Showing posts with label money supply. Show all posts
Showing posts with label money supply. Show all posts

Sunday, July 12, 2026

Stagflation, Part 12: The Philippines' Balance-Sheet Origins of Inflation

  

What people today call inflation is not inflation, i.e., the increase in the quantity of money and money substitutes, but the general rise in commodity prices and wage rates which is the inevitable consequence of inflation. This semantic innovation is by no means harmless—Ludwig von Mises 

Stagflation, Part 12: The Philippines' Balance-Sheet Origins of Inflation
I. Preamble: Interconnectedness of All Economic Phenomena 

II. Following the Money: The Balance-Sheet Origins of Inflation

IIA. Why This Matters: From External Discipline to Domestic Bailout

IIB. Following the Credit: Electricity and the New Transmission of Liquidity

IIC. When Balance Sheets Become Policy: From Liquidity to Prices

III. Oil Relief, Monetary Inflation, and the Return of Deferred Prices

IIIA. Administrative Suppression Is Not Price Stability

IIIB. The Poor Continue Paying the Highest Inflation Tax

IIIC. Benchmarkism and the Illusion of Labor Absorption

IIID. Wage Mandates and the Intervention Spiral

IV. Conclusion: Inflation Before Prices 

Stagflation, Part 12: The Philippines' Balance-Sheet Origins of Inflation 

Why Consumer Prices Reveal the Consequences, Not the Beginning, of the Process 

I. Preamble: Interconnectedness of All Economic Phenomena 

Economic commentary often treats macroeconomic releases as though they describe separate realities. Bank lending is analyzed independently of inflation. Labor market statistics are discussed apart from monetary policy. Wage adjustments are framed as social policy, while electricity is relegated to industry news. Each release receives its own headline, its own narrative, and then quickly disappears into the next news cycle. 

Yet the economy functions as an interconnected process rather than a collection of isolated indicators. 

As Ludwig von Mises observed, economics "does not allow of any breaking up into special branches." It is concerned with "the interconnectedness of all phenomena of acting and economizing." Economic facts condition one another, and each problem can only be properly understood within a broader system that assigns its due place to every aspect of human action and economic choice. 

Money created through the banking system finances specific borrowers. Credit helps determine which investment projects become financially viable, influencing the allocation of resources, production costs, employment, asset prices, and eventually consumer prices. Monetary developments therefore propagate through the economy sequentially rather than simultaneously. 

The political environment further shapes this process by influencing the prevailing model of economic development. Governments frequently respond to the unintended consequences of earlier interventions with additional interventions. Each successive policy alters incentives, redirects capital toward politically favored sectors, and generates new distortions that invite further intervention, progressively reducing the economy's capacity to adjust through market processes. 

These developments are not isolated events. They represent successive stages of the same underlying process. 

The Philippine economy today provides an instructive example. 

Conventional narratives frame these developments as isolated economic events. In reality, they form an interconnected process that reflects the deepening consequences of balance-sheet expansion, politically driven credit allocation, and successive policy interventions. 

The sequence matters because inflation does not begin at supermarket shelves, gasoline stations, or electricity bills. Nor does it begin with the consumer price index. By the time consumer prices visibly accelerate, the underlying monetary and financial adjustments have often been unfolding for a period. Markets respond to underlying conditions. What is seen as inflation is, therefore, a symptom. 

The process begins elsewhere. 

It begins with the expansion of balance sheets. 

II. Following the Money: The Balance-Sheet Origins of Inflation 

One of the recurring shortcomings of contemporary macroeconomic analysis is its tendency to treat inflation primarily as a phenomenon of price changes. 

Policymakers, talking heads, and financial markets closely monitor consumer price indices because they are readily observable, politically salient, and easily communicated. Rising food prices, higher electricity bills, and more expensive transportation become the visible face of inflation. 

Because consumer prices are both politically sensitive and immediately observable, inflation is also commonly framed as a problem originating in markets rather than in monetary or policy decisions. The mechanical focus is on the supply side. Thus, the resulting narrative emphasizes shortages, speculation, supply-chain disruptions, hoarding or price gouging, encouraging corrective political interventions, while the monetary and administrative policies that altered purchasing power and resource allocation receive comparatively little or no scrutiny at all. 

Yet the price changes captured by official statistics describe only one observable manifestation of a much broader monetary and financial process. 

Consumer price indices summarize exchange ratios over a given period; they do not reveal how the purchasing power underlying those transactions was created, allocated, and transmitted throughout the economy. 

Before consumer price indices register sustained inflation, balance sheets have often been expanding for months. Before households pay more at the grocery, someone must first acquire additional purchasing power. Before firms bid more aggressively for labor, raw materials, or imported inputs, someone must first obtain financing that enables such spending. 

Within the financial system, the interaction of savings, credit creation, monetary policy, and bank intermediation determines how purchasing power is created, allocated, and transmitted throughout the economy. 

These financial adjustments reshape resource allocation, investment decisions, production structures, and distribution, eventually influencing employment, incomes, spending patterns, and consumer prices. 

Periods of monetary accommodation magnify the imbalances (excess leverage, credit concentration, politically directed finance, sectoral distortions) that developed in the process. 

Monetary conditions have evolved through successive phases rather than discrete episodes. The BSP's earlier pandemic-era monetary expansion was followed by a period of policy tightening to contain rising inflation. Beginning in the second half of 2024, however, the BSP gradually shifted toward monetary accommodation through successive reductions in policy rates and reserve requirements. Rather than immediately accelerating consumer prices, these measures first affected the financial system by lowering funding costs, intensifying the expansion of banks' capacity to extend credit, increasing system-wide liquidity, and encouraging further balance-sheet expansion. 

These changes in monetary and credit conditions propagated or diffused gradually through the economy. As new purchasing power entered through bank lending and other financial channels, it influenced financing decisions, resource allocation, investment activity, and "aggregate demand" before becoming fully reflected in consumer price measures. 

The BSP's May 2026 Depository Corporations Survey (DCS) illustrates this transmission process. 

Broad money continued to accelerate for a fourth consecutive month.


Figure 1

M3 expanded by 12.8 % year-on-year, following growth of 10.3 % in February, 12.1 %in March, and 12.2 %in April. (Figure 1, topmost pane) 

While the various monetary aggregates have not followed identical trajectories over recent years, the May data point to increasingly broad-based liquidity conditions. 

  • Cash in circulation, which had recently trailed the other aggregates in growth, rebounded.
  • M1’s growth trend remained robust, sustaining the momentum from its earlier expansion in 2023.
  • M2 and M3 growth accelerated in Q2 2025, showing that monetary expansion had become more widely distributed across the financial system rather than concentrated in a single aggregate. 

The significance of these figures lies not merely in their magnitude but in what they reveal about the sources of liquidity. 

The current acceleration in liquidity growth echoes the BSP’s pandemic‑era response. And while the DCS shows that domestic credit remained the principal driver of monetary expansion, the transmission channel has shifted. 

Banks net claims on central government (NCoCG) rose 16.2% to Php 6.4 trillion. (Figure 1, middle image) 

Claims on the public non‑financial sector accelerated even more rapidly, surging 41.2%, coinciding with the DOF’s proposed record remittances of GOCCs to the national government. Are banks financing the GOCC remittances? 

Lending to the private sector also strengthened to 13.2%, though at a more moderate pace. 

The banks’ net claims share of domestic claims stood at 27.1% in May 2026, slightly down from the record 27.6% in May 2024, while claims on the private sector reached 64.23%, sharply lower despite recovering from its interim trough in Q4 2023. Since the pre‑pandemic year 2019, bank net claims on the central government have taken an increasingly larger share of domestic claims—a clear sign that liquidity creation now stems primarily from bank financing of the government. (Figure 1, lowest diagram)


Figure 2

In the meantime, BSP’s net claim on central government (NCoCG) growth doubled in May to Php 662.6 billion, though it remains below pandemic levels. (Figure 2, topmost window) 

In sum, these developments suggest that the recent acceleration in monetary growth has been driven primarily by continued domestic balance-sheet expansion by banks and the government-BSP complex rather than by external sources of liquidity. 

