Global Equity Markets: A Complete Recovery or A False Dawn?

``But the fallout from this crisis will be with us for a long time. Stocks are thought to be riskier than bonds and much riskier than mortgage bonds. Those that believed they could automatically make junk bonds safe by "backing" them with assets, be they homes or railroad cars, have been proven wrong. It turns out that the best credits are general obligation bonds based on all the firm's income and assets, not debts backed by dubious assets.”-Jeremy Siegel, Wharton University of Pennsylvania, Why Bernanke’s Critics Have it All Wrong

My apologies for initially posting the wrong chart, I'd like to thank reader Melvin for bringing this up...

The Phisix ballooned by nearly 5% this week, accounting for a dramatic 15% advance in only two successive weeks since it hit new lows last August 17^th.

Many had been seen cheering in the assumption that perhaps the ‘bottom had been found, the crisis had been averted and we are on our way to glory’, as it had been during the past 4 years.

As the previous corrections served as “windows of opportunity” to reenter the market, such occasions proved to be profitable engagements and thus had been programmed into the mindsets of our average investors that history is due bound to repeat itself.

Perhaps they could be right. But we simply couldn’t go along with such views because we understand that past performances does not always produce similar outcomes or we simply can’t be lulled into simplistic generalizations.

As proven by the recent turmoil, today’s financial markets have been closely intertwined. Imagine the woes of some real estate speculators in New York or elsewhere in the US similarly affects the security prices at Philippine Stock Exchange or even potentially the financial conditions of the “real economy” in the form of lending conditions to our entrepreneurs or farmers.

True enough the Phisix recovered a substantial segment of its lost ground as global equities appeared to have “stabilized” as shown in Figure1.

Divergences in Bond Markets and Equity Markets: Who’s right?

But beyond the horizon of the equity markets. the strains from the recent bouts of liquidity seizure or credit squeeze still has not been “normalized”--the very essence that has buttressed the financial markets in its entirety.

Figure 1: Stockchart.com: Recovery or Pause from Bloodbath?

As shown in the chart, world markets, represented by the Dow Jones World Index, at the lowest pane, alongside with the US S&P 500 (main window) manifesting some indications of recovery. Yet, just as global stocks initiated some convalescence, panic buying towards short term 3 month T-Bill US treasuries resulted to a PLUNGE in its discount rate last August 20^th, marked by the circle at the topmost pane.

Today, the short-term US treasury has like stocks, equally recovered some lost footing but still drifts below the breakdown levels.

Mr. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of UK’s Telegraph has an interesting dramatized commentary last August 23^rd (highlight mine),

``Ben Bernanke is looking hawkish to me, given the shock of what happened on Monday when yields on 3-month US Treasury notes plunged at the fastest pace ever recorded, a panic flight to safety that no living trader had ever seen before.

``Why? Because trust had collapsed to such a degree that players with a lot of cash no longer believed it safe to leave wealth in bank accounts, or the money market funds of brokerage companies - (exposed as they are to short-term commercial paper and subprime CDOs). This did not occur after 9/11, or in the heat of the October 1987 crash. Nor did was there such a banking panic in October 1929. (it hit in August 1931). If you think this is of no importance, or that this will pass swiftly, you have a strong nerve.”

Of course, this “flight-to-safety” can also be noted in the US 10-year treasury (seen in pane below the 3-month T-bills) whose yields have been on a DECLINING TREND even as global stock markets remained buoyant (Could the bond markets have presaged the decline in stocks?).

The yields of the 10 year instrument have traditionally been benchmarks of mortgage rates. But in today’s setting, mortgage rates remained high as a consequence to the growing risk aversion towards mortgage-related instruments and the tightening of lending conditions in the mortgage markets, while the 10-year benchmark yields has collapsed.

According to the Shobhana Chandra of Bloomberg, ``The average rate on a one-year adjustable mortgage surged to 6.51 percent, the highest since January 2001, from 5.84 percent the prior week. The rate also surpassed the cost of a 30-year fixed loan for the first time.”

The stampede towards the treasury markets are indications relayed by the bond investors that they expect a SIGNIFICANT SLOWDOWN or at worst a RECESSION.

Professor Gary North explains in his article “RECESSIONS ARE GREAT OPPORTUNITIES” last December why such market reactions are likely to be indicators of such events,

``This oddity appears before every recession. It exists because bond investors are generally a lot wiser than stock investors. They are mainly institutional buyers and rich buyers. They see what is coming earlier than stock investors do. When they see recession coming, they are willing to lock in their money for 30 years rather than get paid a higher rate for money tied up for 90 days. They think rates are coming down. They want to lock in high rates.

``Why should interest rates come down? Because rates fall during recessions. There is reduced demand for loans: fear of debt. There is also money flowing out of the stock market into CD's, T-bills, and simple bank accounts: fear of capital losses. People care more about the return of their capital more than the return on their capital.”

Equity Markets: Walking on Government Crutches

In addition, for last week, the gains from the US broadmarket bellwether the S & P 500 seems to have been bolstered by government led initiatives. Aside from the provision of contingent liquidity by global Central banks, there had been a barrage of jawboning from US authorities (see two arrows in Figure 1).

On Wednesday, following a hefty decline, Fed Chairman Bernanke announced that the FED would “act AS NEEDED to ease the impact of the credit squeeze” and the market almost virtually erased the losses overnight.

Friday was a follow through, but this time with US President Bush promising to respond to the unfolding crisis by helping those “affected” (proposed loosening up on standards from GSEs and allow for refinancing) saying this was not to benefit the speculators but aimed at helping the low income home-owners.

Meanwhile, at the annual FED symposium at Jacksonville Arkansas, its Chairman Ben Bernanke reiterated what it said Wednesday that the Fed ``will act as needed to limit the adverse effects on the broader economy that may arise from the disruptions in financial markets”.

Notice that under today’s circumstances, the global financial markets appear to be TOTALLY DEPENDENT on the actions of Global Central banks. Everyday the market looks for guidance from authorities, without which the market undergoes selling pressure. For instance, the Bush-Bernanke tandem has temporarily provided relief or the cushion required to sustain the US equity markets at present levels.

But financial markets ACT as a discounting mechanism, from which the present messages by authorities UNLESS TRANSFORMED INTO ACTIONS will likely become stale, discounted or ignored from where the risks of a selloff becomes of a larger probability.

