The Major Risk from Currency Union Breakups: Hyperinflation

At the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Mr. Anders Aslund has an interesting paper on the historical aftermaths of the dissolution of currency unions.

Mr. Aslund opens with a refutation of the Nirvana fallacy of the Keynesian prescription on the currency devaluation elixir. Here Mr. Aslund rebuts Nouriel Roubini. (all bold highlights mine)

While beneficial in some cases, devaluation is by no means necessary for crisis resolution. About half the countries in the world have pegged or fixed exchange rates. During the East Asian crisis in 1998, Hong Kong held its own with a fixed exchange rate, thanks to a highly flexible labor market. The cure for the South European dilemma is available in the European Union. In the last three decades, several EU members have addressed severe financial crises by undertaking serious fiscal austerity and reforms of labor markets, thus enhancing their competitiveness, notably Denmark in 1982, Holland in the late 1980s, Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s, all the ten post communist members in the early 1990s, and Germany in the early 2000s. Remember that as late as 1999, the Economist referred to Germany as “the sick man of the euro.”

More recently, the three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria have all repeated this feat (Åslund 2010, Åslund and Dombrovskis 2011). Among these many crisis countries, only Sweden and Finland devalued, showing that devaluation was not a necessary part of the solution. The peripheral European countries suffer in various proportions from poor fiscal discipline, overly regulated markets, especially labor markets, a busted bank and real estate bubble, and poor education, which have led to declining competitiveness and low growth. All these ailments can be cured by means other than devaluation.

Mr. Aslund on the currency union dissolution during the gold standard eon.

It was rather easy to dissolve a currency zone under the gold standard when countries maintained separate central banks and payments systems. Two prominent examples are the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union. The Latin Monetary Union was formed first with France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland and later included Spain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Venezuela. It lasted from 1865 to 1927. It failed because of misaligned exchange rates, the abandonment of the gold standard, and the debasement by some central banks of the currency. The similar Scandinavian Monetary Union among Sweden, Denmark, and Norway existed from 1873 until 1914. It was easily dissolved when Sweden abandoned the gold standard. These two currency zones were hardly real, because they did not involve a common central bank or a centralized payments system. They amounted to little but pegs to the gold standard. Therefore, they are not very relevant to the EMU.

“Abandonment of gold standard” simply suggests that some members of these defunct unions wantonly engaged in inflationism which were most likely made in breach of the union’s pact that had led to their dissolution.

Mr Aslund tersely describes on one account of “successful” post gold standard breakup…

Europe offers one recent example of a successful breakup of a currency zone. The split of Czechoslovakia into two countries was peacefully agreed upon in 1992 to occur on January 1, 1993. The original intention was to divide the currency on June 1, 1993. However, an immediate run on the currency led to a separation of the Czech and Slovak korunas in mid-February, and the Slovak koruna was devalued moderately in relation to the Czech koruna. Thanks to this early division of the currencies, monetary stability was maintained in both countries, although inflation rose somewhat and minor trade disruption occurred (Nuti 1996; Åslund 2002, 203). This currency union was real, but thanks to the limited financial depth just after the end of communism, dissolution was far easier than will be the case in the future. In particular, no financial instruments were available with which investors could speculate against the Slovak koruna

It seems unclear why the Czech and Slovak experience had been the least worse or had the least disruption compared to the others.

Yet considering that inflation is a monetary phenomenon with political objectives, “limited financial depth” seems unlikely a significant factor the “success”. Instead it may have been that political authorities of the Czech and Slovak experience, aside from the “early division of currencies” which may have given a transitional time window, may have likely implemented some form of monetary discipline which lessened the impact.

Mr Aslund finds that the the incumbent European Union seems more relevant with three recent accounts of currency disintegration which had cataclysmic results.

The situation of the EMU is very different from these three cases. It has no external norm, such as the gold standard, and it is a real currency union with a common payments mechanism and central bank. The payments mechanism is centralized to the ECB and would fall asunder if the EMU broke up because of the large uncleared balances that have been accumulated. The more countries that are involved in a monetary union, the messier a disruption is likely to be.

The EMU, with its 17 members, is a very complex currency union. When things fall apart, clearly defined policymaking institutions are vital, but the absence of any legislation about an EMU breakup lies at the heart of the problem in the euro area. It is bound to make the mess all the greater. Finally, the proven incompetence and slowness of the European policymakers in crisis resolution will complicate matters further.

The three other European examples of breakups in the last century are of the Habsburg Empire, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. They are ominous indeed. All three ended in major disasters, each with hyperinflation in several countries. In the Habsburg Empire, Austria and Hungary faced hyperinflation.

Yugoslavia experienced hyperinflation twice. In the former Soviet Union, 10 out of 15 republics had hyperinflation. The combined output falls were horrendous, though poorly documented because of the chaos. Officially, the average output fall in the former Soviet Union was 52 percent, and in the Baltics it amounted to 42 percent (Åslund 2007, 60).

According to the World Bank, in 2010, 5 out of 12 post-Soviet countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—had still not reached their 1990 GDP per capita levels in purchasing power parities. Similarly, out of seven Yugoslav successor states, at least Serbia and Montenegro, and probably Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, had not exceeded their 1990 GDP per capita levels in purchasing power parities two decades later (World Bank 2011).

