Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Quote of the Day: Why socialism is evil

This is why socialism is evil. It employs evil means, confiscation and intimidation, to accomplish what are often seen as noble goals — namely, helping one’s fellow man. Helping one’s fellow man in need by reaching into one’s own pockets to do so is laudable and praiseworthy. Helping one’s fellow man through coercion and reaching into another’s pockets is evil and worthy of condemnation. Tragically, most teachings, from the church on down, support government use of one person to serve the purposes of another; the advocates cringe from calling it such and prefer to call it charity or duty.
This is from economics professor Walter E. Williams from an article at the LewRockwell.com

Japan’s NIkkei Rockets 3.3% as Bank of Japan Promises More Kool Aid

As I told you this isn’t your granddaddy’s stock market as the foundations of today's financial markets have been erected from credit steroids.

Proof? Japan’s Nikkei 225 catapulted by 3.3% today!

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Why?  Because the government, particularly the Bank  of Japan, promised more free lunch money in the prospects of a faltering economy from the fading effects of Abenomics.

From the BBC.
Japan's central bank, Bank of Japan, has expanded two key lending programmes to try to boost economic growth.

It has doubled the size of one facility to 7 trillion yen ($68bn; £41bn) and said banks can now borrow twice as much money at low rates as previously under the second programme.

The central bank also extended the expiry of both schemes by one year.

The move comes just a day after Japan reported disappointing growth numbers for the October-to-December quarter.

Its gross domestic product rose by 1% on an annualised basis during the period, much lower than analyst forecasts of an expansion of close to 2.8%.

The weaker than expected data had raised questions on whether Japan's recovery - triggered by a series of aggressive stimulus and policy moves over the past year - can be sustained.
Japan's government now seems deeply worried that the declining "high" impact from BoJ's earlier flooding of monetary steroids, will be aggravated by the coming consumption tax hike this April which is from 5% to 8%. So they throw in more of the monetary punch bowl. 

Ironically the expected onrush to spend prior to a hike in consumption tax has hardly generated a "front loading effect" as Japanese consumers remain reluctant. This plus the unimpressive GDP announced a few hours back may have prompted for the BoJ action.

This shows how fragile Japan's financial conditions are, such that Japan too can serve as an aggravating factor to a global black swan event.

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Look at how the USD-Yen responded to the announcement, USD-yen soared. 

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The rising Nikkei 225 (green line) has so far been tightly correlated with a falling yen (blue line) and vice versa. 

So betting on the Nikkei can be seen as a proxy to betting against the yen or vice versa. Said differently, currency traders have now donned the jacket of stock market speculators and vice versa.

And you thought that stock markets has been about corporate fundamentals and the economy eh?

More on this possibly during the weekend.

Video: F. A. Hayek on J.M Keynes: Keynes Knew Very Little of Economics, Economics was just a sideline to him

In the following interview, the great Austrian economist Friedrich August von Hayek makes his comments on mainstream economic deity, John Maynard Keynes' knowledge of economics. Hayek has been a personal friend and an intellectual rival of JMK. 

F. A Hayek opens with a strong criticism of Keynes who he says "knew very little of economics"(0:10), except that Keynes concentrated (or tunneled on) "Marshallian economics". 

Hayek further says that despite being one of the most intelligent thinkers he has ever known "economics was just a sideline for him" (2:28). Hayek said that Keynes wanted "to recreate the subject".

Hayek further noted that Keynes "knew very little of 19th century economic history" (0:22) whose understanding had been guided by "aethestic appeal" although paradoxically Keynes "hated the 19th century".

Hayek also noted that Keynes was never interested in the theory of capital (4:28), was "very shaky on the theory of international trade" (4:32) although Keynes was "well informed on  contemporary monetary theory but even there did not know such things are Henry Thornton or Wicksell" (4:37) and Keynes only read French where the "whole German literature was in accessible to him" (4:48)

Interesting.

(hat tip Mark Thornton Mises Blog)

Will a Mises Moment Occur in China?

Here is a bizarro comment/report of the day.

