Infographics: The World’s Most Famous Case of Hyperinflation: Weimar Germany (Part 1 & 2)

The World’s Most Famous Case of Hyperinflation (Part 1)

The Money Project is an ongoing collaboration between Visual Capitalist and Texas Precious Metals that seeks to use intuitive visualizations to explore the origins, nature, and use of money.

From the Money Project/Visual Capitalist

The Great War ended on the 11th hour of November 11th, 1918, when the signed armistice came into effect. 

Though this peace would signal the end of the war, it would also help lead to a series of further destruction: this time the destruction of wealth and savings.

The world’s most famous hyperinflation event, which took place in Germany from 1921 and 1924, was a financial calamity that led millions of people to have their savings erased.

The Treaty of Versailles

Five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Treaty of Versailles was signed, officially ending the state of war between Germany and the Allies.

The terms of the agreement, which were essentially forced upon Germany, made the country:

1. Accept blame for the war

2. Agree to pay £6.6 billion in reparations (equal to $442 billion in USD today)

3. Forfeit territory in Europe as well as its colonies

4. Forbid Germany to have submarines or an air force, as well as a limited army and navy

5. Accept the Rhineland, a strategic area bordering France and other countries, to be fully demilitarized.

“I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible.” – John Maynard Keynes, representative of the British Treasury

Keynes believed the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were many times more than it was possible for Germany to pay. He thought that this could create large amounts of instability with the global financial system.

The Catalysts

1. Germany had suspended the Mark’s convertibility into gold at the beginning of war.

This created two separate versions of the same currency:

Goldmark: The Goldmark refers to the version on the gold standard, with 2790 Mark equal to 1 kg of pure gold. This meant: 1 USD = 4 Goldmarks, £1 = 20.43 Goldmarks

Papiermark: The Papiermark refers to the version printed on paper. These were used to finance the war.

In fear that Germany would run the printing presses, the Allies specified that reparations must be paid in the Goldmarks and raw materials of equivalent value.

2. Heavy Debt

Even before reparations, Germany was already in significant debt. The country had borrowed heavily during the war with expectations that it would be won, leaving the losers repay the loans.

Adding together previous debts with the reparations, debt exceeded Germany’s GDP.

3. Inability to Pay

The burden of payments was high. The country’s economy had been damaged by the war, and the loss of Germany’s richest farmland (West Prussia) and the Saar coalfields did not help either.

Foreign speculators began to lose confidence in Germany’s ability to pay, and started betting against the Mark.

Foreign banks and businesses expected increasingly large amounts of German money in exchange for their own currency. It became very expensive for Germany to buy food and raw materials from other countries.

Germany began mass printing bank notes to buy foreign currency, which was in turn used to pay reparations.

4. Invasion of The Ruhr 

After multiple defaults on payments of coal and timber, the Reparation Commission voted to occupy Germany’s most important industrial lands (The Ruhr) to enforce the payment of reparations.

French and Belgian troops invaded in January 1923 and began The Occupation of The Ruhr.

German authorities promoted the spirit of passive resistance, and told workers to “do nothing” to help the invaders. In other words, The Ruhr was in a general strike, and income from one of Germany’s most important industrial areas was gone. 

On top of that, more and more banknotes had to be printed to pay striking workers.

Hyperinflation

Just two calendar years after the end of the war, the Papiermark was worth 10% of its original value. By the end of 1923, it took 1 trillion Papiermarks to buy a single Goldmark.

All cash savings had lost their value, and the prudent German middleclass savers were inexplicably punished. Learn about the effects of German hyperinflation, how it was curtailed, and about other famous hyperinflations in Part 2. 

Courtesy of: The Money Project

Part 2

Again from the Money Project/Visual Capitalist

Slippery Slope

“Inflation took the basic law-and-order principles of loyalty and trust to the extreme.” Martin Geyer, Historian. 

“As things stand, the only way to finance the cost of fighting the war is to shift the burden into the future through loans.” Karl Helfferich, an economist in 1915.

“There is a point at which printing money affects purchasing power by causing inflation.” Eduard Bernstein, socialist in 1918.

In the two years past World War I, the German government added to the monetary base of the Papiermark by printing money. Economic historian Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich said that the “lubricant of inflation” helped breathe new life into the private sector.

The mark was trading for a low value against the dollar, sterling and the French franc and this helped to boost exports. Industrial output increased by 20% a year, unemployment fell to below 1 percent in 1922, and real wages rose significantly.

Then, suddenly this “lubricant” turned into a slippery slope: at its most severe, the monthly rate of inflation reached 3.25 billion percent, equivalent to prices doubling every 49 hours.

When did the “lubricant” of inflation turn into a toxic hyperinflationary spiral?

The ultimate trigger for German hyperinflation was the loss of trust in the government’s policy and debt. Foreign markets refused to buy German debt or Papiermarks, the exchange rate depreciated, and the rate of inflation accelerated.

The Effects

Hyperinflation in Germany left millions of hard-working savers with nothing left.

Over the course of months, what was enough money to start a stable retirement fund was no longer enough to buy even a loaf of bread.

Who was affected?

-The middle class – or Mittelstand – saw the value of their cash savings wiped out before their eyes.

-Wealth was transferred from general public to the government, which issued the money.

-Borrowers gained at the expense of lenders.

-Renters gained at the expense of property owners (In Germany’s case, rent ceilings did not keep pace with general price levels)

-The efficiency of the economy suffered, as people preferred to barter.

-People preferred to hold onto hard assets (commodities, gold, land) rather than paper money, which continually lost value.

