Marcos-nomics stimulus: Yields of the Philippine Treasury Curve Plunged, The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth

 

The budget should be balanced, the Treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, and the assistance to foreign lands should be curtailed lest Rome become bankrupt. People must again learn to work, instead of living on public assistance— Taylor Caldwell, (often misattributed to Marcus Tullius Cicero) 

In this issue

Marcos-nomics stimulus: Yields of the Philippine Treasury Curve Plunged, The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth  

I. The Radio Silence on Last Week’s Collapse of the Philippine Treasury Yield Curve

II. What a Bullish Flattener Implies

III. How Rate Cuts Could Affect the Health of the Philippine Banking System

IV. Mounting Economic Fragility: Higher May Unemployment Rate and the Rising Dependence on Government Jobs

V. Mounting Economic Fragility: Elevated Trade Deficit, Softened FDI Flows in April, and Stagnant Manufacturing Sales

VI. "Marcos-nomics stimulus:" The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth  

Marcos-nomics stimulus: Yields of the Philippine Treasury Curve Plunged, The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth

The collapse in the yields of the Philippine Treasury Markets highlights the BSP's upcoming rate cuts, which, along with May's spending and liquidity growth spike, represents the "Marcos-nomics stimulus."

I. The Radio Silence on Last Week’s Collapse of the Philippine Treasury Yield Curve

Last week, significant developments in the Philippine treasury markets went largely unreported by the media and the echo chamber. Despite this, the implications of these changes are significant for the country's economy.

Figure 1

One. T-bill rates remained steady, while yields on Philippine notes and bonds plunged, deepening the "bullish flattening" process that we have been pointing out. (Figure 1, topmost window)

Two.  The entire Philippine treasury curve has traded below the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' (BSP) overnight reverse repurchase rate (ON-RRP). (Figure 1, middle image) 

Figure 2

Three.  The steep drop in 10-year Philippine treasury notes last week was the most pronounced in the (ASEAN) region, even surpassing the recent declines seen in US Treasury counterparts. (Figure 1, lowest diagram, Figure 2, upper graph)

In essence, treasury traders have reinforced indications that the BSP is preparing to lower rates.

You heard this first here.

II. What a Bullish Flattener Implies

Yet, a bullish flattener can be seen as a sign of different things depending on the context.

In the BSP’s latest Financial Stability Report (FSR), a bullish flattening curve represents "Longer-term outlook is improving and investors price-in lower rates. This gives the central bank room to lower the policy rate" (BSP, 2023)

For Wellspring Financial Advisors, "We have historically seen bull flattening leading into a recession. This can often happen because of a flight to safety trade and/or a lowering of inflation expectations " (Bruss, 2023)

Last we noted that "T-bill rates have been coming off their recent highs, and the narrowing of the treasury curve or a "bullish flattening" has highlighted weaker inflation and slower GDP growth, supporting the BSP's desired rate cuts" (Prudent Investor, 2024)

The point is, while not a direct indicator of economic conditions or inflation, the treasury yield curve provides a crucial insight depending on prevailing economic and financial circumstances.

Nonetheless, the following factors may be relevant to the present conditions:

First, the fact that rates have been tumbling translates to the treasury markets expecting an easing of monetary policy. Rate cuts can only be justified by diminishing inflation rates.

Second, lower inflation expectations increase the demand for longer-term securities. (ceteris paribus)

Third, it could also signify slowing economic growth or increasing risk aversion (even flight to safety).

Fourth, it may imply accruing imbalances in the supply and demand for Philippine treasuries.

III. How Rate Cuts Could Affect the Health of the Philippine Banking System

How will this affect the banking system?

One. The illusion of debt-financed spending utopia.

While lower rates could boost the GDP in the immediate term through increased credit expansion, allowing for expanded financing of Keynesian desired spending, this is contingent upon the capacity of balance sheets to absorb higher leverage.

For instance, unlike in 2008-2017, the serial BSP rate cuts in pre-pandemic 2019 haven’t exactly bolstered bank lending, which in contrast, declined due to the scourge of hidden NPLs. (Figure 2, lower pane)

Only the BSP’s historic Php 2.3 trillion liquidity injections backed by the unprecedented relief measures reversed it in 2021.  