In short, the markets expect the authorities to ACT on their promises to resolve the impasse otherwise a selloff becomes imminent!

Put under the previous analogy we used; like drug addicts, today’s market have been anxiously awaiting for requisite substance for them to continue with the party.

In another perspective, it is quite ironic why authorities would have to react to the present turmoil with utmost urgency, when the equity markets have taken a small impact. Consider, despite the present selloffs, the US equity markets remain positive year-to-date; the Dow Jones Industrial up 7.2%, the S & P 500 3.93%, Nasdaq 7.5% and Russell 3000 3.75%.

The answer appears to be premised on the chain of leverage embedded in the present financial system.

Many of the non-banking financial institutions like hedge funds have taken enormous amounts of leverage by as much as 10 times or more for every dollar of capital exposed. For example, a $100,000 position geared 10 times would translate to $1,000,000 in investment exposure--where a 5% gain is magnified into 50% return. That’s when the going was good.

Conversely, when the going gets tough, a 5% loss wipes out 50% off the capital or simply a 10% loss eviscerates all capital from those institutions with a 10 to 1 or more in gearing. Small moves get amplified with margin positions.

Subsequently, losses emanating from such levered positions impair the capability of such institutions to pay or settle with their creditors, who essentially takes a hit through a forcible expansion of the lending institutions’ liabilities and where operational losses mount. To paraphrase a saying, if you borrow 100,000 pesos from a bank, the loan is your problem. But if you borrow 100 million pesos from a bank, the loan becomes the bank’s problem.

In today’s landscape, an overdose of credit is the problem of the financial system.

This is could be ONE possible major reason why regulators have been overly alarmed by the losses from other markets which threatens to diffuse to an equivalent streak of losses in the equity markets.

The Essence of a Fractional Banking Reserve Requires A Bailout of the Banking System!

``From the fact that people are very different it follows that, if we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual position, and that the only way to place them in an equal position would be to treat them differently. Equality before the law and material equality are therefore not only different but are in conflict with each other; and we can achieve either one or the other, but not both at the same time.”-Friedrich Hayek, Austrian economist, The Road to Serfdom

In addition, as discussed last August 13 to 17, [see US FEDERAL RESERVE Is Financial Markets Sensitive!) since the US economy’s core source of financing for its household consumer spending patterns has been the financial markets, we argued that the FED would do everything (“inflationary”--you can name all sorts of programs or rescue packages) it can to avert a crisis.

Another very important aspect which we would like to add in the considering the present predicament is the construct of today’s de facto monetary standard, the US dollar standard.

Such essentially operates under the FRACTIONAL BANKING RESERVE principle as defined by wikipedia.org, ``refers to the common banking practice of issuing more money than the bank holds as reserves. Banks in modern economies typically loan their customers many times the sum of the cash reserves that they hold.”

When we deposit 100,000 pesos to a bank, our expectation is that our deposits will be safeguarded and the bank will pay us 100,000 pesos when we demand it. The unfortunate part is that under the fractional reserve banking standard, on an aggregate basis, “reserves” reflect only a fraction of our accrued deposits, (to our example such bank has only 10,000 pesos!).

The fractional banking principle is actually a “cartelization” of banking industry. The distinguished Murray Rothbard of the Austrian School of Economics in a 1995 describes the present money standard (highlight mine),

``In modern central banking, the Central Bank is granted the monopoly of the issue of bank notes (originally written or printed warehouse receipts as opposed to the intangible receipts of bank deposits), which are now identical to the government's paper money and therefore the monetary "standard" in the country…

``Here's how the counterfeiting process works in today's world. Let's say that the Federal Reserve, as usual, decides that it wants to expand (i.e., inflate) the money supply. The Federal Reserve decides to go into the market (called the "open market") and purchase an asset. It doesn't really matter what asset it buys; the important point is that it writes out a check. The Fed could, if it wanted to, buy any asset it wished, including corporate stocks, buildings, or foreign currency. In practice, it almost always buys U.S. government securities…

``Thus, the Federal Reserve and other central banking systems act as giant government creators and enforcers of a banking cartel; the Fed bails out banks in trouble, and it centralizes and coordinates the banking system so that all the banks, whether the Chase Manhattan, or the Rothbard or Rockwell banks, can inflate together. Under free banking, one bank expanding beyond its fellows was in danger of imminent bankruptcy. Now, under the Fed, all banks can expand together and proportionately.”

Two things to bear mind:

One, today’s highly leveraged non-banking finance (hedge funds, security dealers insurance and pension funds, credit derivative companies, et. al.) reflects on the basic principles of the FRACTIONAL RESERVE Banking standard but have been unsupported by a cartel of Central banks (once again as my premise last week…government policies reflects on the markets and not the other way around) and…

Second and most importantly, as Murray Rothbard asserted, the banking industry as an indispensable conduit of the fiat monetary standard cartel, authorities will ALWAYS contrive actions to bailout the system REGARDLESS of the costs. Abandoning the banking cartel is almost equivalent to a rescindment of today’s fiat money standard. Such is unlikely to happen.

This has been echoed by mainstream economists such as Harvard’s Martin Feldman who on Friday warned of a growing risk of US recession and recommended immediate rate cuts, quoting a report from Bloomberg, ``Lowering interest rates may result in a ``stronger economy with higher inflation than the Fed desires,'' a situation that Feldstein described as the ``lesser of two evils.''

FED RATE CUTS: USE History as a Guide, Not Gospel

``Every crackup is the same, yet every one is different. Today’s troubles are unusual not because the losses have been felt so far from the corner of Broad and Wall, or because our lenders are unprecedentedly reckless. The panics of the second half of the 19th century were trans-Atlantic affairs, while the debt abuses of the 1920s anticipated the most dubious lending practices of 2006. Our crisis will go down in history for different reasons.”-James Grant-The FED’s Subprime Solution

We’d like reiterate our view where policy actions such as rate cuts are no guarantee to the resolution of the imbalances in the US economy, much more to expect the same in the financial markets.

In the words of Standard & Poors’ Chief Strategist Sam Stovall (highlight mine), ``Our advice this time around is, as always: use history as a guide, but not gospel. The rate reduction, in our view, relieved the tension surrounding the credit crisis, but it has not removed the underlying concern surrounding the economy and the stock market.” (The S&P group expects the S&P 500 to end the year at 1510 or 2.44% up than Friday’s)

As a concrete example, the recent series of action like the provision of contingent liquidity, lowering of discount rates and the temporary exemption in the financing of brokers-dealers have not relieved the markets of the present stresses YET.