Although the current expansion differs from the pandemic response in both scale and transmission mechanism, its underlying balance-sheet logic is strikingly similar. Liquidity is once again being created through coordinated expansion of public and banking-sector balance sheets—not primarily to finance new productive activity, but to sustain an increasingly leveraged economic structure. 

Unlike 2020, the current process operates largely through the routine mechanisms of government finance, central-bank operations, and bank credit rather than emergency facilities. 

Nevertheless, the recurring liquidity injections exhibit the characteristics of a quasi-bailout whose monetary consequences gradually diffuse through the economy before becoming visible in consumer prices. 

IIA. Why This Matters: From External Discipline to Domestic Bailout 

For many years, discussions of Philippine liquidity focused primarily on external sources of monetary expansion—remittances, export earnings, business process outsourcing receipts, tourism revenues, foreign portfolio flows, foreign direct investment, and movements in the country's international reserves. 

These external inflows undoubtedly influence domestic liquidity conditions. Historically, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves also imposed an important discipline on domestic monetary expansion, as the BSP's balance sheet remained closely linked to developments in the external sector. 

Over time, however, the growing financing requirements of the domestic economy increasingly shifted the source of monetary accommodation inward. 

Ever since the 1997 Asian crisis, the BSP built up foreign reserves, which held nearly fixed at ~86–87% of assets from 2012 to 2018, culminating in 2019. Pandemic injections of $2.3 trillion cut that share to ~72%, as historic liquidity infusions raised domestic securities to nearly 20% — exposing peso fragility. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

While BSP has since reduced its domestic securities share and rebuilt reserves, banks now carry the burden of financing sovereign liabilities. 

As an aside, strangely, the BSP has yet to publish its monthly updates for 2026 

Consequently, this reinforced the larger role of domestic credit creation in expanding liquidity — a greater reliance on internally generated purchasing power rather than external inflows. 

Equally revealing are developments on the liability side of the banking system. 

Deposit substitutes—including money-market borrowings, promissory notes, and commercial paper—accelerated sharply. After expanding by just over 10 % year-on-year in February, their growth surged to nearly 74 % in April before approaching 95 % in May. Wholesale funding has therefore become an increasingly important source of financing for continued balance-sheet expansion. (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

The changing composition of bank liabilities provides important clues about conditions within the financial system. Rather than merely reflecting a preference for alternative funding structures, the growing reliance on wholesale liabilities suggests that banks theoretically are adapting to funding, regulatory, and balance-sheet constraints while sustaining asset growth. It also reflects the increasingly important role of market-based financing in supporting credit creation when traditional deposit growth alone becomes insufficient. 

That evolution carries important implications. 

Conventional narratives often portray banks as simple intermediaries that collect household savings before lending those funds to borrowers. Modern banking systems operate differently. Through credit expansion, bank lending simultaneously creates deposits, expanding both assets and liabilities on bank balance sheets. 

The composition of those balance sheets, however, is equally important. As a growing share of bank assets becomes concentrated in public-sector claims and other policy-influenced lending, while portions of private-sector credit remain constrained by weaker credit quality and elevated non-performing loans, the organic growth of deposits becomes less sufficient to sustain continued balance-sheet expansion. The sharp increase in wholesale liabilities therefore appears less a voluntary shift in funding strategy than an institutional response to mounting balance-sheet pressures, with banks increasingly relying on market-based funding to support continued liquidity creation. 

Understanding this mechanism fundamentally changes how monetary statistics should be interpreted. 

Liquidity is not merely a passive consequence of economic activity. It is created through identifiable balance-sheet transactions that determine who first receives newly created purchasing power, under what conditions, and for what purposes. 

This is where aggregate monetary statistics become insufficient. 

Headline M3 describes the resulting expansion of liquidity. It does not reveal how that liquidity was created, through whose balance sheet it entered the economy, or which borrowers received the newly created purchasing power. 

Money does not enter the economy uniformly. New purchasing power enters through specific borrowers, particular industries, and identifiable financial channels before gradually spreading throughout the broader economy. Those early recipients acquire the ability to bid for labor, raw materials, imported inputs, financial assets, and productive resources before the nominal incomes of later recipients adjust. Relative prices therefore begin changing well before those adjustments become visible in aggregate price indices. 

Price changes themselves reflect the interaction of supply and demand. Without additional money or credit to finance higher spending, stronger demand in one part of the economy generally requires weaker demand elsewhere. Generalized inflation therefore requires an expansion of purchasing power beyond the mere redistribution of existing income and savings. Even supply shocks initially alter relative prices; they become broader and more persistent only when accommodated by monetary expansion. 

As the late Nobel Laureate economist Milton Friedman reminded us: inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon — produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output. 

This is why some industries expand more rapidly than others. Certain asset prices appreciate long before consumer prices accelerate. Input costs often rise months before those increases appear in finished goods. The process is neither instantaneous nor evenly distributed. It unfolds according to the channels through which money and credit enter the economy. 

The balance sheet therefore provides the first map of inflation's transmission. 

If the Depository Corporations Survey explains how liquidity is created, the BSP's lending statistics reveal where that newly created purchasing power is increasingly being directed.

That question is particularly revealing in the current Philippine context. 

Aggregate lending growth accelerated during May. Yet the headline figure conceals a more important structural development. The composition of credit—not merely its quantity—provides the more meaningful signal. 

Among all sectors of the economy, one has emerged as the largest destination for new bank financing. 

The electricity sector. 

IIB. Following the Credit: Electricity and the New Transmission of Liquidity 

If the Depository Corporations Survey (DCS) reveals the expansion of monetary and banking-system balance sheets, the BSP's Universal and Commercial (U/C) Bank Lending data reveals how newly created purchasing power is allocated across sectors of the economy. Together, the two datasets provide complementary views of the same process: one identifies the expansion of liquidity within the financial system, while the other shows where credit creation is concentrated. 

The May lending report continued to show a rapid pace of credit expansion. Total outstanding loans of universal and commercial banks accelerated from 11.84 %year-on-year growth in April to 12.62 %in May, extending the recovery in bank lending that followed the BSP's shift toward monetary easing. 

On the surface, these figures suggested improving financial conditions and stronger economic activity. 

Aggregate lending growth, however, reveals only the quantity of credit creation. The more important question is where that credit is being allocated.


Figure 3

Consumer lending, which had been one of the principal drivers of post-pandemic credit expansion, continued to decelerate gradually while remaining elevated. Consumer loans slowed from 19.58 %to 19.03 percent, while credit-card lending eased slightly from 26.57 %to 26.30 percent. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

Household borrowing therefore remained strong, but it was no longer the dominant source of credit expansion.

Production lending moved in the opposite direction. 

Loans to production activities accelerated from 10.70 %to 11.67 percent, suggesting that banks were directing a larger share of new lending toward business-related activities rather than household consumption. Under normal conditions, such a shift would generally be interpreted as favorable, as productive investment should expand capacity, increase output, and support long-term economic growth. 

The sectoral composition of production lending, however, reveals a more complex picture. 

Among major industries, electricity, gas, steam, and air-conditioning supply recorded the strongest expansion by a wide margin. Outstanding loans to the sector increased by 31.65 % year-on-year, accelerating from 25.83 %in April. (Figure 3, middle image)

More significantly, electricity accounted for the largest absolute increase in bank lending among all industries, adding approximately Php133.3 billion in a single month and roughly Php539.2 billion over the preceding twelve months. 

As a result, the sector's share of total universal and commercial bank loans increased from 12.2 %in May 2025 to 14.5 %by May 2026, reaching its highest level since the BSP began publishing the current series! 

This is not simply another industry experiencing rapid credit growth. 

It represents a significant reallocation of the banking system's balance sheet. 

Balance sheets often reveal structural changes before those changes become visible in national income statistics. Financing patterns, investment decisions, and credit allocation frequently adjust before their consequences appear in GDP, employment, or consumer-price data. Following the money therefore requires examining not only how much credit is created, but also which sectors receive that credit. 

This pattern also reflects broader developments within the Philippine electricity sector. 