Powered mostly by consumer loans, universal commercial bank lending soared by 10.2% in May 2024—the strongest growth since March 2023.

Much of the current strength in bank lending is due to 'refinancing' or debt 'rollovers,' which is why the Consumer Price Index (CPI) remains subdued.

Ironically, the establishment brands this debt expansion as 'restrictive.' Incredible.

In the absence of this vigorous credit expansion, think of what would happen to inflation and GDP.

The thing is, spending will be determined by balance sheet conditions over time, rather than just rates alone.

Two. A temporary boost on investments.

With surging fixed-income prices, it may also boost the banking industry’s investment side of the balance sheets.

Figure 3

It may also temporarily lower the industry’s camouflaged mark-to-market losses in the context of held-to-maturity (HTM) assets. (Figure 3, topmost chart)

However, HTMs showed minimal improvement when 10-year yields plummeted in 2022-2023, confirming the trend observed from 2019 to 2022, where a crash in rates resulted in negligible progress for the bank’s HTM assets.

Three. An adverse impact on the bank’s interest margins.

Furthermore, the narrowing bond spreads should also lead to tighter interest margins for banks as the 2019-2020 experience showed, which means lesser incentive to lend. (Figure 3, middle graph)

Lastly, falling rates expose disguised credit risks.

During 2019-2020, the BSP rate cuts were in response to mounting pressures from credit delinquencies in the banking system. While the pandemic recession exacerbated the situation, BSP's comprehensive measures—combining rate cuts, liquidity injections, and various relief efforts—masked the true extent of NPLs. (Figure 3, lowest pane)

Despite some of these relief measures and subsidies in place, the recent resurgence of NPLs have been pressuring the BSP to consider such rate cuts.

Figure 4

In short, the BSP rate cuts would whet the speculative appetite of banks and financial institutions for "investments," while reducing their core "lending" operations (similar to the rate cuts of 2019-2020) (Figure 4, topmost image)

Most importantly, higher interest rates have exacerbated the servicing costs associated with record-high levels of public debt, indicating a potential reduction in GDP growth driven by lower public spending over time.

IV. Mounting Economic Fragility: Higher May Unemployment Rate and the Rising Dependence on Government Jobs

Despite its ever-shifting or ambivalent stance, the BSP has been advocating for lower rates. Several economic data released last week help explain this push.

Firstly, despite the recent record-high employment rates, labor markets continue to face challenges.

While the unemployment rate rose from 4% in April to 4.1% in May, this increase was primarily due to a rise in the labor force participation rate. The employed population actually increased by 510,000 month-over-month (MoM), but a larger increase in the labor force by 576,000 led to an uptick in the unemployment rate. (Figure 4, middle visual)

However, a broader analysis reveals emerging tensions in labor participation rates. 

It seems odd to see a job boost in the investment-starved agricultural sector reportedly suffering substantial losses from El Nino. Yet, the government bannered Php 9.6 billion in investment gains this month (mostly from the elites). 

Furthermore, the government was the largest contributor to job gains. Aside from construction jobs stemming partly from government infrastructure projects (including PPPs), the government and defense sectors saw significant gains in both May and March. (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

Even assuming its accuracy, this data provides clues as to why consumers have been struggling, contradicting the headline trend of "full employment." 

V. Mounting Economic Fragility: Elevated Trade Deficit, Softened FDI Flows in April, and Stagnant Manufacturing Sales 

Next, external trade retraced much of its April advances in May.

Figure 5

Import growth fell from a 13.01% increase in April to a negative 0.03% in May, primarily due to an 11.5% plunge in capital goods imports, while consumer goods imports only rose by a meager 0.42%. Capital and consumer goods accounted for 25.6% and 19.6% of the total share, respectively. (Figure 5, topmost pane)

Export growth also dived from a 27.9% growth spike in April to a 3.08% contraction in May. 