From Bloomberg: (original)
Record new credit in China in January may help Asia’s largest economy maintain momentum amid government efforts to rein in risky lending
From same article but updated to look complete
China’s aggregate financing, the broadest measure of credit, climbed to 2.58 trillion yuan ($425 billion), the central bank said Feb. 15, spurring optimism the economy will maintain momentum amid government efforts to rein in risky lending.
Push credit to NEW record levels will “rein in risky lending”? Give more alcohol to alcoholics will remove alcoholism?  

A more sensible report from Reuters

First the stock market rally…
China's stock market began January heading in the same direction it went in 2013, when it posted one of the world's worst performances, but on Monday it ended with a year-to-date gain for the first time in 2014.

The turnaround comes as investors see signs of support from the central bank and take advantage of a lighter month of new listings. Other emerging markets have recovered as well, though some continue to lag behind.
Next inundating the system with steroids…
Banks are finding it easier to obtain the short-term loans that are critical to their operations, a shift that has improved sentiment among investors over the past month. A benchmark for the cost of short-term loans among banks, the weighted average of the seven-day repurchase agreement rate, stands at 3.86%, down from 4.36% Friday and 6.59% on Jan. 20, the height of a brief wave of panic that swept China's banking system at the start of the year.

The lower rates came after the Chinese central bank channelled a large amount of cash into the financial system to prevent a repeat of a severe crunch seen in June.

Further evidence of looser monetary conditions emerged on Saturday, when official data showed Chinese financial institutions lent far more than expected in January. Banks issued 1.32 trillion yuan ($217.6 billion) of new loans, compared with 482.5 billion yuan in December, according to the People's Bank of China. The country's banks typically lend more aggressively at the start of the year than at the end, so increases are common, but the January total was also well above the 1.07 trillion yuan in new loans recorded a year earlier.

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Chinese stock markets has been celebrating the RECORD steroids as shown by the recent spike in the Shanghai Composite. Will more steroids be coming so as to fuel the SSEC higher?

We learn too that Chinese resident investors have become more discriminate, picky or selective and cautious with regards to fixed income placements as bond spreads between investment grade and lower grade issues widen

From another Reuters report: (bold mine)
Unlike in mature markets, where a AA rating is considered strong, investors deem anything below AAA in China to be weak.

The spread between high- and low-risk borrowers , according to Thomson Reuters benchmark curves, has widened to a 21-month high of 105 basis points now, from around 70 bps in mid-2013, when China's money markets suffered a short lived liquidity squeeze that sent tremors well beyond its borders.
"Short lived" in the face of growing credit tremors? "Short lived" when government uses bigger and bigger intensity of liquidity injections? I doubt it.

So prior to the New Year, the Chinese government conducted a bailout. After the New Year, the Chinese government extends a subsidy (another bailout?) to a politically privileged sector.

Yet will the two interventions be enough to stabilize China’s markets? Or will the Chinese government have to employ serial bailouts in increasing frequency in order to keep the China’s highly fragile financial markets and economic system from falling apart?
Reports indicate that the second delinquent shadow bank trust, the Jilin Province Trust, is in the process of also being bailed out. The said Trust have financed the same beleaguered company that prompted for the first “trust” or shadow bank bail out of 2014.
Negotiations are ongoing over the return of funds to investors in the product created by Jilin Province Trust Co Ltd and backed by a loan to a coal company, Shanxi Liansheng Energy Co Ltd.
Interesting no? Will bailouts become a weekly affair?

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Record credit infusion has substantially brought down rates of 7 day repo. Yet how long will the effects of the steroids last? A month or a week or two before new credit issues emerge? 

You see the problem isn't liquidity, the problem is the sustainability of the heavy debt yoke which has not only brought about rising rates that increases the burden of debt servicing but also credit quality issues. Liquidity signifies only a symptom of the disease. So in effect, the actions by the Chinese government to inject liquidity has been meant to buy time.

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Record cash injection seem hardly to impact yields of China’s 10 year sovereign.

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Curiously even the Chinese currency (against the USD) the yuan has been weakening from the start of the year. Are these signs of capital flight?


