RGE on Philippine Rice Crisis

RGE Monitor recently posted a synopsis on the Philippines rice crisis entitled “Philippine Rice Shortage: A Homegrown Crisis?” on in their “SPOTLIGHT ISSUES”.

Listed below are some of the litany of sins (focusing mostly on internal problems; highlight mine) + my comments.

RGE: “Despite being an agricultural economy, Philippines turned into world's top rice importer (esp. long grain) after Marcos' deposition in 1986. Other rice shortages occurred during Spanish colonial era and US occupation.

RGE: “Rice shortages had common cause: Public policies encouraging production of crops for export rather than local demand

My comment: Previously depressed prices of rice prodded government to encourage this policy; still the unintended impact of regulations.

RGE: “Other internal causes of current rice shortage:

RGE:- “trade barriers that tighten rice supply - high import tariffs (50%) paid to NFA (National Food Administration) by private sector rice distributors/retailers, ban on private importation

My comment: subsidies always cause distortions

RGE:- “landlords convert agricultural land for non-farm use to avoid govt's land distribution program

My comment: When investments to the agricultural sector become a losing proposition then it is natural for landowners to diversify. This represents more of an effect and an aggravating circumstance.

RGE:- “low productivity due to poor irrigation, poor seed and fertilizer technology, higher cost of imported fertilizer due to higher feed and energy costs

My comment: Same premise, low returns equals low incentive for increasing productivity.

RGE - “use of rice as a political salve - subsidized rice diverted to the poor

My comment: Bullseye!

RGE - “uncompetitive local rice industry plagued with monopolies by special interest groups (in and out of gov't), inadequate marketing

My comment: Subsidies bestows undue privileges to favored groups. Here they monopolize the rice trade. And since farmers totally depend on “special interest groups” and the government for sales, market price signals have not diffused to them. Consequently, “special interest groups” control a bigger share of the income at the expense of the producers or farmers.

RGE: “NFA interventions unsuccessful at stabilizing rice prices”

My comment: Touché!

Rice Crisis: The Superman Effect And Modern Agriculture

``Everyman who hoards does it for his own protection; yet by hoarding he aggravates the very condition that started his fear.”- Irving Fisher in “Booms and Depressions”

The “superman effect” intensifies as governments around the world step up interventionist measures.

Aside from throwing of more taxpayer money and other market distortive policies as a stopgap to the ongoing rice shortage, the arrest of so called “hoarders” a.k.a economic saboteurs becomes one good political photo op- the portrayal of government in action or the superman effect in motion- of course, coming at the expense of private property.

Where government fails, we the citizenry pays.

Calls for even more subsidies, an end to liberalization, extension of agrarian reform and disallowing imports by leftist groups is like closing the barn door when all the horses have left. From a hindsight perspective, everyone seems to know how to resolve this predicament, especially in using public funds, yet none of them seems to have foreseen this.

Although like the rest of the commodities from oil and energy to precious and base metals to other agriculture products, the story of the rice crisis is principally an offshoot to the seeds of global monetary inflation and its accompanying imbalances and the overinvestment-underinvestment cycle mainly underpinned by the unintended consequences following years of massive government manipulation of the marketplace.

This noteworthy observation from Professor Michael Pettis of Peking University's Guanghua School of Management wrote, ``Inflation is not just a Chinese concern, of course. It seems to be a rising problem around the world, especially in countries that intervened regularly in the currency markets to promote mercantilist export policies. This is more evidence, I think, that my theory that the recent policies among several developing countries, aimed at protecting them from the threat of another Asian-Crisis-style meltdown, may have simply transformed one kind of balance sheet mismanagement into another kind. In their determination to protect themselves from one kind of unstable balance sheet, they seem to have constructed a different, but equally unstable, kind of balance sheet.” (underscore mine)

Prescribing more interventionist palliatives is like giving more alcohol to an alcoholic; it will satisfy the temporal desires of the inebriate, but worsens his physical condition.

Remember, land is a constant factor. So, while subsidies may serve as panacea, the impending crop substitutions emanating from the incentive shift from these policies will mean possible shortages of other crops or other items/produce that depends on land for output in the future.

One may argue that at least such measures may not be as politically destabilizing or that the opportunity costs won’t be politically sensitive in nature, but for us these suppositions signifies imprudent assumption. The impact from these asymmetries will be seen later, perhaps through other channels or through output changes and whose political implications are likely to be unanticipated.

Modern Agriculture Requires Market Pricing Efficiency

Yet, decades of “self sufficiency” programs have not met their desired goals primarily because the efficiency of price signals has not permeated into the marketplace via productive capital investments.

Domestic farmers have not been able to increase productivity and output and manage risk because they have been entirely dependent on middlemen and traders or the government (through the National Food Authority) for price information and as exclusive buyers of their produce, thus have been shielded from the market pricing signals as discussed last week.

An organized commodity futures market would have been a primary conduit for such price mechanism transmission, which soberly said, we don’t have. Thailand’s Agricultural Futures Exchange is one such example of a productivity enhancement for its farmer constituents.

