``Every investment is a form of speculation. There is in the course of human events no stability and consequently no safety." -- Ludwig von Mises
Figure 1 stockcharts.com: Confirming Averages
The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate hut at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups—Henry Hazlitt
``Every investment is a form of speculation. There is in the course of human events no stability and consequently no safety." -- Ludwig von Mises
Figure 1 stockcharts.com: Confirming Averages
``The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves. But unlike the Lord, the market does not forgive those who know not what they do.”- Warren Buffett
The risks remain out there in spite of the snowballing sanguine expectations.
Figure 2: IMF: Philippine Peso and the VIX Index
In figure 2, courtesy of the IMF, the Philippine Peso (dotted line) has appreciated amidst the backdrop of a RECORD low volatility, low signs of anxiety and high-risk appetite conditions as represented by the VIX Index.
Figure 3: IMF: Appreciation pf Regional Currencies Against the US Dollar
Figure 4: IMF: Rollover and Exchange Risks in Public Debt
While there is no question that the present efforts of reforms instituted by the incumbent administration has significantly improved the country’s finances and fiscal position, a boatload of work remains to be done.
In Figure 4, the IMF reminds us that the
And this is what I’ve been saying all along. Today’s tsunami of capital has prompted both the private and public institutions, particularly the emerging trend of state investment companies to manage excess reserves, into expand their investing universe, to even consider illiquid and exotic themes, in order to squeeze out returns in a world faced with diminishing returns due to extensive competition and adaptation of similar investing approaches.
Furthermore, the introduction of innovative instruments such as derivatives, structured products and other forms of sophisticated trading strategies has compounded this outlook. As we have discussed before, in order to expand returns more leverage are being applied to magnify returns.
For instance, in our past issues we delved about the added liquidity brought about by the provisions of the carry trade arbitrage, where according to the Financial Times, ``households in Latvia and Romania have developed so much enthusiasm for borrowing in yen.” This means the carry trade has now turned increasingly global and more widespread to include unsophisticated households.
As record short positions have been taken against the “funding” currencies of the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc, demand for high yield instruments as the New Zealand’s dollar have caused a surge in the bond issuance of KIWI, adds Peter Garnham, Gillian Tett and David Turner of the Financial Times (emphasis mine), ``To take one out-of-the-way corner of global finance, the amount of bonds denominated in New Zealand dollars by European and Asian issuers has almost quadrupled in the past couple of years to record highs. This NZ$55bn (US$38bn, £19bn, €29bn) mountain of so-called "eurokiwi" and "uridashi" bonds towers over the country's NZ$39bn gross domestic product - a pattern that is unusual in global markets.” Incredible.
While this has so far reduced the volatility in New Zealand’s currency or any asset beneficiaries of the carry trade by way of offsetting the risks via hedging through derivatives, the world has been consistently adding tremendous amount of leverage which may at one point pose as a systemic risk or destabilize the global financial markets and the world economy.
Derivative trades, like any typical trades work on two ways, a buyer and seller, while such aims to reduce risks by dispersion one thing we shouldn’t forget is that there is always someone on the other side who will absorb the risks.
And I think this phenomenon is adding to the speculative inflows into our region and our local asset class.
Aside from
As you can see in Table 1, relative to PE ratios, the Phisix is situated on the HIGH end among its regional contemporaries in 2006. Whereas its earnings growth is expected to outperform the region for 2007 and 2008, the present gains appear to have almost consumed the expected growth rate. The same dynamics can be said of with the outperformance of
``Wall Street likes to characterize the proliferation of frenzied financial games as a sophisticated, prosocial activity, facilitating the fine-tuning of a complex economy. But the truth is otherwise: Short-term transactions frequently act as an invisible foot, kicking society in the shins." - Warren Buffett
***
While I do not know about the authenticity of this article I would like to share my insights on this interview:
``Fools ignore complexity," said Alan Perlis, the
I had been asked by a client if the recent developments in the
Subprime loans are basically loans to consumers who do not qualify for prime rate loans and have impaired or non-existent credit histories, therefore are classified as a higher risk group likely to default. As such, subprime loans are charged at higher rates compared to the prime loans.
