More Inflation Myths: Velocity of Money

John Mauldin defines inflation as

a combination of the money supply AND the velocity of money. In short, if the velocity of money is falling, the Fed can print a great deal of money (expanding its balance sheet) without bringing about inflation.

So how valid or real is his definition?

The Velocity of M2 has been in a decline since 2006. This decline culminated in 2008 with the Lehman bankruptcy. Since bottoming out in early 2009, the velocity of M2 has been rangebound

In contrast, % change of M2 has been ascendant from 2007 and peaked during the first quarter of 2009. From 2009-2010, M2 has been in a steady decline. Following a bottom in early 2010, the % change of the M2 has been roaring upwards.

By the conditional definition that inflation is a function of Money Supply AND velocity, the US should be witnessing disinflation from 2009-2010, since it was only then where both money stock AND velocity had a synchronized decline. And from 2010 to date, a stagnant or rangebound inflation rate.

Unfortunately, only part of the story seems correct. US inflation rate fell from July 2008 and bottomed in July 2009. Since, US CPI rate continues to climb upwards in defiance of Mr. Mauldin’s definition of inflation (chart from trading economics)

The same story applies when seen with the US Producer’s Price Index

Mr. Mauldin was actually discussing the chances of hyperinflation in the US using the Weimar Germany as example

The Weimar hyperinflation according to Wikipedia.org is the

period of hyperinflation in Germany (the Weimar Republic) between 1921 and 1923. (I am emphasizing the period)

Chart from Now and Futures

During the Weimar episode, the velocity of money AND money supply only spiked together during the grand finale, which means that by clinging on to the velocity of money to define inflation, the value of your cash would have been a toilet paper. Similar to the Zimbabwe dollar.

In short, in the Weimar experience velocity of money lagged money supply growth.

Professor Hans Sennholz described how hyperinflation occurred in Weimar Germany (bold emphasis mine)

The German inflation of 1914–1923 had an inconspicuous beginning, a creeping rate of one to two percent. On the first day of the war, the German Reichsbank, like the other central banks of the belligerent powers, suspended redeemability of its notes in order to prevent a run on its gold reserves.

Like all the other banks, it offered assistance to the central government in financing the war effort. Since taxes are always unpopular, the German government preferred to borrow the needed amounts of money rather than raise its taxes substantially. To this end it was readily assisted by the Reichsbank, which discounted most treasury obligations.

A growing percentage of government debt thus found its way into the vaults of the central bank and an equivalent amount of printing press money into people's cash holdings. In short, the central bank was monetizing the growing government debt.

By the end of the war the amount of money in circulation had risen fourfold and prices some 140 percent. Yet the German mark had suffered no more than the British pound, was somewhat weaker than the American dollar but stronger than the French franc. Five years later, in December 1923, the Reichsbank had issued 496.5 quintillion marks, each of which had fallen to one-trillionth of its 1914 gold value

I am delighted that the recent political schisms (Volker et. al.) and the division among US Federal Reserve officials seems to have prompted team Bernanke’s reluctance to deploy QE 3.0.

This is a manifestation of institutional ‘check and balance’ that indeed lessens the odds of a US based hyperinflation

However, using velocity of money as an excuse to justify the actions of the US Federal Reserve resonates exactly why hyperinflation transpired in Weimar

Again Hans Sennholz (bold emphasis added)

The most amazing economic sophism that was advanced by eminent financiers, politicians, and economists endeavored to show that there was neither monetary nor credit inflation in Germany. These experts readily admitted that the nominal amount of paper money issued was indeed enormous. But the real value of all currency in circulation, that is, the gold value in terms of gold or goods prices, they argued, was much lower than before the war or than that of other industrial countries….

Of course, this fantastic conclusion drawn by monetary authorities and experts bore ominous consequences for millions of people. Through devious sophisms it simply removed the cause of disaster from individual responsibility and thus also all limits to the issuance of more paper money.

The source of this momentous error probably lies in the ignorance of one of the most important determinants of money value, which is the very attitude of people toward money. For one reason or another people may vary their cash holdings. An increase in cash holdings by many people tends to raise the exchange value of money; reduction in cash holdings tends to lower it. Now in order to change radically their cash holdings, individuals must have cogent reasons. They naturally enlarge their holdings whenever they anticipate rising money value as, for instance, in a depression. And they reduce their holdings whenever they expect declining money value. In the German hyperinflation they reduced their holdings to an absolute minimum and finally avoided any possession at all. It is obvious that goods prices must then rise faster and the value of money depreciate faster than the rate of money creation. If the value of individual cash holdings declines faster than the rate of money printing, the value of the total stock of money must also depreciate faster than this rate. This is so well understood that even the mathematical economists emphasize the money "velocity" in their equations and calculations of money value. But the German monetary authorities were unaware of such basic principles of human action.

