Eric Margolis: Russians Won World War II

World War II has been popularly sold as having been won by the West. However historian Eric Margolis sets the record straight: it was the Russians that delivered the fatal blow to Nazi Germany. 

Importantly, Mr. Margolis says that applied to today's geopolitical developments, the lessons of World War II should not be forgotten.

From LewRockwell.com (bold mine)

It was churlish for western leaders to boycott this week’s Victory Parade in Moscow that commemorated the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany 70 years ago.

Historic events are facts that should not be manipulated according to the latest political fashions. Being angry at Moscow for mucking about in Ukraine does not in any way lessen the glory, admiration and thanks owed to the Russian people for their heroism during World War II.

Americans and Canadians like to believe they won the war in Europe and give insufficient recognition to the decisive Soviet role. Most Europeans would rather not think about the matter. By contrast, Russians know that it was their soldiers who really won the war. They remain angry that their military achievements are ignored by American triumphalists and myth -makers.   

Not only did Stalin’s Soviet Union play the key role in crushing Nazi Germany, its huge sacrifices saved the lives of countless American, British and Canadian soldiers. Were it not for the USSR’s victory, Nazi Germany might be alive and well today.

Let’s do the numbers. The Soviet armed forces destroyed 507 German division and 100 allied Axis divisions (according to Soviet figures). These latter included the pan-European Waffen SS whose largest numbers came from Belgium, Holland and Scandinavia, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland and a division from Spain.

Soviet military historians claim their forces destroyed 77,000 enemy planes, 48,000 enemy tanks and armored vehicles. The Red Army accounted for 75-80% of Axis casualties in World war II.

In the process,  1,710 Russian cities, 70,000 towns and villages, 31,850 factories or and 1,974 collective farms were destroyed. Add 84,000 schools, 43,000 libraries and 65,000 km of railway.

The leading Russian military historian Dimitri Volkogonov revealed during the Gorbachev years that  Russia’s total losses from 1941-1945 were 26.6  to 27 million dead. Ten million of them were Soviet soldiers dead or missing. Compare this to total US dead in the European theater of 139,000. 

No one likes to admit it was Stalin who defeated Nazi Germany. Stalin killed far more people than Adolf Hitler, including 6 million Ukrainians liquidated in the early 1930’s and four million Muslims during the war. The Soviet gulag was grinding up victims well into the 1950’s.   

Today, seven decades later, we are barraged with films and reports about Germany’s concentration camps while Stalin’s far more extensive and lethal gulag is ignored. Roosevelt spoke warmly of Stalin as “Uncle Joe.” Churchill kept silent.

When Americans, British and Canadians landed at Normandy in June, 1944, they met Germany forces that had been shattered on the Eastern Front and bled white. Understrength German units had almost no gasoline and were low on ammunition, tanks and artillery.

Mr. Margolis adds that the Russians contributed to the defeat of the Japanese imperial army at China and Manchuria.

The shattering of the Kwantung army is believed by some historians to have contributed to Japan’s surrender. Other historians suggest that America’s use of two nuclear weapons against Japan was a hasty effort to make it surrender before the Red Army landed in Japan.

Read the rest here

Bank of Japan Goes Unlimited QE; Will Abenomics Be a Replay of the Takahasi-Model?

As anticipated, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has formalized her assimilation of the policies embraced by her contemporaries, the US Federal Reserve and the ECB

The Bloomberg reports,

The Bank of Japan (8301) set a 2 percent inflation target and said it will shift to Federal Reserve-style open-ended asset purchases in its strongest commitment yet to ending two decades of deflation.

The central bank will buy about 13 trillion yen ($145 billion) in assets per month from January 2014, including about 2 trillion in Japanese government bonds and about 10 trillion yen in treasury bills. The BOJ previously said it would ease until 1 percent inflation is “in sight.”

Like all inflationism, the initial impact has been to trigger an artificial boom whose price will paid overtime via an eventual bust (most likely triggered by the return of bond vigilantes) or from a currency crisis.

Nonetheless Mark Twain once said that history does not repeat itself but it may rhyme. Telegraph’s Ambrose Evans Pritchard suggests that Abenomics could be a replay of "Japan’s Keynes" Korekiyo Takahasi:

Premier Shinzo Abe has vowed an all-out assault on deflation, going for broke on multiple fronts with fiscal, monetary, and exchange stimulus.