``They made up about a fifth of all new mortgages last year and about 13.5 percent of outstanding home loans, up from about 2.5 percent in 1998, according to the Washington-based Mortgage Bankers Association” notes a Bloomberg report.
Rising incidences of defaults and foreclosures have led to a wave of mortgage lenders going under. Since December of 2006 ``about 20 lenders have gone kaput”, according to Mortgage-Lender-Implode-A-Meter.
Present developments have likewise led to the an increased loan loss provisions by the world’s third largest bank by market value, the HSBC Holdings Plc, aside from suffering from a management shakeout, while US second largest subprime lender New Century Financial Corp said that it probably lost money last year and had to restate earnings for 2006, where its stock prices tumbled 36% last Wednesday.
While of course we remain vigilant over the fact that the latest housing boom in the
Figure 1: NYT: Largest Housing Boom Since 1890
Figure 2: Stockcharts.com: Global Correlation
Figure 3: Stockcharts.com: Dow Jones Mortgage Finance and Philadelphia Bank
Figure 4: IIF: Worldwide Economic Growth Slowdown
Further, boom-bust cycles have been determined by massive credit expansions from which today’s marketplace have been structured, in the words of the illustrious Ludwig von Mises, ``The boom can last only as long as the credit expansion progresses at an ever-accelerated pace. The boom comes to an end as soon as additional quantities of fiduciary media are no longer thrown upon the loan market”.
In principle, this makes little difference from what has occurred in the Great Depression in the 1930s to Japan’s recent bout with deflation. Of course, this is in sharp contrast to Milton Friedman-Anna Schwartz’s theory [US Fed Chief Bernanke’s icon] that it was government’s failure to liquefy the system that caused such conditions.
In fact, in terms of the scale and magnitude, today’s money and credit creation has been unprecedented.
I might add too that today’s financial marketplace is undergoing the greatest experiment of all time, the FIAT MONEY Standard or the US dollar “DIGITAL and DERIVATIVES” standard system.
American Jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once said that ``A page of history is worth a volume of logic.”
In the John Law 1720 experience, the excesses of fiat money dynamics caused a reversion to the gold standard; it may or may not be the case today. In human history ALL experiments with paper money have been etched in epitaphs.
The great depression led to the US Government’s revocation of the public’s ownership rights of gold and the adoption of protectionist policies.
In addition, while there have been indeed massive changes in today’s economic and financial frontiers such as a combination of deregulation, technology enabled integration, greater participation of nations to trade and the inclusion of a huge pool of labor supply into the world economy, which has contributed to what is known as the era of disinflation, the collective government/central bank’s action has been to sow the seeds of inflation in the financial system.
The public’s perception that inflation remains muted lies on the chicanery of price index manipulation meant to promote and preserve the political power of the ruling class, regardless of the form of government. In Zimbabwe, for example, its national government comically and laughably declared inflation as illegal amidst hyperinflation or inflation gone berserk! Quoting New York Times (emphasis mine), ``For the government, “the big problem about
One must be reminded that these massive changes globally may well just be the initial impacts of the adjustments operating under a greatly expanded economic universe which should translate to rising inflationary pressures overtime as demographic trends and entitlement programs continue to exert pressures on the fiscal state of collective governments.
This is not without precedent, however. Historian Niall Ferguson identifies globalization trends prior to 1914 which ended with the advent of World War I. Operating almost in the same template, the financial markets had been equally complacent then and risk insensitive. Let me quote Mr. Ferguson at length,
``To be sure, structural changes may have served to dampen the bond market’s sensitivity to political risk. Even as the international economy seemed to be converging financially as a result of exchange rate alignment, market integration, and fiscal stabilization, the great powers’ bond markets were growing apart. The rise of private savings banks and post office savings banks may help to explain why bond prices became less responsive to international crises. An investor whose exposure to long-term government bonds was mediated though a savings account might well have overlooked the potential damage a war could do to his net worth, or might well have missed the signs of impending conflict. Yet even to the financially sophisticated, as far as can be judged by the financial press, the First World War came as a surprise. Like an earthquake on a densely populated fault line, its victims had long known that it was a possibility, and how dire its consequences would be; but its timing remained impossible to predict, and therefore beyond the realm of normal risk assessment.”
He warns of the risks that history could repeat itself.