Stories of Hyperinflation

During the peak of hyperinflation, workers were often paid twice a day. Workers would shop at midday to make sure their money didn’t lose more value. People burned paper bills in the stove, as they were cheaper than wood or other fuel.

Here some of the stories of ordinary Germans during the world’s most famous case of hyperinflation.

“The price of tram rides and beef, theater tickets and school, newspapers and haircuts, sugar and bacon, is going up every week,” Eugeni Xammar, a journalist, wrote in February 1923. “As a result no one knows how long their money will last, and people are living in constant fear, thinking of nothing but eating and drinking, buying and selling.”

A man who drank two cups of coffee at 5,000 marks each was presented with a bill for 14,000 marks. When he asked about the large bill, he was told he should have ordered the coffees at the same time because the price had gone up in between cups.

A young couple took a few hundred million marks to the theater box office hoping to see a show, but discovered it wasn’t nearly enough. Tickets were now a billion marks each.

Historian Golo Mann wrote: “The effect of the devaluation of the German currency was like that of a second revolution, the first being the war and its immediate aftermath,” he concluded. Mann said deep-seated faith was being destroyed and replaced by fear and cynicism. “What was there to trust, who could you rely on if such were even possible?” he asked.

Even Worse Cases of Hyperinflation

While the German hyperinflation from 1921-1924 is the most known – it was not the worst episode in history.

In mid-1946, prices in Hungary doubled every fifteen hours, giving an inflation rate of 41.9 quintillion percent. By July 1946, the 1931 gold pengõ was worth 130 trillion paper pengõs.

Peak Inflation Rates:

Germany (1923): 3.5 billion percent

Zimbabwe (2008): 79.6 billion percent

Hungary (1946): 41.9 quintillion percent

Hyperinflation has been surprisingly common in the 20th century, happening many dozens of times throughout the world. It continues to happen even today in countries such as Venezuela.

What would become of Germany after its bout of hyperinflation?

A young man named Adolf Hitler began to grow angry that innocent Germans were starving…

“We are opposed to swarms of Americans and other foreigners raising prices throughout Germany while millions of Germans are starving because of the increased prices. We are equally opposed to German profiteers and we are demanding that all be imprisoned.” – Adolf Hitler, 1923, Chicago Tribune

Courtesy of: The Money Project

War on Coins: European Commission Proposes 1, 2 cent phase out as German Official Balks

Euro Commission officials has proposed to phase out small denomination coins. Such proposals follows other nations like Canada,  Netherland and Finland whom has similarly embarked on extinguishing coins from circulation.

From Reuters:

Saving pocket change may not end the euro zone crisis, but the European Commission hopes that scrapping the smallest coins could help penny-pinching governments cut costs.

The European Commission outlined proposals this week for the 17 euro zone countries to scrap their 1 and 2 cent coins, leaving 5-cent pieces as the smallest in circulation.

The Commission says the cost of making the coins has exceeded their face value for the past 11 years, effectively costing member states 1.4 billion euros ($1.8 billion).

More than 45 billion of the 1 and 2 cent coins have been minted since the euro entered circulation in 2002, but many are now buried behind sofas, lost in back pockets or left on the street rather than making their way to cash registers.

While scrapping them all together may appear to make sense, some consumers worry that rounding prices up to the nearest 5 cents will prove inflationary. On the other hand, rounding prices down to the nearest 5 cents might be beneficial.

Some observations:

European officials admit that these coins have greater value than the designated official face value.

Here is the content of the euro coins, according to the Wikipedia.org

The euro 1 and 2 coins are two-toned. The "gold" is an alloy, 75% copper, 20% zinc and 5% nickel. The "silver" is cupronickel, 75% copper, 25% nickel. The 10, 20 and 50-cent coins are a proprietary alloy known as "Nordic gold", consisting of 89% copper, 5% aluminium, 5% zinc and 1% tin. The 1, 2 and 5-cent coins are copper-coated steel fourrées. The copper alloys make the coinage antimicrobial.

So for the EU bureaucracy to cut further losses, it has been alleged, coin production need to be halted.

Next, EU officials imply that the public has been unintentionally hoarding coins: “buried behind sofas, lost in back pockets or left on the street rather than making their way to cash registers”.

Authorities acknowledge that such coins have higher value, but they insinuate that their constituents, the average citizens, don’t see or realize this. So the public is completely ignorant from real world affairs.

Such is an example where authorities are engaged in what seems as rhetorical sophistry which media imbibes as the gospel of truth.

In reality, such proposal has been all about political subterfuge.

Even if the ECB has been inflating less than her peers, they have been inflating. (charts from Cumber.com)

Yet by holding coins, one’s resources will affected less from the stealth transfer of being wealth conducted through inflationist policies.

In other words, coins provides refuge against policies that facilitate indirect looting of people’s savings, especially during run away inflation.

Recognizing this, the German central bank or Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann in an interview at the Bild.ge indirectly expressed opposition on such proposals…

In the German population, the desire to hold on to the coinage. Personally, I can only agree with that.

This is natural given the trauma from horrors of the Weimar hyperinflation as shown by the coin above in stating that “On 15 November 1923 1 pound of bread cost 80 billion, 1 pound of meat: 900 billion, 1 glass of beer: 52 billion”

Albeit, Mr. Weidmann leaves the decision on reducing the circulation of coins to the EU finance ministers than to central bankers.

Again whether it is cash transactions, gold and other precious metals, crypto-currencies like bitcoins or even government made coins, world governments have been working around the clock to ensure forced access on people’s savings.

More Inflation Myths: Velocity of Money

John Mauldin defines inflation as

a combination of the money supply AND the velocity of money. In short, if the velocity of money is falling, the Fed can print a great deal of money (expanding its balance sheet) without bringing about inflation.