Arguably, Austria and Hungary did not recover from their hyperinflations in the early 1920s until the mid-1950s. Thus the historical record is that half the countries in a currency zone that breaks up experience hyperinflation and do not reach their prior GDP per capita as measured in purchasing power parities until about a quarter of a century later, which is far more than the lost decade in Latin America in the 1980s.

The causes of these large output falls were multiple: systemic change, competitive monetary emission leading to hyperinflation, collapse of the payments system, defaults, exclusion from international finance, trade disruption, and wars. Such a combination of disasters is characteristic of the collapse of monetary unions.

Why hyperinflation poses as the greatest risk for the disintegration of the fiat money based currency unions?

A common reflex to these cases is to say that it was a long time ago, that things are very diferent now, and that other factors matter. First of all, it was not all that long ago. Two of these economic disasters occurred only two decades ago. Second, hyperinflation was probably the most harmful economic factor, and it is part and parcel of the collapse of a currency zone, regardless of the time period. About half of the hyperinflations in world history occurred in connection with the breakup of these three currency zones. The cause was competitive credit emission by competing central banks before the breakup. Third, monetary indiscipline and war are closely connected. The best illustration is Slovenia versus Yugoslavia. In the first half of 1991, the National Bank of Yugoslavia started excessive monetary emission to the benefit of Serbia. On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared full sovereignty not least to defend its finances. Two days later, the Yugoslav armed forces attacked Slovenia (Pleskovic and Sachs 1994, 198). Fortunately, that war did not last long and Slovenia could exit Yugoslavia and proved successful both politically and economically

Again since inflationism essentially represents monetary means to attain political ends, previous accounts of hyperinflation in post currency union dissolution may have been a result of policy miscalculations from political leaders trying to attain the illusory positive effects from devaluation.

Or most importantly or which I think is the more relevant is that in absence of access to local and foreign savings through banking or financial markets, political authorities in pursuit of their survival have resorted to massive money printing operations.

Also since hyperinflation means the destruction of division of labor or free trade, one major consequences have been to seek political survival through plunder, thus the attendant war. Inflationism, according to great Ludwig von Mises has been “the most important economic element in this war ideology”.

Looking at history has always been deterministic. We look at the past in the account of how narrators describes the connections of the facts in them. But we must not forget of the importance of theory in examining these facts.

As Austrian economist Hans Hermann Hoppe explains,

There must also be a realm of theory — theory that is empirically meaningful — which is categorically different from the only idea of theory empiricism admits to having existence. There must also be a priori theories, and the relationship between theory and history then must be different and more complicated than empiricism would have us believe.

I concur that hyperinflation could likely be the outcome for many European countries once a breakup of the Eurozone becomes a reality. This will not happen because history will merely repeat itself, but because the preferred recourse by politicians has been to resort to inflationism. Theory and history have only meshed to exhibit the likelihood of such path dependent political actions.

Video: Stephen Roach: Central Bankers Pulling the Wool Over Our Eyes with ZIRP and Magical QE

[hat tip ZeroHedge]

In the interview with Bloomberg’s Tom Keene at Davos, Morgan Stanley Asia’s Stephen Roach is right to point out that central bankers have been pulling the wool over our eyes with ZIRP and magical QE, which for him does little to sustain economic recovery, and that central bankers have been mired in a policy trap—or commitments to up the ante on current policies to produce short term outcomes.

However Mr. Roach eludes the political aspects of why central bankers have been pulling the wool over our eyes with these monetary nostrums, which palpably has been designed to save the skins of bankers and their political patrons.

And Mr. Roach glosses over the fact that current monetary panacea, which have brought upon the 2008 crisis and which continues to linger today, has real effects to the economy, through accretion of imbalances or malinvestments which engenders another bust down the road. What this means is that boom bust cycles has distortive effects to a large segment of an economy.

Also policy traps are representative of the priorities of typical political agents.

Mr. Roach speaks highly of China’s fine tuning of monetary policies, which he believes the recent gamut tightening measures has been effective enough for the Chinese authorities to allow for policy accommodation under current conditions. Mr. Roach also hopes to see central bankers imbue on the traits of ex-US Federal Reserve chair Paul Volcker. Lastly Mr. Roach says that capitalism built on Greenspan’s policies had been misplaced.

I am sure that Paul Volcker is an exception to the norm, given the environment of the yesteryears, but am not sure if Paul Volker today would apply the same set of policies. In short, I am sceptical of the time consistency of Paul Volcker’s policies.

Further given that Chinese authorities has been operating on Keynesian guided policies, then same boom bust cycles will apply. So far real pool of savings in China has deferred on the day of reckoning, but current policies which extrapolate to capital consumption will eventually expose these imbalances.

Lastly with due respect to Mr. Roach, central banking, or the politicization of money, does not in any way embody capitalism. Remember half of every transactions facilitated by legal tender imposed medium isn’t one determined by the markets but by government.

And neither does Greenspan’s unregulated financial system which has been anchored on manipulating interest rates and bailouts, and whose regulations has been gamed by the political and banking class.

Capitalism does not prevent market from clearing excesses, but to the contrary induces such dynamics. The persistency of the 2008 crisis, which extends today, has been due to policies which has been preventing the required adjustments from previously acquired malinvestments and distortions.