Figure 1: IMF Weather Derivatives: Strong Growth

If developed countries have utilized futures and derivatives markets to hedge for ‘weather conditions’ shown in Figure 1, example CME’s weather derivatives and Weekly weather futures, why shouldn’t we provide our farmers financial sophistication through risk management market facilities which should enable them to increase productivity and output, reconfigure the present inefficient trade structure and to even provide for insurance?

Just to give you an idea on weather derivatives, this from IMF (highlight mine), ``Weather derivatives offer a way for producers vulnerable to short-term fluctuations in temperature or rainfall to hedge their exposure. Exchange-traded contracts are typically linked to the number of days hotter or colder than the seasonal average within a future period…Weather derivatives are now complemented by weather swaps and insurance contracts that can be used to hedge adverse weather and agricultural outcomes. Governments in some lower-income countries (for example, India and Mongolia) now offer crop and livestock insurance as a way to protect their most vulnerable farmers. Ethiopia pioneered drought insurance in 2006.”

In short, profits or incomes by both farmers and investors alike can be optimized while inversely mitigating losses by the use of such sophisticated “price based” financial instruments without the needless involvement of added taxpayer funds. Greater productivity ensures adequate supplies. This is the modern approach to develop the agricultural sector over the long term.

Fiscal Impact of Subsidies

Last week we excerpted from a leading newspaper an estimate of the food component to the Philippine Consumer Price Index as only 13.5%. Apparently this turns out to only account for select items, and not the broader food basket as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Financial Times: Unbalanced Diet

From the Lex column of the Financial Times (highlight mine), ``In the Philippines, a country that spent years turning round its fiscal deficit, the rice subsidy is expected to reach $520m this year, according to the Asian Development Bank, about 1.5 per cent of state spending. Indonesia will cough up a whopping $2.2bn for food subsidies – about 3 per cent of expenditure – according to the ADB, almost three times the size of earlier estimates. These subsidies add an estimated 0.4-1.7 per cent to the fiscal deficit as a percentage of gross domestic product in the Philippines, Indonesia and India (including off-budget items). If sustained, the measures will dent fiscal balances and raise the spectre of higher funding costs for governments. This will be most painful for countries already forking out on big fuel and fertilizer subsidies, such as Indonesia and India. There are other drawbacks. Most worrying is inflation – the very beast governments are seeking to tame.”

As the chart shows the Philippines appears to be the most price sensitive to food (see right chart) in the region with over 40% share of the CPI, thereby subjecting us to higher security and political stability risks. The series of attempts to pour taxpayers money to the present crisis seems to be a desperate reaction out of fear and another act of political survival.

A Possible Strain To the Philippine Peso

As the Financial Times observed, subsidies will pose as an additional burden to the country’s balance sheets and weigh on the fiscal conditions (which have seen a marked improvement-see left chart) that could lead to increased financing costs at the expense of the business climate. All of which could signify a strain on the performance of the Philippine Peso.

Again this is to emphasize that the Peso’s performance will be relative to the degree of social spending by the country whose national currency the Peso is compared to.

For instance, while Asia and emerging markets are trying to address the heightening political risks from rising food prices by increasing regulations and restrictions on food aside from massive subsidies, the US is undergoing the same process of imposing more regulations and providing of more subsidies (monetary and administrative) but aimed at alleviating or cushioning the economy from a risk of depression and from a financial meltdown.

So while both countries are engaged in currency debasing (protectionist) programs, they represent distinct political objectives.

Thus, the divergent scale of the interventions in support of these objectives will likely determine the relative price values of their currencies.

Higher Interest Rates and More Currency Arbitrage?

Likewise, we are told by the administration that despite the drastic and dramatic increase in expenditures to meet such contingencies, they will try to “balance the budget”.

This implies sacrificing other parts of social spending such as prospective infrastructure investment programs. This diversion of funds is likely to negatively impact the country’s economic growth prospects.

Figure 3: Asianbondsonline.com: 2 and 10 years Local Currency Yield

With consumer price inflation rising to its fastest pace in 20 months to 6.4% from last year (which we have been expecting), present monetary settings brings us deeper into a negative real rates.

As we have repeatedly said, negative real rates will likely trigger more speculative activities as the search for the alternative monetary function of “store of value” intensifies. This further reinforces more “inflation” within the domestic economic and financial system.

So we may likewise expect the domestic central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), to raise policy rates to keep up with rising treasury yields (falling bond prices) see figure 3.

Otherwise maintaining present rates amidst surging consumer price could lead to negative real rates across the entire yield curve, which should further aggravate the opportunity costs of holding cash.

On the other hand, rising yields could lead to resurgent foreign capital portfolio flows predicated on currency yield spread arbitrages or carry trades.

It is a wonder; could last week’s reemergence of foreign capital flows into the Phisix, the largest since the last week of December 2007, signal the return of foreign capital? While it would be hasty to interpret a data of one week as a future trend, these developments are certainly worth the look.

Global Liquidity’s Impact To Food; Divergences Between Stocks and Commodity Prices

``The gold standard makes the money's purchasing power independent of the changing, ambitions and doctrines of political parties and pressure groups. This is not a defect of the gold standard; it is its main excellence." - Ludwig von Mises, Human Action
Yet, global liquidity continues to impact the real economy.