This is a near copy of the remarkable experiment in the early 1930s under Korekiyo Takahasi, described by Ben Bernanke as the man who "brilliantly rescued" his country from the Great Depression.

Takahasi was the first of his era to tear up rule book completely. He took Japan off gold in December 1931. He ran "Keynesian" budget deficits deliberately, launching a New Deal blitz before Franklin Roosevelt took office.

He compelled the Bank of Japan to monetise debt until the economy was back on its feet. The bonds were later sold to banks to drain liquidity.

He devalued the yen by 60pc against the dollar, and 40pc on a trade-weighted basis. Japan's textile, machinery, and chemical exports swept Asia, ultimately causing the British Empire and India to retaliate with Imperial Preference and all that was to follow -- and there lies the rub, you might say.

Takahasi was assassinated by army officers in 1936 when he tried to tighten by cutting military costs. Policy degenerated. Japan later lurched into hyperinflation.

Then Takahasi’s adaption of inflationism signified as mostly resource transfers to the military, the latter of which became the dominant force in her domestic policy affairs, which as noted above, was epitomized by Takahasi’s assassination.

And instead of reducing deficit spending, the Wikipedia.org notes that, the military influenced government "introduced price controls and rationing schemes that reduced, but did not eliminate inflation, which would remain a problem until the end of World War II". 

And like Germany, the Takashi inspired inflationism resulted to the massive build up of Japan's military might, which thus critically contributed to materialization of World War II.

Yet Japan eventually succumbed to a post war hyperinflation (JapanReview.net).

Things are different today than in the 1930-1945. Japan has the largest debt in the world as % of GDP, where a breakaway of consumer price inflation could easily trigger a debt crisis. Moreover increasing monetization of her debt risks an inflation spiral.

Contrary to mainstream's expectations, once the inflation genie gets out of the bottle it will be hard to contain them, especially with politically influential power blocs resisting them. As in the case of Takashi, the military resisted spending cuts that led to Takashi's fatality.

Although we already seem to be seeing typical symptoms of geopolitical strains from inflationism through the Senkaku Island dispute. 

About a week ago, both the Japanese and Chinese government reportedly scrambled jet fighters over the contested island nearly resulting to a direct confrontation (RT.com). Yesterday, 3 Chinese patrol ships reportedly entered Japanese territorial waters (Japan Daily Press).

The bottom line is that the effects of inflationism will ultimately be destabilizing for both the economy and in societal affairs, as depicted by the unfolding geopolitical developments.

Robert Higgs: How Economic Warfare Provoked Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor

71 years ago December 7, the Japanese government bombed Pearl Harbor. This “day of infamy” has been portrayed by the mainstream as having been a “good war”. 

In truth, there is more than meets the eye. America’s entry to World War II had been a contrivance.

Austrian economist Professor Robert Higgs in a recent talk narrates of how US president Franklin D. Roosevelt baited the Japanese into attacking the US, that paved way for America’s participation in World War II.

The gist from Mises Institute (bold mine)

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, the U.S. government fell under the control of a man who disliked the Japanese and harbored a romantic affection for the Chinese because, some writers have speculated, Roosevelt's ancestors had made money in the China trade. Roosevelt also disliked the Germans in general and Adolf Hitler in particular, and he tended to favor the British in his personal relations and in world affairs. He did not pay much attention to foreign policy, however, until his New Deal began to peter out in 1937. Thereafter he relied heavily on foreign policy to fulfill his political ambitions, including his desire for reelection to an unprecedented third term.

When Germany began to rearm and to seek Lebensraum aggressively in the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration cooperated closely with the British and the French in measures to oppose German expansion. After World War II commenced in 1939, this U.S. assistance grew ever greater and included such measures as the so-called destroyer deal and the deceptively named Lend-Lease program. In anticipation of U.S. entry into the war, British and U.S. military staffs secretly formulated plans for joint operations. U.S. forces sought to create a war-justifying incident by cooperating with the British navy in attacks on German U-boats in the northern Atlantic, but Hitler refused to take the bait, thus denying Roosevelt the pretext he craved for making the United States a full-fledged, declared belligerent—a belligerence that the great majority of Americans opposed.