This from Mish Shedlock (highlight mine), ``There have been some 300+ government initiatives to make housing more affordable and every one of them failed including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The reason they failed is because by promoting housing with tax breaks, cheap loans, the ownership society, etc etc home prices are bound to rise. And rise they did until a blowoff top was reached which is exactly where we are now."

One must be reminded that the recent monetary policies initiated by Mr. Greenspan to prevent deflationary depression have been a structural contributor to the recent credit bubble, whose pain we are today experiencing. Put differently, the temporary efforts to boost economic activities through diverse government policies or interventionism results to the boom bust cycle. These may not happen all at once, but as the Austrians assert, they eventually set in.

Further we’d like to add that aside from finding its roots in the attempt to maneuver and manipulate the markets to meet their desired ends; like clockwork authorities validate our observation that they are REACTIVE in nature to the envisaged problems and employ treatment-based political appeasement measures.

The growing clamor for rate cuts has evidently seen political pressures militate on the authorities, where the need to take action has prompted the Bush-Bernanke tandem to go public with matching rhetoric.

I’d like to quote Nassim Nicolas Taleb anew, ``Everybody knows that you need more prevention than treatment, but few reward acts of prevention. We glorify those who left their names in history books at the expense of those contributors about whom our books are silent. We are not just a superficial race (this may be curable to some extent); we are a very unfair one."

So if one is to expect collective government’s knee jerk measures to resolve on the present fixes, the odds looks likely against it.

But of course, we can’t shut our doors to miracles.

Credit Card Strains and the Austrian Trade Cycle

``The ultimate cause, therefore, of the phenomenon of wave after wave of economic ups and downs is ideological in character. The cycles will not disappear so long as people believe that the rate of interest may be reduced, not through the accumulation of capital, but by banking policy. Ludwig Von Mises On the Manipulation of Money and Credit, p. 139

Figure 2: stockcharts.com: Credit Card Next? Slowing Retail and Financials

We have to admit the recent rebound in the equity markets appear to have lifted the S & P retail index away from its downward path (see topmost panel) as shown in Figure 2. However, it is too soon to say with confidence that the storm has passed.

Meanwhile, the financial index, found at lower pane below the retail index, responsible for 20% of the S&P 500 industry weighting and close to two-fifths of the profits still undergoing the angst from the recent liquidity crunch.

Aside from mortgages, one of the financial channels which US consumers access to support their spending patterns is through credit cards.

This from the Financial Times, ``Credit card companies were forced to write off 4.58 per cent of payments as uncollectable in the first half of 2007, almost 30 per cent higher year-on-year. Late payments also rose, and the quarterly payment rate - a measure of cardholders' willingness and ability to repay their debt - fell for the first time in more than four years.”

Let us not forget that as part of the income flow securitization, where three general features (wikipedia.org) are found—pooling and transferring of receivables, structuring and issuing securities, servicing, allocating payments and monitoring, credit cards constitute an important part of such asset backed securities, usually either as Master Trust or Issuance Trust.

And further deterioration in credit card payment schedules or actualized losses could likely to lead to subprime mortgages-like losses in several financially engineered products. The illiquidity contagion phenomenon is indeed spreading.

In figure 2, both Master Card (main window) and American Express (lower window) have similarly reflected infirmities in share prices. Are they today, telling us of the state of US consumers?

With strains over at the credit markets, the burden grows for the credit market represented by Credit Rating Agencies.

Established rating agency Moody’s President Mr. Brian Clarkson sees an unprecendented bout of illiquidity where in an interview with Reuters (covered by Bloomberg) he says, ``I've been in the marketplace for 20 years ... what we're experiencing is an extreme lack of confidence and lack of liquidity. I have never seen this before," Clarkson told Reuters in an interview. "A lot of it has to do with transparency: it's not clear who owns what."

As we have pointed out in the past, symptoms of transparency, illiquidity, common holder factor problems, crisis of confidence and others are simply reflective of the business cycle underpinned by the credit cycle. The great Ludwig von Mises, describes of the Austrian Theory of the Trade cycle in 1943, which appears to set the tone in today’s economic and financial landscape (highlight mine),

``Once the reversal of the trade cycle sets in following the change in banking policy, it becomes very difficult to obtain loans because of the general restriction of credit. The rate of interest consequently rises very rapidly as a result of a sudden panic. Presently, it will fall again. It is a wellknown phenomenon, indeed, that in a period of depressions a very low rate of interest-considered from the arithmetical point of view-does not succeed in stimulating economic activity. The cash reserves of individuals and of banks grow, liquid funds accumulate, yet the depression continues…

``It has often been suggested to "stimulate" economic activity and to "prime the pump" by recourse to a new extension of credit which would allow the depression to be ended and bring about a recovery or at least a return to normal conditions; the advocates of this method forget, however, that even though it might overcome the difficulties of the moment, it will certainly produce a worse situation in a not too distant future.”

``Finally, it will be necessary to understand that the attempts to artificially lower the rate of interest which arises on the market, through an expansion of credit, can only produce temporary results, and that the initial recovery will be followed by a deeper decline which will manifest itself as a complete stagnation of commercial and industrial activity. The economy will not be able to develop harmoniously and smoothly unless all artificial measures that interfere with the level of prices, wages, and interest rates, as determined by the free play of economic forces, are renounced once and for all.”

Are the Austrians right and we could be facing the inevitable turn of the trade cycle?

How to Prudently Play the Market

``Safety is something that happens between your ears, not something you hold in your hands."- Jeff Cooper, Celebrity (1920-2006)

So how does one today face to the markets?

First we are in deep uncertainty (Knightean uncertainty or incalculable outcome) whether the actions taken by policymakers will have substantial remedial effects to the US markets and the economy or not, a very important driver of global markets today. My bias is towards the latter given my predilections for the Austrian’s perspective.

The markets could continue to rebound in the coming sessions but fall hard if measures taken will be insufficient to mitigate the present circumstances. So a dose of caution is warranted.