Figure 4: Brad Setser Dollar Reserves versus US Current Account Deficit

Figure 4 from Brad Setser exhibits how world foreign exchange dollar reserves growth continues to explode to the upside as global central banks, broken down into emerging markets (green), industrial economies (yellow) and total reserves (blue line) continue to heavily accumulate US dollars in excess of the US current account deficit (red dotted line). This signifies the tremendous flow of global liquidity even amidst the ongoing credit crunch in the US and in other parts of the world.

To quote Brad Setser, ``The basic story of 2007 is that central banks were buying more of everything.” (highlight mine) The increase in emerging world’s share of global reserves, more purchases of euros, pounds and other currencies but importantly more dollar purchases which dwarfed all.

The point is that the massive surge of global forex reserves appears to flow into commodities or that the commodity spectrum has been functioning as the “lightning rod” in absorbing the flush of liquidity generated by global central banks.

Yet, all is not equal in the world of commodities. Hard assets have clearly outperformed the stock prices of companies engaged in them as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 US Global: Hard Assets versus Paper Assets

Stock prices of natural resource companies have been weighed by sentiment, forced selling and investor redemption as investors worldwide pulled out nearly $100 billion of equity funds during the first quarter despite better earnings prospects.

Eventually when the turmoil subsides we should expect a return to reality. ``The value of resources equities will eventually catch up to the underlying commodities, so we believe this divergence creates an excellent opportunity for investors to acquire natural resources stocks at bargain prices” wrote Evan Smith of the Global Resource Fund.

Once again, the commodity cycle is a long process shaped by repeated government’s attempt to control the marketplace. Such distortions eventually surface through the disequilibrium in the demand and supply equation which gets to be reflected in prices as seen today.

Earlier it had been manifested through rising oil and energy prices. Next, precious metals and industrial metals caught up. Today, it has spread to “food” or agricultural or soft commodities. Will a US Dollar Crisis be next?

This also means that all attempts to restrict trade will ensure an extended crisis. With marginal global reserves at the lowest level since 1976 and where several countries are reportedly joining the fray to secure grain supplies in Africa as Liberia, Nigeria Senegal and Ivory Coast (Financial Times), rice prices continue to climb to the stratosphere (guardian.co.uk).

Thus any form of disruption (such as unexpected climate changes) could further exacerbate today’s shortages.

Philippine Mining: Supply Shortages Will Draw Investments

``You can observe a lot by watching.” Yogi Berra

Recently an article downplayed the sanguine picture of the Philippine mining industry. It attributed the drab outlook to emerging investor’s qualms over “Land ownership disputes, communist and Muslim insurgencies and bureaucratic red tape” as main reasons why resource based investors are having second thoughts on the Philippines.

The main fallacy with the argument is that the so called obstacles have been nothing new; they have long existed even long before the commodity boom. The fact that the present thrust by the government to reinvigorate the sector should signify as welcome news; even when confronted with some political resistance.

Next, the cited alternative venues to the Philippines have almost equal risks measures, be it in the context of political stability, red tape or cost of doing business. For instance going back to Figure 2 Vietnam is second to the Philippines in terms of price sensitivity to food. This implies of a marginal difference in the risk potential relative to political stability.

Third, figure 6 should validate the veracity of claims of meaningful alternatives.

Figure 6: US Global Investors: Copper Inventory with 3-4 days of global demand

With global reserves of copper at a hairline thin 3-4 days of demand, this posits that copper stocks have been in a chronic shortage and continues to deteriorate sharply which is reflected in current prices. In short, record sky high prices have yet to incite an equal response to supplies enough to stabilize or depress prices.

Yet, investments to increase reserves have been conspicuous see figure 7…

Figure 7: US Global Investors: Mining Deals Review

but mostly in deals which involves global mergers and acquisition.

According to US Global Investors (emphasis mine) ``PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd. released its latest Mining Deals 2007 publication. In it, PwC says that the merger-and-acquisition records set in 2007 are poised to continue in 2008 due to increased vertical integration in the industry, as well as Chinese, Russian and Indian companies assuming larger roles each year.” This means that global resource based companies have been doing less exploration which could imply limited access to areas for exploration.

Thus, we find it strange for an article to articulate on the availability of potential replacement sites as premise to the cynicism to the industry’s potential. Instead the major risk faced by the industry, in our view, is the rise of a populist leadership which may opt to retard the industry by prohibition edict or via nationalism. But that would be tantamount to shooting ourselves in the foot.

Of course, as we mentioned copper prices is just off from its recent peak, but is presently knocking at the doors of a fresh landmark high in prices.

Figure 8: Kitco.com: Base Metal Index

Nonetheless, it is not just an issue of copper; figure 8 shows the Kitco base metal index trading sideways following a huge bullmarket stretching from 2003 to mid 2007. Yet, like copper, stockpiles of lead and zinc are near historical lows.