So how valid or real is his definition?

The Velocity of M2 has been in a decline since 2006. This decline culminated in 2008 with the Lehman bankruptcy. Since bottoming out in early 2009, the velocity of M2 has been rangebound

In contrast, % change of M2 has been ascendant from 2007 and peaked during the first quarter of 2009. From 2009-2010, M2 has been in a steady decline. Following a bottom in early 2010, the % change of the M2 has been roaring upwards.

By the conditional definition that inflation is a function of Money Supply AND velocity, the US should be witnessing disinflation from 2009-2010, since it was only then where both money stock AND velocity had a synchronized decline. And from 2010 to date, a stagnant or rangebound inflation rate.

Unfortunately, only part of the story seems correct. US inflation rate fell from July 2008 and bottomed in July 2009. Since, US CPI rate continues to climb upwards in defiance of Mr. Mauldin’s definition of inflation (chart from trading economics)

The same story applies when seen with the US Producer’s Price Index

Mr. Mauldin was actually discussing the chances of hyperinflation in the US using the Weimar Germany as example

The Weimar hyperinflation according to Wikipedia.org is the

period of hyperinflation in Germany (the Weimar Republic) between 1921 and 1923. (I am emphasizing the period)

Chart from Now and Futures

During the Weimar episode, the velocity of money AND money supply only spiked together during the grand finale, which means that by clinging on to the velocity of money to define inflation, the value of your cash would have been a toilet paper. Similar to the Zimbabwe dollar.

In short, in the Weimar experience velocity of money lagged money supply growth.

Professor Hans Sennholz described how hyperinflation occurred in Weimar Germany (bold emphasis mine)

The German inflation of 1914–1923 had an inconspicuous beginning, a creeping rate of one to two percent. On the first day of the war, the German Reichsbank, like the other central banks of the belligerent powers, suspended redeemability of its notes in order to prevent a run on its gold reserves.

Like all the other banks, it offered assistance to the central government in financing the war effort. Since taxes are always unpopular, the German government preferred to borrow the needed amounts of money rather than raise its taxes substantially. To this end it was readily assisted by the Reichsbank, which discounted most treasury obligations.

A growing percentage of government debt thus found its way into the vaults of the central bank and an equivalent amount of printing press money into people's cash holdings. In short, the central bank was monetizing the growing government debt.

By the end of the war the amount of money in circulation had risen fourfold and prices some 140 percent. Yet the German mark had suffered no more than the British pound, was somewhat weaker than the American dollar but stronger than the French franc. Five years later, in December 1923, the Reichsbank had issued 496.5 quintillion marks, each of which had fallen to one-trillionth of its 1914 gold value

I am delighted that the recent political schisms (Volker et. al.) and the division among US Federal Reserve officials seems to have prompted team Bernanke’s reluctance to deploy QE 3.0.

This is a manifestation of institutional ‘check and balance’ that indeed lessens the odds of a US based hyperinflation

However, using velocity of money as an excuse to justify the actions of the US Federal Reserve resonates exactly why hyperinflation transpired in Weimar

Again Hans Sennholz (bold emphasis added)

The most amazing economic sophism that was advanced by eminent financiers, politicians, and economists endeavored to show that there was neither monetary nor credit inflation in Germany. These experts readily admitted that the nominal amount of paper money issued was indeed enormous. But the real value of all currency in circulation, that is, the gold value in terms of gold or goods prices, they argued, was much lower than before the war or than that of other industrial countries….

Of course, this fantastic conclusion drawn by monetary authorities and experts bore ominous consequences for millions of people. Through devious sophisms it simply removed the cause of disaster from individual responsibility and thus also all limits to the issuance of more paper money.

The source of this momentous error probably lies in the ignorance of one of the most important determinants of money value, which is the very attitude of people toward money. For one reason or another people may vary their cash holdings. An increase in cash holdings by many people tends to raise the exchange value of money; reduction in cash holdings tends to lower it. Now in order to change radically their cash holdings, individuals must have cogent reasons. They naturally enlarge their holdings whenever they anticipate rising money value as, for instance, in a depression. And they reduce their holdings whenever they expect declining money value. In the German hyperinflation they reduced their holdings to an absolute minimum and finally avoided any possession at all. It is obvious that goods prices must then rise faster and the value of money depreciate faster than the rate of money creation. If the value of individual cash holdings declines faster than the rate of money printing, the value of the total stock of money must also depreciate faster than this rate. This is so well understood that even the mathematical economists emphasize the money "velocity" in their equations and calculations of money value. But the German monetary authorities were unaware of such basic principles of human action.

To give an aura of credibility, many adhere to statistical aggregates for economic definitions and explanations. They forget that economics and money is about people and their actions.

How Money Dies-The Process

Telegraph’s Ambrose Evans Pritchard has a nice narrative on hyperinflation.

He writes, (all bold highlights mine)

Ebay is offering a well-thumbed volume of "Dying of Money: Lessons of the Great German and American Inflations" at a starting bid of $699 (shipping free.. thanks a lot).

The crucial passage comes in Chapter 17 entitled "Velocity". Each big inflation -- whether the early 1920s in Germany, or the Korean and Vietnam wars in the US -- starts with a passive expansion of the quantity money. This sits inert for a surprisingly long time. Asset prices may go up, but latent price inflation is disguised. The effect is much like lighter fuel on a camp fire before the match is struck.

People’s willingness to hold money can change suddenly for a "psychological and spontaneous reason" , causing a spike in the velocity of money. It can occur at lightning speed, over a few weeks. The shift invariably catches economists by surprise. They wait too long to drain the excess money.

