Vietnam Raises Minimum wages by 15%, Bank of Indonesia Hikes Interest Rates, Thailand’s Parallel Universe

The Vietnamese government mandated a 15% increase in minimum wages a few days back.

Speaking in behalf of Japanese companies whom has expressed concerns over rising input costs, the Nikkei Asia reports

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung approved the wage adjustment proposals made by the National Wage Council without substantial changes. The new minimum wages will become effective on Jan. 1, 2015.

The decision means that Vietnam's minimum pay will post a 17-fold jump from 15 years ago, in keeping with the rapid economic growth during the period. The upward trend of wages is likely to continue as workers stage strikes in demand of higher wages.

Increased labor costs could have serious repercussions for Japanese companies operating in the country.

The minimum monthly salary in Region 1, which includes urban areas like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, will rise 14.8% from 2014 to 3.1 million dong ($145) in 2015. While Region 2, mostly made up of suburban areas, will rise 14.6% to 2.75 million dong. Provincial Region 3 and the rural Region 4 will increase by 14.3% and 13.2%, respectively, to 2.4 million dong and 2.15 million dong.

The increases for Region 3 and 4 will be 20,000-50,000 dong less than the National Wage Council's August proposals for those regions, which called for pay increases of over 15%. The differences indicate the government's acknowledgment of mounting concerns by foreign companies over labor costs.

Why is this significant? Because simply stated, government’s inflation statistics (from tradingeconomics.com) and reality doesn’t match. There won’t be amplified political pressures for wage hikes if not for significant cost of living increases!

This report from a domestic news outfit, Thanhniennews.com reveals of the implied discrepancy (bold mine)

even that salary only covers 69-77 percent of a Vietnamese person's basic living costs, according to the survey, which polled 1,500 workers in 12 cities and provinces during the first half of this year.

Up to 13 percent of workers said their salaries do not cover their basic living costs, 25 percent said they had to spend carefully and 50 percent said their salary only affords the most basic standard of living.

Vietnam's economy, which recorded growth of 5.42 percent last year, is expected to expand 5.8 percent in 2014, in line with a government target. The Southeast Asian country is expected to keep annual inflation at a rate below 5 percent, or about 2 percentage points below a government target.

Why shouldn’t there be increased inflationary pressures in Vietnam's economy?

Vietnam’s government has been on a spending binge as revealed by the huge fiscal deficits (as of 2013). How are these being funded? External borrowing plays a big role in the financing. External debt has been ballooning in nominal terms and as well seen from debt-gdp ratio. 

So borrowing externally and I would suppose also internally has caused a surge in M2.

Balance of trade has been negative of late even as current account remains positive-–most likely as a result of external borrowings. 

So the Vietnamese (both private and public) has been spending more than they have been producing. Spending which has been financed largely by debt.

Naturally, this entails strains on the domestic currency. The USD-Vietnamese dong has been soaring. The USD-VND now at July milestone highs. All these points to bigger inflation pressures than what has been revealed by government statistics.

Nonetheless like almost elsewhere, Vietnam’s stocks has been at a 5 year high. It has only been in August where the Ho Chi Minh Index has seen some selling pressures in the face of a severely weakening dong.

What Vietnam’s macro fundamentals reveal has not only been inaccurate statistics but importantly structural fragilities making her economy vulnerable to shocks either internally or externally triggered. 

Yes the Vietnamese government have recently posted record foreign exchange reserves but this have been funded by external borrowings.

And ASEAN’s economic troubles keep mounting.

Indonesia has raised interest rates for the sixth time since June 2013 as the government reduced oil subsidies and allowed for a 30% hike in fuel prices.

From Reuters: 

Indonesia's central bank, moving quickly to contain inflation after the government raised fuel prices more than 30 percent, hiked its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 7.75 percent on Tuesday.

In his first major economic policy decision, President Joko Widodo on Monday night raised subsidised gasoline and diesel prices by more than 30 percent to help fund his reform agenda and tackle the country's budget and current account deficits.

What has adjusting interest rates (a monetary tool) have to do with fuel price increases (real economy)--the latter of which should signify a temporary boost? This relationship has hardly been questioned by the consensus or by media or explained by 'experts'.

Well, the answer can be shown above.  

The Indonesian government has likely been using fuel prices as a pretext to curb runaway private sector credit! 