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And record cash injections seem to have only INCREASED the probability of default as measured by 5 year CDS.

So will the Chinese government continue to inject RECORD after RECORD of credit to produce short term “stability” in the hope the debt nightmare might go away? Or has the Chinese government been playing a financial Russian Roulette?

The Chinese government should heed the wisdom of the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises whose warnings have become resonantly valid in the case of China. (bold mine)
Because the effects which the inflationists seek by inflation are of a temporary nature only, there can never be enough inflation from the inflationist point of view. Once the quantity of money ceases to increase, the groups who were reaping gains during the inflation lose their privileged position. They may keep the gains they realized during the inflation but they cannot make any further gains. The gradual rise of the prices of goods which they previously were buying at comparatively low prices now impairs their position because as sellers they cannot expect prices to rise further. The clamor for inflation will therefore persist.
But if the Chinese government will continue gamble with with sustained record injections of credit and liquidity then we might see a “Mises moment” in China.

Again the great Mises.
But on the other hand inflation cannot continue indefinitely. As soon as the public realizes that the government does not intend to stop inflation, that the quantity of money will continue to increase with no end in sight, and that consequently the money prices of all goods and services will continue to soar with no possibility of stopping them, everybody will tend to buy as much as possible and to keep his ready cash at a minimum. The keeping of cash under such conditions involves not only the costs usually called interest, but also considerable losses due to the decrease in the money’s purchasing power. The advantages of holding cash must be bought at sacrifices which appear so high that everybody restricts more and more his ready cash. During the great inflations of World War I, this development was termed “a flight to commodities” and the “crack-up boom.” The monetary system is then bound to collapse; a panic ensues; it ends in a complete devaluation of money Barter is substituted or a new kind of money is resorted to. Examples are the Continental Currency in 1781, the French Assignats in 1796, and the German Mark in 1923.
If the Chinese government continues to inject record after record liquidity this may prompt for a "crack up boom" as described above, yet if they decide to withhold liquidity then there will be a massive deflationary (property and stock market and eventually economic) bust. The Mises Moment. The effect from the current trend of political actions, of trying to buy time from markets to clear, looks headed in such direction

Has the falling yuan been a sign? Have recovering gold prices been indicative of such buildup of stress behind the scenes in China?

Oh by the way, ASEAN currencies staged a very remarkable rally yesterday in the face of severely oversold conditions. The question will the rally be sustained?  Or how long with this last?

We live in very interesting times.

Monday, February 17, 2014

Global Markets: How Sustainable is the Recent Risk ON?

From Risk OFF suddenly to Risk ON. 

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Most of global stock markets led by the US went into hyperdrive mode.

Some bulls have come out of their hibernation to aver “you see I told you, forex reserves, floating currency, low NPLs neatly did the trick. And this has been all about ‘irrationality’”. Of course, I will keep pointing out—the so-called financial market ‘irrationality’ represents a two way street, because such involves the base human impulses of both greed and fear. Bluntly put, fear can be irrational as much as greed. However, any idea of a one directional bias for irrationality signifies in and on itself “irrational” logic

A mainstream foreign report even implied that the “short-lived” emerging market woes have passed. I can’t agree to the notion that 7 ½ months of Emerging Market volatility represents a “short” time frame period. Neither can I reconcile how the repeated ON and OFF volatilities over the same period equals the conclusion that EM troubles have passed.

EM guru Franklin Templeton’s Mark Mobius, for instance, flip flopped for the second time in 2 weeks, earlier by noting how EM selloff will “deepen” to this week’s “probably nearing the end of this big rush out of emerging markets.”[1]

Such seeming state of confusion from the mainstream signifies desperation to resurrect the boom days underpinned by cheap money.

Yet has the current rally been really indicative of the end of the EM selloff? Or has this been the proverbial calm before the storm or the maxim “no trend goes in a straight line”? Or a stock market lingo—a dead cat’s bounce?