"Velocity took an almost right-angle turn upward in the summer of 1922," said Mr O Parsson. Reichsbank officials were baffled. They could not fathom why the German people had started to behave differently almost two years after the bank had already boosted the money supply. He contends that public patience snapped abruptly once people lost trust and began to "smell a government rat".

The point is hyperinflation is an outcome of a political process which begins in a nondescript mode or on a benign phase but eventually turns unwieldy.

Murray Rothbard aptly described this process in Mystery of Banking

``When expectations tip decisively over from deflationary, or steady, to inflationary, the economy enters a danger zone. The crucial question is how the government and its monetary authorities are going to react to the new situation. When prices are going up faster than the money supply, the people begin to experience a severe shortage of money, for they now face a shortage of cash balances relative to the much higher price levels. Total cash balances are no longer sufficient to carry transactions at the higher price. The people will then clamor for the government to issue more money to catch up to the higher price. If the government tightens its own belt and stops printing (or otherwise creating) new money, then inflationary expectations will eventually be reversed, and prices will fall once more—thus relieving the money shortage by lowering prices. But if government follows its own inherent inclination to counterfeit and appeases the clamor by printing more money so as to allow the public’s cash balances to “catch up” to prices, then the country is off to the races. Money and prices will follow each other upward in an ever-accelerating spiral, until finally prices “run away,” doing something like tripling every hour. Chaos ensues, for now the psychology of the public is not merely inflationary, but hyperinflationary, and Phase III’s runaway psychology is as follows: “The value of money is disappearing even as I sit here and contemplate it. I must get rid of money right away, and buy anything, it matters not what, so long as it isn’t money.”

And as one would observe, the process involves a feedback loop between government actions and market responses or an action-reaction stimulus-response mechanism until everything gets out of hand—and thus, money perishes.

Of course Mr. Pritchard ends up downplaying such risks.

He concludes, ``There is a clear temptation for the West to extricate itself from the errors of the Greenspan asset bubble, the Brown credit bubble, and the EMU sovereign bubble by stealth default through inflation. But that is a danger for later years. First we have the deflation shock of lives. Then -- and only then -- will central banks go to far and risk losing control over their printing experiment as velocity takes off. One problem at a time please.”

He contravenes his earlier anecdote about the benign origins of hyperinflation.

Because inflation is a symptom of the consequences of the actions of policymakers in attempting to attain certain political goals, which as shown above are channelled through the feedback mechanism, this means that if the actions to sustain these political goals would imply the increasing application of inflationism, then the risks of hyperinflation can’t be discounted. The current benign conditions does not signify the remoteness of such risks.

One must put in mind, that what seems to drive the actions of the present batch of policymakers is the seductive appeal of the immediacy of the impact from inflationism, the economic ideological bias and path dependency from recent “successes” of such actions.

Yet Mr. Pritchard can thank his lucky stars that globalization could serve as a counterbalancing force that might be able to reduce (if not delay) the risks of any of the two extreme outcomes of deflation or hyperinflation.

Zimbabwe's Hyperinflation: Prices Doubled Everyday, But Only 2nd Worst In History, Lessons

Last February in Zimbabwe's Hyperinflation we featured the world's recent case of hyperinflation as featured by Cato.org's Steve Hanke.

Lately, Steve H. Hanke and Alex K. F. Kwok came up with an updated paper on this. (Hat Tip: Mark Perry)

From Steve Hanke, ``The 20th century witnessed 28 hyperinflations. Most were associated with the monetary chaos that followed the two World Wars and the collapse of communism. Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation of 2007–08 represents the first episode in the 21st century and the world’s 30th hyperinflation."

The table above shows that it took just about one day (24.7 hrs) for prices of goods to double.

Nevertheless it still lagged the Hungarian account which took only 15 hours to achieve the same astounding feat. This also means that Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation ranks as the second worst in human history.

This table shows of the exponential acceleration rate of inflation which peaked in November last year- a month on month rate of 79,000,000,000%!!!

This very important point from Steve Hanke, ``Hyperinflations have never occurred when a commodity served as money or when paper money was convertible into a commodity. The curse of hyperinflation has only reared its ugly head when the supply of money had no natural constraints and was governed by a discretionary paper money standard."

This means that yes, the paper money system is predisposed to the risks of hyperinflation.

To give you an idea how a society endures from hyperinflation Alexander Jung, from Spiegel Online takes account of the Weimar German experience (incidentally ranked as the fourth worst after Yugoslavia)

An excerpt, (bold highlights mine)

``History may hail "the miracle of the rentenmark," but in reality it constituted an admission that the German Reich was bankrupt. And as always, it was the populace that picked up the tab.

``The stupid ones were those who had nest eggs: the thrifty, holders of government bonds, but primarily the country's pensioners. In other words, those who received money without having to work for it, who lived on their pensions or the interest on their savings. Large sections of the middle classes saw themselves stripped of their assets, losing almost everything they had set aside for years. Banks, savings banks, and insurance companies suffered huge losses and were left with nothing but their paper money. As a result, they had to start the majority of their businesses from scratch in 1924.

``By perverse contrast, the winners of the hyperinflation first and foremost the state, but also were those with massive debts;private individuals who had borrowed money to buy houses, construction land or farmland, and whose loans were slashed by the switch to the rentenmark.

``Some industrialists made huge gains from the period of hyperinflation. Hugo Stinnes, whom Time magazine crowned "Germany's new Kaiser," built up an immense corporate empire comprising heavy industry, newspapers, ships and hotels -- all based on a mountain of debt. As late as the summer of 1922, Stinnes was recommending that people continue capitalizing on "the weapon of inflation." Indeed manufacturers and craftsmen in general profited from the crisis since they possessed plants and buildings -- that is, tangible assets that outlived the currency switch.