To give an aura of credibility, many adhere to statistical aggregates for economic definitions and explanations. They forget that economics and money is about people and their actions.

Velocity Of Money: A Flawed Model

``Economics is a social science. Econometric models spit out results that lack the accuracy of chemistry experiments and the precision of mathematical equations. Central bankers are forced to deal in the realm of the touchy-feely all the time. If their work could be reduced to an equation, we wouldn’t a) need them or b) find ourselves in the mess we’re in now.” Caroline Baum Central Banks Can Do Better Than Just Mopping Up

Zero Hedge’s Mr. Tyler Durden comment of ``And instead of this excess money hitting broader aggregates such as M2 or MZM, it is held by the banks, who proceed to buy securities outright on their own, either Treasuries or Equities. Apply the proper "money multiplier" to get the monetary impact on the S&P 500, as a result of the banks not lending these excess reserves, and instead simply speculating with it, and you will likely get the increase in the market cap of the S&P since the launch of QE” provoked my inquisition to mainstream’s allure to use money velocity as benchmark for arguing the case for deflation.

Velocity of money is the turnover (circulation) rate of money in terms of transactions.

It is assumed that a low money velocity, which means lower rate of circulation, can only support lower prices.

Yet if US banks have indeed been directly speculating, and if such activities haven’t been registering in money aggregates, as postulated by Mr. Durden, then the whole premise built around the inefficacy of monetary policies seems tenuous because statistics have not accurately captured such bank speculations in the asset markets.

Besides, Velocity of Money is a statistical measure based on the Keynesian consumption model, where spending equates to income.

The idea is more spending would result to higher prices and higher national income and or higher economic growth.

This is an example from wikipedia.org,

``If, for example, in a very small economy, a farmer and a mechanic, with just $50 between them, buy goods and services from each other in just three transactions over the course of a year

Mechanic buys $40 of corn from farmer.

Farmer spends $50 on tractor repair from mechanic.

Mechanic spends $10 on barn cats from farmer

``then $100 changed hands in course of a year, even though there is only $50 in this little economy. That $100 level is possible because each dollar was spent an average of twice a year, which is to say that the velocity was 2 / yr.”

In short, velocity of money measures transactions only and not of real economic output.

Moreover, it is also implies that money printing or increasing systemic leverage as the key driver to an increased velocity of money.

From the Austrian economic perspective, this concept is pure flimflam.

Henry Hazlitt wrote ``What the mathematical quantity theorists seem to forget is that money is not exchanged against a vacuum, nor against other money (except in bank clearings and foreign exchange), but against goods. Hence the velocity of circulation of money is, so to speak, merely the velocity of circulation of goods and services looked at from the other side. If the volume of trade increases, the velocity of circulation of money, other things being equal, must increase, and vice versa.” (bold emphasis mine)

Similarly Ludwig von Mises scoffs at the concept, ``They introduce instead the spurious notion of velocity of circulation fashioned according to the patterns of mechanics.” (bold emphasis mine)

Figure 5: Hoisington Management: Velocity of Money

Some deflation exponents say that the two major forces, which drove up the velocity of money, which has characterized the previous boom (see figure 5), particularly financial innovation and leveraging, will be materially less a factor in the post boom era.

The general notion is that the collapse of the shadow banking system and the deleveraging in the US households and its banking system would lead to deflationary pressures from which the government or the central bank inflationary policies won’t be able to offset.

That is from a mathematical standpoint, from which presumes to capture all the variables of human actions. Unfortunately, these macro based math models don’t reflect on reality, because it can’t impute the cause and effect, before and after outcomes of human decisions.

Other reasons why I think velocity of money is a flawed model?

One, such outlook depends on the accuracy of each and every variable that constitutes the equation, such as money supply. If Mr. Durden is correct, then velocity of money model automatically crumbles.

Two, it disregards the impact of pricing dynamics on the marketplace, e.g. how will lower prices impact demand?

Three, it discounts man’s adoptability in acquiring technology [see earlier post, Technology's Early Adoptor Disproves Deflation]

Fourth, such measure focuses entirely on the leveraging of the financial sector and leaves out the contributions from the real economy.

Fifth, it treats the economy as a homogeneous constant (single form of capital, labor and output), from which excludes the evolving phases of the interlinkages of the marketplace, governments and technology.

Lastly, it oversimplistically omits the transmission mechanism from the interactions of the US (policies and economic activities) with the world.

As Professor Arnold Kling observed, ``Structural models do not extract information from data. Instead, they are a method for creating and calibrating simulation models that embody the beliefs of the macroeconomist about how the economy works. Unless one shares those beliefs to begin with, there is no reason for any other economist to take seriously the results that are calculated.” (bold emphasis mine)

Or as Warren Buffett on warned on depending on models, ``Our advice: Beware of geeks bearing formulas.”