Nonetheless as I keep pounding on the table, we should expect “sharp volatility in the global financial markets (stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies) in the coming sessions. The volatility may likely be in both directions but with a downside bias”[2]

Acute market volatilities represent a normative character of major inflection points whether bottom or top. Incidentally since the present volatilities has been occurring at record or post-record highs of asset prices particularly for the stock market, then current volatility logically points to a ‘topping’ formation rather than to a ‘bottoming’ formation.

Severe gyrations tend to highlight the terminal phase of a bull market cycle. Again in whether in 1994-1997 or in 2007-2008, denial rallies can be ferocious to the point of expunging all early bear market losses but eventually capitulate to the full bear market cycle[3].

The bottom line is that stock markets operate in cycles and that the best way to play safe is to first understand the cycle and ride on the cyclical tide.

China: Stocks Soar as Default Risks Escalates

Let us examine why global stock markets resumed a risk ON scenario this week. 

Take China, the Shanghai Composite celebrated the first week of the year of the wooden horse with a blistering 3.5% run.

Monday’s ramp was allegedly prompted by the extension of subsidies by the Chinese government to automakers[4]. Incidentally one of the beneficiaries of the extended subsidies to automakers has been BYD Co., an automaker with investments from Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. More signs that Mr. Buffett once a value investor has transformed into a political entrepreneur.

Moreover, this one week stock market blitzkrieg has partly been an offshoot to the Chinese government’s rescue of a troubled shadow banking wealth management ‘trust’ product worth 3 billion-yuan ($496 million) at the near eve of the New Year’s celebrations[5].

So prior to the New Year, the Chinese government conducted a bailout. After the New Year, the Chinese government extends a subsidy (another bailout?) to a politically privileged sector.

Yet will the two interventions be enough to stabilize China’s markets? Or will the Chinese government have to employ serial bailouts in increasing frequency in order to keep the China’s highly fragile financial markets and economic system from falling apart?

How about reports where six trust firms which has 5 billion ($826.6 million) loan portfolio to a delinquent coal company have been in danger of default[6]? The debt exposure by the six trust firms account for 67% more than the size of the one recently bailed out by the world’s largest China’s state owned bank, the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd (ICBC).

The Reuters’ report adds that another trust, Jilin Province Trust Co Ltd, with exposure to struggling coal company Shanxi Liansheng Energy Co Ltd have failed to pay off “763 million yuan in maturing high-yield investments it sold to wealthy clients of CCB (China Construction Bank)”.

Ironically this is the same coal company with which the ‘first’ bailed out trust firm has exposure to. Has Jilin Province Trust’s debt payment delinquency been in the hope for a bailout? Will other creditors with exposure to the same coal company follow suit?

So has the pre-New Year bailout of the ICBC sponsored Trust firm exposed to Shanxi Liansheng Energy, opened the Pandora’s box of the moral hazard of dependency on government life support system? Will shadow banks resort to defaults or threats of defaults in order to be bailed out? Should we expect a wave of bailouts? How will the Chinese government pay for all these?

Yes while foreign currency reserves of the Chinese government tabulates to a record high of $3.82 trillion at the close of December 2013, as proportion to shadow banking debt this represents only half of $7.5 trillion based on JP Morgan estimates[7] and one fourth if based on the estimates of the controversial former Fitch’s analyst Charlene Chu[8]

And this is just the shadow banks. Of course not every shadow banks will fail, but the point is how deep will a potential contagion be? This is some dynamic which I think no one has a clue.

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Aside from tremors from the shadow banks, private Chinese companies who lack implicit guarantees from the government have either postponed or canceled debt issuance. The Zero hedge reports[9] 9 companies who recently backed down from raising $1 billion worth of debt.

Moreover, Chinese non-performing loans (NPL) have been racing higher for the 9th consecutive quarter to the highest level since the 2008 crisis.

As you can see, the Chinese NPL experience demolishes the false notion that falling NPLs are free passes to bubbles. Credit bubbles implode from their own weight or from rising interest rates or from a reversal of confidence by lenders. In China’s case, rising NPLs are symptoms of the hissing overstretched credit bubble which has been transmitted via higher consumer price inflation and rising interest rates.