``Most farmers also did extremely well. "They had money to burn, and spent it willy-nilly," writer Lion Feuchtwanger recalled. Some bought themselves entire stables of racehorses, others expensive cars. "Farmer Greindlberger drove from the grimy village street of Englschalking to Munich in an elegant limousine complete with a liveried chauffeur, while he himself was dressed in a brown velvet jacket and a green chamois-tufted hat," Feuchtwanger wrote of the rural rich.

``Never before had Germany witnessed such a fundamental redistribution of wealth, and many of the winners were those who had previously been wealthy....

``Disillusioned, many Germans chose to withdraw from the bitter reality of their lives, and simply left the country. In 1923, the authorities counted three times as many emigrées as the year before. Some sought refuge in sects, others committed suicide. Millions more became radicalized."

Read the rest here

So experts and officials recommending inflation as the fix for today's debt woes, could actually be leading us to the precipice.

Be very careful of what you wish for.

Monetary Forces Appear To Be Gaining An Upper Hand

Many have been puzzled by the widening disconnect between what's happening in the financial markets and what's going on in the real economy.

For instance the 30% surge in the US major bellwether S&P 500 since March 9th has prompted for a record PE ratio.

According to Chartoftheday.com, This ``illustrates how this plunge in earnings has impacted the current valuation of the stock market as measured by the price to earnings ratio (PE ratio). Generally speaking, when the PE ratio is high, stocks are considered to be expensive. When the PE ratio is low, stocks are considered to be inexpensive. From 1936 into the late 1980s, the PE ratio tended to peak in the low 20s (red line) and trough somewhere around seven (green line). The price investors were willing to pay for a dollar of earnings increased during the dot-com boom (late 1990s) and the dot-com bust (early 2000s). As a result of the current plunge in earnings and the recent 2.5 month stock market rally, the PE ratio has spiked to the low 120s – a record high."

Yet for some analysts earnings will continue to plummet....

The above chart from Barry Ritholtz's Big Picture

For the bulls, this phenomenon translates to reflexivity- markets are sending signals of economic recovery.

But for the bears, this translates to a false dawn-an unsustainable bear market rally.

However we offer a third opinion: markets have been reflecting monetary forces gaining an upper hand. The sustainability of which will depend on the persistence of the application of inflationary mechanism by governments, especially the US.

Yet can stocks depart from fundamentals?

Let us look at history but from an extreme end.

The following charts are all from Nowandfuture.com

In 1920s the Weimar Republic in Germany experienced a hyperinflationary depression

As you can see above unemployment exploded!

Yet the stock market soared!However, the German currency the Mark fell of the cliff as the German government massively printed money!
Finally, hyperinflation-the cost of living skyrocketed!

So the answer is yes; stockmarkets or financial markets and the real economy can "disconnect" when monetary forces utterly overwhelms the economy. That's because when money losses its "store of value" functions due to excessive government policies to inflate, people look for a substitute. They accumulate or transact in foreign currencies, buy hard assets or conduct exchanges in barter. It's anything but the inflated local currency.

However, in the US, today's environment has been a raging battle between deflationary forces and government inflation, so the likelihood is sharp volatility until one of which will dominate.

Nonetheless since almost every governments had also been conducting their own variant of inflation, the surges in the commodity markets and world stock markets appear to be symptoms of monetary forces gaining an upper hand.

Hence we could be looking nascent inflation that risks developing into super-stagflation or at worst hyperinflation.

Expect A Different Inflationary Environment

``For inflation does not come without cause. It is the result of policy. It is the result of something that is always within the control of government—the supply of money and bank credit. An inflation is initiated or continued in the belief that it will benefit debtors at the expense of creditors, or exporters at the expense of importers, or workers at the expense of employers, or farmers at the expense of city dwellers, or the old at the expense of the young, or this generation at the expense of the next. But what is certain is that everybody cannot get rich at the expense of everybody else. There is no magic in paper money.” -Henry Hazlitt, What You Should Know About Inflation p.135

Ever since the US Federal Reserve announced that it would embark on buying $300 billion of long term US treasury bonds and ante up on its acquisitions of mortgage-based securities by $750 billion, this has generated an electrifying response in the global financial markets.

First, it hastened the decline in the US dollar index, see figure 1.

Figure 1: stockcharts.com: Transmission Impact of the US Fed’s QE via the US dollar

Next, it goosed up both the commodity markets (as represented by the CRB-Reuters benchmark lowest pane) and key global equity markets, as seen in the Dow Jones World index (topmost pane) and the Dow Jones Asia ex-Japan (pane below main window). The seemingly congruous movements seem to be in response to US dollar’s activities.

At the end of the week as the US dollar rallied vigorously, where the same assets reacted in the opposite direction. So it is our supposition that correlation here implies causation: a falling US dollar simply means more surplus dollars in the global financial system relative to its major trading partners.

In other words, since the efficiency of the global financial markets have greatly been impeded by collaborative intensive worldwide government interventions, the main vent of the officially instituted policy measures have been through the currency markets.

And since the US dollar is the world’s de facto currency reserve, the actions of the US dollar are thereby being transmitted into global financial assets. As former US Treasury secretary John B. Connolly memorably remarked in 1971, ``The US dollar is our currency, but your problem!”

Bernanke’s Inflation Guidebook

And as we have long predicted, the US Federal Reserve will be using up its policy arsenal tools to the hilt. And if there is anything likeable from Mr. Bernanke is that his prospective policy directives have been explicitly defined in his November 21 2002 speech Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here which has served as a potent guidebook for any Central Bank watcher.