While Artificial Intelligence (AI) has boosted global semiconductor trade, with exports increasing by 19.3% year-over-year (YoY) and 4.1% month-over-month (MoM) in May, Philippine semiconductor exports saw an incredible collapse from a 30.7% YoY growth spike in April to a 13.3% contraction in the same month! Microchip exports accounted for 43.4% of the total share. (Figure 5, middle graph) 

Thirdly, despite periodic junkets by the leadership, which reportedly led to significant investment pledges from key geopolitical partners like the US and NATO, April's Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) fell by 36.9%, but overall YTD growth was up still 18.7%. Debt made up significant proportions of both April's and YTD FDIs: 73.2% and 63.5%, respectively. What happened to these investment promises? (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

Also, debt-driven FDI flows do not automatically translate into 'investments' and could serve other purposes. Some might declare it as such to the government to avail of incentives. 

Lastly, FDI flows exhibit a downtrend.

Figure 6

Finally, domestic manufacturing remains stagnant, with production values and volumes increasing by 2.2% and 3.2% respectively in May (YTD: -0.1% and +0.9%). However, these gains may be offset by declining sales values and volumes, which saw decreases of -1.5% and -0.3% in May (YTD: -1.4% and -0.3%). (Figure 6, topmost graph) 

Imports have partially filled the slack in domestic production, which is the essence of the trade deficit. 

Overall, weak imports and a manufacturing stupor manifest a fragile domestic demand. 

In a nutshell, despite optimistic projections by the echo chamber, even government data suggests a critical shortage of investments and an increasing dependence on debt supporting the real (not statistical) economy.  

Moreover, deepening dependence on the government to stimulate GDP growth, evidenced by near-record "twin deficits," could lead to heightened inflation, higher future taxes, and magnified reliance on external debt. (Figure 6, middle chart)

It is not helpful when the establishment confuses the GDP with the overall economy, for the simple reason that the GDP has been skewed to reflect the growth of the government and the elites—the "trickle-down syndrome." 

VI. "Marcos-nomics stimulus:" The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth

Could the public spending spike observed in May 2024 signify a potential precursor to a "Marcos-nomics stimulus" program? 

Meanwhile, infrastructure, public defense-related projects, pre-election expenditures, and bureaucratic spending were likely funded by the national government, which saw a 22.3% spike in disbursements in May. 

This contributed to a 14.8% surge in national government spending over the first 5 months, reaching an all-time high nominal level of Php 1.443 trillion! 

So if we are not mistaken, "Marcosnomics" will be heavy on political expenditures but sold to the public as a "stimulus." (Prudent Investor, 2024)

May 2024 marked the fourth highest spending on record, which significantly boosted the BSP’s principal measure of liquidity, M3, to 6.5%, a six-month high.

Figure 7

A substantial portion of this liquidity growth stemmed from cash in circulation, which surged to its second-highest level on record, surpassing the zenith of December 2022. (Figure 7, topmost image) 

Traditionally, December has been the peak for M3 annually. However, this time could be different. If May’s spending trend continues, nominal cash levels may surpass the historic highs of December 2023 even before year-end! 

May’s cash growth rate of 6.1% YoY was the highest since December 2022’s 7.6%. 

For want of doubt, the administration has begun injecting large amounts of cash into the financial system. 

Together with the accelerating growth in the banking system’s loans, the BSP’s net claims on the central government (NCoCG) surged by 89.21% in May, while the bank's NCoCG slowed to 12.2%. (Figure 7, middle graph) 

This combined financing of government deficit spending and private sector borrowing or formal credit expanded by 9.44% to a record Php 27.02 trillion in May! 

And yet, all we can hear from the consensus is that this represents a “restrictive environment!” 

The thing is, if May’s deficit spending-driven liquidity growth will be sustained, it should put a floor on the present private sector-powered disinflationary impulses—with a time lag. 

The Philippine treasury markets have signaled that the BSP may be about to confirm the unannounced "Marcos-nomics stimulus" with upcoming rate cuts. 

However, such stimulus could also reinvigorate the third wave of the incumbent inflation cycle. (Figure 7, lowest chart) 

Stay tuned.