Second, to assess on Standard & Poors’ Sam Stovall’s projection (for a yearend target of the S & P 500 at 1510 or 2.44% from Friday’s close) appears inclined towards unfavorable conditions for investing today since markets appear to have interim greater downside than upside prospects (again using the US benchmark as bellwether to global equities and in the assumption that US and global equities would continue to move congruently).

Next, the Economist laid out its cards for a probability scenario where it says that 60% is likely to be odds where the credit crisis would be resolved in a gradual and orderly manner. It weighted 30% for the US to enter a recession while 10% for the world to enter into a “severe economic repercussions…with devastating effect”…a.k.a. depression.

So let us put it in a table and weigh the asymmetric odds and outcomes…

Here we purposely omitted the depression scenario as not to skew the bias towards the pessimists.

Gains are likely to be favorable if we look on this equation from the frequency standpoint.

However, how much is made or the magnitude of the gain or loss is what matters to us, investors.

As such we see that in the above table, the risks side is likely to significantly outweigh the benefits. Or if the risk scenario materializes, it would costs us more in terms of losses (in Pesos) even if it has lesser chances of happening.

So under such conditions a defensive stance would be most judicious, either by raising a significant cash position relative to overall portfolio or to undertake short term “small” or “position-sized” trades backed with stop loss measures (for those with irresistible temptations to tinker with the market).

Now for those who can afford the volatility may close their eyes and stay long because we believe the Phisix should recover and move advance over the long term.

Phisix: Local Investors Take On the Driver’s Wheel; Fed Actions Should Be Bullish Long Term

``The strength of your character comes not from how you react to your successes, of which I know there will be many. The strength of your character comes from how you react to your failures, of which there also will be many, especially if you make bold moves. So, always believe in yourself, persevere, but be willing to adapt.”-Larry Bock, Lux Capital

Now we understand that the Phisix has rallied vigorously from its lows to perk up the hopes of the bulls.

Figure 3: PSE: Peso Volume: Declining Volume

Yet we remain unconvinced since technically the rally has been accompanied by diminishing volume (green trend arrow- red arrows marks the tops) as shown in Figure 3. Such rallies are likely characteristics of relief or clearing rallies coming off from a significant selloff but are unlikely harbingers of interim good news.

Figure 4: PSE: Local Investors: Declining volume but Market drivers

Nonetheless, not everything we see is bad. One thing which surprised us much was the way local investors have been able to engineer a massive rally in the face of foreign selling.

While we have seen intermittent activities led by local investors in the past, the recent streak of gains coupled with its attendant intensity was even more remarkable.

Local investors in the past have been seen driving second and third tier issues, but from the lows of August 17^th, local investors were able to push both index issues and the broader market to garner a 15% gains for two weeks! A first in the present cycle, amazing!

Figure 5: stockcharts.com: Emergent signs of divergences?

Further we saw some seminal signs of DIVERGENCES last week, see figure 5, where the US markets fell hard but the Phisix fell below in degree relative to the US markets (used to be that Phisix would move about 2-3x the performance of the US markets or “Beta”). While the US markets fell Thursday, instead the Phisix moved higher!

This shows how local investors have gradually imbued of the significance of the markets, which in my view is part and parcel for any unfolding bullish cycle.

Anyway we have been long term bulls over the prospects of the Philippine financial markets. And given that a depression is less likely a scenario to unfold, the future actions by the US Federal Reserve will benefit the local markets by establishing a complete divergence or possible decoupling. The flood of money unleashed by the Fed should likely boost the “strong links” in the global financial markets, which this time should be…Asia!

One of our favorite analyst Mr. Louis Gave of Gavekal Research deals with such an outlook (highlight mine)…

``During the Asian crisis, the nadir of the markets involved a number of policy-related events - the Hong Kong government's intervention in its domestic equity market, the bailout of LTCM by a Fed-organized consortium, central bank rate cuts, etc. The central banks took their time in acting (the Asian Crisis started in July 1997, and the rescue did not come until October 1998), since the balance sheets of the Western World's banks did not look threatened. However, once bank shares started collapsing, central banks were quick to act…

`` After the Asian crisis, the extra liquidity injected into the system went into the technology sector, and then into housing (which, at the time, offered strong fundamentals). In the late 1990s, these were the "strong links" in the global financial system. Ironically, 10 years to the day after the Asian crisis, Asia has now become the strong link in the global system. To put it another way, money in Asia to this day is still cheap and plentiful. Following the Fed rate cuts and liquidity injections, money will be even cheaper and even more plentiful. As we see it, this can only have a positive impact on asset prices around the region…

`` The Western central banks' cuts in interest rates and injections of liquidity will force Asian policymakers to make a choice. Will they:

`` Allow their currencies to appreciate against Western World currencies? If this happens, it will mark the final unraveling of the effects of the Asian Crisis, and Asian countries should see the same kind of consumption boom which the Western World experienced between 1997 and 2007.

`` Continue to maintain their currencies at an artificially low level against Western World currencies? To do this, Asian policymakers will have little choice but to print massive amounts of money and run the risk of domestic inflation.

``Either way, it seems to us that investors in Asian assets are today sitting in a very comfortable position. Either, we will see massive currency appreciation and a boom in domestic consumption, or we will witness large liquidity injections which almost ipso facto guarantee a sharp rise in asset prices.”

Short term uncertainty. But long term gains. The Phisix 10,000 in the horizon!

‘Scapegoating’ the Markets?

It’s finger pointing time again! In every crisis there’s got to be a scapegoat, and with the ongoing tremors felt in the global financial markets, the easiest blame always falls to where the stress is evident—the markets.

First, financial markets become the OBJECT OF SCORN for transmitting adversarial conditions to the real economy or to our ‘hapless’ neighborhood folks. Second, markets are DOWNPLAYED FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS to the economy and worst of all, markets are even portrayed as AN ECONOMIC WEDGE to the society’s income class structure!

But do markets really deserve such blame or are these symptoms to other UNSEEN factors glossed over by such commentaries?

The investing public talk today about the US subprime blowout as is if it was a staple; your every morning oatmeal or ‘pandesal’ and coffee on your breakfast table. The notion is that the subprime woes CAUSES today’s market jitters.

In contrast, for us, the subprime imbroglio is only a strain to a deeper structural malaise bluntly dismissed by the mainstream.