Our previous analysis examined how mounting financial pressures within the industry were increasingly addressed through institutional restructuring, financing arrangements, and regulatory adjustments rather than through explicit fiscal appropriations. A series of developments pointed in the same direction: the SMC–Aboitiz Equity Ventures–Meralco (Chromite) Batangas LNG deal, Prime Infrastructure's acquisition of First Gen, the suspension of real-property taxes (RPTs) on power assets, and the introduction of the Government Energy Auction Allowance (GEA-ALL) on top of the existing FIT-ALL mechanism. Although different in form, these measures reflected a broader effort to maintain the financial viability of a strategically important sector while limiting reliance on direct fiscal support. 

The important observation is that the banking system has become an increasingly important channel through which financing reaches the electricity sector. Given that electricity-sector output has remained weak despite rapid credit expansion, the increase in lending raises questions beyond simple investment financing. Electricity GDP has stagnated since Q2 2025 (Figure 3, lowest graph) 

This reflects a quasi‑bailout scheme channeled through refinancing requirements, balance‑sheet restructuring, and regulatory incentives. 

Government‑affiliated private sector balance sheets absorb pressures that would otherwise appear on public accounts. Rather than showing up as fiscal expenditure, burdens are transferred via corporate restructuring and commercial banks, facilitated by regulatory adjustments. The cost does not disappear; it migrates across balance sheets, masking fragility under the guise of restraint. 

In this environment, the boundary between monetary policy, industrial policy, and financial-sector policy becomes increasingly difficult to separate. 

Credit allocation does not require formal central planning to influence economic outcomes. Once liquidity expands within the banking system, institutions respond to incentives, regulations, collateral conditions, risk assessments, and political priorities. The resulting allocation of credit reflects not only private lending decisions but also the broader institutional environment in which those decisions occur. 

This is why following the money requires following the balance sheet rather than the budget alone. 

The modern transmission of policy increasingly operates through credit markets. 

IIC. When Balance Sheets Become Policy: From Liquidity to Prices 

The significance of electricity lending extends beyond a single industry. It illustrates a broader feature of modern monetary transmission: the effects of monetary accommodation depend not only on the quantity of liquidity created, but also on where newly created purchasing power is allocated. 

The May DCS and lending reports reveal two dimensions of the same process. The DCS shows the continued expansion of liquidity through domestic credit creation, while lending data reveal how that purchasing power is distributed across sectors. Credit directed toward different uses—financial assets, real estate, consumption, infrastructure, utilities, or government financing—produces different effects on investment decisions, resource allocation, and relative prices. 

The transmission from monetary expansion to consumer prices is therefore neither immediate nor uniform. Newly created purchasing power enters the economy through specific financial channels, affecting particular borrowers and sectors before broader price effects emerge. 

The May balance-sheet and lending data indicate that these earlier stages of the process remain active. Liquidity continues expanding, domestic credit remains the principal source of monetary growth, and bank lending increasingly reflects sectoral concentrations, including electricity. 

June's inflation report should therefore not be interpreted as an isolated movement in consumer prices. It represents a later stage of a monetary and credit process already visible within the financial system. 

The balance sheet reveals where the process begins. Consumer prices reveal where it eventually appears. 

The significance of electricity lending extends beyond a single industry. It illustrates a broader feature of modern monetary transmission: the effects of monetary accommodation depend not only on the quantity of liquidity created, but also on where newly created purchasing power is allocated. 

III. Oil Relief, Monetary Inflation, and the Return of Deferred Prices 

Having followed the creation of liquidity through the banking system and traced its allocation across the economy's balance sheets, the analysis now moves to where these monetary processes become most visible: consumer prices. 

June's inflation report was widely interpreted as evidence that inflationary pressures were easing. Headline consumer price inflation declined from 6.8 %in May to 6.4 percent in June, reinforcing the view that price pressures were gradually moderating and that recent policy measures were beginning to stabilize conditions. 

The underlying picture, however, was more complex.


Figure 4

The decline in headline inflation was driven primarily by a factor external to domestic monetary conditions: the sharp reduction in global oil prices. West Texas Intermediate crude declined by more than 23 % during June, easing one of the most significant cost pressures affecting households and businesses. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

Transport inflation correspondingly slowed from 16.2 %to 12.8 percent, contributing substantially to the moderation in the overall index. (Figure 4, middle image) 

Had inflation been primarily a fuel-price phenomenon, the decline in headline inflation would have represented a broader improvement. 

The underlying data suggest otherwise. 

Core inflation accelerated from 4.1% to 4.4%, indicating that price pressures were becoming more broadly distributed beyond volatile food and energy components. The breadth of monthly price movements also remained significant: only three of the thirteen major CPI divisions recorded declines, while eight increased and two remained unchanged. 

The decline in headline inflation therefore reflected the offsetting effect of a major temporary component rather than a broad reversal of inflationary pressures. Lower oil prices reduced one important source of cost pressure, but they did not eliminate the monetary and credit conditions that had already influenced other parts of the economy. 

As established in Part I, monetary expansion does not affect all prices simultaneously. Newly created purchasing power enters through specific financial channels, influencing particular borrowers, industries, and production decisions before broader consumer-price effects emerge. 

June's CPI data should therefore not be interpreted as contradicting the monetary process. They illustrate its continuing transmission. 

The BSP's monetary data reinforce this interpretation. Broad money expanded by 12.8% in May, marking the fourth consecutive month of double-digit M3 growth. (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

Such expansion does not mechanically determine a precise monthly inflation outcome; monetary transmission operates through time and through changing economic structures. However, sustained liquidity growth provides the financial conditions through which localized price pressures can become more broadly embedded. 

This distinction is essential because supply conditions and monetary conditions operate differently. 

Supply disruptions can alter relative prices. Higher oil prices increase transportation costs. Poor harvests reduce agricultural supply. Geopolitical conflicts and supply-chain disruptions affect specific markets. 

But relative-price changes alone do not create sustained economy-wide inflation. Without additional purchasing power, higher spending in one category must generally reduce spending elsewhere. A rise in one set of prices is offset by weaker demand in another. 

Generalized inflation requires a mechanism that allows nominal spending to expand across multiple sectors simultaneously. 

That mechanism is provided by monetary and credit expansion. 

The balance sheets examined in Part II explain how that purchasing power entered the economy. 

The CPI data reveal where those monetary effects are becoming visible. 

IIIA. Administrative Suppression Is Not Price Stability 

June's inflation data also illustrate a recurring feature of price management: suppressing visible price increases does not necessarily resolve the conditions producing them. 

When politically sensitive prices rise, policymakers often respond by attempting to manage the observed price outcome directly through administrative measures, subsidies, regulatory interventions, or temporary restrictions. Such measures may provide short-term relief, but they do not eliminate the underlying economic pressures affecting supply, costs, and incentives. 

Rice provides one example.

 


Figure 5 

Despite the continued implementation of the Maximum Suggested Retail Price (MSRP), import liberalization measures, 20 pesos rice rollouts and further policy interventions affecting rice markets, rice inflation remained elevated at close to 15 %in June, only marginally lower than May's 15.6 percent. (Figure 5, upper diagram) 

The persistence of high rice inflation demonstrates the limits of administrative measures as a substitute for resolving underlying supply and cost pressures. A controlled price may temporarily alter the reported price path, but it cannot by itself change the economic conditions determining production, distribution, and availability. 

The irony is, despite this, authorities still propose to extend price caps

Electricity provides another important illustration. 

During June, Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) prices increased by approximately 23 percent, with particularly sharp movements in the Visayas. The development attracted limited public attention despite its potential implications for future consumer prices. 

Earlier in the year, authorities temporarily suspended aspects of WESM pricing under Executive Order No. 110 before subsequently restoring market-based pricing mechanisms. The objective was understandable: electricity prices had become politically sensitive, and temporary intervention offered immediate relief. 

However, prices perform a crucial and indispensable economic function. They transmit information about scarcity, and costs necessary for economic calculation. Administrative intervention can delay that information from appearing in observed prices, but it cannot eliminate the underlying pressures that generated it. 

When market pricing resumes, adjustments may reflect not only current conditions but also costs that accumulated during the period of suppression. What appears to be a sudden price increase may therefore represent deferred price discovery rather than a newly emerging problem. 

The same principle applies beyond electricity. Temporary relief measures introduced during the earlier oil-price shock have since been reversed, restoring excise-tax collections while households continue facing elevated living costs. The sequence demonstrates a recurring policy tension: measures that to supposedly protect consumer gives way to other political priorities. 