Moreover, the economically recoverable reserves of lead, tin, and copper could be depleted within the next 25 years if their extraction expands at current rates, says Lester Brown of the Earth Policy. This means that unless a substitute for copper is found, the current pace of consumption would lead to severe shortages in the future. And severe shortage leads to high prices enough to cover the costs of undertaking a high risk project profitably.

So where there are real shortages, there isn’t much of an option.

The Shadow Banking System

A diagram of the simplified structure of the Shadow Banking System according to Hervé Hannoun of the Bank of International Settlements…

Missing Rallies or Catching A Falling Knife?

The recent stock market activities has stimulated the urge for some to consider today’s rally as a possible turning point -that some of us may harbor the feeling of “missing the train”.

First, we do not have the power of clairvoyance as to really know when the market bottoms or peaks out. We do not also know where the short term market path will go, simply because we can’t read the emotional impulses of every market participants.

Even if my first lessons in the stock market had been in technical or chart reading, I eventually discovered that these are not foolproof, entirely depends on past performance (pattern and signal reading), and is a tool mainly utilized by brokers who are itching for trading churns and not measured risk reward output.

The chart above shows that during this bearmarket cycle, rallies have been significant (see ellipses) or V-shaped but they tend to give them away as the tide reverses.

New York Times’ Floyd Norris: For Stocks, It’s the Wild West, East ...

Can today mark the bottom? Maybe or maybe not. My impression is that for as long as the world markets continue to track the developments in the US and forced liquidations represent a significant driving force weighing down on global markets (see volatility chart from NYT's Floyd Norris), then a major bullish run on our markets or to any stock markets elsewhere will likely remain suspect.

Second, the important lesson I learned about the market is to understand the interplay of different cycles and try to project on how these are likely to impact prices of assets or securities and thus allocate portfolio according to our risk profile.

Yet looking at the how regional and other contemporary markets have performed none of which has yet revealed signs of conspicuous decoupling. All of them, World Index, Emerging Markets and Asia ex-Japan continue to manifest downside action and bias.

So regarding risk, a downside bias could still be the dominant driver, although global monetary conditions and idiosyncratic fundamentals may support or cushion the decline of individual markets.

My point is: to hinge on the idea of missing a train ride is tantamount to catching a falling knife.

We simply shouldn’t believe in “missing rallies” today simply because different cycles seem to converge and point towards greater downside risks than a precipitate recovery. Remember, bearmarkets draws in hopes of investors until they capitulate.

If a decision has been made to enter the market today, then the expectation should be geared towards the longer horizon since the risks is likely tilted towards more potential downside actions or the risks of a portfolio going underwater. For me, trying to bottom fish or picking market tops is a game of vanity.

We should get aggressive when the trend suggests of a complete reversal. This is like paying for an insurance premium, by buying high because they are likely to go higher and importantly because the risks are likely to be reduced.

Thus, conservative portfolio exposure and allocation is best recommended.

How Surging World Rice And Food Prices Could Impact the Philippines

``Some argue rather forcefully that we’re now immersed in “debt deflation.” I understand the basic premise, but to examine double-digit growth in Bank Credit, GSE “books of business” and money fund assets provides a different perspective. To be sure, our Credit system continues to provide sufficient Credit to finance massive Current Account Deficits. And it is this ongoing flow of dollar liquidity that stokes both indomitable dollar devaluation and global Credit excess. Many contend that inflationary pressures are poised to wane as the U.S. economy weakens. I’ll suggest that inflation dynamics will prove much more complex and uncooperative. There is further confirmation of the view that the bursting of the Wall Street finance Bubble will have a significantly greater impact on asset prices than on general consumer pricing pressures.”-Doug Noland, End of the Era, PrudentBear.com

The Philippines once again hit the world headlines.

However, this time it is not due to its intense infatuation with “personality based politics” but for driving up prices of rice to milestone record highs as the world’s biggest buyer of grain.

The projected deficit or shortfall in the national stock level of the primary food staple has prompted the national government to drastically react by suddenly tapping into the world markets where it has been reportedly trying to secure some 1.8- 2.1 million tonnes from Vietnam and Thailand (Financial Times).

Figure 1: Ino.com: CBOT Rice futures at Record High

This week rice futures surged by over 30% (see Figure 1) to set fresh record levels at the Chicago Board of Trade. And this has been equally reflected in global rice benchmarks.

According to the Financial Times, ``Thai rice, a global benchmark, was quoted yesterday at Dollars 760 a tonne, up 30 per cent from the previous daily quote of about Dollars 580 a tonne, according to Reuters data. But some traders said the jump was not as steep, adding that Thai rice had already hit about Dollars 700 a tonne this week.

``Rice prices have doubled since January, when the grain traded at about Dollars 380 a tonne, boosted by strong Asian, Middle Eastern and African demand, and tight exportable supplies across Asia, according to the US Department of Agriculture.” (emphasis mine)

Nonetheless, rice relative to other major agricultural commodities is the least traded in the world since most of the major rice consuming countries are close to or have reached self-sufficiency levels. It is reported by the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) that annually “only 7% of the world’s production is traded across international boarders”.

That was then.

Price Inflation’s Accelerating Momentum

The dynamics are quickly changing.