The growing risk of debt default, shrinking access to credit and rising NPLs are troubling signs of rapidly deteriorating China’s credit conditions. Yet these are signs of stability?

Even the China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has been cognizant of the growing risks of debt defaults. As quoted by Bloomberg[10]:
China’s central bank signaled that volatility in money-market interest rates will persist and borrowing costs will rise, underscoring the risk of defaults that could weigh on confidence and drag down growth.

“When the valve of liquidity starts to tame and curb excessive credit expansion, money-market rates, or the cost of liquidity, will reflect that,” the People’s Bank of China said in a Feb. 8 report. “The market needs to tolerate reasonable rate changes so that rates can be effective in allocating resources and modifying the behavior of market players.”
Meanwhile China’s banking regulator, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, in the face of rising concerns of defaults has ordered some small financial institutions to “set aside more funds to avoid a cash shortfall” according to another Bloomberg report[11].

As you can clearly see, the Chinese government has been preparing for their financial Yolanda.

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Moreover, the Chinese government dramatically infused money into the financial system last January based on the latest PBOC data where the Zero Hedge observed, “this month's broad liquidity creation was the largest monthly amount in China's history!”[12]

China’s infusion of a tsunami of liquidity, where China’s loan creation (left window) totalled $218 billion in January while total social financing (right window) spiked by $425 billion has essentially dwarfed the $75 billion by the US Federal Reserve and the $74 billion by the Bank of Japan.

Why the gush of government sponsored loan creation-total social financing in the face of rising risks of defaults? Has the Chinese government been forced to play the debt musical chairs in the recognition that a stoppage in credit inflation would extrapolate to a Black Swan event[13]

All these represents newfound stability and a conclusion to the EM sell off? All these are bullish reasons to bid up on stocks? Will ASEAN or the Philippines be immune to a potential debt implosion?

Or have the recent spurt in China’s stocks been signs of communications (public relations/ signalling channel in central bank gobbledygook) management by Chinese government aimed at creating a financial Potenkim Village in order to assuage creditors?

As risk analyst, I’d say good luck to all those who believe that “this time is different”.

US Stocks: Fed’s Janet Yellen Gives Go Signal for More Stock Market Bubble

How about US stocks?

US stocks sprinted for the two successive weeks expunging most if not all of the earlier losses. As of Friday, the S&P 500 knocks at the door of new record highs.

The melt up in US stocks began the previous week when the ECB made a “teaser” to further ease by suspending sterilization in March.

As a side note, this week the enticement for more easing came with a report the ECB has been “seriously considering” negative overnight bank deposit rates[14]. This may have also compounded on the frenzied charge by US-European stock market bulls.

Europe’s stocks have been on a blitz. But ECB’s overture for more easing reveals of the stagnation of Europe’s real economy. 

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Europe’s economic stagnation has been reflected on corporate earnings. Forward revenues of European stocks have been in a steady decline since 2012.

Ironically, European stock markets seem to see heavenly bliss from such negative streak of earnings.

Such parallel universe exhibits why this has hardly been your granddaddy’s stock markets.

Central bank policies have transformed financial markets into a loaded casino (backed by central bank PUT or implicit guarantees) where people mindlessly chase yields with the singular aim of jumping on the stock market bandwagon financed with a deluge of credit money and rationalizing such actions by shouting statistics, regardless of their relevance.

Moreover, the unimpressive US job data whetted on the speculative appetite of the Pavlovian momentum chasing crowd. 

Bad news in the real economy has been good news for Wall Street. Why? Because Wall Street expects subsidies provided by the US Federal Reserve to them, via zero bound rates and asset purchases charged to the real economy, to continue.

In terms of present policies, this implies that the Fed’s “tapering” may be truncated.

Bad news in the real economy is good news for Wall Street has been one of this week’s main theme.

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Retail sales fell most since June 2012 blamed mostly on the “bad weather”. Revised data showed that retail sales slumped also even in December but at a lesser degree[15]. So this has hardly been about bad weather or that bad weather represents a convenient rationalization for the stock market meltup.