Aside from risks of a long known possibility but whose “timing is impossible to predict” also comes of risks from something beyond what is conventionally known. It is called the Black Swan problem, where swans had been assumed as white until black swans where found in
To borrow the words of the erudite author Nassim Taleb which he calls as "ludic fallacy" or "the attributes of the uncertainty we face in real life have little connection to the sterilized ones we encounter in exams and games".
The real world is complex, fluid and dynamic. This is in contrast to what is commonly known, or perceived as, or what we know, and could pose as one of the "sterilized" risks probabilities. We maybe overestimating on what we know and underestimating the role of chance. Most of the blowups emanate from unexpected events. Trying to figure or mathematically model all variables is an impossible task; while we try to assimilate risks prospects, the more scenarios we build on, the more questions that comes in mind.
I am not certain if the present ruckus in the subprime markets will diffuse to the general markets. Signs are that the impacts have been minimal; yield spreads in major public and private instruments benchmarks have been little changed, US dollar has even declined, while gold and oil staged strong rebounds. In other words, no relative signs of stress yet.
However if major participants to the subprime mortgage markets find themselves facing a liquidity squeeze enough to provide for a meaningful impact on the Credit and Derivative markets, then there is a likelihood of a contagion to the general financial sphere with systemic repercussions. It would be best to deal with these once the signs of stress or dislocations become more apparent.
``Three financial postures for firms, households, and government units can be differentiated by the relation between the contractual payment commitments due to their liabilities and their primary cash flows. These financial postures are hedge, speculative, and ‘Ponzi.’ The stability of an economy’s financial structure depends upon the mix of financial postures. For any given regime of financial institutions and government interventions the greater the weight of hedge financing in the economy the greater the stability of the economy whereas an increasing weight of speculative and Ponzi financing indicates an increasing susceptibility of the economy to financial instability.”-Hyman Minsky, Finance and Profits: The Changing Nature of American Business Cycles, 1980
Last week also tackled on the unwinding of the YEN carry trade as a possible risk to the present bullish momentum of the global markets.
The Economist magazine recently argued that the in spite of the lack of intervention, the present record low levels of the Japanese YEN against the Euro and the real trade weighted value which is now at its lowest level since 1970s according to an index tracked by JP Morgan, see figure 5, the Japanese Yen is “misaligned” and has contributed to the distortion of the global economy, through the exacerbation of the “asset-price bubbles” around the world.
Figure 5: Economist: Living Dangerously?
Their gripe is that even with one of the world’s largest current-account surpluses and low levels of inflation, ``the abnormally low rates”, wrote the Economist, ``could be viewed as a form of intervention to hold down the yen.”
Therefore together with the Financial Times editorial both have recommended the use of its excess US dollar ($875 billion) foreign exchange reserves to intervene and shore up the Yen.
I recall
As we have pointed out before, the present concern is that much of the imbalances have been due to the massive leverage employed in the world financial markets, in particular, the Japanese currency as a potential source of leverage, as its currency could have been sold short via currency forward swaps, an off balance sheet transaction which does not appear in official statistics. So where does one get present estimates? According to the Economist, ``through record net “short” positions in the yen futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.”
We don’t know if such estimates are accurate or if any prospective interventions would succeed or simply be another feckless exercise to please the growing chorus for the Japanese to intervene. What we understand is that with such clamor, unlike the Chinese, the
Finally, the Economist relates of a similar incident in the past (emphasis mine), ``In fact, the main trigger for an unwinding of carry trades is likely to be not Japanese interest rates, but an upsurge in currency volatility. That is what happened in 1998, when enormous yen carry trades had built up. After
Well so much for intervention; with the political equation heating up it won’t be far when George Soros’ theory of self-fulfilling bias may in itself trigger an upsurge in currency volatility.
Be careful on what you wish for.
Going back to Philippine stock market internals, I have reverted to my sentiment indicators such as total number of trades and number of daily traded issues as a measure of investor psychology, where present activities possibly denote of emerging indications of “euphoria”.