Subprime loans are simply loans to people who are less financially qualified or have spotty credit histories. In the US, these imploding subprime papers represent the popping bubble in its housing industry that preceded it. Such instruments were mostly used in the acquisition of assets by the public in the belief that:

1.) monetary conditions would perpetually remain favorable or interest rates would remain always low or

2.) housing prices would continually rise which encouraged speculative “flipping” purchases, which became a vicious cycle even by those who can ill afford to make those regular mortgage payments or

3.) access to these loans to refinance or extract from existing equity to fund lavish lifestyles are immune from economic cycles

In sum, subprime loans were acquired NOT for productive purposes, but either for plain consumption or outright speculation.

Moreover, originators and other lending intermediaries took advantage of the sizzling hot love affair with the Housing boom and engaged the public’s appetite with more adventurous risk taking behavior through a reduction of lending standards.

Nonetheless, this expansive lust for risky assets essentially spread from lenders to investment banks and prime dealers, which packaged and repackaged such securities into highly complex levered forms of instruments, had them stamped with approval by established credit rating agencies and sold to financial institutions (hedge funds, insurances, pension funds, corporate treasuries etc…) around the world, who were then hungry for profits or to those who were eager to match returns with existing liabilities, in a world where rates of returns have diminished.

In short, in boom times risk was conventionally thought to have been “EXTINCT”.

Inflationary Policies and Not Markets are the Culprit to Inequality!

``There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose."--John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919)

Figure 1: InvestU: Subprime Loans Explode from Greenspan Policies!

Now all of these rampant speculation and spendthrift ways wouldn’t have materialized UNLESS CONDITIONS PERMITTED THEM. In the words of Mark Twain, ``A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when the sun is shining and wants it back the minute it begins to rain.”

It is the nature of BOOM CONDITIONS FUELED BY EASY MONEY POLICIES that such risky behavior exists in the first place. We previously discussed the Minsky Model under which credit cycles gradate from CONSERVATIVE “HEDGE” financing to wanton or BLIND GAMBLING (“Ponzi” finance). Or where streaks of successes eventually lead to greed, complacency to risk then evolves to future instability. Such patterns appear to repeat itself anew.

Figure 1 courtesy of Dr. Mark Skouzen of InvestU, depicts to us that as the US FEDERAL Reserves brought their interest rates to a four decade low, subsequently, the toxic subprime instruments ballooned!

According to Dr. Mark Skouzen (highlight mine), ``As Greenspan & Co. lowered the Fed Funds Target Rate from 6% to 1%, banks borrowed cheaply from the Fed window, and invested in risky mortgages. The subprime mortgage market took off like a rocket, from 2% to 14% of all mortgages over a five-year period (2000-2005). In 2003, the year of the great money flood, when the Fed cut rates to only 1%, the subprime lending went from 4% of total lending to more than 10%. That’s in one year!

``But there is no free lunch, as sound economists have warned repeatedly. At some point, the harvest time comes and the wheat must be separated from the tares. This is the crisis stage, where the boom turns into the bust. Now it’s harvest time, and we are weeping the effects of the Greenspan era.”

Oh of course, before we forget, we might add that subprime loans have essentially been BYPRODUCTS of Government Sponsored Enterprises (Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae). These institutional agencies handled most of the mortgage financing deals until they got entangled with accounting issues. This fundamentally paved way for the spawning of Wall Street’s version of Gremlins.

Figure 2 PrudentBear.com: Consumer Debt Exploded On Fed Actions!

A favorite analyst of ours Mr. Doug Noland of the Credit Bubble Bulletin wrote of such evolution (highlight ours), ``Issuance of GSE debt and Agency MBS stalled abruptly in 2004. Yet at that point Mortgage Finance Bubble Dynamics were in full force. After all, Inflationary Biases had taken firm hold in real estate markets across the country and throughout the Wall Street mortgage finance machinery. Indeed, the Street didn’t miss a beat with the hamstrung GSEs. The evolution of market perceptions of Moneyness to include ALL mortgage-related securities encouraged an historic issuance boom in “private-label” MBS and ABS. Wall Street was quite keen to more than fill the GSE void with its own brand of top-rated "structured finance." And flood it they did.”

Figure 2 courtesy of Prudentbear.com reveals that household mortgage debts exploded during the advent of the millennium as the FED undertook its massive “reflationary” campaign to stave off the risks of deflation.

Figure 3: Moneyandmarkets.com: Derivatives Explode Simultaneously with Greenspan Policies!

In addition, financial creativity led to the introduction of innovative instruments such as derivatives. Mortgage instruments were likewise bundled with other debt papers (consumer and corporate debts) into such highly complex structures.

Paul Tucker, Executive Director and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, aptly describes this phenomenon (emphasis mine), ``This is the age of what I call Vehicular Finance. The key intermediaries are no longer just banks, securities dealers, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds. They include hedge funds of course, but also Collateralised Debt Obligations, specialist Monoline Financial Guarantors, Credit Derivative Product Companies, Structured Investment Vehicles, Commercial Paper conduits, Leverage Buyout Funds – and on and on. These vehicles can fit together like Russian dolls. By way of illustration – and, I fear, slipping for a moment into alphabet soup – SIVs may hold monoline-wrapped AAA-tranches of CDOs, which may hold tranches of other CDOs, which hold LBO debt of all types as well as asset-backed securities bundling together household loans.”

In essence, this age of Vehicular Finance has seen an explosion of the opaque derivative markets. Figure 3 courtesy of moneyandmarkets.com, reveals that coincidental with the surge in subprime and other household mortgage instruments, notional derivatives quadrupled in 2006 from 1998, with the gist of its growth coming from the period when the FED undertook its campaign to the flood the world with cheap money!

On the aggregate level, let us now refer to the FED’s Flow of funds to ascertain the pace of debt expansion in the US corporate sector.

Figure 4: Yardeni.com: US DEBTS to the Moon!

In figure 4 courtesy of Yardeni.com, the red line shows the occasion when the FED began its resuscitation campaign.

Here we see, the financial and non-financial sectors accelerated their debt accumulation to the tune of 110% and 215% of the GDP as of the first quarter of 2007!

What a coincidence! The FED cuts rate to historical lows, and consequently the debts markets from both the corporate, finance and consumer levels flew!

Figure 5: McKinsey Quarterly: Global Financial Assets outpace Real GDP!

I have shown you this before. Figure 5 courtesy of McKinsey Quarterly shows how global financial assets have been growing at a nifty clip.