The chart from Businessinsider reveals that core retail sales has been in a downtrend even as retail employment has been rising[16]. Yet how will a sustained fall in retail sales continue to finance retail employment?

Most importantly factory production dropped most since 2009[17] again blamed on the bad weather.

So the unexpected declines in factory output, jobs and retail sales, which not only translates to sluggish economic growth but may even reinforce on each other, have been seen as bullish for stocks by Wall Street.

This reveals how central banking policies have been driving a wedge or a gulf between the Main Street and Wall Street as evidenced by such seeming economic and social schadenfreude, where Wall Street benefit from the sufferings of the real economy. This also means more polarization or partisanship in the political sphere.

Another very significant catalyst for US stock market melt UP has been the debut testimony given by Fed Chairwoman, Ms. Janet Yellen, at the House Financial Services Committee hearing[18].

While Ms. Yellen admits that low interest rate can fuel asset bubbles, she denies that US stocks have been a bubble, where her personal sentiment sent a flurry of bid orders that powered stocks to a frenetic melt up mode.

Ms. Yellen’s admission that low interest rates serves fuel to bubbles…(bold mine)
We recognize that in an environment of low interest rates like we've had in the Unites States now for quite some time, there may be an incentive to reach for yield. We do have the potential to develop asset bubbles or a build up in leverage or rapid credit growth or other threats to financial stability. Especially given that our monetary policy is so accommodative, we are highly focused on trying to identify those threats.
Ms. Yellen’s grants a license to the US stock market bubble…
I think it's fair to say our monetary policy has had an effect of boosting asset prices. We have tried to look carefully at whether or not broad classes of asset prices suggest bubble-like activity. I have not seen that in stocks, generally speaking. Land prices, I would say, suggest a greater degree of overvaluation.
First, admit it and then deny it. Except for land prices, for Ms. Yellen “threats to financial stability” has been anything but relevant to the US. Does Ms. Yellen own a lot of stocks?

As another side note: Contra other central bankers like those from the Philippines, at least Ms Yellen acknowledges that low interest rates “may be an incentive to reach for yield” and thus “have the potential to develop asset bubbles”.

I don’t know which metrics Ms Yellen uses in valuing stocks or measuring credit growth. But the Russell 2000 at 81 price earnings ratio (!!!) as of Friday February 14th close, certainly looks like a bubble from whatever angle.

And that “potential to develop asset bubbles or a build up in leverage or rapid credit growth or other threats to financial stability” has already been present via record net margin debt, and record issuance of various types of bonds e.g. junk bonds, corporate bonds that has been used to finance equity buybacks.

Perhaps the FED may be looking at solely the credit from the banking sector. If so, then such blinders will come at a great cost. Are bonds not financial assets held by US banks?

Yet systemic build up in leverage or rapid credit has been relentless.

The latest financial engineering has been to increasingly use shadow banks via “synthetic” derivatives based on corporate bonds in the face of shrinking liquidity in the bond markets. This novel approach has been meant to hedge on assets or to bet on their performance which according to the Financial Times represents a “dramatic shift in the nature of the corporate bond market”[19].

Moreover equities have increasingly played an important role as collateral for repo trades. From a Bloomberg report[20] “Repurchase agreements, known as repos, backed by equities rose 40 percent during the year ended Jan. 10, according to Federal Reserve data. Rising equity-collateral usage combined with a slide in repos backed by government securities pushed equities share to 9.6 percent of the $1.55 trillion tri-party repo market in January, up from 5.7 percent a year earlier, Fitch said in a report published yesterday.”

This growing moneyness or liquidity yield of equities seem to play right into Mr. George Soros’ reflexivity theory[21] in that “when people are eager to borrow and the banks are willing to lend, the value of the collateral rises in a self-reinforcing manner and vice versa.”

Hence soaring stocks, which leads to increasing values of equity based collateral, feeds on the borrowing appetite of stock market participants. The latter are likely to use proceeds from such borrowing to finance even more equity purchases that would be used to obtain more credit for speculation. Such collateral-lending-price feedback loop mechanism only serves as fodder to a deeper stock market Wile E. Coyote mania.