Administrative intervention can influence the timing of price adjustments. 

It cannot permanently remove the economic forces requiring those adjustments. 

When underlying pressures are postponed rather than resolved, inflation does not disappear. Its transmission is merely delayed, redistributed, or redirected through other channels. 

IIIB. The Poor Continue Paying the Highest Inflation Tax 

Headline inflation also conceals an important distributional reality. 

Aggregate price indices describe an average household. No household is actually average. 

The BSP and the Philippine Statistics Authority recognize this distinction by publishing separate inflation measures for the Bottom 30 %of income households. These statistics often provide a clearer picture of inflation's social consequences because lower-income households devote a larger share of their budgets to essential goods. 

June's data offered little relief. 

Although the gap between Bottom-30 food inflation and headline food inflation narrowed slightly—from 8.5 percentage points in May to 7.9 percentage points in June—it remained historically elevated or significantly above the inflation spike of 2023. (Figure 4, lower graph) 

This difference matters because persistent inflation does not affect all households equally. 

Higher‑income households generally possess greater ability to adjust through changes in consumption patterns, sustained reductions in savings, or by using accumulated assets to defend against erosion of purchasing power — for example, buying USD or other inflation‑hedging instruments. 

Lower-income households have far fewer margins of adjustment. 

They continue purchasing the same essential goods—rice, food, electricity, and transportation—but those costs represent a much larger share of their available income. Inflation therefore reduces not only purchasing power but also household flexibility and resilience. 

This perspective exposes inflation’s role as inequality’s engine: a regressive tax that punishes the poor while averages mask fragility. 

This distinction is also important when interpreting broader economic classifications and averages. Improvements in aggregate indicators may reflect selective progress, but they do not necessarily capture how households experience changing prices in their daily lives. 

Statistical averages summarize outcomes. 

Ironically, the data defies the conditions that brought upon the upper middle-income country (UMIC) status upgrade

That asymmetry becomes even clearer when moving beyond prices and examining the labor market, where businesses must decide whether rising costs can still be absorbed or whether they must adjust employment, investment, and production decisions. 

That said, selective liquidity injections and quasi-bailout dynamics operate as an inflation tax. The redistribution occurs through the unequal transmission of newly created purchasing power: early recipients benefit before prices fully adjust, while households with the least ability to hedge against inflation absorb the greatest loss of purchasing power. Monetary accommodation therefore functions as a regressive transfer mechanism, amplifying inequality and social pressures. 

IIIC. Benchmarkism and the Illusion of Labor Absorption 

The June inflation report reveals where the transmission of monetary expansion becomes visible. The May labor report, by contrast, reveals where its longer-term consequences begin to emerge. 

Official commentary described the May labor statistics as evidence of improving "labor absorption." The phrase itself is revealing. It suggests that employment expands mechanically once workers become available, as though the economy simply absorbs labor whenever conditions permit. 

The reality is different. 

Employment is not an autonomous variable. In a market economy, labor demand is derived demand. Firms do not hire merely because workers are seeking employment. They hire because entrepreneurs, operating under uncertainty, expect that committing resources to expand the enterprise will generate future returns. 

Employment therefore represents the outcome of prior investment decisions. 

Structural capital includes not only physical assets and financial resources, but also the organizational, technological, managerial, and human capital that allow labor to become productive. Workers become more valuable when combined with the complementary capital, processes, and institutions that enable production to occur efficiently

A labor market can therefore improve through two very different mechanisms. 

The first involves firms utilizing existing deployed capital: filling vacancies, extending working hours, increasing production within current facilities, or replacing workers who have exited. 

The second involves entrepreneurs committing new capital to expand the productive structure itself: entering new markets, building additional facilities, acquiring new capabilities, and creating new organizational capacity. 

It is the second process that represents the creation of additional productive capacity and therefore determines the economy's longer-term ability to generate sustainable employment growth. 

Labor statistics, however, cannot fully distinguish between these outcomes. A reduction in unemployment or underemployment may indicate improved labor utilization, but it does not necessarily reveal whether firms are undertaking the deeper capital commitments required for sustained economic expansion. 

The broader investment environment provides a more cautious picture.


Figure 6

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has weakened substantially reaching a decade-low level in April. (Figure 6, topmost pane)

While the recent Iran war oil shock may have contributed to this, the broader decline in foreign exposure since 2022 suggests increasing caution among investors considering long-term commitments. 

This pattern is notable given the investment pledges announced during official engagements with geopolitical partners. Announced intentions do not automatically translate into deployed capital. Actual investment decisions ultimately depend on expected returns and hurdle rates, underwritten by institutional conditions, policy stability, and the perceived risks facing capital commitments. 

The divergence between household and business sentiment reflects a similar tension. 

BSP surveys indicate that consumers remain concerned about rising food prices, declining purchasing power, and persistent inflation pressures. Large formal enterprises, by contrast, maintain comparatively stronger expectations regarding sales and operating conditions. (Figure 6, middle left and right images) 

This divergence partly reflects differences in economic position. Large firms generally have greater access to credit, capital markets, export revenues, diversified income streams, and pricing power. Their outlook may therefore reflect stronger balance-sheet capacity or even narrative management aimed at securing financial interests, rather than broad-based improvements in the economy.

Even within business surveys, the signals are mixed. Firms may express confidence regarding near-term operations while remaining cautious about major expansion decisions. Ultimately, investment outcomes—not surveys—determine whether optimism translates into productive capacity. 

The labor statistics themselves also present a more complex picture than headline indicators suggest. 

Compared with April, labor-force participation and unemployment marginally increased 

Compared with May of the previous year, however, employment and labor-force participation remained weaker. 

More importantly, under present high inflation conditions, labor‑market softness reflects entrenched financing costs, balance‑sheet strain, policy uncertainty, volatile prices, and compressed margins. (Figure 6, lowest chart) 

Unlike the post‑pandemic reopening inflation spike, when BSP’s unprecedented injections and fiscal support temporarily fueled pent‑up demand, today’s environment discourages irreversible capital commitments. Employment gains in agriculture, construction, and accommodation may be seasonal or policy‑driven, not evidence of durable expansion. 

These conditions do not naturally encourage the irreversible commitments associated with expanding structural capital. 

The sectoral composition of employment gains reinforces this caution. 

Agriculture recorded the largest employment increase despite recurring weather disruptions and elevated input costs. Construction also expanded, although some of its momentum may reflect continued government infrastructure activity rather than broad-based private investment. Accommodation and food services improved despite tourism in recession in 2025, as well as earlier reported contractions in Baguio, Boracay, Hundred Islands and East Visayas. 

Such movements may represent temporary adjustments, seasonal effects, or sector-specific developments. 

They do not, by themselves, demonstrate a generalized expansion of productive capacity. 

The labor data is another manifestation of benchmarkism

Employment, unemployment, and underemployment are valuable indicators. They measure observable outcomes, but they reveal little about the entrepreneurial processes that generate those outcomes. 

They tell us how many people currently have jobs. 

They tell us far less about whether entrepreneurs are committing scarce capital to create the productive capacity required for future employment. 

That unseen process ultimately determines whether current labor conditions represent a durable expansion or merely a temporary improvement within a constrained economic structure.

IIID. Wage Mandates and the Intervention Spiral 

Against this backdrop, the Metro Manila wage board approved a historic Php85 per day increase in mandated wages, the largest adjustment in years. The measure was presented as a response to rising living costs and as protection against inflation. 

The political appeal is understandable. 

The economic challenge is that higher mandated wages do not restore lost purchasing power. They redistribute the burden of reduced real income among employers, consumers, investors, taxpayers, and workers themselves. 

The cost does not disappear because it is mandated. 

Businesses facing higher labor costs must adjust through some combination of lower margins, higher prices, reduced hiring, delayed investment, automation, or restructuring. The ability to absorb these costs differs significantly across firms. 

Large corporations with stronger balance sheets, broader revenue sources, easier access to financing, and greater pricing power may adapt more easily. 

Many MSMEs face a different reality. Operating with thinner margins, limited access to financing, and fewer opportunities to pass costs forward, smaller firms are generally less capable of absorbing mandated increases in labor costs. 