In June 1940, Henry L. Stimson, who had been secretary of war under William Howard Taft and secretary of state under Herbert Hoover, became secretary of war again. Stimson was a lion of the Anglophile, northeastern upper crust and no friend of the Japanese. In support of the so-called Open Door Policy for China, Stimson favored the use of economic sanctions to obstruct Japan's advance in Asia. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes vigorously endorsed this policy. Roosevelt hoped that such sanctions would goad the Japanese into making a rash mistake by launching a war against the United States, which would bring in Germany because Japan and Germany were allied.

The Roosevelt administration, while curtly dismissing Japanese diplomatic overtures to harmonize relations, accordingly imposed a series of increasingly stringent economic sanctions on Japan. In 1939, the United States terminated the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan. "On July 2, 1940, Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials." Under this authority, "[o]n July 31, exports of aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap were restricted." Next, in a move aimed at Japan, Roosevelt slapped an embargo, effective October 16, "on all exports of scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and the nations of the Western Hemisphere." Finally, on July 26, 1941, Roosevelt "froze Japanese assets in the United States, thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end. One week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan."  The British and the Dutch followed suit, embargoing exports to Japan from their colonies in Southeast Asia.

Roosevelt and his subordinates knew they were putting Japan in an untenable position and that the Japanese government might well try to escape the stranglehold by going to war. Having broken the Japanese diplomatic code, the American leaders knew, among many other things, what Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda had communicated to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura on July 31: "Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas."

Because American cryptographers had also broken the Japanese naval code, the leaders in Washington also knew that Japan's "measures" would include an attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet they withheld this critical information from the commanders in Hawaii, who might have headed off the attack or prepared themselves to defend against it. That Roosevelt and his chieftains did not ring the tocsin makes perfect sense: after all, the impending attack constituted precisely what they had been seeking for a long time. As Stimson confided to his diary after a meeting of the War Cabinet on November 25, "The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." After the attack, Stimson confessed that "my first feeling was of relief . . . that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people."

Read the rest or the start of his talk here

This explains the "coincidence" or “the stroke of luck” on why none of the three US aircraft carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor where present during the time of strike.

[Updated to add: Also think about how political leaders lack the compunction to even offer their citizens as sacrificial lambs (Pearl Harbor casualties 2,402 deaths 1,282 injured) in order to pursue personal political agenda.]

Today, the same strategy of economic and financial sanctions has been slapped on Iran.

The great French proto-Austrolibertarian Frédéric Bastiat was right, if goods don’t cross borders, armies will.  Protectionism is an act of war.

Has the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki been about the Cold War?

In the US, many political insiders opposed the gruesome atomic bombing Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945, which slaughtered civilians conservatively estimated at 75,000 and 150,000 respectively, saw the bombing as unnecessary.

The Washington Blog enumerates them and further reveals of the real reason why this tragic event occurred: as psychological deterrent to the Soviet Union (hat tip Lew Rockwell.com) 

From the Washington’s Blog (all bold original)

History.com notes:

In the years since the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, a number of historians have suggested that the weapons had a two-pronged objective …. It has been suggested that the second objective was to demonstrate the new weapon of mass destruction to the Soviet Union. By August 1945, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had deteriorated badly. The Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Russian leader Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill (before being replaced by Clement Attlee) ended just four days before the bombing of Hiroshima. The meeting was marked by recriminations and suspicion between the Americans and Soviets. Russian armies were occupying most of Eastern Europe. Truman and many of his advisers hoped that the U.S. atomic monopoly might offer diplomatic leverage with the Soviets. In this fashion, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan can be seen as the first shot of the Cold War.

New Scientist reported in 2005:

The US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was meant to kick-start the Cold War rather than end the Second World War, according to two nuclear historians who say they have new evidence backing the controversial theory.

Causing a fission reaction in several kilograms of uranium and plutonium and killing over 200,000 people 60 years ago was done more to impress the Soviet Union than to cow Japan, they say. And the US President who took the decision, Harry Truman, was culpable, they add.

“He knew he was beginning the process of annihilation of the species,” says Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University in Washington DC, US. “It was not just a war crime; it was a crime against humanity.”