In 2005, global financial assets were about 2.8 times global GDP. Where have the growth sectors been? According to the chart in 1995-2004, the Compounded Annual Growth Rate had been in Equity Securities (9.4%) and Private Government Debt (9.4%)! Government and Private debt accounted for 41% of total financial assets in 2005 and expected to be 44% of total assets in 2010!

Again, this simply shows that the massive amounts of leverages had been a worldwide phenomenon and NOT limited to the US.

Oh, my ramblings and may not be enough though. Well, to add some MEAT to our presentation…guess on who said this?

``American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage"

Well if you guessed former FED Chair Greenspan…then you are right! Bravo! The speech was delivered in February 23, 2004 to the Credit Union National Association meeting where Greenspan EXHORTED the public to go for Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs)….the very problem we see sending ripples to global markets!

And I suppose those who listened to him or heeded his advice should now be asking for his scalp!

What are we then trying to show? In a word….INFLATION!

Celebrated economist Milton Friedman’s famous definition of inflation… “is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”.

Another prominent economist Henry Hazlitt’s explains further (highlight mine), ``Inflation, always and everywhere, is primarily caused by an increase in the supply of money and credit. In fact, inflation is the increase in the supply of money and credit. If you turn to the American College Dictionary, for example, you will find the first definition of inflation given as follows: "Undue expansion or increase of the currency of a country, esp. by the issuing of paper money not redeemable in specie."

Which leads us to ask, who does the ACT of inflating….the markets? Or who is responsible for the creation of the incentives 1) to produce and intermediate credit on a multiplier scale, 2) to relay signals to the business community 3) to setup the conditions for lower lending standards, 3) to allow credit rating agencies to pass off dubious papers as AAA ratings, 4) to exhort consumption binges for the households and 5) to stir up the gambling instincts or go wild on speculative orgies?

Or, perhaps a more germane question should instead be, are the markets simply REFLECTING on the volatility IMPOSED THROUGH it via furtive monetary policies?

Now if some families in New York or in California fail to pay their house bills (for one reason or another) and undergoes foreclosure proceedings which eventually affect our provincial farmer’s access to financing, then who should get the blame? Is it fair then to shoot the messenger?

In Defense of the Philippine Stock Exchange From Political Correctness

Now when markets become an instrument for POLITICAL CORRECTNESS we are compelled to respond.

Where the allegation is…

In rising markets, the rich benefits with a miniscule “trickle-down-effect” to our economy…

In falling markets, the poor ‘non market participant’ gets clobbered by losses transmitted by changes in financial conditions…

While the rich is implied to remain “rich” or “unaffected” by the reversals of financial fortunes…

Of course, the obvious implication here is that the financial markets including the PSE becomes an agent of “inequality”, where gains are limited to a select few while losses ripple across the country.

First, our response on the issue of losses…

In absolute terms, a LOSS is a LOSS is a LOSS…regardless of economic status!

Let us put that in an OBJECTIVE perspective…

In 1997 as we previously described, the Phisix fell by 70% in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis from 3,400 to about 1,000. Then, whether one’s investment was Php 100 million, 1 million or 10,000 pesos, in absolute terms a 70% write off is a loss of Php 70 million, Php 700,000, or Php 7,000 respectively!...

Regardless of how one views the RELATIVE VALUE of money or…

Regardless of the wealthy’s “reserve” status (besides how can we categorize or know about the depth of their vaults?).

What we want to emphasize is that, losses DO NOT DISTINGUISH between people attired in COAT AND TIE or those wearing only tattered SANDOS, SHORTS AND SLIPPERS. Anyway, should there be one?

Second, is the issue of categorization; how certain are we that the “wealthy” dominates stocks investing?

Are we talking of Peso investment volume per capita or the average net worth of the average investor? Does the PSE have a data on such demographic make up?

What's more, investing in the stock market is NOT an exclave reserve for the “rich” since a neophyte or practically anyone from any income stratum can buy stocks for less than P 10,000.

To suggest another angle, what if LOCAL INSTITUTIONS and not retail investors dominate the Peso volume of trades? How does one classify them? Are they still part of the cyclically “immune” much loathed “Elite” brigade?

How about FOREIGN MONEY, are they also part of the complicit team of “inequality drivers” too?

Anyway, RISING markets DOES have the tendency to attract a wide variety of investors, again regardless of social status (one can just look at China.)….

When lower income levels troop into the market, STATISTICALLY you can bring down the averages…oops, remember the Gaussian Curve?

Does a population of more retail investors AUTOMATICALLY EQUATE to “wealthy” class of investors dominating our stock market trades? Not necessarily I suppose...

What we are trying to painstakingly point out here is…unwarranted POLITICALLY COLORED sweeping conclusions have been punctured with a lot of observational biases…

Nicolas Nassim Taleb, in his book Black Swan, the Impact of the Highly improbable, calls this kind of cognitive bias as the ROUNDTRIP Fallacy….

The flawed circular logic goes something like this, “the RICH profits from the STOCK MARKET, the STOCKMARKET is for the RICH”…

Or simply, the UNFAIRNESS of stereotyping!

Where the driver of my broker, invests in the market, I presume that he must also be “Rich”!

The third point is the issue of “market prompted inequality”.

For an economic class to assumingly reap the benefits from a collective activity it implies uniformity of actions, which is hardly the case.

One should realize that being rich and a rising market is NO guarantee of stock market investing success!

We should remember that every security yields a different price and varies in the degree of volatility…

Remember those “Greek” letters in “Alpha”, “Beta” and etc…

Then there are different perceptions and set of actions from different market participants on how to manage their portfolios…

Together these variables combine to facilitate the trades in the stock market.

But like every type of enterprise or even careers, there would always be winners and losers. Of course, rising markets are likely to produce more winners than otherwise and vice versa.

And this equation is UNIVERSAL to the investment spectrum…or in any other entrepreneurial endeavor….

Be it investments in tourism projects, schools, restaurants, computer shops, sari-sari stores, farming, or others.

Under ALL types of markets (financial or otherwise), the accurate anticipation of future events coupled with the corresponding action determines the success of an investor (regardless of economic status), unless the participant is a government sponsored entity such as the hybrid “sovereign wealth funds”.