Supplies are rapidly being depleted around the world. According to the Financial Times, ``Global rice stocks are set to fall this year to about 70m tonnes, the lowest level in 25 years and less than half the 150m tonnes held in inventories in 2000.”

Figure 2: The Economist: A Reversal of Long Term Declining Prices on Supply

Following 6 out of eight years where demand has surpassed supplies, inventories as measured by the stocks-to-use ratio has fallen to a precariously low level similar to that in 1976 with roughly over 70m tonnes of reserves at a time when population was about a little over 4.1 billion compared to today’s 6.6 billion.

Figure 2 from the Economist shows that despite the rising rice production over the decades, the recent price activities imply for a reversal of the long term declining trend, which also appears to reflect stronger increases in demand relative to supply.

Figure 3 from UN’s FAO shows of the world’s largest major exporters of rice.

In FAO’s 2007 Rice Market Monitor it noted that

``The 2007 forecast of global carryover stocks has also been lowered since September by 5 million tonnes to 102.4 million tonnes, which would represent a 1.2 million tonnes drop from opening levels. The expected decline suggests that production in 2007 would fall short of utilization and that drawing from world reserves would be needed to bridge the gap. The expected year-to-year contraction is anticipated to affect mostly the major importing countries, except Indonesia. Although as a group, the traditional exporting countries are foreseen to end their 2007 seasons with larger inventories, much of the increase would be concentrated in China. The situation in the other traditional exporting countries is less buoyant, since Australia, Cambodia, Thailand, the United States and Viet Nam are all anticipated to end the season with lower inventories.” (highlight mine)

Growing demand and production shortfalls have likewise led to major policy changes among nations.

Major exporters as Vietnam, India, Egypt and Cambodia (International Herald Tribune) have imposed restrictions (on a varying scale: Vietnam to reduce exports by 22%, India pegged new prices at $1,000 per ton, Russia imposed export duties) on rice exports. Thailand is yet in public discussion and risks following the same “protectionist” measures.

Next, present shipments are being consummated to comply with the recent contracts entered into by governments through state owned companies, with virtually no private contracts signed. Basically, governments have cornered both the buy and sell side of the trade equation.

So far, all these concerted restrictions have effectively taken off about a third of rice supplies in the international markets, reduced liquidity and thus, have contributed immensely to the ongoing price volatility in the world market.

Political Impact of Rising Food Prices

Figure 4: UN FAO: Surging Food Price Indices

No, this is not entirely about the issue of rice; it is about food in general…and on a global reach.

As you can see in Figure 4, global food prices have been surging almost across the board-as dissected per group (left) and as generally classified (right)- and the momentum of increases has recently accelerated.

Notes the UN FAO, ``In 2007, the FAO Food Price Index averaged 157, up 23 percent from 2006 and 34 percent from 2005. Except for sugar, prices of which declined sharply, international prices of other major food commodities rose significantly in 2007. Dairy, cereals and vegetable oils made the strongest gains, supported by tight supply and demand situation. In December, the food index averaged 184, the highest recorded monthly average since the start of the index in 1990.”

So as the food spectrum appears to be taking the heat from heightening episodes of “price inflation”, recent political events imply “inflation” getting rapidly unhinged in the broader segment of the world.

Since rice is a staple of more than 2.5 billion of the world’s population (mostly in Asia) this has political significance.

Recently riots have erupted around the world in Guinea, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Uzbekistan and Yemen associated with soaring food prices (New York Times). Since rice is also a staple in Africa, small countries as Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Senegal have been suffering from social unrest (Financial Times).

``But food protests now crop up even in Italy. And while the price of spaghetti has doubled in Haiti, the cost of miso is packing a hit in Japan”, reports the CNN.

Meanwhile, sporadic violence in Egypt has prompted President Hosni Mubarak to require the army to “bake” or ramp up bread production (upi.com)! As you can see, desperate problems call for desperate measures.

In 2007, we saw a prelude to this antsy over food such as the "Tortilla Crisis" in Mexico, the "Pasta Protest" in Milan, and riots and stampede in China over cooking oil. Today we are simply witnessing the aggravation of such “food inflation” tensions.

Present And Prospective Policy Responses

Naturally, the typical response to politically charged events by governments is likewise “political” in nature or as we long described- the treatment based solution directed to appease the short term demands of voters or the populace than over structural reforms.

The Philippine government has not reached a point that requires its 200,000 strong military personnel to operate as bakers or farmers, but we are closely getting there.

So aside from the frantic buying in the overseas market to shore up local stockpiles whose import bill is projected to rise to P 60 billion with Php 21.7 billion serving as rice subsidies through the National Food Authority (Philippine Daily Inquirer), the government plans to relax or ease tariffs import duties similar to oil.

Currently tariffs for rice and corn stand at 50% and 40% (!!!), according to the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Imagine the astounding amount of subsidies or “safety nets” granted to our farmers (meant to protect them from external competition) throughout the years and yet they have remained “poor”, uncompetitive and “unproductive”!

The government is also reportedly planning to allow for greater private sector participation for importation and to expand rise production expenditures to US $68.5 billion, while the social welfare services intends to issue rice coupons to the depressed “poor families” sectors of the society (reuters alernet.org). I wonder how many of these “redistribution” goodies would genuinely end up with the needy and not to “poor” relatives and associates of those in charge—of course at the expense of taxpayer’s money.