___ 

References

FINANCIAL STABILITY COORDINATION COUNCIL, 2023 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT December 2023, p.35 bsp.gov.ph

Kevin Bruss Steepening and Flattening of the Yield Curve, Wellspring Financial Advisors, August 10, 2023; wellspringadvisorsllc.com

Prudent Investor, June CPI’s Decline Reflects Demand-Side Slowdown: Will the BSP Join Global Peers in Easing Policies, and Will the Government Pursue 'Marcos-nomics Stimulus'? July 7, 2024

Prudent Investor, Could the Philippine Government Implement a 'Marcosnomics' Stimulus Blending BSP Rate Cuts and Accelerated Deficit Spending? Substack.com June 30, 2024

 

Analyzing the Philippines’ February Merchandise Trade: Unveiling the Impact of Statistical Base Effects on a 'Growth' Rebound

 

Facts are stubborn things, but statistics are pliable—Mark Twain

 

In this issue

Analyzing the Philippines’ February Merchandise Trade: Unveiling the Impact of Statistical Base Effects on a 'Growth' Rebound

I. Unveiling the Statistical Mirage Behind Merchandise Trade Growth

II. Export Boom? Semiconductor Up YoY but on a Downslide while Agro-Based and EDP Exports Rebound

III. Import Trends: Capital, Consumer, and Raw Materials Up YoY, Yet in Downtrend—Where Are the Investments?

IV. A Revival of the Domestic Manufacturing Sector?

V. Private Sector S&P PMI Survey Diverge from the PSA; Rising USD Peso Points to Risks of Stagflation

 

Analyzing the Philippines’ February Merchandise Trade: Unveiling the Impact of Statistical Base Effects on a 'Growth' Rebound

 

Government and media pounced on the positive YoY sign on Philippine Merchandise Trade, interpreting it as "growth."  However, filtering noise from signal tell us otherwise.

 

I. Unveiling the Statistical Mirage Behind Merchandise Trade Growth

 

Businessworld, April 12: Preliminary data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) showed the country’s trade-in-goods balance — the difference between exports and imports — stood at a $3.65-billion deficit in February, slipping by 6% from the $3.88-billion gap in February last year. Month on month, the trade gap also narrowed from the revised $4.39 billion in January. The trade deficit in February was the smallest in five months or since the $3.55-billion deficit in September last year. Outbound sale of goods expanded for the second straight month by 15.7% annually to $5.91 billion in February. This was faster than the revised 9.1% growth in January and a turnaround from the 18.3% decline in February last year. This was the quickest exports growth in 16 months or since the 20.6% surge in October 2022. Meanwhile, imports rose by 6.3% to $9.55 billion in February, ending two months of decline. This was a turnaround from the revised 6.1% contraction in January and the 11.8% decline in February 2023. Imports growth was also the fastest in 16 months or since 7.7% in October 2022. (italics mine)

 

YoY February exports grew by 15.7%, while imports increased by 6.34%, and total external trade expanded by 9.74%. As a result, the trade deficit improved by 6%.

 

Great news, right?

 

That's if you discount the overall trend.

 

In reality, February's boost was a mirage—a product of the statistical "low" base effect.

Figure 1

 

From a noise versus signal standpoint, February's USD performance only reinforced the downside drift of the nation's trend in external trade. (Figure 1, topmost graph)

 

It is no coincidence that the fall in external trade deficit has resonated with the easing of the fiscal deficit manifesting the "twin deficits."  (Figure 1, middle window)

 

The easing of public spending has reduced the "crowding effect," freeing up more resources for the market economy's use. (Figure 1, lowest chart)

 

Still, despite the imbalances from the structural shift in bank lending operations, the declining import trend demonstrates mounting strains on consumers from inflation.

 

However, both deficits translate to an economy spending more than it produces, thereby requiring borrowing to fund the savings-investment gap.

 

II. Export Boom? Semiconductor Up YoY but on a Downslide while Agro-Based and EDP Exports Rebound

 

Export boom?

Figure 2

 

Though semiconductor exports soared by 31.9% in February, export volume in USD has been down 2.14% MoM. It has been trending down since September 2023/October 2022. (Figure 2, topmost image)

 

The microchip % share of exports accounted for 44.8% in February 2024, slightly lower than 45.5% in January and substantially higher than 39.3% from the same month a year ago.

 

What other sectors grew in volume and in percentage?