The effects of such policies are therefore not distributed evenly across the economy. Larger enterprises with stronger balance sheets, greater access to capital markets, established supply chains, and greater pricing power are better positioned to adjust. For smaller competitors and potential new entrants, however, higher compliance costs can become additional barriers to expansion. 

This creates an unintended asymmetry. Policies introduced in the name of protecting workers strengthens the position of established firms by increasing the cost of competition, while reducing opportunities for smaller enterprises to grow, train new workers, and create new employment capacity. This creates an implicit protective moat for conglomerates, raising barriers to entry and reinforcing concentration under the guise of worker protection

The consequences extend beyond immediate hiring decisions. Firms may respond by reducing entry-level opportunities, favoring experienced workers over new graduates, limiting employee benefits, postponing expansion, increasing automation where feasible, or remaining informal. These adjustments reduce the economy's capacity to develop skills, accumulate enterprise capital, and expand productive output. 

When such interventions occur within an environment of monetary accommodation and expanding liquidity, the adjustment process becomes even more complex. Higher business costs can contribute to higher prices, while weaker investment incentives constrain future supply growth. The result is not simply a labor-market adjustment, but a mechanism through which inflationary pressures and weaker productive capacity can reinforce one another—stagflation. 

Over time, successive interventions can generate a cumulative process in which attempts to offset earlier distortions create new distortions requiring further intervention. 

Mandated wage hikes redistribute costs but do not restore purchasing power. Larger firms adapt; MSMEs struggle. The result is an implicit moat for conglomerates, raising barriers to competition. Within monetary accommodation, higher costs feed inflation while weaker investment erodes capacity — stagflation in motion. Successive interventions spiral into quasi‑bailouts, entrenching centralization, weakening feedback, and deepening rent‑seeking fragility. 

IV. Conclusion: Inflation Before Prices 

As Ludwig von Mises observed, what is commonly called inflation today is more accurately the consequence of inflation rather than inflation itself. The persistent tendency to equate inflation with rising consumer prices shifts attention away from the monetary and financial processes that precede those price movements. 

The Philippine experience illustrates why that distinction matters. 

Balance sheets reveal where purchasing power is created. Bank lending reveals where newly created purchasing power is initially directed. Credit allocation influences investment decisions, resource allocation, relative prices, and production structures long before those adjustments become visible in consumer price statistics. 

By the time inflation appears in the Consumer Price Index, the underlying monetary process has often been unfolding for months. 

Yet the process does not end with liquidity creation. The destination of that liquidity matters. When monetary expansion increasingly operates through the financing of existing financial pressures, politically significant sectors, or heavily leveraged structures, liquidity creation can function as a form of quasi-bailoutshifting adjustment costs across balance sheets rather than allowing those pressures to be fully resolved through market processes. 

The consequence is not merely higher prices. 

It is a gradual weakening of the economy's capacity to adjust. Resources are redirected toward sustaining existing structures rather than expanding productive capacity. Price signals are delayed through administrative interventions. Labor statistics improve without necessarily reflecting stronger capital formation. Businesses face rising costs while investment incentives weaken. 

These developments represent different stages of the same underlying process. 

The BSP's balance-sheet and lending data therefore provide more than a snapshot of current financial conditions. They reveal the evolving structure through which liquidity is created, transmitted, allocated, and ultimately reflected in economic outcomes. June's inflation report, the widening divergence between headline and core inflation, the burden borne by lower-income households, the changing character of employment, and the growing reliance on successive interventions are not isolated developments. They are manifestations of a broader balance-sheet process. 

Understanding inflation therefore requires looking beyond benchmark statistics. Consumer prices summarize observable outcomes. They do not explain how those outcomes came into being. 

Following inflation means following the money. 

It means following balance sheets before price indices, credit allocation before consumer spending, and institutional incentives before policy outcomes. 

Only by understanding that sequence can we understand not only why prices rise, but also why repeated attempts to suppress adjustment can transform monetary accommodation into a self-reinforcing process of weaker investment, distorted allocation, and ultimately stagflation. 

_____

References: (last 3)

Stagflation Part 11: The Intervention Ecosystem Behind Moody's and Fitch's Banking Warnings 

Stagflation Part 10: The Politics of Contradiction—Rate Hikes, Liquidity Addiction, and External Constraint Under Balance-Sheet Stress 

Stagflation Part 9: The Good News Mirage — Statistical Stability Amid Structural Fragility


Monday, December 07, 2020

Five Reasons Why Stagflation Risks Will Dominate the Philippine Economic Landscape in 2021

 


Special privilege is any item of income or of position in the market for goods and services where the amount paid and received fails to reflect the judgment of "the judges of the market place" as to its worth. It is where the judgment of the voters in the economic market place is overruled by their political servants; it is where persons are forced to pay for a thing beyond their opinion of its worth, through the device of an authority backed by the taxing power or legal penalty. Among the things that fall in this class of special privilege are monopoly, prohibition of competition through force, fixing of prices by governmental decree or protection of others who do the same thing, the forcing of payment for work not wanted done, and the prohibition of the free movement of goods across political borders—F. A. Harper, Liberty: A Path To Its Recovery  

 

 

In this issue 

Five Reasons Why Stagflation Risks Will Dominate the Philippine Economic Landscape in 2021 

I. Touché! A Mainstream Admission of the BSP Instigated K-Shape Recovery! 

II. Mainstream’s Incredible Forecasting Blindness! In 2021: Economic Turmoil Shifts from the Shutdown to the Backlash from the Bailout Policies 

III. Public and Infrastructure Spending Down Again in October as DBCC’s Downgrades 2020 GDP Again! 

IV. Stagflation Has Arrived! Why the Surge in the CPI Will Be Sustained 

V. Disruption of Say’s Law: Be Careful of What you Wish For; The BSP’s Inflation Tax 

VI. Growing Risks from Inflating Bubbles, Treasury Markets Signal Inflation and Emergent Risks of Stagflation 

 

Five Reasons Why Stagflation Risks Will Dominate the Economic Landscape in 2021 


I. Touché! A Mainstream Admission of the BSP Instigated K-Shape Recovery! 

 

From an earlier note… 

 

A K-shaped recovery leads to changes in the structure of the economy or the broader society as economic outcomes and relations are fundamentally changed before and after the recession, according to Investopedia. For instance, the net worth of American billionaires zoomed in 2020, even as the economy has struggled. That's mostly from record highs in the US stock markets fueled by the US Fed’s liquidity expansion. 

  

Here, the distribution of ownership of listed securities at the Philippine capital markets, as well as the distribution of trading participants should give us a clue of the main beneficiaries of the central bank liquidity pumps. 

  

In the US, it is called Wall Street versus Main Street. 


Ten Signs of a Frothing Speculative Mania in the Philippine Stock Exchange! November 15, 2020 

 

And… 

 

In doing so, the Php 1.9 trillion liquidity bonanza has effectively been subsidizing big-time corporate borrowers at the expense of savers while simultaneously amplifying credit risks as signified by the growing divergence in the bond spread of corporations and the domestic treasuries.  


Philippine Elites Urge the BSP to Double Liquidity Injections as 3Q Corporate Debt Swells while Revenues and Income Plunge! November 29, 2020 

 

Then last week… 

 

From the ABS-CBN News (December 1): MANILA - The head of Ayala Corp on Tuesday said the country’s recovery from the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic will likely be uneven, with big companies quickly bouncing back while smaller businesses continuing to face challenges.  This was in contrast to the projection of the Department of Trade and Industry which sees a strong V-shaped recovery next year…“We recognize that the recovery in our country will not be the same for everyone. In fact, we already see today that while capital markets are open to large, established institutions who thus have more options to endure the downturn, the drop in consumer demand has left many MSMEs in a more challenged position,” Zobel said during a virtual forum on foreign investment in the post-pandemic Philippines. “Those already most vulnerable stand to become even more so,” Zobel told participants in the 9th Arangkada Philippines Forum.  

 

Touché! 