In addition, for public display of government in action or what I call the “superman effect”-people love to see superheroes rescue the victims (e.g. falling from buildings or emancipation from the clutches of the antagonist/s) and not by the unappreciated preventive actions-aimed against “profiteers”, the government intends to “toughen up” against “hoarding” (Philippine Daily Inquirer). Are we seeing more opportunities for extortion or corruption?

If all these measures don’t meet their desired end, the probable next line of action would be bigger subsidies at the expense of the fiscal conditions, imposition of price caps or ceilings or rationing or forced appropriation of private properties-all of which means more inflationary policies, market distorting measures and more socialism of the marketplace.

All this suggest the prospective impairment of the country’s balance sheets which will all be reflected in our reduced purchasing power. The fate of the Peso will depend on who among the relative currencies would be inflating more. As we have pointed out in the past see February 18 to 25 edition [Surge of Food Prices Presage Armed Conflicts!], rising food prices have coincided with armed conflicts and the rise of tyrants and despots. Could we risk the emergence of a new dictator?

Nonetheless, if there will be any political cause that that could unseat the present administration, it is not from the angle of “truth” but from “hunger”. Thus, expect more rescue packages at the expense of the taxpayer.

Rising Food Prices Is A Complex Issue But Driven By Mostly Unintended Consequences

``What we commonly find, in going through the histories of substantial or prolonged inflations in various countries, is that, in the early stages, prices rise by less than the increase in the quantity of money; that in the middle stages they may rise in rough proportion to the increase in the quantity of money (after making due allowance for changes that may also occur in the supply of goods); but that, when an inflation has been prolonged beyond a certain point, or has shown signs of acceleration, prices rise by more than the increase in the quantity of money... As a result, the larger supply of money actually has a smaller total purchasing power than the previous lower supply of money. There are, therefore, paradoxically, complaints of a ‘shortage of money’.”-Henry Hazlitt, (1894–1993) libertarian philosopher, economist, and journalist; The Velocity of Circulation

We came across an article where a local expert from the academia lectured on the present predicament attributing the crop of problems to “productivity”. We are likewise told that we require “investments” in research and development, the “right” irrigation, “adequate comprehension” of the needs of the farmers to reach a sustainable increased productivity.

While we basically concur with the premise of “productivity” as the root of most economic problems, the fundamental problem of the argument of “productivity” is one of abstraction, similar to politically abused terminologies of “honesty” or “truth”. To quote Ludwig von Mises in Liberalism, ``The concept of productivity is altogether subjective; it can never provide the starting-point for an objective criticism.”

On the surface the “proposed solution” looks so downright simple, easy to address, quite plausible and pragmatic to the point that it does not require an expert to make such prescription. But after all these years, our question remains, if such has been the case then why today’s quandary?

To quote the Economist (highlight mine), ``Robert Zeigler of the International Rice Research Institute, one of the driving forces behind Asia’s 1960s “green revolution” in farming, says that governments are now reaping the results of years of neglecting agricultural research, irrigation and other means to aid farmers.”

From the hindsight, everything looks easily explained. The problem here is the operating belief that current conditions can be sterilized or seen from amongst the limited variables operating under laboratory “cultured” settings.

Besides, given that we "supposedly" know what to do, these experts imply that throwing “tax payers” money to all these supposed problems will resolve the problem. You could add to the above the call for subsidies for higher quality seeds or funding for scientific cross breeding of existing strains of rice, but it seems none of these will be enough. Why?

The fact is the world is not as simple as we may perceive it to be, as there are many unforeseen factors that have contributed to the present environment such as evolving geography or climate dynamics, the intermittent occurrence of plant diseases or viruses, strained water supplies, the loss of arable lands due to natural causes as desertification or to even a sharp decline of Honey Bee population, which have been an instrumental component of pollinating world’s major crop production (sciencedaily.com)!

Knee Jerk Government Policies And Side Effects

Most importantly aside is the unintended effects from government policies.

Since global governments have practically corralled the rice markets, price signals have essentially been distorted. One can’t argue that this is signifies a “market failure” since the global rice markets have now morphed into an exclusive intergovernment activity. The recent volatility of rice prices seems to manifest of such aberration.

Yet, the present measures adopted by governments signify knee jerk reactions and does not guarantee of a sound resolution to the brewing disparity.

Governments reacting via the "superman effect" have now opted to either conserve its resources by closing its markets (for exporters) or by throwing vasts amount of taxpayers money to secure its desired outcome (for importers), without the necessary structural reforms. More protectionism and socialism would consequently lead to more resource allocation imbalances. All band aid remedies may temporarily alleviate pressures, but exacerbate or even extend the day of reckoning when it materializes. It is not the question of if, but when.

The fact that the Philippines have shielded its farmers with towering walls of tariffs over the years, which have not improved their lots (they are still marching on the streets!), seem to represent sufficient evidence of government policy failures. This has kept the incentives away from investors (remember capital investment would come from either private investors or you the taxpayer) who our expert say ought to have invested in the industry (R & D, irrigation, “aid to farmers”, high quality seeds etc…).