***

[The conventional explanation of using the bombs to end the war and save lives] is disputed by Kuznick and Mark Selden, a historian from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, US.

***

New studies of the US, Japanese and Soviet diplomatic archives suggest that Truman’s main motive was to limit Soviet expansion in Asia, Kuznick claims. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union began an invasion a few days after the Hiroshima bombing, not because of the atomic bombs themselves, he says.

According to an account by Walter Brown, assistant to then-US secretary of state James Byrnes, Truman agreed at a meeting three days before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima that Japan was “looking for peace”. Truman was told by his army generals, Douglas Macarthur and Dwight Eisenhower, and his naval chief of staff, William Leahy, that there was no military need to use the bomb.

“Impressing Russia was more important than ending the war in Japan,” says Selden.

John Pilger points out:

The US secretary of war, Henry Stimson, told President Truman he was “fearful” that the US air force would have Japan so “bombed out” that the new weapon would not be able “to show its strength”. He later admitted that “no effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb”. His foreign policy colleagues were eager “to browbeat the Russians with the bomb held rather ostentatiously on our hip”. General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project that made the bomb, testified: “There was never any illusion on my part that Russia was our enemy, and that the project was conducted on that basis.” The day after Hiroshima was obliterated, President Truman voiced his satisfaction with the “overwhelming success” of “the experiment”.

We’ll give the last word to University of Maryland professor of political economy – and former Legislative Director in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and Special Assistant in the Department of State – Gar Alperovitz:

Though most Americans are unaware of the fact, increasing numbers of historians now recognize the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb to end the war against Japan in 1945. Moreover, this essential judgment was expressed by the vast majority of top American military leaders in all three services in the years after the war ended: Army, Navy and Army Air Force. Nor was this the judgment of “liberals,” as is sometimes thought today. In fact, leading conservatives were far more outspoken in challenging the decision as unjustified and immoral than American liberals in the years following World War II.

***

Instead [of allowing other options to end the war, such as letting the Soviets attack Japan with ground forces], the United States rushed to use two atomic bombs at almost exactly the time that an August 8 Soviet attack had originally been scheduled: Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The timing itself has obviously raised questions among many historians. The available evidence, though not conclusive, strongly suggests that the atomic bombs may well have been used in part because American leaders “preferred”—as Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Martin Sherwin has put it—to end the war with the bombs rather than the Soviet attack. Impressing the Soviets during the early diplomatic sparring that ultimately became the Cold War also appears likely to have been a significant factor.

***

The most illuminating perspective, however, comes from top World War II American military leaders. The conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that … most Americans haven’t paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue: Not only did most top U.S. military leaders think the bombings were unnecessary and unjustified, many were morally offended by what they regarded as the unnecessary destruction of Japanese cities and what were essentially noncombat populations. Moreover, they spoke about it quite openly and publicly.

***

Shortly before his death General George C. Marshall quietly defended the decision, but for the most part he is on record as repeatedly saying that it was not a military decision, but rather a political one.

Let me add this paper from Stanford University authored by Gene Hu 

There is considerable evidence that the American perspective on the Soviet Union and the diplomacy that occurred between the U.S. and the Soviet Union prior to these powers entering into a full-blown Cold War, was influenced by the advantage the Americans had because they had developed nuclear weapons technology. The development of such technology moreover, was dramatically and conclusively demonstrated when Truman dropped the bomb on Hiroshima, then Nagasaki. There was no doubt in the world’s mind that the technology was real and that whoever controlled it, wielded an incredible power. One is tempted to conclude that while the bombing of Hiroshima possibly ended the war with Japan in ways that may have spared both sides lives, it also conveniently served to inform the world of the Americans’ superior military might.

History is written by the victors.

Whether these bombings were due to “insistence on unconditional surrender that was the root of all evil” (Philosopher GEM Anscombe per historian Ralph Raico) or as political psy-war meant as deterrent against the fast expanding forces of the Soviet Union, the barbarism from the use of weapons of mass destruction makes those whom unleashed it war criminals.

To quote historian Ralph Raico 

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a war crime worse than any that Japanese generals were executed for in Tokyo and Manila. If Harry Truman was not a war criminal, then no one ever was.