Manias may persist for as long as return on assets outpaces the cost of servicing debt or upon the sustained confidence of creditors on the capability and willingness of borrowers to fulfil their financial obligations.

If the cost of servicing debt is measured by the actions of the US treasury markets, then we should see how the latter has recently behaved.

Yet the dramatic melt UP in stocks have translated into wild swings in the yields of 10 year UST notes.

Why? Because rising stocks based on intensifying demand for credit tends to push up on yields, while adverse main stream economic data tend to push down yields as economic uncertainty spurs concern over asset selloffs or asset “deflation”.

Yet over the week, yields of 10 year notes climbed 7 bps to 2.75%. This means that the stock market melt UP seem to have bigger influence on the UST markets than the sluggish growth data.

This also means that regardless of what the Fed does (whether they persist on tapering or Untapers) for as long as, or in the condition that the stock market (and real estate) mania persists, yields of USTs are most likely to edge up.

This seems as signs that the US inflationary boom has reached a maturation phase where available resources have not been adequate to finance bubble projects on the pipeline. The entrepreneurial cluster of errors has been based on the misplaced belief of the abundance of savings from artificially lowered interest rates. Such errors are being reflected on rising interest rates and or an up creep of inflation.

Bernanke’s QE 3.0 in September 2012 had only a 3 month impact in the suppression of yields. Since July 2012, yields of USTs trekked higher, but the upside momentum accelerated when Abenomics and the Bernanke’s “taper” was announced in the second quarter of 2013.

This also is one reason why past data can hardly be relied on. That’s because central policies have so vastly distorted the pricing mechanism that has altered the traditional functional relationship of firms, markets and the economy.

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What has driven yields of USTs down of late has been a pseudo meltdown in US stocks. While “bad news is good news” may hinder rising yields, strength in economic data will expedite the advance.

As one would note from the above overlapped charts of the yields of 10 year notes (TNX) and the S&P, over the last 9 months, there seems to be new correlation where yields of 10 year USTs decline ahead of the S&P (green rectangle). And the S&P rallies ahead of the bottoming TNX.

And rising UST yields (higher interest rates) amidst rising asset prices fuelled by massive debt expansion only exacerbates on the Wile E. Coyote momentum which eventually will lead to the Wile E. Coyote moment or what Ms. Yellen calls as “threats to financial stability”.

And all the RECORD credit inflation seems to escape the eyes of an econometric technician like Ms. Yellen who seems to think that all these operates in a vacuum.

Unfortunately blindness leads to Black Swans.














[12] Zero Hedge Spot The Real Liquidity Bubble February 15, 2014


[14] Wall Street Real Time Economic Blog ECB Considers Negative Deposit Rate February 12 2014,


[16] Businessinsider.com Something Has To Give Here February 13, 2014



[19] Financial Times Investors turn to ‘shadow’ bond market February 10, 2014


[21] George Soros The Alchemy of Finance John Wiley & Sons p 23

Emerging Markets: Why Adjustments For Relative Yield Spreads has been Disorderly

Rising yields of USTs will have an impact on the policies of central banks whom has dovetailed their policies with that of the US Federal Reserve configured on zero bound rates

At the basic level, rising yields of USTs will compel for an adjustment in the respective contemporaneous ‘yield spread’ of domestic bond markets relative to the USTs that will get reflected on monetary policies.

What has made the adjustment disorderly, particularly for Emerging Markets has been the overdependence of specific economies on the zero bound regime, principally due to economic growth structured on credit expansion rather than economic reforms.

The relative yield spread adjustments has only exposed on the distinct vulnerabilities of these economies thereby leading to massive outflows.

The idea that the emerging market selloffs has passed days of turbulence neglects the importance of the fundamental relationship between respective pre-Taper/Abenomics ‘yield spreads’ of distinct EM nations with that of the USTs.

I pointed out last week how the direction of the Phisix seems to have found an anchor on the actions of USTs, where each time yields of 10 year USTs close in at 3% this seem to have spurred weakness or a spontaneous selloff in Philippine stocks.