ECB’s Jens Weidmann warns Printing Money for Bailouts may lead to Hyperinflation

ECB’s council member and chief of Germany’s Bundesbank Jens Weidmann says that printing money to bailout institutions may lead to hyperinflation.

From the Bloomberg, (bold emphasis mine)

“One of the severest forms of monetary policy being roped in for fiscal purposes is monetary financing, in colloquial terms also known as the financing of public debt via the money printing press,” Weidmann, who heads Germany’s Bundesbank, said in a speech in Berlin today. The prohibition of monetary financing in the euro area “is one of the most important achievements in central banking” and “specifically for Germany, it is also a key lesson from the experience of hyperinflation after World War I,” he said.

The ECB is under pressure to ramp up its bond purchases to cap soaring yields in Italy as governments fail to contain the two-year-old sovereign debt crisis. Weidmann also rejected proposals to use Bundesbank currency and gold reserves to help finance purchases by a special fund, saying this is another form of monetary financing.

Such a course “undermines the incentives for sound public finances, creates appetite for ever more of that sweet poison and harms the credibility of the central bank in its quest for price stability,” Weidmann said…

And in rejecting the expanded leveraged for the EFSF…

“I am glad that also the German government echoed our resistance to the use of German currency or gold reserves in funding financial assistance to other” euro-area members, he said. “Proposals to involve the Eurosystem in leveraging the EFSF -- be it through a refinancing of the EFSF by the central bank or most recently via the use of currency reserves as collateral for a special purpose vehicle buying government bonds -- would be a clear violation of this prohibition” on monetary financing.

Mr. Weidmann practically exposes the proposed leveraged scheme of the EFSF as concealed money printing operations as I have previously pointed out here and here

However my general impression behind all the ‘smoke and mirrors’ promoted as a comprehensive rescue strategy is that these measures fundamentally stands on the ECB’s monetization of government debt.

In short, the EU’s Bazooka bailout deal represents as an implicit license for or as façade to the ECB’s massive money printing program.

One would note that path dependency continues to influence the mindset of policymakers—Germany’s traumatic experience with the gruesome Weimar episode of hyperinflation has made German policymakers outspokenly resistant to money printing policies, whereas America’s harrowing experience with a decade long of economic depression has made US policymakers more accommodative to inflationist policies.

Nevertheless, the tallied ECB’s 183 billion euros ($253 billion) purchases of distressed nations’ assets has been said to be sterilized, albeit I’m not sure to what extent these has been (as EU’s money supply growth has been ramping up) and what will occur once these neutralization measures reaches its statutory limits.

Bernanke’s Doctrine: Fed Mulls Purchases of Mortgage Backed Securities

From the Wall Street Journal. (bold emphasis mine)

Federal Reserve officials are starting to build a case for a new program of buying mortgage-backed securities to boost the ailing economy, though they appear unlikely to move swiftly.

The idea would be to target any new efforts by the central bank at the parts of the economy that are most severely impeding a recovery—the housing and mortgage markets—by working to push down mortgage rates.

Lower mortgage rates, in turn, could encourage more home buying and mortgage-refinancing, and help the economy by freeing up cash for consumers to spend on other goods and services. Mortgage rates are already very low, but some Fed officials believe they might be pushed lower. Moreover, Fed officials believe their past purchase programs helped to lift stock markets, by driving investors from low-risk investments toward riskier investments.

The Fed discussions occur amid broader efforts in the government to find ways to revive housing markets and stir refinancing.

"I believe we should move back up toward the top of the list of options the large-scale purchase of additional mortgage-backed securities," Federal Reserve governor Dan Tarullo said in a speech Thursday at Columbia University.

A new Fed mortgage-bond-buying program isn't a certainty. If inflation doesn't recede as many officials expect, or if the economy picks up with surprising vigor on its own, such a program might not win broad support inside the Fed.

I’ve been repeatedly saying that team Bernanke’s ‘ant-deflation’ policies have been meant to fire up the ‘animal spirits’ of the economy via the stock markets as the primary target.

It’s still been the same same same guiding path of policymaking for Bernanke et.al.

However so far, all these so-called variations of the next Quantitative Easing has remained as virtual reality...promises. Yet, even without QE, US money supply keeps growing robustly.

US Derivative Time Bomb: Five Banks Account for 96% Of The $250 Trillion Exposure

From Zero Hedge (bold emphasis mine)

The latest quarterly report from the Office Of the Currency Comptroller is out and as usual it presents in a crisp, clear and very much glaring format the fact that the top 4 banks in the US now account for a massively disproportionate amount of the derivative risk in the financial system. Specifically, of the $250 trillion in gross notional amount of derivative contracts outstanding (consisting of Interest Rate, FX, Equity Contracts, Commodity and CDS) among the Top 25 commercial banks (a number that swells to $333 trillion when looking at the Top 25 Bank Holding Companies), a mere 5 banks (and really 4) account for 95.9% of all derivative exposure (HSBC replaced Wells as the Top 5th bank, which at $3.9 trillion in derivative exposure is a distant place from #4 Goldman with $47.7 trillion). The top 4 banks: JPM with $78.1 trillion in exposure, Citi with $56 trillion, Bank of America with $53 trillion and Goldman with $48 trillion, account for 94.4% of total exposure. As historically has been the case, the bulk of consolidated exposure is in Interest Rate swaps ($204.6 trillion), followed by FX ($26.5TR), CDS ($15.2 trillion), and Equity and Commodity with $1.6 and $1.4 trillion, respectively. And that's your definition of Too Big To Fail right there: the biggest banks are not only getting bigger, but their risk exposure is now at a new all time high and up $5.3 trillion from Q1 as they have to risk ever more in the derivatives market to generate that incremental penny of return.