Quote of the Day: World War II Did Not End the Great Depression

Unemployment fell during the war entirely because of the buildup of the armed forces. In 1940, some 4.62 million persons were actually unemployed (the official count of 7.45 million included 2.83 million employed on various government work projects). During the war, the government, by conscription for the most part, drew some 16 million persons into the armed forces at some time; the active-duty force in mid-1945 numbered in excess of 12 million. Voila, civilian unemployment nearly disappeared. But herding the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar labor force into the armed forces (to eliminate 9.5 percent unemployment) scarcely produced what we are properly entitled to call prosperity.

Yes, officially measured GDP soared during the war. Examination of that increased output shows, however, that it consisted entirely of military goods and services. Real civilian consumption and private investment both fell after 1941, and they did not recover fully until 1946. The privately owned capital stock actually shrank during the war. Some prosperity. (My article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Economic History, March 1992, presents many of the relevant details.)

It is high time that we come to appreciate the distinction between the government spending, especially the war spending, that bulks up official GDP figures and the kinds of production that create genuine economic prosperity. As Ludwig von Mises wrote in the aftermath of World War I, “war prosperity is like the prosperity that an earthquake or a plague brings.”

That’s from the economist Robert Higgs who debunks the popular myth.

Common sense tells us that it would be foolish to ever think that society prospers from death and destruction, despite what statistics say. Yet many fall for sloppy generalizations, which has been founded on the post hoc fallacy and the broken window "war prosperity" myth.

Again Professor Art Carden on the Broken Window Fallacy

Could the US be using the Euro crisis to extract support for a possible war against Iran?

The US appears to be dead set on bringing war to Iran.

Reports suggests that bailouts of the Eurozone via the IMF in exchange for embargoes against Iran could be part of the rescue package dangled or concessions arranged by US authorities.

Writes the Wall Street Journal Blog,

Europe may have just traded a U.S.-pushed Iranian oil embargo in exchange for Washington’s support of International Monetary Fund bailout loans to Italy and Spain, if one economist’s speculation is right.

Jacob Kirkegaard, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, speculates the timing Europe’s newly-proposed ban on Iranian oil imports is too fortuitous to be purely coincidental.

Greece, Spain and Italy–in that order–heavily depend on Iranian crude and have been the most resistant to an embargo. They are now no longer fighting a ban–Italy has stated it would support it in principle while the others have signaled they wouldn’t stand in the way. [The agreement in principle is subject to substantial negotiations on timing or exemptions for long-term deals.]

Each of those countries are also the current epicenters of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. Athens is in the middle of negotiating an agreement with bondholders on a debt deal that will pave the way for a near doubling of emergency loans, including from the IMF. Italy has to roll over nearly $340 billion in debt this year, but the cost of borrowing has soared beyond levels economists say is sustainable. Rome late last year turned down an offer for an IMF loan, but many economists say Italy will need IMF credit to pull itself out of its financial mire. And Spain’s banks are facing a housing bubble that could very well mean Madrid must soon ask for IMF assistance.

Earlier the US has already began to apply political pressure by imposing sanctions against Iran’s central bank.

From Yahoo,

Iran's currency hit a new record low to the U.S. dollar on Monday, two days after President Barack Obama signed into law a bill targeting Iran's central bank as part of the West's efforts to pressure Tehran over its nuclear program.

The semiofficial Mehr news agency said the Iranian currency's exchange rate hovered late Monday around 17,800 riyals to the dollar, marking a roughly 12 percent slide compared to Sunday's rate of 15,900 riyals to the dollar. The riyal was trading at around 10,500 riyals to the U.S. dollar in late December 2010.

The report said Iran's central bank called on Iranian experts to meet Wednesday to discuss the turbulence in the currency market.

The bill Obama signed on Saturday includes an amendment barring foreign financial institutions that do business with Iran's central bank from opening or maintaining correspondent operations in the United States. The Obama administration, however, is looking to soften the impact of the measure, fearing they could lead to a spike in global crude oil prices or pressure key allies that import Iranian oil.

Economic sanctions are meant to isolate nations which may invite or have been designed to provoke reprisals.