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It would seem that the same relationship holds true for ASEAN currencies. Since September 2013, where the yields of 10 year USTs (TNX, below chart) approached 3%, ASEAN currencies TWICE—particularly the USD-Philippine peso (red orange), US-Indonesian rupiah (orange), USD-Thai baht (green) and the USD-ringgit (red)—suffered convulsions from what should be normal yield spread adjustments.

Moreover, the second episode has led to greater (and not lesser) volatility where all four currencies broke beyond the September 2013 highs. So it would seem misguided to impulsively conclude that the emerging Asia’s woes have been short lived or has passed. Such assumption will have to be premised on a sustained decline of the TNX. However as pointed above, declining TNX has, of late, been accompanied by falling US stocks. And a steep drop in US stocks has likewise had a negative impact on local and regional stock market performance.

It is true that all of the region’s currencies have been rallying during the past two weeks. This has also been accompanied by buoyancy in the region’s equity markets. And again that has been largely because the TNX has dropped steeply. Nonetheless, the lull in ASEAN’s markets may be temporary as TNX has been climbing again (red ellipse). 

Notice that when the TNX peaked in September, the two month of tranquil space permitted the region’s financial markets to somewhat recover. However it is a question if the TNX has found a bottom. If it has, then it means a narrowing of the time span covering the previous peaks of September and December. This may imply that the ascent of the TNX may be accelerate or intensify. A fresh record breakout by US stocks can easily power the TNX to new highs.

Yet the current rally of domestic bonds of emerging Asia has hardly been impressive. Additionally, while regional currencies have bounced back, they are far from the lows of the post September levels. ASEAN currencies are rallying in lesser degree than during the post September lows.

The question now is if the TNX should continue to climb or spike, will the impact be devastatingly larger this time?

Presently even the mainstream has come to notice the recent bout of volatilities has exposed on the price inflation predicament of ASEAN[1]. But the emerging stagflation ogre has been seen as a supply side driven predicament rather than a credit inspired demand side imbalance. Debt exists nowhere in mainstream analysis.

Yet debt has been the anchor of any potential transmission mechanisms for a contagion

For instance, US and European banks have been found to have chased yield by having bigger exposure on EM’s the Fragile Five.

Philip Coggan of the Buttonwood Blog fame at the Economist quotes Erik Nielsen[2]
According to the BIS, US banks’ exposure to the “Fragile Five” increased by 37% to $212bn, while their exposure to the Eurozone periphery declined by 17% to $164bn. UK banks’ exposure to the Fragile Five increased by 29% to $291bn – while their exposure to the periphery declined by 30% to $277bn. German banks expanded their exposure to the Fragile Five by 34% to a relatively modest $69bn – while shrinking their exposure to the periphery by an eye-watering 50% to $354bn. French banks increased their Fragile Five exposure by a modest 15% (to $69bn) – while chopping their Eurozone peripheral exposure by 43% to $514bn. Italian banks doubled their exposure to the Fragile Five – but to a total of just $11bn, while cutting their exposure to the periphery (excluding Italy itself) by 46% to $33bn.  And Spanish banks increased their exposure to the Fragile Five by 26% to $185bn, while chopping their peripheral exposure (ex Spain) by 29% to $105bn.
So mainstream western banks flocked into the Fragile Five when the PIGS crisis surfaced.

And the powerful argument presented by Mr. Coggan has been to debunk the use of accounting identities in denying the above risk. Mr. Coggan writes, “the fragile five got that tag because they have current account deficits, but such deficits require, as an accounting identity, capital inflows. Someone had to lend these countries money so they could buy imports.”

In short behind all the smoke screens thrown by the consensus to defend the status quo via statistical figures and accounting identities, everything else will all boil down to sustainability or unsustainability of DEBT operating under the presence of the bond vigilantes.



[1] Wall Street Journal Real Time Economics Blog, In Asia, Concerns About Inflation Re-Emerge, February 11, 2014

[2] Buttonwood, The money has to go somewhere February 10, 2014