Indonesia's political economy used to be the poster child for the ASEAN boom which had been blessed by upgrades by credit rating agencies.

And true enough, credit upgrades got Indonesians to rack up more credit. Yes this applies even to the government where fiscal deficits has widened, which as usual has been financed by a surge in external debt and domestic monetary inflation.

At the end of the day,  Indonesia's credit bubble has inflated both a property and a (signs of deflating?) stock market bubble as seen by the JCI Index (left window) even as the rupiah has been significantly weakening (see right window, now the USD-IDR approaches January 2014 highs). 

Remember Indonesia has been labeled one of Emerging market's fragile five and currently has been marked as one of the most expensive bourses in the world by the Telegraph!

Finally, Thailand just posted a .6% growth in the 3Q.  

From the Strait Times: Thailand's planning agency on Monday trimmed its economic growth forecast for this year to 1.0 per cent from 1.5-2.0 per cent seen in August, citing weak exports. In 2013, growth was 2.9 per cent. The Thai economy grew a much less-than-expected 0.6 per cent in July-September quarter from the same period a year ago, and expanded 1.1 per cent from the previous three months, the National Economic and Social Development Board, which compiles gross domestic product (GDP) data, said earlier on Monday.

I recently questioned the optimism by Thai authorities who predicted a 1.5% growth for 2014: 2Q GDP of a  marginal +.4 growth in GDP spared the Thai economy from a technical recession (chart from tradingeconomics.com) Given the stagnant 1H, it would take about 3% growth for the 2H in order to meet the BoT’s 1.5% target this year. Yet the BoT admits that debt burdened consumers have been marginally improving.

So the Thai economy continues to struggle. Aside from the politics, onerous debt burdens should continue to weigh on the economy.

Yet does the Thai government know that produce 1% GDP for 2014 would require 2.5% growth in 4Q? Have they been dreaming?

Don’t worry be happy, in today's world illusions prevail. Bad economic news has become good news for stocks. The Thai experience of near recession growth or stagnation comes with near milestone high stocks!! 

Parallel universes have now been the fad. As one may notice, regardless of fundamentals, stocks have been foreordained to rise forever!!!

Vietnam’s Banking System Has Been Short on Gold

I pointed out earlier how Vietnam’s banking system enticed the public by paying dividends on gold holdings lodged or deposited with them. This seems to be a ruse.

Yet like any typical paper money based banking system, bankers distrust gold and exploit them. The public’s gold stored at the banks have essentially been “shorted” by Vietnam’s banking system supposedly to boost liquidity.

Notes the Zero Hedge, (bold original) 

any time a bank, and especially an entire banking sector, is willing to pay you paper "dividends" for your gold, run, because all this kind of (s)quid pro quo usually ends up as a confiscation ploy. Sure enough, as Dow Jones reports today, the gold, which did not belong to the banks and was merely being warehoused there (or so the fine print said), was promptly sold by these same institutions to generate cash proceeds and to boost liquidity reserves using other people's gold, obtained under false pretenses. 

And now, it is time for the forced sellers to become forced buyers, as "the State Bank of Vietnam, the country's central bank, may allow local banks to buy up to 20 metric tons of gold over the next two months to improve their liquidity ahead of a ban soon on their use of gold as a means of boosting their operating capital." What they mean is that having been caught engaging in an illegal reserve boosting operating, the banks are now "allowed" to undo their transgressions ahead of a "ban" on what inherently was not a permitted practice. What is left unsaid, of course, is that any gold anywhere in the world, that is not in one's physical possession, and has been handed over to an insolvent bank (virtually all of them) for "safekeeping", is currently being sold, lent out, rehypothecated and otherwise traded with, in a way that any demand for full delivery will generally be met with silence, blank stares and phone calls going straight to voicemail.

The growing clamor for ‘audits’ on gold reserves and the "discovery" or revelation of Vietnam’s banking system gold “shorts” should provide gold prices the necessary support.

Yet this gives further motivation for the average Vietnamese to stockpile their gold holdings at home.

Could Gold Prices be Signaling a Reprieve in Selloffs or a Bottom?

Over at the commodity markets, gold’s and silver’s recent bounce could yet signal a reprieve to the market’s selloff.