Since the Philippines has no organized market platform for its agricultural produce (commodity spot and futures market/s) that could have instituted pricing efficiency or delivered price signals enough to generate whether a given line of production is profitable or not, or a means from which to determine the profitable redistribution of resources to the areas in need, or a coordinative function of prices across the production and consumption structure, the present system still depends on the old traditional ways reliant on the functioning ‘cartels’ for financing and distribution, and kept our farmers in poverty bondage despite the so-called safety nets.

With inadequate infrastructure, the lack of price signals, limited access to financing, and deeply embedded ‘cartelized’ system (apparently the main beneficiaries of the subsidies), who in the right mind would invest or plunk capital into a losing proposition? Moreover, the depressed prices of the past years further worsened these conditions (see figure 2 earlier).

This is not an insulated development though, the aggregation of collective government policies aimed at providing so-called safety nets via subsidies, have induced the cycles of overinvestment and underinvestment. The agricultural subsidies of US, the Common Agriculture Policy of Europe and the rice subsidies of Japan have had an important hand in the present disequilibrium of supply and demand.

Moreover, recent mandate to promote the use of biofuels such as the US Energy Policy Act of 2005 have spurred meaningful impact to global agricultural prices.

Mr. Kevin Kerr for the Daily Reckoning makes this noteworthy comment on the unforeseen impact of the recently enacted law (underscore mine),

``Then the political light bulb came on – dimly, but it came on. The idea was to turn a key staple of our food supply (corn) into fuel and thus create a panacea for the energy problem. This was a miracle, right? Wrong. Ethanol is nothing new; it has been around since cars first rolled out of Detroit. Ethanol from corn comes at a very high price. Not only does it require several steps to turn corn into ethanol, but it requires acres more of land, fertilizer, fuel, water, etc. At the end of the day, the only thing that widespread ethanol use is doing is destroying more of our natural resources while perpetuating the myth that we are doing something about our energy problem. It’s almost criminal…

``It has become so absurd that farmers are becoming careless, throwing aside less-profitable crops like cotton and wheat.

``In addition, being overlooked are prudent farming methods like crop rotation and not growing corn on corn, or the process of growing a different crop the year after you grow corn in a particular field. The environmental statistics are staggering, too.

``In Wisconsin, for example, local rivers and tributaries have been dropping rapidly due to all of the extra water consumption - millions and millions of gallons.

In short, subsidies have fostered a seismic shift of activity towards these mandated crops at the expense of other agricultural produce. Reduced acreage allotted for other crops have diminished supplies which have caused higher prices for the latter. Moreover, the lack of prudent farming methods are likewise contributing to inferior yields and the inordinate usage of water, which has been turning out to be a long term strain on agricultural productivity (or lesser future output).

Moreover, monetary policies have had a substantial impact to the price of commodities. As we have long argued negative to low real rates tend to stimulate the public to seek a substitute “store of value” in lieu of a currency which it perceives to be losing purchasing power (or buys less quantity via higher prices).

Figure 5: Jeff Frankel: Commodity Prices and Real Interest Rates

Mr. Jeffrey Frankel provides us with the empirical evidence, see Figure 5, of how real interest rates are strongly correlated with price directions of commodities. This alternative explanation from Frankel (highlight mine):

``The theoretical model can be summarized as follows. A monetary expansion temporarily lowers the real interest rate (whether via a fall in the nominal interest rate, a rise in expected inflation, or both – as now). Real commodity prices rise. How far? Until commodities are widely considered “overvalued” — so overvalued that there is an expectation of future depreciation (together with the other costs of carrying inventories: storage costs plus any risk premium) that is sufficient to offset the lower interest rate (and other advantages of holding inventories, namely the “convenience yield”). Only then do firms feel they have high enough inventories despite the low carrying cost. In the long run, the general price level adjusts to the change in the money supply. As a result, the real money supply, real interest rate, and real commodity price eventually return to where they were. The theory is the same as Rudiger Dornbusch’s famous theory of exchange rate overshooting, with the price of commodities substituted for the price of foreign exchange.”

We have earlier been suspecting that some asset class would benefit from the recent monetary developments. Could soaring rice prices signify as the elected “store of value” for the Filipinos?

By and large, this phenomenon has not been unexpected to us, since we have been saying all along the inflationary pressures will continue to mount and reflected in disparate ways as governments inflate the system to avert a financial storm.

Possible Market Implications

What this means to markets?

It means agriculture and resource based industries remain as compelling investment themes for as long as governments will undertake socialistic tendencies to inflate the financial system to serve its political objectives.

As earlier discussed, distortive monetary policies coupled with increasing administrative regulations are likely to entail unintended effects that would be manifested in the market prices of commodities.

Moreover, demographic dynamics such as urban migration and infrastructure development will further add strains to the present disequilibrium aside from the ongoing global wealth redistribution process.

Yet, there could be other factors such as changes in weather and other imponderables that may elevate this progression in spite of the deflationary chapter in some industrialized economies.