At this point the economist PhD readers will scream: "this is total BS - after all you have bilateral netting which eliminates net bank exposure almost entirely."

True: that is precisely what the OCC will say too. As the chart below shows, according to the chief regulator of the derivative space in Q2 netting benefits amounted to an almost record 90.8% of gross exposure, so while seemingly massive, those XXX trillion numbers are really quite, quite small... Right?

...Wrong. The problem with bilateral netting is that it is based on one massively flawed assumption, namely that in an orderly collapse all derivative contracts will be honored by the issuing bank (in this case the company that has sold the protection, and which the buyer of protection hopes will offset the protection it in turn has sold). The best example of how the flaw behind bilateral netting almost destroyed the system is AIG: the insurance company was hours away from making trillions of derivative contracts worthless if it were to implode, leaving all those who had bought protection from the firm worthless, a contingency only Goldman hedged by buying protection on AIG. And while the argument can further be extended that in bankruptcy a perfectly netted bankrupt entity would make someone else whole on claims they have written, this is not true, as the bankrupt estate will pursue 100 cent recovery on its claims even under Chapter 11, while claims the estate had written end up as General Unsecured Claims which as Lehman has demonstrated will collect 20 cents on the dollar if they are lucky.

The point of this detour being that if any of these four banks fails, the repercussions would be disastrous. And no, Frank Dodd's bank "resolution" provision would do absolutely nothing to prevent an epic systemic collapse.

...

Lastly, and tangentially on a topic that recently has gotten much prominent attention in the media, we present the exposure by product for the biggest commercial banks. Of particular note is that while virtually every single bank has a preponderance of its derivative exposure in the form of plain vanilla IR swaps (on average accounting for more than 80% of total), Morgan Stanley, and specifically its Utah-based commercial bank Morgan Stanley Bank NA, has almost exclusively all of its exposure tied in with the far riskier FX contracts, or 98.3% of the total $1.793 trillion. For a bank with no deposit buffer, and which has massive exposure to European banks regardless of how hard management and various other banks scramble to defend Morgan Stanley, the fact that it has such an abnormal amount of exposure (but, but, it is "bilaterally netted" we can just hear Dick Bove screaming on Monday) to the ridiculously volatile FX space should perhaps raise some further eyebrows...

Such immense risk exposure by ‘Too Big to Fail’ (TBTF) US banks entail that political actions or policy making will likely be directed towards the prevention of a massive deflationary banking sector collapse from a derivatives meltdown.

And problems at the Eurozone could just be the pin that could ‘pop the bubble’.

This implies greater likelihood of persistent bailout policies which mostly will be coursed through inflationism. It’s an “inflate or die” for politically privileged TBTF banks in the US or in the Eurozone.

Again political leaders appear to be using the financial markets as leverage to negotiate for the passage of such policies.

Proof?

From today’s Bloomberg article, (bold emphasis mine)

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner warned at the annual meeting of the IMF failure to combat the Greek-led turmoil threatened “cascading default, bank runs and catastrophic risk.”

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said euro-region leaders must erect a firewall around Greece to avert a cascade of market attacks on other European states that would risk breaking up the currency area.

Expanding the powers of the region’s rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, as agreed by European leaders in July is necessary to avoid Greece’s problems from spilling over to other countries, Merkel said late yesterday on ARD television. The fund’s permanent successor, due to take effect in mid-2013, is needed “so we can in fact let a state go insolvent” if it can’t pay its bills, she said.

Policy makers can make the EFSF more “efficient” by leveraging it without involving the ECB, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said over the weekend. He also raised the prospect of bringing in the permanent backstop before 2013.

Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney estimated 1 trillion euros ($1.3 trillion) may have to be deployed while U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne said a solution is needed by the time that Group of 20 leaders meet in Cannes, France, on Nov. 3-4.

Policymakers have been intensifying their jawboning or mind conditioning of the public of the exigencies of more bailouts.

They will come. But, perhaps, only after the markets endure more pain.

US Mulls ‘official’ QE 3.0, Operation Twist AND Fiscal Stimulus

Again, it’s almost too predictable that the path dependency of political authorities have been to resort to more central bank activism and to apply additional government spending on emergent signs of economic weakness.

In the US, the QE 2.0 has still been in motion despite the official program for its closure last June.

Yet, over the interim there have been modified actions which can be extrapolated to stealth QE 3.0: such as extended zero bound rates until 2013 and the reinvesting of principal payments (whose mix of asset purchases would be altered partly to induce mortgage refinancing).

This news account gives light to the potential course of action by Team Ben Bernanke after his speech last night, from Bloomberg, (bold highlights mine)

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said policy makers will discuss the tools they could use to boost the recovery at their next meeting this month and stand ready to use them if necessary.