On the one hand, this bounce could signify a reaction to extremely oversold levels but may not be indicative of a bottom yet.

On the other hand, if gold and silver have found a bottom then they could likely be signaling the coming tsunami of inflationism, where the tendency is that gold leads other assets in a recovery, perhaps like 2008.

Also, the recent bounce came amidst Greek polls exhibiting improvements of the standings of pro-austerity camp, perhaps indicative of reduced odds of a Greece exit. A victory by pro-bailout camp government would allow the ECB to orchestrate the same operations that it has been conducting at the start of the year.

For most of the past 3 years prices of gold and the US S&P 500 have been correlated but with a time lag. Since March an anomalous divergence occurred, the S&P rose as the gold fell. For most of the past two weeks both gold and the S&P fumbled which seem to have closed the divergence gap.

But over the two days gold rose as stocks fell. Such anomaly will be resolved soon.

Again, gold cannot be seen as a standalone commodity and should be seen in the context of both the general commodity sphere and of other financial assets.

Focusing on gold alone misses the point that gold represents one of the contemporary assets that competes for an investor’s money. Such that changes in the gold prices would likewise affect prices of other relative assets.

Prices are all interconnected, the great Henry Hazlitt explained[1]

No single price, therefore, can be considered an isolated object in itself. It is interrelated with all other prices. It is precisely through these interrelationships that society is able to solve the immensely difficult and always changing problem of how to allocate production among thousands of different commodities and services so that each may be supplied as nearly as possible in relation to the comparative urgency of the need or desire for it.

To fixate only on gold without examining the actions of other assets would risk the misreading of the gold and other asset markets.

Let me further add that a Greece exit or a collapse of the Euro doesn’t automatically mean higher gold prices. This entirely depends on the actions of central banks.

Since gold is not yet money today, based on the incumbent legal tender laws, it would be totally absurd to argue that under today’s fiat money system—where financial contracts have been underwritten on paper currencies mostly denominated in US dollars or the foreign currency alternatives, European euro, British pound, Swiss franc, Japanese yen or even China’s renminbi—all debt liquidations, be it ‘calling in of loans’ or ‘margin calls’ will be consummated in paper money currency and not in gold.

This means that a genuine debt deflation would translate to greater demand for cash balance (based on Irving Fisher’s account of debt deflation[2]) which means more demand for the US dollar and other currencies of ex-euro trade counterparties.

And that’s what has been happening lately to the marketplace, the US dollar (USD) and US Treasuries 10 year prices (UST) has risen opposite to falling gold prices and other financial assets.

This means part of the global system has been enduring stresses from debt liquidations, which again bolsters the relative effects of money and boom bust cycles.

As pointed out before[3], it would be mistake to equate the 1930 eras (gold bullion standard) or the 1940 eras (Bretton Woods standard) with today’s digital and fiat money system. That would be reading trees for forest when gold was officially money then.

And given that gold has long been branded a “barbaric relic” and has practically been taken off the consciousness of the general public in Western nations, gold has hardly been appreciated as money, perhaps until a disaster happens.

It has only been recently and due to sustained gains of gold prices where gold’s importance has begun to percolate into the American public[4].

Yet the Americans see gold more of an investment than as money

But of course, this is different with many Asians who still values gold as money. For example, many Vietnam banks are even paying gold owners fee for storage[5] in defiance of government edict.

Gold’s rise would be premised from central banking inflationism designed to protect the certain political interests, which today have represented the banking institutions and the Federal and national governments.

As proof, the latest quasi bank run in Greece, which I pointed out above, has reportedly been due to concerns over devaluation of the drachma, should Greece exit from the EU and NOT from deflation.

While I remain long term bullish gold, short term I remain neutral and would like see further improvements in gold’s price trend and subsequently the relative trends of other “risk ON” assets.

---

[1] Hazlitt Henry How Should Prices Be Determined? , May 18, 2012

[2] Wikipedia.org Fisher's formulation, Debt Deflation

[3] See Gold Unlikely A Deflation Hedge June 28, 2012

[4] Gallup.com Gold Still Americans' Top Pick Among Long-Term Investments, April 27, 2012

[5] See Vietnam Banks Pay Gold Owners for Storage, April 12, 2012

Vietnam Banks Pay Gold Owners for Storage

Here is an enlightening piece from Tim Staermose of the Sovereign Man.

