such may also represent politicking between political agencies.

Yet the financial world speculates that the prospects of reduced interventions from the BSP via limited access to national sovereign bonds may lead to a stronger peso. This could be a possibility, but I doubt that this would be the dominant factor.

Instead I am inclined to think that given the politics of the peso (appeal to the voters of OFW families and exporters) and of the dominant politics of social democracy, this provides the opportunity and justification for the national government to go on a spending splurge, through the issuance of more debt instruments that will be intermediated through the domestic banking system with the BSP. They will be labeled as spending meant for infrastructure and other social services, when such will be used mainly to “manage the peso”. 

Yet increases in government debt will compound on the accelerating systemic debt levels.

The other option is for the national government, via the congress, is to allow the BSP to issue their own bonds which empowers the BSP to parlay on the politics of the peso.

Having both options may not be far-fetched scenario.

Capital Flows: Myth and Reality

I would further add that international capital flows, the du jour bogeyman of central banks, are really not the culprit of financial instability or price inflation as these latter two variables belongs to the realm of domestic monetary policies. 

As Wall Street financial analyst Kel Kelly explains[15], (bold mine)
The notion of capital flows and money crossing borders is misunderstood by most people. Except for physical paper bills belonging to tourists, to drug dealers, or to foreign workers sending cash earnings home to relatives, money does not cross borders. Money generally remains in the country to which it belongs — and merely changes ownership. As this section will show, "speculative" money "flowing across borders" really consists only of the domestic central bank trying to keep its currency artificially priced.

So called "capital" or "hot money" does not "flow" from one country of origin into another country. However, money created in one country can be — and is, to a limited degree — used to buy the currency of another country and direct it into the purchase of asset prices in that country (bidding asset prices higher in the process). If a disproportionate amount of local currency is channeled into asset prices in a country, less currency is being spent on goods and services in the economy, causing consumer prices to fall.

But in reality, consumer prices in countries with booming asset markets do not usually fall while asset prices rise; both usually rise in tandem. This is because the local money supply is increasing, and pushing up both classes of prices (i.e., financial assets and consumer prices), even though one is rising faster than the other. It is therefore local money, not foreign money, inflating assets.
In short, spiralling prices is a function of yield chasing mentality powered by domestic credit and money expansion. Entry of foreign funds only changes the composition of the ownership of asset prices and does not necessarily constitute or equate to rising of asset prices. 

And there is no money flows in the asset markets.

As I previously wrote[16],
Simply said, the presence foreign buyers don’t necessarily extrapolate to higher prices. This would depend on the valuation of every participant, whether the foreigner acts for himself or in behalf of a fiduciary fund from which his/her valuations and preferences would translate into action.

If the foreigner is aggressive then he/she may bid up prices. But again since people’s valuations differ, the scale of establishing parameters for each action varies individually.

A foreign participant can also be conservative, who may rather patiently accumulate, than bid up prices.
And speaking of foreign portfolio investments, the BSP reported that for February, registered foreign investments totalled $2.1 billion[17]. This has been 24.6% lower than from $2.8 billion last January. Most of these or 76.4% were directed at the PSE listed companies, particularly holding firms (US$474 million), banks (US$332 million), property companies (US$211 million), telecommunication firms (US$151 million), and utility companies (US$123 million).
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One would note that the ranking of foreign buying essentially reflects on the returns of the PSE sectors which has been led by Property-holding-financial industries of which have been the primary objects of today’s credit bubble

Paul Volcker: Central banking “Hubris”

And going back to central bank policies, like Bank of Thailand’s deputy governor Mr Pongpen Ruengvirayudh, the BSP honcho Mr. Tetangco acknowledges of the dynamics of a bubble, and of the growing rate of domestic credit. But both categorically denies of the risks of respective domestic bubbles. That’s because they believe that “old rules of valuation no longer apply” and that they think that they possess divine omniscience or a magic wand that will successfully control or manage markets and the laws of economics in line with their visions.

In stark contrast to such chimerical outlook, in a March 13 2013 speech, former US Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, a retired colleague of theirs, takes to task conventional central bankers at an economic conference sponsored by the Atlantic magazine.

Mr. Volcker holds them as unaccountable and as inept for the heavy cost paid from the “failure to recognize the implications of behavior patterns and speculative excesses in the financial markets that culminated in the crisis”[18]

Mr. Volcker has even more strident words on what he sees as “hubris” from contemporary central banking peers: (bold mine)
I do see a risk of what I consider a strange theory that these all-powerful central banks can play a little game.  And when you want to expand – let’s have a little inflation that peps it up.  But, of course, as soon as it gets a little big we’ll shut it off and then we’ll bring it down again.  There is no central bank that I know of that has ever exhibited the capacity for that kind of fine-tuning.  And if they lose sight of the basic role of a central bank is to maintain price stability, stability generally – the game will sooner or later be lost.  That doesn’t mean you’re going to off in the next few years on some great inflationary boom – an inflationary process.  But this hubris that somehow we have the tools that can manage in a very defined way little increases or decreases in the inflation rate to manage the real economy is nonsense.  Did I say that strongly enough?
Add to this, even more bizarre has been the concept where increases in asset prices have been seen or read by policymakers as signs of ‘stability’, whereas, decreasing asset prices have been viewed or interpreted as ‘instability’ which for them requires interventionist actions.

The fact of the matter is that these are symptoms of artificially inflated unsustainable booms that results to its natural corollary—asset deflation.

So when authorities talk about focusing on ‘financial stability’, this should serve as warning signals over the risks of a blossoming manic phase of a maturing bubble process in motion.

Bottom line: This week’s correction mode in the Phisix may possibly continue, perhaps headed towards a 5-10% level from the recent peak. However, such retrenchment phase is likely to be one of a short duration.

The sustained manic “This time is different” mentality both reflected on market participants as well as in political authorities expressed through policymaking as signified by this week’s cut in SDA rates by the BSP, will likely rekindle another bout of buying binge soon, unless external events may cause some disruption. The effects of taxing depositors to bailout Cyprus could signify as “one thing leads to another” via the growing risks of bank runs in the Eurozone[19].

And given the intense politicization of the marketplace, expect financial markets to remain highly volatile, as this will be marked by sharp advances and declines. 








[6] Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly Princeton University 2009

[7] Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly ReinhartandRogoff.com


[9] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: Monetary Policy - Glossary and Abbreviations Special Deposit Accounts – Fixed-term deposits by banks and trust entities of BSP-supervised financial institutions with the BSP. These deposits were introduced in November 1998 to expand the BSP's toolkit for liquidity management. In April 2007, the BSP expanded the access to the SDA facility to allow trust entities of financial institutions under BSP supervision to deposit in the facility.


[11] Milton Friedman The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory (1970) Wikiquote

[12] Ludwig von Mises, Section 5 The Controversy Concerning the Choice of the New Gold Parity CHAPTER III THE RETURN TO SOUND MONEY Theory of Money and Credit p 454 Mises.org


[14] REPUBLIC ACT No. 7653 THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT lawphil.net

[15] Kel Kelly The China Bust: Tic Toc October 10, 2011 Mises.org


[17] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Foreign Portfolio Investments Yield Net Inflows in February March 15, 2013

[18] Paul Volker Quoted by Doug Noland, Insights From Former Fed Chairmen, March 15, 2013 Credit Bubble Bulletin Prudentbear.com