Policy makers “are prepared to employ these tools as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in the context of price stability,” Bernanke said today in Minneapolis, echoing points from his Aug. 26 remarks in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.

The Fed chief, in a speech to economists, stopped short of signaling what he believes is the central bank’s best option to aid the economy. He said in previous remarks that the Fed’s measures to bolster growth include lengthening the duration of securities in its $1.65 trillion Treasury portfolio and buying more government bonds.

Media calls this portfolio rebalancing towards the lengthening of the duration of securities held as ‘Operation Twist’ which apparently aims to lower long term interest rates in order to induce the marketplace to get exposed into more risk assets. This has been part of Bernanke’s dogma of the wonkish Financial Accelerator where

changes in interest rates engineered by the central bank affect the values of the assets and the cash flows of potential borrowers and thus their creditworthiness, which in turn affects the external finance premium that borrowers face

The constant alterations of monetary policy reveal of how the previous QEs has failed. And such experiment/s will likely be put in place ahead of another official QE. The next FOMC meeting will be on the third week of September.

Of course, Ben Bernanke sees inflation as having little risk for him to have the mettle to toy around with such experimental measures.

From Marketwatch.com

see little indication that the higher rate of inflation experienced so far this year has become ingrained in the economy

The perceived low risk inflation regime has partly been because of the way the bond markets have been structured which many ideologically biased experts use as measure for inflation, and also of the constant manipulations of the commodity markets as part of their signaling channel to manage ‘inflation expectations’. Even gold markets have been subjected to price suppression scheme according to the Wikileaks

And the barrage of QE in the headlines of late, which I read has been part of this communications management tool being employed to condition the public for the next official QE.

Of course, the last act won’t come from the Bernanke’s Federal Reserve, as President Obama has offered to join in by introducing more government spending coupled with temporary tax cuts to please the opposition (Republicans).

This from the Bloomberg,

President Barack Obama called on Congress to pass a jobs plan that would inject $447 billion into the economy through infrastructure spending, subsidies to local governments to stem teacher layoffs, and cutting in half the payroll taxes paid by workers and small-business owners.

The package is heavily geared toward tax cuts, which account for more than half the dollar value of the stimulus, and administration officials said they believe that will have the greatest appeal to Republican members of Congress.

“The question is whether, in the face of an ongoing national crisis, we can stop the political circus and actually do something to help the economy,” Obama told a joint session of Congress tonight, according to a text of the address released by the White House.

A $105 billion infrastructure proposal includes money for school modernization, transportation projects and rehabilitation of vacant properties. Most of the economic impact from the infrastructure spending would be next year though some of it would come in 2013, an administration official said.

“Ultimately, our recovery will be driven not by Washington, but by our businesses and workers,” the president said. “But we can help. We can make a difference.”

The administration estimated that $35 billion it’s seeking in direct aid to state and local governments to stem layoffs of educators and emergency personnel would save the jobs of 280,000 teachers, according to a White House fact sheet.

It has never been the question whether past policies worked. It’s just doing the same thing over and over with practically the same results which represents as plain insanity and the misplaced belief on miracles from centrally planned actions.

Economic reality will eventually unmask the charade of shifting resources from productive activities to non-productive activities that will not only lead to capital consumption but also lead to cronyism, corruption, regime uncertainty, economic and financial fragility and political instability. Obviously Obama's is desperately trying to shore up his re-election odds, whose popularity rating has fallen to new lows.

Nonetheless we will be seeing expanded stimulus from all fronts in the US and the world which means a vastly distorted financial markets. More stimulus on top of the existing ones which means increasing systemic risks from artificial boosters or substance dependency.

This also means traditional metrics in the assessment of the financial marketplace will hardly be effective.

How Reliable is the S&P’s ‘Death Cross’ Pattern?

Mechanical chartists say that with the recent stock market collapse, the technical picture of the US S&P 500 have been irreparably deteriorated such that prospects of a decline is vastly greater (which has been rationalized on a forthcoming recession) than from a recovery. The basis of the forecast: the Death Cross or ‘A crossover resulting from a security's long-term moving average breaking above its short-term moving average or support level[1]’.

First of all, I’ve seen this picture and the same call before.

In July of last year, the S&P also experienced a similar death cross. Many articles emphasized on the imminence of a crash[2] that never materialized.

Secondly, I think applying statistics to past performances to generate “feasible” odds on a bet based on the ‘death cross’ represents as sloppy thinking

To wit, betting based on a ‘death cross’ signifies a gambler’s fallacy or fallacy committed when a person assumes that a departure from what occurs on average or in the long term will be corrected in the short term[3].

A coin toss will always have a 50-50 head-tail probability distribution. If the random coin toss exercise would initially result to string of ‘heads’ outcome, the eventual result of this repeated exercise would still result to a 50-50 outcome or a zero average, as shown by the chart below.

As the illustrious mathematician Benoit Mandelbroit wrote[4],

If you repeat a random experiment often enough, the average of the outcomes will converge towards an expected value. With a coin, heads and tails have equal odds. With a die, the side with one spot will come up about a sixth of the time

Applied to the death cross, we see the same probability 50-50, because each event from where the ‘death cross’ appears entails different conditions (finance, market, politics, social, cultural, even time and spatial differences and etc), as earlier argued[5]. It would signify a sheer folly to oversimplify the cause and effect order and speciously apply odds to it.