 

The financial and economic ramifications of BSP policies of zero-bound rates and the current bailouts are not neutral and subject to the Cantillon Effects, viz. early receivers of newly created money or monetary inflation are the primary beneficiaries coming at the expense of late receivers of money. That isthe injection of new money to the financial channel or the government (direct QE) unevenly influences the structure of money prices, which reflect on the distribution of resources and wealth of the economy in their favor, in the short-run and over time. The limited participation/penetration levels of MSMEs and individuals in the formal financial system compounds such effects. 

  

And the fact is that since a significant portion of their revenue streams, and supply chains as well as financial claims and vice versa, are entwined with MSMEs, firms of the elites don’t operate in isolation either. This means that unless the elites use such a void to gain a greater share of the economy, which should lead towards monopolization, the present economic fallout will linger on. 

 

II. Mainstream’s Incredible Forecasting Blindness! In 2021: Economic Turmoil Shifts from the Shutdown to the Backlash from the Bailout Policies 

 

And as the yearend nears, expect the mainstream to dish out fabulous predictions for 2021. 

 

Here are two opposing forecasts. One is from a leading credit rating agency, the S&P Global Ratings, while the other represents a multilateral agency, the ADB. 

 

From the CNN (November 30): The Philippine economy is on its way to bouncing back from the coronavirus pandemic, but recent typhoons caused a setback, S&P Global Ratings said. In a new set of forecast for Asia-Pacific economies, the global credit rater noted the slow downtrend in new COVID-19 cases in the country, which allowed for freer movement and more jobs as quarantine rules were relaxed. However, recent typhoons dampened the gradual pick-up in economic activity, S&P said. The country incurred billions of pesos in damage to agriculture and infrastructure in the aftermath of Typhoons Quinta and Ulysses and Super Typhoon Rolly. S&P maintained its projections for the Philippines: negative 9.5 percent for this year, and a recovery of 9.6 percent in 2021. 

 

From the Inquirer (December 2) COVID-19’s impact on economies will spill over to next year such that the pandemic-induced economic losses in the Philippines would exceed 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) both in 2020 and 2021 especially due to a slow recovery in consumer confidence, according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 

 

The following news excerpts reveal the track record of S&P Global. 

 

From the Businessworld (February 20): In a note sent to reporters on Wednesday, S&P said it lowered its gross domestic product (GDP) growth outlook for the Philippines to 6.1% in 2020, from the already downgraded 6.2%. The global ratings agency maintained its Philippine growth forecast at 6.4% for 2022. 


From ABS-CBN News (April 30) The Philippine economy could contract by 0.2 percent this year and credit will grow at its slowest pace as a fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, debt-watcher S&P said Thursday. The lockdown, which started on March 17, covered Luzon Island home to roughly half of the country’s 100 million population which also accounts for 70 percent of the economy, said S&P Global Ratings associate director Nikita Anand. 


From the Manila Times (June 27): S&P Global Ratings on Friday trimmed anew its estimate for the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) performance this year as it pointed to government-imposed, growth-disrupting lockdowns as the reason. “Economic activity has stalled and we expect the economy to shrink 3 percent this year, compared with growth of 6.0 percent in 2019,” the credit ratings agency said in a report. 


The world’s leading credit rating agency revised its forecast by at least FOUR times this year! Amazing! 

  

It speaks loudly on how they conduct their so-called ratings or appraisals of institutional or national credit profiles. 

 

Now let us move on to the ADB. 


From the ADB (April 3) In its annual flagship economic publication, Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2020, ADB projects the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP) to grow at 2.0% in 2020 following an “enhanced community quarantine” imposed by the government in March to stop the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in the country. But ADB expects a strong recovery to 6.5% GDP growth in 2021, assuming that COVID-19 infections in the country are curbed by June this year. 


From the Businessworld (June 19): THE Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) outlook for the Philippines has turned grim, as it now expects the economy to shrink by as much as 3.8% this year. …“The forecast for 2020 is revised down to 3.8% contraction because household consumption and investment have slowed more than expected. The contraction in the global economy will continue to drag external trade, tourism and remittances,” the ADB said in the report…For 2021, the ADB kept its 6.5% growth forecast for the Philippines, “supported by public infrastructure spending and anticipated recovery in consumer and business confidence.” 


From the Manila Times (July 24) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) expects the country’s gross domestic product to contract by as much as 5.3 percent this year, although it says there are encouraging signs that the worst may be over for the economy. In a virtual briefing on Thursday, ADB Country Director for the Philippines Kelly Bird cited the “ADB Outlook 2020 Supplement” report it released in mid-June in describing the 3.8-percent decline it forecast then as “the median of our range, which is 2.3 to 5.3 percent.”  

 

From the ADB (September 15): The Philippine economy is forecast to contract by 7.3% in 2020 amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic before growth returns to 6.5% in 2021, according to a new report from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) released today. 

 

Figure 1 

ADB downshifted their projections by at least FIVE times!  

 

This exercise shows how CLUELESS the mainstream has been. 

  

Basic economic logic tells us that the near-total freezing of the division of labor will lead not only to a deep recession but also to a massive disruption of the production and pricing structure, such that the longer the freeze, the wider the swath, and the greater the scale of economic devastation.  

  

Given that the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 2019 GDP exhibits the share of the Luzon region, constituting about 70% of the GDP, it is stunning to see the mainstream predict only 3% (S&P Global June) or 3.8% (ADB June) annual contraction following a quarter of near-total shutdown! 

  

Another important lesson is that the economy CANNOT be opened and shut like a water spigot WITHOUT incurring substantial damages that will have lasting effects. The failure to comprehend the complexity of the intertwined network effects of the economy have led to the historic debacle of the policy of lockdown socialism. 

  

Moreover, because the shutdown only exposed the vulnerabilities from embedded imbalances, the National Government (NG), along with its monetary agency, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), has been impelled to launch an unprecedented bailout program with which consequences remain in the dark for them 

 

And obsessed with formalism through econometrics, because the economy is seen by the mainstream as only a construct of statistical numbers, to arrest risk aversion, authorities have tinkered with statistics and joined global central bank contemporaries to inflate risk assets to restore animal spirits.  

 

The popular understanding is that throwing money via the printing press of the BSP to save the economy will work like magic.   

 

But, two wrongs don’t make a right.  

 

In 2021, the source of the economy's burden and suffering will shift or transition from the repercussions of the economic freeze to the adverse consequences or repercussions of this year's bailout policies. 

  

Yet, hardly anyone from the mainstream sees any chance of this happening. 

 

III. Public and Infrastructure Spending Down Again in October as DBCC’s Downgrades 2020 GDP Again! 

 

Barely a month after the imposition of the ECQ, the administration promised to use "build, build and build" to fuel a bounce in the GDP. 

 

Here is an example.  

 

Metro Manila (CNN Philppines, April 13)— The administration's flagship infrastructure program "Build, Build, Build" will be a steady force in the Philippines' recovery plan amid the COVID-19 crisis, with a top official saying it will be the country's "fuel" for an economic "bounce back." Finance Secretary Carlos "Sonny" Dominguez III told CNN Philippines Monday that the government should likewise focus on infrastructure developments as a way of pump priming the economy. 

 

Strangely, the administration appears to be pulling their punches.  

 

After peaking in April, public spending continues to languish towards the yearend. It was down 6.84% in October, the first month of the fourth quarter, from a larger decline of 15.45% last September and grew by a measly .38% in August. 

 

As such, public spending growth in the last 10-months slowed to 12.75%. 

 

 

 

Figure 2 

 

Construction wholesale prices, which include prices declared by the Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH), National Housing Authority (NHA), and Subdivision and Housing Developers Association (SHDA), inched higher last October, but its price trend remains downhill.  Growth of cement prices remained sluggish as cement production continues to shrink in the face of a flurry of bids on infrastructure-related stocks at the PSE since the nadir of March. (Figure 1, lowest pane) 

 

So what happened to build, build, and build? Despite sustained informational media campaign, why the slowdown?  

 

Yet, the supposed elixir effect on the economy continues to bombard media. 

 

From the Businessworld (December 2): A CONSTRUCTION spending level equivalent to 5% of GDP will be the “magic number” that will likely drive an economic recovery, Acting Socioeconomic Planning Secretary Karl Kendrick T. Chua, said at a construction industry conference. Speaking at the forum arranged by the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines Wednesday, Mr. Chua said he expects a pickup in the sector with the government planning to ramp up spending on infrastructure projects to P1.12 trillion in 2021 and P1.018 trillion in 2022, equivalent to 5.5% and 4.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. “The magic number that we are targeting is 5% (of GDP), which is sufficient (for the) economy to rebound strongly. That translates to a lot of jobs,” Mr. Chua said. 