For instance, the latest move to prop up the long end of the Treasury market was revealed in 2001 where Bernanke noted that ``a sufficiently determined Fed can peg or cap Treasury bond prices and yields at other than the shortest maturities”, and the shoring up of the mortgage market as ``might next consider attempting to influence directly the yields on privately issued securities”.

Nevertheless even as Mr. Bernanke once said that ``I am today neither forecasting nor recommending any attempt by U.S. policymakers to target the international value of the dollar”, he believes in the ultimate antidote against the threat of deflation could be through the transmission effects of the US dollar’s devaluation, ``it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation” where he has showcased the great depression as an example; he said,`` If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.”

Of course, this isn’t merely going to be a central bank operation but one combined with coordinated efforts with the executive department or through the US Treasury, again Mr. Bernanke, ``effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities”.

Although Mr. Bernanke’s main prescription has been a tax cut, he combines this with government spending via purchases of assets, he recommended `` the government could increase spending on current goods and services or even acquire existing real or financial assets. If the Treasury issued debt to purchase private assets and the Fed then purchased an equal amount of Treasury debt with newly created money, the whole operation would be the economic equivalent of direct open-market operations in private assets.”

And the recent fiscal stimulus, guarantees and other bailout programs which have amassed to some nearly $9.9 trillion [see $9.9 Trillion and Counting, Accelerating the Mises Moment] of US taxpayers exposure plus the recent $1 trillion Private Investment Program or PPIP have all accrued in accordance to Mr. Bernanke’s design.

In all, Mr. Bernanke hasn’t been doing differently from Zimbabwe’s Dr. Gideon Gono except that the US Federal Reserve can deliver the same results via different vehicles.

Inflation is what policymakers have been aspiring for and outsized inflation is what we’re gonna get.

Stages of Inflation

There are many skeptics that remain steadfast to the global deflationary outlook based on either the continued worsening outlook of debt deleveraging in the major financial institutions and or from the premise of excessive supplies or surplus capacities in the economic system.

We agree with the debt deflation premise (but not the global deflationary environment) and pointed to the dim prospects of Geither’s PPIP program [see Why Geither's Toxic Asset Program Won't Float] precisely from the angle of deleveraging and economic recessionary pressures. However, this is exactly why central bankers will continue to massively inflate-to reduce the real value of these outstanding obligations. And this episode has been a colossal tug-of-war between government generated inflation and market based deflation.

It is further a curiosity how the academe world or mainstream analysis has been obsessing over the premise of the normalization of “borrowing and lending” in order to spur inflation. It just depicts how detached “classroom” or “ivory tower” based thinking is relative to the “real” functioning world.

We don’t really need to restore the private sector driven credit process to achieve inflation. As manifested in the recent hyperinflation case of Zimbabwe; all that is needed is for a government to simply endlessly print money and to spend it.

The sheer magnitude of money printing combined with market distortive administrative policies sent Zimbabwe’s inflation figures skyrocketing to vertiginous heights (89.7 SEXTILLION percent or a number backed with 21 zeroes!!!) as massive dislocations and shortages in the economy emerged out of such policy failures.

By the way, as we correctly predicted in Dr. Gideon Gono Yields! Zimbabwe Dump Domestic Currency, since the “Dollarization” or “rand-ization or pula-ization” of Zimbabwe’s economy, prices have begun to deflate (down 3% last January and February)! The BBC reported ``The Zimbabwean dollar has disappeared from the streets since it was dumped as official currency.” The evisceration of the Zimbabwean Dollar translates to equally a declension of power by the Mugabe regime which has resorted to a face saving “unity” government between the opposition represented by current Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC and President Mugabe's Zanu-PF.

And going back to inflation basics, we might add that a dysfunctional deflation plagued private banking system wouldn’t serve as an effective deterrent to government/s staunchly fixated with conflagrating the inflation flames.

For instance, in the bedrock of the ongoing unwinding debt deleveraging distressed environment, the UK has “surprisingly” reported a resurgence of inflation last February brought about by a “rise” in food prices due to the “decline” in UK’s currency the British pound-which has dropped by some 26% against the US dollar during the past year (Bloomberg). While many astonished analysts deem this to be a “hiccup”, we believe that there will be more dumbfounding of the consensus as inflation figures come by. And we see the same “startling” rise in inflation figures reported in Canada and in South Africa.

What we are going to see isn’t “stag-deflation” but at the onset STAGFLATION, an environment which dominated against the conventional expectations during the 70s.

Why? Because this isn’t simply about demand and supply of goods and services as peddled by the orthodoxy, but about the demand and supply of money relative to the demand and supply of goods and services. Better defined by Professor John Hussman, ``Inflation basically measures the percentage change in the ratio of two “marginal utilities”: the marginal utility of real goods and services divided by the marginal utility (mostly for portfolio and transactions purposes) of government liabilities.”

For instance mainstream analysts tell us that stock prices reflect on economic growth expectations and that during economic recessions, which normally impairs earnings growth, this automatically translates to falling stock prices.

We’ll argue that it depends--on the rate of inflation.

Figure 2: Nowandfutures.com: Weimar Germany: Surging Stock Prices on Massive Recession

This is basically the same argument we’ve made based on Zimbabwe’s experience, in the Weimar hyperinflation of 1921-1923, its massively devaluing currency, which accounted for as the currency’s loss of store of value sent people searching for an alternative safehaven regardless of the economic conditions.