Figure 1: Rising Number of Trades: Spikes Denotes of Market Tops
Figure 3: Daily Traded Issues: Intensifying Broad based activities signifies speculative biases
This phenomenon can be gleaned from market participants with very short-term time horizons as they attempt to chase prices in the hope that a greater fool will be out there to imbue on someone else’s folly. As the legendary and most successful stock market investor Mr. Warren Buffett once warned, “the dumbest reason in the world to buy a stock is simply because it is going up”, for the speculating public today, it is the reverse, the dumbest reason is for one to be left out of fad.
While everyone would have whatever justifications to be bullish in today’s market; namely, “cheap”, “growing earnings/revenues/production...etc” [as if earnings really mattered in pricing securities-am speaking domestically; in 2002 no one wanted to talk about anything about the stockmarket], proposed “backdoor” listings, rumored mergers and acquisitions, proposed expansions, better “economic outlook” due to “reforms” and other pabulums; the Philippine market is factually driven by foreign money and most probably fostered upon the account of a global inflationary [exploding money and credit] environment.
All these are presently being manifested in the world asset markets with the Philippines as part of the beneficiary of the “financial globalization”, this report from Bloomberg’s Oliver Biggadike on the present surging liquidity (emphasis mine), ``Domestic liquidity expanded 21.4 percent in December from a year earlier, following November's 18.5 percent gain, Tetangco told reporters last night. Money supply, which grew 16.1 percent in October, is expanding on record remittances from overseas nationals and investment in the country's stocks and bonds.” [I have long argued that the rise of the Peso has been mostly determined by portfolio flows and regional support at the margins...need I say more?]
As recap, market internals appear to highlight signs of a developing mania which could be indicative of a nearing inflection point, however, manias can last longer or intensify more than one can imagine. In manias, the greater fool theory is the prevalent theme as market participants become more emotionally attached to the present gains of the market as a permanent feature of the market’s landscape. Any “stories”, however irrelevant, are used to justify activities to scoop up share prices regardless of valuations, hoping that a greater fool will be willing to pay for it on higher prices.
Finally, since the Phisix has been driven by foreign money, any catalyst to a possible “culmination” or “climax” could, in most probability, come from external sources as that of the May 2006 incident. Whether the Phisix would suddenly become “expensive” in the foreign fund’s point of view or a global readjustment in the risk premia or an abrupt surge in the downside volatility could trigger a shift in psychology and cause a “repricing of some assets” as warned by Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank. Politics as some may suggest would have little impact on today’s capital flow dynamics unless it threatens the very nature of its functionality, as explained last week.
Be careful out there.
``Probability is omnipotent and omnipresent. It influences every coin at any time in any place, instantly. It cannot be shielded or altered. And probability is not limited to coins and dice and slot machines. Probability is the guiding force of everything in the universe, living or nonliving, near or far, big or small, now or anytime.” Scott Adams-creator of Dilbert, in God’s Debris
Quoting the normally bullish BCA Research on their invaluable insights (emphasis mine)...
Figure 5: stockcharts.com: Potential Jolt from Carry Trades
We should not forget that May 2006’s cross asset class sell-off has largely been in response to Japan’s administered increase of its bank reserves requirements which virtually prompted a spike in the Yen, the “funding currency” and consequently a selloff in the global markets, as shown in Figure 5.
The enclosed portion of the chart shows of how the spike in the Japanese Yen (red candlestick) coincided with the sudden selloffs in the US S & P 500 index (black line) as well as in the Phisix (lower panel).
Since a “carry trade” involves borrowing money from a low interest rate country, such as Japan’s Yen and using the proceeds to invest in higher yielding assets, where the profits obtained are derived from the spreads; a sudden tightening of the monetary policy or an abrupt jump in the value of the funding currency, which in this case is the Yen, could trigger a sellout in the invested assets which had been leveraged against the Yen for short covering.
In other words, a great deal of today’s liquidity driven markets could have been generated from the leverage arising from the carry trade arbitrage.
While the Yen today continues to drift along the four year lows against the US dollar, possibly providing fuel for the sustained run-up in global equities (see again figure 5), any precipitate departure from its downtrodden state could send tremors throughout the financial markets similar to that of May of 2006.
While there are those who argue that today’s highly sophisticated markets may have justifiably produced low volatility or reduced risk premiums or diffused risk concentration among the asset markets to allow for increased capacity to absorb greater leverage, it looks to me like risks have been simply remolded into different forms whose full blown impacts have yet to be seen and felt.