 

Wow! If 5% translates to a lot of jobs, why not 50% or 100%? Wouldn’t we reach nirvana by then? 

 

From John Maynard Keynes, 

 

If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing. 

 

John Maynard Keynes, Chapter 10, Book 3; The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Marxists.org 

 

Sounds familiar? 

 

But then who pays for these grand digging projects? 

 

Because of constraints in public spending, the modest fiscal deficit of Php 61.36 billion last October has emerged principally from the revenue shortfall of 12.8% from collection deficits of the BIR (-14.2%) and the BoC (-12.3%). [Figure 2, upmost left pane] 

 

In the 10-months of 2020, though the aggregate deficit hit a record Php 940.58 billion. [Figure 2, upmost right pane] 

 

The lower-than-expected output has impelled the DBCC to prune down the deficit-to-GDP target from 9.6% to 7.6% in 2020. And perhaps because of the reduction in public spending activities through the yearend, the same budget agency revised down their GDP target for 2020 to -8.5 to -9.5%. Revised down again, then again and again. 

 

Once again from our July outlook… 

 

The point is not that they have been wrong, yes they have been consistently and flagrantly wrong, but rather, their rapidly shifting projections do not even seem to be even driven by data or by context.  

 

The most important lesson, aside from the moving goalpost, has been that the NG subjected the population to a repressive social “health” policy when they were either clueless of its economic implications or had an unstated different agenda in mind.  

 

The Failure of the Centrally Planned ECQ Health Policy, Statistical Charades, and 1Q Real Estate Divergences July 12, 2020 

 

Oddly too, while the National Government appears to be backpedaling from its proposed fuel for economic recovery, it has been borrowing aggressively 

 

Last October, public debt jumped by an unprecedented Php 659 billion (month-on-month) to hit a milestone Php 10.028 trillion or about 56% of the annualized GDP (based on the revised DBCC target). [Figure 2, middle window] 

 

If the NG is keeping a tab on public spending, why borrow aggressively? 

  

Are they borrowing to pump public spending up in 2021?  

 

Or are they expecting deficits to swell from the implementation of the CREATE bill, which passed the Senate last week, that would apply retroactively and thus, initially weaken the top-line of the income statement of the National Government? 

 

Or are they fretful that a spike in public spending in the face of Php 1.9 trillion liquidity injections may combust street inflation? 

 

Or is it a combination of the above? 

 

As a final note, system leverage (public debt plus universal and commercial banking loans) reached a historic Php 18.726 trillion or a staggering 105% of the DBCC’s downgraded GDP target for 2020! [Figure 2, lowest pane] 

 

As an aside, while cutting taxes should be a welcome development, it is inconsistent with a government indulged in record public spending and accommodating a ballooning fiscal deficit on a historic scale, funded by a colossal surge in debt stocks. 

 

From the Inquirer (December 1): Dominguez earlier acknowledged that repaying these massive borrowings could require higher taxes in the future and possibly selling government assets, like mining sites and contracts, and selling gaming operations to the private sector. 

 

Prolonged economic weakness, and or higher rates or reduced access to savings (here or abroad) will force the government to either raise taxes soon or accelerate the use of the BSP’s printing press. It may even do both simultaneously. 

 

IV. Stagflation Has Arrived! Why the Surge in the CPI Will Be Sustained 

 

From the Inquirer (December 4): Prices of basic goods and services accelerated beyond the central bank’s forecast range for November, due mainly to a spike in food prices caused by the recent spate of typhoons. Despite this, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Governor Benjamin Diokno assured that the 3.3 percent inflation rate for last month was a temporary phenomenon. In a mobile phone message to reporters on Friday, the central bank chief said that the average inflation rate is still expected to settle “within the government’s target range of 3 percent, plus or minus 1 percent for 2020-2022, as the impact of supply disruptions due to recent typhoons is expected to be largely transitory.” 

 

Figure 3 

While a supply shock from the recent typhoons may have been a contributor to the recent rise in statistical inflation, under the current scenario, it is doubtful that rising prices have signified a transitory phenomenon. 

 

Nota bene: This author does not believe in the accuracy of the CPI simply because averaging different goods as potatoes, cars, laptops, and Netflix subscription fees represent a ridiculous and impractical exercise, and thus, do not reflect a realistic demonstration of price changes experienced by individuals writ large (community). Furthermore, since the CPI is a political-economic sensitive number, as per the PSA, "it is a major statistical series used for economic analysis and as a monitoring indicator of government economic policy", hence to advance the political-economic agenda of the incumbent such statistics are vulnerable to interventions. But anyway, using the lens of the mainstream, we extrapolate this data alongside the others to arrive at some clues of the political economy heading forward.  

 

First, momentum and trend. 

 

Since the short-bouts of deflation in September and October 2015, the headline CPI has been on an uptrend. It raged in 2018, peaked to multi-year highs in September 2018, marked by the rice crisis, then fell off the cliff to reach a bottom in September 2019, from which it began its grinding uphill climb. 

 

The headline CPI consolidated for most of 2020 as the economy had been shut down, then accelerated upwards in November, breaking out of the said range, reinforcing the momentum and price trend. [Figure 3, upmost window] 

 

The 5-year and 1-year uptrends have barely been in accord with the claim that November’s CPI represents a “transitory” phenomenon. 

 

Meanwhile, the core CPI remains rangebound, highlighting feeble demand and the crucial shift in expenditures towards necessities. 

 

Second, the CPI exhibits the massive disruption of the division of labor and Say’s Law. 

 

Typhoons, a politically convenient and heuristic-based excuse, haven’t been the only source of supply shocks.  

 

The National Government’s quarantine policy has caused a monumental structural disruption of the division of labor, which not only has curtailed and deformed the entwined, interconnected lattice networks of supply and demand chains but likewise, through price caps, has been reinforcing maladjustments.  

 

The BSP-led Financial Stability Coordinating Council even admits to this in their latest Financial Stability Report: (bold original, italics mine) [p.26 to 29] 

 

Wholesale and trade. The viability of big and bigger malls may have to be reconsidered. This is not just because of physical distancing norms, which will affect baseline assumptions about foot traffic. The bigger concern may be in the emergence of ecommerce, which has given retailers its internet-based platform to sell and market products. This provides consumers greater reach and enables households to purchase at the comfort of their homes, without being constrained with store hours or dreaded parking at the malls. With some products visible on the online market even before the pandemic, the quarantine was the trigger for the underlying, likely permanent change. Online transactions also adjust the employment frontier from the stores/retailers to the backroom services handling electronic orders. Physical stores may not be completely eliminated but a reconfiguration is likely. 

 

Transportation-related services. The premium on space hits transportation significantly. Air travel needs to be reconfigured on the operating assumption that the baseline revenue-passenger kilometer (RPK)25 is adjusted downwards. With most airplanes currently acquired via a lease, the financing component necessarily must be addressed. Public transportation carriers are similarly impacted as passengers-per-trip is expected to decline even though the marginal cost (fuel and depreciation) is less dependent on the number of riding passengers as they are on the number of trips. Likewise, air and sea cargo are also not dependent on passenger traffic, but will nonetheless depend on market activity where intra-border activity is all the more important. Vehicles used for delivery services are expected to get a further boost from the shift to e-commerce and this will favor compact, maintenance-light designs. 

 

Leisure activities and services. A global economy reeling from a pandemic will carefully weigh the timing and propriety of leisure-related activities. There will be a balance between treating leisure as a demand that can be postponed as against a needed outlet for built-up stress. The key will be in convincing the public that standard health protocols and hygiene practices are effectively and continuously applied, particularly for facilities that offer public use. Dine-in facilities and travel accommodations will likely see demand lag for some time, while current capacities and sprawling structures will have to be rationalized in light of the spacing and health concerns.  