People piled into stocks (right), whose index gained by 9,999,900%, even as unemployment rate soared to nearly 30%! It’s because the German government printed so much money that Germans lost fate in their currency “marks” and sought refuge in stocks. Although, stock market gains were mostly nominal and while the US dollar based was muted (green line).

In other words, money isn’t neutral or that the impact of monetary inflation ranges in many ways to a society, to quote Mr. Ludwig von Mises, ``there is no constant relation between changes in the quantity of money and in prices. Changes in the supply of money affect individual prices and wages in different ways.”

For example, it doesn’t mean just because gold prices hasn’t continually been going up that the inflationary process are being subverted by deflation.

As Henry Hazlitt poignantly lay out the divergent effects of inflation in What You Should Know About Inflation (bold highlight mine) ``Inflation never affects everybody simultaneously and equally. It begins at a specific point, with a specific group. When the government puts more money into circulation, it may do so by paying defense contractors, or by increasing subsidies to farmers or social security benefits to special groups. The incomes of those who receive this money go up first. Those who begin spending the money first buy at the old level of prices. But their additional buying begins to force up prices. Those whose money incomes have not been raised are forced to pay higher prices than before; the purchasing power of their incomes has been reduced. Eventually, through the play of economic forces, their own money-incomes may be increased. But if these incomes are increased either less or later than the average prices of what they buy, they will never fully make up the loss they suffered from the inflation.”

In short, inflation comes in stages.

Let us use the example from the recent boom-bust cycle…

Figure 3: yardeni.com: US Debt as % of GDP

When the US dot.com bust in 2000 prompted the US Federal Reserve to cut interest rates from 6% to 1%, the inflationary pressures had initially been soaked up by its household sector which amassed household debts filliped by a gigantic punt in real estate.

As the speculative momentum fueled by easy money policies accelerated, monetary inflation were ventilated through three ways:

1. An explosion of the moneyness of Wall Street’s credit instruments which directly financed the housing bubble.

Credit Bubble Bulletin’s Doug Noland has the specifics, ``As is so often the case, we can look directly to the Fed’s Z.1 “flow of funds” report for Credit Bubble clarification. Total (non-financial and financial) system Credit expanded $1.735 TN in 2000. As one would expect from aggressive monetary easing, total Credit growth accelerated to $2.016 TN in 2001, then to $2.385 TN in 2002, $2.786 TN in 2003, $3.126 TN in 2004, $3.553 TN in 2005, $4.025 TN in 2006 and finally to $4.395 TN during 2007. Recall that the Greenspan Fed had cut rates to an unprecedented 1.0% by mid-2003 (in the face of double-digit mortgage Credit growth and the rapid expansion of securitizations, hedge funds, and derivatives), where they remained until mid-2004. Fed funds didn’t rise above 2% until December of 2004. Mr. Greenspan refers to Fed “tightening” in 2004, but Credit and financial conditions remained incredibly loose until the 2007 eruption of the Credit crisis.” (bold highlight mine)

2. These deepened the current account deficits, which signified the US debt driven consumption boom.

Again the particulars from Mr. Noland, ``It is worth noting that our Current Account Deficit averaged about $120bn annually during the nineties. By 2003, it had surged more than four-fold to an unprecedented $523bn. Following the path of underlying Credit growth (and attendant home price inflation and consumption!), the Current Account Deficit inflated to $625bn in 2004, $729bn in 2005, $788bn in 2006, and $731bn in 2007.” (bold highlight mine)

3. The subsequent sharp fall in the US dollar reflected on both the transmission of the US inflationary process into the world and the globalization of the credit bubble.

Again Mr. Noland for the details, ``And examining the “Rest of World” (ROW) page from the Z.1 report, we see that ROW expanded U.S. financial asset holdings by $1.400 TN in 2004, $1.076 TN in 2005, $1.831 TN in 2006 and $1.686 TN in 2007. It is worth noting that ROW “net acquisition of financial assets” averaged $370bn during the nineties, or less than a quarter the level from the fateful years 2006 and 2007.”

In short, the inflationary process diffused over a specific order of sequence, namely, US real estate, US financial debt markets, US stock markets, global stock markets and real estate, commodities and lastly consumer prices.

Past Reflation Scenarios Won’t Be Revived, A Possible Rush To Commodities

Going into today’s crisis, we can’t expect an exact reprise of the most recent past as the US real estate and the US financial debt markets are likely to be still encumbered by the deleveraging process see figure 4.

Figure 4: SIFMA: Non Agency Mortgage Securities and Asset Backed Securities

Some of the financial instruments such as the Non-Agency Mortgage Backed Securities (left) and Asset Backed Securities (right), which buttressed the real estate bubble have materially shriveled and is unlikely to be resuscitated even by the transfer of liabilities to the government.

Besides, the general economic debt levels remain significantly high relative to the economy’s potential for a payback, especially under the weight of today’s recessionary environment.

Which is to say that today’s inflationary setting will probably evolve to a more short circuited fashion relative to the past.

This leads us to surmise that most of global stock markets (especially EM economies which we expect to rise faster in relative terms) could rise to absorb the collective inflationary actions led by the US Federal Reserve but on a much divergent scale. Currency destruction measures will also possibly support OECD prices but could underperform, as the onus from the tug-of-war will probably remain as a hefty drag in their financial markets.

And this also suggests that commodity prices will also likely rise faster (although not equally in relative terms) than the previous experience which would eventually filter into consumer prices.

In other words, the evolution of the opening up of about 3 billion people into the global markets, a more integrated global economy and the increased sophistication of the financial markets have successfully imbued the inflationary actions by central banks over the past few years. But this isn’t going to be the case this time around-unless economies which have low leverage level (mostly in the EM economies) will manage to sop up much of the slack.