Proof?

One would hear proponents bluster over the success of the death cross in 2000 and 2007. Obviously the hindsight bias can be very alluring but deceptive. The causal relationship which made the ‘death cross’ seemingly effective in 2000 and 2007 for the US S&P 500 had been mostly due to the boom bust cycles which culminated to a full blown recession or a crisis during the stated periods.

The death cross was last seen in July of last year (green circle above window), but why didn’t it work? The answer, because the death cross had been pulverized by Bernanke’s QE 2.0 (see green circle chart below). When Mr. Bernanke announced QE 2.0, the ‘death cross’ transmogrified into a ‘golden’ cross!!! This shows how human action is greater than historical determinism or chart patterns.

Many mistakenly think that chart patterns has an inherently built in success formula which is magically infallible, as said above, they are not.

Third, not all market crashes has been due to recessions.

The above illustrates the crash of 1962 (upper window) and 1987 (lower window)[6]. This is obviously unrelated to the death cross, however the point is to illustrate that not every stock crash is related to economic activities. The recent crash may or may not overture a recession.

Bottom line: The prospective actions of US Federal Reserve’s Ben Bernanke and European Central Bank’s Jean-Claude Trichet represents as the major forces that determines the success or failure of the death cross (and not statistics nor the pattern in itself). If they force enough inflation, then markets will reverse regardless of what today’s chart patterns indicate. Otherwise, the death cross could confirm the pattern. Yet given the ideological leanings and path dependency of regulators or policymakers, the desire to seek the preservation of the status quo and the protection of the banking class, I think the former is likely the outcome than the latter.

And another thing, we humans are predisposed to look for patterns even when non-exist, that’s a result of our legacy or inheritance from hunter gatherer ancestors’ genes whom looked for patterns in the environment for survival or risked being eaten alive by predators. This behavioural tendency is called clustering illusion[7]. A cognitive bias which we should keep in mind and avoid in this modern world.

---

[1] Investopedia.com Death Cross

[2] The Economic Collapse Blog, The Death Cross: Another Sign That We Are On The Verge Of A Recession?, July 5, 2010

[3] Nizkor.org Fallacy: Gambler's Fallacy

[4] Mandelbrot, Benoit B The (mis) Behaviour of Markets, Profile Books p.32

[5] See The Causal Realist Perspective to the Phsix-Peso Bullish Momentum, July 10, 2011

[6] About.com Stock Market History

[7] Wikipedia.org Clustering illusion

Quote of the Day: Path Dependency

From Professor Arnold Kling,

…most respectable people think that Bernanke and Paulson and TARP and such SAVED THE WORLD, and so that is now the model going forward for handling any situation involving shaky large banks.

China Warns US on Debt Default as ‘Playing with Fire’

Here is another spectacle, China warns the US of ‘playing with fire’ by tinkering with the prospects of default.

From yahoo.com

Republican lawmakers are "playing with fire" by contemplating even a brief debt default as a means to force deeper government spending cuts, an adviser to China's central bank said on Wednesday.

The idea of a technical default -- essentially delaying interest payments for a few days -- has gained backing from a growing number of mainstream Republicans who see it as a price worth paying if it forces the White House to slash spending, Reuters reported on Tuesday.

But any form of default could destabilize the global economy and sour already tense relations with big U.S. creditors such as China, government officials and investors warn.

Li Daokui, an adviser to the People's Bank of China, said a default could undermine the U.S. dollar, and Beijing needed to dissuade Washington from pursuing this course of action.

"I think there is a risk that the U.S. debt default may happen," Li told reporters on the sidelines of a forum in Beijing. "The result will be very serious and I really hope that they would stop playing with fire."

China is the largest foreign creditor to the United States, holding more than $1 trillion in Treasury debt as of March, U.S. data shows, so its concerns carry considerable weight in Washington.

"I really worry about the risks of a U.S. debt default, which I think may lead to a decline in the dollar's value," Li said.

This just shows how governments have been addicted towards profligacy and inflationism as recourse to economic predicaments.

By advocating an increase of US debts, the US will genuinely be “playing with fire”.

Eventually this spending-deficit cycle will reach a point where the US economy won’t be able to pay her liabilities and will prompt her to an outright default or pursue hyperinflationary policies. So China is effectively asking the US to kick the can down the road.

However, these warnings do not just come from China, but also from the Fed’s James Bullard and one of the key credit rating agency, the Fitch Ratings

From the Reuters (hat tip Dr Antony Mueller)

A default would have severe reverberations in global markets, a top Federal Reserve official said just hours after Fitch Ratings warned it could slash credit ratings if the government misses bond payments.

St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank President James Bullard told Reuters on Wednesday "the U.S. fiscal situation, if not handled correctly, could turn into a global macro shock."

"The idea that the U.S. could threaten to default is a dangerous one," he said in an interview.

"The reverberations in those global markets would be very severe. That's where the real risk comes in," Bullard warned.

So the political pressure to raise debt limits has apparently been escalating.

Once the US Congress approves such actions, which I think they will, this gives the Fed another rational for QE 3.0: insurance against the risk of a bond auction failure as previously discussed here.