Here’s something you don’t see every day: Banks in Vietnam will actually pay YOU to store your gold in one of their safe deposit boxes. I was pretty surprised to find this out for myself; neither Simon nor I have seen it anywhere else in the world except here.

This is actually how banking used to be. The original bankers were goldsmiths– big burly guys who worked with gold on a daily basis. They had the security systems already established, and, for a fee, they were willing to let you park your gold in their safes.

Eventually, goldsmiths got into the moneylending business; instead of charging a security fee, they would pay depositors a rate of interest for the right to loan out the gold at a higher rate of interest.

Goldsmiths’ reputations lived and died based on the quality of their loan portfolios, and their consistency of paying back depositor savings.

Today that’s all but a footnote in history. Except in Vietnam.

Read the rest here.

Interesting to note that despite technical political restrictions to do so by Vietnam’s authorities, whom sees gold as a constriction to their activities, paying fees to gold depositors seem to have become an ingrained practice by Vietnamese bankers. The simple reason for this is that gold ownership has been the main preference of the average Vietnamese over fiat money or the dong.

Yet perhaps, today’s exception will become the tomorrow’s norm. Stated differently, perhaps Vietnam’s banking ‘archaic’ banking system could become the banking system's paradigm of the future.

Add to this Malaysia’s desire for a gold standard, India’s cultural attachment to gold and the growing appetite for gold by the Chinese as evidenced by surging imports (see chart above from US Global Funds), I’d say that these evolving trends in Asia could serve as clues to the direction of the prospective reforms of the global monetary system.

Vietnam’s Inflation Control Measures And The Japanese Yen’s Record High

``If most of us remain ignorant of ourselves, it is because self-knowledge is painful and we prefer the pleasures of illusion.” Aldous Huxley

There are other issues that appear to have been eclipsed by the Dubai Debt Crisis.

Vietnam’s Inflation Control Measures

First, Vietnam announced a sharp hike in its interest rate to allegedly combat inflation. According to Finance Asia, ``The State Bank of Vietnam will increase its benchmark interest rate to 8% from 7% as of December 1”

In addition, Vietnam likewise devalued its currency the Dong by 5.2%. According anew to Finance Asia, [bold emphasis mine] ``The State Bank of Vietnam also reset the US dollar reference rate to 17,961 dong from its current level of 17,034 dong, in its third devaluation of the currency in two years. The central bank will also narrow the trading band of the dollar against the dong to 3% from 5%.

``This is an effort not only to bring confidence to the currency, but also to correct the difference versus where the dong is trading on the black market, which has been at about 19,700 per US dollar in recent weeks.”

Figure 6: Wall Street Journal: Vietnam’s Devaluation

In other words, currency controls have widened the spread between the black market rate of the Vietnam Dong relative to the US dollar and the official devaluation merely is an attempt to close the chasm. The Vietnamese economy has been suffering from a huge current account deficit to the tune of almost 8% of its GDP.

However, in spite of the fresh monetary actions (see figure 6) the black market rate for the Dong and the official rate remain far apart.

And because of the spike in interest rates, the Vietnam equity benchmark fell by 11.73% over the week.

However, a curious and notable observation is that Vietnam’s present policies seems like responding to a market symptom which can be characterized as our Mises Moment,

This from Thanhnien.com, ``Vietnamese lenders are facing a shortage of funds to meet rising demand for loans because gains in gold and the dollar are deterring people from putting money in the bank, according to a government statement. Commercial banks have had to raise deposit interest rates to as high as 9.99 percent over the past week and offered gifts and bonuses to depositors to lure them back, the statement on the government’s website said.” [bold emphasis original]

In other words, the Vietnamese people have been hoarding gold and foreign currency (US Dollar) and have shunned the banking system in response to Vietnam’s government repeated debasement of its currency. It’s seems like an early symptom of demonetization.