Take for example China. China’s economy has generally a low of leverage which allows it the privilege of taking on more debts.

Figure 5: US Global Investors: China Loans and Fixed Asset Investment Surge

And that’s what it has been doing today in the face of this crisis-China’s national stimulus and monetary easing programs is expected to incur deficits of about 3-7% of its GDP coupled by the QE measures instituted by the US has impelled a recent surge in China’s domestic bank loans and real fixed investments.

Qing Wang of Morgan Stanley thinks that the US monetary policy measures has lowered “the opportunity cost of domestic fixed-asset investment”, which means increasing the attractiveness of Chinese assets.

According to Mr. Wang, ``In practice, lower yields on US government bonds means lower returns on the PBoC’s assets. This should enable the PBoC to lower the cost of its liabilities by: a) lowering the coupon interest rates it pays on the PBoC bills, which is a major liability item on its balance sheet; b) lowering the ratio of required reserves (RRR) on which the PBoC needs to pay interest; or c) lowering the interest rates that the PBoC needs to pay on the deposits of banks’ required reserves and excess reserves, currently at 1.62% and 0.72%, respectively. These potential changes should then lower the opportunity cost of bank lending from the perspective of individual banks.” (bold highlights mine)

In other words, low interest rates in the US can serve as fulcrum to propel a boom in China’s bank lending programs.

This brings us to the next perspective, which assets will likely benefit from such inflationary activities.

Henry Hazlitt gives us again a possible answer ``In answer to those who point out that inflation is primarily caused by an increase in money and credit, it is contended that the increase in commodity prices often occurs before the increase in the money supply. This is true. This is what happened immediately after the outbreak of war in Korea. Strategic raw materials began to go up in price on the fear that they were going to be scarce. Speculators and manufacturers began to buy them to hold for profit or protective inventories. But to do this they had to borrow more money from the banks. The rise in prices was accompanied by an equally marked rise in bank loans and deposits.” (bold highlight mine)

This suggests that expectations for more inflation are likely to trigger rising prices and growing shortages, which will likely be fed by more money printing, and eventually an increase in credit uptake in support these actions.

Some Proof?

China is on a bargain hunting binge for strategic resources, according to the Washington Post March 19^th, ``Chinese companies have been on a shopping spree in the past month, snapping up tens of billions of dollars' worth of key assets in Iran, Brazil, Russia, Venezuela, Australia and France in a global fire sale set off by the financial crisis.

``The deals have allowed China to lock up supplies of oil, minerals, metals and other strategic natural resources it needs to continue to fuel its growth. The sheer scope of the agreements marks a shift in global finance, roiling energy markets and feeding worries about the future availability and prices of those commodities in other countries that compete for them, including the United States.”

China has also engaged in a record buying of copper, according to commodityonline.com March 14^th, ``China has started to buy copper in a big way again. As part of the country’s strategy to make use of the recessionary trends in the global markets, China has hiked its copper buying during the past few months…

``According to recently released data, China’s copper import hit a record high of 329,300 tonnes in February, up 41.5 per cent from the 232,700 tonnes of January.”

Summary and Conclusion

Overall, these are some important points to ruminate on:

-It is clear that the thrust by the US government seems to be to reduce the real value of its outstanding liabilities by devaluing its currency. Since the US dollar is the world’s de facto currency reserve the path of the US government policy actions will be transmitted via its exchange rate value to the global financial markets and the world’s real economy. And this translates to greater volatility of the US dollar. Moreover, except for the ECB (yet), the QE efforts by most of the major central banks could translate to a race to the bottom in terms of devaluing paper money values.

-Collaborative global policy measures to inflate the world appear to be gaining traction in support of asset prices but at the expense of currency values.

-Global central bankers have been trying to revive inflationary expectations that are effectively “reflexive” in nature. By painting the perception of a ‘recovery’ through a rising tide of the asset markets, officials hope that this might induce a torrent of asset buying from a normalization of the credit process.

-The monumental efforts by global central banks to collectively turbocharge the global asset markets could eventually spillover to consumer prices and “surprise” mainstream analysts over their insistence to “tunnel” over the deflation angle. We expect higher consumer prices to come sooner than later especially if EM economies would be unable to fill the role of raising levels of systemic leveraging.

-Money isn’t neutral which means that the impact of inflation won’t be the same for financial assets and the real economy. Some assets or industries will benefit more than the others.

-We can’t expect the same “reflation” impact of the past episode to happen again as the ongoing tug-of-war between market-based debt deflation and government’s fixation to inflate the system has displaced the gains derived from the previous trends of globalization and the sophistication of financial markets. The US real estate markets will have surpluses to work off and the financial markets that financed the US real estate markets will remain broken for sometime and will take substantial number of years to recover.

-The impact of inflation will come in stages and perhaps accelerate in phases.

-The risk is that inflation could rear its ugly head in terms of greater than expected consumer prices earlier than what the consensus or policymakers expect. And if this is the case then it could pose as management dilemma for policymakers as the real economy remains weak and apparently fragile from the excessive dependence on the government and from the intense distortion brought about by government intervention in the marketplace. To quote Morgan Stanley’s Manoj Pradhan, ``Can QE be rolled back quickly? In theory, yes! Both passive and active QE could be reversed very quickly. The desire to hike rates above their currently low levels complicates matters slightly. Why? The effectiveness of passive QE depends on the willingness of banks to seek returns in the economy rather than simply parking excess reserves with the central bank. Hiking interest rates would reduce these incentives.”

Finally as we previously said it is increasingly becoming a cash unfriendly environment.