But while China warns of a default, the fact is that the US has already been partially defaulting on her debt via inflationism (QE 1.0 and 2.0)

Repeating what Murray Rothbard wrote,

Inflation, then, is an underhanded and terribly destructive way of indirectly repudiating the "public debt"; destructive because it ruins the currency unit, which individuals and businesses depend upon for calculating all their economic decisions.

So China prefers indirect default by inflation than an outright default.

Finally another paradox is that this warning of China comes amidst what appears to be her declining interest to finance the US.

True China owns lots of US debts (following charts from zero hedge)

But China has been buying less during the past months

Bottom line: Global policymakers appear to be averse at imposing fiscal discipline and would choose the inflationism route instead.

These actions manifest what I call path dependency or the bailout mentality via inflationism. Until the next crisis implodes such dogmatist approach simply won’t change.

Serial Bailouts For Greece (and for PIIGS)

From the Bloomberg

European Union officials will focus on preparing a new aid package for Greece that includes a “voluntary” role for investors after the EU and International Monetary Fund approved the fifth installment of Greece’s 110 billion-euro ($161 billion) bailout.

“I expect the euro group to agree to additional financing to be provided to Greece under strict conditionality,” Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said after meeting with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou in Luxembourg yesterday. “This conditionality will include private-sector involvement on a voluntary basis.”

Papandreou agreed to 78 billion euros in additional austerity measures and asset sales through 2015 to secure the 12 billion euro bailout payment and meet conditions for receiving an additional rescue package. He agreed to make “significant” cuts in public-sector employment and establish an agency to manage accelerated asset sales, according to a statement released in Athens yesterday. The plan is fueling popular opposition and protests across Greece...

Under the original rescue, Greece was due to sell 27 billion euros of bonds next year. EU leaders and Papandreou have acknowledged that a return to markets won’t be possible with Greece’s 10-year debt yielding 16 percent, more than twice the level at the time of the bailout. The EU is looking to close that funding gap through new loans and bondholders’ willingness to roll over Greek debt, EU officials have said.

Europe’s financial leaders needed to hammer out a revised Greek package to persuade the IMF to pay its share of the 12 billion-euro tranche originally due in June. The IMF had indicated that it would withhold its 3.3 billion-euro piece unless the EU comes up with a plan to close Greece’s funding gap for 2012. The EU-IMF statement said the full payment would be made in early July. [all bold highlights mine]

These developments seem on the way to validate my views.

Mainstream has been ignoring the political role of the EU’s existence, the role of central bankers, the intertwined complex political relationships between the banking sector, the central banks and the national governments and the inherent ability of central banks to conduct bailouts by inflating the system.

If the US had QE [Quantitative Easing] 1.0, 2.0 and most likely a 3.0...until the QE nth, despite poker bluffing statements like this [Morningstar.com]

"The trade-offs are getting--are getting less attractive at this point. Inflation has gotten higher," Bernanke said. He cited the rising inflation expectations seen then and offered "it's not clear that we can get substantial improvements in payrolls without some additional inflation risk." He went on, "If we're going to have success in creating a long-run sustainable recovery with lots of job growth, we've got to keep inflation under control."

...or that the earlier consensus view that QE 3.0 is unlikely,

central bank watchers believe there is simply no appetite within the central bank to undertake such an effort, which some in markets are already referring to as QE3.

...QE 3.0 will be coming for the above reasons as earlier discussed.

The path dependence from previous actions of regulators and political leaders and the dominant ideological underpinnings which influence their actions combined with the framework of current network of political institutions are highly suggestive of the direction of such course of actions.

Importantly, the implicit priority to support the politically privileged industries as the banking system—which functions as the main intermediary that channels private sector funds to governments. Alternatively, this means policies has been designed to sustain the status quo for politicians and their allies.

Further, it would be misplaced to put alot of emphasis on political protestations by the public as measure to predict future policies.

Political leaders have learned the lessons of Egypt and Tunisia and have been applying organized violence as seen in Libya, in Yemen or in Syria.

It won’t be different for the political leaders of the developed world. As indications of their prospective actions against popular political pressure, even several protestors on US Memorial Day have suffered from police brutality from just “dancing”

In addition, sentiment can shift swiftly.

Recent soft patches in economic data, which I think has been part of the signaling channel maneuver, which has likewise began to affect markets, appear to be reversing previous sentiments which says that the Fed has “no appetite” for QE 3.0.

Again from Morningstar

Having received the strongest indication yet of a slowing economic recovery, traders of U.S. interest rate futures on Friday backed off on the notion that the Federal Reserve will start raising its short-term federal-funds rate during the first half of next year.

Finally, for those who say they are ‘massively’ short the Euro...

...it’s gonna be alot of pain for them.

So like the US, the above only reveals that the Eurozone crisis will mean that Greece and the PIIGS will experience bailouts after bailouts after bailouts. Thus, an implied currency war in the process until the unsustainable system of fiat money collapses or people awaken to the risk thereof and apply political discipline.

For now, the policy of bailouts and inflationism will continue to be the central feature of today’s global policy making process where currency values will be determined by the degree of relative inflationism applied.

Philippine Mining Index and the Manipulated Collapse of Commodity Prices

We're living in an amazing world where real assets can be purchased with fantasy money. It won't last because it's illogical and synthetic. But it has already lasted longer than most realists thought possible.-Richard Russell

The Phisix finally took a breather, falling by 2.33% over the week, the first decline over 7 weeks. Such loss substantially reduced the year to date gains to only .43%.