Figure 6: US Global Investors: Share of Food in Headline CPI Inflation

On the negative side, higher food or commodity escalates the risk of social unrest which ups the security and political risks dimensions for investors; especially in least developed countries, where a high percentage share of Food relative to headline inflation as shown in Figure 6 courtesy of US Global Investors, may destabilize the peace and order situation or elicit the recurrence of dictatorship rule.

In addition, more social safety nets are likely to threaten fiscal discipline and wreak havoc or impair the balance sheets of national governments as the future need to pay off present subsidies by more taxes grows.

Since most governments will be undertaking currency debasement programs, the currency that debases least will likely rise, but all paper currencies will most probably fall against tangible or hard assets.

The relief is that the food basket of the Philippines CPI such as rice, meat, corn and flour comprise around 13.5 percent of the CPI basket, according to the central bank (Philippine Daily Inquirer).

Given the recent predicaments, the present leadership is faced between the perils of the proverbial devil and the deep blue sea.

Groping For A Market Bottom

Many have been calling for a market bottom.

A market bottom, according to Economist’s Market.view can be identified by the following signs (highlight mine):

``Bear-market bottoms usually require three things. First, they require the existence of forced sellers, to have driven prices down rapidly. Secondly, they offer some clear appeal on valuation grounds. Third, they need a catalyst, an event which, while gloomy, might conceivably mark the worst moment of the crisis.

That’s the way it has been in 2003, observes Market.view,

``All the requirements were in place in early 2003. Pension funds and insurance companies had become forced sellers of equities for solvency reasons. The dividend yield had risen sharply from its pitiful level during the dotcom boom; in the UK, it was higher than the yield on government bonds for the first time since the late 1950s. Finally, the onset of the Iraq war proved the catalyst, perhaps due to the sheer relief that all the uncertainty was out of the way. Equities duly rallied, sharply.”

Today, there are some signs of the reemergence the same pattern. According to Market.view,

``And there is a plausible case for saying all three elements are in place this time. Not, however, for equities but for investment-grade corporate debt. First, there have been forced sellers; notably hedge funds and specialist vehicles like conduits. Second, spreads over government bonds seem to offer a return that compensates for a very high level of defaults. Third, the collapse of Bear Stearns could conceivably mark the worst moment of the crisis.

And importantly, global fund managers who are overweight cash are at extreme levels, possibly indicative of a looming reversal, adds market.view (emphasis mine),

``Sentiment is also pretty gloomy at the moment, usually a bullish sign. According to Merrill Lynch’s monthly poll of fund managers, a net 42% of asset allocators are overweight cash, a record level. Since slightly more are underweight equities than bonds, that might suggest the stockmarket is a better bet. However, it is hard to argue that there have been forced sellers of equities; shares have held up rather better than corporate bonds. And equity valuations are only decent by historical standards, rather than compelling, even if one discounts the fact that profits are high relative to GDP.”

While it may possibly be true that the present levels of cash could serve as a contrarian indicator, the chart of global money managers who are overweight cash (in %), courtesy of the Economist and Merrill Lynch plus the S & P 500 weekly by bigcharts.com, appear to indicate otherwise-- that bear markets have, in the past, sucked out excess cash from global fund managers- from which the bottom has been marked by low levels of fund managers with available cash!

Since "Bear markets descend on a ladder of hope", maybe this attracts the phenomenon called the catching of "falling knives" or "bottom fishers" deplete their cash levels.

This also means that mere sentiment may not precisely reflect inflection points because general market trends can lead to protracted sentiment excesses. This noteworthy excerpt from Dr. John Hussman,

``Presently, the level of advisory bullishness is not much below where we would expect it to be, given the market decline that we've observed. That's often the case early in bull or bear markets. High bullishness in early bull markets is typically not a negative, because the initial advance is generally very powerful. Likewise, high bearishness is typically not a positive early in bear markets, because the initial decline is often fairly deep.” (emphasis mine)

Barry Ritholtz observes of “rampant bottom callers” or of many articles declaring to an end to the “bear” market or a market bottom.

These are likely to instead signify the “Denial stage” of the psychological cycle operating within the markets as shown above.

Besides, the present rally seems to be in reaction to the gamut of Central Bank measures; US Federal Reserves expanded TAF or the TSLF, the 75 bp cuts, reduced reserves of GSE to expand mortgage acquisition, Fed bypass of lending procedures the activation of depression era laws to “salvage” Bear Sterns and BoE and the ECB’s liquidity provision and more, aside, from the technical oversold conditions.

The notion is that all these measures will be sufficient panaceas to the present problem. We doubt so.

What’s more, today’s forced selling seems to be a function of liquidity induced problems borne out of some material insolvency within the financial industry. The peak of forced selling would most probably occur once the ‘critical mass’ of losses surface, which is not likely to be anytime soon.

Of course, valuations matter- that’s why we see some selective opportunities. But gains of the past will possibly not be repeated this year; you’d have to have a longer horizon aside from positioning defensively.

As for an event driven catalyst, this can possibly be seen only from the hindsight.

As a reminder, market trends or cycles are long drawn out processes and not simply one or two time events.