 

Real estate. This presents an enigma as several factors are at play. For one, the value of distancing and the preference for open spaces will create a premium for more “sprawling” developments and a discount on existing “cramped” locations. For another, as interest rates are expected to remain low for some time, financing real estate is relatively cheap at this point. Yet, there is that premium on liquidity as well. While developers have a strong desire to re-establish their liquidity, would-be buyers may also not want to part with their liquidity given market uncertainties. All these may boil down to a need versus a want on the buy-side while the sell side may have to prioritize liquidity for now in anticipation of a protracted recovery to an uncertain New Economy. 

 

Professional services. Face-to-face meetings are still not the norm and increasingly, business dealings are held through virtual meetings. Advisory-type services are creating a demand for remote meeting apps, with the sustainability heavily depending on available IT infrastructures. Most professional services can be delivered through cyber means but at some loss of interpersonal interactions. Such interaction may be more important for some (for example, medical consultations and legal advice) than others (i.e. business transactions and consulting services). Webinars and e-learning facilities may now be the rave, but the network that one develops in face-to-face activities is as much value than the knowledge shared at these activities. In effect, the output can be delivered in cyberspace but cannot really be quite the same 

 

The forcible shift to eCommerce and telecommutation (remote work or work from home), for instance, will have substantial adverse consequences on the brick-and-mortar economic model, most particularly, shopping malls or other commercial real estate projects. And not only will this entail losses and an upsurge in idle resources, but leveraged financing predicated on the previous race-to-build supply (malinvestments) will likely take a hit from such structural change.  

  

The share of loans of retail, real estate, construction, and finance account for a whopping Universal and commercial banks 45.7% of the total banking loan portfolio net of Reserve Repos as of October. [Figure 3 middle pane] 

 

While the BSP focuses on the services side of the economy, significant shifts have likewise covered the production side.  

 

V. Disruption of Say’s Law: Be Careful of What you Wish For; The BSP’s Inflation Tax 

 

According to Jean-Baptiste Say’s “the law of markets” or eponymously “Say’s Law”, production precedes consumption or demand is comprised by supply. Goods and services are paid for by other goods and services. Money, functioning as a medium, facilitates such exchanges. Hence, supply disruptions would redound to dislocations in demand or reduced production extrapolates to diminished income. 

 

That said, given the current environment, where encompassing drastic political interventions, compounded by the radical change in consumer behavior and preferences have strained the supply side, prices of goods and services may surge to manifest improvements in demand (even on a partial scale) fueled by the BSP’s monetary inflation--channeled via public spending and or even a revival of bank lending. 

 

And to counter this, imports would have to complement domestic supply, which should widen further trade deficits, and subsequently, exert pressure on the stock of US dollars and foreign exchange held by both banks and the BSP, which again should get manifested on the USD peso exchange rate.    

 

Thus, the rosy projections for 2021 by the mainstream reverberates to a "Be careful what you wish for" moment. 

 

Third, the BSP has been implementing an inflation tax.  

 

When the BSP forces down its policy rates to attain a negative real rates regime, which represents an implied subsidy to the borrowers such as the National Government, the outcome has been typically a rising price trend for the CPI. The differentials between November’s CPI (3.3%) and the BSP’s ON RRP newly adjusted rates (2%) has only expanded and thus authorities have only deepened the use of Financial Repression or the inflation tax policies against the citizenry.  

 

So while the BSP says that the higher CPI is only transitory, their actions underscore a policy to increase the confiscation of more resources from the public indirectly or through the BSP’s printing press. 

 

Furthermore, while the job, revenue, and income losses from the massive dislocations of the networks of supply chains have recently capped increases in CPI, the intertemporal consequences to the BSP’s Php 1.9 trillion of liquidity injections, could be a spark to the unleashing of spiraling price inflation (CPI). 

 

From the CNN December 3: The BSP has slashed the key interest rate — which is used by banks and other lenders in pricing loans — to a record-low of 2%, hoping to entice people and businesses to borrow and sustain their spending behavior to tide the economy through the recession. Strict bank rules on lending and liquidity have also been relaxed, which include lower reserve requirements, additional property loans, and more incentives to lend to micro, small, and medium enterprises. In sum, these interventions have injected an additional ₱1.9 trillion to the financial system, waiting to be taken up as retail or business loans or be reinvested. However, banks have been reluctant to grant credit as they turn risk-averse, while demand is also down as people and business owners are uncertain of their financial prospects. Diokno said the benign inflation trend, which is seen to stay below 3% until 2022, lets the central bank keep rates down. "This outlook provides the BSP with ample room to keep the monetary stance sufficiently accommodative to mitigate the strong downside risks to growth," he added…Diokno, who was Budget secretary before being appointed as BSP governor in March 2019, admitted the stimulus packages laid out by the national government are "relatively lower" compared to those rolled out by neighboring countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. "Even as BSP is prepared to implement additional policy measures, fiscal policy should play a more significant role in helping restore market confidence," the central bank chief noted. 

 

Once again, prolonged economic weakness, and or higher rates or reduced access to savings (here or abroad) will force the government to either raise taxes soon or accelerate the use of the BSP’s printing press. It may even do both simultaneously. 

 

Of course, the BSP thinks it can contain or manage any outbreak of the CPI with barely any costs. That is what they want us to believe.  

 

Figure 4 

 

Sadly, the recent peak of 4.75% from November 2018 to April 2019 in its ON RRP rates exposed the economy’s fragility and its eroding capability to handle leverage at such levels as soaring bank delinquencies followed (even before 2020). [Figure 4, upmost pane] Moreover, declining CPI and ON RRP had barely supported bank lending growth. [Figure 4, middle pane] 

 

The BSP’s combined rescue operations have recently jolted money supply growth represented by M3, which culminated in May at 16.74% that subsequently juiced up the CPI.  However, frail bank lending plus raging delinquencies appears to be offsetting the liquidity tsunami being foisted into the financial system by the BSP.  

 

That being the case, the morbid consternation of monetary deflation will most likely also incent authorities to escalate the expansion of the domestic central bank’s balance sheet.  

 

VI. Growing Risks from Inflating Bubbles, Treasury Markets Signal Inflation and Emergent Risks of Stagflation 

 

 

 

Figure 5 

Fourth, the BSP’s policy of inflating asset bubbles only underscores the aggravation of the misdirection of scarce resourcesSurging money supply growth eventually feeds into the CPI and the stock market. So unlike recent mainstream rationalizations suggesting that lower CPI is good for stocks, ascending CPI has usually accompanied the increases of the headline index as today. [figure 5] 

  

And as previously noted, the recent aerial acrobatics by the domestic equity benchmark, which has resonated with the world, has barely been accounted for by any significant improvement on the economy, rather, has signified the thrust by the BSP and global central banks to perk up the animal spirits or market confidence to keep deflation at bay, through sustained liquidity injections. 

  

Yet aside from detachment from realities, asset bubbles have been driving an inequality wedge, which translates to increasing political division over time, and as pointed above, had been cited by an elite. 

 

The zeitgeist of monetary inflation eloquently captured by this quote from John Maynard Keynes:  

 

Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currencyBy a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security but [also] at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth. 

 

Those to whom the system brings windfalls, beyond their deserts and even beyond their expectations or desires, become "profiteers," who are the object of the hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has impoverished, not less than of the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery. 

 

Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose. 

 

John Maynard Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace 1919. pp. 235-248. PBS.org 

 

The unwinding of bubbles will contribute to the general tightening of money that should add to the pressure of increasing rates.  

 

 

Figure 6 

Fifth and lastly, Philippine Treasury markets have been saying inflation ahead!  

 

Curves across the treasury have been steepening. With rates rising faster at the farther end, this represents a “bearish steepener” or concerns over increased inflation ahead. 

 

The odd thing is that despite the mainstream’s rhetoric, the few participants of the treasury market, which consists mainly of domestic financial institutions (private and public) appear to be defying expectations of a “benign inflation trend”, seen by the BSP “to stay below 3% until 2022”.  

 

Again, an economic rebound in the face of the Php 1.9 trillion floating liquidity should mean higher inflation, which consequently translates to rising interest rates and a weaker peso. Such an environment should expose the underbelly of the banking system. 

  

And again, even as signs of stagflation has already appeared, hardly anyone has been expecting such a dynamic to become the primary risk of 2021.