 

Agro-based exports jumped 24.1% YoY, accounting for 7.2% of the total share. (Figure 2, middle diagram)

 

Electronic Data Processing exports also vaulted by 23.1% YoY, with a 7.5% share of the total. (Figure 2, lowest graph)

 

Electronic products (which include the semiconductor and EDP sectors) soared by 27%, accounting for 58% share of the total.

 

The thing is, only a handful of sectors benefited from February's export growth.

III. Import Trends: Capital, Consumer, and Raw Materials Up YoY, Yet in Downtrend—Where Are the Investments?

 

How about imports?

 

Last February, capital goods imports fell by only 3.4% YoY, while consumer goods imports grew by 9.2%.

Figure 3

 

But both sectors suffered a plunge in USD volume of 13.6% and 16.3% MoM, and they have shown signs of further weakening (Figure 3, topmost image)

 

So based on capital goods imports, the avalanche of news headlines about the proposed massive investment flows from a peripatetic leadership selling politically related investments to the US and their allies have yet to happen.

 

Still, the government reported that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows almost "doubled" in January 2024, mainly from a surge of debt flows. Debt flows accounted for 90% of the FDI. Investments, eh?

 

Curiously, despite the wonderful headlines predicated on YoY, the FDI trend in million USD remains southbound. (Figure 3, middle visual)

 

And this bifurcation applies to raw materials imports, which expanded by 11.8%, despite the downtrend since 3Q 2022. Raw material imports serve as a pulse on the manufacturing sector. (Figure 3, lowest chart)

 

IV. A Revival of the Domestic Manufacturing Sector?

 

Yet, authorities tell us that growth in the manufacturing sector has been picking up.

Figure 4

 

First, the sector's bank credit growth more than doubled from 2% in January to 5.9% in February. The sector's bank credit growth has dovetailed the Producers Price Index (PPI) or "measure of change in the prices of products or commodities produced by domestic manufacturers and sold at farm gate prices to wholesale/other consumers in the domestic market." (PSA, Openstat)

 

Will the PPI follow the rebound in bank credit?

 

Second, manufacturing volume and value were up 8.9% and 7.5% in February 2024, even as net sales in volume and value contracted by 0.5% and 1.7%.

 

Generally, producers have been ramping up in production despite slower sales—implying substantial inventory accumulation.

 

V. Private Sector S&P PMI Survey Diverge from the PSA; Rising USD Peso Points to Risks of Stagflation

 

Figure 5

 

But, the S&P PMI survey for March diverged from the PSA:

 

The latest PMI® data by S&P Global indicated only a modest improvement in the health of the Filipino manufacturing sector during March. Though the pace of expansion was largely sustained from the previous survey period, growth in new orders remained historically subdued. Furthermore, production lapsed back into contraction for the first time since July 2022 amid material shortages. Companies raised their employment and buying activity at stronger rates and renewed their efforts to replenish inventories. That said, the degree of confidence in the outlook for output over the coming year dropped to a near four-year low. In terms of prices, the rate of input cost inflation softened to the weakest since October 2020. Additionally, charges levied for Filipino manufactured goods fell for the first time in nearly four years. (SPI Global, April 2024)

 

Both indicators shared the replenishment of inventories and the account of disinflation via the PPI, but instead of output growth, the SPI indicated a production lapse.

 

The Philippine PMI appears to have been plagued by a "rounding top." (Figure 5, topmost image)

 

In summary, government data points to an upturn in the manufacturing sector in the GDP, which diverges from the SPI’s outlook.

 

Dialing back to imports, only one major category registered increases in both YoY and MoM volume: fuel imports, which were up by 8.3% YoY and 28.4% MoM, driven by rising oil prices. (Figure 5, middle chart)

 

As noted above, due to the "low" base of 2023, government data recorded growth—a chimera.

 

However, the general trend for merchandise trade exhibits ongoing weakness in capital goods, consumers, and manufacturing, along with rising risks of stagflation.

 

The rising US dollar-Philippine peso $USDPHP suggests that the easing of this deficit (and the twin deficits) must be ephemeral. (Figure 5, lowest diagram)

 

___

References:

 

S&P Global Philippines Manufacturing PMI Filipino manufacturing output slides into contraction for the first time since July 2022, April 1, 2024, spglobal.com