I am reminded by World War II, where economic sanctions has served as major compelling factor that has prompted Japan to strike at the US.

Writes historian Eric Margolis,

When in late 1941, US President Franklin Roosevelt sought (my view) to push Japan into the war by imposing an embargo of oil and scrap metal on Japan, Tokyo had a two-year stockpile of oil.

Tokyo’s military-dominated government faced a stark choice: go immediately to war in hopes of a quick victory while there was still oil, or watch its oil stores dwindle way and thus face military impotence. War was the choice.

Japan’s leading military officer, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, warned Japan was going to war for oil, and would be defeated because of lack of oil.

Stirring up patriotic passion through war has been a facile way to generate votes, especially with the US presidential elections fast approaching.

With President Obama’s improving but still near record low approval ratings, chances of re-election remains murky.

And it is of no wonder why most of the GOP Republican candidates, except for Ron Paul, have also adapted a war stance.

Presidential aspirants from both camps have palpably been appealing to the public's emotions or to patriotism to solicit votes, as well as, tacitly appease the military industrial and banking interests groups.

In the words of former United States Senator from Indiana Albert J. Beveridge (1862-1927) also an American historian

Beware the leader who bangs the drums of war in order to whip the citizenry into a patriotic fervor, for patriotism is indeed a double-edged sword. It both emboldens the blood, just as it narrows the mind. And when the drums of war have reached a fever pitch and the blood boils with hate and the mind has closed, the leader will have no need in seizing the rights of the citizenry. Rather, the citizenry, infused with fear and blinded by patriotism, will offer up all of their rights unto the leader and gladly so.

People get what they deserve.

Did the US Bait Japan into Bombing Pearl Harbor?

Today is the 70th anniversary of the infamous Pearl Harbor bombing which paved way for the US to declare war against Japan.

Contrary to mainstream history, the trigger happy US President FDR allegedly provoked Japan to launch the attack.

Writes Patrick Buchanan,

On Dec. 8, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt took the rostrum before a joint session of Congress to ask for a declaration of war on Japan.

A day earlier, at dawn, carrier-based Japanese aircraft had launched a sneak attack devastating the U.S. battle fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Said ex-President Herbert Hoover, Republican statesman of the day, “We have only one job to do now, and that is to defeat Japan.”

But to friends, “the Chief” sent another message: “You and I know that this continuous putting pins in rattlesnakes finally got this country bit.”

Today, 70 years after Pearl Harbor, a remarkable secret history, written from 1943 to 1963, has come to light. It is Hoover’s explanation of what happened before, during and after the world war that may prove yet the death knell of the West.

Edited by historian George Nash, Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath is a searing indictment of FDR and the men around him as politicians who lied prodigiously about their desire to keep America out of war, even as they took one deliberate step after another to take us into war.

Yet the book is no polemic. The 50-page run-up to the war in the Pacific uses memoirs and documents from all sides to prove Hoover’s indictment. And perhaps the best way to show the power of this book is the way Hoover does it — chronologically, painstakingly, week by week.

Read the rest here

Why Nuclear Power Became Japan’s Energy Priority

Eric Margolis, at the lewrockwell.com, traces Japan’s prioritization of nuclear power as its main source of energy to ‘energy independence’ and the stigma of World War II.

Mr. Margolis writes,

In Japan’s samurai code, an act of supreme bravery occurs when a fighter confronts impossible odds, or knows his death in battle is inevitable, yet still decides to fight for honor’s sake. In samurai lore, this is know as "the nobility of failure."

Japanese history and, of course, World war II, are replete with examples of self-sacrifice and boundless valor in the face of certain defeat.

Brave and resolute as Japanese are, the question remains, why did Japan only 15 years or so after the nuclear horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki decide to build nuclear power plants they knew could be potentially dangerous?

The answer lies in World War II. Japan has no resources, other than rock, wood, water and its industrious people. All raw material to this island nation had to be imported by sea...

After the war, Japan’s leadership concluded their nation had to have energy independence, even if it meant from potentially dangerous nuclear power. Japan must never again be left helpless. Oil was too precious to use for power generation. It had to be stockpiled for strategic use and transportation.

So Japan took a calculated risk with nuclear power in spite of the ingrained fears of its people.

Read the rest here