``Like every acting man, the entrepreneur is always a speculator. He deals with the uncertain conditions of the future. His success or failure depends on the correctness of his anticipation of uncertain events. If he fails in his understanding of things to come, he is doomed. The only source from which an entrepreneur's profits stem is his ability to anticipate better than other people the future demand of the consumers. If everybody is correct in anticipating the future state of the market of a certain commodity, its price and the prices of the complementary factors of production concerned would already today be adjusted to this future state. Neither profit nor loss can emerge for those embarking upon this line of business.”- (highlight mine) Murray Rothbard, the Market, Man, State and the Economy

You see, under such conditions, even the “POOR”, which supposedly is a “victim” of the market fluctuations, can benefit from the stockmarket! One must remember, RISK TAKING IS ESSENTIAL TO WEALTH CREATION! In other words, markets provide the opportunities for ANY SOCIAL CLASS to benefit either from LUCK OR SKILLS, which in itself is a GRAND EQUALIZER.

On the other hand, to even entertain the thought of a “class struggle” presupposes the contrary; the “POOR” CANNOT BENEFIT from the markets. This seems to be dangerously discriminatory since it essentially DENIGRATES their capacity to think (anticipate) or even be lucky. So such assumption is UNDEMOCRATIC and sows the seeds of further INEQUALITY.

This leads us to the final point of our contention: The true source of Inequality.

Putting the blame on the markets for economic inequality is truly unfortunate and strays from the root of the issue.

As we have noted above, inflation is the core to society’s inequalities.

Again let me lengthily quote the illustrious economist Henry Hazlitt, in his book “What You Should Know about Inflation” (highlight mine),

``Inflation never affects everybody simultaneously and equally. It begins at a specific point, with a specific group. When the government puts more money into circulation, it may do so by paying defense contractors, or by increasing subsidies to farmers or social security benefits to special groups. The incomes of those who receive this money go up first. Those who begin spending the money first buy at the old level of prices. But their additional buying begins to force up prices. Those whose money incomes have not been raised are forced to pay higher prices than before; the purchasing power of their incomes has been reduced. Eventually, through the play of economic forces, their own money-incomes may be increased. But if these incomes are increased either less or later than the average prices of what they buy, they will never fully make up the loss they suffered from the inflation.”

``Inflation, in brief, essentially involves a redistribution of real incomes. Those who benefit by it do so, and must do so, at the expense of others. The total losses through inflation offset the total gains. This creates class or group divisions, in which the victims resent the profiteers from inflation, and in which even the moderate gainers from inflation envy the bigger gainers. There is general recognition that the new distribution of income and wealth that goes on during an inflation is not the result of merit, effort, or productiveness, but of luck, speculation, or political favoritism. It was in the tremendous German inflation of 1923 that the seeds of Nazism were sown.”

``An inflation tends to demoralize those who gain by it even more than those who lose by it. The gainers become used to an "unearned increment." They want to keep their relative gains. Those who have made money from speculation prefer to continue this way of making money instead of working for it.”

In other words, subsidies, bailouts (which includes the market’s expected FED cuts (!) or Bill Gross’ suggestion for Fiscal Policy rescue package or Willem Buiter’s proposal for the Fed to act as a “market maker of last resort”), social welfare, wars, price control, dole outs (aids, grants, etc…), taxes or other redistributive programs fundamentally TRANSFER RESOURCES FROM PRODUCTIVE TO NON-PRODUCTIVE activities are inflationary in nature, because they tend CONSUME capital.

Burned capital signifies “SUNK COSTS” from which taxpayers would have to shoulder at the end of the day, despite the other ephemeral options of borrowing and printing money.

Figure 6: American Institute for Economic Research: US Dollar’s Purchasing Power

Figure 6, courtesy of the American Institute for Economic Research reveals of what inflation does to the public—the LOSS OF PURCHASING POWER or it lowers the standard of living for its citizenry!

As an example, the US dollar’s purchasing power plunged by 95% since the FED came to being in 1913 that’s according to the US Bureau of Labor and Statistics. You can check on website’s INFLATION CALCULATOR via the provided link…where $100 today has the same buying power of only $4.75 in 1913!

Figure 7: BSP: Peso-US dollar Rate: The Peso’s Anguish

In the same context, see figure 7, the Philippine Peso’s foreign exchange value relative to the US dollar fell from 2.733 in 1960 to 51.3143 in 2006 (BSP-thanks Vina)! During the same period, the US dollar’s purchasing power lost 85%, which even AMPLIFIES the loss of the Peso’s Purchasing Power! Yet in contrast to the claims where a LOWER PESO will help jobs or the public simply has not been supported by evidence.

By logic, we should have been one of the top exporting countries by now if PRICE ALONE, as reflected by the currency, had been the key measure of success…but where (see Figure 8)?

In practice, as any entrepreneur knows, price, while important, is NOT the only factor that shapes business transactions. Consider labor cost, China’s export might is often attributed to its low labor cost, but this is not entirely accurate, because Africa has even cheaper labor costs, so they should have been the export leaders, but not- because they suffer from other aspects of impairment such as the lack of infrastructure to security to governance concerns which increases the cost of doing business.

So after four decades of peso devaluation which area of trade have we then topped? Yes, you guessed it right again…human exports! Why? Because of our depressed standards of living as a consequence to the enormous purchasing power gap relative to the developed world prompted the LARGE SCALE EXPORT OF OUR CITIZENRY instead of goods of services! Essentially, an arbitrage of income disparities even in the Labor markets!

Figure 8: Yardeni.com: Exports Benefit from Lower Peso?

On the other hand, instead of the increased market share and profits via efficiency and productivity gains aided with lower prices, as our neighbors, what we saw is the opposite: MOUNTING HOMEGROWN INEFFICIENCIES aggravated the loss of competitive edge for our enterprises, which reduced our standards of living, discouraged productive risk taking ventures which thereby brought about the present outbound migratory trends.

The financial markets are to blame? In all 47 years until today, the domestic financial markets remain a small segment of the economy (see below: Stock Market: Boon or Bane to the economy?).

So, again despite the tremendous loss of purchasing power transmitted via the declining PESO-US dollar exchange during the past 47 years, why is it our economy remains uncompetitive and still mired in poverty?

In effect, the issue of inequality is LARGELY an OFFSHOOT to persistent government interventionist activities and does NOT emanate from the markets. The markets or financial conditions simply reflect on such policies, whether internally generated or from external influences.

To quote Milton Friedman anew, “There is no FREE LUNCH”.