The decline had been broad based, but ironically the mining and oil sector eluded the downturn supposedly on a raft of speculations over prospective deals.

I say ironic because such defiance comes in the face of a manipulated collapse of commodity prices in the world markets.

The Manipulated Collapse

Abruptly changing the rules of the game represents manipulation.

Since trades are essentially anchored upon expectations based on existing information which incorporates rules and other operating parameters (e.g. architecture of trading platform), drastically altering the rules midway dramatically shifts the balance of cost-benefit expectations and the economic distribution of resources, as manipulation benefits the regulators and their allies at the expense of market participants.

While I expected the huge run up in silver prices to be met with sharp price volatility[1], I didn’t expect that this would be prompted for by a series of steep credit margin hikes imposed by the CME[2]. Silver prices fell 25% over the week.

Since commodity markets are interrelated, as many investors or institutions position in different commodities or commodity indices, the assault on the silver markets rippled throughout the commodity sphere and to other markets.

One evidence of such imbalance is that even as silver prices collapsed, the physical inventory of silver shriveled[3], instead of ballooning. This means that instead of a panic from a sharp price downswing, many have taken the price drop as an opportunity to accumulate physical silver! What appears to be happening is that the heavily leveraged positions or those who fail to meet the margin calls, have forcibly been closed regardless of price, but the new entrants have used such opportunity to accumulate substantially.

If this should serve as a clue then the interventions mean that the effect on silver prices is likely to be transitory as players adjust to the new environment.

The other point is that the fundamental drivers of silver and other commodities remain firmly entrenched.

Commodity Prices Underpin the Fate of Mining and Resource Firms

Changing the rules midway was part of the scenario of the silver bubble meltdown in 1980. The Hunt brothers, whom attempted to corner the silver market, suffered from the same credit margin hikes which led to their bankruptcy.

But of course, the major factors that led to the commodity bubble bust had been due to sharp increases in the interest rates, coming from a shift in the monetary policy stance by US Paul Volcker led US Federal Reserve, and that a global commodity glut had accrued as the globalization gradually took hold[4].

Except for the manipulation, the above events hasn’t shaped the de facto climate.

Why is this important? Because share prices of mining or other commodity based companies essentially depend on the prices of the commodity products.

The almost two decade of bear market in commodities led to the hibernation of mining and other resource based companies or a slump in terms of stock market prices.

Remember Atlas Consolidated at php 400 per share in the 70s and was seen as a ‘blue chip’? Today, Atlas trades at a measly php 15 per share following years of dormancy in the company’s operations. To consider, real or inflation adjusted prices in the 70s means a lot more Pesos today.

As one would note, the CRB Reuters futures index (lower window) courtesy of chartrus.com[5] squares with the performance of the Philippine Mining Index (upper window).

When I turned bullish on gold in 2003 I called this the “Rip Van Winkle”[6] moment. The concurrent rise of the CRB Reuters index also reflects on the Philippine Mining Index.

The point is that the buoyancy of domestic mining and oil index (or prices of mining and oil companies) greatly depends on the underlying trends of their commodity products.

Commodities As Hedge

The war against precious metals is being waged most possibly as part of the signaling channel tools which Central Banks employ to manage inflation expectations. This I think is part of the orchestrated conditioning employed by the US Federal Reserve that is being used to justify further interventions particularly the QE 3.0[7].

All talks about tightening and the ending of QE part of another series of poker bluff at work.

Given the weak housing market (which risks endangering the balance sheets of the US banking system which Fed chair Bernanke sees as the heart of the US economy), the declining interests of foreign governments to finance US deficits, insufficient private savings and the wobbly financial conditions of states[8], plus the ideological economic (quasi boom) biases and path dependency of the policymaking by US political authorities, the US is left with little option but to reengage in quantitative easing sometime in the near future after the end of the QE 2.0 in June.

And part of the propaganda, through biased research studies by the Fed and allied institutions, has been to delink the Fed’s policies with that of surging commodity prices. And the other way to create this impression is to manipulate the commodity markets.

At the end of the day commodities still represents as insurance from the adverse unintended consequences of the monetary interventionism—an addiction inspired by grand delusions of power.

To quote Michael Taylor[9],

the state exacerbates the conditions which are supposed to make it necessary. We might say that the state is like an addictive drug: the more of it we have, the more we 'need' it and the more we come to 'depend' on it.

---

[1] See Hi Ho Silver!, April 23, 2011

[2] See War on Precious Metals Continues: Silver Margins Raised 5 times in 2 weeks!, May 5, 2011

[3] See War Against Precious Metals: Silver’s Collapsing Prices in the face of Collapsing Inventories, May 6, 2011

[4] See War on Precious Metals: Silver Prices Plunge On Higher Credit Margins, May 2, 2011

[5] Chartrus.com CRB Reuters Futures

[6] See Philippine Mining Index; We’ve Only Just Begun! April 10, 2006

[7] See War on Precious Metals: The Rationalization Process For QE 3.0, May 7, 2011

[8] See The US Dollar’s Dependence On Quantitative Easing, March 20, 2011

[9] Taylor, Michael The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 168 Quotes.liberty-tree.ca