As we have previously quoted Professor Ludwig von Mises from his Stabilization of the Monetary Unit? From the Viewpoint of Theory,

``If people are buying unnecessary commodities, or at least commodities not needed at the moment, because they do not want to hold on to their paper notes, then the process which forces the notes out of use as a generally acceptable medium of exchange has already begun. This is the beginning of the “demonetization” of the notes. The panicky quality inherent in the operation must speed up the process. It may be possible to calm the excited masses once, twice, perhaps even three or four times. However, matters must finally come to an end. Then there is no going back. Once the depreciation makes such rapid strides that sellers are fearful of suffering heavy losses, even if they buy again with the greatest possible speed, there is no longer any chance of rescuing the currency. In every country in which inflation has proceeded at a rapid pace, it has been discovered that the depreciation of the money has eventually proceeded faster than the increase in its quantity.” [bold emphasis mine]

Will Vietnam follow the path of the most recently concluded Zimbabwean monetary disease?

I was thinking of Venezuela as next likely candidate but here we have a next door neighbor exhibiting the same symptoms that ails every government that attempts to control or manipulate the marketplace.

The Japanese Yen On A 14 Year High

The second issue overshadowed by the Dubai Debt Crisis is that the Japanese Yen soared to its highest level against the US dollar in 14 years.

According to a Bloomberg report, ``The dollar dropped to the lowest level versus the yen since July 1995 and fell against the euro as the Federal Reserve’s signal it will tolerate a weaker greenback encouraged investors to buy higher-yielding assets outside the U.S.”

The strength of the Japanese yen had been broad based against other major currencies but gains were marginal.

The news blamed the Yen’s rise on the carry trade ``delay debt repayments spurred investors to sell higher-yielding assets funded with the currencies.”

Such oversimplification is not convincing or backed by evidence.

As noted earlier, the US dollar fell to new lows on the Dubai incident before rallying back Friday but eventually giving back most of its gains.

Besides, not all markets had been severely hit. In Latin America, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela all registered weekly gains. Emerging markets are expected to take it to the chin when carry trades unravel. This hasn’t been the general case.

In Europe, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Italy survived the week on positive grounds. So even if the Dubai debt crisis exposed Europe more than the others, the selling pressure wasn’t the same. UK home to RBS suffered marginal losses (.11%).

Again none of these accounts for as any solid or concrete signs of an unwinding of carry trade.

Figure 7: stockcharts/google: Nikkei-Yen and Japan exports

While the rising Japanese Yen has so far coincided with a lethargic Nikkei since August (see figure 7 left window), it’s not clear that such correlation has causation linkages.

Although the Japanese government thinks it has.

Again from the same Bloomberg article, ``Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii said he will contact U.S. and European officials about exchange rates if needed, signaling his growing concern that the yen’s ascent will hurt the economy. The Bank of Japan checked rates at commercial banks in Tokyo, seen as a type of verbal intervention, Kyodo News Service reported.

``Japan hasn’t sold its currency since March 16, 2004, when it traded around 109 per dollar. The Bank of Japan sold 14.8 trillion yen ($172 billion) in the first three months of 2004, after record sales of 20.4 trillion yen in 2003. Japan last bought the currency in 1998, purchasing 3.05 trillion yen as the rate fell as low as 147.66.”

Well it came to my surprise that after all the political gibberish about Japan’s so-called export economy or export dependency, we realized that Japan’s economy is hardly about global trade.

According to ADB data, Japan’s trade in 2006 only accounted for 28.2% of the nation’s GDP, where export (right window) is only 16% of the GDP pie (yes this stunned me as I had the impression all along that Japan’s trade was at the levels of Hong Kong and Singapore and I had to check on official or government data).

The Philippines has even a higher share of trade (84.7%) and exports (36.9%)!

In addition, Japan’s industry, as a share of GDP pie registered for only 26.3%, according to the CIA factbook in 2008.

So a policy for a weaker yen is likely to benefit a small but strong lobbying segment of the society at the expense of the consumers (via cheaper products) or the society.

All these are strong evidences on why the world is facing a greater degree of risks from a hyperinflation episode.

The fallacious Mercantilist-Keynesian paradigm wants a race to devalue currency values, based on a simplistic one product, single price sensitivity, one labor, homogenous capital model which presumes global trade is a zero sum game. They hardly think of money in terms of purchasing power but from political interests based on “aggregate demand”.

Finally, Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii isn’t likely to succeed in convincing his peers to collaborate to prevent the yen from strengthening. That’s because all of them share the same line of thinking or ideology. And Fed Chairman Bernanke has been on a helicopter mission that will likely to persist until imbalances unravel to haunt the global markets anew.