Stock Market: Boon or Bane to the Philippine Economy?

``But innovation, in Schumpeter’s famous phrase, is also “creative destruction”. It makes obsolete yesterday’s capital equipment and capital investment. The more the economy progresses, the more capital formation will it therefore need. Thus, the classical economist-or the accountant or the stock exchange-considers “profit” is a genuine cost, the cost of staying in business, the cost of a future in which nothing is predictable except that today’s profitable business will become tomorrow’s white elephant.”- Peter F. Drucker, Profit’s Function, The Daily Drucker.

Admittedly, the Philippine financial markets are small relative to its neighbors, to say the least UNDERDEVELOPED, since we principally rely on the banking system for most of its financing needs, as shown in figure 9.

Figure 9: IMF (2006): The Need to Develop Stock and Bond Markets

It is why the IMF argues that we need to develop our local markets (stocks and bonds) as a vital part of our economic development. Remember, the lifeblood of an economy is the financing sector.

However, to project our market’s past into the future, and use this as basis to censure Philippine markets as some burden to the economy obviously disregards today’s evolving trends.

For instance, we have consistently pointed out that the Phisix, the Peso and its bond markets have closely tracked the movements of world markets. To wit, foreign money has been a principal driver of our markets today. All these suggest to us that our financial markets have been undergoing transitional integration following the “financial globalization” model, which is why we remain structurally bullish on the domestic markets.

Going back to basics; how does a market work?

According to Wikipedia.org, ``A market is a social arrangement that allows buyers and sellers to discover information and carry out a voluntary exchange of goods or services. It is one of the two key institutions that organize trade, along with the right to own property.” In short it is place to conduct exchanges to satisfy one’s needs.

Our community marketplace, where we usually source the food for our daily meals, is a basic example of a functioning market. Here, suppliers of chicken, beef, fish, vegetables and others consumer staples congregate to meet buyers who trade their supplies for money.

Prices of the items traded fluctuate daily depending on demand and supply as well as other factors driving the exchange mechanism (competition, profits etc…). Credit is likewise a part of operations depending on the arrangements of the economic agents.

If such marketplace is indispensable to one’s community, then the financial markets do not DIFFER from its functionality except for the products that it exchanges—financial securities.

Going to a broader perspective, if financial markets are a bane to the economy, then why have economies that have espoused varied degrees of the capitalistic model worldwide, from former communist countries of China and Vietnam, to Eastern Europe as Slovenia or Estonia, to Africa like Kenya or Nigeria or to Latin America as Peru or Costa Rica, necessitate having stockmarkets?

Historically, stock markets around the world have had important contributions to the national economy, let me cite D. W. Mackenzie in an article published at Mises.org (highlight mine), ``Stock exchanges played an important role in the development of the industrial West. Initially, these stock exchanges were informal and unsophisticated. The London Stock Exchange developed in the eighteenth century. The stock market in Amsterdam emerged in the seventeenth century. The financial system of Belgium began in the fourteenth century, but the Brussels Stock Exchange opened in 1801. These early stock markets developed into sophisticated institutions with formal rules. These early stock markets in major cities began to direct capital investment throughout the West and in parts of Asia. Statistical studies indicate that the economic development of Belgium was driven by the development of Belgian financial markets, including the Brussels Stock Exchange. Financial development in Belgium began with the country’s independence in 1830, and was accelerated by the liberalization of the Belgian stock market in 1867. This pattern was paralleled in many nations. Statistical studies show that well-developed stock exchanges have enhanced long-run economic growth, increased capital investment, and raised productivity throughout the industrialized world.”

So in essence, the stock market functions as a channel to REDIRECT SAVINGS into investments or an important part of the capital formation process, it also serves as an ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FOR RAISING OR ACCESSING CAPITAL, it works to PROVIDE LIQUIDITY for company owners as well as for public investors, it LOWERS THE COST of capital, and importantly PLACES PRICE MECHANISM from which the investors values a company or an enterprise.

Stock market investing, unlike the currency markets is NOT A ZERO SUM WIN-LOSE outcome because it has value added components such as dividends, aside from the actual ownership in the company itself.

Allow us to quote more of D. W. Mackenzie (highlight mine) ``Financial markets are important in capitalism because they redirect resources towards the satisfaction of the most urgent consumer demands. As Ludwig von Mises noted “it is above all necessary that capital be withdrawn from particular undertakings and applied in other lines of production … [This] is essentially a matter of the capitalists who buy and sell stocks and shares, who make loans and recover them, who speculate in all kinds of commodities” (Mises 1922 [1936] p121). A study by Borsch-Supan and Romer (1998) finds that competitive financial markets reinforce product market competition by cutting off funds to unproductive companies, but only in the face of competitive threats. Borsch-Supan and Romer also find that government regulation and ownership are important causes of low capital productivity, both directly and indirectly through limitations of competition. For example, the trade protection of the German and US auto industries and Deutsche Telekom enabled these companies to earn high profits, despite low productivity. Many less developed nations are now emulating the West by forming more sophisticated financial markets. One study (Agarwal 2001) of nine African nations indicates that stock exchange development has led to increased economic growth. Another study (Aragarwal 2007) of twenty-one developing nations shows that the development of stock exchanges increases private investment and economic growth. This study indicates that stock exchanges contribute to economic development by stabilizing productivity and liquidity shocks.”

To add, Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, in his latest speech likewise underscored the significance of financial markets development in the age of financial globalization to the national economy (emphasis mine), ``it is no coincidence that the countries—in Latin America and elsewhere—where financial market development has been the most advanced are also those that have been among the most successful economies. The causality runs both ways. As macroeconomic policies have become more credible, and confidence grows that inflation will remain low, demand for financial services increases. As financial markets grow, the availability of credit increases, spurring faster noninflationary growth. And as financial markets become more sophisticated, and risk management and hedging become easier, economies become better able to manage volatility.”

As you can see, for many reasons cited above, financial markets including the stock markets signify an integral part of capitalism, hence the sine qua non presence to any economy that aspires to move up to the ladder of economic prosperity.

It would be better for us to face up with these unfolding trends especially in the light of the massive technological advances which have largely underpinned today’s accelerated integration process.

Denying their significance or restricting our insights to the past paradigms simply leads to misdiagnosis, faulty assumptions and eventually, misleading and unjust generalizations.